[ParlTrack]

Proposal for a directive
Recital 13 a (new)

(13a) Taking into account the heterogeneity of networks in terms of their size and density and the variety in the organisational structures of national and local or regional authorities and their respective experiences of the process of market opening, each Member State should be given sufficient flexibility to organise its network in such a way that a mix of open-access services and services performed under public service contracts can be achieved in order to ensure a high quality of services readily accessible to all passengers. Following selection of the public service contracts to put out to tender, each Member State should establish on a case-by-case basis which safeguard mechanisms to introduce for each service should the tender procedure not be successfully completed. Those mechanisms should not in any way generate additional charges for the railway undertakings managing those services.

2013/09/26
Committee: TRAN

David Maria SASSOLI, Franco FRIGO

Proposal for a directive
Recital 19 a (new)

(19a) In the light of the experience acquired through the network of regulatory bodies under Article 57 of Directive 2012/34/EU, the Commission should bring forward a legislative proposal to consolidate the network of regulatory bodies, formalise their procedures and give them legal personality, by 31 December 2016 at the latest. The resulting organisation should act as a supervisor and arbitrator to settle issues of a cross-border and international nature, and as a body for hearing appeals against decisions taken by the national regulatory authorities.

2013/09/26
Committee: TRAN

David Maria SASSOLI, Franco FRIGO

Proposal for a directive
Recital 19 b (new)

(19b) On the basis of the experience acquired through the new network of regulatory bodies, the Commission should bring forward a legislative proposal under which the network of regulatory bodies is replaced with a single European regulatory body that acts as a supervisor and arbitrator to settle any issues of a cross-border and international nature, and as a body for hearing appeals against decisions taken by the national regulatory authorities. This single European regulatory body should be operational by the time of the opening of the domestic rail passenger market.

2013/09/26
Committee: TRAN

David Maria SASSOLI, Franco FRIGO

Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – point 1 – point c a (new)

(ca) The following new Point 32 is added: ‘(32) Of the functions performed by the infrastructure manager, the following shall constitute essential functions: (a) decision making on train path allocation, including both the definition and the assessment of availability and the allocation of individual train paths; and (b) decision making on infrastructure charging, including determination and collection of the charges, without prejudice to Article 29(1).’

2013/09/26
Committee: TRAN

David Maria SASSOLI, Franco FRIGO

Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – point 3

2a. Members of the supervisory board or management board or heads of rail network managers or of any railway undertaking operating on these may not, for a period of at least three years following the termination of their duties, take up any managerial position in any public body responsible for the administration or regulation of the railway sector. The same restriction shall apply to managers of public bodies who leave their posts to take up managerial positions with rail network managers or any railway undertaking operating on these.

2013/09/26
Committee: TRAN

David Maria SASSOLI, Franco FRIGO

Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – point 3 a (new)

Directive 2012/34/EU
Article 7 – paragraph 5 a (new)

In Article 7, the following paragraph is added: ‘5a. (a) A Member States may decide not to apply the requirements under Article 7 (1) to (4) or those under Articles 7a to 7c. In such cases the Member State must comply with paragraphs 2 to 6 of this Article. (b) Member States shall ensure that the essential functions determining equitable and non-discriminatory access to infrastructure are entrusted to bodies or firms that do not themselves provide any rail transport services. Regardless of organisational structures, this objective shall be shown to have been achieved. The essential functions shall be: (a) decision making on train path allocation, including both the definition and the assessment of availability and the allocation of individual train paths; and (b) decision making on infrastructure charging, including determination and collection of the charges, without prejudice to Article 29(1).’ Member States may, however, assign to railway undertakings or any other body the responsibility for contributing to the development of the railway infrastructure, for example through investment, maintenance and funding. Where the infrastructure manager, in its legal form, organisation or decision- making functions, is not independent of any railway undertaking, the functions referred to in Sections 2 and 3 of Chapter IV shall be performed respectively by a charging body and by an allocation body that are independent in their legal form, organisation and decision-making from any railway undertaking. When the provisions of Sections 2 and 3 of Chapter IV refer to the essential functions of an infrastructure manager, they shall be understood as applying to the charging body or the allocation body for their respective powers. 3. Without prejudice to Article 56, the infrastructure manager shall first request the approval of the regulatory body referred to in Article 55 before making any change to the level of charges for access to railway infrastructure or for access to service facilities which the manager operates. The regulatory body shall verify compliance with this Directive and with the charging framework and specific charging rules established by Member States in accordance with Article 29. 4. Without prejudice to Article 56(1), an applicant shall have the right to appeal to the regulatory body if he believes he has been unfairly treated, discriminated against or in any way disadvantaged, and in particular against decisions adopted by the infrastructure manager or, where appropriate, by the railway undertaking or manager of a service facility, concerning scheduled or unscheduled maintenance work. 5. Without prejudice to Article 56(9), in the event of an appeal against a refusal to grant infrastructure capacity, or against the terms of an offer of capacity, the regulatory body shall either confirm that no modification of the infrastructure manager’s decision is required, or shall require modification of that decision, in accordance with the decision of the regulatory body, within one month of receiving the appeal. The infrastructure manager shall comply with the decision adopted by the regulatory body as soon as is practicably possible, and in any event no later than one month after notification of the decision. 6 Without prejudice to powers in respect of judicial appeal conferred by constitutional rules, where applicable, appeals against decisions taken by the regulatory body under Article 56(10) may not be such as to have suspensive effect when the decision concerns charges for access to railway infrastructure or allocation of capacity.

2013/09/26
Committee: TRAN

David Maria SASSOLI, Franco FRIGO