8 Amendments of Nirj DEVA related to 2008/2031(INI)
Amendment 4 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital A a (new)
Recital A a (new)
Aa. whereas the mutuality of the two concepts of human rights and human dignity, and their interdependence, is definitively identified in the Preamble to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights: 'Whereas recognition of the inherent dignity and of the equal and inalienable rights of all members of the human family is the foundation of freedom, justice and peace in the world',
Amendment 5 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital A b (new)
Recital A b (new)
Ab. whereas recognising man’s rights as inalienable to his being, and not as the product of a legal charter, is essential to sustaining liberty in a free society, and whereas in failing to propagate this understanding man has been left in the precarious state of having no inherent rights other than those which the social community deigns to confer on him,
Amendment 6 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital A c (new)
Recital A c (new)
Ac. whereas concern for the human dignity of man, as well as his human rights, must be placed at the centre of any consideration of the role that sanctions have to play in the area of international policy – because whilst international charters may recognise certain rights arising out of human dignity, such charters can never in themselves be regarded as the source of such rights,
Amendment 6 #
Draft opinion
Paragraph 6
Paragraph 6
6. Deplores the fact that sanctions have not been used consistently by the EU and its Members States; believes that in order to uphold credibility and avoid the accusation of "double standards", the EU must be able to justify the adoption or non-adoption of sanctions, based primarily on human rights grounds and arguments of effectiveness; recalls that the UN Oil-for-Food Programme in Iraq which in principle was a noble concept, was in practice a massive opportunity for graft and corruption; and therefore suggests that new sanctions, and any specified waivers, be monitored by Member States with unblemished reputations on sanctions- busting specifically, and corruption more generally;
Amendment 30 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 3
Paragraph 3
3. Considers that, for sanctions to be effective, their introduction must be seen as legitimate by public opinion at European and international levels and in countries in which changes are expected; stresses that consultation of the European Parliament in the decision-making process gives them added legitimacy and therefore, to that end, demands that the EU itself demonstrates this respect for legitimacy (and in fact gives credibility to it) by encouraging the governments of Europe to give their peoples (where constitutionally allowable) a chance to approve, or reject, the Lisbon Treaty that has been forced upon them;
Amendment 42 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 8
Paragraph 8
8. RegretAcknowledges that the existence of intra-EU disagreements on policies towards a given country such as Cuba or the reluctance of Member States to antagonise major partners such as Russia have led the EU to adopt only 'informal sanctions' in Presidency Conclusions, reflecting an unbalanced or inconsistent application of EU sanctions; recognises, however, that measures included in the Council conclusions, such as the deferral of the signing of agreements with countries such as Serbia, could be a useful tool in order to pressure third countries to fully cooperate with international mechanisms;
Amendment 71 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 21
Paragraph 21
21. Calls on the EU to systematically develop a dialogue with non-sanctioning states with a view to reaching a common position on restrictive measures, especially at regional level; points out that, as shown in the case of Burma/Myanmar, sanctions do not bring about the required change of policy or activities when the international community is divided and major players are not involved in their implementation; however, recalls that, as shown in the case of pre-invasion Iraq, sanctions do not necessarily bring about the required change even when the international community is unanimous either; and therefore observes that where they are ineffective the failure of sanctions may be due more to a visible lack of will in the international community to move beyond posturing as opposed to any lack of visible unity;
Amendment 75 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 25
Paragraph 25
25. Calls for the systematic inclusion in the legal instruments of clear and specific benchmarks as conditions for the lifting of the sanctions; insists, in particular, that the reference criteria should be establishremembers that the UN Oil for Food Programme in Iraq, which in principle was a noble concept, provided oin the basis of an independent evaluapractice a massive opportunity for graft and corruption, and therefore suggests that new sanctions, and should not be altered at a later stage, depending on political changes within the Councilany specified waivers, be monitored by Member States with unblemished reputations with regard to sanctions-busting specifically, and corruption more generally;