BETA

Activities of Norica NICOLAI related to 2013/2170(INI)

Shadow reports (1)

2016/11/22
Committee: AFET
Dossiers: 2013/2170(INI)
Documents: PDF(141 KB) DOC(64 KB)

Amendments (27)

Motion for a resolution
Recital A

A. whereas ~~the issue of~~ anti-missile defence (AMD) was already raised in the past but has become more topical in recent years in view of the multiplication of threats stemming from nuclear proliferation to which the EU and its allies must be able to respond effectively technology has a long history but only recently has reached the needed degree of interception needed to ensure the functioning of such a system;

2014/01/08
Committee: AFET

Motion for a resolution
Recital A a (new)

Aa. whereas a number of states, such as the USA and Israel have functioning AMD and short-range missile defence systems in place;

2014/01/08
Committee: AFET

Motion for a resolution
Recital B

B. whereas ~~AMD is not only a leading symbol of the USA’s commitment to the EU and to its Eastern European M~~the USA has bilaterally and multilaterally implicated a number of EU member Sstates ~~but also of allied solidarity, even if the system is not specifically intended to shield the particular country in which it is based~~in AMD projects which might have a significance for other parts of the Union as well given the range of defence aimed by the projects;

2014/01/08
Committee: AFET

Motion for a resolution
Recital C

C. whereas the global character of current challenges and the spread of technological knowledge require broader cooperation between the EU and its neighbours, as well as a more accurately defined risk assessment between allieNATO has had several rounds of talks with the Russian Federation, inviting it to be a partner of the AMD projects;

2014/01/08
Committee: AFET

Motion for a resolution
Recital C a (new)

Ca. whereas the main purported reason for an AMD system in Europe would be to defend from the threat of so-called rogue states, with a number of countries currently under UN sanctions having or being suspected of having significant missile technology able to target countries in the EU;

2014/01/08
Committee: AFET

Motion for a resolution
Recital C b (new)

Cb. whereas the new deal signed in November 2013 in Geneva between various countries and Iran, one brokered by the HR/VP of the European Union ensures no further nuclear threat posed by Iran;

2014/01/08
Committee: AFET

Motion for a resolution
Recital C c (new)

Cc. whereas from EU member states, only Poland, the Czech Republic, Romania and Bulgaria have been in direct talks with the trans-Atlantic partners for the implementation of an AMD project, with several installations being already in place in Romania;

2014/01/08
Committee: AFET

Motion for a resolution
Recital C d (new)

Cd. whereas the USA have stated repeatedly in Congressional hearings and State Department documents that the primary goal of an AMD system in Europe would be to ensure the safety of USA and NATO assets in that territory with any other reasons coming as secondary;

2014/01/08
Committee: AFET

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1

1. Stresses that nuclear proliferation poses a grave danger to the survival of humankind. Even a nuclear strike confined to a to specific area would be constitute a global catastrophe, resulting in a major system shock at global level. The cost of such an event, both human and financial, would be extremely highWelcomes the prospect of a European territory defensible from ballistic missiles, nuclear or kinetic, while noting the highly fragmented state of current projects and a need to involve all major parties of the EU in its implementation and range of potential defence;

2014/01/08
Committee: AFET

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1 a (new)

1a. Considers that AMD technology has the potential to destabilise current deterrent arrangements in place in Europe and the world and calls for a higher level of coordination between Member States, with the help of the Council, EEAS and European Defence Agency, in order to avoid possible duplications of costs and differences in national foreign policies;

2014/01/08
Committee: AFET

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 2

2. Highlights th~~e latest phase in the deployment of NATO’s anti-missile shield (AMS), which aims to annihilate ballistic missiles before they reach their targets in the final stage of~~ at current technological restrictions do not make any potential AMD system, especially the one envisaged by NATO in Europe, neitheir trajectory upon re- entry into the atmosphere, will face greater restrictions than was previously anticipated. It will provide protection to key NATO assets, but contrary to previous plans, it will not, in its current form, provide sufficient coverage infallible nor able to offer full defence range to all EU countries and limited in the number of missiles it could intercept; stresses therefore the whole European population from the limited number of intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) in existence. This unforeseen development has raised support for a European AMS which would supplement NATO’s systemat the only sure mean to ensure peace and defence is a high degree of international cooperation and dialogue;

2014/01/08
Committee: AFET

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 3

3. ~~Stress~~Notes that, due to the financial crisis and budget cuts, not enough resources are being used to maintain sufficient defence capabilities, thereby leading to the reduction of the EU’s military capabilities and industrial capacity; both the current and any future AMD project in Europe would be affected by the financial crisis and wide- ranging defence spending cuts in Europe, therefore making its implementation dependent on the foreign policy of external actors like the USA; considers that this gives the EU member states limited options and calls for more trans- border and multilateral dialogue between Union countries on AMD projects; considers that the current form of AMD projects in Europe limits the EU means of interacting and affecting this issue; calls therefore for more Union engagement with the member states and international partners and notes the possibility for the HR/VP to intermediate a deal between the USA and the Russian Federation for a joint approach to AMD;

2014/01/08
Committee: AFET

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 4

4. Argues that the ~~legitimate~~ grounds for an anti-missile shield originate in the threat of a nuclear attack potentially orchestrated by actors who do not subscribe to traditional understandings of rationality. In real terms, certain ‘rogue’ states or state-like actors could be prepared to attack, eAMD system issue from a new form of deterrence from ballistic missile attacks, either of a nuclear or kinetic nature, with its main limitation being that ballistic missiles are not the only means for delivering nuclear or kinetic payloads; stresses however the potential positiven i~~n cases where doing so would ultimately result in their inevitable self-destruction~~mpact of an AMD project as a deterrent for any ballistic projects being developed by rogue states;

2014/01/08
Committee: AFET

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 5

5. Notes that convincing evidence exists that a number of ‘rogue’ states are attempting to acquire nuclear weapons; notes, furthermore, some of these states have stated their preparedness to use these weapons should their interests be jeopardised; recalls, in this connection, the vast arsenal of nuclear weapons already in the possession of highly unstable states; welcomes that fact that most such states are not in the immediate vicinity of the EU and well outside most ballistic missile ranges;

2014/01/08
Committee: AFET

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 6

6. Highlights that it is extremely difficult to evaluate the current and future risks of such developments, and that even if some of these countries have the capacity to develop a nuclear bomb, this does not necessarilyNotes that in the current dynamic international state of affairs, long term projects such as an AMD systems for Europe are hard to justify in spending and calls for the European Commission to issue an analysis of the potential need for such a tool, as well as means t~~hat they are capable of developing ICBMs in the near future~~o cooperate at an EU level for a realistic and useful implementation;

2014/01/08
Committee: AFET

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 7

7. Notes that there is some evidence that Pakistan might be transferring technological expertise to Iran and North Korea; highlights, furthermore, the worrying fact that thousands of unemployed ex-Soviet nuclear scientists provide a continuing threat as regards the transfer of dangerous information;deleted

2014/01/08
Committee: AFET

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 8

8. Underlines that a potential nuclear attack and the manifold unpredictable effects likely to result therefrom constitute an existential threat; highlights, however, that regardless of the gravity of such a risk, it is but one risk among many others; argues, therefore, that the proportional reduction of the existential risk should serve as a baseline for the evaluation of the feasibility of the AMS;deleted

2014/01/08
Committee: AFET

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 9

9. Draws attention to the approximation that the AMS is likely to be an extremely costly project and that it is unlikely that it would fall within the scope of standard EU financing schemes; underlines, furthermore, that maintenance will increase costs in the long run; notes that ~~the EU is expected to be called upon to substantially contribute to the infrastructure, operations and maint~~any current arrangements do not involve the EU as a financer of the project and that any involvement of the Union should also mean an enhanced co~~sts~~verage of the AMSD system;

2014/01/08
Committee: AFET

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 10

10. Calls therefore for a thorough and transparent cost-benefit analysis to be carried out regarding AMS by the European Commission and European Defence Agency; points out that this analysis should be conducted by an independent panel and should evaluate the cost of the AMS in relation to the potential risk of a ‘rogue’ state orchestrating an attack using ICBMs;

2014/01/08
Committee: AFET

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 11

~~11. Stresses that ICBMs are by no means the only delivery system used in nuclear devices; points out that the AMS might provide a false sense of security;~~deleted

2014/01/08
Committee: AFET

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 12

12. Proposes that should the AMS turn out to be a feasible and cost-effective means of reducing the risk of a nuclear attack, the European Union should consider its development and construction, preferably at European level;deleted

2014/01/08
Committee: AFET

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 14 a (new)

14a. Notes that developing a new technology such as the AMD systems in Europe could have a highly beneficial impact on the European Defence Industry, providing for jobs and research; calls therefore on the member states to find ways to promote European companies as well in the development of AMD;

2014/01/08
Committee: AFET

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 16

16. Recalls that NATO has announced its intention to actively seek cooperation on missile defence with Russia (and other Euro-Atlantic partners), thereby paving the way for greater transparency on nuclear issues and short-range nuclear weaponsConsiders that any viable AMD project being developed at an European level should involve European states outside of the EU as well, notably the Russian Federation, Ukraine and Turkey;

2014/01/08
Committee: AFET

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 18

18. Notes that Russia has expressed its willingness to participate in the development of the AMS; points out, on the other hand, that if Russia does not participate in the AMS for Europe, it will most likely react and develop countermeasures to balance the altered strategic landscape;deleted

2014/01/08
Committee: AFET

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 19

19. Argues that the EU, in cooperation with NATO and possibly with Russia, is capable of pooling resources and developing the AMS, thereby defending Europe against potential attacks from ‘rogue’ states or other state-like actors; points out that this approach would likely benefit all those involved;deleted

2014/01/08
Committee: AFET

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 20

20. Argues that ~~European~~an EU-wide anti-missile defence would require complex institutional arrangements that are currently not in existence; calls ~~for~~the Commission report on AMD to have a credible plan for an institutional framework in which the EU, NATO and non-NATO countries and Russia could work together;

2014/01/08
Committee: AFET

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 22

22. Strongly believes that analysis should include the various compositions of potential collaborators on the system, as well as its price and effectiveness; stresses that only after this point, if proven feasible, should the EU and its strategic partners move on to the design, production, and implementation phases;deleted

2014/01/08
Committee: AFET