2013/2170(INI) | [ParlTrack]

Motion for a resolution
Citation 4 a (new)

- having regard to the Conclusions of the European Council on common security and defence policy, Brussels, 19 December 2013,

Amendment 10 #

Motion for a resolution
Recital A a (new)

Aa. whereas the conclusions of the most recent European Council Summit held on 19 and 20 December 2013 do not include the anti-missile shield for Europe as a priority action in the field of defence;

Amendment 100 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 22

22. Strongly believes that analysis should include the various compositions of potential collaborators on the system, as well as its price and effectiveness; ~~stresses that only after this point, if proven feasible, should the EU and its strategic partners move on to the design, production, and implementation phases;~~

Amendment 11 #

Motion for a resolution
Recital A b (new)

Ab. whereas NATO is developing a NATO Ballistic Missile Defence (BMD) capability to pursue its core task of collective defence, aiming to provide full coverage and protection for all NATO European populations, territory and forces against the increasing threats posed by the proliferation of ballistic missiles;

Amendment 12 #

Motion for a resolution
Recital B

B. whereas ~~AMD is not only a leading symbol of the USA’s commitment to the EU and to its Eastern European M~~the USA has bilaterally and multilaterally implicated a number of EU member Sstates ~~but also of allied solidarity, even if the system is not specifically intended to shield the particular country in which it is based~~in AMD projects which might have a significance for other parts of the Union as well given the range of defence aimed by the projects;

Amendment 13 #

Motion for a resolution
Recital B

B. whereas AMD is not only a leading symbol of the USA’s commitment to the EU, to NATO and to its Eastern European Member States but also of allied solidarity, even if the system is not specifically intended to shield the particular country in which it is based;

Amendment 14 #

Motion for a resolution
Recital B

B. whereas AMD is not only a leading symbol of the USA’s commitment to the EU and to its Eastern European Member States but also of allied solidarity, even if the system is not specifically intended to shield the particular country in which it is basedthe effectiveness of the decision taken in November 2010 in the NATO Lisbon summit to establish a joint missile defence system to protect against long-range ballistic missile attack with weapons of mass destruction, would require a broader cooperation between EU and its neighbours as well as a better assessment of the future threats posed to NATO territory by such weapons;

Amendment 15 #

Motion for a resolution
Recital B

B. whereas ~~AMD is not only a leading symbol~~the essential contribution of United States to NATO BMD is a confirmation of the USA’s commitment to the ~~EU and to its Eastern~~security of Europe an ~~Member States but also of allied solidarity, even if the system is not specifically intended to shield the particular country in which it is base~~d of the European allies and the importance of the transatlantic bond;

Amendment 16 #

Motion for a resolution
Recital B

B. whereas AMD is not only a leading symbol of the USA’s commitment to ~~the EU and to its Eastern European Member States~~NATO, but also of allied solidarity~~, even if~~: the system is ~~not~~ specifically intended to ~~shield the particular country in which it is based~~protect countries in which facilities for the interception and destruction of ballistic missiles are located (e.g. Romania and Poland), although such facilities are also capable of protecting neighbouring countries;

Amendment 17 #

Motion for a resolution
Recital C

C. whereas the global character of current challenges and the spread of technological knowledge require broader cooperation between the EU and its neighbours, as well as a more accurately defined risk assessment between allieNATO has had several rounds of talks with the Russian Federation, inviting it to be a partner of the AMD projects;

Amendment 18 #

Motion for a resolution
Recital C

C. whereas the global character of current challenges ~~and~~, the spread of ~~technological knowledge require broader coop~~missile defence technology and the progress in the internation ~~between the EU and its neighbours, as well as a more accurately defined~~al efforts to reduce the threats of missile proliferation require a review of the risk assessment ~~between allies~~;

Amendment 19 #

Motion for a resolution
Recital C a (new)

Ca. whereas the main purported reason for an AMD system in Europe would be to defend from the threat of so-called rogue states, with a number of countries currently under UN sanctions having or being suspected of having significant missile technology able to target countries in the EU;

Amendment 2 #

Motion for a resolution
Citation 5 a (new)

- having regard to the Chicago Summit Declaration Issued by the Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Chicago on 20 May 2012,

Amendment 20 #

Motion for a resolution
Recital C b (new)

Cb. whereas the new deal signed in November 2013 in Geneva between various countries and Iran, one brokered by the HR/VP of the European Union ensures no further nuclear threat posed by Iran;

Amendment 21 #

Motion for a resolution
Recital C c (new)

Cc. whereas from EU member states, only Poland, the Czech Republic, Romania and Bulgaria have been in direct talks with the trans-Atlantic partners for the implementation of an AMD project, with several installations being already in place in Romania;

Amendment 22 #

Motion for a resolution
Recital C d (new)

Cd. whereas the USA have stated repeatedly in Congressional hearings and State Department documents that the primary goal of an AMD system in Europe would be to ensure the safety of USA and NATO assets in that territory with any other reasons coming as secondary;

Amendment 23 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1

1. Stresses that nuclear proliferation poses a grave danger to the survival of humankind. Even a nuclear strike confined to a to specific area would be constitute a global catastrophe, resulting in a major system shock at global level. The cost of such an event, both human and financial, would be extremely highWelcomes the prospect of a European territory defensible from ballistic missiles, nuclear or kinetic, while noting the highly fragmented state of current projects and a need to involve all major parties of the EU in its implementation and range of potential defence;

Amendment 24 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1

1. Stresses that ~~nuclear~~ proliferation of weapons of mass destruction poses a grave danger to the survival of humankind. Even a ~~nuclear~~ strike confined to a to specific area using nuclear, biological or chemical weapons would be constitute a global catastrophe, resulting in a major system shock at global level. The cost of such an event, both human and financial, would be extremely high;

Amendment 25 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1

1. Stresses that nuclear proliferation poses a grave danger to the survival of humankind. Even a nuclear strike confined to a to specific area would be constitute a global catastrophe, resulting in a major system shock at global level. The cost of such an event, both human and financial, would be extremely high; stresses, at the same time, that threats of a different nature should not be ignored, such as those posed by arming warheads with other types of weapons of mass destruction, for instance, radiological materials or conventional loads, especially in the case of short-range ballistic missiles;

Amendment 26 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1 a (new)

1a. Considers that AMD technology has the potential to destabilise current deterrent arrangements in place in Europe and the world and calls for a higher level of coordination between Member States, with the help of the Council, EEAS and European Defence Agency, in order to avoid possible duplications of costs and differences in national foreign policies;

Amendment 27 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1 a (new)

1a. Stresses that the NATO ballistic missile defence system (NATO BMD), in accordance with the decisions taken at NATO's Lisbon and Chicago summits concerning ensuring that all NATO territory in Europe has anti-missile protection, is currently being established on the basis of American anti-missile defence installations in Europe (EPAA) and on national resources of NATO member states allocated to the ALTBMD programme and to the NATO BMD joint command system; notes that the announcement of interim NATO BMD capability at the May 2012 NATO summit in Chicago is the first meaningful step taken by NATO towards building this system in Europe and towards achieving complementarity between US and NATO anti-missile defence systems; stresses that the NATO BMD is defensive, forms part of the deterrence mechanism, and supplements the strategic offensive arsenal;

Amendment 28 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 2

2. Highlights th~~e latest phase in the deployment of NATO’s anti-missile shield (AMS), which aims to annihilate ballistic missiles before they reach their targets in the final stage of~~ at current technological restrictions do not make any potential AMD system, especially the one envisaged by NATO in Europe, neitheir trajectory upon re- entry into the atmosphere, will face greater restrictions than was previously anticipated. It will provide protection to key NATO assets, but contrary to previous plans, it will not, in its current form, provide sufficient coverage infallible nor able to offer full defence range to all EU countries and limited in the number of missiles it could intercept; stresses therefore the whole European population from the limited number of intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) in existence. This unforeseen development has raised support for a European AMS which would supplement NATO’s systemat the only sure mean to ensure peace and defence is a high degree of international cooperation and dialogue;

Amendment 29 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 2

2. Highlights th~~e latest phase in the deployment of~~at the project is still in its early stages, but in its later phase NATO’'s anti-missile s~~hield (AMS), which~~ystem aimsing to annihilate ballistic missiles ~~before they reach their targets~~upon re-entry into the ~~final stage of their trajectory upon re- entry into the atmosphere~~atmosphere, before they reach their targets, will face greater restrictions than ~~was~~ previously anticipated. It will provide protection to key NATO assets, but contrary to previous plans, it will not, ~~in its current form~~at this stage, provide sufficient coverage for the whole European population from the limited number of short and medium range and intercontinental ~~ballistic~~ missiles (ICBMs) in existence. This unforeseen development has raised support for a European ~~AMS which would~~ supplement to NATO’'s system;

Amendment 3 #

Motion for a resolution
Recital A

A. whereas ~~the issue of~~ anti-missile defence (AMD) was already raised in the past but has become more topical in recent years in view of the multiplication of threats stemming from nuclear proliferation to which the EU and its allies must be able to respond effectively technology has a long history but only recently has reached the needed degree of interception needed to ensure the functioning of such a system;

Amendment 30 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 2

2. Highlights the latest phase in the deployment of NATO’s anti-missile shield (AMS), which aims to annihilate ballistic missiles before they reach their targets in the final stage of their trajectory upon re- entry into the atmosphere, will face greater restrictions than was previously anticipated. It will provide protection to key NATO assets, but contrary to previous plans, it will not, in its current form, provide sufficient coverage for the whole European population from the limited number of intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) in existence. This unforeseen development has raised support for a European AMS which would supplement NATO’s system; nevertheless, considers that the current system is a major step forward in ensuring the protection of EU territory against ICBMs;

Amendment 31 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 2

2. Highlights the latest phase in the deployment of NATO’s anti-missile shield (AMS), which aims to annihilate ballistic missiles before they reach their targets in the final stage of their trajectory upon re- entry into the atmosphere, will face greater restrictions than was previously anticipated. It will provide protection to key NATO assets, but contrary to previous plans, it will not, in its current form, provide sufficient coverage for the whole European popuTakes note of the achievement of Interim NATO BMD Capability that will provide maximum coverage within available means, to defend populations, territory and forces across southern NATO Europe against a ballistic missile attack and the aim to provide full coverage and protection for NATO European Member States by the end of the decade. Takes note of the cancellation of~~rom~~ the ~~limited number of intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) in existence. This unforeseen development has raised support for a European AMS which would supplement NATO’s system~~Phase 4 of the US contribution to NATO BMD, the European Phased Adaptive Approach (EPAA);

Amendment 32 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 2

2. Highlights the latest phase in the deployment of NATO’s anti-missile shield (~~AMS~~NATO BMD), which aims to annihilate ballistic missiles before they reach their targets in the final stage of their trajectory upon re- entry into the atmosphere, will face greater restrictions than was previously anticipated. It will provide protection to key NATO assets~~, but contrary to previous plans, it will not~~ and should, in its current form, provide ~~sufficient coverage~~partial protection for the whole European population from ~~the limited number of intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) in existence. This unforeseen development has raised support for a European AMS which would supplement NATO’s system~~attacks using short-, medium- and intermediate-range missiles and intercontinental ballistic missiles;

Amendment 33 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 3

3. ~~Stress~~Notes that, due to the financial crisis and budget cuts, not enough resources are being used to maintain sufficient defence capabilities, thereby leading to the reduction of the EU’s military capabilities and industrial capacity; both the current and any future AMD project in Europe would be affected by the financial crisis and wide- ranging defence spending cuts in Europe, therefore making its implementation dependent on the foreign policy of external actors like the USA; considers that this gives the EU member states limited options and calls for more trans- border and multilateral dialogue between Union countries on AMD projects; considers that the current form of AMD projects in Europe limits the EU means of interacting and affecting this issue; calls therefore for more Union engagement with the member states and international partners and notes the possibility for the HR/VP to intermediate a deal between the USA and the Russian Federation for a joint approach to AMD;

Amendment 34 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 3

3. Stresses that, Europe has no choice but to take on greater responsibility for its own security but due to the financial crisis and budget cuts, not enough resources are ~~being used to maintain sufficient defence capabilities, thereby leading to the reduction of the EU’s military cap~~dedicated to defence capabilities which renders political support for missile defence dependant on US financing the system; in this respect, it should be reminded that the US House of Representatives called on Europeans to pick up part of the cost for estabili~~ties and industrial capacity~~shing the Alliance missile defence system;

Amendment 35 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 4

4. Argues that the ~~legitimate~~ grounds for an anti-missile shield originate in the threat of a nuclear attack potentially orchestrated by actors who do not subscribe to traditional understandings of rationality. In real terms, certain ‘rogue’ states or state-like actors could be prepared to attack, eAMD system issue from a new form of deterrence from ballistic missile attacks, either of a nuclear or kinetic nature, with its main limitation being that ballistic missiles are not the only means for delivering nuclear or kinetic payloads; stresses however the potential positiven i~~n cases where doing so would ultimately result in their inevitable self-destruction~~mpact of an AMD project as a deterrent for any ballistic projects being developed by rogue states;

Amendment 36 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 4

Amendment 37 #

Zbigniew ZIOBRO

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 4

4. Argues that the legitimate grounds for an anti-missile shield originate in the threat of a nuclear attack potentially orchestrated by actors who do not subscribe to traditional understandings of rationality. In real terms, certain ‘rogue’ states or state-like actors could be prepared to attack, even in cases where doing so would ultimately result in their inevitable self-destruction; notes, moreover, that Russia is becoming heavily militarised and that this may pose a threat to neighbouring countries;

Amendment 38 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 4

4. Argues that the legitimate grounds for an anti-missile shield originate in the threat of a ~~nuclear attack~~attack conducted by weapons of mass destruction and potentially orchestrated by actors who do not subscribe to traditional understandings of rationality. In real terms, certain ‘rogue’ states or state-like actors could be prepared to attack, even in cases where doing so would ultimately result in their inevitable self-destruction;

Amendment 39 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 4

4. Argues that the legitimate grounds for an anti-missile shield originate in the threat of a nuclear attack potentially orchestrated by actors who do not subscribe to traditional understandings of rationality. In real terms, certain ‘rogue’ states or state-like actors could be prepared to attack, even in cases where doing so would ultproliferation of ballistic missiles that can carry weapons of mass destruction, including nuclear weapons. The increasing threat of ballistic missiles is not limaite~~ly result in their inevitable self-destruction~~d to states but might come from state-like actors;

Amendment 4 #

Zbigniew ZIOBRO

Motion for a resolution
Recital A

A. whereas the issue of anti-missile defence (AMD) was already raised in the past but has become more topical in recent years in view of the multiplication of threats stemming from nuclear proliferation to which the EU and its allies must be able to respond effectively, and in view of the aggressive behaviour of Russia, which in December 2013 deployed Iskander-M rockets in Kaliningrad oblast;

Amendment 40 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 4

4. Argues that the legitimate grounds for ~~an anti-missile shield originate in~~the NATO BMD are to prevent attacks using short-range ballistic missiles (SRBMs), medium-range ballistic missiles (MRBMs), intermediate-range ballistic missiles (IRBMs) and intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM), which may also encompass the threat of a nuclear attack potentially orchestrated by actors who do not subscribe to traditional understandings of rationality. In real terms, certain ‘rogue’ states or state-like actors could be prepared to attack, even in cases where doing so would ultimately result in their inevitable self-destruction;

Amendment 41 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 4

Amendment 42 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 4 a (new)

4a. Points out that some failed or highly unstable states pose a serious threat to European and world security, since they offer perfect conditions for terrorist groups to become established in their territory or indeed to take control of the state in question;

Amendment 43 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 5

5. Notes that convincing evidence exists that a number of ‘rogue’ states are attempting to acquire nuclear weapons; notes, furthermore, some of these states have stated their preparedness to use these weapons should their interests be jeopardised; recalls, in this connection, the vast arsenal of nuclear weapons already in the possession of highly unstable states; welcomes that fact that most such states are not in the immediate vicinity of the EU and well outside most ballistic missile ranges;

Amendment 44 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 5

5. Notes that convincing evidence exists that a number of ~~‘rogue’~~ states are attempting to acquire nuclear weapons; notes, furthermore, some of these states have stated their preparedness to use these weapons should their interests be jeopardised; recalls, in this connection, the vast arsenal of nuclear weapons already in the possession of highly unstable states;

Amendment 45 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 5

5. Notes that ~~convincing evidence exists that~~ a number of ‘rogue’ states are attempting to acquire nuclear weapons; notes, furthermore, some of these states have stated their preparedness to use these weapons should their interests be jeopardised; recalls, in this connection, the vast arsenal of nuclear weapons already in the possession of highly unstable states;

Amendment 46 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 5

5. Notes that convincing evidence exists that a number of ‘'rogue’' states are attempting to acquire nuclear weapons as well as ballistic missile capabilities; notes, furthermore, some of these states have stated their preparedness to use these weapons should their interests be jeopardised; recalls, in this connection, the vast arsenal of nuclear weapons already in the possession of highly unstable states;

Amendment 47 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 5

5. Notes that convincing evidence exists that a number of ~~‘rogue’ stat~~totalitarian regimes are attempting to acquire nuclear weapons; notes, furthermore, some of these states have stated their preparedness to use these weapons should their interests be jeopardised; recalls, in this connection, the vast arsenal of nuclear weapons already in the possession of highly unstable states;

Amendment 48 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 6

6. Highlights that it is extremely difficult to evaluate the current and future risks of such developments, and that even if some of these countries have the capacity to develop a nuclear bomb, this does not necessarilyNotes that in the current dynamic international state of affairs, long term projects such as an AMD systems for Europe are hard to justify in spending and calls for the European Commission to issue an analysis of the potential need for such a tool, as well as means t~~hat they are capable of developing ICBMs in the near future~~o cooperate at an EU level for a realistic and useful implementation;

Amendment 49 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 6

6. Highlights that it is extremely difficult to evaluate the current and future risks of such developments, and that even if some of these countries have the capacity to develop ~~a nuclear bomb~~weapons of mass destruction, this does not necessarily mean that they are capable of developing ICBMDs in the near future;

Amendment 5 #

Jacek Olgierd KURSKI

Motion for a resolution
Recital A

A. whereas the issue of anti-missile defence (AMD) was already raised in the past but has become ~~more~~particularly topical in recent years in view of the multiplication of threats stemming from nuclear proliferation to which the EU and its allies must be able to respond effectively, and in view of the increasing militarisation of Russia, which is committed to deploying Iskander-M ballistic missiles in the Kaliningrad oblast;

Amendment 50 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 6

6. Highlights that it is extremely difficult to evaluate the current and future risks of such developments, and that even if some of these countries have the capacity to develop a nuclear bomb, this does not necessarily mean that they are capable of developing ICBMs in the near future; stresses the need, however, to consider the possibility of these countries using short-, medium- and intermediate-range missiles;

Amendment 51 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 7

7. Notes that there is some evidence that Pakistan might be transferring technological expertise to Iran and North Korea; highlights, furthermore, the worrying fact that thousands of unemployed ex-Soviet nuclear scientists provide a continuing threat as regards the transfer of dangerous information;deleted

Amendment 52 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 7

Amendment 53 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 7

7. Notes that there is some evidence that Pakistan might be transferring technological expertise to Iran and North Korea; highlights, furthermore, the worrying fact t-{}-hat thousands of unemployed ex-Soviet nuclear scientists provide a continuing threat as regards the transfer of dangerous information; welcomes, at the same time, the signing in Geneva of the P5+1 agreement with Iran concerning the Iranian nuclear programme, which is a step towards increasing stability in the Middle East and improving relations between Iran and the Euro-Atlantic Community; notes, however, that this interim agreement does not deal with methods for delivering weapons of mass destruction – particularly missile technology – and therefore may not constitute a basis for any limitations on the development of the NATO BMD, including the EPAA, especially since the threats posed to Europe by missiles and WMDs is much more complex and is not restricted to Iran;

Amendment 54 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 8

8. Underlines that a potential nuclear attack and the manifold unpredictable effects likely to result therefrom constitute an existential threat; highlights, however, that regardless of the gravity of such a risk, it is but one risk among many others; argues, therefore, that the proportional reduction of the existential risk should serve as a baseline for the evaluation of the feasibility of the AMS;deleted

Amendment 55 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 8

8. Underlines that a potential nuclear, chemical, or biological attack and the manifold unpredictable effects likely to result therefrom constitute an existential threat; highlights, however, that regardless of the gravity of such a risk, it is but one risk among many others; argues, therefore, that the proportional reduction of the existential risk should serve as a baseline for the evaluation of the feasibility of the ABMS;

Amendment 56 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 8

8. Underlines that a potential nuclear attack and the manifold unpredictable effects likely to result therefrom constitute an existential threat; highlights, however, that regardless of the gravity of such a risk, it is but one risk among many others; argues, therefore, that the proportional reduction of the existential risk should serve as a baseline for ~~the evaluation of the feasibility of the AMS~~a review of the threat assessment;

Amendment 57 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 9

9. Draws attention to the approximation that the AMS is likely to be an extremely costly project and that it is unlikely that it would fall within the scope of standard EU financing schemes; underlines, furthermore, that maintenance will increase costs in the long run; notes that the EU is expected to be called upon to substantially contribute to the infrastructure, operations and maintenance costs of the AMS;deleted

Amendment 58 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 9

9. Draws attention to the approximation that the AMS ~~is likely to~~will definitely be an extremely costly project and that it ~~is unlikely that it would~~will undoubtedly not fall within the scope of standard EU financing schemes; underlines, furthermore, that maintenance will increase costs in the long run; notes that the EU ~~is expected to~~must on no account be called upon to substantially contribute to the infrastructure, operations and maintenance costs of the AMS;

Amendment 59 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 9

9. Draws attention to the approximation that the AMS is likely to be an extremely costly project and that it is unlikely that it would fall within the scope of standard EU financing schemes; underlines, furthermore, that maintenance will increase costs in the long run; notes that ~~the EU is expected to be called upon to substantially contribute to the infrastructure, operations and maint~~any current arrangements do not involve the EU as a financer of the project and that any involvement of the Union should also mean an enhanced co~~sts~~verage of the AMSD system;

Amendment 6 #

Motion for a resolution
Recital A

A. whereas the issue of ~~anti-~~ballistic missile defence (ABMD) was already raised in the past but has become more topical in recent years in view of the multiplication of threats stemming from ~~nuclear proliferation to which the EU and its~~the proliferation of nuclear weapons and of other weapons of mass destruction and the proliferation of ballistic missiles to which NATO and European allies must be able to respond effectively;

Amendment 60 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 10

10. Calls therefore for a thorough and transparent cost-benefit analysis to be carried out regarding AMS; points out that this analysis should be conducted by an independent panel and should evaluate the cost of the AMS in relation to the potential risk of a ‘rogue’ state orchestrating an attack using ICBMs;deleted

Amendment 61 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 10

10. Calls therefore for a thorough and transparent cost-benefit analysis to be carried out regarding AMS by the European Commission and European Defence Agency; points out that this analysis should be conducted by an independent panel and should evaluate the cost of the AMS in relation to the potential risk of a ‘rogue’ state orchestrating an attack using ICBMs;

Amendment 62 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 10

10. Calls therefore for a thorough and transparent cost-~~benefit~~effectiveness analysis to be carried out regarding AMS; points out that this analysis should be conducted by an independent panel and should evaluate the cost of the AMS in relation to the potential risk of a ~~‘rogue’ state~~state or other actor orchestrating an attack using ICBMs;

Amendment 63 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 10

10. Calls therefore for a thorough and transparent cost-benefit analysis to be carried out regarding AMS – investigations should be carried out into which EU mechanisms can be used to deepen political, military and industrial cooperation between Member States in the field of BMD, for example as regards capabilities in terms of carrying out BMD-related EU research and development projects, and as regards identifying EU Member States’ missile defence capabilities against the backdrop of their defence priorities and the continued discussions over the future development of the Common Security and Defence Policy; points out that this analysis should be conducted by an independent panel and should evaluate the cost of the AMS in relation to the potential risk of a ‘rogue’ state orchestrating an attack using short-, medium- and intermediate-range missiles or ICBMs;

Amendment 64 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 11

~~11. Stresses that ICBMs are by no means the only delivery system used in nuclear devices; points out that the AMS might provide a false sense of security;~~deleted

Amendment 65 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 11

11. Stresses that ICBMs are by no means the only delivery system used in nuclear devices; ~~points out that the AMS might provide a false sense of security;~~

Amendment 66 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 11

11. Stresses that ICBMs are by no means the only delivery system used in nuclear devices; points out ~~that the AMS might provide a false sense of security~~, nonetheless, that the AMS is one of Europe’s key defence and deterrence capabilities and an important factor ensuring peace in Europe; points out that having an effective missile defence system on the European continent has strengthened the EU’s international position and reduced the risk associated with the use or threat of use of missile technology against the EU; points out that the main BMD-related task should be to ensure that the European continent is capable of defending itself from a wide spectrum of missile threats and to provide protection to armed forces deployed outside Europe;

Amendment 67 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 11

11. Stresses that ICBMs are by no means the only delivery system used in nuclear devices; points out that the AMS might provide a ~~false~~relevant sense of security;

Amendment 68 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 12

Amendment 69 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 12

Amendment 7 #

Motion for a resolution
Recital A

A. whereas the issue of anti-missile defence (AMD) was already raised in the past but has become more topical in recent years in view of the multiplication of threats stemming from nuclear proliferation and other weapons of mass destruction, such as chemical, biological and radiological weapons, as well as the potential threat posed by conventional weapons, such as short-range ballistic missiles, to which the EU and its allies must be able to respond effectively;

Amendment 70 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 12

Amendment 71 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 12

Amendment 72 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 12

12. Proposes that should the AMS turn out to be a feasible and cost-effective means of reducing the risk of a nuclear attack, the European Union should consider its development and construction, preferably at EuropeanConsiders that, on the basis of an evaluation of the financial burden the NATO European allies would be called upon to assume and the probability and immediacy of a missile attack, it might be judicious for the development as well as the construction of an anti-missile defence system to be undertaken at EU level;

Amendment 73 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 12 a (new)

12a. Stresses that efforts at EU level in the field of missile defence should be complementary to the actions of NATO, which is and should remain the main forum for the integration of national BMD systems in Europe;

Amendment 74 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 12 b (new)

12b. Stresses that EU initiatives, such as Pooling & Sharing, may prove helpful in strengthening cooperation between Member States in the areas of BMD and carrying out joint research and development work; notes that, in the long term, such cooperation could also lead to the further consolidation of the European defence industry;

Amendment 75 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 13

13. ~~Stresses that due to the large number of Russian ICBMs in existence, the European AMS does not constitute a significant threat to Russian nuclear~~Recalls that NATO missile defence is not directed against Russia and will not undermine Russia's strategic deterrence capabilities;

Amendment 76 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 14

14. Points out that anti-missile technology is developing rapidly; believes that ~~prospective countermeasures, if developed,~~the AMS would provide partial, but credible defence against short-, medium- and intermediate-range missiles, as well as a limited number of ICBMs;

Amendment 77 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 14 a (new)

14a. Notes that developing a new technology such as the AMD systems in Europe could have a highly beneficial impact on the European Defence Industry, providing for jobs and research; calls therefore on the member states to find ways to promote European companies as well in the development of AMD;

Amendment 78 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 15

15. Stresses that if the fifth phase of the AMS is ever concluded by the European Union, multiple key challenges must be met, considering that construction of the AMS would bring the EU closer to a defence union, thereby changing its strategic role;deleted

Amendment 79 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 15

Amendment 8 #

Motion for a resolution
Recital A a (new)

Aa. whereas a number of states, such as the USA and Israel have functioning AMD and short-range missile defence systems in place;

Amendment 80 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 15

Amendment 81 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 16

16. Recalls that NATO has announced its intention to actively seek cooperation on missile defence with Russia (and other Euro-Atlantic partners), thereby paving the way for greater transparency on nuclear issues and short-range nuclear weaponsConsiders that any viable AMD project being developed at an European level should involve European states outside of the EU as well, notably the Russian Federation, Ukraine and Turkey;

Amendment 82 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 16

16. Recalls that NATO has announced its intention to actively seek cooperation on missile defence with Russia (and other Euro-Atlantic partners), ~~thereby paving the way for greater transparency on nuclear issues and short-range nuclear weap~~and takes the view that this collaboration would be crucial, since it would prevent the anti-missile shield from unleashing a possible arms race with undesired repercussions on other regions;

Amendment 83 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 17

17. Argues that Russia’s involvement in the AMS is desirable, given that potential interceptions would most likely take place in Russian airspace; argues, furthermore, that Russia’s involvement in the development of the AMS would be beneficial in economic terms, if the system-related costs were to be shared by the actors involved;deleted

Amendment 84 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 17

17. Argues that Russia’s ~~involvement in~~cooperation to the AMS is desirable, given that potential interceptions would most likely take place in Russian airspace; argues, furthermore, that Russia’s involvement in the development of the AMS would be beneficial in economic terms, if the system-related costs were to be shared by the actors involvedargues, furthermore, that Russia’s cooperation might also be relevant in economic terms;

Amendment 85 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 17

17. ~~Argues that Russia’s involvement in the AMS is desirable~~Stresses that NATO is prepared to cooperate with Russia based on the assumption of cooperation between two independent missile defence systems – NATO’s and Russia’s; points out that NATO made an offer to Russia at the Chicago summit to develop a transparency regime that preserves reciprocity, and therefore urges Russia to adopt a constructive approach; accepts, at the same time, Russia’s involvement in the AMS, given that potential interceptions would most likely take place in Russian airspace; argues, furthermore, that Russia’s involvement in the development of the AMS wcould be beneficial in economic terms, if the system-related costs were to be shared by the actors involved; stresses, once more, that although effective cooperation with Russia could bring measurable benefits, it must be pursued in accordance with political realities and on the basis of full reciprocity and transparency, as increasing mutual trust is vital for the gradual development of such cooperation; notes, therefore, that moving Russian missiles closer to NATO and EU borders is incomprehensible and poses a threat;

Amendment 86 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 18

18. Notes that Russia has expressed its willingness to participate in the development of the AMS; points out, on the other hand, that if Russia does not participate in the AMS for Europe, it will most likely react and develop countermeasures to balance the altered strategic landscape;deleted

Amendment 87 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 18

Amendment 88 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 18

18. Notes that Russia has expressed its willingness to participate in the development of the AMS; points out, on the other hand, that if Russia does not participate in the AMS for Europe, it will most likely react ~~and develop countermeasures~~ to balance the altered strategic landscape;

Amendment 89 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 19

19. Argues that the EU, in cooperation with NATO and possibly with Russia, is capable of pooling resources and developing the AMS, thereby defending Europe against potential attacks from ‘rogue’ states or other state-like actors; points out that this approach would likely benefit all those involved;deleted

Amendment 9 #

Motion for a resolution
Recital A a (new)

Aa. whereas the Common Security and Defence Policy will develop in full complementarity with NATO, in the agreed framework of the strategic partnership between the EU and NATO, as confirmed by the European Council on 19 December 2013;

Amendment 90 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 19

Amendment 91 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 19

19. Argues that the EU, in cooperation with NATO and possibly with ~~Russia~~other countries, is capable of pooling resources and developing the AMS, thereby defending Europe against potential attacks from ‘rogue’ states or other state-like actors; points out that this approach would likely benefit all those involved;

Amendment 92 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 19

19. Argues that ~~the EU, in cooperation with NATO and possibly with Russia,~~NATO is capable of pooling resources and developing the AMS, thereby defending Europe against potential attacks from ‘rogue’ states or other state-like actors; points out that this approach would likely benefit all those involved;

Amendment 93 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 19

19. Argues that the EU, in cooperation with NATO and possibly with Russia, is capable of pooling resources and developing the AMS, thereby defending Europe against potential attacks from ~~‘rogue’~~ states or other ~~state-like~~ actors; points out that this approach would likely benefit all those involved;

Amendment 94 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 20

20. Argues that European anti-missile defence would require complex institutional arrangements that are currently not in existence; calls for a credible plan for an institutional framework in which the EU, NATO and non-NATO countries and Russia could work together;deleted

Amendment 95 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 20

Amendment 96 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 20

20. Argues that ~~European~~an EU-wide anti-missile defence would require complex institutional arrangements that are currently not in existence; calls ~~for~~the Commission report on AMD to have a credible plan for an institutional framework in which the EU, NATO and non-NATO countries and Russia could work together;

Amendment 97 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 20

20. Argues that European anti-missile defence would require complex institutional arrangements that are currently not in existence; calls for a ~~credible plan for an institutional framework in which the EU, NATO and non-NATO countries and Russia could work together~~n immediate end to initiatives which would involve the EU participating in the development of an AMS;

Amendment 98 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 21

21. Demands that necessary and credible institutional arrangements be established before construction of the system; points out that an AMS system, no matter how technologically advanced or comprehensive, is worthless withoutPoints out that BMD requires a rapid and effective chain of command, capable of making decisions in a very short period of time;

Amendment 99 #