2011/2156(INI) | [ParlTrack]

Motion for a resolution
Recital C a (new)

Ca. whereas rises in actual consumer prices are induced by many factors, among them market structures in real economy, shortages in natural resources and speculative and irrational tendencies in markets;

Amendment 100 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 9 b (new)

9b. Recalls that before the outbreak of the financial crisis, the ratio of public debt to GDP of the euro-area declined in between 1999 and 2007 from 72% of GDP to 67% of GDP and that in contrast, debt levels of households, firms and the leverage of the financial sector experienced a significant increase over the same period; reminds in particular that the household debt in the euro area increased from 52% to 70% of GDP during the same period and that financial institutions debt increased their debt from less than 200% of GDP to more than 250% acknowledges that some Member States such as Greece and Italy were important exceptions to these general trend;

Amendment 101 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 10

10. Notes the rapid evolution of the leverage ratio of the ECB, measured by its capital and reserves in relation to assets; notes that this leverage ratio by far exceeds that of other comparable central banks, with the exception of those having implemented quantitative easing programmes, – which, unlike the purchase of government debt by the ECB, serve a monetary policy management purpose – such as the Federal Reserve or the Bank of England;

Amendment 102 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 10

10. Notes the rapid evolution of the leverage ratio of the ECB, measured by its capital and reserves in relation to assets; notes, however, that by mid-August 2011 the balance sheet has already shrunk by around 10% from its peak; notes that this leverage ratio by far exceeds that of other comparable central banks, with the exception of those having implemented quantitative easing programmes, such as the Federal Reserve or the Bank of England;

Amendment 103 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 10

10. Notes the ~~rapid~~ evolution of the leverage ratio of the ECB, measured by its capital and reserves in relation to assets; notes that this leverage ratio ~~by far exceeds~~is lower than that of other comparable central banks, ~~with the exception of those having implemented quantitative easing programmes,~~ such as the Federal Reserve or the Bank of England;

Amendment 104 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 10

10. Notes the ~~rapid~~ evolution of the leverage ratio of the ECB, measured by its capital and reserves in relation to assets; notes that thise leverage ratio ~~by far exceeds~~cannot be applied to central banks in the same way as it is to commercial banks; notes that the leverage ratio is lower than that of other comparable central banks, ~~with the exception~~and especially of those having implemented quantitative easing programmes~~, such as the~~ (Federal Reserve or the Bank of England), or is similar to it (Bank of Japan);

Amendment 105 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 10

10. Notes the rapid e~~volut~~xpansion of the ~~leverage ratio of the ECB, measured by its capit~~balance sheet of the ECB in October 2008; notes, however, that by mid-August 2011 the bal and reserves in relation to assets; notes that this leverage ratio by far exceeds that of other comparable central banks, with the exception of those having implemented quantitative easing programmes, such as the Federal Reserve or the Bank of Englandce sheet has already shrunk by around 10% from its peak; notes that the increase is in line with other comparable central banks, and is significantly less than those central banks having implemented quantitative easing programmes, such as the Federal Reserve or the Bank of England, which are respectively of 216 % and 200 % as noted by Jean-Claude Trichet in ECON on August 29th 2011;

Amendment 106 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 10

10. Notes the rapid e~~volut~~xpansion of the ~~leverage ratio of the ECB, measured by its capit~~balance sheet of the ECB in October 2008; notes, however, that by mid-August 2011 the bal an~~d reserves in relation to assets; notes that this leverage ratio by far exceeds that of other comparable central banks, with the exception of those~~ce sheet has already shrunk by around 10% from its peak; notes that that the increase is in line with other comparable central banks, and is significantly less than those central banks having implemented quantitative easing programmes, such as the Federal Reserve or the Bank of England;

Amendment 107 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 10

10. Notes the rapid evolution of the leverage ratio of the ECB, measured by its capital and reserves in relation to assets; notes that th~~is leverage ratio by far exceeds that of other comparable c~~ere has been also a substantial evolution in balance sheet sizes of other Central bBanks~~, with the exception of those having implemented~~ having implemented emergency and non conventional liquidity provision facilities, including quantitative easing programmes, such as the Federal Reserve or the Bank of England;

Amendment 108 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 11

11. Points out and welcomes the fact that the ECB balance sheet expansion has not led to inflation, due to its increasing role as a central counterparty between euro area banks, which effectively amounts to a monetisation of bank bailouts, and that the inflation target has consistently remained around the 2% level;

Amendment 109 #

Ramon TREMOSA i BALCELLS, Sylvie GOULARD, José Manuel GARCÍA-MARGALLO Y MARFIL

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 11

11. Points out that the ECB balance sheet expansion h~~as not led to inflation, due to~~ighlights its increasing role as a central counterparty between euro area banks, which effectively amounts to a monetisation of bank bailouts;

Amendment 11 #

Motion for a resolution
Recital D

D. whereas on 10 May 2010, the ECB announced ithat the Eurosystem would intervene directly but temporarily in the euro area public and private debt securities markets through the Securities Markets Programme, the book value of settled purchases of which amounted to EUR 77110.5 billion ion ~~June~~19 August 2011,

Amendment 110 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 11

11. Points out that the ECB balance sheet expansion has not led to inflation, due to its increasing role as a central counterparty between euro area banks~~, which effectively amounts to a monetisation of bank bailouts~~; points out that providing liquidity to solvent banks does not necessarily entail an increase in monetary supply and notes that the non-standard measures are of a temporary nature;

Amendment 111 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 11

11. Points out that the ECB balance sheet expansion has not led to inflation, ~~due to its increasing role as a central counterparty between euro area banks, which effectively amounts to a monetisation of bank bailouts;~~and reflects a temporary shift of intermediation from the interbank market to the Eurosystem as well as an increase in assets which will mature over time

Amendment 112 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 11

11. Points out that the ECB balance sheet expansion has not led to inflation, ~~due to its increasing role as a central counterparty between euro area banks, which effectively amounts to a monetisation of bank bailouts~~and reflects a temporary shift of intermediation from the interbank market to the Eurosystem as well as an increase in assets which will mature over time;

Amendment 113 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 12

12. ~~Restates with concern~~Stresses the overreliance of many euro area banks on the liquidity provided by the ECB, in the absence of a fully functional interbank market; notes ~~with concern~~ the collateral policies of the ECB as regards the amount and the quality of asset-backed securities provided to the Eurosystem as collateral, estimated at EUR 488 billion;

Amendment 114 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 12

12. Restates with concern the overreliance of many euro area banks on the liquidity provided by the ECB, in the absence of a fully functional interbank market; welcomes – though notes with ~~concern~~out some misgivings – the collateral policies of the ECB as regards the amount and the quality of asset-backed securities provided to the Eurosystem as collateral, estimated at EUR 488 billion;

Amendment 115 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 12

12. Restates ~~with concern the over~~the reliance of many euro area banks on the liquidity provided by the ECB, in the absence of a fully functional interbank market; ~~notes with concern the collateral policies of the ECB as regards the amount and the quality of asset-backed securities provided to the Eurosystem as collateral, estimated at EUR 488 billion;~~

Amendment 116 #

Ramon TREMOSA i BALCELLS, José Manuel GARCÍA-MARGALLO Y MARFIL

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 12

12. ~~Restates with concern the overreliance of many euro area banks on the liquidity provided by the ECB, in the absence of a fully functional interbank market; n~~Notes with concern the collateral policies of the ECB as regards the amount and the quality of asset-backed securities provided to the Eurosystem as collateral, estimated at EUR 488 billion;

Amendment 117 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 12

12. Restates with concern the overreliance of many euro area banks on the liquidity provided by the ECB, in the absence of a fully functional interbank market; notes ~~with concern the collateral policies of the ECB as regards the amount and the quality of asset-backed securities provided to the Eurosystem as collateral, estimated at EUR 488 billion;~~that while in 2010 the Eurosystem accepted on average EUR 488 billion of asset-backed securities as collateral, the eligibility criteria for ABS in Eurosystem credit operations have been tightened significantly which leads to a reduction over time of this amount

Amendment 118 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 12

12. ~~Restat~~Observes with concern the overreliance of many euro area banks on the liquidity provided by the ECB, in the absence of a fully functional interbank market; notes with concern the collateral policies of the ECB as regards the amount and the quality of asset-backed securities provided to the Eurosystem as collateral, estimated at EUR 488 billion- proportionality of the demand for Eurosystem refinancing by some euro area banks, in the absence of a fully functional interbank market; notes that while in 2010 the Eurosystem accepted on average EUR 488 billion of asset-backed securities as collateral, the eligibility criteria for ABS in Eurosystem credit operations have been tightened significantly which leads to a reduction over time of this amount;

Amendment 119 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 12 a (new)

12a. Stresses that the Eurosystem has refused to disclose the method used to determine the 'theoretical price' of impaired assets eligible for its liquidity operations in the framework of the Enhanced Credit Support; underlines that it is therefore impossible to verify whether the ECB has played a quasi-fiscal role; demands in this perspective to the ECB to disclose its valuation methods used all along the crisis,

Amendment 12 #

Motion for a resolution
Recital D

Amendment 120 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 12 b (new)

12b. Underlines that given the lack of a proper euro area crisis framework the ECB was pushed to take risks it was not foreseen to;

Amendment 121 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 12 c (new)

12c. Asks the ECB for enhanced transparency of the quality and quantity of securities, included asset backed securities accepted as collateral as well as other marketable and not marketable securities held for monetary purposes and securities not held for monetary purposes;

Amendment 122 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 13

13. Acknowledges the necessity of non- standard monetary policy measures, but calls for athe long-term phasing-out of those programmes ~~as soon as possible~~;

Amendment 123 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 13

13. Acknowledges the necessity of non- standard monetary policy measures~~, but~~; calls for a phasing-out of those programmes ~~as soon as possible~~, the achievement of deepened economic governance and the establishment of an EU fiscal union;

Amendment 124 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 13

13. Acknowledges the necessity of non- standard monetary policy measures, but calls for a phasing-out of those programmes as soon as ~~possible~~the financial markets have stabilised and the sovereign debt crisis has been solved;

Amendment 125 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 13

13. Acknowledges the necessity of non- standard monetary policy measures~~, but calls for a phasing-out of those programmes as soon as possibl~~ and recalls their temporary nature;

Amendment 126 #

Thomas MANN

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 13

13. Acknowledges the necessity of non- standard monetary policy measures, but calls for a phasing-out of those programmes as soon as possible in the context of clear exit strategies;

Amendment 127 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 13

13. Acknowledges the necessity of non- standard monetary policy measures, but calls for a phasing-out of those programmes ~~as soon as possible;~~ provided that a Community framework is established to properly deal with financial instability as well as cross- border banking recovery and resolution framework ;

Amendment 128 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 13

13. Acknowledges the necessity of non- standard monetary policy measures, but calls for a phasing-out of those programmes as soon as possible to be replaced by a more sophisticated and balanced policy of the ECB working with a broader perspective for the economy as a whole;

Amendment 129 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 13 a (new)

13a. Points to the fact that countries that are backed by a central bank with a mandate and the political will to act as a „lender of last resort“ are faced by much lower interest rates to finance their debt via financial markets; reminds in this context that the rise of public debt and deficit in the US, Japan and the UK did not have any considerable effect on the cost of their newly issued bonds in 2010 while in 2011 US and Japanese long term interest rates are even falling to record lows of 1-2 %;

Amendment 13 #

Motion for a resolution
Recital D

D. whereas on 10 May 2010, the ECB announced it would intervene ~~directly~~in secondary markets but temporarily in the euro area public ~~and private~~ debt securities ~~markets~~ through the Securities Markets Programme, purchases of which amounted to ~~EUR 77.5~~129 billion ~~in June 2011~~at the beginning of September 2011; whereas these securities have been bought with a discount,

Amendment 130 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 13 b (new)

13b. Believes that only a strong and credible message to the markets will protect Member States from sudden liquidity stops on the financial markets; believes that the liquidity and lending framework of the ECB can be used effectively and without financial risk to assist Member States facing financial market liquidity shortages; asks therefore the Member States to enable the ECB to act as a lender of last resort or to set up a European Bank for Sovereign Debt linked to the ECB;

Amendment 131 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 14

14. Calls on the ECB to put in place in the Security Markets Program a discount rate mechanism that can be adjusted, taking into account whether a certain security is further downgraded by most credit rating agencies and ensuring that the ECB does not end up with too many risky assets; in addition, believes that the ECB should use at least two credit rating qualifications before accepting a security as collateral;deleted

Amendment 132 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 14

Amendment 133 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 14

14. Calls on the ECB to put in place in the Security Markets Program a discount rate mechanism that can be adjusted, taking into account whether a certain security is further downgraded by most credit rating agencies and ensuring that the ECB does not end up with too many risky assets; in addition, believes that the ECB should use a~~t least two~~ number of credit rating qualifications before accepting a security as collateral;

Amendment 134 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 14

14. Calls on the ECB to put in place in the Security Markets Program a discount rate mechanism that can be adjusted, taking into account whether a certain security is further downgraded by most credit rating agencies and ensuring that the ECB does not end up with too many risky assets; in addition, believes that the ECB should ~~use at least two~~consult all credit rating qualifications before accepting a security as collateral;

Amendment 135 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 14

14. Calls on the ECB to put in place in the Security Markets Program a discount rate mechanism that can be adjusted, taking into account whether a certain security is further downgraded by most credit rating agencies and ensuring that the ECB does not end up with too many risky assets; in addition, believes that the ECB should ~~use~~extend the policy of requiring at least two credit rating qualifications before accepting a security as collateral; from asset-backed securities to all other collateral types where currently only one rating is required;;

Amendment 136 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 14

14. Calls on the ECB to put in place in the Security Markets Program a discount rate mechanism that can be adjusted, taking into account whether a certain security is further downgraded by most credit rating agencies and ensuring that the ECB does not end up with too many risky assets; in addition, believes that the ECB should ~~use at least two credit rating qualifications before accepting a security as collateral~~, as a general rule, accept government bonds issued by a Member State as collateral, irrespective of the decisions of rating agencies or rating foundations;

Amendment 137 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 14

14. ~~Calls on the ECB to put in place in the Security Markets Program a discount rate mechanism that can be adjus~~Emphasizes that conditions attached to banks benefiting from outstanding modalities related, taking into account whether a certain security is further downgraded by most credit rating agencies and ensuring that the ECB does not end up with too many risky assets; in addition, believes that the ECB should use at least two credit rating qualifications before accepting a security as collateral;o TARGET-2 settlement system and more generally ECB liquidity provision facilities are a matter of concern in terms of credit risks for the ECB itself as well as in terms of scope and transparency,

Amendment 138 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 15

15. Asks for more public information on flows between euro area central banks measured in the Target-2 programme so that these flows are not interpreted as permanently moving from current account surplus countries to deficit countries in order to avoid their financial collapse;deleted

Amendment 139 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 15

15. Asks for more public information on flows between euro area central banks measured in the Target-2 programme so that these flows ~~are not interpreted as permanently moving from current account surplus countries to deficit countries in order to avoid their financial collapse~~can be identified as a temporary substitute for private capital to finance current account deficits, and for clarification that the European Stability Mechanism (ESM) serves to replace this method for financing current account deficits;

Amendment 14 #

Motion for a resolution
Recital D a (new)

Da. whereas the Target2 balances, which permit the financing of current account deficits via the ECB, do not contain any upper limits on the accumulation of deficits in the national central banks’ balance sheets, and whereas Greece, Ireland, Portugal and Spain have by now accumulated EUR 340 billion in Target liabilities vis-à-vis the ECB;

Amendment 140 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 15

15. Asks for more public information on flows between euro area central banks measured in the Target-2 programme ~~so that these flows are not interpreted as permanently moving from current account surplus countries to deficit countries in order to avoid their financial collapse~~for the sake of increased transparency;

Amendment 141 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 15

15. ~~Asks for more public information on~~States that flows between euro area central banks measured in the Target-2 programme s~~o that these flows are~~hould not be interpreted as permanently moving from current account surplus countries to deficit countries in order to avoid their financial collapse;

Amendment 142 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 15

15. Asks the ECB for more public and regular information on flows between euro area central banks measured in the Target- 2 ~~programme so that these flows are not interpreted as permanently moving from current account surplus countries to deficit countries in order to avoid their financial collapse;~~settlement system in order to have a proper view of its recent developments,

Amendment 143 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 15 a (new)

15a. Is concerned about the high levels of maturity and currency mismatch of several systemically and non systemically relevant euro area banking institutions,

Amendment 144 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 15 b (new)

15b. Deems that in the current emergency context it is urgent to define and disclose additional strict conditions attached to ECB liquidity provisions, including prudential conditions going beyond internal and non disclosed rules and haircuts related to the collateral accepted for its refinancing operations,

Amendment 145 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 15 c (new)

15c. Asks the ECB to explore whether compulsory reserves requirements could be an additional instrument to the interest rate in order to preserve financial stability without hampering the recovery,

Amendment 146 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 15 d (new)

15d. Notes that in the US and the EU one of the consequences of monetary policies before and during the crisis has been the engineering of a steep yield curve which helps the banking system to be more rapidly recapitalized with the help of depositors and short term lenders;

Amendment 147 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 15 a (new)

15a. underlines the constant and rigorous stance taken by the ECB for years in terms in order to strengthen economic governance in the European interest;

Amendment 148 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 16

Amendment 149 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 16

Amendment 15 #

Motion for a resolution
Recital D a (new)

Da. whereas the ECB decided the 4th June of 2009 to launch a purchase programme of covered bonds in primary and secondary markets for EUR 60 billion which was expected to be fully implemented by the end of June 2010

Amendment 150 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 16

16. Calls for ~~a more integrated~~ macro- prudential ~~policy framework within the monetary policy context, if necessary including differentiated macro-prudential tools in the Union to~~supervision of the financial system which is better integrated into the monetary policy context and which takes account ofor differences between the euro area and non- euro area countries; calls for an analysis of the effectiveness of the new financial supervisory architecture and for an evaluation of the option establishing a single European financial supervisory authority, unifying under its umbrella the current European Supervisory Authorities and the European Systemic Risk Board;

Amendment 151 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 16

Amendment 152 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 16

Amendment 153 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 16

16. Calls for a more integrated macro- prudential policy framework within the monetary policy context, if necessary including differentiated macro-prudential tools in the Union to account for differences between the euro area and non-euro area countries; calls for an analysis of the effectiveness of the new financial supervisory architecture and for an evaluation of the option establishing a single European financial supervisory authority, unifying under its umbrella the current European Supervisory Authorities and the European Systemic Risk Board;to further develop an integrated analytical framework to jointly assess the effects of macro-prudential and monetary policies, while fully respecting that the ECB and the ESRB have separate mandates; calls to further develop the macro-prudential policy toolkit of the ESRB, taking into account national, legal and other financial system specificities; calls for an analysis of the effectiveness of the new financial supervisory architecture and for an evaluation of the option establishing a single European financial supervisory authority, unifying under its umbrella the current European Supervisory Authorities and the European Systemic Risk Board in the context of the upcoming review of the ESRB and the ESAs, as laid down in the respective regulations[1]; [1] In accordance with Article 20 of Regulation No 1092/2010 establishing the ESRB and with articles 81 of Regulations 1093/2010, 1094/2010 and 1095/2010 establishing the EBA, EIOPA and ESMA, respectively.

Amendment 154 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 16

Amendment 155 #

Thomas MANN

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 16 a (new)

16a. Calls for the consistent application of the European Stability and Growth Pact and an automatic mechanism for sanctions in the event of budget deficits;

Amendment 156 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 16 a (new)

16a. Notes that the main reasons for the huge deficits and the subsequent steep increase in borrowing costs are phenomena such as tax competition that has reduced the tax burden of capital at the expense of labour, the socialization of private losses through injections of liquidity in the banking sector and the speculative behaviour of rating agencies and international financial centres;

Amendment 157 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 17

Amendment 158 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 17

Amendment 159 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 17

Amendment 16 #

Motion for a resolution
Recital D a (new)

Da. whereas, given the harsh austerity measures and credit terms adopted, the most likely scenario, according to the OECD study on the Greek debt published on 2 August 2011, is that Greece's public debt, which was 140% of GDP in 2010, will fall to 100% of GDP in 2035,

Amendment 160 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 17

17. Stresses the need for a single European minister of Finance to be foreseen in the next EU Treaty change in order to coordinate a basic common fiscal policy that could enhance the effectiveness of the euro; believes that the democratic legitimacy of such a proposal must adequately be addressed; notes in this sense that in a monetary union, fiscal policy does not only concern the Member States and that the present crisis has shown the limits of 100% decentralised fiscal policies;

Amendment 161 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 17

17. Stresses the need for a single European minister of Finance, in ~~order to coordinate a basic common fiscal policy that could enhance the effectiveness of the euro~~the spirit of the proposal made by Jean-Claude Trichet in Aachen on 2 June 2011; believes that the democratic legitimacy of such a proposal must adequately be addressed; notes in this sense that in a monetary union, fiscal policy does not only concern the Member States and that the present crisis has shown the limits of 100% decentralised fiscal policies;

Amendment 162 #

Claudio MORGANTI

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 17

17. Stresses the need for ~~a single European minister of Finance in order to coordinat~~greater coordination to achieve a basic common fiscal policy that could enhance the effectiveness of the euro; believes that the democratic legitimacy of such a proposal must adequately be addressed; notes in this sense that in a monetary union, fiscal policy does not only concern the Member States and that the present crisis has shown the limits of 100% decentralised fiscal policies;

Amendment 163 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 17

17. Stresses th~~e need for~~at the creation of a single European minister of Finance ~~in order to coordinate a basic common fiscal policy that could enhance the effectiveness of the euro~~with democratic legitimacy could enhance the economical use of the European Union’s existing resources; believes that the democratic legitimacy of such a proposal must adequately be addressed; notes in this sense that in a monetary union, fiscal policy does not only concern the Member States and that the present crisis has shown the limits of ~~100% decentralised fiscal policies;~~ fiscal equalisation mechanisms seeking to paper over the fundamental structural failings of the European monetary union;

Amendment 164 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 17

17. Stresses the need for a single European minister of Finance that could emerge from the European Commission, in order to coordinate a ~~basic~~ common fiscal ~~policy~~union that cwould enhance the effectiveness of the euro; believes that the democratic legitimacy of such a proposal must adequately be addressed; notes in this sense that in a monetary union, fiscal policy does not only concern the Member States but has many cross-border spillovers and that the present crisis has shown the limits of 100% decentralised fiscal policies;

Amendment 165 #

Rodi KRATSA-TSAGAROPOULOU

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 17

17. Stresses the need for ~~a single European minister of Finance in order to~~better coordinateion of a basic common fiscal policy that could enhance the effectiveness of the euro; ~~believes that the democratic legitimacy of such a proposal must adequately be addressed;~~ notes in this sense that in a monetary union, fiscal policy does not only concern the Member States and that the present crisis has shown the limits of 100% decentralised fiscal policies;

Amendment 166 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 17

17. Stresses the need for a single European minister of Finance in order to coordinate a basic common fiscal and economic policy that could enhance the effectiveness of the euro and the single market; believes that the democratic legitimacy of such a proposal must adequately be addressed; notes in this sense that in a monetary union, fiscal policy does not only concern the Member States and that the present crisis has shown the limits of 100% decentralised fiscal policies; stresses the importance of an adequate EU budget so that the European Union has the necessary resources to meet current challenges and the conditions that have developed on the markets;

Amendment 167 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 17

17. Stresses the need for a single European minister of Finance in order to coordinate a basic common fiscal policy that could enhance the effectiveness of the euro; believes that the democratic legitimacy of such a proposal must adequately be addressed; notes in this sense that in a monetary union, fiscal policy does not only concern the Member States and that the present crisis has shown the limits of ~~100%~~ decentralised fiscal policies; believes single European minister of Finance should be democratically accountable before the European Parliament; stresses that a step further towards a Fiscal union within the Community method requires enhanced democratic ownership and a Treaty revision,

Amendment 168 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 17

17. Stresses the need for a single European minister of Finance in order to ~~coordinate a basic common fiscal policy that could enhance the effectiveness of the euro~~implement the effective harmonization of taxation policies that could enhance the effectiveness of the euro, prevent further competition in tax matters and so contribute to the reduction of public deficits while the implementation of an EU financial transaction tax will also contribute to improved stability in financial markets; believes that the implementation of a minimum corporation tax and minimum taxes on income and property will also contribute to the ability of Member States to invest in education, research and in sustainable infrastructures; believes that the democratic legitimacy of such a proposal must adequately be addressed; notes in this sense that in a monetary union, fiscal policy does not only concern the Member States and that the present crisis has shown the limits of 100% decentralised fiscal policies;

Amendment 169 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 17 a (new)

17a. Stresses the importance of involving the non-eurozone member states in a future fiscal union, given that EU currencies are interdependent;

Amendment 17 #

Motion for a resolution
Recital D b (new)

Db. whereas by the end of 2010 the ECB held €480 billion of asset-backed securities and €360 billion of non- marketable financial instruments, both categories amounting to a total of 44% of its total assets,

Amendment 170 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 17 a (new)

17a. Underlines the failure of the neoliberal economic growth model; underlines also the need for European States to be released from austerity programmes and measures and cuts, since they deepen the crisis and lead to an economic impasse the cost of which will have to be borne by the peoples of Europe;

Amendment 171 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 18

Amendment 172 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 18

Amendment 173 #

Rodi KRATSA-TSAGAROPOULOU

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 18

18. ~~Stresses the need for a single European Treasury to relieve the ECB off its quasi-fiscal role; until that is the case, suggests confining more tasks to the European Stability Mechanism (ESM); r~~Regrets that, as it stands, the ESM will not operate under Community rules and did not acquire the right to purchase government bonds on the secondary market as this would have meant a relief for the ECB in the current circumstances;

Amendment 174 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 18

18. Stresses the need for a single European Treasury to relieve the ECB off its quasi- fiscal role; until that is the case, suggests increasing the resources and flexibility of the European Financial Stability Fund (EFSF) and confining more tasks to the European Stability Mechanism (ESM); regrets that, as it stands, the ESM will not operate under Community rules and did not acquire the right to purchase government bonds on the secondary market as this would have meant a relief for the ECB in the current circumstances;

Amendment 175 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 18

Amendment 176 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 18

Amendment 177 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 18

18. Stresses the need for ~~a single European Treasury to relieve the ECB off its quasi-fiscal role; until that is the case, suggests confining~~the ECB to morve tasks to the European Stability Mechanism (ESM); regrets that, as it stands, the ESM will not operate under Community rules and did not acquire the right to purchase government bonds on the secondary market as this would have meant a relief for the ECB in the current circumstancesaway from its quasi-fiscal role;

Amendment 178 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 18

Amendment 179 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 18

18. ~~Stresses the need for a single European Treasury to relieve the ECB off its quasi- fiscal role; until that is the case, sugg~~Is of the opinion that the creation of a European finance minister should be complemented by a single European Treasury; welcomes the decision taken by the Heads of State and Government on 21 July to improve the effectivenests ~~confining more tasks to the European Stability Mechanism (ESM); regrets that, as it stands, the ESM will not operate under Community rules and did not acquire the right to purchase government bo~~of the EFSF and of the ESM by increasing their flexibility linked to appropriate conditionality, notably allowing them to intervene in the secondary markets on the basis of an ECB analysis recognizing the existence of exceptional financial market circumstances and risks to financial stability ands on the ~~secondary market as this would have meant a relief for the ECB in the current circumstanc~~basis of a decision by mutual agreement of the EFSF/ESM Member States, to avoid contagion; regrets that as it stands the ESM will not operate under Community rules;

Amendment 18 #

Motion for a resolution
Recital E

E. whereas most of the long-term government debt of Greece and Portugal is on the ECB balance sheet and the persistent rumours of Greek debt restructuring may again delay the ECB’s exit from non-standard measures,deleted

Amendment 180 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 18

Amendment 181 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 18

18. Stresses the need ~~for a single European Treasury~~ to relieve the ECB off its quasi-fiscal role; ~~until that is the case, suggests confining more tasks to the European Stability Mechanism (ESM); regret~~notes that, as it stands, the ESM will not operate under Community rules and did not – and was not intended to – acquire the right to purchase government bonds on the secondary market ~~as this would have meant a relief for the ECB in the current circumstances~~;

Amendment 182 #

Ramon TREMOSA i BALCELLS, Antolín SÁNCHEZ PRESEDO

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 18

18. Stresses the need for a single European Treasury to relieve the ECB off its quasi- fiscal role; until that is the case, suggests confining more tasks to the European Stability Mechanism (ESM); regrets that, as it stands, the ESM will not operate under Community rules and did not acquire the right to purchase government bonds on the secondary market as this would have meant a relief for the ECB in the current circumstancesEuropean Monetary Fund (EMF) responsible, inter alia, for issuing Eurobonds and European bonds for specific projects, and for ensuring that access to resources deriving from their issue is strictly tied to fulfilment of the commitments made in connection with economic governance; until that is the case, suggests confining more tasks to the European Stability Mechanism (ESM); regrets that, as it stands, the ESM will not operate under Community rules; welcomes the agreement reached by the Heads of State of the Euro Group on 21 July to increase the flexibility of the EFSF, which will include the possibility of intervening in secondary markets; deplores, however, its underfunding, its exclusively intergovernmental nature and the fact that it’s role has still not been fully developed;

Amendment 183 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 18 a (new)

18a. Welcomes that the European Stability Mechanism (ESM) acquired the right to purchase government bonds on the secondary market as this could mean a relief for the ECB in the current circumstances;

Amendment 184 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 18 a (new)

18a. Welcomes that the European Stability Mechanism (ESM) acquired the right to purchase government bonds on the secondary market as this could mean a relief for the ECB in the current circumstances;

Amendment 185 #

Ramon TREMOSA i BALCELLS, Sylvie GOULARD, José Manuel GARCÍA-MARGALLO Y MARFIL

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 18 a (new)

18a. Asks the euro area Member States to consider allowing the EFSF-ESM to apply for a banking licence in order to allow it to access ECB liquidity and enhance its intervention capacities;

Amendment 186 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 18 b (new)

18b. Deplores in this regard that the ESM has been established outside the EU Treaties and therefore calls on the Commission to propose a permanent crisis management mechanism based on Community rules (e.g. a European Monetary Fund)

Amendment 187 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 19

~~19. Underlines the absolute necessity to quickly implement and apply the provisions of the economic governance package once the negotiations have been concluded;~~deleted

Amendment 188 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 19

19. Underlines the absolute necessity to quickly implement and apply the provisions of ~~the~~a balanced economic governance package once the negotiations have been concluded;

Amendment 189 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 19

19. ~~Underlines the absolut~~Believes that the nec~~essity to quickly implement and apply the provisions of the economic governance package once the negotiations have been concluded~~onomic governance package, apart from being the wrong recipe for ending the crisis, is also one that has failed; stresses that for one year, the 'experiment' of economic governance and the experiment of a 'stricter SGP' have been under way in Greece, Ireland and Portugal; notes that the results are disastrous, especially in Greece: a deeper recession, higher unemployment and greater poverty and destitution;

Amendment 19 #

Motion for a resolution
Recital E

E. whereas most of the long-term government debt of Greece and Portugal is on the ECB balance sheet and ~~the persistent rumours of Greek debt restructuring may~~whereas Greek debt restructuring, justified by structural debt and growth problems, will again delay the ECB’s exit from non- standard measures,

Amendment 190 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 19 a (new)

19a. Points to the costs of exchange-rate fluctuations for undertakings and States; calls on the Council to work towards a global monetary order that meets the requirements of monetary stability and corresponds to the reality of a multipolar world;

Amendment 191 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 20

Amendment 192 #

Burkhard BALZ

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 20

Amendment 193 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 20

20. Believes that the introduction of jointly guaranteed eurosecurities may constitute the necessary political signal and fiscal quantum-leap and forward that the Union needs at this juncture; welcomes the rapid implementation of the feasibility report promised by the Commission in its declaration XXX;

Amendment 194 #

Sylvie GOULARD, Ramon TREMOSA i BALCELLS

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 20

20. BWel~~iev~~comes th~~at the introduction of eurosecurities may constitute the necessary fiscal quantum-leap forw~~e rapid implementation of the feasibility report promised by the Commission in its declaration XXX with regard t~~hat~~o the ~~Union needs at this juncture; welcomes the rapid implementation of the feasibility report promised by the Commission in its declaration XXX~~introduction of eurosecurities, since it believes that this would, with the creation of the right conditions, ensure the necessary fiscal improvement that the Union needs at this juncture;

Amendment 195 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 20

20. Believes that the introduction of eurosecurities may constitute the necessary fiscal quantum-leap forward that the Union needs at this juncture; ~~welcomes the rapid implementation of the feasibility report promised by the Commission in its declaration XXX;~~ calls on the Commission to immediately put forward legislative proposals on the setting up of a system of common issuance of European sovereign bonds, or euro securities, under joint and several liability, following Commissioner Rehn's declaration in Plenary in 22 June 2011; believes that increasing liquidity on a new global eurobonds market could reduce the financial costs for Member States and which would contribute to the Euro becoming a global reserve currency

Amendment 196 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 20

20. Believes that the introduction of eurosecurities ~~may consti~~at this junctutre ~~the necessary fiscal quantum-leap forward that the Union needs at this juncture~~will result in increased incentives to irresponsible national budgetary policies; welcomes the rapid implementation of the feasibility report promised by the Commission in its declaration XXX;

Amendment 197 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 20

20. Believes that the introduction of eurosecurities may constitute the necessary fiscal quantum-leap forward that the Union needs at this juncture; welcomes the rapid implementation of the feasibility report promised by the Commission in its declaration XXX; would stabilise the current situation by reducing the total cost of debt and ensuring the liquidity of the European market; asks for the rapid implementation of the feasibility report promised by the Commission in its declaration XXX; encourages the Commission to use its legislative initiative power to come further with legislative proposals in this sense;

Amendment 198 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 20

20. Believes that the introduction of eEuro~~securitie~~bonds may constitute the necessary fiscal quantum-leap forward that the Union needs , in that this ~~juncture; welcomes~~could help towards macroeconomic stability and the sustainability of public finances, provided that the share of national debt covered by Eurobonds is kept to a judicious level and access to the Fund set up as a result of the issuing of Eurobonds (the EMF) is tied to fulfilment of the commitments made in connection with economic governance; Welcomes, therefore, the rapid implementation of the feasibility report promised by the Commission in its declaration XXX;

Amendment 199 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 20

20. Believes that the introduction of eurosecurities may constitute the necessary fiscal quantum-leap forward ~~that the Union needs at this juncture~~; welcomes the rapid implementation of the feasibility report promised by the Commission in its declaration XXX; on the introduction of eurobonds

Amendment 2 #

Ramon TREMOSA i BALCELLS, José Manuel GARCÍA-MARGALLO Y MARFIL

Motion for a resolution
Citation 3

– having regard to Articles 3 and 15 on the Protocol on the Statute of the European System of Central Banks and of the European Central Bank annexed to the Treaty,

Amendment 20 #

Motion for a resolution
Recital E

E. whereas ~~most of the long-term government debt of Greece and Portugal is on the ECB balance sheet and the persistent rumours of Greek debt restructuring~~persistent rumours of Greek debt restructuring and the impact thereof on the financial markets and the broader economy may again delay the ECB'’s exit from non-standard measures,

Amendment 200 #

Thomas MANN

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 20

20. Believes that the introduction of eurosecurities may constitute the necessary fiscal quantum-leap forward that the Union needs at this juncture; welcomes the rapid implementation of the feasibility report promised by the Commission in its declaration XXXeurosecurities should not be endorsed if they take away from deficit states the incentive to pursue a disciplined, responsible budgetary policy; advocates, however, discussing by way of Commission studies what forms eurosecurities might take, in the interest of making qualified decisions possible;

Amendment 201 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 20

20. ~~Believ~~Notes that the introduction of eurosecurities ~~may constitute the necessary fiscal quantum-leap forward that the Union needs at this juncture;~~is one way of pooling liability for Member States’ debt, expresses doubts as to whether such a measure is sensible or feasible, and stresses that each Member State is liable for its own debts, but welcomes the rapid implementation of the feasibility report promised by the Commission in its declaration XXX;

Amendment 202 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 20

20. Believes that the introduction of eurosecurities may constitute the necessary fiscal quantum-leap forward that the Union needs at this juncture; welcomes the rapid implementation of the feasibility report promised by the Commission in its declaration XXX, given the present dimension of the crisis at European level, the introduction of eurosecurities is no longer an adequate measure; emphasizes strongly the need for a radical overhaul of the Maastricht Treaty in order to allow Member States to borrow directly from the ECB, without any conditions relating to the application of austerity programmes;

Amendment 203 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 20

20. Believes that the introduction of eurosecurities ~~may~~combined with enhanced fiscal discipline is urgently required for the survival of the euro and would constitute the necessary fiscal quantum- leap forward that the Union needs at this juncture; welcomes the rapid implementation of the feasibility report promised by the Commission in its declaration XXX;

Amendment 204 #

Ramon TREMOSA i BALCELLS, José Manuel GARCÍA-MARGALLO Y MARFIL

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 20 a (new)

20a. Calls for a more integrated macro- prudential policy framework within the monetary policy context, if necessary including differentiated macro-prudential tools in the Union to account for differences between the euro area and non-euro area countries; is looking forward to the general report1 by the Commission expected at the latest by 2 January 2014, which should review the decisions taken for the creation of the ESFS (European System of Financial Supervision); __________________ 1 Article 81 of Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 November 2010 establishing a European Supervisory Authority (European Banking Authority), amending Decision No 716/2009/EC and repealing Commission Decision 2009/78/EC

Amendment 205 #

Motion for a resolution
Subheading 3 a (new)

External Dimension

Amendment 206 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 20 a (new)

20a. Highlights as its opinion that the solution to Europe's sovereign debt crisis is not to establish new forums for discussion and coordination but to use those decision making bodies we already have to address the underlying problems; considers the consolidation of public finances, better surveillance of financial markets, growth enhancing reforms and the integration of the service economy into the Internal Market as the three most important steps forward in order to make Europe prosper once more;

Amendment 207 #

Ramon TREMOSA i BALCELLS, Antolín SÁNCHEZ PRESEDO

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 20 a (new)

20a. Considers that a market for Eurobonds should be introduced in three consecutive phases, as was the case with the introduction of the single currency; the first phase would consist of ensuring convergence between the economic policies of the countries wishing to participate in the EMF; in the second phase, the functions performed by the EFSF and, where applicable, the ESM, would gradually be transferred to the EMF; in the third phase, the Treaties would be amended to establish the EMF as an official body and permit the joint issuing of Eurobonds in line with the principle of joint and several liability;

Amendment 208 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 20 a (new)

20a. Takes the view that the role of the euro as reserve currency should be strengthened in the interest of more global balance; calls in this regard for a Special Drawing Rights regime to be convertible implemented based on a basket of fully convertible currencies;

Amendment 209 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 20 b (new)

20b. The European Monetary Fund would also be responsible for issuing bonds for projects of specific European interest, and would hence complement the activities of the European Investment Bank to spur European economic growth and job creation.

Amendment 21 #

Ramon TREMOSA i BALCELLS, Sylvie GOULARD, Antolín SÁNCHEZ PRESEDO, José Manuel GARCÍA-MARGALLO Y MARFIL

Motion for a resolution
Recital E

Amendment 210 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 20 b (new)

20b. As the ECB, IMF and Commission work together on missions in some Member States, calls on the Commission to put forward proposals for a single external representation of the euro area according to Article 138 TFEU; particularly for the IMF;

Amendment 211 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 21

Amendment 212 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 21

21. Reiterates its long-standing call for the minutes of the meetings of the Governing Council to be public; considers that their non- publication might be interpreted as a sign of weakness of the monetary union~~, as if the public and necessary individual accountability in the decision-taking within the Governing Council should be interpreted as a confrontation between Member States~~;

Amendment 213 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 21

21. Reiterates its long-standing call for the minutes of the meetings of the Governing Council to be public; considers their non- publication as a sign of weakness of the monetary union, as if the public and necessary individual accountability in the decision-taking within the Governing Council should be interpreted as a confrontation between Member States;commends that the ECB enhance the transparency of its work in order to increase its legitimacy and predictability. Transparency is also needed with regard to the internal models used to value illiquid collateral and the valuations assigned to specific securities offered as collateral

Amendment 214 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 21

21. Reiterates its long-standing call for the summary of minutes of the meetings of the Governing Council to be made public; considers their non- publication as a sign of weakness of the monetary union, as if the public and necessary individual accountability in the decision-taking within the Governing Council should be interpreted as a confrontation between Member States;

Amendment 215 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 21

Amendment 216 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 21 a (new)

21a. Further to the number of debates which have arisen on the subject, asks for more public information on flows between euro area central banks measured in the Target-2 programme, so as to establish whether or not these flows should be interpreted as permanently moving from current account surplus countries to deficit countries in order to avoid their financial collapse

Amendment 217 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 21 a (new)

21a. Reminds to the ECB Governing Board that according to E(S)CB Statutes, Article 10(2): “the Governing Council shall act by a simple majority of the members having a voting right" and so decisions do not be necessary taken by unanimity; calls the ECB governing board to make public its voting record

Amendment 218 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 21 a (new)

21a. Calls, in line with the Court of Auditors reports, on more transparency and accountability when it comes to documentation of decisions concerning the recruitment procedures as well as salaries and bonus reviews;

Amendment 219 #

Juozas IMBRASAS

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 21 a (new)

Amendment 22 #

Motion for a resolution
Recital E

E. whereas most of the long-term government debt of Greece and Portugal is on the ECB balance sheet ~~and the persistent rumours of Greek debt restructuring may again delay the ECB's exit from non-standard measures,~~

Amendment 220 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 21 a (new)

21a. Asks the Council to give special weight to ethical criteria in future selection procedures for the Central Bank’s Executive Board; believes that with a view to the democratic legitimacy and credibility of the monetary union, there should be no doubt about future candidates’ loyalty to the Euro area as a whole;

Amendment 221 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 21 b (new)

21b. Welcomes the commitment of the ECB to its accountability in the front of the EP and stresses the very constructive role played by the ECB at the highest level and through its staff in the co-decision procedure;

Amendment 23 #

Motion for a resolution
Recital E

E. whereas most of the long-term government debt of Greece and Portugal is on the ECB balance sheet and the persistent rumours of Greek debt restructuring may again delay the ECB's exit from non-standard measuresthe ECB has bought long-term Greek and Portuguese government bonds, showing its capacity for stabilising the financial system; considers, however, that a comprehensive, long lasting solution outside the ECB should be sought for sovereign debt management,

Amendment 24 #

Motion for a resolution
Recital E a (new)

Ea. Whereas interest rates in the euro area remained at 1% throughout 2010 but have since been raised by 25 basis points in April 2011 and again by 25 basis points in July 2011, bringing the rate to 1.5%,

Amendment 25 #

Motion for a resolution
Recital E b (new)

Eb. Whereas Article 282 of the TFEU states that the primary objective of the ECB is to maintain price stability and that the ECB should support general economic policies to help achieve it, and also notes the work by the ESRB under the auspices of the ECB on financial stability;

Amendment 26 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1

1. ~~Welcomes the fact that so far, the ECB has been remarkably successful in maintaining HICP inflation at close to 2% despite~~Notes that the ECB has allowed HICP inflation to exceed 2%, partly owing to a number of macro-financial shocks and volatile commodity prices;

Amendment 27 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1

1. Welcomes the fact that so far, the ECB has been remarkably successful in maintaining HICP inflation at close to ~~2% despite a number of~~its target rate of 2% while inflationary pressures have been generated in particular by macro-financial shocks and volatile commodity prices while average GDP growth has been low in the Union;

Amendment 28 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1 a (new)

1a. Expresses concern about the affect of interest rate increases on economic growth in the euro area, adds that this could hinder the already slow recovery in the euro area, particularly in its weakest economies;

Amendment 29 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1 a (new)

1a. Emphasises the fact that what is declared to be the ECB's sole objective, namely price stability, has a negative impact under current circumstances, since it ignores the impact the ECB's policies may have on the real economy;

Amendment 3 #

Motion for a resolution
Recital A

A. whereas in 2010 the euro area recovered with GDP growth of 1.7% and is expected to ~~stagnate at a similar level~~remain consistently below 2% throughout 2011, after the slump in 2009 of -4.2% growth,

Amendment 30 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1 b (new)

1b. Underscores the fact that the structure of the ECB as an independent body, as set out in the Maastricht Treaty, does not promote overall European economic growth and no longer even promotes monetary stability; takes the view that the ECB must operate under the democratic control of the relevant European institutions;

Amendment 31 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 2

2. Underlines that, while month-on-month HICP inflation has mostly been above 2% since the beginning of 2010, what matters for monetary policy are future expectations, the low level of which are a testimony of high ECB credibility; underlines that core HIPC in September 2011 is only 1%,

Amendment 32 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 2

2. Underlines that, while month-on-month HICP inflation has mostly been above 2% since the beginning of 2010, what matters for monetary policy are future expectations, the low level of which are a testimony of high ECB credibility and governments’ increasingly coherent budgetary policies;

Amendment 33 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 2

2. Underlines that~~, while~~ month-on-month HICP inflation has mostly been above 2% since the beginning of 2010, wthat ~~matters for~~future expectations regarding this figure are a significant aspect of monetary policy, a~~re future expectations, the~~nd that efforts are needed to bring it to a low level of, which ~~are a testim~~can only ~~of high ECB credibility~~be achieved through the ECB’s full independence from fiscal actors;

Amendment 34 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 2 a (new)

2a. Underlines that most eurozone countries were not in trouble before the financial crisis and had declining levels of public debt to GDP ratios as well as decreasing deficits;

Amendment 35 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 2 a (new)

2a. Takes the view that besides HIPC, assets prices developments and credit growth in the EU and in Member States are crucial indicators for an effective monitoring of financial stability within the EMU and more broadly the EU,

Amendment 36 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 2 b (new)

2b. Stresses that before the financial crisis, private debt increased in an unsustainable way, and that risks were created through private debt bubbles; furthermore, the increase in government debt was a result of the need to save the private sector, in particular the financial sector;

Amendment 37 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 2 c (new)

2c. Notes that the public debt to GDP ratio of the eurozone is much lower that that of the US and Japan;

Amendment 38 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 2 d (new)

2d. Believes in the strength of the eurozone economy and in the importance of the euro as an international currency;

Amendment 39 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 3

3. Recalls that the ~~single~~primary objective of ECB is price stability; notes that de facto financial stability is becoming a second objective; also notes the work of the ESRB under the auspices of the ECB on financial stability;

Amendment 4 #

Motion for a resolution
Recital A

A. whereas in 2010 the euro area recovered with GDP growth of 1.7% and is expected to ~~stagnate~~grow at a similar level throughout 2011, after ~~the slump~~registering in 2009 ofa -4.2% growth,

Amendment 40 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 3

3. Recalls that the single objective of ECB is price stability; notes that de facto financial stability and proper liquidity of the financial markets is becoming a second objective; also notes the work of the ESRB under the auspices of the ECB on financial stability;

Amendment 41 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 3

3. Recalls that the ~~single~~primary objective of ECB is price stability; ~~notes~~and that ~~de facto financial stability is becoming a second objective~~it thereby contributes to financial stability; also notes the work of the ESRB under the auspices of the ECB on financial stability;

Amendment 42 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 3

Amendment 43 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 3

3. Recalls that the ~~single~~primary objective of ECB is price stability whereas it shall also support the general economic policies and objectives in the Union; notes that de facto financial stability is becoming a second objective; also notes the work of the ESRB under the auspices of the ECB on financial stability;

Amendment 44 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 3

3. Recalls that the ~~single~~main objective of the ECB is price stability; ~~notes~~welcomes the fact that de facto financial stability is becoming a second objective as it supports the former; also ~~not~~welcomes the work of the ESRB under the auspices of the ECB on financial stability; notes however that policies aiming at achieving higher growth are also necessary;

Amendment 45 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 3

3. Recalls that the ~~single~~primary objective of ECB is price stability; notes that de facto ~~financial stability is becoming a second objective; also notes~~stability of the financial system is one of the responsibilities of the ESCB; also calls for a revision of the ~~work~~role of the ESRB ~~under the auspices of the ECB on~~in the light of its failures with regard to financial stability;

Amendment 46 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 3

3. Rrecalls that the ~~single~~primary objective of ~~ECB is price stability; notes that de facto financial stability is becoming a second objective; also notes the work of the ESRB~~the ESCB shall be to maintain price stability in accordance with article 282 of the TFEU ; and that it thereby contributes to financial stability; welcomes the creation of the ERSB on 1 January 2011 under the auspices of the ECB ~~on financial stability~~;

Amendment 47 #

Claudio MORGANTI

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 3

3. Recalls that the ~~single~~primary objective of the ECB is price stability; notes that ~~de facto financial stability is becoming a second objective; also notes~~ensuring the stability of the financial system is one of the ESCB’s tasks; calls also for the ~~work~~role of the ESRB ~~under the auspices of the ECB on~~to be reviewed in the light of its failure to ensure financial stability;

Amendment 48 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 3

3. Recalls that the single objective of the ECB is price stability; notes that ~~de facto~~ financial instability ~~is becoming a second objective~~gives rise to serious risks of medium-term price stability in that it hampers the smooth functioning of monetary policy; also notes the work of the ESRB ~~under the auspices~~, with the support of the ECB, on ~~financial stability~~macro-prudential supervision;

Amendment 49 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 3

3. Recalls that the ~~single~~basic objective of the ECB is price stability~~; notes that de facto financial stability is becoming a second objective;~~ and that financial stability is a second objective; notes, however, that the current debt crisis in the eurozone has shown the direct connection between monetary and financial policy and stability; congratulates the ECB on the decisive role it has played through the emergency measures it has taken to maintain market stability and also notes the work ofdone by the ESRB, under the auspices of the ECB ~~on financi~~, to secure fiscal stability;

Amendment 5 #

Motion for a resolution
Recital A

A. whereas in 2010 the euro area ~~recovered with~~with a overall GDP growth of 1.7% did not recover the slump in 2009 of -4.2% growth and is expected to stagnate at a similar level throughout 2011, ~~after the slump in 2009 of -4.2% growth,~~

Amendment 50 #

Sylvie GOULARD, Ramon TREMOSA i BALCELLS

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 3

3. Recalls that the ~~single~~primary objective of ECB is price stability; notes that de facto financial stability is ~~becoming a second objective;~~a second objective which is particularly crucial in the current context of financial turmoil and instability ; underlines that article 127.6 the Council, acting by means of regulations in accordance with a special legislative procedure, may unanimously, and after consulting the European Parliament and the European Central Bank, confer specific tasks upon the European Central Bank concerning policies relating to the prudential supervision of credit institutions and other financial institutions with the exception of insurance undertakings also notes the work of the ESRB under the auspices of the ECB on financial stability;

Amendment 51 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 3 a (new)

3a. underlines that the rebuying of bonds on the secondary markets is justified by the aim of restoring a monetary policy which functions effectively, during this period of exceptional malfunction of certain sectors of the market; these programmes of rebuying bonds are complemented by programmes neutralising liquidity;

Amendment 52 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 3 a (new)

3a. Is deeply alarmed about the persistence of the renewed financial turmoil in the EU and the persistence of substantial macro financial imbalances between the euro area economies as well as deflationary pressures in many euro- area Member States;

Amendment 53 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 3 a (new)

3a. Stresses that the work undertaken by the ESRB, under the auspices of the ECB, to secure financial stability has addressed the problem only superficially. It is indisputable that it is impossible solely by imposing restrictive measures or strict rules of a temporary nature to change the structures that created the crisis and are geared to the rampant pursuit of profitability by financial institutions;

Amendment 54 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 3 a (new)

3a. Stresses that the ECB henceforth should not only concentrate on stability of consumer prices and financial stability, but also on asset prices, sustainable growth and employment

Amendment 55 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 4

4. Observes that, despite unitary monetary policy, monetary conditions and the impact of monetary policy diverge considerably in the euro area; in countries experiencing turbulence, banks are tightening the availability of credit, with the opposite happening in other countries with a current account surplus; this asymmetry is likely to become even more pronounced if the ECB keeps increasing rates, given the prevalence of loans indexed to short-term interest rates in the former group of countries;

Amendment 56 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 4

4. Observes that, despite unitary monetary policy, monetary conditions diverge considerably in the euro area; in countries experiencing turbulence, banks are tightening the availability of credit, with the opposite happening in other countries with a current account surplus; this asymmetry is likely to become even more pronounced if the ECB keeps increasing rates in order to kick-start trade and thus promote economic recovery, given the prevalence of loans indexed to short-term interest rates in the former group of countries;

Amendment 57 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 4

4. Observes that, despite unitary monetary policy, monetary conditions diverge considerably in the euro area; in countries experiencing turbulence, banks are tightening the availability of credit, with the opposite happening in other countries with a current account surplus; this asymmetry is likely to become even more pronounced if the ECB keeps increasing rates, given the prevalence of loans indexed to short-term interest rates in the former group of countries, while in the latter group of countries the risk of an investment and asset bubble will become acute if the interest rate remains relatively low;

Amendment 58 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 4

4. Observes that, despite unitary monetary policy, monetary conditions diverge considerably in the euro area; in countries experiencing turbulence, banks are tightening the availability of credit, with the opposite happening in other countries with a current account surplus; this asymmetry is likely to become even more pronounced if the ECB keeps increasing rates, given the prevalence of loans indexed to short-term interest rates in the former group of countries; thus believes in the necessity of a common EU fiscal governance;

Amendment 59 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 4

4. Observes that, despite unitary monetary policy, monetary conditions diverge considerably in the euro area; in countries experiencing turbulence, banks are tightening the availability of credit, with the opposite happening in other countries with a current account surplus; ~~this asymmetry is likely to become even more pronounced if the ECB keeps increasing rates, given the prevalence of loans indexed to short-term interest rates in the former group of countries;~~

Amendment 6 #

Motion for a resolution
Recital A

A. whereas in 2010 the euro area recovered with GDP growth of 1.7% and is expected to stagnate at a similar or lower levels throughout 2011, after the slump in 2009 of -4.2% growth, whereas behind these aggregated figure some euro-area Member States remained in recession during the same period,

Amendment 60 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 4

4. ~~Observes that, despite unitary monetary policy,~~Recalls that the persistent and even growing lack of economic convergence continues to be a structural problem for unitary monetary policy in the Euro area; underlines that monetary conditions diverge considerably in the euro area; in countries experiencing turbulence, banks are tightening the availability of credit, with the opposite happening in other countries with a current account surplus; this asymmetry is likely to become even more pronounced if the ECB keeps increasing rates, given the prevalence of loans indexed to short-term interest rates in the former group of countries; calls therefore on the Commission to put forward a proposal for a European Clearing Union aimed at balancing macroeconomic imbalances within Euro area countries, siphoning off ~~countries~~trade surpluses of Member States at least partially to redistribute these gains to countries with a trade balance deficit;

Amendment 61 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 4 a (new)

4a. Deplores the current oligopoly and lack of transparency of credit rating agencies and strongly doubts the validity of their assessments;

Amendment 62 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 4 a (new)

4a. Emphasises that because of structural weaknesses in the eurozone, it is extremely doubtful that relatively small economies will manage successfully to follow adjustment procedures in times of turbulence and crisis; stresses also that, because of its inherent characteristics, the single currency has served the interests of the economically strong countries at the expense of the weaker economies;

Amendment 63 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 4 a (new)

4a. Deplores the current approach to the Euro area crisis that links necessary assistance granted by Member States, IMF and ECB to unsustainable austerity measures to countries in need of liquidity; points to the problem that, as a consequence, recessionary effects also further destabilize financial market confidence and have not contributed to lowering interest rates for government bonds;

Amendment 64 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 4 b (new)

4b. Highlights fears that, without the adoption of fiscal and monetary policies that promote a reduction in unemployment, safeguard minimum wages and protect the weaker sectors of the economy, there will be no recovery;

Amendment 65 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 5

5. Calls on the Commission to set up a European credit rating foundation and to evaluate the pros and cons of temporarily suspending credit ratings for countries following an EU/IMF adjustment programme;deleted

Amendment 66 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 5

5. Calls on the Commission to set up a European credit rating ~~founda~~institution and to evaluate the pros and cons of temporarily suspending credit ratings for countries following an EU/IMF adjustment programme;

Amendment 67 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 5

5. Calls on the Commission to ~~set up a European credit rating fou~~create condaition ~~and to evaluate the pros and cons of temporarily suspending credit ratings for countries following an EU/IMF adjustment programme~~s that will boost competition between rating agencies as well as increasing the number of such agencies;

Amendment 68 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 5

5. ~~Calls on the Commission to set up a European credit rating foundation and to evaluate the pros and con~~Believes that it is politically unacceptable and dangerous for the economy that the credit rating agencies, which have played a negative role in this crisis, should continue to be given the right, by the EU itself, to evaluate not only the businesses but also the economies of tMem~~porarily suspending credit ratings for~~ber States; calls on the Commission to promote the functioning of a democratically countr~~ies following an EU/IMF adjustment programme~~olled body, which has no links to private interests and will undertake the evaluation work within the framework of solidarity between States and their citizens;

Amendment 69 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 5

5. Calls on the Commission to set up a European credit rating foundation ~~and to evaluate the pros and cons of temporarily suspending credit ratings for countries following an EU/IMF adjustment programme~~that shall restrict its activity to the private sector while credit ratings for countries shall henceforth not be taken into account by EU institutions; the Commission shall evaluate the feasibility of prohibiting credit ratings for countries in the Union; in addition to that, market access to credit rating agencies in the Union shall only be granted to entities fulfilling high transparency criteria as well as certain professional and ethical standards;

Amendment 7 #

Motion for a resolution
Recital A

A. whereas in 2010 the euro area recovered, with GDP growth of 1.7% ~~and is expected to stagnate at a similar level throughout 2011~~, after the slump in 2009 of -4.27% growth, although some international bodies have warned of a possible world economic slowdown,

Amendment 70 #

Ramon TREMOSA i BALCELLS, Antolín SÁNCHEZ PRESEDO, José Manuel GARCÍA-MARGALLO Y MARFIL, Sylvie GOULARD

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 5 – indent 1 (new)

- Calls on the Commission to create the conditions for a European Monetary Fund to ensure that the IMF will not need to be involved in Europe’s future credit policy, thereby reducing the Member States’ dependence on other international institutions and markets

Amendment 71 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 5 a (new)

5a. Welcomes the entrance of Estonia into the eurozone as a proof of the strength of the euro project as a common currency.

Amendment 72 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 5 a (new)

5a. Is of the opinion that relying on the OECD’s list of offshore financial centres is not sufficient; asks the European Commission to present a proposal for an EU list;

Amendment 73 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 5 a (new)

5a. Is concerned with global monetary developments and the external value of the euro as non conventional liquidity injections in most OECD countries have significant spillover effects; believes that a much stronger international coordination is required for a more stable global monetary system;

Amendment 74 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 6

6. Welcomes the determination and proactive stance of the ECB throughout the crisis since 2007 and in particular during the summer 2011 when some major EU economies were put in difficulty;

Amendment 75 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 6

6. Welcomes the determin~~ation~~ed and proactive stance of the ECB throughout the crisis since 2007, in the face of continued indecisiveness by the Member States which is pushing the ECB into assuming an overtly political role in responding to the current debt crisis;

Amendment 76 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 6

6. Welcomes the determination and proactive stance of the ECB ~~throughout~~during the crisis ~~since 2007~~on the financial markets in 2007 and 2008;

Amendment 77 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 6

6. Welcomes the determination and proactive stance of the ECB throughout the crisis since 2007; believes however that monetary policy has a part of responsibility in the creation of asset bubbles given the unsustainable developments of credit growth during the years before the crisis,

Amendment 78 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 6

6. ~~Welcomes the determination and proact~~Emphasises and strongly criticises the passive stance of the ECB throughout the crisis since 2007, which created an explosive social and economic mixture in Europe;

Amendment 79 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 6 a (new)

6a. Recalls the ECB’s refusal drastically to reduce the destructive action of speculators and the sharp increase to unprecedented levels of the spreads of eurozone member countries through the purchase of government bonds;

Amendment 8 #

Motion for a resolution
Recital B

B. whereas the average general government deficit in the euro area ~~deteriorat~~increased to 6.0% of GDP in 2010 and the average debt burden stood at 85.1% of GDP, up from 0.7% and 66.2% in 2007, respectively, and in comparison to a debt burden of 101.1% of GDP for the USA and 212.71% for Japan,

Amendment 80 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 6 a (new)

6a. Welcomes the intervention of the ECB to stabilize sovereign bonds markets, criticizes its persistent lack of account of social objectives of the Union in its recommendations and conditions attached to its stabilization policies;

Amendment 81 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 6 b (new)

6b. Notes with disappointment the ECB’s decision to keep its rates at a higher level than those in the U.S. and the United Kingdom, thereby contributing to the continuation of the recession;

Amendment 82 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 7

7. ~~Recalls~~takes note of the proposals on crisis management made by the ECB both in terms of economic governance and the banking resolution mechanism;

Amendment 83 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 8

8. Deplores the fact that hesitation in the management of the crisis by the Commission and the Member States, particularly in those lacking reforms, has triggered the ECB’s position against restructuring of Greece’s debt;deleted

Amendment 84 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 8

8. Deplores the fact that hesitation in the management of the crisis by the Commission and the Member States, particularly in those lacking reforms, has triggered the ECB's position against restructuring of Greece's debt;deleted

Amendment 85 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 8

Amendment 86 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 8

8. Deplores the fact that ~~hesitation in the management of the crisis by the Commission and the Member States, particularly in those lacking reforms, has triggered the ECB’s~~the ECB has taken up a position against restructuring of Greece’s debt;

Amendment 87 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 8

8. Deplores the ~~fact that~~ hesitation in the management of the crisis by the Commission and ~~the Member States, particularly in those lacking reforms, has triggered the ECB's position against restructuring of Greece's debt~~believes that solidarity between Member States is in the best interest of each one of the EU countries;

Amendment 88 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 8

8. Deplores the ~~fact that hesitation in the management of the crisis by the Commission and the Member States, particularly in those l~~lack of an adequate EU economic policy framework for crisis management and the hesitation in the management of the crisis by the Member States and the Commission; urges the Council and the Commission to rapidly put forward comprehensive and far reackhing ~~reforms, has triggered the ECB's position against restructuring of Greece's debt;~~ measures required for the survival of the euro such as Eurobonds combined with a stronger fiscal discipline, as well as enhanced capacity and scope of the EFSF/ESM,

Amendment 89 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 8

8. Deplores the fact that hesitation in the ~~management of the crisis by the Commission and the Member States, particularly in those lacking reforms, has triggered the ECB's position against restructuring of Greece's debt~~political reaction to the crisis, particularly by the most wealthiest Member States, has not been sufficient to prevent the dramatic rise in interest rates for a number of Member States’ sovereign debt bonds;

Amendment 9 #

Rodi KRATSA-TSAGAROPOULOU

Motion for a resolution
Recital B

B. whereas the average general government deficit in the euro area deteriorated to 6.0% of GDP in 2010 and the average debt burden stood at 85.1% of GDP, up from 0.7% and 66.2% in 2007, respectively, ~~and~~ in comparison to athe debt burden ~~of 101.1% of GDP for the USA and 212.71% for Japan,~~for the USA which rose from 93.5% to 101.1% of GDP in 2011, while Switzerland’s fell from 56.4% of GDP in 2005 to only 40.1% of GDP in 2010;

Amendment 90 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 8

8. Deplores the fact that hesitation in the management of the crisis by the Commission and the Member States, particularly in those lacking reforms, has triggered the ~~ECB’s position against restructuring of Greece’s debt~~need to take additional measures;

Amendment 91 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 8 a (new)

8a. Welcomes the extraordinary steps taken by the ECB as a means of immediate crisis management, but stresses the need to find a comprehensive solution at European level, in a first phase by broadening the competencies of the temporary and permanent financial stability mechanism and, in a second phase, by issuing Eurobonds;

Amendment 92 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 8 a (new)

8a. Is alarmed about continuous strains on the euro area sovereign bonds markets reflected on widening spreads over the last two years; deems that flight to safety provoked by waves of panic experienced during the current financial crisis have had massive distorting effects and have created costly negative externalities, commends efforts made by the ECB by means of its Securities Markets Programs to bring down spreads of vulnerable Member States;

Amendment 93 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 8 b (new)

8b. is deeply concerned with the current macro financial global context, the sharp slow down of the recovery and the threat of a global shortfall in aggregate demand in the face of a capacity glut; believes that in such a simultaneous fiscal consolidation process in all Member States achieved by means of far reaching austerity measures will worsen the situation and ultimately fail,

Amendment 94 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 8 c (new)

8c. Notes that the financial crisis in the euro-area is a solvency crisis that initially manifested itself as a liquidity crisis; deems that such a situation cannot be resolved in the long term by simply pouring new debt and liquidity into highly indebted economies in combination with accelerated plans for fiscal consolidation,

Amendment 95 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 8 d (new)

8d. Takes note of the restructuring of Greek debt by means of a EU coordinated voluntary exchange offer; deems that the Greek debt burden reduction agreed at the 21st July summit do not restore public debt sustainability

Amendment 96 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 9

9. Notes that, while deleveraging is continuing in parts of the private sector and most Member States (MS), leveraging is still very widespread in the public sector, not least to absorb the outcome of the financial crisis;

Amendment 97 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 9

9. Notes that, while deleveraging is continuing in parts of the private sector ~~and most Member States (MS), leveraging~~ , leveraging, which is drastically increasing the level of debt in nearly all Member States, is still ~~very~~far too widespread in the public sector;

Amendment 98 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 9

9. ~~Not~~Believes that, ~~while~~if deleveraging is continuing in parts of the private sector ~~and most Member States (MS), leveraging is still very widespread in the public sector~~, the same behaviour in the public sector will tend to deepen the crisis by amplifying the depressing impact of reduced private expenditure; in this sense, takes note of the statement made by Christine Lagarde, head of the IMF, calling on the US and EU to abandon fiscal austerity and switch to stimulus measures;

Amendment 99 #