BETA

83 Amendments of Eva JOLY related to 2016/0409(COD)

Amendment 169 #
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 5
(5) The fact that the legislative basis necessary for governing SIS consists of separate instruments does not affect the principle that SIS constitutes one single information system that should operate as such. Certain provisions of these instruments should therefore be identical, while other provisions should differ, in particular as regards the authorities authorised to access to the data contained into the SIS information system. The rules on the protection of personal data should be fully guaranteed, in particular the purpose limitation principle.
2017/09/07
Committee: LIBE
Amendment 172 #
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 6 a (new)
(6 a) Competent authorities should be able to add in the SIS specific information relating to any specific, objective, physical characteristics of a person not subject to change. This information may relate to characteristics such as piercings, tattoos, marks, scars, etc. However, it should not reveal sensitive data of a person such as ethnicity, religion, disability, gender or sexual orientation, as defined in Article 9 of the General Data Protection Regulation.
2017/09/07
Committee: LIBE
Amendment 176 #
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 8
(8) It is necessary to maintain a manual setting out the detailed rules for the exchange of certain supplementary information concerning the action called for by alerts. National authorities in each Member State (the SIRENE Bureaux), should ensure the immediate exchange of this information.
2017/09/07
Committee: LIBE
Amendment 178 #
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 9
(9) In order to maintain the efficient and immediate exchange of supplementary information concerning the action to be taken specified in the alerts, it is appropriate to reinforce the functioning of the SIRENE Bureaux by specifying the requirements concerning the available resources, user training and the response time to the inquiries received from other SIRENE Bureaux.
2017/09/07
Committee: LIBE
Amendment 182 #
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 15
(15) SIS should permit the processing of biometric data in order to assist in the reliable identification of the individuals concerned. In the same perspective, SIS should also allow for the processing of data concerning individuals whose identity has been misused (in order to avoid inconveniences caused by their misidentification), subject to suitable safeguards; in particular with the consent of the individual concerned and a strict limitation of the purposes for which such data can be lawfully processed.
2017/09/07
Committee: LIBE
Amendment 189 #
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 17
(17) This Regulation should set out the conditions for use of dactylographic data and facial images for identification purposes. The use of facial images for identification purposes in SIS should also help to ensure consistency in border control procedures where the identification and the verification of identity are required by the use of fingerprints and facial images. Searching with dactylographic data should be mandatory if there is anyserious doubt concerning the identity of a person. Facial images for identification purposes should only be used in the context of regular border controls in self-service kiosks and electronic gates.
2017/09/07
Committee: LIBE
Amendment 191 #
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 18
(18) The introduction of an automated fingerprint identification service within SIS complements the existing Prüm mechanism on mutual cross-border online access to designated national DNA databases and automated fingerprint identification systems46 . The Prüm mechanism enables interconnectivity of national fingerprint identification systems whereby a Member State can launch a request to ascertain if the perpetrator of a crime whose fingerprints have been found, is known in any other Member State. The Prüm mechanism verifies if the owner of the fingerprints are known in one point in time therefore if the perpetrator becomes known in any of the Member States later on he or she will not necessarily be captured. The SIS fingerprint search allows an active search of the perpetrator. Therefore, it should be possible to upload the fingerprints of an unknown perpetrator into SIS, provided that the owner of the fingerprints can be identified to a high degree of probability as the perpetrator of a serious crime or act of terrorism. Such fingerprints should only be stored with the aim of identifying an unknown wanted person and his or her whereabouts; a verified match of these data does not constitute on its own a sufficient basis to take another action (e.g. taking into custody). Only after successful verification of the match, taking into account additional information or evidence and proper consultation with the Member State issuing the alert should the result be used for other actions. This is in particular the case if fingerprints are found on the weapon or on any object used for the offence. The mere presence of the fingerprints at the crime scene should not be considered as indicating a high degree of probability that the fingerprints are those of the perpetrator. A further precondition for the creation of such alert should be that the identity of the perpetrator cannot be established via any other national, European or international databases. Should such fingerprint search lead to a potential match the Member State should carry out further checks with their fingerprints, possibly with the involvement of fingerprint experts to establish whether he or she is the owner of the prints stored in SIS, and should establish the identity of the person. The procedures should be subject of national law. An identification as the owner of an "unknown wanted person" in SIS may substantially contribute to the investigation and it may lead to an arrest provided that all conditions for an arrest are met. _________________ 46 Council Decision 2008/615/JHA of 23 June 2008 on the stepping up of cross- border cooperation, particularly in combating terrorism and cross-border crime (OJ L 210, 6.8.2008, p.1); and Council Decision 2008/616/JHA of 23 June 2008 on the implementation of Decision 2008/615/JHA on the stepping up of cross-border cooperation, particularly in combating terrorism and cross-border crime (OJ L 210, 6.8.2008, p. 12).
2017/09/07
Committee: LIBE
Amendment 199 #
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 20
(20) It should be possible to add a DNA profile in cases where dactylographic data are not available, and which should only be accessible to authorised users. DNA profiles should facilitate the identification of missing persons in need of protection and particularly missing children, including by allowing the use of DNA profiles of parents or siblings to enable identification. DNA data should not contain reference to racial origin.deleted
2017/09/07
Committee: LIBE
Amendment 208 #
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 23
(23) SIS should contain alerts on missing persons to ensure their protection or to prevent threats to public security. Issuing an alert in SIS for children at risk of abduction (i.e. in order to prevent a future harm that has not yet taken place as, for example in the case of children who are at risk of parental abduction) should be limited, therefore it is appropriate to provide for strict and appropriate safeguards. In cases of children, these alerts and the corresponding procedures should serve the best interests of the child having regard to Article 24 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union and the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child of 20 November 1989.
2017/09/07
Committee: LIBE
Amendment 211 #
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 23 a (new)
(23 a) Assessing risk should be seen as integral to the investigation into the disappearance of a person and will indicate the seriousness and urgency of the case. The level of seriousness and urgency has to be established by competent authorities so one can decide whether or not to issue a preventive alert.
2017/09/07
Committee: LIBE
Amendment 212 #
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 23 b (new)
(23 b) The level of risk to which a missing person is exposed must be understood and can be done by assessing their personal circumstances and the environment to which they are exposed. The two combined will indicate how significant the risk is. It is up to the competent authority to determine the level of risk and, based on the level of risk, whether or not to issue a preventive alert.
2017/09/07
Committee: LIBE
Amendment 215 #
(24) A new action should be included for cases of suspected terrorism and serious crime, allowing for a person who is suspected to have committed a serious crime or where there is a reason to believe that he or she will commit a serious crime, to be stopped and questioned in order to supply the most detailed information to the issuing Member State. This new action should not amount either to searching the person or to his or her arrest. It should supply, however, sufficient information to decide about further actions. Serious crime should be the offences listed in Council Framework Decision 2002/584/JHA.deleted
2017/09/07
Committee: LIBE
Amendment 219 #
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 29
(29) Alerts should not be kept in SIS longer than the time required to fulfil the purposes for which they were issued. In order to reduce the administrative burden on the different authorities involved in processing data on individuals for different purposes, it is appropriate to align the retention period of alerts on persons with the retention periods envisaged for return and illegal stay purposes. Moreover, Member States regularly extend the expiry date of alerts on persons if the required action could not be taken within the original time period. Therefore, the retention period for alerts on persons should be a maximum of fivthree years. As a general principle, alerts on persons should be automatically deleted from SIS after a period of fivthree years, except for alerts issued for the purposes of discreet, and specific and inquiry checks. These should be deleted after one year. Alerts on objects entered for discreet checks, inquiry checks or specific checks should be automatically deleted from the SIS after a period of one year, as they are always related to persons. Alerts on objects for seizure or use as evidence in criminal proceedings should be automatically deleted from SIS after a period of five years, as after such a period the likelihood of finding them is very low and their economic value is significantly diminished. Alerts on issued and blank identification documents should be kept for 10 years, as the validity period of documents is 10 years at the time of issuance. Decisions to keep alerts on persons should be based on a comprehensive individual assessment. Member States should review alerts on persons within the defined period and keep statistics about the number of alerts on persons for which the retention period has been extended.
2017/09/07
Committee: LIBE
Amendment 224 #
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 30
(30) Entering and extending the expiry date of a SIS alert should be subject to the necessary proportionality requirement, examining whether a concrete case is adequate, relevant and important enough to insert an alert in SIS. Offences pursuant to Articles 1, 2, 3 and 4 of Council Framework Decision 2002/475/JHA on combating terrorism50 constitute a very serious threat to public security and integrity of life of individuals and to society, and these offences are extremely difficult to prevent, detect and investigate in an area without internal border controls where potential offenders circulate freely. Where a person or object is sought in relation to these offences, it is always necessary to create the corresponding alert in SIS on persons sought for a criminal judicial procedure, on persons or objects subject to a discreet, inquiry and specific check as well as on objects for seizure, as no other means would be as effective in relation to that purpose. _________________ 50 Council Framework Decision 2002/475/JHA of 13 June 2002 on combating terrorism (OJ L 164, 22.6.2002, p. 3).
2017/09/07
Committee: LIBE
Amendment 227 #
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 33
(33) Data processed in SIS in application of this Regulation should not be transferred or made available to third countries or to international organisations. However, it is appropriate to strengthen cooperation between the European Union and Interpol by promoting an efficient exchange of passport data. Where personal data is transferred from SIS to Interpol, these personal data should be subject to an adequate level of protection, guaranteed by an agreement, providing strict safeguards and conditions.
2017/09/07
Committee: LIBE
Amendment 230 #
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 35
(35) For processing of data by competent national authorities for the purposes of the prevention, investigation, detection of serious crime or terrorist offences, or prosecution of criminal offences and the execution of criminal penalties including the safeguarding against the prevention of threat to public security, national provisions transposing Directive (EU) 2016/680 should apply. The provisions of Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council52 and Directive (EU) 2016/680 should be further specified in this Regulation where necessary. _________________ 52Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016 on the protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data and repealing Directive 95/46/EC (General Data Protection Regulation (OJ L 119, 4.5.2016, p. 1).
2017/09/07
Committee: LIBE
Amendment 231 #
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 37
(37) The provisions of Directive (EU) 2016/680, Regulation (EU) 2016/679 and Regulation (EC) No 45/2001 should be further specified in this Regulation where necessary. With regard to processing of personal data by Europol, Regulation (EU) 2016/794 on the European Union Agency for Law Enforcement cooperation (Europol Regulation)54 applies. _________________ 54Regulation (EU) 2016/794 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 May 2016 on the European Union Agency for Law Enforcement Cooperation (Europol) and replacing and repealing Council Decisions 2009/371/JHA, 2009/934/JHA, 2009/935/JHA, 2009/936/JHA and 2009/968/JHA (OJ L 135, 25.5.2016, p. 53).deleted
2017/09/07
Committee: LIBE
Amendment 233 #
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 38
(38) The provisions of Decision 2002/187/JHA of 28 February 200255 setting up Eurojust with a view to reinforcing the fight against serious crime concerning data protection apply to the processing of SIS data by Eurojust, including the powers of the Joint Supervisory Body, set up under that Decision, to monitor the activities of Eurojust and liability for any unlawful processing of personal data by Eurojust. In cases when searches carried out by Eurojust in SIS reveal the existence of an alert issued by a Member State, Eurojust cannot take the required action. Therefore it should immediately inform the Member State concerned allowing it to follow up the case. _________________ 55 Council Decision 2002/187/JHA of 28 February 2002 setting up Eurojust with a view to reinforcing the fight against serious crime (OJ L 63, 6.3.2002, p. 1).
2017/09/07
Committee: LIBE
Amendment 236 #
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 41
(41) The national independent supervisory authorities should monitor the lawfulness of the processing of personal data by the Member States in relation to this Regulation. The rights of data subjects for access, rectification and erasure of their personal data stored in SIS, andas regards subsequent remedies before national courts as well as the mutual recognition of judgments should be set out. Therefore, it is appropriate to require annual statistics from Member States.
2017/09/07
Committee: LIBE
Amendment 241 #
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 45
(45) It is also necessary to set out clear rules for Europol on the processing and downloading of SIS data to allow the most comprehensive use of SIS provided that data protection standards are respected as provided in this Regulation and Regulation (EU) 2016/794under Union law. In cases where searches carried out by Europol in SIS reveal the existence of an alert issued by a Member State, Europol cannot take the required action. Therefore it should immediately inform the Member State concerned allowing it to follow up the case.
2017/09/07
Committee: LIBE
Amendment 244 #
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 46
(46) Regulation (EU) 2016/1624 of the European Parliament and of the Council56 provides for the purpose of this Regulation, that the host Member State is to authorise the members of the European Border and Coast Guard teams or teams of staff involved in return-related tasks, deployed by the European Border and Coast Guard Agency, to consult European databases, where this consultation is necessary for fulfilling operational aims specified in the operational plan on border checks, border surveillance and return. Other relevant Union agencies, in particular the European Asylum Support Office and Europol, may also deploy experts as part of migration management support teams, who are not members of the staff of those Union agencies. The objective of the deployment of the European Border and Coast Guard teams, teams of staff involved in return- related tasks and the migration management support team is to provide for technical and operational reinforcement to the requesting Member States, especially to those facing disproportionate migratory challenges. Fulfilling the tasks assigned to the European Border and Coast Guard teams, teams of staff involved in return- related tasks and the migration management support team necessitates access to SIS via a technical interface of the European Border and Coast Guard Agency connecting to Central SIS. In cases where searches carried out by the team or the teams of staff in SIS reveal the existence of an alert issued by a Member State, the member of the team or the staff cannot take the required action unless authorised to do so by the host Member State. Therefore it should inform the Member States concerned allowing for follow up of the case. _________________ 56 Regulation (EU) 2016/1624 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 September 2016 on the European Border and Coast Guard and amending Regulation (EU) 2016/399 of the European Parliament and of the Council and repealing Regulation (EC) No 863/2007 of the European Parliament and of the Council, Council Regulation (EC) No 2007/2004 and Council Decision 2005/267/EC (OJ L 251 of 16.9.2016, p. 1).
2017/09/07
Committee: LIBE
Amendment 246 #
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 47
(47) In accordance with Commission proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing a European Travel Information and Authorisation System (ETIAS)57 the ETIAS Central Unit of the European Border and Coast Guard Agency will perform verifications in SIS via ETIAS in order to perform the assessment of the applications for travel authorisation which require, inter alia, to ascertain if the third country national applying for a travel authorisation is subject of a SIS alert. To this end the ETIAS Central Unit within the European Border and Coast Guard Agency should also have access to SIS to the extent necessary to carry out its mandate, namely to all alert categories on persons and alerts on blank and issued personal identification documents. _________________ 57deleted COM (2016)731 final.
2017/09/07
Committee: LIBE
Amendment 253 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 3 – paragraph 1 – point a
(a) ‘alert’ means a set of data, including biometric identifiers as referred to in Article 22 and in Article 40, entered in SIS allowing the competent authorities to identify a person or an object with a view to taking specific action;
2017/09/07
Committee: LIBE
Amendment 261 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 3 – paragraph 1 – point h
(h) ‘flag’ means a suspension of validity of an alert at the national level that may be added to alerts for arrest, alerts for missing persons and alerts for discreet, inquiry and specific checks, where a Member State considers that to give effect to an alert is incompatible with its national law, its international obligations or essential national interests. Where the alert is flagged, the requested action on the basis of the alert shall not be taken on the territory of this Member State.
2017/09/07
Committee: LIBE
Amendment 270 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 8 – paragraph 1
1. Supplementary information shall be exchanged in accordance with the provisions of the SIRENE Manual and using the Communication Infrastructure. Member States shall provide the necessary technical and personal resources to ensure the continuous availability and immediate exchange of supplementary information. In the event that the Communication Infrastructure is unavailable, Member States may use other adequately secured technical means to timely exchange supplementary information.
2017/09/07
Committee: LIBE
Amendment 274 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 8 – paragraph 3
3. The SIRENE Bureaux shall carry out their task in a quick and efficient manner, in particular by replying to a request as soon as possible but not later than 12 hours after the receipt of the request. In case of alerts for terrorism offences the SIRENE Bureaux shall act immediately.
2017/09/07
Committee: LIBE
Amendment 285 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 12 – paragraph 1
1. Without prejudice to Article 25 of Directive (EU) 2016/680, Member States shall ensure that every access to and all exchanges of personal data within CS-SIS are logged in their N.SIS for the purposes of checking whether or not the search is lawful, monitoring the lawfulness of data processing, self-monitoring and ensuring the proper functioning of N.SIS , data integrity and security.
2017/09/07
Committee: LIBE
Amendment 291 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 12 – paragraph 7
7. Where Member States carry out automated scanned searches of the number plates of motor vehicles, using Automatic Number Plate Recognition systems, and only if such automated searches are allowed under national law, Member States shall maintain a log of the search in accordance with national law. The content of this log shall be established by means of implementing measures in accordance with the examination procedure referred to in Article 72(2). Where a positive match is achieved against data stored in SIS, or a national or technical copy of SIS data, a full search shall be carried out in SIS in order to verify that a match has indeed been achieved. The provisions of paragraphs 1 to 6 of this Article shall apply to this full search.
2017/09/07
Committee: LIBE
Amendment 295 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 14 – paragraph 1
Before being authorised to process data stored in SIS and periodically after access to SIS data has been granted, the staff of the authorities having a right to access SIS shall receive appropriate training about data security, fundamental rights including data protection rules and the procedures on data processing as set out in the SIRENE Manual. The staff shall be informed of any relevant criminal offences and penalties.
2017/09/07
Committee: LIBE
Amendment 303 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 18 – paragraph 4
4. The logs may only be used for the purposes mentioned in paragraph 1 and shall be deleted at the earliest one year, and at the latest three years,one year after their creation. The logs which include the history of alerts shall be erased after one to threone years after deletion of the alerts.
2017/09/07
Committee: LIBE
Amendment 309 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 20 – paragraph 3 – point e
(e) any specific, objective, physical characteristics not subject to change, not linked to special categories of personal data defined in Article 9 of Regulation (EU) 2016/679, such as ethnicity, religion, disability, gender or sexual orientation;
2017/09/07
Committee: LIBE
Amendment 316 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 20 – paragraph 3 – point x
(x) relevant DNA profiles subject to Article 22(1)(b) of this Regulation;deleted
2017/09/07
Committee: LIBE
Amendment 326 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 22 – title
Specific rules for entering photographs, facial images, and dactylographic data and DNA profiles
2017/09/07
Committee: LIBE
Amendment 329 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 22 – paragraph 1 – introductory part
1. The entering into SIS of data referred to in Article 20(3)(w), (x) and (y) shall be subject to the following provisions:
2017/09/07
Committee: LIBE
Amendment 331 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 22 – paragraph 1 – point a
(a) Photographs, facial images, and dactylographic data and DNA profiles shall only be entered following a quality check to ascertain the fulfilment of a minimum data quality standard.
2017/09/07
Committee: LIBE
Amendment 334 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 22 – paragraph 1 – point b
(b) A DNA profile may only be added to alerts provided for in Article 32(2)(a) and (c) and only where photographs, facial images or dactylographic data suitable for identification are not available. The DNA profiles of persons who are direct ascendants, descendants or siblings of the alert subject may be added to the alert provided that those persons concerned gives explicit consent. The racial origin of the person shall not be included in the DNA profile.deleted
2017/09/07
Committee: LIBE
Amendment 362 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 32 – paragraph 2 – point c
(c) children at risk of abduction in accordance with paragraph 43b.
2017/09/07
Committee: LIBE
Amendment 371 #
(a) Paragraph 2c shall apply to children at risk under the following conditions: (i) An alert on a child referred to in paragraph 2c shall be entered at the request of the competent authority of the Member State where the child has gone missing. (ii) The assessment whether a missing child is at risk, should be determined by competent authorities. Following this risk assessment, protocols and tools should support the necessary action to be taken, as included in the alert.
2017/09/07
Committee: LIBE
Amendment 374 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 32 – paragraph 4
4. An alert on a child referred to in paragraph 2(c) shall be entered at the request of therequested and ruled on by a competent judicial authority of the Member State that has jurisdiction in matters of parental responsibility in accordance with Council Regulation No 2201/200374 where a concrete and apparent risk exists that the child may be unlawfully and imminently removed from the Member State where that competent judicial authority is situatedin accordance with Council Regulation No 2201/200374. In Member States which are party to the Hague Convention of 19 October 1996 on Jurisdiction, Applicable law, Recognition, Enforcement and Cooperation in Respect of Parental Responsibility and Measures for the Protection of Children and where Council Regulation No 2201/2003 does not apply, the provisions of the Hague Convention are applicable. _________________ 74 Council Regulation (EC) No 2201/2003 of 27 November 2003 concerning jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in matrimonial matters and the matters of parental responsibility, repealing Regulation (EC) No 1347/2000 (OJ L 338, 23.12.2003, p. 1).
2017/09/07
Committee: LIBE
Amendment 387 #
Proposal for a regulation
Chapter 9 – title
ALERTS ON PERSONS AND OBJECTS FOR DISCREET CHECKS, INQUIRY CHECKS OR SPECIFIC CHECKS
2017/09/07
Committee: LIBE
Amendment 388 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 36 – paragraph 1
1. Data on persons or vehicles, boats, aircraft and containers shall be entered in accordance with the national law of the Member State issuing the alert, for the purposes of discreet checks, inquiry checks or specific checks in accordance with Article 37(4).
2017/09/07
Committee: LIBE
Amendment 394 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 36 – paragraph 2 – point c
(c) where an overall assessment of a person, in particular on the basis of past criminal offences, gives reason to believe that that person may also commit serious crimes in the future, in particular the offences referred to in Article 2(2) of the Framework Decision 2002/584/JHA.deleted
2017/09/07
Committee: LIBE
Amendment 401 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 37 – paragraph 1 – introductory part
1. For the purposes of discreet checks, inquiry checks or specific checks, all or some of the following information shall be collected and immediately communicated to the authority issuing the alert when border control checks, police and customs checks or other law enforcement activities are carried out within a Member State:
2017/09/07
Committee: LIBE
Amendment 403 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 37 – paragraph 2
2. The information referred to in paragraph 1 shall be immediately communicated through the exchange of supplementary information.
2017/09/07
Committee: LIBE
Amendment 404 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 37 – paragraph 4
4. Depending on the operational circumstances and in accordance with national law, an inquiry check shall comprise a more in-depth check and a questioning of the person. Where inquiry checks are not authorised by the law of a Member State, they shall be replaced by discreet checks in that Member State.deleted
2017/09/07
Committee: LIBE
Amendment 407 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 37 – paragraph 5
5. During specific checks, persons, vehicles, boats, aircraft, containers and objects carried, may be searched in accordance with national law for the purposes referred to in Article 36. Searches shall be carried out in accordance with national law. Where specific checks are not authorised by the law of a Member State, they shall be replaced by inquirydiscreet checks in that Member State.
2017/09/07
Committee: LIBE
Amendment 412 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 40 – title
Alerts on unknown wanted person for apprehensidentification under national law
2017/09/07
Committee: LIBE
Amendment 417 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 40 – paragraph 1
Dactylographic data may be entered in SIS, not related to persons who are subject of the alerts. These dactylographic data shall be either complete or incomplete sets of fingerprints or palm prints discovered at the scenes of crimes under investigation, of serious crimes and terrorist offences under investigation and where it can be established to a high degree of probability that they belong to the perpetrator of the offence. The dactylographic data in this category shall be stored as “unknown suspect or wanted person” and shall only be stored with the aim of identifying an unknown wanted person and his or her whereabouts, provided that the competent authorities cannot establish the identity of the person by using any other national, European or international database.
2017/09/07
Committee: LIBE
Amendment 422 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 41 – paragraph 1
In the event of a hit or a potential match with the data stored pursuant to Article 40, the identity of the person shall be established in accordance with national law, together with verification that the dactylographic data stored in SIS belong to the person. Member States shall immediately communicate by using supplementary information in order to facilitate timely investigation of the case.
2017/09/07
Committee: LIBE
Amendment 425 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 42 – title
Specific rules for verification or search with photographs, facial images, and dactylographic data and DNA profiles
2017/09/07
Committee: LIBE
Amendment 431 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 42 – paragraph 1
1. Photographs, facial images, and dactylographic data and DNA profiles shall be retrieved from SIS to verify the identity of a person who has been located as a result of an alphanumeric search made in SIS.
2017/09/07
Committee: LIBE
Amendment 433 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 42 – paragraph 2
2. Dactylographic data may also be used to identify a person. Dactylographic data stored in SIS shall be searched for identification purposes only if the identity of the person cannot be ascertained by other means.
2017/09/07
Committee: LIBE
Amendment 438 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 42 – paragraph 4
4. As soon as this becomes technically possible, and while ensuring a high degree of reliability of identification, photographs and facial images may be used to identify a person. Identification based on photographs or facial images shall only be used at regular border crossing points where self-service systems and automated border control systems are in use.deleted
2017/09/07
Committee: LIBE
Amendment 460 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 46 – paragraph 2
2. Where a search by Europol reveals the existence of an alert in SIS, Europol shall immediately inform the issuing Member State via the channels defined by Regulation (EU) 2016/794.
2017/09/07
Committee: LIBE
Amendment 461 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 46 – paragraph 3
3. The use of information obtained from a search in the SIS is subject to the consent of the Member State concerned. If the Member State allows the use of such information, the handling thereof by Europol shall be governed by Regulation (EU) 2016/794. Europol may only communicate such information to third countries and third bodies with the consent of the Member State concerned. and in full respect of Union law on data protection.
2017/09/07
Committee: LIBE
Amendment 469 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 47 – paragraph 2
2. Where a search by a national member of Eurojust reveals the existence of an alert in SIS, he or she shall immediately inform the issuing Member State.
2017/09/07
Committee: LIBE
Amendment 473 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 48 – paragraph 3
3. Where a search by a member of the European Border and Coast Guard teams or teams of staff involved in return-related tasks or by a member of the migration management support team reveals the existence of an alert in SIS, the issuing Member State shall be immediately informed thereof. In accordance with Article 40 of Regulation (EU) 2016/1624, members of the teams may only act in response to an alert in SIS under instructions from and, as a general rule, in the presence of border guards or staff involved in return-related tasks of the host Member State in which they are operating. The host Member State may authorise members of the teams to act on its behalf.
2017/09/07
Committee: LIBE
Amendment 479 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 49 – paragraph 2
2. The European Border and Coast Guard Agency shall, for the purpose of performing its tasks conferred on it by the Regulation establishing a European Travel Information and Authorisation System (ETIAS), have the right to access and search data entered in SIS, in accordance with Articles 26, 32, 34, 36 and 38(2) (j) and (k).deleted
2017/09/07
Committee: LIBE
Amendment 483 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 49 – paragraph 3
3. Where a verification by the European Border and Coast Guard Agency reveals the existence of an alert in SIS the procedure set out in Article 22 of Regulation establishing a European Travel Information and Authorisation System (ETIAS) applies.deleted
2017/09/07
Committee: LIBE
Amendment 488 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 49 – paragraph 6
6. Except where necessary to perform the tasks for the purposes of the Regulation establishing a European Travel Information and Authorisation System (ETIAS), nNo parts of SIS shall be connected to any computer system for data collection and processing operated by or at the European Border and Coast Guard Agency, nor shall the data contained in SIS to which the European Border and Coast Guard Agency has access be transferred to such a system. No part of SIS shall be downloaded. The logging of access and searches shall not be construed to be the downloading or copying of SIS data.
2017/09/07
Committee: LIBE
Amendment 489 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 51 – paragraph 1
1. Alerts entered in SIS pursuant to this Regulation shall not be kept lonlyger than for the time required to achieve the purposes for which they were entered.
2017/09/07
Committee: LIBE
Amendment 491 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 51 – paragraph 2
2. A Member State issuing an alert shall, within fivthree years of its entry into SIS, review the need to retain it. Alerts issued for the purposes of Article 36 of this Regulation shall be kept for a maximum period of one year.
2017/09/07
Committee: LIBE
Amendment 495 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 51 – paragraph 5
5. In cases where it becomes clear to staff in the SIRENE Bureau, who are responsible for coordinating and verifying of data quality, that an alert on a person has achieved its purpose and should be deleted from SIS, the staff shall immediately notify the authority which created the alert to bring this issue to the attention of the authority. The authority shall have 30 calendar days from the receipt of this notification to indicate that the alert has been or shall be deleted or shall state reasons for the retention of the alert. If the 30-day period expires without such a reply the alert shall be deleted by the staff of the SIRENE Bureau. SIRENE Bureaux shall report any recurring issues in this area to their national supervisory authority.
2017/09/07
Committee: LIBE
Amendment 498 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 52 – paragraph 1
1. Alerts for arrest for surrender or extradition purposes pursuant to Article 26 shall be deleted once the person has been surrendered or extradited to the competent authorities of the issuing Member State. They mayshall also be deleted where the judicial decision on which the alert was based has been revoked by the competent judicial authority according to national law.
2017/09/07
Committee: LIBE
Amendment 509 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 52 – paragraph 4 – introductory part
4. Alerts on discreet, inquiry and specific checks shall be deleted in accordance with the following rules:
2017/09/07
Committee: LIBE
Amendment 510 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 52 – paragraph 4 – subparagraph 1 – introductory part
Concerning alerts on discreet, inquiry and specific checks, pursuant to Article 36, an alert shall be deleted upon:
2017/09/07
Committee: LIBE
Amendment 514 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 52 – paragraph 6
6. Alerts on unknown wanted persons pursuant to Article 40 shall be deleted in accordance with the following rulesupon:
2017/09/07
Committee: LIBE
Amendment 519 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 53 – paragraph 6
6. With regard to the alerts laid down in Articles 26, 32, 34, 36, 38 and 40 of this Regulation, any processing of information contained therein for purposes other than those for which it was entered in SIS has to be linked with a specific case and justified by the need to prevent an imminent serious threat to public policy and public security, on serious grounds of national security or for the purposes of preventing a serious crime. Prior authorisation from the Member State issuing the alert shall be obtained for this purpose.
2017/09/07
Committee: LIBE
Amendment 525 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 53 – paragraph 8
8. Each Member State shall send, to the Agency, a list of its competent authorities which are authorised to search directly the data contained in SIS pursuant to this Regulation, as well as any changes to the list. The list shall specify, for each authority, which data it may search and for what purposes. The Agency shall ensure the annual publication of the list on its website and in the Official Journal of the European Union.
2017/09/07
Committee: LIBE
Amendment 526 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 54 – paragraph 1
1. Article 53(2) shall not prejudice the right of a Member State to keep in its national files SIS data in connection with which action has been taken on its territory. Such data shall be kept in national files for a maximum period of three years, except if specific provisions in national law provide for a longer retention period.
2017/09/07
Committee: LIBE
Amendment 529 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 56 – paragraph 3
3. Where a Member State other than that which issued an alert has evidence suggesting that an item of data is factually incorrect or has been unlawfully stored, it shall, through the exchange of supplementary information, immediately inform the issuing Member State at the earliest opportunity and not later than 10 days after the said evidence has come to its attention. The issuing Member State shall check the communication and, if necessary, correct or delete the item in question without delay.
2017/09/07
Committee: LIBE
Amendment 541 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 57 – paragraph 4 a (new)
4 a. In case of a data breach, data subjects shall be informed in accordance with Article 34 of Regulation (EU) 2016/679 or Article 31 of Directive (EU) 2016/680.
2017/09/07
Committee: LIBE
Amendment 542 #
(a) the SIRENE Bureau shall immediately contact the requesting authority to clarify whether or not the alert is on the same person;
2017/09/07
Committee: LIBE
Amendment 546 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 59 – paragraph 3 – introductory part
3. For the purpose of this Article, and subject to the victim’s explicit consent for each data category, only the following personal data may be entered and further processed in SIS : :
2017/09/07
Committee: LIBE
Amendment 547 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 59 – paragraph 3 – point e
(e) any specific objective and physical characteristic not subject to change;deleted
2017/09/07
Committee: LIBE
Amendment 548 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 59 – paragraph 3 – point j
(j) fingerprints;deleted
2017/09/07
Committee: LIBE
Amendment 550 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 61 – paragraph 3
3. Paragraph 2 shall not prejudice the right of a Member State to keep in national files data relating to a particular alert which that Member State has issued or to an alert in connection with which action has been taken on its territory. The period for which such data may be held in such files shall be governed by national lawone year.
2017/09/07
Committee: LIBE
Amendment 552 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 63
1. By way of derogation from Article 62, the passport number, country of issuance and the document type of stolen, misappropriated, lost or invalidated passports entered in SIS may be exchanged with members of Interpol by establishing a connection between SIS and the Interpol database on stolen or missing travel documents, subject to the conclusion of an Agreement between Interpol and the European Union. The Agreement shall provide that the transmission of data entered by a Member State shall be subject to the consent of that Member State. 2. The Agreement referred to in paragraph 1 shall foresee that the data shared shall only be accessible to members of Interpol from countries that ensure an adequate level of protection of personal data. Before concluding this Agreement, the Council shall seek the opinion of the Commission on the adequacy of the level of protection of personal data and respect of fundamental rights and liberties regarding the automatic processing of personal data by Interpol and by countries which have delegated members to Interpol. 3. The Agreement referred to in paragraph 1 may also provide for access through SIS for the Member States to data from the Interpol database on stolen or missing travel documents, in accordance with the relevant provisions of this Decision governing alerts on stolen, misappropriated, lost and invalidated passports entered in SIS.Article 63 deleted Exchange of data on stolen, misappropriated, lost or invalidated passports with Interpol
2017/09/07
Committee: LIBE
Amendment 553 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 65
Right of access, rectification of inaccurate data and erasure of unlawfully stored 1. The right of data subjects to have access to data relating to them entered in SIS and to have such data rectified or erasure shall be exercised in accordance with the law of the Member State before which they invoke that right. 2. If national law so provides, the national supervisory authority shall decide whether information is to be communicated and by what means. 3. A Member State other than that which has issued an alert may communicate information concerning such data only if it first gives the Member State issuing the alert an opportunity to state its position. This shall be done through the exchange of supplementary information. 4. A Member State shall take a decision not to communicate information to the data subject, in whole or in part, in accordance with national law, to the extent that, and for as long as such a partial or complete restriction constitutes a necessary and proportionate measure in a democratic society with due regard for the fundamental rights and legitimate interests of the natural person concerned, in order to: (a) avoid obstructing official or legal inquiries, investigations or procedures; (b) avoid prejudicing the prevention, detection, investigation or prosecution of criminal offences or the execution of criminal penalties; (c) protect public security; (d) protect national security; (e) protect the rights and freedoms of others. 5. Any person has the right to have factually inaccurate data relating to him rectified or unlawfully stored data relating to him erased. 6. The person concerned shall be informed as soon as possible and in any event not later than 60 days from the date on which he applies for access or sooner if national law so provides. 7. The person concerned shall be informed about the follow-up given to the exercise of his rights of rectification and erasure as soon as possible and in any event not later than three months from the date on which he applies for rectification or erasure or sooner if national law so provides.Article 65 deleted data
2017/09/07
Committee: LIBE
Amendment 572 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 69 – paragraph 1
1. The national supervisory authorities and the European Data Protection Supervisor, each acting within the scope of its respective competences, shall actively cooperate with each other within the framework of their responsibilities and shall ensure coordinated supervision of SISin accordance with Article 62 of [New Regulation 45/2001].
2017/09/07
Committee: LIBE
Amendment 573 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 69 – paragraph 2
2. They shall, each acting within the scope of its respective competences, exchange relevant information, assist each other in carrying out audits and inspections, examine difficulties in the interpretation or application of this Regulation and other applicable legal acts of the Union, study problems that are revealed through the exercise of independent supervision or through the exercise of the rights of data subjects, draw up harmonised proposals for joint solutions to any problems and promote awareness of data protection rights, as necessary.deleted
2017/09/07
Committee: LIBE
Amendment 575 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 69 – paragraph 3
3. For the purposes laid down in paragraph 2, the national supervisory authorities and the European Data Protection Supervisor shall meet at least twice a year as part of the European Data Protection Board established by Regulation (EU) 2016/679. The costs and servicing of these meetings shall be borne by the Board established by Regulation (EU) 2016/679. Rules of procedure shall be adopted at the first meeting. Further working methods shall be developed jointly as necessary.deleted
2017/09/07
Committee: LIBE
Amendment 577 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 69 – paragraph 4
4. A joint report of activities as regards coordinated supervision shall be sent by the Board established by Regulation (EU) 2016/679 to the European Parliament, the Council, and the Commission every two years.deleted
2017/09/07
Committee: LIBE