48 Amendments of Sven GIEGOLD related to 2015/2221(INI)
Amendment 2 #
Motion for a resolution
Citation 6 a (new)
Citation 6 a (new)
– having regard to the proposal of the European Commission for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on structural measures improving the resilience of EU credit institutions (COM/2014/043),
Amendment 3 #
Motion for a resolution
Citation 6 b (new)
Citation 6 b (new)
– having regard to the Financial Stability Review 11/2015 of the European Central Bank,
Amendment 4 #
Motion for a resolution
Citation 6 c (new)
Citation 6 c (new)
– having regard to the Decision of the European Central Bank of 24 February 2014 on the organisation of preparatory measures for the collection of granular credit data by the European System of Central Banks (ECB/2014/6),
Amendment 5 #
Motion for a resolution
Citation 6 d (new)
Citation 6 d (new)
– having regard to the Decision of the European Commission to refer the Czech Republic, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Poland, Romania and Sweden to the Court of Justice of the European Union (the Court) for failing to implement the Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive (2014/59/EU),
Amendment 6 #
Motion for a resolution
Citation 6 e (new)
Citation 6 e (new)
– having regard to the recent work of the Basel Committee, especially to the Revisions to the Standardised Approach for credit risk and the Revision to the measurement of operational risk,
Amendment 7 #
Motion for a resolution
Citation 6 f (new)
Citation 6 f (new)
– having regard to the European Systemic Risk Board report on the regulatory treatment of sovereign exposures of March 2015,
Amendment 28 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital B
Recital B
B. whereas the BU is instrumental to ensuring stability and restoring confidence in euro area banks, enhancing financial integration, fostering risk sharingminimising the risk of disruptive individual bank failures while sharing residual cross border systemic risks within the monetary union and contributing to breaking the link between sovereigns and banks at national level;
Amendment 43 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital E
Recital E
E. whereas the SRM is the second pillar of the BU and aims to ensure uniform rules and procedures and a common decision- making process for orderly resolution of failinged banks with minimum impact on the rest of the financial system, ordinary citizens, the real economy and public finance;
Amendment 49 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital F
Recital F
F. whereas a common DGS, originally intended as the third pillar of the BU, so far consists only in an approximation of national DGSs, while, ultimately a common DGSscheme that is able to ensure the same level of protection for deposits, irrespective of their location, is a necessary component of a true BU;
Amendment 75 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 2 – point a
Paragraph 2 – point a
(a) the recruitment process, which resulted in a good blend of competences, cultures and gender, thus contributing to the supranational nature of the SSM, and the thorough training activity programme for national competent authorities (NCAs) and ECB staff; points out, however, that ECB staff working conditions leave room for improvement;
Amendment 77 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 2 – point a a (new)
Paragraph 2 – point a a (new)
(aa) points out that, however, the ECB sets its employment law unilaterally and without consultation or involvement of the European Parliament or the EU Commission; deplores that the ECB issues term contracts only for the conversion of which into indefinite term contracts there is no involvement of staff representation; deplores that involvement of staff representatives is also totally absent in hiring and promotion decisions and is, therefore, concerned that this approach weakens the legitimation of staffing decisions while in an international organisation as the ECB every effort should be made to avoid the slightest perception of clientelism and favouritism; notes, furthermore, that the ECB does not keep track of the hours worked by ECB staff and cannot prove how it effectively complies with EU labour law, and that, as a result, there are signals in the SSM of risks of burnout, exhaustion and lack of prioritisation as well as room for improvement of coordination of work; notes that the Governing Council, after having received an open letter by the union IPSO at the ECB, decided to increase the headcount in the SSM – albeit not in line with the union's request and that all this may pose risks to the operations of the SSM in the longer run; deplores that the ECB does not enter into negotiations with unions and staff representatives on working conditions and that, overall, social dialogue and staff working conditions in terms of work life balance and social dialogue overall still leave ample room for improvement; welcomes therefore the steps by the ECB to address this situation;
Amendment 79 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 2 – point b
Paragraph 2 – point b
(b) the drafting, building on national best practices, of the Supervisory Manual laying down common processes, procedures and methods for conducting a euro-wide supervisory review process, which should be made fully public;
Amendment 81 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 2 – point e
Paragraph 2 – point e
(e) the processes devised to work offoperationalise the common procedures (authorisation of qualifying holdings, licensing, passporting, fit and proper assessments);
Amendment 83 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 2 – point e a (new)
Paragraph 2 – point e a (new)
(ea) the contribution to improving the balance sheets of SSM banks through the AQR and accompanying stress tests;
Amendment 89 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 3
Paragraph 3
3. Notes that a very significant share of work is routinely devoted to administrative procedures, required by the SSM Regulation, which may not always be proportionate, and stands ready to consider proposals aimed at reducing the operational burden on structures at all levels and improving the effectiveness of the SSM supervision, namely by delegating certain decisionsexploiting the potential onf specifictreamlining administrative issues within clear limits and guidelineprocedures, including standardised reporting templates and systems;
Amendment 95 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 4
Paragraph 4
4. Believes that while the degree of effectiveness achieved by JSTs in less than a year is remarkable, further improvements can be pursued, including by involving NCAs in a more effective way and ensuring that their staff are motivated and involved in the decision-making process;
Amendment 101 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 6
Paragraph 6
6. Emphasises the need to avoid double reporting requirements and more generally an unnecessary administrative burden on credit institutions, in particular smaller banks; that is demonstrated not to be necessary to ensure the soundness and good conduct of credit institutions, in particular smaller banks; calls on the ECB to revise their plans to set up a granular credit data register ("AnaCredit') to ensure full compliance with personal data protection and the principles of proportionality and good administrative behaviour; calls for the ECB to adopt a more transparent process, including the use of timely public consultation before adopting relevant quasi legislative measures;
Amendment 109 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 7 a (new)
Paragraph 7 a (new)
7a. Calls for urgent and systematic reviews of comprehensive assessments of ECB supervised institutions in all cases where an institution is deemed sound under the assessment and subsequently runs into trouble as well as appropriate improvements of the methodology in the light of lessons learned;
Amendment 110 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 7 b (new)
Paragraph 7 b (new)
7b. Welcomes the fact that the ECB is working on enhancements in the macro stress testing framework to integrate more realistic dynamic features in the stress testing model-framework, add a proper liquidity stress test component, integrate contagion effects within the banking system as well as the two-way interaction with the real economy and the shadow banking sector in the broader framework; stresses the need to enhance the powers of the ESRB to ensure such stress testing is kept relevant;
Amendment 113 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 8
Paragraph 8
8. Considers the comprehensive assessment performed ahead of the launch of the SSM to be a fundamental step towards restoring the confidence lost through the crisis years and enhancing the resilience of the euro area banking system by improving its capitalisation and increasing transparency;
Amendment 118 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 9
Paragraph 9
9. Underlines that economic recovery is underway but is still fragile and modest, inflation remains below its target, credit dynamics are still subdued in many jurisdictions and a large stock of non- performing loans weighs on many European banks’ balance sheets, limiting their capacity to finance the economy; warns that weak profitability prospects for banks, low secondary market liquidity, rising debt sustainability concerns in the public and non-financial private sectors as well as a rapidly growing shadow banking sector are together the key sources of risk for the EU's financial stability;
Amendment 129 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 10
Paragraph 10
10. Highlights that effective coordination between macro-prudential and micro- prudential policies is crucial, and underlines that the SSM is fully part of the EU macro-prudential framework and has been given relevant macro-prudential responsibilities, together with the NCAs and the ECB Governing Council; stresses that these powers of NCAs and the SSM must be complemented by an EU-wide, cross-sectorial macro-prudential authority, which could be a more independent and enhanced ESRB, to ensure that macro risks are tackled in the overall European interest;
Amendment 131 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 10 a (new)
Paragraph 10 a (new)
10a. Agrees with views expressed by senior ECB figures that, macroprudential policy must place greater emphasis on preventing large fluctuations in the financial cycle, rather than simply increasing resilience to shocks when they occur. In addition to the bank-side capital based measures enhancing banks' resilience, borrower-based instruments (such as LTVs or DSTIs), which have proved to be more effective in curtailing excessive credit growth, and are also applicable in a time-varying fashion, should gain more prominence and be properly embedded in European legislation, which is not the case at present; further agrees, that a broader macroprudential toolkit is needed to address risks stemming from the shadow banking sector due to its increasing role in credit intermediation;
Amendment 132 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 10 b (new)
Paragraph 10 b (new)
10b. Welcomes the research by the ECB into the definition of financial stability and urges the development of tools such as the systemic risk index discussed in the Financial Stability Review November 2015 for monitoring systemic risk as part of an effective toolkit for managing it;
Amendment 133 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 10 c (new)
Paragraph 10 c (new)
10c. Welcomes the proposal for a structural reform of banks put forward by the European Commission as a first step in addressing the significant systemic risks that persist in the European banking system, especially those stemming from the interaction of real economy oriented banking and more volatile capital market oriented activities; regrets that the European Parliament has so far failed to agree on a common position and the Council has shown no ambition to tackle this key source of financial instability;
Amendment 134 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 10 d (new)
Paragraph 10 d (new)
10d. Notes that the insurance sector is becoming increasingly more involved in financial services originally provided by banks; warns that an unlevel playing field between insurance and banking sectors may lead to regulatory arbitrage of prudential and consumer protection rules; calls, therefore, on the ESFS for an urgent identification of where the principle of "same risk, same rules" is not fully applied and for swift action to be taken to correct this;
Amendment 152 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 12
Paragraph 12
12. Notes that, while an increase in capital requirements, beyond a certain threshold, may in the short term induce banks to curtail the supply of credit, and therefore looks forward to an overall stabilisation of the level of capitalcurtail the supply of credit, higher and better quality capital is nevertheless essential to ensuring the stability of the supply of credit in the long run, and therefore deplores the fact that banks in the Union were not obliged to recognise losses and raise capital to replace those losses as well as meet higher capital standards much earlier, as they were in the US, which would have restored their lending capacity by now;
Amendment 156 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 12 a (new)
Paragraph 12 a (new)
12a. Notes the need for research into crucial principles for an effective supervisory framework on which there is not yet a clear position of the SSM: – financial stability – how to define it and how to measure it; – how much capital should banks hold in "normal" conditions; – the diversification and optimal mix of capital; – what role there is for other prudential requirements; – how do liquidity and capital requirements interact; – in which sub-entity of a banking group should capital and liquidity be located;
Amendment 159 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 13
Paragraph 13
13. Considers the stabilisation of the supervisory and regulatory framework an important element to restore investors’ confidence, to avoid uncertainty about regulatory and supervisory action, and to support growth and financial stability; calls for reducing complexity in existing regulation in the short term and for establishing in the medium term an integrated European rulebook on financial regulation and consumer rights, replacing the current complex and burdensome silo-like legislation; underlines the need for a reform of the SSM to achieve independence of supervision and monetary policy in order to prevent conflict of interests;
Amendment 162 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 14
Paragraph 14
14. Welcomes the development of a common methodology for the 2015 round of the Supervisory Review and Evaluation Process (SREP); takes note that, partly as a consequence of the swift start of the SSM, many aspects of this methodology were finalised while the SREP cycle was already underway, and considers that in order to improve robustness of results and consistency between banks’ risk profiles and capital levels, the process leading to the approval of the common supervisory standards for risk assessment may benefit from further refinement;
Amendment 165 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 15
Paragraph 15
15. Underlines that the legislation’s lack of clarity on the hierarchy between pillar two and capital buffers in relation to the Maximum Distributable Amount threshold and to other sanctioning measures does not prevent the SSM from using a margin of flexibility in order to avoid solutions which are too rigid and might negatively affect the AT1 bond market and the level playing field with other jurisdictions; believes that all capital requirements, whether they result from Pillar 1, Pillar 2 or stress testing exercises should be taken into account in determining the MDA;
Amendment 168 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 16
Paragraph 16
16. Believes that the homogenisationconsistency of supervisory practices and standards within the euro area is a key objective for the SSM in order to ensure a true level playing field; in this respect, welcomes the agreement on a single implementation of national options and discretion for the euro area; calls for an urgent reduction of the number of national options and discretions; considers that such a single implementation requires a gradual approach and should aim to address all existing barriers and segmentations; stands ready to cooperate at the legislative level to further improve regulatory and supervisory harmonisation;
Amendment 180 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 17
Paragraph 17
17. Stresses the importance of the work that has been undertaken on the hcomogenisationparability of the calculation of risk- weighted assets, which is pivotal for comparability purposes, and on thethe benchmarking and review of internal models for the calculation of banks’' capital requirements, and considers progress in this area, for all portfolios, crucial in order to preserve the effectiveness and credibility of banking supervision in the euro area in order to promote best practice in market and credit risk models and improve the relevance of the standard approaches to such risks; calls for efforts to align bank internal risk and pricing models with regulatory capital requirement models; recalls the neutrality of banking supervision with regard to accounting as laid down in Recital 39 of the Council Regulation (EU) No 1024/2013 ("SSM regulation"); therefore calls on the ECB not to ask institutions to provide data which cannot be derived from their respective accounting frameworks applicable to them pursuant to other acts of Union and national law;
Amendment 185 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 18
Paragraph 18
18. Underlines that the SSM should look beyond credit risk to all forms of bank riska narrow focus on Pillar 1 credit, market and operational risk to all forms of bank risk including model risk, reputation risk and financial risks related to climate change, specifically the potential threat to financial stability posed by so-called "stranded assets" as highlighted, among others, by the Governor of the Bank of England, and that further steps are necessary to reinforce the supervisory scrutiny of banks’' financial portfolios, especially level 3 assets; welcomes the attempts of the Basel Committee to revise the credit risk standard approach as well as measurement of operational risk; deplores that the large exposure regime still excludes sovereign exposures and allows higher limits for interbank exposures; welcomes the recommendations of the ESRB to revise the treatment of sovereign and interbank exposures;
Amendment 192 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 20
Paragraph 20
20. Underlines the important role played by the SSM during the Greek crisis in monitoring the condition of the country’s banking sector, in conducting a comprehensive assessment of the significant Greek institutions and in contributing to the determination of the recapitalisation needs; regrets the fact that the "no creditor worse off" principle may impede swift bail-ins; questions the independence of financial consultancies which played a central role in all the euro area bailouts by giving expertise to the "troika" of international lenders; criticises that these firms were often hired without a public tender although they so far invoiced taxpayers in Cyprus, Greece, Ireland, Portugal and Spain over EUR 80 million; calls for more transparency and accountability in the hiring process to avoid potential conflicts of interest, which arise from links to investment funds and other financial service providers;
Amendment 199 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 21
Paragraph 21
21. Believes that the ECB’'s supervisory strategy, while avoiding any differentiation along national lines, should reflect and safeguard pluralism of banking models across the EU, in particular through respecting the principle of proportionality in relation to smaller simpler banking models, a healthy diversity of banking models across the EU which can significantly reduce systemic risks;
Amendment 205 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 22
Paragraph 22
22. Considers transparency vis-à-vis market players and the public, including on sensitive topics, to be essential for fair competition in the banking market; underlines that transparency of both supervisors and supervised entities is also a prerequisite for accountability, as it allows Parliament and the public to be informed about key policy issues and to assess consistency with rules and supervisory practices; calls for more transparency with regard to pillar 2 decisions and justifications; believes that additional capital requirements related to shortcomings in institutions' Internal Capital Adequacy Assessment Process should be accompanied by a clear plan to address those shortcomings upon which the lifting of extra capital charges is made clearly conditional;
Amendment 213 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 24
Paragraph 24
24. Welcomes the efficient and open way in which the ECB has so far fulfilled its accountability obligations towards Parliament and calls upon the ECB to continue to fully engage in this regard and to further contribute to improving Parliament’s capacity to assess SSM policies and activities; notes, however, the fact that the European Central Bank is able to make rules independently, the legal nature of which affects the Member States and their citizens, without the involvement of the usual European-level legislative bodies in these decisions; therefore encourages the ECB to improve the processes for developing such rules and enhancing the involvement of the European Parliament;
Amendment 218 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 25
Paragraph 25
25. Underlines the importance of cooperation with the European Banking Authority (EBA) and with other authorities within the European System of Financial Supervision, while fully respecting the division of roles and competences and the separation between regulation and supervision in order to help ensure compliance with the EU checks-and- balances structure; stresses in particular that the EBA, with its explicit consumer protection mandate, must enforce and enhance the consumer protection framework for banking services, in complement to the SSMs prudential supervision, and in the Union as a whole;
Amendment 224 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 25 a (new)
Paragraph 25 a (new)
25a. Points out that since the ECB has become the supervisor of euro area significant banks the issue of how to prevent and settle potential conflicts of interest between its monetary and supervisory missions has become an important policy debate with implications for the future design of the Economic and Monetary Union and its institutional 'checks and balances'; stresses the controversial role played by the ECB in the Troika framework which raises also fundamental questions on the boundaries of the 'technical agency' role devolved to the ECB and hence on whether such role carries unavoidable conflicts of interest; asks the ECB to redefine its role regarding assistance programmes to a role of 'silent observer'; underlines that the broad discretionary powers of the ECB Governing Council when it comes to specific decisions (e.g. Greece, Cyprus and Ireland) confirming or limiting the provision of ELA by National Central Banks (NCBs) inevitably put the ECB in a position where its independence in the exercise of the lender of last resort function from supervisory and political decision making will be questioned; is of the opinion that the ELA regime needs a diligent revision in the light of the 'Europeanisation' of bank supervision as serious doubts remain as to whether current discretion is fully consistent with a balanced doctrine of operational independency; welcomes the remarks made by President Draghi in the ECON committee hinting that such reform should be explored;
Amendment 250 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 32
Paragraph 32
32. Welcomes the preparation by the SRB of manuals on resolution activities, in line with the relevant EBA standards, which aim to promote a consistent and effective approach to resolution tasks within the SRM; believes those manuals should be made fully public;
Amendment 255 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 33 a (new)
Paragraph 33 a (new)
33a. Underlines that, according to the SRM regulation, the Board should take due care, as a matter of priority, to establish the resolution plans of systemically important institutions, assess their resolvability and take all action necessary to address or remove all of the impediments to their resolvability; further emphasises that the Board has the power to require changes to the structure and organisation of institutions or groups to take measures which are necessary and proportionate to reduce or remove material impediments to the application of resolution tools and ensure the resolvability of the entities concerned;
Amendment 258 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 33 b (new)
Paragraph 33 b (new)
33b. Recalls that the safekeeping of SME deposits is a critical function and its continuity in a crisis very important and, therefore, that the SRM must ensure that the Minimum Requirement for Eligible Liabilities - i.e. equity as well as unsecured debt - should be set sufficiently high to ensure that the chances of eligible but uncovered deposits of SMEs incurring losses is minimised;
Amendment 270 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 35
Paragraph 35
35. Calls on Member StatesBelgium, Czech Republic, Cyprus, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Poland, Romania, Slovenia and Sweden to fully and swiftly implement the Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive (BRRD) and on Luxembourg to fully and swiftly implement the intergovernmental agreement (IGA) on transfer and mutualisation of contributions to the Single Resolution Fund; regrets the decision to set up the fund through an IGA rather than through Union law and the fact that the Commission did not act swiftly enough to ensure timely implementation of BRRD;
Amendment 289 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 36
Paragraph 36
36. Stresses the need, as a consequence of the existence of the national compartments in the SRF, to rapidly put in place an adequate bridge financing mechanism in order to provide the fund, if necessary, with sufficient resources in the period before its completionas required under Article 74 of the SRM Regulation in order to provide the fund, if necessary, with additional resources in the period before its completion where the amount of ex-ante and ex-post contributions obtainable proves insufficient; underlines that, without recourse to such a mechanism, under the first years of the gradual mutualisation, the requirement for Member States to replenish national compartments with ex- post contributions could prove strongly pro-cyclical; recalls that the Eurogroup and the Ecofin ministers identified, in their statement of 18 December 2013, the possibility of having recourse to both national sources and the European Stability Mechanism (ESM), and considers the latter the most effective and credible solution, which could be implemented either through a swift revision of the ESM treaty or through appropriate implementation of the provisions of Article 13 thereof;
Amendment 309 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 38
Paragraph 38
38. Recalls that the credibility of the BU, and in particular of bail-in and single resolution provisions, requires a common backstop in order to be able to support the SRF, if necessary, beyond its capacity of EUR 55 billion, and considers that its setting-up should start swiftly and be based on the ESM with any loans from the ESM being repaid via contributions from the institutions covered by the SRM;
Amendment 323 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 39
Paragraph 39
39. Underlines that, together with the SSM and the SRM, the capacity to afford the same level of protection to deposits, irrespective of their location, is an indispensable component for completing the BU; calls on Belgium, Czech Republic, Estonia, Greece, Italy, Cyprus, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Poland, Romania, Slovenia and Sweden to fully and swiftly implement the Deposit Guarantee Schemes Directive;
Amendment 342 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 40
Paragraph 40
40. WelcomesIs concerned at the Commission’'s announcement regarding the presentation of a legislative proposal for the first steps towards a European Deposit Insurance Scheme (EDIS) by initially establishing a welcome reinsurance mechanism at EU level for the national deposit guarantee schemes but that will gradually be transformed into a full EU- wide deposit insurance scheme; that could do harm to established subsidiary schemes of mutual support of small banks;