20 Amendments of Sven GIEGOLD related to 2017/0333R(APP)
Amendment 23 #
Motion for a resolution
Citation 12 a (new)
Citation 12 a (new)
- having regard to the Eurogroup report to Leaders on EMU deepening of 4 December 2018 (Press release 738/18),
Amendment 24 #
Motion for a resolution
Citation 12 b (new)
Citation 12 b (new)
- having regard to the study for the AFCO Committee of April 2016 on the Implementation of the Lisbon Treaty - Improving functioning of the EU: Economic and Monetary Policy (PE 556.952),
Amendment 99 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 2
Paragraph 2
Amendment 114 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 3
Paragraph 3
3. Highlights that the proper functioning of an EMU depends on the existence of an institution serving as a ‘lender of last resort’; acknowledgnotes, in this context, the positive contribution of the ESM, despite its intergovernmental nature, towards addressing the weaknesses of the institutional setting of the EMU, namely by providing financial assistance to several Member States affected by the financial crisis and the Great Recession;
Amendment 116 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 3 a (new)
Paragraph 3 a (new)
3 a. Strongly deplores that previous macroeconomic adjustment programmes have not adequately respected the Union's fundamental rights and overall legal framework, nevertheless escaped judicial scrutiny benefiting from the ESM intergovernmental structure; agrees with the Commission that adjustment programmes shall be accompanied by and consistent with social impacts assessments; stresses, however, that these impact assessments shall analyse, monitor and manage on a quantifiable basis the intended and unintended social consequences of planned policy measures and any social change processes invoked by those interventions rather than provide an uncritical ratification of fiscal consolidation measures as it has been the case so far; calls for the integration of such detailed obligation in the EMF statute and for the conduct of meaningful social impact assessments on all previous programmes;
Amendment 124 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 4
Paragraph 4
4. Recalls its previous positions in favour of the incorporation of the ESM into the EU legal framework, which would make it a fully-fledged EU body, creating, inter alia, legal certainty that its acts and omissions are subject to judicial scrutiny on the basis of EU law; insists that this incorporation should continue to be understood as part of the EMU completion project; believes that such an integration would allowbe an insufficient per se, yet indispensable condition for management in accordance with the Community method, ensure the full consistency of fiscal rules and obfaciligtations, facilitateng economic and fiscal policy coordination, and enhanceing democratic legitimacy and accountability through the European Parliament;
Amendment 130 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 4 a (new)
Paragraph 4 a (new)
4 a. Emphasises in particular the need to further increase the transparency and accountability of the decision-making process leading to the adoption of macroeconomic adjustment programmes, providing for a clearer and well- delimitated mandate for all involved stakeholders; asks for such provisions to be integrated in the future EMF statute as well as in case of a future proposal to amend Regulation(EU) No 472/2013;
Amendment 132 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 4 b (new)
Paragraph 4 b (new)
4 b. Notes that the ECB’s role is not sufficiently defined, as both the ESM Treaty and the EMF Commission proposal state that the Commission should work ‘in liaison with the ECB’, thus reducing the ECB to an advisory role; reminds that the ECJ has ruled in the Pringle case that the tasks allocated to the ECB by the ESM Treaty are in line with the various tasks which the TFEU and the Statute of the ESCB [and the ECB] confer on it provided that a certain number of conditions are permanently fulfilled; reminds that the ECB’s mandate is circumscribed by the TFEU to the areas of monetary policy and financial stability and that involvement of the ECB in the decision-making process related to budgetary, fiscal and structural policies is not foreseen by the Treaties; reiterates that potential ECB conflicts of interest in the previous adjustments programmes, especially as regards crucial liquidity policy, need to be effectively addressed;
Amendment 133 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 4 c (new)
Paragraph 4 c (new)
4 c. Is further of the opinion that macroeconomic adjustment programmes shall be adopted by means of Delegated Acts on the basis of Article 290 TFEU, granting the Parliament and the Council equal rights in repealing them;
Amendment 134 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 4 d (new)
Paragraph 4 d (new)
4 d. Regrets that in the Commission proposal the revenue and expenditure of the EMF are outside the EU budget, pre- empting the Parliament from exercising its discharge powers and violating the principle of unity of the EU budget as enshrined in Article 310 TFEU; calls, therefore, for the integration of the EMF in the Union budget by creating a budget line financed by ear-marked Member States contributions with the rest of the general budget offering a guarantee to the EMF operations up to a pre-defined amount; considers that any opposite approach, whereby the EMF escapes budgetary scrutiny by the Parliament, contradicts the letter and the spirit of the treaties and constitutes, as noted by ECA “a key gap in the proposed accountability arrangements of the EMF”1a; _________________ 1a Opinion No 2/2018 “The audit and accountability considerations concerning the proposal of 6 December 2017 for the establishment of a European Monetary Fund within the Union legal framework”, paragraph 42 (Based on: Repasi 2016 (Study for the AFCO Committee): Implementation of the Lisbon Treaty - Improving functioning of the EU: Economic and Monetary Policy (Page 42 f.) (PE 556.952))
Amendment 135 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 4 e (new)
Paragraph 4 e (new)
4 e. Calls for ensuring gender balance in the composition of EMF governing bodies and in the shortlist of the candidates for the position of the Managing Director; Member States should be required to select subsequent Directors of alternating gender;
Amendment 136 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 4 f (new)
Paragraph 4 f (new)
4 f. Asks for a stronger role for the European Parliament in the selection of the EMF Managing Director; calls, in this respect, for granting the Parliament the right to approve the shortlist of candidates for the position of the Managing Director as well as to object selected candidates after the selection made by the Council;
Amendment 158 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 6 a (new)
Paragraph 6 a (new)
6 a. Calls for the inclusion in the EMF of a debt restructuring settlement mechanism consistent with the basic principles on sovereign debt restructuring processes adopted by the UN General Assembly in 20151b and asks for a debt sustainability analysis on the basis of an enlarged debt sustainability concept underpinning a fundamental rights oriented approach; _________________ 1b Basic Principles on Sovereign Debt Restructuring Processes, UN resolution 2015, A/69/L.84.
Amendment 185 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 9
Paragraph 9
9. Highlights the need for an efficientStresses that the transformation of the ESM into a fully-fledged EU body is ad odds with the foreseen unanimity voting rule, intrinsic to an intergovernmental modus operandi; calls for the backstop to the SRF to be provided avoiding complex decision- making procedure in the reformed ESM, particularly in the case of urgent ss that limit its effectiveness in stabilising confidence in the banking union; the backstop should be established as an EMF credit line that can be used without a new round of national decisions; considers that such a decision making process would enhance EMF’s capacity to respond swiftly to economic and financial shocks, whilst respecting Member States’ constituationsal order;
Amendment 199 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 10
Paragraph 10
10. Considers that a credible funding- in-resolution framework has to clearly distinguish between solvency and liquidity needs; calls for a swift ESM reform that also redefines its role, functions and financial tools, so that the new ESF can offer liquidity support in case of resolution and serve as a financial backstop for the SRF; calls for the SRF to be made operational as soon as possible and, in any case, before 20241;
Amendment 206 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 10 a (new)
Paragraph 10 a (new)
10 a. Regrets that the Eurogroup agreement of December 2018 is silent on the modalities of how the SRB would provide liquidity support to banks when using the proposed ESM/EMF credit line; considers as a way forward the possibility of the SRF to issue guarantees or bonds to be lent to the banks, that can then be used as collateral for either ELA or the ordinary monetary policy operations by the ECB; underlines, however, that the proposed framework is not suitable for such a construction, as borrowing from the ESM/EMF would make it more difficult for the SRB to issue bonds with a good credit rating, due to the preferred- creditor status of the ESM/EMF; (Source: Demertzis et al. 2018: How to provide liquidity to banks after resolution in Europe’s banking union, Bruegel external publication.(http://bruegel.org/2018/11/ho w-to-provide-liquidity-to-banks-after- resolution-in-europes-banking-union/))
Amendment 208 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 10 b (new)
Paragraph 10 b (new)
10 b. Welcomes the fact that the Euro group agreement of December 2018 makes the ESM’s Precautionary Conditioned Credit Line (PCCL) conditional on transparent and precise ex- ante eligibility criteria and not on ex-post policy conditions, while replacing the PCCL’s MoU by a ‘Letter of Intent’, that should help reduce the strong disincentives to use the ESM, in the case of liquidity crises; calls, however, for a revision of the proposed criteria to access the PCCL, given that as they stand, they would render more than half of the Eurozone countries ineligible to use it[1];stresses the need for the ECB to clarify whether it considers the PCCL as a suitable programme to access the OMT1c; _________________ 1c http://bruegel.org/2018/12/does-the- eurogroups-reform-of-the-esm-toolkit- represent-real- progress/?utm_source=GDPR&utm_cam paign=34a728f379EMAIL_CAMPAIGN_ 2018_12_13_09_09&utm_medium=email &utm_term=0_7c51e322b7-34a728f379- 278611705
Amendment 211 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 10 c (new)
Paragraph 10 c (new)
10 c. Further welcomes the replacement of two-limb CACs by single limb CACs, that can facilitate debt restructuring in exceptional insolvency crises;
Amendment 218 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 11
Paragraph 11
11. Underlines the risks arising from the delay in completing the banking union; while welcomesing, in this context, the European Council’s commitment to a common backstop for the SRF and recalls the need also to establish the EDIS, it is concerned that any reform of the ESM will not be undertaken before 2021; recalls the need also to establish the EDIS in the form of a full reinsurance scheme for national deposit insurance scheme respecting the principle of subsidiarity;
Amendment 228 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 12
Paragraph 12
12. Invites the ESM to establish a protocol for a Memorandum of Cooperation (MoC) with the European Parliament, with immediate effect, to further promote institutional dialogue and enhance the ESM’s transparency, accountability and democratic legitimacy in line with the further deepening of interinstitutional cooperation on the economic governance of the euro area; the MoC should specify the rights of the European Parliament and its members as regards questions put to the EMF, regular hearings, nomination rights, budgetary control rights and discharge procedures;