Activities of George Sabin CUTAȘ related to 2011/2156(INI)
Plenary speeches (1)
ECB annual report for 2010 (debate)
Amendments (24)
Amendment 4 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital A
Recital A
A. whereas in 2010 the euro area recovered with GDP growth of 1.7% and is expected to stagnategrow at a similar level throughout 2011, after the slumpregistering in 2009 ofa -4.2% growth,
Amendment 8 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital B
Recital B
B. whereas the average general government deficit in the euro area deterioratincreased to 6.0% of GDP in 2010 and the average debt burden stood at 85.1% of GDP, up from 0.7% and 66.2% in 2007, respectively, and in comparison to a debt burden of 101.1% of GDP for the USA and 212.71% for Japan,
Amendment 23 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital E
Recital E
E. whereas most of the long-term government debt of Greece and Portugal is on the ECB balance sheet and the persistent rumours of Greek debt restructuring may again delay the ECB's exit from non-standard measuresthe ECB has bought long-term Greek and Portuguese government bonds, showing its capacity for stabilising the financial system; considers, however, that a comprehensive, long lasting solution outside the ECB should be sought for sovereign debt management,
Amendment 34 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 2 a (new)
Paragraph 2 a (new)
2a. Underlines that most eurozone countries were not in trouble before the financial crisis and had declining levels of public debt to GDP ratios as well as decreasing deficits;
Amendment 36 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 2 b (new)
Paragraph 2 b (new)
2b. Stresses that before the financial crisis, private debt increased in an unsustainable way, and that risks were created through private debt bubbles; furthermore, the increase in government debt was a result of the need to save the private sector, in particular the financial sector;
Amendment 37 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 2 c (new)
Paragraph 2 c (new)
2c. Notes that the public debt to GDP ratio of the eurozone is much lower that that of the US and Japan;
Amendment 38 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 2 d (new)
Paragraph 2 d (new)
2d. Believes in the strength of the eurozone economy and in the importance of the euro as an international currency;
Amendment 44 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 3
Paragraph 3
3. Recalls that the singlemain objective of the ECB is price stability; noteswelcomes the fact that de facto financial stability is becoming a second objective as it supports the former; also notwelcomes the work of the ESRB under the auspices of the ECB on financial stability; notes however that policies aiming at achieving higher growth are also necessary;
Amendment 58 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 4
Paragraph 4
4. Observes that, despite unitary monetary policy, monetary conditions diverge considerably in the euro area; in countries experiencing turbulence, banks are tightening the availability of credit, with the opposite happening in other countries with a current account surplus; this asymmetry is likely to become even more pronounced if the ECB keeps increasing rates, given the prevalence of loans indexed to short-term interest rates in the former group of countries; thus believes in the necessity of a common EU fiscal governance;
Amendment 61 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 4 a (new)
Paragraph 4 a (new)
4a. Deplores the current oligopoly and lack of transparency of credit rating agencies and strongly doubts the validity of their assessments;
Amendment 72 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 5 a (new)
Paragraph 5 a (new)
5a. Is of the opinion that relying on the OECD’s list of offshore financial centres is not sufficient; asks the European Commission to present a proposal for an EU list;
Amendment 87 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 8
Paragraph 8
8. Deplores the fact that hesitation in the management of the crisis by the Commission and the Member States, particularly in those lacking reforms, has triggered the ECB's position against restructuring of Greece's debtbelieves that solidarity between Member States is in the best interest of each one of the EU countries;
Amendment 98 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 9
Paragraph 9
9. NotBelieves that, whileif deleveraging is continuing in parts of the private sector and most Member States (MS), leveraging is still very widespread in the public sector, the same behaviour in the public sector will tend to deepen the crisis by amplifying the depressing impact of reduced private expenditure; in this sense, takes note of the statement made by Christine Lagarde, head of the IMF, calling on the US and EU to abandon fiscal austerity and switch to stimulus measures;
Amendment 103 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 10
Paragraph 10
10. Notes the rapid evolution of the leverage ratio of the ECB, measured by its capital and reserves in relation to assets; notes that this leverage ratio by far exceedsis lower than that of other comparable central banks, with the exception of those having implemented quantitative easing programmes, such as the Federal Reserve or the Bank of England;
Amendment 115 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 12
Paragraph 12
12. Restates with concern the overthe reliance of many euro area banks on the liquidity provided by the ECB, in the absence of a fully functional interbank market; notes with concern the collateral policies of the ECB as regards the amount and the quality of asset-backed securities provided to the Eurosystem as collateral, estimated at EUR 488 billion;
Amendment 123 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 13
Paragraph 13
13. Acknowledges the necessity of non- standard monetary policy measures, but; calls for a phasing-out of those programmes as soon as possible, the achievement of deepened economic governance and the establishment of an EU fiscal union;
Amendment 132 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 14
Paragraph 14
Amendment 140 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 15
Paragraph 15
15. Asks for more public information on flows between euro area central banks measured in the Target-2 programme so that these flows are not interpreted as permanently moving from current account surplus countries to deficit countries in order to avoid their financial collapsefor the sake of increased transparency;
Amendment 151 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 16
Paragraph 16
16. Calls for a more integrated macro- prudential policy framework within the monetary policy context, if necessary including differentiated macro-prudential tools in the Union to account for differences between the euro area and non- euro area countries; calls for an analysis of the effectiveness of the new financial supervisory architecture and for an evaluation of the option establishing a single European financial s raise in the funding of the new European Supervisory aAuthority, unifying under its umbrella the current European Supervisory Authorities and the European Systemic Risk Boardies in order to increase their effectiveness;
Amendment 164 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 17
Paragraph 17
17. Stresses the need for a single European minister of Finance that could emerge from the European Commission, in order to coordinate a basic common fiscal policyunion that cwould enhance the effectiveness of the euro; believes that the democratic legitimacy of such a proposal must adequately be addressed; notes in this sense that in a monetary union, fiscal policy does not only concern the Member States but has many cross-border spillovers and that the present crisis has shown the limits of 100% decentralised fiscal policies;
Amendment 169 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 17 a (new)
Paragraph 17 a (new)
17a. Stresses the importance of involving the non-eurozone member states in a future fiscal union, given that EU currencies are interdependent;
Amendment 187 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 19
Paragraph 19
Amendment 197 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 20
Paragraph 20
20. Believes that the introduction of eurosecurities may constitute the necessary fiscal quantum-leap forward that the Union needs at this juncture; welcomes the rapid implementation of the feasibility report promised by the Commission in its declaration XXX; would stabilise the current situation by reducing the total cost of debt and ensuring the liquidity of the European market; asks for the rapid implementation of the feasibility report promised by the Commission in its declaration XXX; encourages the Commission to use its legislative initiative power to come further with legislative proposals in this sense;
Amendment 215 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 21
Paragraph 21
21. Reiterates its long-standing call for the minutes of the meetings of the Governing Council to be public; considers their non- publication as a sign of weakness of the monetary union, as if the public and necessary individual accountability in the decision-taking within the Governing Council should be interpreted as a confrontation between Member States;