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33 Amendments of José GUSMÃO related to 2020/2075(INI)

Amendment 40 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph -1 (new)
-1. Deplores that the European Union economy is in constant crisis mode since the outbreak of the financial crisis in 2007 and stresses that since then socio- economic disparities have increased both between Member States and within Member States especially for the younger generations and for low wage earners 1a; regrets that the existing tools of macroeconomic and fiscal policy coordination as for example expressed in the country specific recommendations have exacerbated these disparities; _________________ 1aThe Social Divide in Europe - OECD report for the Open Society Foundation Europe EU inequality got worse before Covid crisis, data shows | ETUC Inequality and Poverty across Generations in the European Union (imf.org).
2021/04/23
Committee: ECON
Amendment 41 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph -1 a (new)
-1a. Deplores that the design of current macroeconomic legislative framework abolishes or constraints member states’ capacities to employ monetary and fiscal policy for purposes of macroeconomic stabilisation in the euro area 1b; regrets the consequent promotion of international price competitiveness through downward wage flexibility as means of economic adjustment; highlights that former Commissioner László Andor warned that the consequence is social damage due to layoffs and wage cuts in the public and private sector1c; _________________ 1bDesign Failures of the Eurozone - Can They be Fixed? - LSE ‘Europe in Question’ Discussion Papers, Paul de Grauwe, 2013, vol. 57; Forced Structural Convergence in the Eurozone - Or a Differentiated European Monetary Community -Max Planck Institute für Gesellschaftsforschung Discussion Paper 16/15, Fritz Scharpf, 201. 1cDeveloping the Social Dimension of a Deep and Genuine Economic and Monetary Union - László Andor, 13 September 2013.
2021/04/23
Committee: ECON
Amendment 42 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph -1 b (new)
-1b. Is highly worried about the multiple long-term challenges the European Union is confronted with: public health crisis, climate crisis, lack of investment in public infrastructure aggravating socio-economic disparities and fuelling centrifugal tendencies of the Union;
2021/04/23
Committee: ECON
Amendment 43 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph -1 c (new)
-1c. Takes note of the ultra-low interest rate policy of ECB which has only become necessary due of insufficient fiscal policy; strongly deplores its side effects namely fuelling asset and real estate prices, which mainly benefitted capital owners and rent seekers;
2021/04/23
Committee: ECON
Amendment 44 #
-1d. Strongly believes that in order to tackle these challenges and to escape the vicious crisis cycle a decisive and concerted effort is indispensable that cannot be achieved with the current tools of macroeconomic and fiscal policy coordination;
2021/04/23
Committee: ECON
Amendment 52 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1
1. Welcomes the Commission communication of 3 March 2021 entitled ‘One year since the outbreak of COVID- 19: fiscal policy response’ and takes note of the proposed conditions for deactivating the general escape clause (GEC); highlights that deactivation of the GEC shwould be conditional upon the health, social and economic situation across Member States in order to ensure that fiscal support is provided for as long as neededentail fiscal consolidation, which will be detrimental to economic growth, employment and public investment; recalls that the latter is urgently needed over the long run to promote a social, ecological and digital transformation;
2021/04/23
Committee: ECON
Amendment 65 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 2
2. Agrees withTakes note of the opinion of the European Fiscal Board (EFB) on the importance of having a clear pathway towards a reformed fiscal framework prior to the deactivation of the GEC;
2021/04/23
Committee: ECON
Amendment 83 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 4
4. Considers that economic indicators and adjustment paths need to be interpreted cautiously, and therefore calls for the code of conduct of the Stability and Growth Pact to be revised vis-à-vis the benchmarks needed to calculate such adjustment needs and paths; stresses that fiscal guidance should avoid pro-cyclical biases, promote upward convergence and counteract macroeconomic imbalancavoid negative effects on employment as well as wages and counteract macroeconomic imbalances through symmetrically coordinated macroeconomic policies; calls for special accounting treatment for loans from Next Generation EU (NGEU) related spending and from other national initiatives for public investment;
2021/04/23
Committee: ECON
Amendment 95 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 5
5. Calls for a continued expansionary fiscal stance for as long as needed and for it to be shifted to support the recovery from the COVID-19 pandemic and a green, digital and inclusive transformation while ensuring fiscal sustainability in the long term;
2021/04/23
Committee: ECON
Amendment 96 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 5 a (new)
5a. Stresses that the discretionary use of fiscal policy is a key tool for macroeconomic stabilization; highlight that such discretionary use is of special significance in times of economic downturns and to promote structural transformation;
2021/04/23
Committee: ECON
Amendment 100 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 6
6. Calls on the Member States to embed the high-quality fiscal support in credible medium-term frameworks, bearing in mind that emergency measures are temporary, limited and targeted; calls on the Member States to monitor fiscal risks, namely contingent liabilities, as appropriate;deleted
2021/04/23
Committee: ECON
Amendment 137 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 8
8. Stresses the importance of complementarity between monetary and fiscal policies to deliver the required support post-COVID-19; considers that the low interest rate environment has implications for fiscal policy; warns against the negative consequences of a premature tightening of monetary and fiscal policy; is highly concerned about the distributional effects of to the low interest rate environment;
2021/04/23
Committee: ECON
Amendment 155 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 10
10. Calls for an appropriate fiscal and monetary policy mix that work together towards achieving; highlights that the financial and economic crisis of 2008-13 showed that the lender of last resort function of central banks is an indispensable instrument of fiscal and macroeconomic stabilization; calls for a reconsideration of the EUCB’s objectivmandate with a view on ensuring the stability of public finances;
2021/04/23
Committee: ECON
Amendment 169 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 11
11. Highlights that debt levels have increased and that some Member States already have a sizeable debt legacy; notes that circumstances have changed since the Maastricht criteria were defined and that inflation and interest rate levels are considerably lower; recalls the ongoing consultation on the ECB monetary policy, and the need for the ECB to consider full employment and ecological transition on par with its price stability mandate;
2021/04/23
Committee: ECON
Amendment 185 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 12
12. Stresses that debt service costs are expected to remain low for the foreseeable future and primary deficits are likely to be offset by favourable interest-growth differentials; further considers that as long as the differentials are negative it is possible to sustain and progressively reduce high debt levels, while continuing supporting the economy;
2021/04/23
Committee: ECON
Amendment 202 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 13
13. Recalls the importance of growth- enhancing policies and public investment aimed at increasing growth potential and, achieving the EU’s objectivesfull employment and directing a social, ecological and digital transformation;
2021/04/23
Committee: ECON
Amendment 206 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 14
14. Stresses the importance of pursuing a broad and transparent DSA in order to set an appropriate country-specific path, using innovative tools and techniques such as stress tests and stochastic analysis to better reflect risks to public debt dynamics; stresses however that DSA methodologies are intrinsically flawed and incomplete since a DSA amounts to making predictions about an unknowable future, and cannot factor in the future stance of monetary policy or irrational market behaviours;
2021/04/23
Committee: ECON
Amendment 215 #
Motion for a resolution
Subheading 6
A revampednew EU fiscal framework
2021/04/23
Committee: ECON
Amendment 221 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 15
15. Calls on the Commission to relaunch the debate on the reform of the economic governance of the Union with a view to coming forward with a legislative proposal by the end of 2021; calls for a rethink of EU fiscal rulesframework, also in view of the legacies of the pandemic, and supports the EFB’s conclusion that the fiscal framework has to be adapted; calls for a replacement of the principle of rules-based fiscal policy with the principle of discretionary fiscal policy;
2021/04/23
Committee: ECON
Amendment 229 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 15 a (new)
15a. Recalls that the “problem is with the very concept of fiscal rules”, as shown by Blanchard, Leandro and Zettelmeyer1d; highlights that the question whether debt becomes a risk depends on uncertain economic and political factors; stresses therefore that it is impossible to define adequate fiscal policy rules ex-ante that could account for the contingencies involved; _________________ 1dRedesigning EU fiscal rules: From rules to standards - PIIE Working Paper, Olivier Blanchard, Álvaro Leandro and Jeromin Zettelmeyer, February 2021.
2021/04/23
Committee: ECON
Amendment 233 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 16
16. Calls for the rea newed fiscal framework to promote sustainability and cyclical stabilisation and to improve the quality of public expenditure through sustainable investments and reforms; calls for well-defined, transparent, simple, flexible and enforceable rules embedded in a credible and democratic frameworkhat facilitates the use of discretionary fiscal policy by Member States to support country-specific macroeconomic and social objectives; calls for a flexible and democratic framework of fiscal policy coordination that takes into account the specificities of Member States and promote upward economic and social convergeand particular policy objectives of Member States and promotes symmetric macroeconomic policies with a view on reducing intra-euro area imbalances;
2021/04/23
Committee: ECON
Amendment 252 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 17
17. Suggests focusing the fiscal targets on the achievement of a single credible debt anchor aimed at reducing high debt ratios in a realistic and reasonable period of time and differentiated according to the existing debt level of the Member States;deleted
2021/04/23
Committee: ECON
Amendment 262 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 18
18. Proposes an expenditure rule with a ceiling20 on nominal public expenditure when a country’s public debt exceeds a certain threshold; _________________ 20A ceiling fixed for 3-5 years that would depend on the expected potential output growth, expected inflation and the distance from the debt anchor.deleted
2021/04/23
Committee: ECON
Amendment 273 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 19
19. Notes that the country-specific path outcome should result from a discussion between each Member States and the Commission, after a consultation with the EFB in the context of the European Semester; considers that the expenditure rule should also include a correction mechanism to remove cyclical items in the context of strong democratic control;
2021/04/23
Committee: ECON
Amendment 277 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 20
20. UnderlinNotes that expenditure rules allow for automatic stabilisers to operate and are under the direct control of the government; argues that while potential output growth is unobservable and has to be estimated, it is less likely to be subject to revisions than the output gaprecalls however that expenditure rules will constrain the implementation of a discretionary fiscal stimulus; stresses that concepts as potential output growth cannot be adequately measured, nor observed, and can therefore not provide an adequate basis for policy design;
2021/04/23
Committee: ECON
Amendment 290 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 21
21. Proposes, in line with the EFB, ‘ one general escape clause, triggered based on independent economic judgedemocratic deliberation in the European parliament;
2021/04/23
Committee: ECON
Amendment 329 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 24
24. Agrees with the opinion of the EFB and others21 that a deepening of the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) would be helped by a central fiscal capacity, which could help cushion idiosyncratic shocks, whether common or country-specific, in a timely manner; stresses that a central fiscal capacity needs to respect fully the outcomes of national democratic decision-making by parliaments and referenda and shall not be linked to the promotion of reforms in Member States, neither as policy conditionality, nor as incentives; _________________ 21International Monetary Fund and the European Central Bank.
2021/04/23
Committee: ECON
Amendment 336 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 25
25. Welcomes the creation of the NGEU, which is financed through debt issuance guaranteed by the EU budget; regrets the limited size of the grants component of the NGEU, especially compared to the fiscal stimulus measures provided by other jurisdictions; underlines that EU-issuance debt22 will provide a new supply of European high- quality assets, which is a step towards a permanent EU safe asset; proposes to exclude EU-issued debt from the ECB’s monetary financing prohibition using provisions of Article 125 TFEU and following similar specifications made in Council Regulation (EC) No 3603/93 of 13 December 1993; _________________ 22 NGEU & SURE bonds.
2021/04/23
Committee: ECON
Amendment 350 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 26
26. Stresses the importancTakes note of the MIP in identifying and taking preventive and corrective actions against emerging imbalances; regrets the asymmetric nature of the MIP scoreboard and its bias towards the promotion of international cost competitiveness; points out, however, that the potential of this mechanism has not been fully exploited on account of its structural weaknesses; is concerned about the lack of democratic oversight in the MIP; calls for a strengthening of the role of the European parliament and democratic accountability;
2021/04/23
Committee: ECON
Amendment 366 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 27
27. Calls for the MIP to be reformoverhauled to make its indicators and recommendations more forward-looking and symmetrical with regard to over- and undershooting target values, and to focus on indicators under the control of policymakers and geared towards reducing intra-euro area imbalances by means of a symmetrical approach instead of a one- sided promotion of international cost competitiveness; considers that greater compliance with pared-back recommendations must be achieved and MIP-relevant country-specific recommendations should focus on policy actions that can have a direct impact on imbalances; stresses that the MIP must respect Article 153 TFEU entailing that recommendations are not to intervene with national wage policy and collective bargaining;
2021/04/23
Committee: ECON
Amendment 401 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 30
30. Calls for a renewed European Semester as the mainfundamentally changed economic and social policy coordination framework supporting the EU’s long-standing goals of sustainability and upward convergence with stronger national ownershipMember States distinct economic paths ways as decided by their elected parliaments and governments; calls for more rigorous democratic scrutiny and for Parliament’s full involvement in defining the overarching goals and the guidance;
2021/04/23
Committee: ECON
Amendment 413 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 32
32. Calls for more involvement of national productivity councils in the MIP process;deleted
2021/04/23
Committee: ECON
Amendment 423 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 33
33. Underlines that for better enforcement the right balance should be sought between peer support, peer pressure, financial benefits and financial consequemechanisms, especially financial sanctions, have deteriorated public trust in the Union fuelling a crisis of legitimacy; calls for a cancelation of enforcement mechanism related to the economic governances;
2021/04/23
Committee: ECON