Activities of Roberts ZĪLE related to 2023/0111(COD)
Shadow reports (1)
REPORT on the proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Regulation (EU) No 806/2014 as regards early intervention measures, conditions for resolution and funding of resolution action
Amendments (8)
Amendment 63 #
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 2 a (new)
Recital 2 a (new)
(2a) The current legislative review seeks to reinforce the conditions for an orderly bank resolution that provides more protection for depositors. It firmly upholds the insurance to covered deposits, while reinforcing the policy toolbox for resolution, thus allowing for smoother alternatives that provide additional safeguards to depositors and financial stability.
Amendment 65 #
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 4
Recital 4
(4) The intensity, and level of detail, of the resolution planning work needed with respect to subsidiaries that have not been identified as resolution entities varies depending on the size and risk profile of the institutions and entities concerned, the presence of critical functions, and the group resolution strategy. The Single Resolution Board (the ‘Board’) should therefore be able to consider those factors when identifying the measures to be taken in respect of such subsidiaries and follow a simplified approach where appropriate, as long as the simplified approach does not, under any circumstances, result in a reduction of required standards.
Amendment 72 #
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 11
Recital 11
(11) Where the resolution strategy envisages the use of resolution tools other than bail-in, the recapitalisation needs of the entity concerned will generally be smaller after resolution than in case of open bank bail-in. The calibration of the MREL in such a case should take that aspect into account when estimating the recapitalisation requirement. Therefore, when adjusting the level of the MREL for resolution entities the resolution plan of which envisages the sale of business tool or the bridge institution tool and its exit from the market, the Board should take into account the features of those tools, including the expected perimeter of the transfer to the private purchaser or to the bridge institution, the types of instruments to be transferred, the expected value and marketability of those instruments, and the design of the preferred resolution strategy, including the complementary use of the asset separation tool. Since the resolution authority has to decide on a case by case basis on any possible use in resolution of funds from the deposit guarantee scheme and since such decision cannot be assumed with certainty ex ante, the Board should not consider the potential contribution of the deposit guarantee scheme (in resolution when calibrating the level of the MREL. That approach also reduces the likelihood of moral hazard by ensuring that entities are not pre-emptively assuming that funds from the respective deposit guarantee scheme will be used to reach the 8% total liabilities and own funds target.
Amendment 76 #
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 14 a (new)
Recital 14 a (new)
(14a) Where the Board requires information that is necessary for the purposes of updating resolution plans, preparing for the possible resolution of an entity or of carrying out a valuation, the ECB or the relevant national competent authorities should provide the Board with that information to the extent that it is available to them. Where the relevant information is not already available to the ECB or the relevant national competent authorities, the Board and the ECB or the relevant national competent authorities should cooperate and coordinate to collect the information considered necessary by the Board. In the context of such cooperation, the authorities should collect the necessary information having due regard to the principle of proportionality.
Amendment 80 #
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 17 a (new)
Recital 17 a (new)
(17a) The resolution framework is meant to be applied to manage the failure of any institution or entity that has a positive public interest assessment, namely, when the tools available under national law are not adequate. To ensure such outcome, the criteria to apply the public interest assessment to any failing institution or entity should be specified.
Amendment 115 #
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 40 a (new)
Recital 40 a (new)
(40a) Despite an agreement having been reached on the introduction by the European Stability Mechanism (ESM) of a backstop to the Single Resolution Fund, its implementation has not yet been achieved. The additional function of the Single Resolution Fund to provide guarantees to deposit guarantee schemes thus warrants additional safeguards to the former, such as the ratification of the ESM backstop to the Single Resolution Fund.
Amendment 174 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 15
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 15
Regulation (EU) No 806/2014
Article 13 – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 1 – point f a (new)
Article 13 – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 1 – point f a (new)
(fa) the requirement for the management body of the entity to draw up a plan that the entity can implement in case the relevant corporate body decides to initiate the voluntary winding down of the entity.
Amendment 257 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 20
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 20
Regulation (EU) No 806/2014
Article 18a – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 6 a (new)
Article 18a – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 6 a (new)
Where the ECB or the relevant national competent authority does not recognise the remediation plan as credible or feasible, or where the institution or entity fails to comply with the remediation plan, an assessment of whether the institution or entity is failing or likely to fail shall be conducted in accordance with Article 18.