57 Amendments of Sven GIEGOLD related to 2016/2247(INI)
Amendment 5 #
Motion for a resolution
Citation 1 a (new)
Citation 1 a (new)
- having regard to the EU Shadow Banking Monitor from the European Systemic Risk Board (ESRB) of July 2016,
Amendment 13 #
Motion for a resolution
Citation 9 a (new)
Citation 9 a (new)
- having regard to the ECA Special Report on the Single Supervisory Mechanism of 18 November 2016,
Amendment 14 #
Motion for a resolution
Citation 9 b (new)
Citation 9 b (new)
- having regard to the European Systemic Risk Board report on the regulatory treatment of sovereign exposures of March 2015,
Amendment 15 #
Motion for a resolution
Citation 9 c (new)
Citation 9 c (new)
- having regard to the approval by the ECB Governing Council on 4 October 2016 on principles increasing transparency in developing ECB regulations on European statistics and taking into account the transparency practices of the European Parliament, the Council of the European Union and the European Commission,
Amendment 16 #
Motion for a resolution
Citation 13 a (new)
Citation 13 a (new)
- having regard to the EBA Report of 3 August 2016 on the Leverage Ratio requirements under Article 511 of the CRR (EBA-Op-2016-13),
Amendment 20 #
Motion for a resolution
Citation 20 a (new)
Citation 20 a (new)
- having regard to Report of the European Commission on an assessment of the remuneration rules under Directive 2013/36/EU and Regulation (EU) No 575/2013, of 28 July 2016,
Amendment 21 #
Motion for a resolution
Citation 21 a (new)
Citation 21 a (new)
- having regard to the BIS Working Paper No 558 of April 2016 on 'Why bank capital matters for monetary policy,
Amendment 25 #
Motion for a resolution
Citation 27 a (new)
Citation 27 a (new)
- having regard to the Effects Analysis (EA) of the European Commission of 11 October 2016 on the European Deposit Insurance Scheme (EDIS),
Amendment 53 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital B
Recital B
B. whereas the capital and liquidity ratios of EU banks have steadily improved over the last years; whereas risks to financial stability nevertheless remain; whereas the current situation calls for caution when introducing regulatory changes;
Amendment 58 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital B a (new)
Recital B a (new)
Ba. whereas regulatory capital requirements represent the minimum amount that banks should hold while capital, in excess of this amount, is necessary to ensure the ability to meet the minimum requirement at all times;
Amendment 60 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital B b (new)
Recital B b (new)
Bb. whereas internal risk models for operational risk and lending to corporates, other financial institutions, specialised finance and equities banks have persistently resulted in very different capital requirements which are often not justified by different risk sensitivity;
Amendment 63 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital B c (new)
Recital B c (new)
Bc. whereas excessive lending and risk-taking towards the real estate sector has caused major financial crises and real estate bubbles;
Amendment 78 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital D a (new)
Recital D a (new)
Da. whereas the Commission and the ECB have neither addressed nor replied to a number of clarifications and calls for action made by the European Parliament in the 2015 Banking Union report of March 2016;
Amendment 86 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph -1 (new)
Paragraph -1 (new)
Amendment 118 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 2
Paragraph 2
2. Considers that there are risks associated with sovereign debt; notes, however, that modifying its prudential treatment could have a significant effect on the financial sector, which calls for caution in reform effortis concerned that prudential regulation of sovereign exposures encourages banks to hold excessive amounts of sovereign bonds which endangers financial stability; notes that in some Member States financial institutions are overly invested in bonds issued by their own government, leading to excessive 'home bias'; notes, however, that modifying its prudential treatment could have a significant effect on the financial sector; supports the recommendations of the ESRB to revise the treatment of sovereign and interbank exposures; is convinced that a large-exposure limit has to be introduced for sovereigns in order to curb the interdependence between banks and governments; welcomes the latest Commission proposal to reduce the limits for interbank exposures but is of the opinion that lower limits should apply to all banks and not only to global systemically important institutions; awaits with interest the results of the international work on thisto address these issues; considers that, in the end, a better regulatory framework, be it European or international, will be needed; urges the Commission to take a leading role in this regard; calls on supervisory authorities and the Commission to broaden their scope on risks and take into account financial crime as a source of solvency risk for banks;
Amendment 139 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 3
Paragraph 3
3. Considers it essential to ensure the comparability of risk-weighted assets across institutions in order to allow for effective supervision; notes that banks' average risk-weighted assets per unit of assets has almost halved, falling from over 70% in 1993 to below 40% at end 2011; welcomes the work done internationally to streamline the resort to internal models, as well as the introduction of a leverage ratio to act as a backstop; welcomes the Commission proposal for a binding leverage ratio of a minimum of 3% but is concerned about deviations from internationally agreed standards by allowing institutions to reduce the exposure measure by the initial margin received from clients for derivatives cleared through qualifying CCPs; recalls, however, that the regulatory changes planned should not result in an overall significant increases in capital requirements, nor harm the ability of banks to finance the real economy, in particular SMEs; stresses however that the additional pillar 1 capital buffer which could result from the new international regulatory standards may be justified in the case of systemic banks; welcomes the work of BCBS to limit the use of internal models for operational risk and lending to corporates, other financial institutions, specialised finance and equities banks since a more risk-sensitive but mandatory standard approach is required to ensure respect of the "same risks, same rules" principle; welcomes in particular the proposal for improved risk floors in the case of commercial and other real estate lending; calls on financial supervisors to allow new internal models only if they do not lead to significantly lower risk weights; calls on the Commission to require financial institutions to disclose the differences between their internal models and the standardised approach; calls on the Commission to introduce the possibility of institution-specific multipliers for different portfolios if the risk so warrants;
Amendment 149 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 3 a (new)
Paragraph 3 a (new)
3a. Acknowledges that EU rules on remuneration for credit institutions and investment firms are generally effective in curbing excessive risk-taking behaviour and short-termism; notes, however, an overall shift from variable to fixed remuneration and recommends, therefore, compulsory disclosure of a manager-to- worker-pay ratio; is concerned that euro- area banks weakened their capital bases by paying substantial dividends sometimes exceeding the level of retained earnings throughout the crisis years, according to the Bank for International Settlements; calls, therefore, on the relevant supervisors to urge banks to retain profits to increase their own funds and thus improving resilience of the whole financial system; welcomes the latest Commission proposals to exclude small and non-complex institutions as well as staff with low levels of variable remuneration from the deferral and pay- out in instruments requirements;
Amendment 154 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 3 b (new)
Paragraph 3 b (new)
3b. Highlights that a proper implementation of MiFID II is crucial to tackle the problem of mis-selling to retail investors; urges the European Supervisory Authorities (ESAs) to fulfil their investor protection objectives through strong contributions to detect mis-selling practices; stresses that reducing mis-selling and ensuring effective consumer protection is key to strengthen retail investors' trust in the banking sector and the Single Market and to foster prudence in the financial sector;
Amendment 157 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 4
Paragraph 4
4. Points out that guidance provided by international fora should be used in order to avoid the risk of regulatory fragmentation; underlines that this guidance should however be critically assessed, in particular when international fora are lacking democratic legitimacy and public oversight; points to the risks of a rapidly growing shadow banking sector as shown in the 2016 EU Shadow Banking Monitor; insists that any action on the regulation of the banking sector must be accompanied by appropriate regulation of the shadow banking sector; calls, therefore, for coordinated action in order to ensure fair competition and financial stability; reiterates its call to strengthening the supervisory scrutiny on level 3 financial assets, including derivatives;
Amendment 172 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 5
Paragraph 5
5. Stresses that national options and discretions are hindering the creation of a level playing field between Member States; notes that in Regulation (EU) 2016/45 of the European Central Bank of 14 March 2016 on the exercise of options and discretions available in Union law, the ECB provides for a common approach for the treatment of all transitional arrangements; calls for a harmonisation of phase-in periods of capital deductions among Member States, in particular with regard to the deduction of deferred tax assets and holdings in insurance subsidiaries for banks subject to supplementary supervision under the Financial Conglomerates Directive (Directive 2002/87/EC); is concerned by the recognition of "Badwill" stemming from a bargain purchase under IFRS 3 as equity for prudential purposes; welcomes the ECB guidance and regulation harmonising the exercise of some of these within the Banking Union; looks forward to the upcoming amendments to the CRR as a means of closing the most significant ones; reiterates its request to make fully public the Supervisory Manual laying down common processes, procedures and methods for conducting a euro-wide supervisory review process;
Amendment 181 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 5 a (new)
Paragraph 5 a (new)
5a. Highlights that possible negotiations following the United Kingdom's 23 June 2016 referendum shall not be used to promote deregulation in the financial sector; emphasises that equivalence advice by the European Supervisory Authorities and equivalence decisions by the European Commission should aim at ensuring a level playing field in financial services to foster fair competition between the EU and non-EU financial institutions and to strengthen diversity and the development of European financial services providers;
Amendment 185 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 5 b (new)
Paragraph 5 b (new)
5b. Welcomes the latest Commission proposal introducing a binding Net Stable Funding Ratio but is concerned about deviations from internationally agreed standards by opting for a lower cushion to protect against potential losses stemming from uncollateralized gross derivatives liabilities;
Amendment 188 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 6
Paragraph 6
6. Recalls the need to clarify the objectives of Pillar 2 and its place within the stacking order of capital requirements; is of the view that the use of capital guidance is a relevant way forward in order to balance financial stability concerns with flexibility needsat Pillar 1 and Pillar 2 requirements are placed before the combined buffer requirement in the stacking order of capital requirements; points out that the purpose of the Maximum Distributable Amount (MDA) is to ensure that the distribution of profits does not jeopardise the regulatory capital position of a credit institution; believes that all capital requirements, whether they result from Pillar 1, Pillar 2 or stress testing exercises should be taken into account in determining the MDA; is concerned that the introduction of capital guidance might encourage supervisors to reclassify Pillar 2 capital requirements as Pillar 2 capital guidance so as to allow distributions; calls, therefore, on the Commission to ensure compliance with the principle of liability;
Amendment 195 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 6 a (new)
Paragraph 6 a (new)
6a. Reiterates the need to ensure higher transparency on the full set of supervisory practices and in particular in the SREP cycle; asks the ECB to publish performance indicators and metrics to demonstrate supervisory effectiveness and to enhance its external accountability; reiterates its call for more transparency with regard to Pillar 2 decisions and justifications; calls on the ECB to publish Joint Supervisory Standards;
Amendment 206 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 7
Paragraph 7
7. Notes that the ‘'too-big-to-fail’' issue still needs to be addressed; reaffirms its view that the introduction of a financial stability and resolvability assessment in the Qualifying Holdings Directive (Directive 2007/44/EC) is necessary to avoid new risks in this area due to a higher number of mergers and acquisitions and therefore welcomes the initiative of the Commission to revitalise the negotiations in the European Parliament on the proposal for Banking Structural Reform, including its link with necessary SSM supervision actions on bank governance, and in particular on risk management, risk appetite and cyber- risk;
Amendment 218 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 8
Paragraph 8
8. Points out that easier delegation of decision-making on some routine issues from the Supervisory Board to relevant officials could contribute to making ECB banking supervision more efficient and effective; calls on the ECB to specify the tasks and the legal framework for the delegation of decision-making;
Amendment 226 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 9
Paragraph 9
9. Recalls the need to find, in the exercise of supervision, a balance between the need for proportionality and the need for a consistent approach; Points out the need to avoid unnecessary bureaucracy for companies as well as for consumers and to minimize the risks for the financial system; recalls the need to find, in the exercise of supervision, a balance between the need for proportionality and the need for a consistent approach; calls on the Commission to prioritise work on a "small banking box" and to extend it to an assessment of the feasibility of a future regulatory framework consisting of less complex and more appropriate and proportional prudential rules specific to different types of banking models; sees a need to overcome the proliferation of overlapping reporting requirements and national interpretations of European laws in a common market; calls, therefore, on the Commission to put forward a proposal for a common unitary and consolidated supervisory reporting procedure; calls for a timely announcement of ad-hoc and permanent reporting requirements to ensure high data quality and planning security; calls on the Commission to reduce Pillar 3 disclosure requirements for small and non-listed financial institutions; calls on the Commission to allow small banks to use a simplified approach when calculating interest rate risk for banking book positions; calls on the Commission to maintain the current simple trading book approach for institutions with small trading books and physical commodity business;
Amendment 235 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 9 a (new)
Paragraph 9 a (new)
9a. Reminds the neutrality of banking supervision with regard to accounting as laid down in Recital 39 of the Council Regulation (EU) No 1024/2013 ("SSM Regulation"); calls, therefore, on the ECB not to ask institutions to provide data which cannot be derived from their respective accounting frameworks applicable to them pursuant to other acts of Union and national law; calls on the competent authorities to refrain from exercising the option in Article 24 (2) of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 to require that institutions effect the valuation of assets and off-balance sheet items and the determination of own funds in accordance with International Accounting Standards as applicable under Regulation (EC) No 1606/2002;
Amendment 245 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 9 b (new)
Paragraph 9 b (new)
9b. Welcomes the approval by the ECB Governing Council of principles increasing transparency in developing ECB regulations on European statistics, complementing the merits and costs procedure by public consultations on future draft ECB regulations on European statistics and publishing the results thereof; calls on the ECB to apply this enhanced transparency procedure to all fields of quasi legislative measures; shares the opinion of the European Court of Auditors (ECA) that an audit gap has emerged since the establishment of the SSM; is concerned that due to limitations imposed by the ECB on the ECA's access to documents, important areas are left unaudited; urges the ECB to fully cooperate with the ECA to exercise its mandate and thereby enhance accountability;
Amendment 252 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 9 c (new)
Paragraph 9 c (new)
9c. Is convinced that the existing review obligations in the different legal texts have to be exploited to the maximum extent to streamline the existing EU macro-prudential framework and to clarify the linkages with existing micro- prudential tools, as highlighted in its resolution of 10 March 2016 on the Banking Union and in the working documents that the Commission services have issued for consultation to the relevant stakeholders; considers that borrowing based instruments (such as LTVs and DSTIs) should be embedded in European legislation to ensure harmonisation in the use of these additional types of macro-prudential instruments; stresses that the SSM should also focus its supervisory activity on financial risks related to climate change, specifically the potential threat to financial stability posed by the so-called "stranded assets";
Amendment 257 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 9 d (new)
Paragraph 9 d (new)
9d. Expresses concern about the vulnerabilities in the real estate sector identified by the ESRB issuing a warning to eight Member States; calls the ESRB to explore comprehensive policy actions to address these vulnerabilities and to closely monitoring their implementation, including the recommendation to close real-estate data gaps by the end of 2020;
Amendment 259 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 9 e (new)
Paragraph 9 e (new)
9e. Is concerned that fair competition in the single market might be distorted as only a small number of SSM members have activated or plan to activate general systemic risk buffers, while only two SSM members have announced the activation of a counter-cyclical capital buffer in 2017; notes that the ECB has so far not fully exercised its macroeconomic supervisory powers by fostering the adoption of macro-prudential supervisory instruments by national authorities;
Amendment 260 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 9 f (new)
Paragraph 9 f (new)
9f. Reiterates the need to enhance the ESRB's institutional and analytical capacity to assess risks and vulnerabilities beyond the banking sector, as for instance by looking carefully at the insurance sector which is becoming increasingly involved in financial services originally provided by banks; recalls that the ESRB should address the interconnectedness of financial markets and any other systemic risk affecting the stability of financial markets, including preventing large fluctuations in the financial cycle and developing tools such as the systemic risk index;
Amendment 263 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 9 g (new)
Paragraph 9 g (new)
9g. Considers that the institutional setting underlying the EU framework for macro-prudential supervision needs to be streamlined to reduce institutional complexity and lengthy process in the interaction between European actors and national authorities and between competent and designated national authorities;
Amendment 264 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 9 h (new)
Paragraph 9 h (new)
9h. Deplores the ad-hoc evaluation which has been applied by the SSM in the stress test exercise in one selective case, leading to the inclusion in the starting level of capitalisation of Deutsche Bank of an asset sale which was not fully completed by 31 December 2015, therefore contradicting the Common Methodology applied for the 2016 EU stress tests;
Amendment 266 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 9 i (new)
Paragraph 9 i (new)
9i. Considers that the opacity surrounding financial conditions of those banks which are not covered by the stress tests and the lack of transparency characterising the ECB's own stress tests for additional 56 banks under its supervision, imply uncertainty in supervisory practices and can lead to undermining market confidence; calls on the ECB to publish the results of its stress test exercise;
Amendment 269 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 9 j (new)
Paragraph 9 j (new)
9j. Considers that when a NCA rejects the demand to take into accounts specific circumstances in the stress test exercise, this should be communicated to the EBA and the SSM to ensure a level playing field;
Amendment 270 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 9 k (new)
Paragraph 9 k (new)
9k. Reiterates its call for a systematic review of comprehensive assessments of ECB-supervised institutions to take into account the lessons learned in cases where an institution is deemed sound under the assessment and subsequently runs into trouble, as well as where an institution is deemed undercapitalised on the basis of a stress test scenario which ex-post turns out to be significantly unrealistic;
Amendment 271 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 9 l (new)
Paragraph 9 l (new)
9l. Regrets that EBA has failed to provide RTSs on the condition of capital requirements for mortgage exposure under Articles 124(4)(b) and 164(6) CRR; stresses that the different views regarding the micro-prudential or the macro prudential dimensions of these guidelines signal that the double majority requirements in the EBA Board for SSM members and countries outside the SSM undermine the effectiveness of the decision-making process; stresses, however, the need to streamline and clarify the supervisory framework to ensure effective interaction of macro- prudential and micro-prudential policy instruments;
Amendment 272 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 9 m (new)
Paragraph 9 m (new)
9m. Notes that the SSM has been assigned the task of European banking supervision for the purpose of ensuring compliance with EU prudential rules and of ensuring financial stability, while other supervisory tasks having clear European spillovers have remained in the hand of domestic supervisors; stresses, in this regard, that the SSM should have monitoring powers concerning Anti- Money Laundering (AML) activities of national banking supervisors; emphasises that EBA should also be assigned additional powers in the field of AML, including the powers to carry out on-site assessments in Member States' competent authorities, to require the production of any information that is relevant to assessing compliance, to issue recommendations for remedial action, to make those recommendations public and to take measures that are necessary to ensure that the recommendations are effectively implemented;
Amendment 273 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 9 n (new)
Paragraph 9 n (new)
9n. Reiterates its call on the ECB to redefine its role with regard to assistance programmes as one of 'silent observer' and to pursue a diligent revision of the ELA regime in the light of European bank supervision as serious doubts remain on whether the ECB's current discretion is fully consistent with a balanced doctrine of operational independence;
Amendment 274 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 9 o (new)
Paragraph 9 o (new)
9o. Reiterates its call on EBA to enforce and enhance the consumer protection framework for banking services in line with its mandate, complementing the SSM's prudential supervision;
Amendment 281 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 10
Paragraph 10
10. Recalls the need to adhere to State aid rules in the context of bank resolution; takes the view that enough flexibility is embedded within the current framework to address specific situations and might be better exploited, in particular in the case of preventive measures involving the use of DGS funds; without hindering genuine resolution of banks which are non-solvent in case of marginal deterioration of the assumption underlying the baseline scenario, in particular in the case of preventive measures involving the use of DGS funds; underlines the importance of correctly defining a meaningful crisis scenario in the stress test exercise to gauge hypothetical losses; calls for introducing an additional "severely adverse scenario", in line with the methodology underlying the stress test exercise in the US, to increase the sensitivity of the adverse scenario with respect to more ordinary macroeconomic fluctuations and market risks; is concerned about the risk stemming from banks' low profitability which can be exacerbated by the persistence of the low interest rate environment; calls for factoring-in this risk in one of the scenarios underlying the stress test exercise; considers that persistent low-interest rates also carry the risk to generate excessive liquidity in the financial system which can result in building up new speculative bubbles; is concerned about the over reliance on non-transparent internal models to translate the changes of macroeconomic factors into bank's risk parameters;
Amendment 287 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 10 a (new)
Paragraph 10 a (new)
10a. Regrets the planned use of precautionary recapitalisation contradicting the provisions of the BRRD which clearly exclude using this tool to cover present and future losses; stresses that operations aimed at cleaning the balance sheets from the burden of non- performing loans are equivalent to recognising losses on these assets;
Amendment 295 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 11
Paragraph 11
11. Takes note of the differences between the FSB TLAC standard and the MREL; stresses, however, that both standards share the same objective; concludes therefore that a holistic approach to loss-absorption can be reached by combining the two; highlights that due consideration should be given to retaining the two criteria of size and risk-weighted assethighest standards of the two, including regarding the deduction of cross-holdings; welcomes the latest Commission proposal to introduce into Pillar 1 a minimum total loss absorbing capacity (TLAC) for global systemically important banks, but is concerned about any lowering of the current EU minimum requirements for own funds and eligible liabilities (MREL); stresses that a Pillar 1 TLAC requirement should apply also to O-SIB in order to be in line with MREL requirements; notes with concerns that according to the EBA interim report on MREL the average level of MREL is lower for G-SIB; is concerned that by its latest proposals, the Commission limits the discretion of the SRB and other resolution authorities when setting MREL; considers that the risk-weighted asset criteria underlying the TLAC standards is strictly interconnected to the work of the BCBS for the finalisation of the Basel III framework, in particular as regards the restrictions of the use of internal model for certain exposures and the introductions of floors;
Amendment 308 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 12
Paragraph 12
12. Draws attention to the importance of clarifying in legislation the stacking order between MREL-eligible CET1 and capital bufferat MREL- eligible CET1 is on top of capital buffers so as to prevent double counting of capital; stresses the need to adopt legislation with the purpose of clarifying responsibilities and powers of resolution and competent authorities for early intervention measures to be taken in cases of breaches of MREL requirements, including taking actions in case of a persistently low level of MREL as well as their rapid deterioration; calls for incorporating into Pillar 1 legislation the existing EBA guidelines on triggers for the use of early intervention measures;
Amendment 314 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 13
Paragraph 13
13. Stresses that it is crucial to harmonise the hierarchy of claims in bank insolvency across Member States in order to make the implementation of the BRRD more consistent and effective; calls on the Single Resolution Board (SRB) to presents the results of the resolvability assessments for G-SIB and other banks, including the proposed measures to overcome impediments to resolution; is concerned that there is no evidence to date that any major banks has been asked to remove obstacles to resolvability; calls on the Single Resolution Board to provide a comprehensive list of obstacles to resolvability in national or European legislation and to report on actions taken by banks to remove these obstacles;
Amendment 322 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 13 a (new)
Paragraph 13 a (new)
13a. Calls on the Commission to produce, as a matter of urgency, a Delegated Act providing criteria for defining and ensuring the continuity of "critical functions" in accordance with Article 2(2) BRRD;
Amendment 325 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 14
Paragraph 14
14. Notes the range of legal options available to ensure the subordination of TLAC-eligible debt; points out that none is preferred by the FSB; is of the view that the approach adopted should first and foremost strike a balance between flexibility and legal certaintyensure genuine subordination of MREL eligible instruments and serve legal certainty; is concerned that according to the latest Commission proposal, structured notes may be deemed eligible for the MREL requirement; is of the opinion that structured notes are complex products which are practically difficult to bail-in; notes that TLAC excludes structured notes from eligibility; calls on the Commission to stick to the international standard and exclude structured notes from eligibility for the entire MREL requirement;
Amendment 329 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 15
Paragraph 15
15. Warns that the BRRD requirement of contractual recognition for bail-in powers on liabilities governed by non-EU legislation proves cumbersome to implement; calls for clarification of the type of liabilities to which such requirement applies; is concerned that according to the latest Commission proposal on Article 55 BRRD, resolutions authorities shall be allowed to not require institutions to include in instruments issued by third countries a contractual term that these instruments can be written-down; calls, therefore, on the Commission to refine its proposal to ensure that the conditions for granting exemptions do not endanger banks' resolvability; recalls that the newly introduced resolution regime has resulted in some instruments offered to retail investors involving a higher risk of loss; therefore calls on the Commission to intensively scrutinise Member States' implementation of the MiFID II Directive, specifically focusing on its provisions which tackle conflicts of interests and ensuring the suitability of retail investment products to investors' needs;
Amendment 338 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 17
Paragraph 17
17. Points out that swift and effective exchange of information between supervision and resolution authorities is paramount in order to ensure smooth crisis management; welcomes the conclusion of a memorandum of understanding (MoU) between the ECB and the SRM in respect of cooperation and information exchange; calls on the ECB to specify in the MoU the communication procedures between joint supervisory teams and internal resolution teams; stresses that the SRB should disclose decisions directly related to institutions and influencing the amount of ex-ante contributions;
Amendment 353 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 18
Paragraph 18
18. RWelcomes the Commission proposal for an EDIS which represents one of the two crucial missing elements to complete the Banking Union together with the establishment of a fiscal backstop for the Single Resolution Fund; regrets that the Commission did not allow for more time to assess the implementation of the DGSD before proposing the EDIS and did not; calls for conducting a proper impact assessment of the EDIS proposal; stands ready, however, to seize the opportunity generated by the proposal to discuss the DGSD and address some of the options and discretions it includes;
Amendment 366 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 19
Paragraph 19
19. Is aware of the potentcrucial benefits of an EDIS; is nevertheles to increase the resilience of the Banking Union against future financial crises by reducing the vulnerability of national deposit guarantee schemes to large local shocks and further reducing the link between banks and their home sovereign; is of the opinion that risk reduction measures are an indispensable cofactor untderparty toinning its establishment in order to prevent moral hazard, and that such measures should preferably precede risk sharinggo hand in hand with risk sharing; underlines that well established national systems must be retained by any of those measures;
Amendment 386 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 20
Paragraph 20
20. Welcomes a European approach to deposit insurance, which must make it possible to address outstanding DGSD implementation issues and phase , moving step by step towards a full-insurance scheme, while preserving the role of existing institutional protection schemes (IPS) and phasing-in the risk reduction measures;
Amendment 397 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 21
Paragraph 21
21. Recommends that the Commission, the ECB and the EBA study the possibility and suitability of accompanying the introduction of the EDIS with an assessment of the capital and liquidity situation of banks in order to better quantify the risks to be insured; stresses the need to amend Regulation (EU) No 806/2014 as regards the wording of Article 92 (2) to refer to the SRF and the DIF in order to enable the European Court of Auditors to audit each the SRF and the DIF;
Amendment 412 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 23
Paragraph 23
Amendment 430 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 24
Paragraph 24
24. Welcomes the establishment of loan facility agreements between the SRF and the Banking Union Member States; is of the opinion, nevertheless, that this solution is not sufficient to do away withovercome the bank-sovereign vicious circle and thaterefore calls for advancing on the work on a common fiscal backstop for the SRF, which should be fiscally neutral over the medium term, should continue step by step;