Activities of Ioan Mircea PAŞCU related to 2013/2170(INI)
Shadow reports (1)
REPORT on an anti-missile shield for Europe and its political and strategic implications PDF (141 KB) DOC (64 KB)
Amendments (24)
Amendment 1 #
Motion for a resolution
Citation 4 a (new)
Citation 4 a (new)
- having regard to the Conclusions of the European Council on common security and defence policy, Brussels, 19 December 2013,
Amendment 2 #
Motion for a resolution
Citation 5 a (new)
Citation 5 a (new)
- having regard to the Chicago Summit Declaration Issued by the Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Chicago on 20 May 2012,
Amendment 6 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital A
Recital A
A. whereas the issue of anti-ballistic missile defence (ABMD) was already raised in the past but has become more topical in recent years in view of the multiplication of threats stemming from nuclear proliferation to which the EU and itsthe proliferation of nuclear weapons and of other weapons of mass destruction and the proliferation of ballistic missiles to which NATO and European allies must be able to respond effectively;
Amendment 9 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital A a (new)
Recital A a (new)
Aa. whereas the Common Security and Defence Policy will develop in full complementarity with NATO, in the agreed framework of the strategic partnership between the EU and NATO, as confirmed by the European Council on 19 December 2013;
Amendment 11 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital A b (new)
Recital A b (new)
Ab. whereas NATO is developing a NATO Ballistic Missile Defence (BMD) capability to pursue its core task of collective defence, aiming to provide full coverage and protection for all NATO European populations, territory and forces against the increasing threats posed by the proliferation of ballistic missiles;
Amendment 15 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital B
Recital B
B. whereas AMD is not only a leading symbolthe essential contribution of United States to NATO BMD is a confirmation of the USA’s commitment to the EU and to its Easternsecurity of Europe an Member States but also of allied solidarity, even if the system is not specifically intended to shield the particular country in which it is based of the European allies and the importance of the transatlantic bond;
Amendment 18 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital C
Recital C
C. whereas the global character of current challenges and, the spread of technological knowledge require broader coopmissile defence technology and the progress in the internation between the EU and its neighbours, as well as a more accurately definedal efforts to reduce the threats of missile proliferation require a review of the risk assessment between allies;
Amendment 31 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 2
Paragraph 2
2. Highlights the latest phase in the deployment of NATO’s anti-missile shield (AMS), which aims to annihilate ballistic missiles before they reach their targets in the final stage of their trajectory upon re- entry into the atmosphere, will face greater restrictions than was previously anticipated. It will provide protection to key NATO assets, but contrary to previous plans, it will not, in its current form, provide sufficient coverage for the whole European popuTakes note of the achievement of Interim NATO BMD Capability that will provide maximum coverage within available means, to defend populations, territory and forces across southern NATO Europe against a ballistic missile attack and the aim to provide full coverage and protection for NATO European Member States by the end of the decade. Takes note of the cancellation ofrom the limited number of intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) in existence. This unforeseen development has raised support for a European AMS which would supplement NATO’s systemPhase 4 of the US contribution to NATO BMD, the European Phased Adaptive Approach (EPAA);
Amendment 39 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 4
Paragraph 4
4. Argues that the legitimate grounds for an anti-missile shield originate in the threat of a nuclear attack potentially orchestrated by actors who do not subscribe to traditional understandings of rationality. In real terms, certain ‘rogue’ states or state-like actors could be prepared to attack, even in cases where doing so would ultproliferation of ballistic missiles that can carry weapons of mass destruction, including nuclear weapons. The increasing threat of ballistic missiles is not limaitely result in their inevitable self-destructiond to states but might come from state-like actors;
Amendment 46 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 5
Paragraph 5
5. Notes that convincing evidence exists that a number of ‘'rogue’' states are attempting to acquire nuclear weapons as well as ballistic missile capabilities; notes, furthermore, some of these states have stated their preparedness to use these weapons should their interests be jeopardised; recalls, in this connection, the vast arsenal of nuclear weapons already in the possession of highly unstable states;
Amendment 52 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 7
Paragraph 7
Amendment 56 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 8
Paragraph 8
8. Underlines that a potential nuclear attack and the manifold unpredictable effects likely to result therefrom constitute an existential threat; highlights, however, that regardless of the gravity of such a risk, it is but one risk among many others; argues, therefore, that the proportional reduction of the existential risk should serve as a baseline for the evaluation of the feasibility of the AMSa review of the threat assessment;
Amendment 57 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 9
Paragraph 9
Amendment 60 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 10
Paragraph 10
Amendment 65 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 11
Paragraph 11
11. Stresses that ICBMs are by no means the only delivery system used in nuclear devices; points out that the AMS might provide a false sense of security;
Amendment 70 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 12
Paragraph 12
Amendment 75 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 13
Paragraph 13
13. Stresses that due to the large number of Russian ICBMs in existence, the European AMS does not constitute a significant threat to Russian nuclearRecalls that NATO missile defence is not directed against Russia and will not undermine Russia's strategic deterrence capabilities;
Amendment 78 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 15
Paragraph 15
Amendment 84 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 17
Paragraph 17
17. Argues that Russia’s involvement incooperation to the AMS is desirable, given that potential interceptions would most likely take place in Russian airspace; argues, furthermore, that Russia’s involvement in the development of the AMS would be beneficial in economic terms, if the system-related costs were to be shared by the actors involvedargues, furthermore, that Russia’s cooperation might also be relevant in economic terms;
Amendment 87 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 18
Paragraph 18
Amendment 90 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 19
Paragraph 19
Amendment 94 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 20
Paragraph 20
Amendment 98 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 21
Paragraph 21
21. Demands that necessary and credible institutional arrangements be established before construction of the system; points out that an AMS system, no matter how technologically advanced or comprehensive, is worthless withoutPoints out that BMD requires a rapid and effective chain of command, capable of making decisions in a very short period of time;
Amendment 100 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 22
Paragraph 22
22. Strongly believes that analysis should include the various compositions of potential collaborators on the system, as well as its price and effectiveness; stresses that only after this point, if proven feasible, should the EU and its strategic partners move on to the design, production, and implementation phases;