Activities of Andreas MÖLZER related to 2011/2156(INI)
Plenary speeches (1)
ECB annual report for 2010 (debate)
Amendments (17)
Amendment 9 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital B
Recital B
B. whereas the average general government deficit in the euro area deteriorated to 6.0% of GDP in 2010 and the average debt burden stood at 85.1% of GDP, up from 0.7% and 66.2% in 2007, respectively, and in comparison to athe debt burden of 101.1% of GDP for the USA and 212.71% for Japan,for the USA which rose from 93.5% to 101.1% of GDP in 2011, while Switzerland’s fell from 56.4% of GDP in 2005 to only 40.1% of GDP in 2010;
Amendment 14 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital D a (new)
Recital D a (new)
Da. whereas the Target2 balances, which permit the financing of current account deficits via the ECB, do not contain any upper limits on the accumulation of deficits in the national central banks’ balance sheets, and whereas Greece, Ireland, Portugal and Spain have by now accumulated EUR 340 billion in Target liabilities vis-à-vis the ECB;
Amendment 19 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital E
Recital E
E. whereas most of the long-term government debt of Greece and Portugal is on the ECB balance sheet and the persistent rumours of Greek debt restructuring maywhereas Greek debt restructuring, justified by structural debt and growth problems, will again delay the ECB’s exit from non- standard measures,
Amendment 26 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1
Paragraph 1
1. Welcomes the fact that so far, the ECB has been remarkably successful in maintaining HICP inflation at close to 2% despiteNotes that the ECB has allowed HICP inflation to exceed 2%, partly owing to a number of macro-financial shocks and volatile commodity prices;
Amendment 33 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 2
Paragraph 2
2. Underlines that, while month-on-month HICP inflation has mostly been above 2% since the beginning of 2010, wthat matters forfuture expectations regarding this figure are a significant aspect of monetary policy, are future expectations, thend that efforts are needed to bring it to a low level of, which are a testimcan only of high ECB credibilitybe achieved through the ECB’s full independence from fiscal actors;
Amendment 57 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 4
Paragraph 4
4. Observes that, despite unitary monetary policy, monetary conditions diverge considerably in the euro area; in countries experiencing turbulence, banks are tightening the availability of credit, with the opposite happening in other countries with a current account surplus; this asymmetry is likely to become even more pronounced if the ECB keeps increasing rates, given the prevalence of loans indexed to short-term interest rates in the former group of countries, while in the latter group of countries the risk of an investment and asset bubble will become acute if the interest rate remains relatively low;
Amendment 67 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 5
Paragraph 5
5. Calls on the Commission to set up a European credit rating foucreate condaition and to evaluate the pros and cons of temporarily suspending credit ratings for countries following an EU/IMF adjustment programmes that will boost competition between rating agencies as well as increasing the number of such agencies;
Amendment 76 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 6
Paragraph 6
6. Welcomes the determination and proactive stance of the ECB throughoutduring the crisis since 2007on the financial markets in 2007 and 2008;
Amendment 86 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 8
Paragraph 8
8. Deplores the fact that hesitation in the management of the crisis by the Commission and the Member States, particularly in those lacking reforms, has triggered the ECB’sthe ECB has taken up a position against restructuring of Greece’s debt;
Amendment 97 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 9
Paragraph 9
9. Notes that, while deleveraging is continuing in parts of the private sector and most Member States (MS), leveraging , leveraging, which is drastically increasing the level of debt in nearly all Member States, is still veryfar too widespread in the public sector;
Amendment 101 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 10
Paragraph 10
10. Notes the rapid evolution of the leverage ratio of the ECB, measured by its capital and reserves in relation to assets; notes that this leverage ratio by far exceeds that of other comparable central banks, with the exception of those having implemented quantitative easing programmes, – which, unlike the purchase of government debt by the ECB, serve a monetary policy management purpose – such as the Federal Reserve or the Bank of England;
Amendment 134 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 14
Paragraph 14
14. Calls on the ECB to put in place in the Security Markets Program a discount rate mechanism that can be adjusted, taking into account whether a certain security is further downgraded by most credit rating agencies and ensuring that the ECB does not end up with too many risky assets; in addition, believes that the ECB should use at least twoconsult all credit rating qualifications before accepting a security as collateral;
Amendment 139 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 15
Paragraph 15
15. Asks for more public information on flows between euro area central banks measured in the Target-2 programme so that these flows are not interpreted as permanently moving from current account surplus countries to deficit countries in order to avoid their financial collapsecan be identified as a temporary substitute for private capital to finance current account deficits, and for clarification that the European Stability Mechanism (ESM) serves to replace this method for financing current account deficits;
Amendment 150 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 16
Paragraph 16
16. Calls for a more integrated macro- prudential policy framework within the monetary policy context, if necessary including differentiated macro-prudential tools in the Union tosupervision of the financial system which is better integrated into the monetary policy context and which takes account ofor differences between the euro area and non- euro area countries; calls for an analysis of the effectiveness of the new financial supervisory architecture and for an evaluation of the option establishing a single European financial supervisory authority, unifying under its umbrella the current European Supervisory Authorities and the European Systemic Risk Board;
Amendment 163 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 17
Paragraph 17
17. Stresses the need forat the creation of a single European minister of Finance in order to coordinate a basic common fiscal policy that could enhance the effectiveness of the eurowith democratic legitimacy could enhance the economical use of the European Union’s existing resources; believes that the democratic legitimacy of such a proposal must adequately be addressed; notes in this sense that in a monetary union, fiscal policy does not only concern the Member States and that the present crisis has shown the limits of 100% decentralised fiscal policies; fiscal equalisation mechanisms seeking to paper over the fundamental structural failings of the European monetary union;
Amendment 181 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 18
Paragraph 18
18. Stresses the need for a single European Treasury to relieve the ECB off its quasi-fiscal role; until that is the case, suggests confining more tasks to the European Stability Mechanism (ESM); regretnotes that, as it stands, the ESM will not operate under Community rules and did not – and was not intended to – acquire the right to purchase government bonds on the secondary market as this would have meant a relief for the ECB in the current circumstances;
Amendment 196 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 20
Paragraph 20
20. Believes that the introduction of eurosecurities may constiat this junctutre the necessary fiscal quantum-leap forward that the Union needs at this juncturewill result in increased incentives to irresponsible national budgetary policies; welcomes the rapid implementation of the feasibility report promised by the Commission in its declaration XXX;