Progress: Procedure completed
Role | Committee | Rapporteur | Shadows |
---|---|---|---|
Lead | AFET | FLAUTRE Hélène ( Verts/ALE) | |
Committee Opinion | DEVE | WEBER Renate ( ALDE) | |
Committee Opinion | INTA |
Lead committee dossier:
Legal Basis:
RoP 54
Legal Basis:
RoP 54Events
The European Parliament adopted by 546 votes to 36, with 40 abstentions, a resolution on the evaluation of EU sanctions as part of the EU's actions and policies in the area of human rights.
The own initiative report had been tabled for consideration in plenary by Hélène FLAUTRE (Greens/EFA, FR) on behalf of the Committee on Foreign Affairs.
The resolution deplores the fact that, to date, no evaluation or impact assessment has been carried out in respect of the EU's sanctions policy and that it is therefore extremely difficult to gauge the policy's impact and effectiveness on the ground and thus to draw the necessary conclusions. The Parliament therefore calls on the Council and the Commission to carry out this evaluation work, recalling that the sanctions policy used against South Africa proved effective in helping to end apartheid.
The resolution also notes the lack of overall coherence of sanctions applied, which, as a result, lack credibility. In fact, the EU’s current sanctions policy sometimes results in contradictory measures being taken, or even a policy of “double standards” that seriously damages the image of the EU. Therefore, the disagreements within the EU as regards certain countries (e.g. Cuba) or the reluctance of Member States to antagonise major commercial partners (e.g. Russia) have led the EU to adopt only ‘informal sanctions’.
According to the Parliament, for sanctions to be effective, their introduction must be seen as legitimate by public opinion at European and international levels and in countries in which changes are expected. In this respect, consultation of the European Parliament in the decision-making process is essential to establish the legitimacy of intended sanctions.
Furthermore, the Parliament considers that recourse to sanctions should be envisaged in the case of actions by authorities that seriously undermine security and human rights or where all contractual and/or diplomatic options have been explored or have clearly reached stalemate. Given that any voluntary and irreversible degradation of the environment constitutes a threat to security and a serious violation of human rights, MEPs call on the Council and the Commission to include this type of voluntary damage among the grounds which may lead to the adoption of sanctions.
Towards effective sanctions : according to the Parliament, the argument of the ‘ineffectiveness’ of sanctions cannot be used in favour of lifting them but should be used instead to re-orientate and reassess the sanction itself. The Parliament stresses, in this regard, the indirect impact of ‘symbolic’ measures as an expression of the EU's moral condemnation, although it warns against placing too much emphasis on the idea of sanctions as symbolic measures, as this could result in them becoming totally devalued. The Parliament provides an overview of measures that could be implemented to make sanctions more effective. It suggests measuring the impact of a sanction on the private and professional activities of the members of a target regime, or on the operation thereof, or its ability to bring about a stop to, or to alter, the policies which have led to its adoption. It also considers that the effectiveness of a sanction depends on the European Union’s capacity to maintain it for the full period. They deplore, in this regard, the use of provisions involving the automatic lifting of sanctions (e.g. ‘sunset clauses’) without prior evaluation. In any case, the Parliament opposes the application of generalised, indiscriminate sanctions to any country, since this approach leads to the total isolation of the population, preferring instead targeted sanctions against the regime , coupled with support for civil society in the country concerned.
Sanctions as part of an overall human rights strategy : according to the Parliament, the approach to adopt regarding sanctions should include, in parallel, political dialogue, incentives and conditionality. This could include, as a last resort, the use of coercive measures. The Parliament considers that ‘human rights’ clauses, the system of generalised preferences and development aid should be used as tools of such a comprehensive and integrated policy approach. In terms of ‘human rights’ clauses (which imply that the non-compliance with human rights in a country with which an agreement has been signed may lead to the annulment of this agreement), the Parliament considers that these must not be implemented in isolation by the EU. On the contrary, according to the Parliament the implementation of human rights clauses and possible sanctions must complement each other. Furthermore, the Parliament calls on the Commission and the Member States to include human rights clauses in all agreement (whether sectoral or more general) and not to propose free trade agreements and/or association agreements – even containing human rights clauses – to governments of countries where massive human rights violations are being perpetrated.
Coordinated action by the international community : convinced that coordinated action by the international community has a stronger impact than disparate and uneven actions by States or regional entities, the Parliament calls on the Council, in the absence of UN Security Council sanctions, to cooperate with non-EU sanctioning states to coordinate their actions in order to increase their effectiveness. The Parliament considers in particular that the signing of a free trade agreement with a region in a targeted country should be used as a "carrot" and means of pressure to improve human rights and that such an agreement should, in any case, not include the country to which sanctions are being applied.
Better evaluate situations to target sanctions : the Parliament underlines the need for an in-depth analysis of each specific situation in order to assess the potential impact of different sanctions and to determine which are the most effective. However, such analysis should not be used to delay the adoption of sanctions. That is why it suggests creating a two-step procedure such as that set out in the CFSP which provides scope for an urgent political reaction (through the adoption of a common position) followed by sanctions. Furthermore, the Parliament calls for the systematic inclusion in the legal instruments of clear and specific benchmarks as conditions for the lifting of the sanctions. The Parliament must also be closely involved in all stages of a sanctions process : the decision-making process, the selection of the sanctions, the definition of benchmarks and the evaluation of their implementation. It believes that the arms embargo imposed on China is an illustration of EU consistency, given that this embargo was originally established following the 1989 Tiananmen massacre and the EU has not received to date any explanations about that massacre.
Effectiveness of targeted action : in order to judge the effectiveness of measures taken, the EU needs certain tools. The Parliament therefore deplores the fact that, owing to a lack of evaluation, it is impossible to assess the effectiveness of targeted measures. However, the Parliament recognises that sanctions of general economic scope, such as those that have been applied in the past to Iraq, have had adverse, counter-productive effects on the population. It therefore welcomes the fact that this approach has been abandoned in favour of more targeted, ‘smart’ sanctions, geared to achieving the maximum impact on those whose behaviour it wants to influence. Overall, the Parliament considers that economic sanctions used in isolation from other policy instruments are extremely unlikely to force a targeted regime to make major policy changes. Sanctions should target, first and foremost, leaders of targeted regimes and perpetrators of human rights violations. It therefore supports the use of targeted financial sanctions against key leaders of targeted regimes and their immediate family members. The plenary also calls for a limited application of the "extraordinary exemptions" to the freezing of assets. It calls for the creation of a specific procedure for objections in the event that a Member State wishes to grant an exemption to the freezing of assets. In addition, the Parliament calls for measures to prevent leaders of targeted regimes from accessing financial services within the EU’s jurisdiction. In this context, the Parliament calls for enhanced cooperation with the SWIFT management in Europe, so as to achieve improved results in the freezing of blacklisted accounts and the elimination of money transfers from/to such accounts. With regard to frozen assets, the plenary calls on the Council and the Commission to investigate the possibility of using frozen income of targeted authorities in a constructive manner, for example by allocating them to victims of human rights violations or for development purposes.
At the same time, the Parliament calls for coordinated cooperation between Member States and the Commission regarding the implementation of EU arms embargoes which are applied by each Member State. This includes making the current Code of Conduct on arms exports legally binding . The Parliament includes among effective targeted action, restrictions on admission (travel bans, visa bans) for blacklisted persons or non-state entities, preventing them from attending EU official meetings and also from travelling to the EU for private reasons. However, it regrets the fact that certain Member States have not complied with certain EU visa bans.
The problem of ‘blacklists’ in the fight against terrorism : the plenary highlighted the dangers of establishing blacklists for persons accused of terrorism, which are sometimes drawn up in an unclear manner. It recalls the obligation of Member States to draft sanctions that fully respect fundamental rights and stresses that the current blacklisting procedures at both the EU and the UN levels are deficient from the perspective of legal security and legal remedies. The plenary therefore calls on the Council to draw all the necessary conclusions and to fully apply the judgments of the Court of First Instance as regards EU autonomous sanctions. It also calls on the Council and the Commission to review the existing procedure for blacklisting and delisting, in order to respect blacklisted individuals’ and entities’ substantive human rights, rights to appeal before an independent and impartial body and due process, including the right to be notified and adequately informed of the charges brought against the individual or entity in question. The plenary considers that Article 75 of the revised treaty would be an opportunity to be seized by Parliament in order to remedy the shortcomings in current practice as regards the inclusion of names on a blacklist. It considers that this issue should be included on the agenda for the 2009 legislative programme. The Parliament regrets, however, that none of the judicial bodies is in position to assess the appropriateness of blacklisting, given that the evidence leading to blacklisting is based primarily on information held by the secret services. It is therefore important that Member States guarantee effective parliamentary control over the work of the secret services, while reiterating that the system of anti-terrorist lists, provided that it respects the most recent case-law of the Court of Justice, is an effective instrument of European Union anti-terrorist policy.
Towards a varied sanctions policy : while in favour of sanctions, the Parliament considers that a strategy of openness and a policy of sanctions are not mutually exclusive. It is therefore also necessary to envisage positive measures alongside sanctions. In this respect, the Parliament notes the cycle of sanctions imposed on Uzbekistan from November 2007 to April 2008: while continuing for one year the sanctions imposed for failure to satisfy initial criteria pertaining to investigations into the Andijan massacre, the Council decided to suspend the implementation of the visa ban, leaving the Uzbek regime six months in which to fulfil a set of human rights criteria, and with the looming threat of the automatic re-establishment of the visa ban. This approach produced some positive developments, even though the overall situation is Uzbekistan remains somewhat precarious. In any case, the Parliament urges that sanctions be systematically accompanied by positive measures to support civil society and human rights defenders and call for the thematic programmes and instruments (EIDHR, non-state actors, investing in people) to contribute to achieving this objective.
Recommendations in relation to the EU institutions and Member States : the Parliament calls on the Commission and the Council to undertake a comprehensive and in-depth evaluation of the EU’s sanctions policy and to ensure that development assistance strategies under the Development Cooperation Instrument and the European Development Fund are consistent with existing sanction regimes. Overall, the Parliament asks that the conditions for general EU budget support be explicitly linked to human rights and call for enhanced cooperation between the competent authorities of the Member States and the Commission in order to ensure more coherent and effective implementation of restrictive measures. Lastly, to give greater legitimacy to the sanctions, the Parliament must be involved at all stages of the procedure for the implementation and supervision of sanctions. In this respect, the Parliament considers that the ratification of the Lisbon Treaty should be the time to improve the expertise of the relevant EU services working in the field of sanctions and to enhance cooperation between the different services. That is why the Plenary calls on the Commission to set up a network of independent experts to put forward to the Council the most appropriate restrictive measures and to draw up a report on the development of the situation on the basis of the established criteria and objectives and, where necessary, to suggest ways in which implementation of sanctions might be improved. According to the Parliament, the setting-up of such a network would improve transparency and discussions on sanctions in general, and would also strengthen the implementation and ongoing monitoring of sanctions in particular cases.
The Committee on Foreign Affairs adopted the report by Hélène FLAUTRE (Greens/EFA, FR) on the evaluation of EU sanctions as part of the EU's actions and policies in the area of human rights, noting the urgent need to evaluate the EU’s sanctions policy. In effect, disparities in the legal bases for the implementation of the EU’s sanctions policy are undermining the transparency and overall coherence of European sanctions policy and, as a result, the credibility thereof. In fact, the EU’s current sanctions policy sometimes results in contradictory measures being taken, or even a policy of “double standards” that seriously damages the image of the EU. Therefore, the disagreements within the EU as regards certain countries (e.g. Cuba) or the reluctance of Member States to antagonise major commercial partners (e.g. Russia) have led the EU to adopt only ‘informal sanctions’.
According to MEPs, for sanctions to be effective, their introduction must be seen as legitimate by public opinion at European and international levels and in countries in which changes are expected. In this respect, consultation of the European Parliament in the decision-making process is essential to establish the legitimacy of intended sanctions.
MEPs consider that recourse to sanctions should be envisaged in the case of actions by authorities that seriously undermine security and human rights. Given that any voluntary and irreversible degradation of the environment constitutes a threat to security and a serious violation of human rights, MEPs call on the Council and the Commission to include this type of voluntary damage among the grounds which may lead to the adoption of sanctions.
Towards effective sanctions : according to MEPs, the argument of the ‘ineffectiveness’ of sanctions cannot be used in favour of lifting them but should be used instead to re-orientate and reassess the sanction itself. In this respect, MEPs establish a framework to make sanctions more effective. To make a sanction more effective, it is important to measure the impact of the sanction on the private and professional activities of the individuals targeted as members of a target regime, on the operation of the regime itself or its ability to bring about a stop to, or to alter, the activities or policies which have led to their adoption. MEPs consider that the effectiveness of a sanction depends on the European Union’s capacity to maintain it for the full period. They deplore, in this regard, the use of provisions involving the automatic lifting of sanctions (e.g. ‘sunset clauses’) without prior evaluation. In all circumstances, MEPs oppose the application of generalised, indiscriminate sanctions to any country, since this approach leads to the total isolation of the population, preferring instead targeted sanctions against the regime, coupled with support for civil society in the country concerned.
Sanctions as part of an overall human rights strategy : according to MEPs, the approach to adopt regarding sanctions should include, in parallel, political dialogue, incentives and conditionality. This could include, as a last resort, the use of coercive measures. Human rights and democracy clauses, the system of generalised preferences and development aid should be used as tools of such a comprehensive and integrated policy approach. Therefore, the human rights clauses must not be implemented in isolation. Furthermore, MEPs urge the Commission and the Member States not to propose free trade agreements and/or association agreements – even containing human rights clauses – to governments of countries where massive human rights violations are being perpetrated. They also call on the Commission to devise a specific strategy on human rights and the situation as regards democracy as part of each country strategy paper.
Coordinated action by the international community : convinced that coordinated action by the international community has a stronger impact than disparate and uneven actions by States or regional entities, MEPs stress the need to cooperate with organisations such as the UN or at least with non-EU sanctioning states. MEPs suggest in particular the creation of a common list of individuals subject to asset freezes, travel bans etc., in order to create the largest possible effect at international level and to maximise the effectiveness of EU sanctions and other sanctions. MEPs stress, in this respect, the urgent need to define a common position regarding Burma/Myanmar.
Better evaluate situations to target sanctions : MEPs underline the need for an in-depth analysis of each specific situation in order to assess the potential impact of different sanctions and to determine which are the most effective. However, such analysis should not be used to delay the adoption of sanctions. That is why they suggest creating a two-step procedure such as that set out in the CFSP which provides scope for an urgent political reaction (through the adoption of a common position) followed by sanctions. Furthermore, MEPs call for the systematic inclusion in the legal instruments of clear and specific benchmarks as conditions for the lifting of the sanctions. The Parliament must also be closely involved in all stages of a sanctions process: the decision-making process, the selection of the sanctions, the definition of benchmarks and the evaluation of their implementation. MEPs believe that the arms embargo imposed on China is an illustration of EU consistency, given that this embargo was originally established following the 1989 Tiananmen massacre and the EU has not received to date any explanations about that massacre.
Effectiveness of targeted action : in order to judge the effectiveness of measures taken, the EU needs certain tools. However, MEPs recognise that sanctions of general economic scope, such as those that have been applied in the past to Iraq, have had adverse, counter-productive effects on the population. They therefore welcome the fact that this approach has been abandoned in favour of more targeted, ‘smart’ sanctions, geared to achieving the maximum impact on those whose behaviour it wants to influence. Overall, MEPs consider that economic sanctions used in isolation from other policy instruments are extremely unlikely to force a targeted regime to make major policy changes. Sanctions should target, first and foremost, leaders of targeted regimes and perpetrators of human rights violations. MEPs therefore support the use of targeted financial sanctions against key leaders of targeted regimes and their immediate family members. MEPs also call for a limited application of the ‘extraordinary exemptions’ to the freezing of assets, except for ‘humanitarian exemptions’ to enable the public to access basic medical care. They also call for measures to prevent leaders of targeted regimes from accessing financial services within the EU’s jurisdiction. In this context, MEPs call for enhanced cooperation with the SWIFT management and shareholders in Europe, so as to achieve improved results in the freezing of blacklisted accounts and the elimination of money transfers from/to such accounts. At the same time, MEPs call for coordinated cooperation between Member States and the Commission regarding the implementation of EU arms embargoes which are applied by each Member State . This includes making the current Code of Conduct on arms exports legally binding. MEPs include among effective targeted action, restrictions on admission (travel bans, visa bans) for blacklisted persons or non-state entities, preventing them from attending EU official meetings and also from travelling to the EU for private reasons. However, they regret the fact that certain Member States have not complied with certain EU visa bans.
Targeted sanctions in the fight against terrorism : MEPs support the existing procedure for blacklisting and delisting, including the system of anti-terrorist lists at European level. They regret, however, that none of the judicial bodies is in position to assess the appropriateness of blacklisting, given that the evidence leading to blacklisting is based primarily on information held by the secret services. According to MEPs, fundamental discretion should not be transformed into impunity and it is therefore important that Member States guarantee effective parliamentary control over the work of the secret services. In particular, the European Parliament must be associated with the work done by the Conference of Oversight Committees of the Intelligence Bodies of the Member States.
A varied sanctions policy : while in favour of sanctions, MEPs consider that a strategy of openness and a policy of sanctions are not mutually exclusive. It is therefore also necessary to envisage positive measures alongside sanctions. In this respect, MEPs note the cycle of sanctions imposed on Uzbekistan from November 2007 to April 2008: while continuing for one year the sanctions imposed for failure to satisfy initial criteria pertaining to investigations into the Andijan massacre, the Council decided to suspend the implementation of the visa ban, leaving the Uzbek regime six months in which to fulfil a set of human rights criteria, and with the looming threat of the automatic re-establishment of the visa ban. This approach produced some positive developments, even though the overall situation is Uzbekistan remains somewhat precarious. In any circumstances, MEPs urge that sanctions be systematically accompanied by enhanced positive measures to support civil society and human rights defenders and call for the thematic programmes and instruments (EIDHR, non-state actors, investing in people) to contribute fully to achieving this objective.
Recommendations in relation to the EU institutions and Member States : MEPs call on the Commission and the Council to undertake a comprehensive and in-depth evaluation of the EU’s sanctions policy and to ensure that development assistance strategies under the Development Cooperation Instrument and the European Development Fund are consistent with existing sanction regimes. Overall, MEPs ask that the conditions for general EU budget support be explicitly linked to human rights and call for enhanced cooperation between the competent authorities of the Member States and the Commission in order to ensure more coherent and effective implementation of restrictive measures. Lastly, to give greater legitimacy to the sanctions, the Parliament must be involved at all stages of the procedure for the implementation and supervision of sanctions.
Documents
- Commission response to text adopted in plenary: SP(2008)6486/2
- Commission response to text adopted in plenary: SP(2008)6073
- Results of vote in Parliament: Results of vote in Parliament
- Decision by Parliament: T6-0405/2008
- Debate in Parliament: Debate in Parliament
- Committee report tabled for plenary, single reading: A6-0309/2008
- Committee report tabled for plenary: A6-0309/2008
- Committee opinion: PE406.016
- Committee opinion: PE405.985
- Amendments tabled in committee: PE407.849
- Committee draft report: PE405.920
- Committee draft report: PE405.920
- Amendments tabled in committee: PE407.849
- Committee opinion: PE405.985
- Committee opinion: PE406.016
- Committee report tabled for plenary, single reading: A6-0309/2008
- Commission response to text adopted in plenary: SP(2008)6073
- Commission response to text adopted in plenary: SP(2008)6486/2
Activities
- Irena BELOHORSKÁ
Plenary Speeches (1)
- Danutė BUDREIKAITĖ
Plenary Speeches (1)
- Kathalijne Maria BUITENWEG
Plenary Speeches (1)
- Colm BURKE
Plenary Speeches (1)
- Carlo CASINI
Plenary Speeches (1)
- Françoise CASTEX
Plenary Speeches (1)
- Luigi COCILOVO
Plenary Speeches (1)
- Proinsias DE ROSSA
Plenary Speeches (1)
- Beniamino DONNICI
Plenary Speeches (1)
- Edite ESTRELA
Plenary Speeches (1)
- Hélène FLAUTRE
- Alain HUTCHINSON
Plenary Speeches (1)
- Monica Maria IACOB-RIDZI
Plenary Speeches (1)
- Filip KACZMAREK
Plenary Speeches (1)
- Glenys KINNOCK
Plenary Speeches (1)
- Nils LUNDGREN
Plenary Speeches (1)
- Marusya LYUBCHEVA
Plenary Speeches (1)
- Manuel dos SANTOS
Plenary Speeches (1)
- Toomas SAVI
Plenary Speeches (1)
- Catherine STIHLER
Plenary Speeches (1)
- Ewa TOMASZEWSKA
Plenary Speeches (1)
- Feleknas UCA
Plenary Speeches (1)
- Anne VAN LANCKER
Plenary Speeches (1)
- Zbigniew ZALESKI
Plenary Speeches (1)
Votes
Rapport Flautre A6-0309/2008 - am. 4 #
Rapport Flautre A6-0309/2008 - am. 5 #
Rapport Flautre A6-0309/2008 - par. 49 #
Rapport Flautre A6-0309/2008 - am. 9 #
Rapport Flautre A6-0309/2008 - am. 11 #
Rapport Flautre A6-0309/2008 - am. 12 #
Rapport Flautre A6-0309/2008 - par. 57 #
Rapport Flautre A6-0309/2008 - par. 58/1 #
Rapport Flautre A6-0309/2008 - par. 58/2 #
Rapport Flautre A6-0309/2008 - par. 66 #
Rapport Flautre A6-0309/2008 - cons. A #
Rapport Flautre A6-0309/2008 - résolution #
Amendments | Dossier |
162 |
2008/2031(INI)
2008/05/30
INTA
33 amendments...
Amendment 1 #
Draft opinion Paragraph 1 1. Considers that human rights
Amendment 10 #
Draft opinion Paragraph 2 a (new) 2a. Considers that sanctions should also affect economic sectors which for governments that violate human rights constitute a strategic source of revenue which enables those governments to hang on to power;
Amendment 11 #
Draft opinion Paragraph 2 b (new) 2b. Considers that when sanctions-related decisions are taken, before sanctions are imposed and when the effectiveness of existing sanctions is assessed, EU bodies should cooperate closely with civil society and non-governmental organisations in the country concerned;
Amendment 12 #
Draft opinion Paragraph 3 3. Does not accept the policy of double standards concerning the imposition of sanctions and believes that sanctions should be imposed regardless of whether or not the infringement is to the detriment of
Amendment 13 #
Draft opinion Paragraph 3 3. Does not accept the policy of double standards and believes that
Amendment 14 #
Draft opinion Paragraph 3 3.
Amendment 15 #
Draft opinion Paragraph 3 a (new) 3a. Considers that, since sanctions have a very important symbolic role to play in the upholding of human rights (owing to the fact that they are linked to specific, defined, blatant violation of human rights), they should not be lifted until the reason for imposing them ceases to apply, irrespective of the effect on the EU's trade interests;
Amendment 16 #
Draft opinion Paragraph 3 b (new) 3b. Takes the view that if it is stated in the evaluation report that the imposition of sanctions is not having the desired effect, the nature of the sanctions should be changed (e.g. from blanket to targeted);
Amendment 17 #
Draft opinion Paragraph 4 a (new) 4a. Takes the view that Bilateral Investment Treaties (BITs) by EU Member States failed to promote human rights standards by exempting EU investors from responsible corporate behaviour in host countries and calls on the Commission to redeem this lack by making EU-based companies liable for human rights violations committed by their subsidiaries in host countries, whenever Member States' existing BITs are renegotiated under Community competence due to ratification of the Lisbon Treaty or whenever new Investment Treaties are negotiated by the Commission;
Amendment 18 #
Draft opinion Paragraph 5 5. Considers that trade sanctions
Amendment 19 #
Draft opinion Paragraph 5 5. Considers that other sanction methods that are not strictly trade sanctions should be
Amendment 2 #
Draft opinion Paragraph 1 1. Considers that human rights must be an essential aspect of the negotiating mandate for trade agreements conferred upon the Commission by the Council and that Parliament must always have a hand in defining that mandate, particularly in view of the fact that the European Union has a key role to play in promoting human rights and democracy in the world and given that economic and political sanctions are an important tool for use in respect of countries which ride roughshod over human rights;
Amendment 20 #
Draft opinion Paragraph 5 5. Considers that trade sanctions should be backed up by tools such as flight bans, restrictions on financial
Amendment 21 #
Draft opinion Paragraph 5 5. Considers that trade sanctions
Amendment 22 #
Draft opinion Paragraph 6 6.
Amendment 23 #
Draft opinion Paragraph 6 a (new) 6a. urges the Commission and the Member States not to propose association agreements - even with human rights clauses - to governments of countries where massive human rights violations are being committed, according to reports by the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights of the United Nations;
Amendment 24 #
Draft opinion Paragraph 7 7. Stresses that
Amendment 25 #
Draft opinion Paragraph 7 Amendment 26 #
Draft opinion Paragraph 7 7. Stresses that
Amendment 27 #
Draft opinion Paragraph 8 8. Calls on the Commission to monitor the effectiveness of trade sanctions and of the criteria used for imposing and withdrawing such sanctions,
Amendment 28 #
Draft opinion Paragraph 8 a (new) 8a. Asks the Commission to evaluate whether sanctions target those who are responsible and whether chosen time- frames are adequate;
Amendment 29 #
Draft opinion Paragraph 8 b (new) 8b. Calls - in cases where a sanction is imposed on a developing country which draws on the support provided by the EU for developing countries - for priority to be given in principle to targeted 'smart' sanctions and not to blanket sanctions which would logically be in conflict with development aid;
Amendment 3 #
Draft opinion Paragraph 1 a (new) 1a. Calls upon the Commission to keep Parliament constantly informed regarding the influence which sanctions imposed have on the achievement of objectives and to submit proposals concerning possible changes in the light of developments in the country concerned;
Amendment 30 #
Draft opinion Paragraph 8 c (new) 8c. Calls upon the Commission and the Council to assess the impact of sanctions on the development policy of the countries in question and on the EU's trade policy;
Amendment 31 #
Draft opinion Paragraph 8 d (new) 8d. When sanction measures are being assessed, calls for account to be taken of the imposition of sanctions by other bodies, in particular the USA and countries which most often trade with countries on which sanctions are to be imposed;
Amendment 32 #
Draft opinion Paragraph 8 e (new) 8e. Calls on the Commission to begin negotiations with countries which act in such a way as to reduce the effectiveness of the sanctions imposed by the EU in a country on which sanctions have been imposed;
Amendment 33 #
Draft opinion Paragraph 8 f (new) 8f. Calls upon the Commission, with a view to enforcing sanctions in the region concerned, to cooperate continuously with the countries bordering the country on which sanctions have been imposed, both when the type of sanction is being devised and when sanctions are being implemented, and also when their effectiveness and their impact on the trade policy of the entire wider region are being evaluated.
Amendment 4 #
Draft opinion Paragraph 1 a (new) 1a. Believes that it is of the utmost importance to include the binding core labour rights of the International Labour Organization (ILO ) in any future Free Trade Agreement (FTA) between the EU and third countries; furthermore considers labour rights to be an essential part of any agreement and therefore takes the view that this requires the chapter on labour rights to be subject to the standard dispute settlement mechanism;
Amendment 5 #
Draft opinion Paragraph 1 a (new) 1a. Notes that purely commercial sanctions have proved very ineffective in most cases, especially if they are not imposed throughout the world and under United Nations auspices, and harm the civil population more than the governments of the countries sanctioned;
Amendment 6 #
Draft opinion Paragraph 1 a (new) 1a. Regards the ratification by trade partners of the core ILO Conventions, the UN Conventions on non-discrimination, and the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) as essential elements of the human rights clause and as a condition for the conclusion of trade agreements with third countries;
Amendment 7 #
Draft opinion Paragraph 1 b (new) 1b. Calls upon the Council and the Commission to draw up a clear analysis of the effectiveness of sanctions which have already been imposed and the influence which they have on the EU's trade relations;
Amendment 8 #
Draft opinion Paragraph 2 2. Takes the view that the EU’s trade sanctions must be more targeted at the financial interests of
Amendment 9 #
Draft opinion Paragraph 2 2. Takes the view that the EU’s trade sanctions should not have a blanket effect on an entire society but must be more targeted at the financial interests of individuals or of the private and/or state companies
source: PE-407.688
2008/06/04
DEVE
10 amendments...
Amendment 1 #
Draft opinion Paragraph 1 1. Believes that in cases of grave violations of human rights and democratic principles, where governments show no commitment to dialogue with the international community and all other measures have failed, sanctions are an important policy tool; considers that given their potential negative side effects, sanctions should only be applied a
Amendment 10 #
Draft opinion Paragraph 8 8. Recommends the establishment of sanctions committees and expert panels to monitor the implementation of EU sanctions, which would enhance the transparency and coherence of the EU's policy; in addition, calls upon the Council and the Commission to take the initiative to strengthen the UN sanctions regime along these lines;
Amendment 2 #
Draft opinion Paragraph 1a (new) 1a. Believes that stronger mechanisms are needed at EU level in order to check and ensure that the EU’s restrictive measures are implemented by all Member States;
Amendment 3 #
Draft opinion Paragraph 1b (new) 1b. Underscores that in countries subject to EU restrictive measures humanitarian aid must be delivered in strict conformity with the humanitarian principles affirmed by the EU Consensus on Humanitarian Aid (i.e. those of humanity, neutrality, impartiality and independence);
Amendment 4 #
Draft opinion Paragraph 1c (new) 1c. Commits its parliamentary bodies, specifically its standing and ad-hoc delegations, to use their contacts with parliaments in non-sanctioning countries to enhance understanding of existing EU sanctions regimes relevant to the region concerned and to examine possibilities for coordinated action for the promotion of human rights;
Amendment 5 #
Draft opinion Paragraph 3a (new) Amendment 6 #
Draft opinion Paragraph 6 6. Deplores the fact that sanctions have not been used consistently by the EU and its Members States; believes that in order to uphold credibility and avoid the accusation of "double standards", the EU must be able to justify the adoption or non-adoption of sanctions, based primarily on human rights grounds and arguments of effectiveness; recalls that the UN Oil-for-Food Programme in Iraq which in principle was a noble concept, was in practice a massive opportunity for graft and corruption; and therefore suggests that new sanctions, and any specified waivers, be monitored by Member States with unblemished reputations on sanctions- busting specifically, and corruption more generally;
Amendment 7 #
Draft opinion Paragraph 7 7. Calls on the Council and the Commission to define, in close
Amendment 8 #
Draft opinion Paragraph 7 7. Calls on the Council and the Commission to define, in close consultation with Parliament, a coherent policy strategy on sanctions; believes that that strategy must also establish principles and procedures which ensure that the positions of civil society and democratic opposition within the countries concerned are taken into account ; underlines that, based on that strategy, each individual case must be analysed with regard to the context and likely effectiveness before action is taken; notes that sanctions are more effective if they are reacting to concrete, sudden incidents and aim at concrete and identifiable measures to be taken by the target country;
Amendment 9 #
Draft opinion Paragraph 7a (new) 7a. Underscores that sufficient time and resources, including staff specialised in human rights, must be invested by the Council and the Commission for the analyses preceding the design of sanctions and for the evaluation of sanctions and their effectiveness;
source: PE-407.744
2008/06/11
AFET
119 amendments...
Amendment 1 #
Motion for a resolution Citation 2 a (new) – having regard to the European Convention on Human Rights and the protocols thereto,
Amendment 10 #
Motion for a resolution Recital E E. whereas
Amendment 100 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 46 46. Calls on the Council and the Commission to
Amendment 101 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 47 47. Considers that Article 75 of the TFEU would be an opportunity to be seized by the European Parliament in order to remedy the shortcomings in current practice
Amendment 102 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 48 48.
Amendment 103 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 48 48.
Amendment 104 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 48 48.
Amendment 105 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 48 48. Deeply regrets that none of the judicial bodies is in position to assess the appropriateness of blacklisting, given that the evidence leading to blacklisting is based purely on information held by the secret services; calls in this regard on EU Member States to allow an effective
Amendment 106 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 48 a (new) 48a. Reiterates however that the system of anti-terrorist lists, provided that it respects the most recent case law established by the Court of Justice, is an effective instrument and one of the pillars of European Union anti-terrorist policy;
Amendment 107 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 48 b (new) 48b. Stresses that terrorism is a threat to safety and freedom and urges therefore that the Council review and update the list of terrorist organisations, taking into account their activities on all continents;
Amendment 108 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 49 Amendment 109 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 50 50. Considers that
Amendment 11 #
Motion for a resolution Recital G G. whereas the EU sanctions policy therefore incorporates or follows UN Security Council sanctions, but its scope and objectives are broader than those of the UN Security Council policy (international peace and security),
Amendment 110 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 50 50. Considers that EU sanctions policy is more effective where it remains explicitly transformable into a policy of positive measures; considers that a strategy of openness and a policy of sanctions are not mutually exclusive; in this respect, notes
Amendment 111 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 51 Amendment 112 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 51 51. Urges that sanctions be systematically accompanied, in the context of a multifold strategy, by enhanced positive measures to support civil society, human rights defenders and all kinds of projects promoting human rights and democracy; calls for the thematic programmes and instruments (EIDHR, non-state actors, investing in people),
Amendment 113 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 51 51. Urges that sanctions be systematically accompanied, in the context of a multifold strategy, by enhanced positive measures to support civil society, human rights defenders and all kinds of projects promoting human rights and democracy; calls for the thematic programmes and instruments (EIDHR, non-state actors, investing in people),
Amendment 114 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 53 53. Calls on the Commission and the Council to undertake a comprehensive and in-depth evaluation of the EU sanctions policy so as to
Amendment 115 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 59 Amendment 116 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 59 59. Calls on the Commission to
Amendment 117 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 59 59. Calls on the Commission to set up a
Amendment 118 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 59 (to become paragraph 58) 5
Amendment 119 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 58 (to become paragraph 59) 5
Amendment 12 #
Motion for a resolution Recital G a (new) Ga. whereas, with regard to international relations and the promotion of the political objectives included in the various founding Treaties, the European Union obtains more meaningful results when it proposes 'positive measures' to its partners on economic and trade issues, and 'political measures to support and encourage' political processes designed to promote more democracy and the rule of law in a given country,
Amendment 13 #
Motion for a resolution Recital H H. whereas sanctions are
Amendment 14 #
Motion for a resolution Recital H H. whereas sanctions are one of a range of instruments which the EU may use to implement its policy on human rights; recalling that the use of sanctions must
Amendment 15 #
Motion for a resolution Recital H H. whereas sanctions are one of
Amendment 16 #
Motion for a resolution Recital H H. whereas, with the sole exception of the case of South Africa, the effectiveness of sanctions has been very limited; whereas sanctions are one of a range of instruments which the EU may use to
Amendment 17 #
Motion for a resolution Recital I I. whereas neither
Amendment 18 #
Motion for a resolution Recital I a (new) Ia. whereas restrictive measures may be targeted at third countries' governments, but also at non-State entities and natural or legal persons (such as terrorist groups or groups supporting them and individual terrorists),
Amendment 19 #
Motion for a resolution Recital J J. whereas the types of
Amendment 2 #
Motion for a resolution Citation 2 b (new) – having regard to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the two optional protocols thereto,
Amendment 20 #
Motion for a resolution Recital L L. whereas EU sanctions themselves are founded on a variety of legal bases, depending on the exact nature of the restrictive measures and on the legal nature of the relations with the third country concerned, as well as on the sectors and objectives in question; whereas these factors determine both the procedure for adoption of the sanctions – which often, but not always, require a CFSP Common Position and therefore unanimity in Council – and the legislative procedure to be followed in order to make the sanctions legally binding and enforceable, the common procedure being that set out in Article 301 of the EC Treaty,
Amendment 21 #
Motion for a resolution Recital N N. whereas, according to the above- mentioned Basic Principles on the Use of Restrictive Measures (Sanctions) as well as the relevant Guidelines, targeted sanctions
Amendment 22 #
Motion for a resolution Recital N N. whereas, according to the above- mentioned Basic Principles on the Use of Restrictive Measures (Sanctions) as well as the relevant Guidelines, targeted sanctions
Amendment 23 #
Motion for a resolution Recital Q Q. whereas relations between the EU and third states are often governed by bilateral or multilateral agreements which allow one of the parties to take appropriate measures in cases of violation by the other party of an essential element of the agreement, namely respect for human rights, international law, democratic principles and the rule of law (the human rights clause), the Cotonou Agreement being a prominent example,
Amendment 24 #
Motion for a resolution Recital R R. whereas the introduction and implementation of restrictive measures is based on
Amendment 25 #
Motion for a resolution Recital R R. whereas the introduction and implementation of restrictive measures
Amendment 26 #
Motion for a resolution Recital R R. whereas the introduction and implementation of restrictive measures is based on a series of principles such as respect for international law, human rights and fundamental freedoms, including due process and the right to an effective remedy, as well as proportionality, and must provide for appropriate exemptions to take account of basic human needs of the targeted persons, allowing a minimum flow of goods and services such as access to primary education, to drinkable water and to basic medical care,
Amendment 27 #
Motion for a resolution Recital R a (new) Ra. whereas the credibility of the EU and its individual Member States is compromised when EU sanctions appear to be or actually are broken, and whereas Robert Mugabe was invited to attend the EU-Africa Summit in Lisbon on 8-9 December 2007, despite the fact that he was formally banned from all territories of EU Member States under Common Position 2004/161/CFSP1,
Amendment 28 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 1 1. Regrets that, to date, no evaluation or impact assessment has been carried out on EU sanctions policy and that it is therefore extremely difficult to gauge the policy's impact and effectiveness on the ground and thus to draw the necessary conclusions; calls on the Council and the Commission to carry out this evaluation work;
Amendment 29 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 1 1. Regrets that, to date, no evaluation or impact assessment has been carried out on EU sanctions policy and that it is therefore extremely difficult to gauge the policy's impact and effectiveness on the ground and thus to draw the necessary conclusions; calls on the Council and the Commission to carry out this evaluation work
Amendment 3 #
Motion for a resolution Citation 16 a (new) Amendment 30 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 3 3. Considers that, for sanctions to be effective, their introduction must be seen as legitimate by public opinion at European and international levels and in countries in which changes are expected; stresses that consultation of the European Parliament in the decision-making process gives them added legitimacy and therefore, to that end, demands that the EU itself demonstrates this respect for legitimacy (and in fact gives credibility to it) by encouraging the governments of Europe to give their peoples (where constitutionally allowable) a chance to approve, or reject, the Lisbon Treaty that has been forced upon them;
Amendment 31 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 4 4. Notes also that sanctions can have symbolic value as an expression of the EU's moral condemnation of the actions of the regime to which sanctions are applied
Amendment 32 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 4 4. Notes also that sanctions can have symbolic value as an expression of the EU's moral condemnation of the actions of the regime to which sanctions are applied
Amendment 33 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 4 4. Notes also that sanctions can have symbolic value as an expression of the EU's moral condemnation
Amendment 34 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 4 4. Notes also that sanctions can have symbolic value as an expression of the EU's moral condemnation of the actions of the regime to which sanctions are applied, thus giving added visibility and credibility to EU foreign policy; considers that that credibility is vitiated by an obvious policy of double standards which ensures that the same kind of breaches of international law are not reflected in the same kind of 'restrictive measures';
Amendment 35 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 4 4. Notes also that sanctions can have symbolic value as an expression of the
Amendment 36 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 5 5. Considers that recourse to sanctions should be envisaged in the case of actions by authorities
Amendment 37 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 6 Amendment 38 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 6 6. Takes the view that any voluntary and irreversible degradation of the environment constitutes a threat to
Amendment 39 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 6 6. Takes the view that any voluntary and irreversible degradation of the environment constitutes a threat to peace and security
Amendment 4 #
Motion for a resolution Recital A a (new) Aa. whereas the mutuality of the two concepts of human rights and human dignity, and their interdependence, is definitively identified in the Preamble to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights: 'Whereas recognition of the inherent dignity and of the equal and inalienable rights of all members of the human family is the foundation of freedom, justice and peace in the world',
Amendment 40 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 7 7.
Amendment 41 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 8 Amendment 42 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 8 8.
Amendment 43 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 8 8. Regrets that the existence of intra-EU disagreements on policies towards a given country
Amendment 44 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 8 8. Regrets that the existence of intra-EU disagreements on policies towards a given country such as Cuba or the reluctance of Member States to antagonise major
Amendment 45 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 8 a (new) 8a. Considers that the European Union sanctions against the Palestinian Government formed in February 2006 following elections which the EU recognised as free and democratic have undermined the consistency of Union policy and proved seriously counterproductive by making the political and humanitarian situation considerably worse;
Amendment 46 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 9 9. Considers that the argument of the 'ineffectiveness' of sanctions cannot be used in favour of lifting them a
Amendment 47 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 9 9. Considers that the argument of the 'ineffectiveness' of sanctions cannot be used in favour of lifting them as it might encourage
Amendment 48 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 10 10. Considers that the effectiveness of sanctions should be analysed at a number of levels, both in terms of the measures' intrinsic effectiveness, i.e. their ability to have an impact on the private and professional activities of the individuals targeted as members of a target regime, or on the operation
Amendment 49 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 10 a (new) 10a. Believes that the effectiveness of a sanction depends on the European Union's capacity to maintain it for the full period and, in this connection, deplores the use of provisions such as 'sunset clauses' involving the automatic lifting of sanctions;
Amendment 5 #
Motion for a resolution Recital A b (new) Ab. whereas recognising man’s rights as inalienable to his being, and not as the product of a legal charter, is essential to sustaining liberty in a free society, and whereas in failing to propagate this understanding man has been left in the precarious state of having no inherent rights other than those which the social community deigns to confer on him,
Amendment 50 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 11 11.
Amendment 51 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 11 11. Considers that
Amendment 52 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 11 11. Considers that a sanctions policy leads de facto to the isolation of the country concerned but should under no circumstances isolate the population; stresses, therefore, that any sanctions taken against government authorities should
Amendment 53 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 11 11. Considers that a sanctions policy leads de facto to the isolation of the country concerned but should under no circumstances isolate the population; stresses, therefore, that any sanctions taken against government authorities should systematically be coupled with
Amendment 54 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 11 a (new) 11a. Stresses, in this context, the political importance of the quite simply disastrous and bankrupt historical experience of the policy of sanctions against Iraq that the United States imposed on the international community; points out, in this connection, that hundreds of thousands of innocent Iraqi civilians died as a result of the direct and collateral effects of that embargo;
Amendment 55 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 12 Amendment 56 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 15 15. Stresses that the
Amendment 57 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 15 a (new) 15a. Considers that failure to take appropriate or restrictive measures in the event of a situation marked by persistent human rights violations seriously undermines the Union's human rights strategy, sanctions policy and credibility; in this connection, believes that the persistent violations of international law by Israel call for urgent action on the part of the Union;
Amendment 58 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 16 16.
Amendment 59 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 16 16.
Amendment 6 #
Motion for a resolution Recital A c (new) Ac. whereas concern for the human dignity of man, as well as his human rights, must be placed at the centre of any consideration of the role that sanctions have to play in the area of international policy – because whilst international charters may recognise certain rights arising out of human dignity, such charters can never in themselves be regarded as the source of such rights,
Amendment 60 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 16 16. Insists, therefore, on the systematic inclusion of human rights clauses and a specific implementation mechanism in all
Amendment 61 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 17 17. Considers that sanctions policy will be
Amendment 62 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 18 a (new) 18a. Stresses therefore that the removal of restrictive measures must not, under any circumstances, be used as a preliminary condition for initiating dialogue with a third country; in this connection, the revision thereof must be conditioned solely by perceptible progress regarding the factors which led to the sanctions being imposed;
Amendment 63 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 19 19. Takes the view that coordinated action by the international community has a stronger impact than disparate and uneven actions by States or regional entities; welcomes, therefore, the
Amendment 64 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 19 19. Takes the view that coordinated action by the international community and by the EU has a stronger impact than disparate and uneven actions by States or regional entities;
Amendment 65 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 19 19. Takes the view that coordinated action by the international community has a stronger impact than disparate and uneven actions by States or regional entities; welcomes, therefore, the notion expressed in the Basic Principles that UN Security Council sanctions should be preferred to EU sanctions
Amendment 66 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 20 20. Calls on the Council, in the absence of UN Security Council sanctions, to cooperate with
Amendment 67 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 20 20. Calls
Amendment 68 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 20 20. Calls on the Council, in the absence of
Amendment 69 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 20 a (new) 20a. Considers that the EU should seek cooperation with other regional organisations, such as the African Union and ASEAN, in order to promote human rights and assure coordination of actions on sanctions;
Amendment 7 #
Motion for a resolution Recital C C. whereas the 2004 Basic Principles on the Use of Restrictive Measures (Sanctions) are the first pragmatic document defining the framework within which the EU imposes sanctions; whereas, however, the EU has been
Amendment 70 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 21 21. Calls on the EU to systematically develop a dialogue with non-sanctioning states with a view to reaching a common position on restrictive measures, especially at regional level; points out that, as shown in the case of Burma/Myanmar, sanctions do not often bring about the required change of policy or activities when the international
Amendment 71 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 21 21. Calls on the EU to systematically develop a dialogue with non-sanctioning states with a view to reaching a common position on restrictive measures, especially at regional level; points out that, as shown in the case of Burma/Myanmar, sanctions do not bring about the required change of policy or activities when the international community is divided and major players are not involved in their implementation; however, recalls that, as shown in the case of pre-invasion Iraq, sanctions do not necessarily bring about the required change even when the international community is unanimous either; and therefore observes that where they are ineffective the failure of sanctions may be due more to a visible lack of will in the international community to move beyond posturing as opposed to any lack of visible unity;
Amendment 72 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 24 24.
Amendment 73 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 24 24. Calls for a more in-depth analysis of each specific situation prior to the adoption of sanctions in order to assess the potential impact of different sanctions, and to determine which are the most effective in the light of all other relevant factors and comparable experiences; considers that a prior analysis is all the more justified since
Amendment 74 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 24 a (new) 24a. Stresses, however, that such analysis should not be used to delay the adoption of sanctions; underlines in this respect that the two-step procedure for the imposition of sanctions under the CFSP provides scope for an urgent political reaction, initially through the adoption of a common position to be set out after a more in-depth analysis of the Regulation, detailing the exact nature and scope of the sanctions;
Amendment 75 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 25 25. Calls for the systematic inclusion in the
Amendment 76 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 25 25. Calls for the systematic inclusion in the legal instruments of clear and specific benchmarks as conditions for the lifting of the sanctions; insists, in particular, that the reference criteria should be established on the basis of an independent evaluation
Amendment 77 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 26 26. Calls on the Council and the
Amendment 78 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 27 27. Believes that the arms embargo imposed on China is an illustration of EU
Amendment 79 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 28 28. Calls on the ‘Sanctions’ formation of the Foreign Relations Counsellors Working Party (RELEX/Sanctions) to fulfil their mandate to the full; insists in particular on the need
Amendment 8 #
Motion for a resolution Recital D D. whereas this sanctions policy is based principally on the five following objectives of the common foreign and security policy (CFSP): to safeguard the common values, fundamental interests, independence and integrity of the Union in conformity with the principles of the United Nations Charter; to strengthen the security of the Union in all ways; to preserve peace and strengthen international security, in accordance with the principles of the United Nations Charter and the Helsinki Final Act, and the objectives of the Paris Charter, including those on external borders; to promote international cooperation; to develop and consolidate democracy and the rule of law and respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms,
Amendment 80 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 29 29. Requests that Parliament be associated in all the stages of a sanctions process: the decision-making process leading to sanctions, the selection of the sanctions most appropriate to the situation, and also the definition of benchmarks and the evaluation of their implementation within the framework of the review mechanism and the lifting of the sanction;
Amendment 81 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 29 a (new) 29a. Recognises that states should be accountable for internationally wrongful acts and underlines the need for a judicial control mechanism with a view to guaranteeing the implementation of sanctions in conformity with international law and humanitarian law;
Amendment 82 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 29 b (new) 29b. Considers that an indiscriminate economic embargo in respect of a country constitutes a violation of human rights, and strongly condemns any embargo in respect of basic medicines, an unacceptable practice which affects mostly innocent children;
Amendment 83 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 31 31. Considers that economic sanctions used in isolation from other policy instruments are extremely unlikely to force a targeted regime to make major policy changes; stresses, moreover, that far-reaching economic restrictions may entail excessively high economic and humanitarian costs, and therefore reiterates its call for more carefully
Amendment 84 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 32 32. Supports the use of targeted financial sanctions against key leaders of targeted regimes, which act directly on the income of the sanctioned individuals
Amendment 85 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 32 32. Supports the use of targeted financial sanctions against key leaders of targeted regimes and their immediate family members, which act directly on the income of the sanctioned individuals rather than on the source of income; stresses that targeted commodity sanctions targeting a specific or major source of income of a regime present the risk of more wide-ranging, indiscriminate effects on the population and may favour the development of a 'black economy';
Amendment 86 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 32 a (new) 32a. Considers that economic and financial sanctions, even when they are targeted, must be applied by all natural and legal persons pursuing commercial activities in the EU, including citizens of third countries, and European citizens or legal persons registered or established in accordance with the legislation of an EU Member State who pursue commercial activities outside the EU;
Amendment 87 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 33 33. Calls for a limited
Amendment 88 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 33 33. Calls for a limited application of the 'extraordinary exemptions' to the freezing of assets; calls, however, for the introduction of 'humanitarian exemptions', such as a system to permit access to basic medical care; calls for the creation of a specific procedure for objections in the event that a Member State wishes to grant an exemption to the freezing of assets, since the efficiency of the restrictive measure is undermined by the lack of such a procedure given that the Member States are only required to inform the Commission in advance of such an exemption;
Amendment 89 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 34 Amendment 9 #
Motion for a resolution Recital E E. whereas
Amendment 90 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 34 34. Calls for action to improve the application of the EU's targeted financial sanctions, in order to ensure that, in practice, the measures comprehensively deny designated persons and entities access to all financial services within the EU's jurisdiction, including those that pass through EU clearing-house banks or otherwise make use of financial services within the EU's jurisdiction; stresses the need for greater flexibility in the distribution of sanction lists within the EU and within Member States to all persons covered by the obligations laid down in the Third Money Laundering Directive; proposes that each Member State designates one institution responsible for disseminating this information;
Amendment 91 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 35 35. Calls for enhanced cooperation by the Council and the Commission with the SWIFT management and shareholders in Europe, so as to achieve improved results in the freezing of blacklisted accounts and the elimination of money transfers from/to such accounts;
Amendment 92 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 36 36. Calls on the Council and the Commission to investigate the possibilities and ways to use frozen income of targeted authorities in a constructive manner, for example by allocating them
Amendment 93 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 38 38. Calls for coordinated cooperation between Member States
Amendment 94 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 42 42. Notes
Amendment 95 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 43 43.
Amendment 96 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 43 43.
Amendment 97 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 44 44. Recalls the obligation of EU Member States to draft sanctions in compliance with Article 6(2) of the Treaty on European Union, which requires the Union to respect fundamental rights, as guaranteed by the European Convention on Human Rights and as they result from the constitutional traditions common to the Member States;
Amendment 98 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 44 44. Recalls the obligation of EU Member States to draft sanctions in compliance with Article 6(2) of the Treaty on European Union, which requires the Union to respect fundamental rights, as guaranteed by the European Convention on Human Rights and as they result from the constitutional traditions common to the Member States; stresses that the present blacklisting procedures at both the EU and the UN levels are deficient from the perspective of legal security and legal remedies; urges the Council to draw all the necessary conclusions and fully to apply the
Amendment 99 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 45 source: PE-407.849
|
History
(these mark the time of scraping, not the official date of the change)
committees/2/rapporteur |
|
docs/2/docs/0/url |
Old
http://nullEN&reference=PE405.985&secondRef=02New
https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/INTA-AD-405985_EN.html |
docs/3/docs/0/url |
Old
http://nullEN&reference=PE406.016&secondRef=02New
https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/DEVE-AD-406016_EN.html |
docs/5/docs/0/url |
/oeil/spdoc.do?i=15373&j=0&l=en
|
docs/6/docs/0/url |
/oeil/spdoc.do?i=15373&j=0&l=en
|
docs/0/docs/0/url |
Old
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?type=COMPARL&mode=XML&language=EN&reference=PE405.920New
https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/EN&reference=PE405.920 |
docs/1/docs/0/url |
Old
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?type=COMPARL&mode=XML&language=EN&reference=PE407.849New
https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/EN&reference=PE407.849 |
docs/2/docs/0/url |
Old
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?type=COMPARL&mode=XML&language=EN&reference=PE405.985&secondRef=02New
http://nullEN&reference=PE405.985&secondRef=02 |
docs/3/docs/0/url |
Old
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?type=COMPARL&mode=XML&language=EN&reference=PE406.016&secondRef=02New
http://nullEN&reference=PE406.016&secondRef=02 |
docs/4/docs/0/url |
Old
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/A-6-2008-0309_EN.htmlNew
https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/A-6-2008-0309_EN.html |
docs/5/docs/0/url |
/oeil/spdoc.do?i=15373&j=1&l=en
|
events/0/type |
Old
Committee referral announced in Parliament, 1st reading/single readingNew
Committee referral announced in Parliament |
events/1/type |
Old
Vote in committee, 1st reading/single readingNew
Vote in committee |
events/2 |
|
events/2 |
|
events/3/docs/0/url |
Old
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?secondRef=TOC&language=EN&reference=20080903&type=CRENew
https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/EN&reference=20080903&type=CRE |
events/5 |
|
events/5 |
|
procedure/legal_basis/0 |
Rules of Procedure EP 54
|
procedure/legal_basis/0 |
Rules of Procedure EP 052
|
committees/0 |
|
committees/0 |
|
committees/1 |
|
committees/1 |
|
committees/2 |
|
committees/2 |
|
docs/4/docs/0/url |
Old
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?type=REPORT&mode=XML&reference=A6-2008-309&language=ENNew
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/A-6-2008-0309_EN.html |
docs/5/body |
EC
|
docs/6/body |
EC
|
events/2/docs/0/url |
Old
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?type=REPORT&mode=XML&reference=A6-2008-309&language=ENNew
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/A-6-2008-0309_EN.html |
events/5/docs/0/url |
Old
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?type=TA&language=EN&reference=P6-TA-2008-405New
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/TA-6-2008-0405_EN.html |
activities |
|
commission |
|
committees/0 |
|
committees/0 |
|
committees/1 |
|
committees/1 |
|
committees/2 |
|
committees/2 |
|
docs |
|
events |
|
links |
|
other |
|
procedure/dossier_of_the_committee |
Old
AFET/6/59415New
|
procedure/legal_basis/0 |
Rules of Procedure EP 052
|
procedure/legal_basis/0 |
Rules of Procedure of the European Parliament EP 052
|
procedure/subject |
Old
New
|
activities |
|
committees |
|
links |
|
other |
|
procedure |
|