BETA

54 Amendments of Anna Maria CORAZZA BILDT related to 2013/2188(INI)

Amendment 46 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital F a (new)
Fa. whereas President Obama has recently announced a reform of the NSA and its surveillance programmes;
2014/01/24
Committee: LIBE
Amendment 75 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital R b (new)
Rb. whereas the mass collection of personal data for commercial purposes and in the fight against terror and serious transnational crime put at risk the personal data and privacy rights of EU citizens;
2014/01/24
Committee: LIBE
Amendment 76 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital S
S. whereas the US data protection legal framework does notshould ensure an adequate level of protection for EU citizens;
2014/01/24
Committee: LIBE
Amendment 85 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital AJ a (new)
AJa. whereas terrorist finance tracking is an essential tool in the fight against terrorism financing and serious crime, allowing counter terrorism investigators to discover links between targets of investigation and other potential suspects connected with wider terrorist networks suspected of financing terrorism;
2014/01/24
Committee: LIBE
Amendment 86 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital AK
AK. whereas the European Parliament asked the Commission to suspend the Agreement and requested that all relevant information and documents be made available immediately for Parliament’s deliberations;deleted
2014/01/24
Committee: LIBE
Amendment 90 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital AM
AM. whereas during the LIBE delegation to Washington of 28-31 October 2013 the delegation met with the US Department of the Treasury; whereas the US Treasury officially stated that since the entry into force of the TFTP Agreethe US government (the NSA is in that sense considered part of the government it) hads not had access to data from SWIFT in the EU except within the framework of the TFTP; whereas the US Treasury refused to comment on whether SWIFT data would have been accessed outside TFTP by any obeen collecting and processing SWIFT data in any other way than as recognised in the agreement, whereas the US Department of the Treasury also gave assurances in relation to access to SWIFT formatted messages in accordance with other legal tools in place; whereas ther US government body or departDepartment of the Treasury did not comment or n whether the US administrationor not it was aware of NSA mass surveillance activities; whereas on 18 Dec24 September 2013 Mr Glenn GreenwEuropol and SWIFT officialds stated before the LIBE Committee inquiry that the NSA and GCHQ had targeted SWIFT networksre were no indications for a breach of the TFTP Agreement by the NSA;
2014/01/24
Committee: LIBE
Amendment 93 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital AP
AP. whereas the Joint Review fails to mention the fact that iArticle 13 of the agreement between the United States of America and the European Union on the cause of proceassieng of personal data for intelligence purposes, under US law, non- US citizens do not enjoy any judicial or administrative avenue to protect their rights, and constitutional protections are only granted to US persons; whereas this lack of judicial or administrative rights nullifies the protections for EU citizens laid down in the existing PNR agreementer name records to the United States Department of Homeland Security allows any individual regardless of nationality, country or origin, or place of residence, whose personal data and personal information has been processed and used in a manner inconsistent with the PNR Agreement, to seek effective administrative and judicial redress in accordance with US law;
2014/01/24
Committee: LIBE
Amendment 96 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital AU
AU. whereas negotiations on the agreement have not progressed because of the US Government’s persistent position of refusingdifficulties in finding agreement on the recognition of effective rights of administrative and judicial redress to EU citizens and because of the intention of providing broad derogations to theon important data protection principles contained in the agreement, such as purpose limitation, data retention or onward transfers either domestically or abroad;
2014/01/24
Committee: LIBE
Amendment 112 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital BD
BD. whereas technological developments have led to increased international intelligence cooperation, also involving the exchange of personal data, and often blurring the line between intelligence and law enforcement activities;
2014/01/24
Committee: LIBE
Amendment 117 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital BF
BF. whereas democratic oversight of intelligence activities is still conducted at national level, despite the increase in exchange of information between EU Member States and between Member States and third countries; whereas there is an increasing gap between the level of international cooperation on the one hand and oversight capacities limited to the national level on the other, which results in insufficient and ineffective democratic scrutinyshould be conducted at national level;
2014/01/24
Committee: LIBE
Amendment 123 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1
1. Considers that recent revelations in the press by whistleblowers and journalists, together with the expert evidencepresentations given during this inquiry, have resulted in compelling evidence of the existence of far-reaching, complex and highly technologically advanced systems designed by US and some Member States’ intelligence services to collect, store and analyse communication and location data and metadata of all citizens around the world on an unprecedented scale and in an indiscriminate and non-suspicion-based manner;
2014/01/24
Committee: LIBE
Amendment 127 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 2
2. Points specifically to US NSA intelligence programmes allowing for the mass surveillance of EU citizens through direct access to the central servers of leading US internet companies (PRISM programme), the analysis of content and metadata (Xkeyscore programme), the circumvention of online encryption (BULLRUN), access to computer and telephone networks and access to location data, as well as to systems of the UK intelligence agency GCHQ such as its upstream surveillance activity (Tempora programme) and decryption programme (Edgehill); believes that the existence of programmes of a similar nature, even if on a more limited scale, is likely in other EU countries such as France (DGSE), Germany (BND) and Sweden (FRA);
2014/01/24
Committee: LIBE
Amendment 128 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 2 a (new)
2a. Welcomes the recent declarations by President Obama to reform the NSA and its programmes, with a view to improve data protection safeguards also for non- US citizens;
2014/01/24
Committee: LIBE
Amendment 131 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 3
3. Notes the allegations of ‘hacking’ or tapping into the Belgacom systems by the UK intelligence agency GCHQ; reiterates the indication by Belgacom that it could not confirm that EU institutions were targeted or affected, and that the malware used was extremely complex and required the use of extensive financial and staffing resources for its development and use that would not be available to private entities or hackers;
2014/01/24
Committee: LIBE
Amendment 142 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 5 a (new)
5a. Recalls EU's firm belief in the need to strike the right balance between security measures and the protection of civil liberties and fundamental rights, while ensuring the utmost respect for privacy and data protection;
2014/01/24
Committee: LIBE
Amendment 152 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 7
7. Questions the compatibility of some Member States’ mapossivble economic espionage activities with the EU internal market and competition law as enshrined in Title I and Title VII of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union; reaffirms the principle of sincere cooperation as enshrined in Article 4 paragraph 3 of the Treaty on European Union and the principle that the Member States shall ‘refrain from any measures which could jeopardise the attainment of the Union’s objectives’;
2014/01/24
Committee: LIBE
Amendment 153 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 8
8. Notes that international treaties and EU and US legislation, as well as national oversight mechanisms, have failed to provide for the necessary checks and balances and for democratic accountability;deleted
2014/01/24
Committee: LIBE
Amendment 157 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 10
10. Sees the surveillance programmes as yet another step towards the establishment of a fully fledged preventive state, changing the established paradigm of criminal law in democratic societies, promoting instead a mix of law enforcement and intelligence activities with blurred legal safeguards, often not in line with democratic checks and balances and fundamental rights, especially the presumption of innocence; recalls in that regard the decision of the German Federal Constitutional Court37 on the prohibition of the use of preventive dragnets (‘präventive Rasterfahndung’) unless there is proof of a concrete danger to other high-ranking legally protected rights, whereby a general threat situation or international tensions do not suffice to justify such measures; __________________ 37 No 1 BvR 518/02 of 4 April 2006.deleted
2014/01/24
Committee: LIBE
Amendment 161 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 11
11. Is adamant that secret laws, treaties and courts violate the rule of law; pPoints out that any judgment of a court or tribunal and any decision of an administrative authority of a non-EU state authorising, directly or indirectly, surveillance activities such as those examined by this inquiry may not be automatically recognised or enforced, but must be submitted individually to the appropriate national procedures on mutual recognition and legal assistance, including rules imposed by bilateral agreements;
2014/01/24
Committee: LIBE
Amendment 164 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 12
12. Points out that the abovementioned concerns are exacerbated by rapid technological and societal developments; considers that, since internet and mobile devices are everywhere in modern daily life (‘ubiquitous computing’) and the business model of most internet companies is based on the processing of personal data of all kinds that puts at risk the integrity of the person, the scale of this problem is unprecedented;
2014/01/24
Committee: LIBE
Amendment 171 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 14
14. Strongly rejects the notion that these issues are purely a matter of national security and therefore the sole competence of Member Statesesses that mass surveillance is not only a matter of national security but also a matter of respect of fundamental rights; Recalls that national security is the sole competence of Member States; calls on Member States to fully respect EU law and the ECHR while acting to ensure their national security; recalls a recent ruling of the Court of Justice according to which ‘although it is for Member States to take the appropriate measures to ensure their internal and external security, the mere fact that a decision concerns State security cannot result in European Union law being inapplicable’38 ; recalls further that the protection of the privacy of all EU citizens is at stake, as are the security and reliability of all EU communication networks; believes therefore that discussion and action at EU level is not only legitimate, but also a matter of EU autonomy and sovereignty; __________________ 38__________________ 38 No 1 BvR 518/02 of 4 April 2006. No 1 BvR 518/02 of 4 April 2006.
2014/01/24
Committee: LIBE
Amendment 203 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 20
20. Calls on certain EU Member States, including the UK, Germany, France, Sweden and the Netherlands, to revise whereif necessary their national legislation and practices governing the activities of intelligence services so as to ensure that they are in line with the standards of the European Convention on Human Rights and comply with their fundamental rights obligations as regards data protection, privacy and presumption of innocence; in particular, given the extensive media reports referring to mass surveillance in the UK, would emphasise that the current legal framework which is made up of a ‘complex interaction’ between three separate pieces of legislation – the Human Rights Act 1998, the Intelligence Services Act 1994 and the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000 – should be revised;
2014/01/24
Committee: LIBE
Amendment 243 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 42
42. Calls on the Commission to conduct before the end 2014 an in-depth assessment of the existing Mutual Legal Assistance Agreement, pursuant to its Article 17, in order to verify its practical implementation and, in particular, whether the US has made effective use of it for obtaining information or evidence in the EU and whether the Agreement has been circumvented to acquire the information directly in the EU, and to assess the impact on the fundamental rights of individuals; such an assessment should not only refer to US official statements as a sufficient basis for the analysis but be based on specific EU evaluations; this in-depth review should also address the consequences of the application of the Union’s constitutional architecture to this instrument in order to bring it into line with Union law, taking account in particular of Protocol 36 and Article 10 thereof and Declaration 50 concerning this protocol;
2014/01/24
Committee: LIBE
Amendment 246 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 44
44. Takes the view that the information provided by the European Commission and the US Treasury does not clarify whether US intelligence agencies have access to SWIFT financial messages in the EU by intercepting SWIFT networks or banks’ operating systems or communication networks, alone or in cooperation with EU national intelligence agencies and without having recourse to existing bilateral channels for mutual legal assistance and judicial cooperationclarify that there were no elements showing that the US Government has acted in a manner contrary to the provisions of the Agreement, and that the US has provided written assurance that no direct data collection has taken place contrary to the provisions of the TFTP Agreement;
2014/01/24
Committee: LIBE
Amendment 248 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 45
45. Reiterates its resolution of 23 October 2013 and asks the Commission for the suspension of the TFTP Agreement;deleted
2014/01/24
Committee: LIBE
Amendment 262 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 47
47. Considers that a satisfactory soconclutsion underof the ‘Umbrella agreement’ is a pre- condition for the full restoration ofn important step forward to restore full trust between the transatlantic partners;
2014/01/24
Committee: LIBE
Amendment 266 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 51
51. Calls on the Council Presidency and the majority of Member States who support a high level of data protectionon Member States to show a sense of leadership and responsibility and accelerate their work on the whole Data Protection Package to allow for adoption in 2014, so that EU citizens will be able to enjoy better protection in the very near future;
2014/01/24
Committee: LIBE
Amendment 297 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 59
59. Strongly emphasises, given the importance of the digital economy in the relationship and in the cause of rebuilding EU-US trust, that the European Parliament will only consent to the final TTIP agreement provided theand distinguishes clearly the TTIP negotiations from revelations on the US NSA mass surveillance programme; however the TTIP agreement shall fully respects fundamental rights recognised by the EU Charter, and that the protection of the privacy of individuals in relation to the processing and dissemination of personal data must continue to be governed by Article XIV of the GATS;
2014/01/24
Committee: LIBE
Amendment 303 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 60
60. Stresses that, despite the fact that oversight of intelligence services’ activities is the sole competence of Member States and should be based on both democratic legitimacy (strong legal framework, ex ante authorisation and ex post verification) and an adequate technical capability and expertise, the majority of current EU and US oversight bodies dramatically lack both, in particular the technical capabilitiand an adequate technical capability and expertise; stresses the importance to respect subsidiarity and the role of national parliaments of the Member States;
2014/01/24
Committee: LIBE
Amendment 308 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 62
62. Calls for the setting up of a high-level group to strengthen cooperation in the field of intelligence at EU level, combined with a proper oversight mechanism ensuring both democratic legitimacy and adequate technical capacity; stresses that the high-level group should cooperate closely with national parliaments in order to propose further steps to be taken for increased oversight collaboration in the EU;deleted
2014/01/24
Committee: LIBE
Amendment 317 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 63
63. Calls on this high-level group to define minimum European standards or guidelines on the (ex ante and ex post) oversight of intelligence services on the basis ofMember States to take in consideration existing best practices and recommendations by international bodies (UN, Council of Europe) concerning the oversight of intelligence services;
2014/01/24
Committee: LIBE
Amendment 320 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 64
64. CRecalls on the high-level group to set strict limits on the duration of any surveillance ordered unless its continuation is duly justified by the authorising/oversight authoritythat the duration of any surveillance ordered should be proportionate and limited to its purpose;
2014/01/24
Committee: LIBE
Amendment 321 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 65
65. Calls on the high-level group to develop criteria on enhanced transparency, built on the general principle of access to information and the so-called ‘Tshwane Principles’41 ; __________________ 41 The Global Principles on National Security and the Right to Information, June 2013.deleted
2014/01/24
Committee: LIBE
Amendment 324 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 67
67. Calls on the Member States to draw on best practices so as to improve access by their oversight bodies to information on intelligence activities (including classified information and information from other services) and establish the power to conduct on-site visits, a robust set of powers of interrogation, adequate resources and technical expertise, strict independence vis-à-vis their respective governments, and a reporting obligation to their respective parliamentnsure democratic control of those activities;
2014/01/24
Committee: LIBE
Amendment 330 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 70
70. Calls on the Commission to present, by September 2014, a proposal for an EU security clearance procedure for all EU office holders, as the current system, which relies on the security clearance undertaken by the Member State of citizenship, provides for different requirements and lengths of procedures within national systems, thus leading to differing treatment of Members of Parliament and their staff depending on their nationality;deleted
2014/01/24
Committee: LIBE
Amendment 336 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 72
72. Calls on the Europol Joint Supervisory Body, together with national data protection authorities, to conduct a joint inspectionreview before the end of 2014 in order to ascertain whether information and personal data shared with Europol has been lawfully acquired by national authorities, particularly if the information or data was initially acquired by intelligence services in the EU or a third country, and whether appropriate measures are in place to prevent the use and further dissemination of such information or data;
2014/01/24
Committee: LIBE
Amendment 352 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 76
76. Calls on the Commission to put forward a proposal for a comprehensive framework for the protection of whistleblowers in the EU, with particular attention to the specificities of whistleblowing in the field of intelligence, for which provisions relating to whistleblowing in the financial field may prove insufficient, and including strong guarantees of immunity;deleted
2014/01/24
Committee: LIBE
Amendment 360 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 77
77. Points out that recent incidents clearly demonstrate the acute vulnerability of the EU, and in particular the EU institutions, national governments and parliaments, major European companies, European IT infrastructures and networks, to sophisticated attacks using complex software; notes that these attacks require such financial and human resources that they are likely tocould originate from state entities acting on behalf of f, but they could also oreign governments or even from certain EU national governments that support them; in this context, regards the case of the hacking or tapping of the telecommunications company Belgacom as a worrying example of an attack against the EU’s IT capacityinate from terrorist or other criminal organisations;
2014/01/24
Committee: LIBE
Amendment 371 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 80
80. Calls on all the Members States, the Commission, the Council and the European Council to address the EU’s dangerou's lack of autonomy in terms of IT tools, companies and providers (hardware, software, services and network), and encryption and cryptographic capabilities;
2014/01/24
Committee: LIBE
Amendment 375 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 82
82. Points out that both telecom companies and the EU and national telecom regulators have clearly neglected the IT security of their users and clients; cCalls on the Commission to make full use of its existing powers under the ePrivacy and Telecommunication Framework Directive to strengthen the protection of confidentiality of communication by adopting measures to ensure that terminal equipment is compatible with the right of users to control and protect their personal data, and to ensure a high level of security of telecommunication networks and services, including by way of requiring state-of-the- art encryption of communications;
2014/01/24
Committee: LIBE
Amendment 391 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 85
85. Calls on the Commission, to strengthen the technological European infrastructure and the European digital market and therefore in the framework of the next Work Programme of the Horizon 2020 Programme, to assess whether; more resources should be directed towards boosting European research, development, innovation and training in the field of IT technologies, in particular privacy-enhancing technologies and infrastructures, cryptology, secure computing, open-source security solutions and the Information Society in order to make email and telecommunications safer; to promote the internal market for European soft- and hardware, and to promote cryptophones and to encrypt communication infrastructures;
2014/01/24
Committee: LIBE
Amendment 396 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 86
86. Asks the Commission to map out current responsibilities and to review, by June 2014 at the latest, the need for a broader mandate, better coordination and/or additional resources and technical capabilities for Europol's CyberCrime Centre, ENISA, CERT-EU and the EDPS in order to enable them to be more effective in preventing and investigating major IT breaches in the EU and in performing (or assisting Member States and EU bodies to perform) on-site technical investigations regarding major IT breaches;
2014/01/24
Committee: LIBE
Amendment 400 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 87
87. Deems it necessary for the EU to be supported by an EU IT Academy that brings togetherconsult with the best European experts in all related fields, tasked with providing all relevant EU Institutions and bodies with scientific advice on IT technologies, including security-related strategies; as a first step asks the Commission to set up an independent scientific expert panel;
2014/01/24
Committee: LIBE
Amendment 426 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 93
93. Calls for the overall architectura better governance of the internet addressing terms ofhe risks related to data flows and storage to be reconsidered, striving for more data minimisation and transparency and less centralised mass storage of raw data, as well as avoiding unnecessary routing of traffic through the territory of countries that do not meet basic standards on fundamental rights, data protection and privacywithout undermining freedom of internet;
2014/01/24
Committee: LIBE
Amendment 433 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 95
95. Calls on the Commission, by September 2014, to evaluate the possibilities of encouraging software and hardware manufacturers to introduce more security and privacy through default features in their products, including the possibility of introducing legal liability on the part of manufacturers for unpatched known vulnerabilities or the installation of secret backdoors, and disincentives for the undue and disproportionate collection of mass personal data, and if appropriate to come forward with legislative proposals;
2014/01/24
Committee: LIBE
Amendment 458 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 107
107. Also believes that that the alleged involvement and activities of EU Members States has led to a loss of trust; is of the opinion that only full clarity as to purposes and means of surveillance, public debate and, ultimatelif necessary, revision of legislation, including a strengthening of the system of judicial and parliamentary oversight, will be able to re-establish the trust lost;
2014/01/24
Committee: LIBE
Amendment 483 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 114 – introductory part
114. Decides to launch A European Digital Habeas Corpus for protecting privacy based on the following 7 actions with a European Parliament watchdog:
2014/01/24
Committee: LIBE
Amendment 493 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 114 – point 4
Action 4: Suspend the TFTP agreement until (i) the Umbrella Agreement negotiations have been concluded; (ii) a thorough investigation has been concluded on the basis of an EU analysis, and all concerns raised by Parliament in its resolution of 23 October have been properly addressed;deleted
2014/01/24
Committee: LIBE
Amendment 501 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 114 – point 5
Action 5: Protect the rule of law and, the fundamental rights of EU citizens, with a particular focus on threats to the freedom of the press and professional confidentiality (including lawyer-client relations) as well as enhanced protection for whistleblowers;
2014/01/24
Committee: LIBE
Amendment 511 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 115 – introductory part
115. Calls on the EU Institutions and the Member States to support and promote the European Digital Habeas Corpus; undertakes to act as the EU citizens’ rights watchdog, with the following timetable to monitor implementation:
2014/01/24
Committee: LIBE
Amendment 512 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 115 – point 1
April-July 2014: a monitoring group based on the LIBE inquiry team responsible for monitoring any new revelations in the media concerning the inquiry’s mandate and scrutinising the implementation of this resolution;deleted
2014/01/24
Committee: LIBE
Amendment 515 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 115 – point 2
July 2014 onwards: a standing oversight mechanism for data transfers and judicial remedies within the competent committee;deleted
2014/01/24
Committee: LIBE
Amendment 518 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 115 – point 4
Autumn 2014: a commitment that the European Digital Habeas Corpus and related recommendations will serve as key criteria for the approval of the next Commission;deleted
2014/01/24
Committee: LIBE
Amendment 520 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 115 – point 5
2014-2015: a Trust/Data/Citizens’ RightsEU-US Data protection group to be convened on a regular basis between the European Parliament and the US Congress, as well as with other committed third-country parliaments, including Brazil;
2014/01/24
Committee: LIBE