17 Amendments of Paulo RANGEL related to 2015/2344(INI)
Amendment 2 #
Motion for a resolution
Citation 1
Citation 1
– having regard to the Treaty on European Union (TEU), especially Article 3 thereof, which establishes the creation of the single market, whose currency is the euro,
Amendment 19 #
Motion for a resolution
Citation 11
Citation 11
– having regard to its resolution of 102 June 2013 on strengthening European democracy in the future4 , __________________ 4 OJ C 65, 19.2.2016, p. 96. OJ C 65, 19.2.2016, p. 96.
Amendment 32 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital A
Recital A
A. whereas the Treaty on European Union establishes the creation of the single marketcontains the objective, inter alia, to establish an internal market and an economic and monetary union, whose currency is the euro; whereas the European Monetary Union currently consists of 19 members, two of whom have opt-out clauses, the remaining seven EU Member States having yet to join; whereas no financial liability will be incurred by the two countries with opt-outs from EMU in the framework of any fiscal capacity for the euro area;
Amendment 34 #
Draft opinion
Paragraph 3 a (new)
Paragraph 3 a (new)
3a. Points out that a budgetary capacity aiming to provide conditional incentives for structural reforms can be established on the basis of the current Treaties, if need be through enhanced cooperation;
Amendment 36 #
Draft opinion
Paragraph 3 b (new)
Paragraph 3 b (new)
3b. Points out that if a budgetary capacity would aim to provide support for adjustment to asymmetric or symmetric shocks, mechanisms to strengthen economic integration and convergence will need to develop from decentralized national fiscal policies towards further sovereignty sharing within common institutions, with increased democratic control at EU level, implying also a general use of the ordinary legislative procedure where this is not yet the case;
Amendment 37 #
Draft opinion
Paragraph 3 c (new)
Paragraph 3 c (new)
3c. Considers furthermore that in such case the integration of the ESM in the EU legal framework is recommendable and that consideration must be given to the establishment of a Treasury within the Commission to manage and supervise the common resources and policies related to them;
Amendment 207 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 6
Paragraph 6
6. Points out that the crisis has proved that a common monetary policy without a common fiscal policy cannot address asymmetric shocks to the euro area; reiterates that mere coordination of national fiscal policies without credible enforcement mechanisms has not prevented an investment gap, has proved to be insufficient to trigger growth-enhancing, sustainable and socially balanced structural reforms and has not enhanced the national capacity to absorb economic shocks;
Amendment 220 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 7
Paragraph 7
7. Observes that the stabilisation of the economic cycle since the beginning of the crisis has relied almost exclusively on the ECB, and that the reduced options available for monetary policy in a context of zero lower bound rates have led the ECB to implement unconventional monetary policy measures; recalls that the President of the ECB has called for integratedfurther sovereignty sharing within common institutions, for a stronger and proactive fiscal policy on the euro area scale and for euro area Member States to deliver on structural reform;
Amendment 238 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 8
Paragraph 8
8. Acknowledges the results achieved since the crisis broke in terms of risk reduction and better coordination; points in particular to the many measures taken by the EU institutions to address the shortcomings revealed by the crisis by strengthening coordination of national fiscal policies, in particular via the adoption of the Six-Pack and the Two-Pack Regulations; welcomes further the fact that the EU institutions have set up frameworks for action were set up in current and future crises, namely by creating the European Financial Stability Mechanism (EFSM), the temporary European Financial Stabilisation Facility (EFSF) and its permanent successor, the European Stability Mechanism (ESM); underlines, however, that these mechanisms dramatically lack democratic oversight and parliamentary control, and hence ownership;
Amendment 247 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 9
Paragraph 9
9. Recalls that in 2012 the Commission introduced in its ‘Blueprint for a deep and genuine EMU’ the idea of a Convergence and Competitiveness instrument for euro area Member States, whereby euro area Member States could get financial support for ‘reform packages that are agreed and important both for the Member States and for the good functioning of the euro area’, and that this financial support ‘could be set up in principle as part of the EU budget’ and be established by secondary law on the basis of Articles 136 or 352 TFEU, if necessary by enhanced cooperation, and financed by either a commitment on the part of the euro area Member States or a legal obligation to that effect enshrined in the EU’s own resources legislation, with inclusion in the EU budget as ‘assigned revenues’; considers the review by the Commission of the European Semester, including the Structural Reform Support Programme (SRSP), as a follow-up to this approach;
Amendment 287 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 13
Paragraph 13
13. Argues that convergence, good governance and conditionality enforced through institutions being held democratically accountable at the euro-area and/or national level are key, notably to preventing permanent transfers and moral hazard;
Amendment 322 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 15
Paragraph 15
15. Stresses that a fiscal capacity must be created on top of existing EU funding instruments, within ithe Union's legal framework, in order toand ensure consistent development between eEurozone and non-e Eurozone Member States;
Amendment 395 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 19
Paragraph 19
19. Demands that the ESM be integrated into the Union’s legal framework and evolve towards a Community mechanism, as provided for in the ESM Treaty and as constantly requested by the European Parliament and foreseencalled for in the Five Presidents’ report; underlines that the ECJ Pringle case-law and jurisprudence open up the possibility of bringing the ESM within the Union’s framework, within the existing Treaties, on the basis of Article 352 TFEU; calls, therefore, on the Commission to bring forward as a matter of urgency a legislative proposal to that end; demands that the ESM be made fully accountable to the European Parliament;
Amendment 416 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 20
Paragraph 20
20. Calls for the ESM, whilst fulfilling its ongoing tasks, to be further developed and turned into a European Monetary Fund (EMF) with adequate lending and borrowing capacities and a clearly defined mandate, including its contribution to a euro area fiscal capacity; stresses that an EMF should be managed by the Commission and, who is held democratically accountable by the European Parliament; emphasises that national parliaments would be involved in the process, given that their constitutional prerogatives regarding financial resourcethe adoption of budgetary decisions could be affected;
Amendment 431 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 21
Paragraph 21
21. Insists that once it is integrated into Community law, the fiscal capacity for the euro area should be integrated into the EU budget, but over and above the current ceilings of the Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF);
Amendment 758 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 38
Paragraph 38
38. Stresses that the Community method should prevail in the development of economic governance for the euro area; urges that no reinforcement of intergovernmental structures should take place in parallel withaddition to existing structures;
Amendment 778 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 40
Paragraph 40
40. Argues that national ownership could be improved by including national parliaments in the proceduresparliaments have an important role to play in helping improve national ownership; insists, however, that the competences of the EP and the national parliaments conferred upon these institutions by the Treaties should be respected and that mixing of these competences be avoided;