BETA

73 Amendments of Sharon BOWLES related to 2012/0242(CNS)

Amendment 75 #
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 1
(1) Over the past decades, the Union has made considerable progress in creating an internal market for banking services. Consequently, in many Member States, banking groups with their headquarters established in other Member States hold a significant market share, and credit institutions have geographically diversified their business, especially within the Euro area.
2012/10/30
Committee: ECON
Amendment 81 #
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 2
(2) Maintaining and deepening the internal market for banking services is essential in order to foster economic recovery in the Union. However this proves increasingly challenging. Evidence shows that the integration of banking markets in the Union is coming to a halt largely due to uncertainties relating to stability within the Eurozone.
2012/10/30
Committee: ECON
Amendment 89 #
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 4
(4) Competence for supervision of individual banks in the Union remains mostly at national level. This limits the effectiveness of supervision and the ability of supervisors to reach a common understanding of the soundness of the banking sector throughout the UnionCoordination between supervisors is vital but the crisis has shown that mere coordination is not enough, in particular in the context of a single currency. In order to preserve and increase the positive effects of market integration on growth and welfare, integration of supervisory responsibilities should therefore be enhanced.
2012/10/30
Committee: ECON
Amendment 105 #
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 6
(6) The European Banking Authority (EBA), established in 2011 by Regulation (EU) No. 1093/2010 of the European Parliament and the Council of 24 November 2010 establishing a European Supervisory Authority (European Banking Authority),4 and the European System of Financial Supervision established by Article 2 of that Regulation and of Regulation (EU) No 1094/2010 of 24 November 2010 establishing a European Supervisory Authority (EIOPA),5 and Regulation (EU) No 1095/2010 of 24 November 2010 establishing a European Supervisory Authority (ESMA)6 have significantly improved cooperation between banking supervisors within the Union. EBA is making important contributions to the creation of a single rulebook for financial services inthroughout the Union, and has been crucial in implementing in a consistent way the recapitalisation of major Union credit institutions agreed by the European Council in October 2011.
2012/10/30
Committee: ECON
Amendment 124 #
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 9
(9) A European banking union should therefore be set up, underpinned by a true single rulebook for financial services for the Single Market as a whole and composed of a single supervisory mechanism for prudential supervision of banks, and a common deposit insurance and resolution framework. . In view of the close links and interactions between Member States participating in the common currency, the banking union should apply at least to all Euro area Member States. With a view to maintaining and deepening the internal market, and to the extent that this is institutionally possible, the banking union should also be open to the participation of other Member States providing that there is no resulting discrimination.
2012/10/30
Committee: ECON
Amendment 132 #
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 10
(10) As a first step towards the banking union, a single supervisory mechanism should ensure that the Union's policy relating to the prudential supervision of credit institutions is implemented in a coherent and effective way, that the single rulebook for financial services is applied equally to credit institutions in all Member States concerned, and that those credit institutions are subject to supervision of the highest quality, unfettered by other, non- prudential considerations. A single supervisory mechanism is the basis for the next steps towards the banking union. This reflects the principle that any introduction of common intervention mechanisms in case of crises should be preceded by common controls to reduce the likelihood that intervention mechanisms will have to be used.
2012/10/30
Committee: ECON
Amendment 151 #
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 11
(11) As the Euro area's central bank with extensive expertise in macroeconomic and financial stability issues, the ECB is well placed to carry out supervisory tasks with a focus on protecting the stability of Europe's financial system. Indeed in many Member States Central Banks are already responsible for banking supervision. The ECB should therefore be conferred specific tasks concerning policies relating to the prudential supervision of credit institutions within the Euro area.
2012/10/30
Committee: ECON
Amendment 159 #
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 12
(12) The ECB should be conferred those specific prudential supervisory tasks which are crucial to ensure a coherent and effective implementation of the Union's policy relating to the prudential supervision of credit institutions, while other tasks should remain with national authorities. The ECB's tasks should include measures taken in pursuance of macro-prudential stability. and may include varying macro- prudential provisions under Union legislation relating to prudential supervision differently for individual Member States to address local circumstances. This should not exclude Member States also having the ability to vary macro-prudential controls in accordance with Union legislation.
2012/10/30
Committee: ECON
Amendment 172 #
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 13
(13) Safety and soundness of large banks is essential to ensure the stability of the financial system. However, recent experience shows that smaller banks can also pose a threat to financial stability. Therefore, the ECB should be able to exercise prudential supervisory tasks in relation to all banks of participating Member States.
2012/10/30
Committee: ECON
Amendment 186 #
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 14
(14) Prior authorisation for taking up the business of credit institutions is a key prudential technique to ensure that only operators with a sound economic basis, an organisation capable of dealing with the specific risks inherent to deposit taking and credit provision, and suitable directors carry out those activities. The ECB should therefore have the task to authorise credit institutions and should be responsible for the withdrawal of authorisations. Accordingly the ECB must also assume the necessary accountability and liabilities that would rest with the competent authorities whose power it is replacing.
2012/10/30
Committee: ECON
Amendment 192 #
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 15
(15) In addition to the conditions set out in Union legislative acts for authorisation of credit institutions and the cases for withdrawal of such authorisations, Member States may currently provide for further conditions for authorisation and cases for withdrawal of authorisation. The ECB should therefore carry out its task to authorise credit institutions and to withdraw the authorisation in case of non- compliance with national law upon a proposal by the relevant national competent authority, which assesses compliance with the relevant conditions set out by national law. It is nevertheless noted that these differences in national law constitute an unlevel playing field in that they lead to differences in supervisory culture and will need addressing in due course.
2012/10/30
Committee: ECON
Amendment 202 #
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 16
(16) An assessment of the suitability of any new owner prior to the purchase of a significant stake in a credit institution is an indispensable tool to ensure the continuous suitability and financial soundness of credit institutions' owners. The ECB as a Union institution is well-placed to carry out such an assessment without imposing undue restrictions to the internal market. The ECB should have the task to assess the prudential implications of acquisition and disposal of significant holdings in credit institutions.
2012/10/30
Committee: ECON
Amendment 204 #
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 16 a (new)
(16 a) It is necessary for a fast and efficient appeal level external to the ECB to be established. With regard to legal appeal to courts for institutions and individuals from a decision or action of the ECB, this should reside with the home Member State for parent institutions and branches and with the Member State of incorporation for subsidiaries. The ECB shall appear as required by judicial proceedings.
2012/10/30
Committee: ECON
Amendment 215 #
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 18
(18) Additional capital buffers, as permitted by Union law relating to prudential supervision of credit institutions, including a capital conservation buffer and a countercyclical capital buffer to ensure that individual credit institutions accumulate during periods of economic growth in the markets in which they are active a sufficient capital base to absorb losses in stressed periods, are key prudential tools to ensure the availability of adequate loss absorbency. The ECB should have the task to impose such buffers and ensure credit institutions comply with them, noting also the need for macro-prudential controls at the national level unless there is fiscal union.
2012/10/30
Committee: ECON
Amendment 225 #
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 19
(19) The safety and soundness of a credit institution depend also on the allocation of adequate internal capital, having regard to the risks to which it may be exposed, and on the availability of appropriate internal organisation structures and corporate governance arrangements. The ECB should therefore have the task to apply Union requirements in prudential regulation ensuring that credit institutions have in place robust governance arrangements, processes and mechanisms, including strategies and processes for assessing and maintaining the adequacy of their internal capital. In case of deficiencies it should also have the task to impose appropriate measures including specific additional own funds requirements, specific publication requirements, and specific liquidity requirements.
2012/10/30
Committee: ECON
Amendment 239 #
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 21
(21) In order to preserve financial stability, the deterioration of an institution's financial and economic situation must be remedied before that institution reaches a point at which authorities have no other alternative than to resolve it. The ECB should have the task to carry out early intervention actions as defined in relevant Union law relating to prudential supervision. It should however coordinate its early intervention action with the relevant resolution authorities. Pending the conferral of resolution powers on a European body, the ECB should moreover coordinate appropriately with the national authorities concerned to ensure a common understanding about respective responsibilities in case of crises, in particular in the context of the cross border crisis management groups and the future resolution colleges established for these purposes.
2012/10/30
Committee: ECON
Amendment 249 #
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 23
(23) The ECB should carry out the tasks conferred on it with a view to ensuring the safety and soundness of credit institutions and the stability of the financial system of the Union and the unity and integrity of the Internal Market, thereby ensuring also the protection of depositors and improving the functioning of the Internal Market, in accordance with the Treaties and single rulebook for financial services in the Union. In particular the ECB shall comply with all aspects of equality and non-discrimination on the basis of gender, nationality or between Member States and with any Union legislative measures intended to redress imbalances.
2012/10/30
Committee: ECON
Amendment 257 #
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 24
(24) The conferral of supervisory tasks on the ECB for some of the Member States should be consistent with the framework of the European System of Financial Supervision (ESFS) set up in 2010 and its underlying objective to develop the single rulebook and enhance convergence of supervisory practices across the whole Union. Cooperation between the banking supervisors and the supervisors of insurance and securities markets is important to deal with issues of joint interest and to ensure proper supervision of credit institutions operating also in the insurance and securities sectors. The ECB should therefore be required to cooperate closely with the EBA, the European Securities and Markets Authority and the European Insurance and Occupational Pensions Authority, within the framework of the EFSF and national authorities and to have memorandas of understanding concerning interaction with markets in financial instruments competent authorities.
2012/10/30
Committee: ECON
Amendment 266 #
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 25
(25) In order to ensure consistency between supervisory responsibilities conferredArticle 42 of the EBA Regulation 1093/2010 requires that the voting members of the Board of Supervisors shall act independently and objectively in the sole interest onf the ECB and decision making within the EBA, the ECB should coordinate a common position amongst representatives of the national authorities of Union as a whole and shall neither seek nor take instructions from Union institutions or bodies, or from any government of a member State or from any other public or private body. It further requires that neither Member States, the Union institutions or bodies, nor any other participating Member States in relation to matters falling within its competenceublic or private body should seek to influence the members of the Board of Supervisors in the performance of their tasks. Accordingly this should not be undermined by the ECB supervisory board nor governing council.
2012/10/30
Committee: ECON
Amendment 274 #
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 26
(26) The ECB should carry out its tasks subject to and in compliance with any Union law rule including the whole of primary and secondary Union law, Commission decisions in the area of State aids, competition rules and merger control and the single rulebook applying to all Member States. The EBA is entrusted with developing draft technical standards and guidelines and recommendations ensuring supervisory convergence and consistency of supervisory outcomes within the Union. The ECB should not replace the exercise of these tasks by the EBA, and should therefore exercise powers to adopt regulations in accordance with Article 132 TFEU only where Union acts adopted by the European Commission upon drafts developed by the EBA or guidelines and recommendations issued by the EBA do not deal with certain aspects necessary for the proper exercise of the ECB's tasks or do not deal with them in sufficient detail and providing there is no detrimental impact on the single market or assumption of responsibilities assigned to the EBA.
2012/10/30
Committee: ECON
Amendment 288 #
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 29
(29) As regards the supervision of cross- border banks active both inside and outside the Euro area the ECB should cooperate closely with the competent authorities of non participating Member States. As a competent authority the ECB should be subject to the related obligations to cooperate and exchange information under Union law and should participate fully in the colleges of supervisors. In addition, since the exercise of supervisory tasks by a European institution brings about clear benefits in terms of financial stability and sustainable market integration, Member States not participating in the common currency should therefore also have the possibility to participate in the new mechanism. However, it is a necessary pre- condition for an effective exercise of supervisory tasks, that supervisory decisions are implemented fully and without delay. Member States wishing to participate in the new mechanism should therefore undertake to ensure that their national competent authorities will abide by and adopt any measure in relation to credit institutions requested by the ECB and the ECB must assume the corresponding national level legal responsibility and democratic accountability for such actions including being subject to an inquiry, court or parliamentary appearance. The ECB should be able to establish a close cooperation with the competent authorities of a Member State not participating in the common currency. It should be obliged to establish the cooperation where the conditions set out in this regulation are met. The conditions under which representatives of the competent authorities of the Member States which established a close co-operation take part to the activities of the Supervisory Board should allow the greatest possible involvement of those representatives taking into account the legal limits following from the Statute of ESCB and of the ECB, in particular as regards the integrity of its decision making process, but noting that the independence requirements for monetary policy do not extend to the tasks assigned under policies relating to prudential supervision.
2012/10/30
Committee: ECON
Amendment 291 #
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 29
(29) As regards the supervision of cross- border banks active both inside and outside the Euro area the ECB should cooperate closely with the competent authorities of non participating Member States. As a competent authority the ECB should be subject to the related obligations to cooperate and exchange information under Union law and should participate fully in the colleges of supervisors. In addition, since the exercise of supervisory tasks by a European institution brings about clear benefits in terms of financial stability and sustainable market integration, Member States not participating in the common currency should therefore also have the possibility to participate in the new mechanism. However, it is a necessary pre- condition for an effective exercise of supervisory tasks, that supervisory decisions are implemented fully and without delay. Member States wishing to participate in the new mechanism should therefore undertake to ensure that their national competent authorities will abide by and adopt any measure in relation to credit institutions requested by the ECB. The ECB should be able to establish a close cooperation with the competent authorities of a Member State not participating in the common currency. It should be obliged to establish the cooperation where the conditions set out in this regulation are met. The conditions under which representatives of the competent authorities of the Member States which established a close co-operation take part to the activities of the Supervisory Board should allow the greatest possible involvement of those represenensure equal treatment of all participating Member Statives taking into account the limits following from the Statute of ESCB and of the ECB, in particular as regards the integrity of its decision making process.
2012/10/30
Committee: ECON
Amendment 300 #
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 30
(30) In order to carry out its tasks, the ECB should have appropriate supervisory powers. Union law on the prudential supervision of credit institutions provides for certain powers to be conferred on competent authorities designated by the Member States for those purposes. To the extent that these powers fall within the scope of the supervisory tasks conferred on the ECB, for participating Member States the ECB should be considered the competent authority and should have the powers conferred on competent authorities by Union law. This includes powers conferred by those acts on the competent authorities of the home and the host Member States and the powers conferred on designated authorities. The ECB must assume the corresponding national level legal responsibility and democratic accountability.
2012/10/30
Committee: ECON
Amendment 309 #
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 33
(33) In its decision-making procedures, the ECB should be bound by Union rules and general principles on due process and transparency. The right of the addressees of the ECB's decisions to be heard should be fully respectedand to have notice of all charges and evidence in a timely manner before any hearing should be fully respected. There shall be rights of appeal and recourse to the relevant national court.
2012/10/30
Committee: ECON
Amendment 314 #
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 34
(34) The conferral of supervisory tasks implies a significant responsibility for the ECB to safeguard financial stability in the Union, and to use its supervisory powers in the most effective and proportionate way. The ECB should therefore be accountable for the exercise of these tasks towards the European Parliament and the Council of Ministers respectively the Eurogroup as democratically legitimised institutions representing the European people and the Member States. That should include regular reporting and responding to questions. Where national supervisors take action under this Regulation, accountability arrangements provided under national law should continue to apply. The ECB should also be accountable to national parliaments for any actions imposed at least until such time as common financial backstops available to all participating Member States replace direct national taxpayer liability.
2012/10/30
Committee: ECON
Amendment 318 #
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 34
(34) The conferral of supervisory tasks implies a significant responsibility for the ECB to safeguard financial stability in the Union, and to use its supervisory powers in the most effective and proportionate way. The ECB should therefore be accountable for the exercise of these tasks towards the European Parliament and the Council of Ministers respectively the Eurogroup as democratically legitimised institutions representing the European people and the Member States. That should include regular reporting and responding to questions. Where national supervisors take action under this Regulation, accountability arrangements provided under national law should continue to apply.
2012/10/30
Committee: ECON
Amendment 342 #
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 36
(36) In particular, a supervisory board responsible for preparing decisions on supervisory matters should be set up with the ECB encompassing the specific expertise of national supervisors. The board should therefore be chaired by a Chair and a Vice-Chair elected by the ECB Governing Councilsupervisory board and composed, in addition, of representatives from the ECB and from national authorities. There should be a 50-50 gender balance on the supervisory board, including for the roles of Chair and Vice Chair. The Chair and Vice-Chair should only be appointed following confirmation by the European Parliament. In order to allow for an appropriate rotation while ensuring the full independence of the Chair and the Vice- Chair, their term should not exceed five years and should not be renewable. In order to ensure full coordination with the activities of the EBA and with the prudential policies of the Union, the EBA and the European Commission should be observers in the supervisory board. The performance of the supervisory tasks conferred upon the ECB requires the adoption of a large number of technically complex acts and decisions, including decisions on individual credit institutions. In order to effectively carry out those tasks in accordance with the principle of separation from tasks relating to monetary policy, the ECB Governing Council of the ECB should be able to delegate certain clearly defined supervisory tasks and related decisions to the supervisory board, subject to the oversight and responsibility of the Governing Council, which can give instructions and directions to that body. The supervisory board may be supported by a steering committee with a more limited composition.
2012/10/30
Committee: ECON
Amendment 348 #
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 36 a (new)
(36a) The minutes of the supervisory board including decisions relating to prudential supervision and voting records should be published, subject to any necessary professionally secrecy. The minutes of the Governing Council with regard to supervisory matters should be published.
2012/10/30
Committee: ECON
Amendment 357 #
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 38
(38) In order to carry out its supervisory tasks effectively, the ECB should exercise the supervisory tasks conferred on it in full independence, in particular from undue political influence and from industry interference which would affect its operational independence.
2012/10/30
Committee: ECON
Amendment 360 #
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 39
(39) In order to carry out its supervisory tasks effectively, the ECB should dispose of adequate resources. Those resources should be obtained in a way that ensures the ECB's independence from undue influences by national competent authorities and market participants, and separation between monetary policy and supervisory tasks. The costs of supervision should be primarily borne by the entities subject to it. Therefore, the exercise of supervisory tasks by the ECB should be financed at least partly by fees charged to credit institutions. In view of the transfer of significant supervisory tasks from national authorities to the ECB it is expected that any supervisory fees due at national level can be reduced as appropriate. The ECB should be subject to full financial and value for money (economy, efficiency and effectiveness) audit with regard to fees.
2012/10/30
Committee: ECON
Amendment 366 #
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 40
(40) Highly motivated, well-trained and impartial staff is indispensable to effective supervision. In order to create a truly integrated supervisory mechanism, appropriate exchange and secondment of staff with and among national supervisors and the ECB should be provided for. Where necessary to avoid conflicts of interest, particularly in the supervision of large banks, the ECB should be able towill normally request that national supervisory teams involve also staff from competent authorities of other participating Member States.
2012/10/30
Committee: ECON
Amendment 373 #
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 41 a (new)
(41a) The ECB should operate in a framework of openness, transparency and non-discrimination towards all Member States which do not use the single currency and with a duty of care towards the single market.
2012/10/30
Committee: ECON
Amendment 374 #
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 41 b (new)
(41b) The ECB should enter into memorandums of understanding with the supervisors of Member States not participating in the supervisory mechanism. Where a Member State has a systemic interest with regard to branches or subsidiaries, the competent authority of those Member State should be present as an observer in the supervisory board.
2012/10/30
Committee: ECON
Amendment 382 #
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 44
(44) In order to ensure that credit institutions are subject to supervision of the highest quality, unfettered by other, non- prudential considerations and that the negative mutually reinforcing impacts of market developments concerns banks and Member States is addressed in a timely and effective way, the ECB should start carrying out specific supervisory tasks as soon as possible. However, the transfer of supervisory tasks from national supervisors to the ECB requires a certain amount of preparation. Therefore, an appropriate phasing-in period should be provided for. The number of banks subject to the supervision of the ECB should increase progressively, taking into account the relevance of the supervision of those banks to ensure financial stability. As a first step the ECB should be able to apply its supervisory tasks to any banks, in particular to banks which have received or requested public financial assistance. As a second step, banks of European systemic importance as reflected in their total exposures and their cross-jurisdictional activities should be covered. Total exposures should be calculated in light of the methodologies defined in the Basel III accord of the Basel Committee on Banking Supervisors on the calculation of the leverage ratio and on the definition of common equity tier 1 capital. Particular attention should also be paid to non risk- weighted aggregates for the purposes of pillar ll capital. The phasing- in process should be completed within one year from the entry into force of this Regulation at the latest.
2012/10/30
Committee: ECON
Amendment 389 #
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 45
(45) The current framework of prudential requirements for credit institutions and the supplementary supervision of financial conglomerates is formed by Directives providing for a significant number of options and discretions for Member States when circumscribing the powers of competent authorities. Pending the adoption of new Union legislative acts which spell out the powers which competent authorities shall have directly and without reference to Member States' options or discretions, the ECB can therefore not take any decisions directly applicable to credit institutions, financial holding companies or mixed financial holding companies. In this transitional phase, the ECB should therefore exercise its tasks only by instructing national competent authorities to act, with the ECB accepting the relevant national legal responsibility and democratic accountability.
2012/10/30
Committee: ECON
Amendment 390 #
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 46
(46) This Regulation respects the fundamental rights and observes the principles recognised in the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, notably the right to the protection of personal data, the freedom to conduct a business, the right to an effective remedy and to a fair trial, and has to be implemented in accordance with those rights and principles. For this purpose the ECB should be party to a proceeding brought in a home member state or a state of incorporation of a subsidiary, with regard to its activity and decisions on prudential supervision.
2012/10/30
Committee: ECON
Amendment 400 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1
This Regulation confers on the ECB specific tasks concerning policies relating to the prudential supervision of credit institutions, with a view to promoting the safety and soundness of credit institutions and the stability of the financial system, with duefull regard and duty of care for the unity and integrity of the internal market. and respecting equality of Member States, freedom of establishment and non- discrimination on any basis including that of currency and location. In the carrying out of tasks conferred to it by this Regulation the ECB shall at no time undermine Article 119 paragraphs (1) and (2) of the Treaty of the Functioning of the European Union nor the tasks of the EBA, in particular with regard to Article 1 (5)(d) of Regulation 1093/2010.
2012/10/30
Committee: ECON
Amendment 406 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1
This Regulation confers on the ECB specific tasks concerning policies relating to the prudential supervision of credit institutions, with a view to promoting the safety and soundness of credit institutions and the stability of the financial system within the EU and each Member State, with due regard for the unity and integrity of the internal market.
2012/10/30
Committee: ECON
Amendment 432 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 3 – paragraph 1
The ECB shall cooperate closely with the European Banking Authority, the European Securities and Markets Authority, the European Insurance and Occupational Pensions Authority and the European Systemic Risk Board, which form part of the European System of Financial Supervision established by Article 2 of Regulations (EU) No. 1093/2010, (EU) No 1094/2010, and (EU) No 1095/2010 and national competent authorities of both participating and non-participating Member States. Where necessary the ECB shall enter into memorandums of understanding with competent authorities responsible for markets in financial instruments. Such memorandums shall be non-discriminatory and shall be made available to the European Parliament, the European Council and competent authorities of all Member States.
2012/10/30
Committee: ECON
Amendment 475 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 4 – paragraph 1 – point e
(e) TIn accordance with Union Acts imposing prudential requirements to impose capital buffers to be held by credit institutions in addition to own funds requirements referred to in (c), including setting countercyclical buffer rates and any other prudential measures aimed at addressing systemic or macro-prudential risks in the cases specifically set out in Union acts;
2012/10/30
Committee: ECON
Amendment 477 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 4 – paragraph 1 – point f
(f) TIn accordance with Union Acts imposing prudential requirements to apply requirements for credit institutions to have in place robust governance arrangements, processes and mechanisms and effective internal capital adequacy assessment processes;
2012/10/30
Committee: ECON
Amendment 481 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 4 – paragraph 1 – point g a (new)
(ga) to be responsible for the ongoing valuation of assets for the purposes of prudential supervision.
2012/10/30
Committee: ECON
Amendment 497 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 4 – paragraph 1 – point k
(k) To carry out prudential supervisory tasks in relation to early intervention where a credit institution does not meet or is likely to breach the applicable prudential requirements, including recovery plans and intra group financial support arrangements that are wholly contained within the participating Member States, in coordination with the relevant resolution authorities;
2012/10/30
Committee: ECON
Amendment 503 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 4 – paragraph 1 – point l
(l) To coordinate and express a common position of representatives from competent authorities of the participating Member States when participating in the Board of Supervisors and the Management Board of the European Banking Authority, for issues relating to the tasks conferred on the ECB by this Regulation.deleted
2012/10/30
Committee: ECON
Amendment 505 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 4 – paragraph 1 – point l
(l) To coordinate and express a common position of representatives from competent authoritabide by Article 42 of the EBA Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010 which requires that the voting members of the Board of Supervisors of the EBA shall act independently and objectively in the sole interest of the Union as a whole and shall neither seek nor take instructions from Union institutions or bodies, of the participating Member States when participating inr from any government of a member State or from any other public or private body and that neither Member States, the Union Institutions or bodies, nor any other public or private body shall seek to influence the members of the Board of Supervisors andin the Management Board of the European Banking Authority, for issues relating to the tasks conferrperformance of their tasks. Accordingly this shall not be undermined onby the ECB by this Regulation. SSM, ECB, ECB supervisory board or Governing Council.
2012/10/30
Committee: ECON
Amendment 524 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 4 – paragraph 3
3. Subject to and in compliance with any relevant Union law rule and in particular any legislative and non-legislative act including technical standards developed by EBA and adopted by the Commission, the ECB may adopt regulations and recommendations and take decisions to implement or apply Union law, to the extent necessary to carry out the tasks conferred upon it by this Regulation, and only where those Union acts do not deal with certain aspects necessary for the proper exercise of the ECB's tasks or do not deal with them in sufficient detail. Before adopting a regulation, the ECB shall conduct open public consultations, including the EBA and the Commission, and analyse the potential related costs and benefits.
2012/10/30
Committee: ECON
Amendment 587 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 5 – paragraph 4
4. National competent authorities shall follow the instructions given by the ECB for the purposes of the tasks mentioned in Article 4(1). Instructions given by the ECB shall not interfere with the exercise of voting rights by competent authorities of participating Member States within the Board of Supervisors and the Management Board of the European Banking Authority.
2012/10/30
Committee: ECON
Amendment 594 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 5 – paragraph 4 a (new)
4a. The ECB shall be liable to national courts for its actions and instructions in place of any liability or duty of national competent authorities. The ECB shall be accountable to national parliaments in accordance with the custom of Member States at least until common financial mechanisms replace direct taxpayer liability in all participating Member States.
2012/10/30
Committee: ECON
Amendment 633 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 6 – paragraph 2 – point c
(c) The Member State concerned has adopted national legal acts to ensure that its national competent authority will be obliged to adopt any measure in relation to credit institutions requested by the ECB, in accordance with paragraph 5 and the ECB has accepted corresponding liability and accountability that previously applied to the national competent authority.
2012/10/30
Committee: ECON
Amendment 637 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 6 – paragraph 3
3. The decision referred to in paragraph 2 shall determine, in compliance with the Statute of ESCB and of the ECB, the conditions under which representatives of the competent authorities of the Member States which established a close cooperation in accordance with this Article shall take part to the activities of the Supervisory Board.deleted
2012/10/30
Committee: ECON
Amendment 642 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 6 – paragraph 3
3. The decision referred to in paragraph 2 shall determine, in compliance with the Statute of ESCB and of the ECB, the conditions under which representatives of the competent authorities of the Member States which established a close cooperation in accordance with this Article shall take part ton a full and equal basis in the activities of the Supervisory Board.
2012/10/30
Committee: ECON
Amendment 651 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 6 – paragraph 5 a (new)
5a. The Member State that has established a close cooperation with the ECB may request the ECB to terminate the close cooperation at any time. In this case, the ECB shall immediately proceed to adopt a decision terminating the close cooperation.
2012/10/30
Committee: ECON
Amendment 658 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 6 a (new)
Article 6a Memoranda of Understanding 1.The ECB and the national competent authority of each non-participating Member State shall prepare and maintain a memorandum of understanding describing in general terms how they will cooperate with one another in the performance of their supervisory tasks under Union law in relation to: (a) credit institutions; (b) financial holding companies; (c) mixed financial holding companies; (d) financial conglomerates. 2. The memorandum must, in particular, make provision about the following matters when performing their tasks in relation to credit institutions or banking groups in relation to which both the ECB and the national competent authority perform supervisory tasks: (a) the need for each party to have regard to the tasks of the other; (b) the arrangements for obtaining and disclosing information; (c) the co-ordination by the parties of the exercise of their powers in relation to: (i) the use of early intervention powers; (ii) investigations; (iii) disciplinary measures. (d) where there is a systemic interest the modalities for observer status of non- participating Member States on the ECB supervisory board 3. The ECB and the national competent authority shall each publish on their websites a copy of the memorandum as and when they are revised and re-issued.
2012/10/30
Committee: ECON
Amendment 771 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 16 – paragraph 1
1. When carrying out the tasks conferred upon it by this Regulation, the ECB shall act independently. This independence does not prevent appearance in court proceedings or Parliaments.
2012/10/30
Committee: ECON
Amendment 780 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 17 – paragraph 1 a (new)
1a. The European Parliament, the Council or an affected Member State or national parliament of an affected Member State, may hold an inquiry or require the setting up of an independent inquiry into the actions or failure to act of the ECB that have or may have led to a significant event in relation to financial stability, confidence or failure of a credit institution. Any such inquiry shall produce a report that is made available to the instigator and also the European Parliament and the Council. Any independent inquiry shall be paid for by the ECB.
2012/10/30
Committee: ECON
Amendment 785 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 18 – paragraph 2
2. The ECB shall carry out the tasks conferred upon it by this Regulation separately from its tasks relating to monetary policy and from any other tasks. The tasks conferred upon the ECB by this regulation shall not interfere with the ECB's tasks relating to monetary policy and any other tasks, the tasks of the European Systemic Risk Board or any other tasks. The ECB shall report to the European Parliament and the Council as to how it has complied with this provision.
2012/10/30
Committee: ECON
Amendment 791 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 18 – paragraph 2 a (new)
2a. Where individuals are found to be in serious breach of the requirements of this Article, this shall be duly recorded and they shall be subject to appropriate sanctions.
2012/10/30
Committee: ECON
Amendment 792 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 18 – paragraph 3
3. For the purposes of paragraphs 1 and 2, the ECB shall adopt any necessary internal rules, including rules regarding professional secrecy. The rules and procedures adopted shall be made public and provided to the European Parliament and Council.
2012/10/30
Committee: ECON
Amendment 811 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 19 – paragraph 1
1. The planning and execution of the tasks conferred upon the ECB, shall be undertaken by an internal body composed of four representatives of the ECB appointed by the Executive Board of the ECB and one representative of the national authority competent for the supervision of credit institutions in each participating Member State (hereinafter ‘supervisory board’). The supervisory board shall be required to have a 50-50 gender balance including for the roles of Chair and Vice- Chair.
2012/10/30
Committee: ECON
Amendment 828 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 19 – paragraph 2
2. In addition, the supervisory board shall include a Chair elected by the members of the Governing Councilsupervisory board, from the members, with the exception of the President, of the Exand a Vice-Chair elected by the members of the supervisory board of the ECB on the basis of merit, skills and knowledge of prudential supervision following an open selecutive Board,on procedure. The Chair and a Vice-Chair electedshall only bye and from the members of the Governing Council of the ECBppointed after confirmation by the European Parliament.
2012/10/30
Committee: ECON
Amendment 840 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 19 – paragraph 3 a (new)
3a. There shall be a clear division of competences between the supervisory board and the Governing Council of the ECB, which shall be made public.
2012/10/30
Committee: ECON
Amendment 856 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 19 – paragraph 6
6. The Chair of the European Banking Authority and a member of the European Commission may participate as an observers in the meetings of the supervisory board.
2012/10/30
Committee: ECON
Amendment 858 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 19 – paragraph 6
6. The Chair of the European Banking Authority and a member of the European Commission may participate as observers in the meetings of the supervisory board. The same right shall be ensured for non- participating Member States, when the supervisory board takes decisions relating to credit institutions operating within jurisdictions of the Member States concerned, or when the supervisory board takes decisions on broader matters of policy, such as structure or decision- making process of the Single Supervisory Mechanism.
2012/10/30
Committee: ECON
Amendment 863 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 19 – paragraph 7
7. The Governing Council shall adopt the rules of procedure of the supervisory board includingand shall make them public. They shall ensure equal treatment of all participating Member States, including voting rights. They shall also include rules on the term of office of the Chair and the Vice-Chair. The term of off, whiceh shall not exceed five years and shall not be renewable.
2012/10/30
Committee: ECON
Amendment 867 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 19 – paragraph 7
7. The Governing Council shall adopt the rules of procedure of the supervisory board including rules on the term of office of the Chair and the Vice-Chair and the modalities for observers on the Governing Council from non-euro participants in the supervisory mechanism when discussing prudential supervision. The term of office shall not exceed five years and shall not be renewable. These rules of procedure shall be made public.
2012/10/30
Committee: ECON
Amendment 870 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 19 – paragraph 7 a (new)
7a. The minutes of the supervisory board and decisions taken relating to prudential supervision including voting records and the minutes and voting records of the Governing Council with regard to supervisory matters shall both be made public within a month, with due regard to Article 20 of this Regulation.
2012/10/30
Committee: ECON
Amendment 886 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 21 – paragraph 2
2. The Chair of the supervisory board of the ECB shall present this report in public to the European Parliament and to the Eurogroup in the presence of representatives from any non participating Member State in relation to which a close cooperation in accordance with Article 6 is in place. The written report shall be made public and include details of compliance with the requirement of separation from monetary policy and of adherence to protection of the single market.
2012/10/30
Committee: ECON
Amendment 890 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 21 – paragraph 3
3. The Chair of the supervisory board may, at the request of the European Parliament, be heard on the execution of its supervisory tasksAt the request of the European Parliament, the Chair of the supervisory Board shall attend and be heard on the execution of its supervisory tasks, or on the outcome of any inquiry under Article 17 (2) by the competent committees of the European Parliament.
2012/10/30
Committee: ECON
Amendment 898 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 21 – paragraph 4
4. The ECB shall reply orally or in writing to questions put to it by the European Parliament, the Council or by the Eurogroup or any Member State.
2012/10/30
Committee: ECON
Amendment 913 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 23 – paragraph 2 a (new)
2a. The annual accounts for the supervisory section of the budget shall be subjected to a full financial and value for money (economy, effectiveness, efficiency) audit which shall be published.
2012/10/30
Committee: ECON
Amendment 918 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 24 – paragraph 2 a (new)
2a. The ECB shall publish its policy on fees and shall consult on its draft policy.
2012/10/30
Committee: ECON
Amendment 921 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 24 a (new)
Article 24a Declaration of interests regarding gifts and hospitality Members of the supervisory body and the Governing Council shall make public meetings held, hospitality received and record publicly all expenses claims over EUR 250.
2012/10/30
Committee: ECON
Amendment 925 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 25 – paragraph 1
1. The ECB shall ensure an appropriate exchange and secondment of staff with and among national competent authorities and set up a system of national peer reviews to demonstrate that it is exercising its powers on an equal basis across all supervised firms. The ECB shall also participate in any EBA exchange and peer review procedures.
2012/10/30
Committee: ECON