BETA

Activities of Syed KAMALL related to 2010/0251(COD)

Plenary speeches (5)

2016/11/22
Dossiers: 2010/0251(COD)

2016/11/22
Dossiers: 2010/0251(COD)

2016/11/22
Dossiers: 2010/0251(COD)

2016/11/22
Dossiers: 2010/0251(COD)

2016/11/22
Dossiers: 2010/0251(COD)

Amendments (56)

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 3

(3) It is appropriate and necessary for the provisions to take the legislative form of a Regulation as some provisions impose direct obligations on private parties to notify and disclose net short positions relating to certain instruments and regarding uncovered short selling. This Regulation does not impose notification and disclosure obligations with respect to long positions, as such obligations are the subject matter of Directive 2004/109/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council on the harmonisation of transparency requirements in relation to information about issuers whose securities are admitted to trading on a regulated market1. A regulation is also necessary to confer powers on the European Securities and Markets Authority (ESA (ESMA) established by Regulation (EU) No ~~[…/…]~~1095/2010 of the European Parliament and of the Council16 to coordinate measures taken by competent authorities or to take measures itself. __________________ 1 OJ 390, 31.12.2004, p. 38.

2011/01/20
Committee: ECON

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 4 a (new)

(4a) Short selling contributes to the efficiency of markets. It increases market liquidity (as the short seller sells securities and then later repurchases those securities to cover the short sale). Also, by allowing investors to act when they believe a security is overvalued short selling leads to the more efficient pricing of securities, helps to mitigate price bubbles and can act as an early indicator of underlying problems relating to an issuer. It is also an important tool for hedging and other risk management activities and market making.

2011/01/20
Committee: ECON

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 6

(6) Enhanced transparency relating to significant net short positions in specific financial instruments is likely to be of benefit to ~~both~~ the regulator ~~and to market participants~~. For shares admitted to trading on a trading venue in the Union, a two-tier model should be introduced that provides for greater transparency of significant net short positions in shares at the appropriate level. At a ~~lower~~defined threshold, notification of a position should be made privately to the regulators concerned to enable them to monitor and, where necessary, investigate short selling that may create systemic risks or be abusive; at a higher threshold, positions should be publicly disclosed to the market in order to provide useful information to other market participants about significant individual short selling positions in shares.

2011/01/20
Committee: ECON

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 8

(8) The notification requirements for sovereign debt should apply to the debt issued by the Union and Member States, including any ministry, department, central bank, agency or instrumentality that issues debt on behalf of a Member State but excluding regional bodies or quasi public bodies that issue debt. This Regulation should not cover debt instruments of corporate issuers in the Union which are not issued on behalf of a Member State.

2011/01/20
Committee: ECON

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 10

(10) To be useful to regulators and the market, any transparency regime should provide complete and accurate information about a natural or legal person'’s positions. In particular, information provided to the regulator o~~r the market~~n a private basis and should take into account both short and long positions so as to provide valuable information about the natural or legal person'’s net short position in shares, sovereign debt and credit default swaps. To avoid regulators receiving notifications that provide information with no material, systemic or supervisory value, the thresholds for private notification should be carefully assessed and the costs and benefits of different thresholds should be considered in detail by ESA (ESMA), which should then advise the Commission as to the appropriate thresholds to be used.

2011/01/20
Committee: ECON

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 12

(12) In addition to the transparency regime for the disclosure of net short positions in shares, ~~a requirement for the marking of sell orders that are executed on trading venues as short orders should be introduced to provide supplementary information about the volume of short sales of sh~~ESA (ESMA) should conduct a quantitative and qualitative impact assessment investigating the costs and benefits of establishing a requirement for the marking of sell orders that ares executed on trading venues. Information about short orders should be collated by the trading venue and published in summary form at least daily in order to also help competent authorities and market participants to monitor levels of short selling as short orders and whether the objective is better achieved by the transparency regime for the disclosure of net short positions in shares.

2011/01/20
Committee: ECON

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 13

(13) Buying credit default swaps without having a long position in underlying sovereign debt or other property or securities located in or issued by entities in the relevant jurisdiction whose value is likely to be negatively impacted by a decline in the creditworthiness of the relevant sovereign can be, economically speaking, equivalent to taking a short position on the underlying debt instrument. The calculation of a net short position in relation to sovereign debt should therefore include credit default swaps relating to an obligation of a sovereign debt issuer. The credit default swap position should be taken into account both for the purposes of determining whether a natural or legal person has a significant net short position relating to sovereign debt that needs to be notified to a competent authority or a significant uncovered position in a credit default swap relating to an issuer of sovereign debt that needs to be notified to the authority.

2011/01/20
Committee: ECON

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 16

(16) Uncovered short selling of shares and sovereign debt is sometimes viewed as increasing the potential risk of settlement failure and volatility. To reduce such risks it is appropriate to place proportionate restrictions on uncovered short selling. The ~~detailed restrict~~Commissions should take into account the different arrangements currently used for covered short selling. It is also appropriate to include requirements on trading venues relating to buy-in procedures and fines for failed settlement of transactions in those instruments. The buy-in procedures and late settlement requirements should set basic standards relating to settlement discipline. However, measures related to settlement and buy-ins should be dealt with in other Union legislation, in a context other than short selling as they are not unique to short selling.

2011/01/20
Committee: ECON

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 16 a (new)

(16a) While settlement discipline is an important component of well-functioning financial markets, it is recognised that the causes of settlement fails are diverse and not limited to short selling. Although settlement discipline, including fines for late settlement and other appropriate measures, should not be included in the scope of this Regulation, the Commission should make concrete proposals in this field by the end of 2011, in parallel with a proposal to create a harmonised legal framework for central securities depositories.

2011/01/20
Committee: ECON

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 17

(17) Measures relating to sovereign debt and sovereign credit default swaps including increased transparency and restrictions on uncovered short selling should impose requirements which are proportionate and at the same time avoid an adverse impact on the liquidity of sovereign bond markets and sovereign bond repurchase (repo) markets. Sovereign credit default swaps are legitimately used to hedge risks other than direct exposure to sovereign debt. This Regulation should not therefore restrict or prohibit uncovered positions in sovereign credit default swaps.

2011/01/20
Committee: ECON

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 19

(19) Market making activities play a crucial role in providing liquidity to markets within the Union and market makers need to take short positions to perform that role. Imposing requirements on such activities could severely inhibit their ability to provide liquidity and have a significant adverse impact on the efficiency of the Union markets. Further market makers would not be expected to take significant short positions except for very brief periods. It is therefore appropriate to exempt natural or legal persons involved in such activities from requirements which may impair their ability to perform such a function and therefore adversely affect the Union markets. In order to capture equivalent third country entities a procedure is necessary to assess the equivalence of the third country markets. The exemption should apply to the different types of market making activity ~~but not to exempt proprietary trading~~that contribute addressable liquidity. It is also appropriate to exempt ~~certain~~ primary market operations such as those relating to sovereign debt and stabilisation schemes as they are important activities that assist the efficient functioning of markets. Competent authorities should be notified of the use of exemptions and should have the power to prohibit a natural or legal person from using an exemption if they do not fulfil the relevant criteria in the exemption. Competent authorities should also be able to request information from the natural or legal person to monitor their use of the exemption.

2011/01/20
Committee: ECON

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 27

(27) Powers of intervention of competent authorities ~~and ESMA~~ to restrict short selling, credit default swaps and other transactions should only be temporary in nature and should only be exercised for such a period and to the extent necessary to deal with the specific threat.

2011/01/20
Committee: ECON

Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – point 3

(3) debt instruments issued by a Member State or the Union and derivatives set out in Annex I Section C points (4) to (10) of Directive 2004/39/EC that relate or are referenced to such debt instruments issued by a Member State or the ~~Union or to an obligation of a Member State or the~~ Union.

2011/01/20
Committee: ECON

Proposal for a regulation
Article 2 – point c

(c) "credit default swap" means a derivative contract in which one party pays a fee to another party in return for compensation or a payment in the event of a default by a reference entity, or a credit event relating to that reference entity ~~and any other derivative contract that has a similar economic effect~~;

2011/01/20
Committee: ECON

Proposal for a regulation
Article 3 – paragraph 1 – introductory part

1. For the purposes of this Regulation, a position resulting from either of the following (in the case of point (b), on a delta-adjusted basis) shall be considered a short position relating to the issued share capital of a company or issued sovereign debt of a Member State or the Union:

2011/01/20
Committee: ECON

Proposal for a regulation
Article 3 – paragraph 1 – point b

(b) a natural or legal person entering into transaction ~~which creates or relates to~~in a financial instrument other than the instruments referred to in point (a) ~~and the~~where the direct effect or one of the direct effects of the transaction is to confer a financial advantage on the natural or legal person in the event of a decrease in the price or value of the share or debt instrument.

2011/01/20
Committee: ECON

Proposal for a regulation
Article 3 – paragraph 2 – introductory part

2. For the purposes of this Regulation, a position resulting from either of the following (in the case of point (b) on a delta-adjusted basis) shall be considered a long position relating to the issued share capital of a company or issued sovereign debt of a Member State or the Union:

2011/01/20
Committee: ECON

Proposal for a regulation
Article 3 – paragraph 6 a (new)

6a. The calculation of a net short position and a net long position for the purposes of paragraphs 3, 4 and 5 shall include any financial instrument giving rise to an economic exposure, whether direct or indirect, to the issued share capital of a company or sovereign debt of a Member State or the Union, provided that: (a) any economic interest held as part of a basket, index or exchange traded fund is determined on the basis of the information as to the composition of the relevant index or basket of securities or of the holdings of the exchange traded fund publicly available at the time of making the calculation and the natural or legal person making the calculation is not required to obtain up-to-date information with respect to such composition from any person; and (b) calculation of a long position is included any interest in debt securities convertible into shares of the relevant issuer.

2011/01/20
Committee: ECON

Proposal for a regulation
Article 4 – paragraph 1

1. For the purposes of this Regulation, a natural or legal person shall be considered to have an uncovered position in a credit default swap relating to an obligation of a Member State or the Union, to the extent that the credit default swap is not serving to hedge against ~~the risk of default of the issuer where the natural or legal person has a long position in the sovereign debt of that issuer or any long position in the debt of an issuer for which the price~~risks associated with the relevant Member State or the Union or with risks associated with property or securities located in ofr i~~ts debt has a high correlation with the price of the obligat~~ssued by entities in the relevant jurisdiction held in the portfolion of ~~a Member State or the Uni~~the natural or legal person. The party under a credit default swap that is obliged to make the payment or pay the compensation in the event of a default or a credit event relating to the reference entity does not by reason of that obligation have an uncovered position for the purposes of this paragraph.

2011/01/20
Committee: ECON

Proposal for a regulation
Article 5 – paragraph 2

~~2. A relevant notification threshold is a percentage that equals 0.2% of the value of the issued share capital of the company concerned and each 0.1% above that.~~deleted

2011/01/20
Committee: ECON

Proposal for a regulation
Article 5 – paragraph 3

3. The Commission ~~may~~shall, by means of delegated acts in accordance with Article 36 and subject to the conditions of Articles 37 and 38, ~~mod~~specify the thresholds mentioned in paragraph ~~2, taking into account the developments in financial markets~~1.

2011/01/20
Committee: ECON

Proposal for a regulation
Article 6

Marking of short orders on trading venue A trading venue that has shares admitted to trading shall establish procedures that ensure that natural or legal persons executing orders on the trading venue mark sell orders as short orders if the seller is entering into a short sale of the share. The trading venue shall publish at least daily a summary of the volume of orders marked as short orders.Article 6 deleted

2011/01/20
Committee: ECON

Proposal for a regulation
Article 7

Public disclosure of significant net short 1. A natural or legal person who has a net short position in relation to the issued share capital of a company that has shares admitted to trading on a trading venue shall disclose to the public details of the position whenever the position reaches or falls below a relevant publication threshold referred to in paragraph 2. 2. A relevant publication threshold is a percentage that equals 0.5% of the value of the issued share capital of the company concerned and each 0.1% above that. 3. The Commission may, by means of delegated acts in accordance with Article 36 and subject to the conditions of Articles 37 and 38, modify the thresholds mentioned in paragraph 2, taking into account the developments in financial markets.Article 7 deleted positions in shares

2011/01/20
Committee: ECON

Proposal for a regulation
Article 8

Notification to competent authorities of significant net short positions in sovereign 1. A natural or legal person who has any of the following positions shall notify the relevant competent authority whenever any such position reaches or falls below a relevant notification threshold for the Member State concerned or the Union: (a) a net short position relating to the issued sovereign debt of a Member State or of the Union; (b) an uncovered position in a credit default swap relating to an obligation of a Member State or the Union. 2. The relevant notification thresholds shall consist of an initial amount and then additional incremental levels in relation to each Member State and the Union, as specified in the measures taken by the Commission in accordance with paragraph 3. 3. The Commission shall, by means of delegated acts in accordance with Article 36 and subject to the conditions of Articles 37 and 38, specify the amounts and incremental levels referred to in paragraph 2. It shall take into account all of the following elements: (a) that the thresholds shall not be set at such a level as to require notification of positions which are of minimal value; (b) the total value of outstanding issued sovereign debt for each Member State and the Union and the average size of positions held by market participants relating to the sovereign debt of that Member State or the Union.Article 8 deleted debt and credit default swaps

2011/01/20
Committee: ECON

Proposal for a regulation
Article 9 – paragraph 1

1. Any notification ~~or disclosure~~ under Articles 5, 7 or 8 shall set out details of the identity of the natural or legal person who has the relevant position, the size of the relevant position, the issuer in relation to which the relevant position is held and the date on which the relevant position was created, changed or ceased to be held.

2011/01/20
Committee: ECON

Proposal for a regulation
Article 9 – paragraph 2

2. The relevant time for calculation of a net short position shall be at 1~~2.00~~1.59 pm of the trading day on which the natural or legal person has the relevant position. The notification or disclosure shall be made not later than 3.30 pm on the next trading day. The times shall be calculated by reference to the time zone of the principal place of business of the natural or legal person.

2011/01/20
Committee: ECON

Proposal for a regulation
Article 9 – paragraph 4 a (new)

4a. The competent authority may decide whether any disclosure shall be made under any Article of positions held on the coming into force of this Regulation unless on or after the coming into force of this Regulation the percentage value of the position of a natural or legal person changes to reach or fall below a relevant notification or publication threshold by a deliberate act of that person.

2011/01/20
Committee: ECON

Proposal for a regulation
Article 12 – paragraph 1 – introductory part

1. A natural or legal person may only enter into a ~~short~~ sale of a share admitted to trading on a trading venue ~~or a short sale of a sovereign debt instrument~~, where that sale is expected to result in a net short position in the relevant share at the close of business, where one of the following conditions is fulfilled:

2011/01/20
Committee: ECON

Proposal for a regulation
Article 12 – paragraph 1 – point a

(a) the natural or legal person has borrowed the share ~~or sovereign debt instrument~~;

2011/01/26
Committee: ECON

Proposal for a regulation
Article 12 – paragraph 1 – point b

(b) the natural or legal person has entered into an agreement to borrow the share ~~or sovereign debt instrument~~;

2011/01/26
Committee: ECON

Proposal for a regulation
Article 12 – paragraph 1 – point c

(c) the natural or legal person has an arrangement with a third party under which that third party has confirmed that the share ~~or sovereign debt instrument~~ has been located ~~and reserved~~ for lending for the natural or legal person so that settlement can be effected when it is due.

2011/01/26
Committee: ECON

Proposal for a regulation
Article 13

Buy-in procedures and fines for late 1. A trading venue that has shares or sovereign debt admitted to trading shall ensure that it, or the central counterparty that provides clearing services for the trading venue, has procedures in place which comply with all of the following requirements: (a) where a natural or legal person who sells shares or sovereign debt instruments on the venue is not able to deliver the shares or sovereign debt instrument for settlement within four trading days after the day on which the trade takes place, or six trading days after the day on which the trade takes place in the case of market making activities, then procedures are automatically triggered for the trading venue or central counterparty to buy-in the shares or sovereign debt instrument to ensure delivery for settlement; (b) where the trading venue or central counterparty is not able to buy-in the shares or the sovereign debt instrument for delivery then cash compensation is paid by the trading venue or the central counterparty to the buyer based on the value of the shares or the debt to be delivered at the delivery date plus an amount for any losses incurred by the buyer; (c) the natural or legal person who fails to settle pays an amount to the trading venue or central counterparty to reimburse the trading venue or central counterparty for all amounts paid pursuant to points (a) and (b). 2. A trading venue that has shares or sovereign debt instruments admitted to trading shall ensure that it has procedures in place, or that the settlement system that provides settlement services for the shares or sovereign debt instrument has procedures in place, which ensure that where a natural or legal person who sells shares or sovereign debt instrument on the venue fails to deliver the shares or sovereign debt instrument for settlement by the date on which settlement is due, then such natural or legal person is subject to the obligation to make daily payments to the trading venue or settlement system for each day that the failure continues. The daily payments shall be sufficiently high not to allow the seller to make a profit from the settlement failure and to act as a deterrent to natural or legal persons failing to settle. 3. A trading venue that has shares or sovereign debt admitted to trading shall have in place rules that enable it to prohibit a natural or legal person that is a member of the trading venue from entering into further short sales of shares or sovereign debt instruments on the trading venue as long as that person fails to settle a transaction resulting from a short sale on that trading venue.Article 13 deleted settlement

2011/01/26
Committee: ECON

Proposal for a regulation
Article 15 – paragraph 1 – introductory part

1. Articles 5~~, 6, 7,~~ to 8 and 12 shall not apply to the activities of an investment firm or a third country entity or a local firm that is a member of a trading venue or of a market in a third country, whose legal and supervisory framework has been declared equivalent pursuant to paragraph 2, when it deals as principal in any financial instrument~~, whether traded on or outside a trading venue, in either or both~~ including equities, options, derivatives, sovereign debt and corporate debt, whether traded on or outside a trading venue or as a systemic internaliser, in one or more of the following capacities:

2011/01/26
Committee: ECON

Proposal for a regulation
Article 15 – paragraph 1 – point a

(a) ~~by posting firm, simultaneous two way quotes of comparable size and at competitive prices, with the result of providing liquidity on a regular and ongoing basis to the market~~in a way that ordinarily has the effect of providing liquidity on a regular basis to the market on both bid and offer sides of the market of comparable size;

2011/01/26
Committee: ECON

Proposal for a regulation
Article 15 – paragraph 1 – point b

(b) as part of its usual business, by fulfilling orders initiated by clients ~~or in response to~~and other market makers or in response to or in anticipation of clients' requests to trade, and by hedging positions arising out of those dealings, whether on a partial or macro basis.

2011/01/26
Committee: ECON

Proposal for a regulation
Article 15 – paragraph 3

3. Articles 8 and 12 and any restrictions or requirements imposed in relation to sovereign debt under Article 16, 17, 18 or 24 shall not apply to the activities of a natural or legal person ~~when, acting as an~~ authorised primary dealer pursuant to an agreement with an issuer of sovereign debt~~, it~~ and which is dealing as principal in a financial instrument in relation to primary or secondary market operations relating to the sovereign debt. of a Member State.

2011/01/26
Committee: ECON

Proposal for a regulation
Article 15 – paragraph 5

5. The exemptions referred to in paragraphs 1 and 3 shall only apply where the natural or legal person concerned has first notified the competent authority of its home Member State, in writing that it~~hey~~ intends to make use of the exemption. The noti~~fication shall be made not less than thirty calendar days before the natural or legal person intends to use the exemption~~ce shall stipulate the type of financial instrument in which the natural or legal person intends to make a market, such as equities, derivatives, corporate bonds, sovereign bonds or options. The notification shall be made not less than thirty calendar days before the natural or legal person intends to use the exemption for trading in any stipulated type of financial instrument unless the competent authority consents to a shorter notice period.

2011/01/26
Committee: ECON

Proposal for a regulation
Article 16 – paragraph 1 – introductory part

1. The competent authority of a Member State may require natural or legal persons who have net short positions in relation to a s~~pecific financial instrument or class of financial instruments to notify it or~~hare admitted to trading on a trading venue to disclose to the public details of the position whenever the position reaches or falls below a notification threshold fixed by the competent authority, where all the following conditions are fulfilled:

2011/01/26
Committee: ECON

Proposal for a regulation
Article 16 – paragraph 2

2. ~~Paragraph 1 shall not apply to financial instruments in respect of which transparency is already required under Articles 5 to 8~~The competent authority of a Member State shall not be permitted to require natural or legal persons who have net short positions in relation financial instruments in respect of which transparency is already required under Articles 5 to 8 of Chapter II, to make additional notifications to it or additional public disclosure in relation to such positions that exceed the requirements set out in Articles 5 to 8 of Chapter II.

2011/01/26
Committee: ECON

Proposal for a regulation
Article 17 – paragraph 2 – introductory part

2. The competent authority of the Member State may prohibit or impose conditions relating to natural or legal persons e~~ntering into:~~stablishing or increasing net short positions in relation to shares admitted to trading on a trading venue in the Member State.

2011/01/26
Committee: ECON

Proposal for a regulation
Article 17 – paragraph 2 – point a

~~(a) a short sale;~~deleted

2011/01/26
Committee: ECON

Proposal for a regulation
Article 17 – paragraph 2 – point b

(b) a transaction other than a short sale which creates, or relates to, a financial instrument and the effect or one of the effects of that transaction is to confer a financial advantage on the natural or legal person in the event of a decrease in the price or value of another financial instrument.deleted

2011/01/26
Committee: ECON

Proposal for a regulation
Article 18

transactions in exceptional situations 1. The competent authority of a Member State may limit natural or legal persons from entering into credit default swap transactions relating to an obligation of a Member State or the Union or limit the value of uncovered credit default swap positions that may be entered into by natural or legal persons that relate to an obligation of a Member State or the Union, where both the following conditions are fulfilled: (a) there are adverse events or developments which constitute a serious threat to financial stability or to market confidence in the Member State or one or more other Member States; (b) the measure is necessary to address the threat. 2. A measure under paragraph 1 may apply to credit default swap transactions of a specific class or to specific credit default swap transactions. The measure may apply in circumstances or be subject to exceptions specified by the competent authority. Exceptions may in particular be specified to apply to market making activities and primary market activities.Article 18 deleted Restrictions on credit default swap

2011/01/26
Committee: ECON

Proposal for a regulation
Article 19 – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 1

1. Where the price of a financial instrument on a trading venue has during a single trading day fallen by the value referred to in paragraph 4 from the closing price on that venue on the previous trading day, the competent authority of the home Member State for that venue ~~shall~~may consider whether it is appropriate to prohibit or restrict natural or legal persons from engaging in short selling of the financial instrument on the trading venue or otherwise limit transactions in that financial instrument on that trading venue in order to prevent a disorderly decline in the price of the financial instrument.

2011/01/26
Committee: ECON

Proposal for a regulation
Article 19 – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 2

Where the competent authority is satisfied under the first subparagraph that it is appropriate to do so, it ~~shall~~may in the case of a share or debt prohibit or restrict persons from entering into a short sale on the trading venue or in the case of another type of financial instrument, limit transactions in that financial instrument on that trading venue and make public its reasons for so doing.

2011/01/26
Committee: ECON

Proposal for a regulation
Article 19 – paragraph 4 – subparagraph 1

4. The fall in value shall be ~~10% or more in the case of a share and for o~~an amount to be specified by ther c~~lasses of financial instruments an amount to be specified by the Commission~~ompetent authority on an individual basis.

2011/01/26
Committee: ECON

Proposal for a regulation
Article 19 – paragraph 4 – subparagraph 2

~~The Commission shall, by means of~~ delegated acts in accordance with Article 36 and subject to the conditions of Articles 37 and 38, specify the fall in value for financial instruments other than shares, taking into account the specificities of each class of financial instrument.

2011/01/26
Committee: ECON

Proposal for a regulation
Article 19 – paragraph 5

~~5. Powers are~~ delegated to the Commission to adopt regulatory technical standards specifying the method of calculation of the 10% fall for shares and of the fall in value specified by the Commission as referred to in paragraph 4. The regulatory standards referred to in the first subparagraph shall be adopted in accordance with Articles [7 to 7d] of Regulation (EU) No …/….[ESMA Regulation]. ESMA shall submit drafts for those regulatory technical standards to the Commission by [31 December 2011] at the latest.

2011/01/26
Committee: ECON

Proposal for a regulation
Article 19 – paragraph 5 – subparagraph 1

~~5. Powers are~~ delegated to the Commission to adopt regulatory technical standards specifying the method of calculation of the 10% fall for shares and of the fall in value specified by the Commission as referred to in paragraph 4.

2011/01/26
Committee: ECON

Proposal for a regulation
Article 19 – paragraph 5 – subparagraph 3

~~ESMA shall submit drafts for those regulatory technical standards to the Commission by [31 December 2011] at the latest.~~deleted

2011/01/26
Committee: ECON

Proposal for a regulation
Article 20 – paragraph 2

Any such measure may be renewed for further periods not exceeding three months at a time if the grounds for taking the measure continue to be applicable. If the measure is not renewed after that three- month period, it shall automatically expire.

2011/01/26
Committee: ECON

Proposal for a regulation
Article 24

ESMA intervention powers 1. In accordance with Article [6a(5)] of Regulation (EU) No …/…. [ESMA Regulation], ESMA shall, where all conditions in paragraph 2 are satisfied, take one or more of the following measures: (a) require natural or legal persons who have net short positions in relation to a specific financial instrument or class of financial instruments to notify a competent authority or to disclose to the public details of any such position; (b) prohibit or impose conditions relating to natural or legal persons entering into a short sale or a transaction which creates, or relates to, a financial instrument and the effect or one of the effects of the transaction is to confer a financial advantage on the natural or legal person in the event of a decrease in the price or value of another financial instrument; (c) limit natural or legal persons from entering into credit default swap transactions relating to an obligation of a Member State or the Union or limit the value of uncovered credit default swap positions that a natural or legal person may enter into relating to an obligation of a Member State or the Union; (d) prevent natural or legal persons from entering into transactions relating to a financial instruments or limit the value of transactions in the financial instrument that may be entered into. A measure may apply in circumstances or be subject to exceptions specified by the relevant competent authority. Exceptions may in particular be specified to apply to market making activities and primary market activities. 2. ESMA shall only take a decision under paragraph 1 if all of the following conditions are fulfilled: (a) the measures listed in points (a) to (d) of paragraph 1 address a threat to the orderly functioning and integrity of financial markets or the stability of the whole or part of the financial system in the Union and there are cross border implications; (b) a competent authority or competent authorities have not taken measures to address the threat or measures that have been taken do not sufficiently address the threat. 3. When taking measures referred to in paragraph 1 ESMA shall take into account the extent to which the measure: (a) will significantly address the threat to the orderly functioning and integrity of financial markets or the stability of the whole or part of the financial system in the Union or significantly improve the ability of competent authorities to monitor the threat; (b) will not create a risk of regulatory arbitrage; (c) will not have a detrimental effect on the efficiency of financial markets, including reducing liquidity in those markets or creating uncertainty for market participants, that is disproportionate to the benefits of the measure. Where a competent authority or competent authorities have taken a measure under Articles 16, 17 or 18, ESMA may take any of the measures referred to in paragraph 1 without issuing the opinion provided for in Article 23. 4. Before deciding to impose or renew any measure referred to in paragraph 1, ESMA shall consult, where appropriate, with the European Systemic Risk Board and other relevant authorities. 5. Before deciding to impose or renew any measure referred to in paragraph 1, ESMA shall notify competent authorities of the measure it proposes. The notification shall include details of the proposed measures, the class of financial instruments and transactions to which they will apply, the evidence supporting those reasons and when the measures are intended to take effect. 6. The notification shall be made not less than 24 hours before the measure is intended to take effect or to be renewed. In exceptional circumstances, ESMA may make the notification less than 24 hours before the measure is intended to take effect where it is not possible to give 24 hours notice. 7. ESMA shall publish on its website notice of any decision to impose or renew any measure referred to in paragraph 1. The notice shall at least specify the following details: (a) the measures imposed including the instruments and class of transactions to which they apply and the duration of the measures; (b) the reasons why ESMA is of the opinion that it is necessary to impose the measures including the evidence supporting the reasons. 8. A measure shall take effect when the notice is published or at a time specified in the notice that is after its publication and shall only apply in relation to a transaction entered into after the measure takes effect. 9. ESMA shall review its measures referred to in paragraph (1) at appropriate intervals and at least every three months. If a measure is not renewed after that three month period, it shall automatically expire. Paragraphs 2 to 8 shall apply to a renewal of measures. 10. A measure adopted by ESMA under this Article shall prevail over any previous measure taken by a competent authority under Section 1.Article 24 deleted

2011/01/26
Committee: ECON

Proposal for a regulation
Article 25

Further specification of adverse events or The Commission shall adopt by means of delegated acts in accordance with Article 36 and subject to the conditions of Articles 37 and 38, measures specifying criteria and factors to be taken into account by competent authorities and ESMA in determining when the adverse events or developments referred to in Articles 16, 17, 18 and 23 and the threats referred to in Article 24(2)(a) arise.Article 25 deleted developments

2011/01/26
Committee: ECON

Proposal for a regulation
Article 28 – paragraph 1

ESA (ESMA) may on the request of one or more competent authorities, the European Parliament, the Council, or the Commission or on its own initiative, conduct an inquiry into a particular issue or practice relating to short selling or relating to the use of credit default swaps to assess whether the issue or practice poses any potential threat to ~~financial stability or~~the stability of the financial system in the Union and marke~~t confidence in the Union~~ appropriate recommendations for action to the competent authorities concerned.

2011/01/26
Committee: ECON

Proposal for a regulation
Article 28 – paragraph 2

ESA (ESMA) shall publish a report setting out its findings and any recommendations relating to the issue or practice within three months of the date on which the inquiry was launched.

2011/01/26
Committee: ECON

Proposal for a regulation
Article 31 – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 2

The competent authority shall inform ESA (ESMA) of any request referred to in the first subparagraph. ~~In case of an investigation or an inspection with cross- border effect, ESMA shall coordinate the investigation or inspection.~~

2011/01/26
Committee: ECON