16 Amendments of Anna FOTYGA related to 2023/2072(INI)
Amendment 3 #
Motion for a resolution
Citation 5 a (new)
Citation 5 a (new)
– having regard to the Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on the protection of the Union and its Member States from economic coercion by third countries (2021/0406(COD)),
Amendment 4 #
Motion for a resolution
Citation 5 b (new)
Citation 5 b (new)
– having regard to its resolution of 16 September 2021 on a new EU-China strategy (2021/2037(INI)), inter alia aimed at strengthening the EU’s `trade toolbox` to help mitigate the current disproportioned bilateral economic and trade relations between China and the EU,
Amendment 8 #
Motion for a resolution
Citation 8 a (new)
Citation 8 a (new)
– having regard to the embargo imposed by China on Lithuania in December 2021, following the approval of the establishment of a representative office of Taiwan in Vilnius,
Amendment 16 #
Motion for a resolution
Citation 11 a (new)
Citation 11 a (new)
– having regard to the Critical Raw Materials Act proposed by the Commission on 16 March 2023 (COM(2023) 160),
Amendment 22 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital C a (new)
Recital C a (new)
Ca. whereas pursuant to the international commitments undertaken in the WTO, in the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, and in the trade and investment agreements concluded with third countries, it is possible for the EU and the Member States to adopt restrictive measures relating to foreign direct investment on the grounds of security or public order, subject to certain requirements;
Amendment 23 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital C b (new)
Recital C b (new)
Cb. whereas the three largest Chinese shareholders in European ports have assets in almost half the ports (14 out of 29) that are located either close to naval bases or provide logistical support to NATO forces, highly increasing the risk of espionage;
Amendment 34 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital E a (new)
Recital E a (new)
Ea. whereas China is involved in constructing EU-funded infrastructure in different EU Member States;
Amendment 37 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital E b (new)
Recital E b (new)
Amendment 38 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital E c (new)
Recital E c (new)
Ec. whereas the Chinese government has demonstrated that it is willing to weaponize its overwhelming control of global rare earth supplies to obtain political concessions;
Amendment 65 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 4 a (new)
Paragraph 4 a (new)
4a. Underlines that PRC projects power overseas by using a network of commercial ports and dual-use facilities that provide logistics and intelligence support to the Chinese navy; notes that in 2022, Chinese companies owned or operated terminals in 96 ports across 53 countries; further notes that in at least 9 ports, two of which in Europe, PLAN warships have undergone significant repairs or maintenance for vessels and equipment; points out that naval visits reveal areas of influence, prioritised operational zones, intelligence collection objectives and cooperation priorities;
Amendment 74 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 5 a (new)
Paragraph 5 a (new)
5a. Emphasises that 98% of EU’s demand for rare earths is being met by the PRC, and that the EU is also reliant on China for solar panels, clean technology, cars, and pharmaceutical technology; underlines the importance of reshoring, using various ways to encourage it, such as financial incentives, innovation policies, industrial policies, trade policies, environmental policies or monetary policies;
Amendment 90 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 7 a (new)
Paragraph 7 a (new)
7a. Stresses that the EU and NATO must work together to develop a long-term plan to counter China’s military-civil fusion (MCF) strategy in Europe;
Amendment 112 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 10
Paragraph 10
10. Welcomes the potential of the Commission’s proposal for a European economic security strategy to expand the EU toolkit to exports or outward investments in a narrow set of key enabling technologies with military applications, inter alia, in the areas of quantum computing, advanced semiconductors and artificial intelligence; calls for the swift adoption of the Commission’s proposals and for the Member States to fully implement the EU’s expanded regulatory framework to exclude entities that could contribute to MCF and to find alternatives for Chinese-financed projects in the EU;
Amendment 119 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 11 a (new)
Paragraph 11 a (new)
11a. Calls on the Commission to establish a regulatory framework and additional security standards for Chinese suppliers of 5G and 6G networks;
Amendment 134 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 13 a (new)
Paragraph 13 a (new)
13a. Stresses the importance of tracking and assessing China’s access to critical infrastructure in the EU, as well as strengthening FDI-screening procedures with due-diligence standards to identify China’s leverage on investors in critical infrastructure;
Amendment 136 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 13 b (new)
Paragraph 13 b (new)
13b. Underlines the need to coordinate critical-infrastructure protection at EU and national levels; considers that responsibility for protecting critical infrastructure ultimately lies with Member States, which should enact critical-infrastructure protection regulations consistent with those in force at EU level;