26 Amendments of Olle SCHMIDT related to 2013/2076(INI)
Amendment 5 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital A
Recital A
A. whereas, according to the Commission services' spring 2013 forecast, GDP in the eurozone fell by 0.6 % in 2012 , after a rise of 1.4 % in 2011 and will contract by 0.4 % in 2013 before rising by 1.2 % in 2014;
Amendment 8 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital B
Recital B
B. whereas, according to the same forecast, unemployment in the eurozone rose from 10.2 % at the end of 2011 to 11.4 % at the end of 2012 and risks further increasing to 12.2 % in 2013 before slightly decreasing again in 2014;
Amendment 23 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital G
Recital G
G. whereas Article 282 TFEU states that the primary objective of the ECB is to maintain price stability and that the ECB should, without prejudice to this, it shall also support the general economic policies ofin the Union without prejudice to price stabilityin order to contribute to the achievement of the latter's objective; whereas the European Systemic Risk Board (ESRB) works under the auspices of the ECB in the area of financial stability;
Amendment 27 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital G a (new)
Recital G a (new)
Ga. whereas the recommendations concerning transparency of voting and the publication of summary minutes put forward in previous Parliament resolutions on the ECB annual reports have not yet been taken into account;
Amendment 40 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1
Paragraph 1
1. Is deeply concerned at the fact that persistently weak economic conditions are becoming the norm in Europe, creating overwhelmingcreate discontent among European citizens and therefore jeopardising the wholwith the European project;
Amendment 47 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 2
Paragraph 2
2. Welcomes the decisions of July 2012 to reduce the key ECB interest rates in the context of very low inflation expectations and weak economic activity; recalls that, in the long term, very low interest rates may cause distortions in the business sector and harm private savings and pension plans;
Amendment 61 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 4
Paragraph 4
4. Considers that the three-year LTRO settled on March 2012 contributed to stabilising the banking system, but that this should be a temporary measure; notes that, despite the liquidity injected into the banking system by the LTRO, the credit available to the real economy is still below pre-crisis levels; suggests that it would be appropriate for the ECB to reduce its deposit facility rate to negative values in order to encourage banking lending to the real economy;
Amendment 86 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 7
Paragraph 7
7. Welcomes the setting-up of the OMTs, with no ex ante quantitative limits, in order to safeguard monetary policy transmission, but deplores the decision to link the activation of the OMT to strict conditionalities attached to an EFSF/ESM programme; calls on the ECB to activate OMTs independently from strict conditionality;
Amendment 103 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 8
Paragraph 8
8. Considers unnecessaryWelcomes the full sterilisation of the liquidity injected by the OMTs, as inflation expectations remain extremely low in a context of weak economic activity;
Amendment 110 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 9
Paragraph 9
Amendment 133 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 10
Paragraph 10
Amendment 155 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 11
Paragraph 11
11. Argues that the conduct of monetary policy should be democratic and should result from open deliberation between different viewpoints and approachesin order to strengthen transparency and thereby democratic accountability;
Amendment 161 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 12
Paragraph 12
12. Invites the ECB to pay more attention to the contractionary effects on GDP, employment and social welfare created by austerity policies carried out by national governments in the framework of Economic Assistance Programmes involving the ECBCouncil to reconsider the involvement of the ECB and the IMF in the Troika ;
Amendment 176 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 13
Paragraph 13
13. Underlines that the ECB's independence should not justify lack of democratic accountabie need for democratic accountability with regard to the SSM and the ECB's involvement in the Troika, while stressing the ECB's independence in the field of monetary politcy;
Amendment 178 #
Motion for a resolution
Subheading 2
Subheading 2
Amendment 179 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 14
Paragraph 14
Amendment 181 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 15
Paragraph 15
Amendment 186 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 16
Paragraph 16
Amendment 204 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 19
Paragraph 19
19. Stresses the importance of a fruitful cooperation between the ECB and the competent national authorities within the framework of the SSM, in order to ensure an effective and smooth supervision, while guaranteeing full separation between monetary policy and supervision;
Amendment 222 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 23
Paragraph 23
23. Considers it urgent to approve the establishment of a European Resolution System in order to protect depositors and prevent fur, to reinforce the stability of ther banking crisessystem as well as to prevent the "too big to fail" syndrome ;
Amendment 225 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 25
Paragraph 25
Amendment 243 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 27 a (new)
Paragraph 27 a (new)
27a. Takes the view that the EU institutions, including the ECB, should lead by example in the field of gender balance and that it is essential that the gender representation among leading positions within the ECB be improved in order to better represent European citizens;
Amendment 244 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 27 b (new)
Paragraph 27 b (new)
27b. Deeply disapproves of the fact the Member States ignored the negative vote in the European Parliament, both in the ECON Committee and in the plenary, because of the lack of gender balance perspective during the appointment of Yves Mersch;
Amendment 245 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 27 c (new)
Paragraph 27 c (new)
27c. Urges the Member States to incorporate a gender-balance perspective with possibility for positive action on the basis of a balanced gender representation in regard to the appointment of members to the Executive Board; whenever a vacancy arises on the Executive Board, Euro Member States should be encouraged to nominate two candidates, one male and one female, for the vacant position;
Amendment 246 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 27 d (new)
Paragraph 27 d (new)
27d. Believes that the principles of gender balance in appointment to leading positions should also apply to the Steering Committee and Advisory Committee of the ESRB as well as the Boards of Supervisors of the ESAs;
Amendment 247 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 27 e (new)
Paragraph 27 e (new)
27e. Believes that Member States should also be encouraged to appoint women as governors of the National Central Banks (NCBs) in order to achieve a better gender balance on the Governing Council and the General Council of the ECB as well as on the General Board of the ESRB;