BETA

50 Amendments of Diogo FEIO related to 2012/0242(CNS)

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 4

(4) Competence for supervision of individual banks in the Union remains mostly at national level. This limits the effectiveness of supervision and the ability of supervisors to reach a common understanding of the soundness of the banking sector throughout the Union. In order to preserve and increase the positive effects of market integration on growth and welfare, integration of supervisory responsibilities, through the definition of common principles and policies (methods, processes, practices and standards), should therefore be enhanced.

2012/10/30
Committee: ECON

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 9

(9) A European banking union should therefore be set up, underpinned by a true single rulebook for financial services for the Single Market as a whole and composed of a single supervisory mechanism, and a common deposit insurance and resolution framework. . In view of the close links and interactions between Member States participating in the common currency, the banking union should apply at least ~~to all Euro area Member State~~, in the setting up phase, to Euro area Member States only, in order to assure that the supervisory mechanism model is the most adequate and can be used by all the Union's Members. With a view to maintaining and deepening the internal market, and ~~to the extent that this is~~following the set up of an institutionally ~~possible~~viable solution, the banking union should also be open later on to the participation of other Member States.

2012/10/30
Committee: ECON

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 10

(10) As a first step towards the banking union, a single supervisory mechanism should ensure that the Union's policy relating to the prudential supervision of credit institutions is implemented in a coherent, integrated, articulated and effective way, that the single rulebook for financial services is applied equally to credit institutions in all Member States concerned, and that ~~those~~all its credit institutions are equally subject to supervision of the highest quality, unfettered by other, non- prudential considerations. In particular, the single supervisory mechanism should be consistent with the functioning of the internal market for financial services and with the free movement of capital. A single supervisory mechanism is the basis for the next steps towards the banking union. This reflects the principle that any introduction of common intervention mechanisms in case of crises should be preceded by common controls to reduce the likelihood that intervention mechanisms will have to be used.

2012/10/30
Committee: ECON

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 10 a (new)

(10 a) The implementation of a single rule book for financial services should be concluded as soon as possible, while the common deposit insurance and resolution framework in the Euro area should follow soon after the setting up of the single supervisory mechanism, and with a specified deadline, as they respectively the second and third fundamental pillars, of a true European banking union.

2012/10/30
Committee: ECON

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 10 b (new)

(10 b) The single supervisory mechanism should provide for a single and indivisible common supervisory framework and rule book, applicable equally to all Credit Institutions, independently of their nature, dimension, complexity or interconnectedness. The single supervisory mechanism should be applied in a way that does not allow for any kind of segmentation, qualification or discrimination whatsoever among credit institutions in terms of quality and strictness of prudential supervision.

2012/10/30
Committee: ECON

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 11

(11) As the Euro area's central bank with extensive and widely recognized expertise in macroeconomic and financial stability issues, the ECB is well placed to carry out supervisory tasks with a focus on protecting the stability of Europe's financial system. Indeed in many Member States Central Banks are already responsible for banking supervision. The ECB should therefore be conferred specific tasks concerningwith access to multiple information resources and having maintained its credibility maintained through the recent crisis, the ECB is well placed to setting up the common supervisory framework and rule book with a focus on protecting the stability of Europe's financial system. Specific responsibilities should therefore be conferred on the ECB concerning the definition of principles and policies relating to the prudential supervision of credit institutions within the Euro area.

2012/10/30
Committee: ECON

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 11 a (new)

(11 a) Such definition of principles and policies (methods, processes, practices and standards) falls under the exclusive competence of the ECB and it could never be delegated since it confers on it the role of guardian of prudential supervision's quality, consistency and uniformity.

2012/10/30
Committee: ECON

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 12

(12) The ECB should be conferred all those specific supervisory ~~task~~responsibilities which are crucial to ensure a coherent, integrated, articulated and effective implementation of the Union's policy relating to the prudential supervision of credit institutions, while other ~~task~~responsibilities should remain with national authorities. The ECB's ~~task~~responsibilities should include ~~measures taken in~~the pursuance of macro-prudential stability.

2012/10/30
Committee: ECON

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 13

(13) Safety and soundness of large banks is essential to ensure the stability of the financial system. However, recent experience shows that smaller banks can also pose a threat to financial stability. Therefore, the ECB should be able to exercise its supervisory ~~tasks in relation~~responsibilities in relation, and in an equal manner, to all banks of participating Member States.

2012/10/30
Committee: ECON

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 13 a (new)

(13 a) The ECB may, under its full discretion, delegate to national competent authorities the execution of some tasks concerning prudential supervision while, at the same time, maintaining full responsibility for coordination, monitoring and control of national competent authorities.

2012/10/30
Committee: ECON

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 13 b (new)

(13 b) In case of delegation of any tasks concerning prudential supervision, national competent authorities could be empowered to take decisions relating to the execution of those tasks although within the common supervisory framework and rule book established by the ECB.

2012/10/30
Committee: ECON

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 13 c (new)

(13 c) As a result of this delegation, national competent authorities should be accountable to the ECB. As part of their duties under the common supervisory framework and rule book, national competent authorities should submit regular reports to the ECB.

2012/10/30
Committee: ECON

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 13 d (new)

(13 d) The ECB should monitor and control national competent authorities under the common supervisory framework and rule book on an ongoing basis, making use of the powers referred to in this Regulation as well as of any powers arising out of the normal management process of delegation, such as the power to conduct audits and peer reviews of national competent authorities.

2012/10/30
Committee: ECON

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 13 e (new)

(13 e) In addition to ongoing reporting, national competent authorities should inform the ECB without delay of any serious concerns about the safety and/or soundness of any credit institution, where the stability of the financial system is or is likely to be endangered by the situation of that credit institution, individually or as part of a group of credit institutions.

2012/10/30
Committee: ECON

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 13 f (new)

(13 f) The ECB may, at any moment, decide to take over the direct supervision of any credit institution in a participating Member State, in particular when the national competent authorities fail to perform their duties under this Regulation or when there is evidence that the credit institution, individually or as part of a group of credit institutions, is about to pose a threat to the orderly functioning and integrity of the Union financial market and/or to the stability of the financial system, or to exacerbate a pre- existing threat.

2012/10/30
Committee: ECON

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 13 g (new)

(13 g) The Colleges of Supervision, under the exclusive guidance and control of the ECB, should continue to exist for credit institutions with cross-border activity, for purposes of regular supervision and most particularly for purposes of dealing with a threat to the orderly functioning and integrity of the Union financial market and/or stability of the financial system.

2012/10/30
Committee: ECON

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 13 h (new)

(13 h) Whenever a competent national authority believes that a major supervisory decision from the ECB might have been disproportionate in its impact and involves serious danger for the national economy and/or financial system of the corresponding Member State, the competent national authorities shall warn and have the right to appeal.

2012/10/30
Committee: ECON

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 14

(14) Prior authorisation for taking up the business of credit institutions is a key prudential technique to ensure that only operators with a sound economic basis, an organisation capable of dealing with the specific risks inherent to deposit taking and credit provision, and suitable directors carry out those activities. The ECB should ~~therefore have~~be responsible for the task tof authoriseing credit institutions and ~~should be responsible for the~~ withdraw~~al of~~ing authorisations.

2012/10/30
Committee: ECON

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 15

(15) In addition to the conditions set out in Union l~~egislative acts~~aw for authorisation of credit institutions and the cases for withdrawal of such authorisations, Member States ~~may~~are currently able to provide for further conditions for authorisation and cases for withdrawal of authorisation. The ECB should therefore carry out its task to authorise credit institutions and to withdraw the authorisation in case of non- compliance with national law upon a proposal by the relevant national competent authority, which assesses compliance with the relevant conditions set out by national law.

2012/10/30
Committee: ECON

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 22

(22) Supervisory ~~task~~responsibilities not conferred on the ECB should remain with national authorities. Those tasks should include the power to receive notifications from credit institutions in relation to the right of establishment and the free provision of services, to supervise bodies which are not covered by the definition of credit institutions under Union law but which are supervised as credit institutions under national law, to supervise credit institutions from third countries establishing a branch or providing cross- border services in the Union, to supervise payments services, to carry out day-to-day verifications of credit institutions, to carry out the function of competent authorities over credit institutions in relation to markets in financial instruments and the prevention of the use of the financial system for the purpose of money laundering and terrorist financing.

2012/10/30
Committee: ECON

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 23

(23) The ECB should carry out the ~~task~~responsibilities conferred on it with a view to ensuring the safety and soundness of credit institutions and the stability of the financial system of the Union and the unity and integrity of the Internal Market, thereby ensuring also the protection of depositors and improving the functioning of the Internal Market, in accordance with the single rulebook for financial services in the Union.

2012/10/30
Committee: ECON

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 36

(36) In particular, a supervisory board responsible for preparing decisions on supervisory matters should be set up with the ECB encompassing the specific expertise of national supervisors. The board should therefore be chaired by a Chair and a Vice-Chair elected by the ECB Governing Council and composed, in addition, of representatives from the ECB and from national authorities. In order to allow for an appropriate rotation while ensuring the full independence of the Chair and the Vice-Chair, their term should not exceed five years and should not be renewable. In order to ensure full coordination with the activities of the EBA and with the prudential policies of the Union, the EBA and the European Commission should be observers in the supervisory board. The performance of the supervisory tasks conferred upon the ECB requires the adoption of a large number of technically complex acts and decisions, including decisions on individual credit institutions. In order to effectively carry out those tasks in accordance with the principle of separation from tasks relating to monetary policy, the ECB Governing Council of the ECB should be able to delegate certain clearly defined supervisory tasks and related decisions to the supervisory board, subject to the oversight and responsibility of the Governing Council, which can give instructions and directions to that body. ~~The supervisory board may be supported by a steering committee with a more limited composition.~~

2012/10/30
Committee: ECON

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 44

(44) In order to ensure that credit institutions are subject to supervision of the highest quality, unfettered by other, non- prudential considerations and that the negative mutually reinforcing impacts of market developments concerns banks and Member States is addressed in a timely and effective way, the ECB should start carrying out specific supervisory tasks as soon as possible~~. However, the transfer of supervisory tasks from national supervisors to the ECB requires a certain amount of preparation. Therefore, an appropriate~~, accordingly to a phasing- in p~~eriod should be provided for. The number of banks subject to the supervision of the ECB should increase progressively,~~lan which tak~~ing~~es into account the relevance of the supervision of those banks to ensure financial stability. As a first step the ECB should be able to apply its supervisory tasks to any banks, in particular to banks which have received or requested public financial assistance. As a second step, banks of European systemic importance as reflected in their total exposures and their cross- jurisdictional activities should be covered. Total exposures should be calculated in light of the methodologies defined in the Basel III accord of the Basel Committee on Banking Supervisors on the calculation of the leverage ratio and on the definition of common equity tier 1 capital. The phasing-in process should be completed within one year from the entry into force of this Regulation at the latestamount of preparation required to set up a common supervisory framework and rule book, as well as for the supervisory tasks.

2012/10/30
Committee: ECON

Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1

This Regulation confers on the ECB specific ~~tasks concerning policies relating to the prudential supervision of credit institutions, with a view to~~responsibilities concerning the definition and implementation of supervisory principles and policies (methods, processes, practices and standards) relating to the prudential supervision of credit institutions, with a view to: - develop a single common supervisory framework and rule book applicable equally to all Credit Institutions, independently of their nature, dimension, complexity or interconnectedness; - promoting the safety and soundness of credit institutions and the stability of the financial system, with due regard for the unity and integrity of the internal market, allowing for no segmentation, qualification or discrimination among credit institutions in terms of quality and strictness of prudential supervision.

2012/10/30
Committee: ECON

Proposal for a regulation
Article 3 – title

Cooperation and responsibilities

2012/10/30
Committee: ECON

Proposal for a regulation
Article 3 a (new)

Article 3a Exclusive responsibilities conferred on the ECB The ECB shall, in accordance with the relevant provisions of Union law, be exclusively: - competent to develop a one and indivisible common supervisory framework and rule book, on the basis of principles and policies applicable to all credit institutions equally while ensuring a coherent, integrated, articulated and effective implementation of the Union's prudential supervision policy; - responsible for the coordination, monitoring and control of national competent authorities; - responsible to pursue macro-prudential stability; - responsible to coordinate and express a common position of representatives from competent authorities of the participating Member States when participating in the Board of Supervisors and the Management Board of the European Banking Authority, for issues relating to the responsibilities conferred on the ECB by this Regulation.

2012/10/30
Committee: ECON

Proposal for a regulation
Article 4 – title

Tasks conferred ton the ECB

2012/10/30
Committee: ECON

Proposal for a regulation
Article 4 – paragraph 1 – introductory part

1. The ECB shall, in accordance with the relevant provisions of Union law~~, be exclusively~~ and with its internal regulation, be competent to carry out, for prudential supervisory purposes, the following tasks in relation to all credit institutions established in the participating Member States, in a equal manner:

2012/10/30
Committee: ECON

Proposal for a regulation
Article 4 – paragraph 1 – point j

(j) To participate in supplementary supervision of a financial conglomerate in relation to the credit institutions included in it and assume the ~~tasks~~responsibility of a coordinator where the ECB is appointed as the coordinator for a financial conglomerate in accordance with the criteria set out relevant Union law;

2012/10/30
Committee: ECON

Proposal for a regulation
Article 4 – paragraph 4

4. This regulation is without prejudice to the responsibilities and related powers of the competent authorities of the participating Member States to carry out supervisory ~~task~~responsibilities not referred to in this Regulation.

2012/10/30
Committee: ECON

Proposal for a regulation
Article 5 – paragraph 1

1. The ECB shall ~~carry out~~pursue its tasks within a single supervisory mechanism composed of the ECB and national competent authorities.

2012/10/30
Committee: ECON

Proposal for a regulation
Article 5 – paragraph 1 a (new)

1a. The ECB may, under its internal regulation, delegate on national competent authorities some of the tasks set out in Article 4(1) concerning prudential supervision.

2012/10/30
Committee: ECON

Proposal for a regulation
Article 5 – paragraph 2

2. National competent authorities shall assist the ECB on its request with the preparation and implementation of any acts ~~relating to the tasks referred to~~falling under its competence, and execute at national level the delegated powers referred to by its internal regulation as mentioned in Article 4(1).

2012/10/30
Committee: ECON

Proposal for a regulation
Article 5 – paragraph 3

3. The ECB shall organise, according to its internal regulation, the practical modalities of implementation of paragraph 2 by the national supervisory authorities in discharging its tasks~~. It shall clearly define the framework and conditions under which national competent authorities shall carry out those activities~~, while at the same time, maintaining full responsibility for coordination, monitoring and control of national competent authorities. National competent authorities shall carry out those tasks within the context of the common supervisory framework and rule book. The national competent authorities of all participating Member States shall be treated on an equal footing.

2012/10/30
Committee: ECON

Proposal for a regulation
Article 5 – paragraph 4

4. National competent authorities shall follow the instructions given by and be accountable to the ECB.

2012/10/30
Committee: ECON

Proposal for a regulation
Article 5 a (new)

Article 5 a Monitoring and right of intervention 1. The ECB shall monitor and control national competent authorities under the common supervisory framework and rule book on an ongoing basis, making use of the powers referred to in this Regulation as well as of any powers arising out of the normal management process of delegation, such as the power to conduct audits and peer reviews of national competent authorities. 2. National competent authorities shall inform the ECB without delay in the following cases: (a) where there are serious concerns about the safety and/or soundness of any credit institution, where the stability of the financial system is or is likely to be endangered by the situation of that credit institution; (b) where the stability of the financial system is or is likely to be endangered by the situation of that credit institution, individually or as part of a group of credit institutions. 3. The ECB may, at any moment, decide to take over the direct supervision of any credit institution in a participating Member State in the following cases: (a) where the national competent authorities fail to perform their duties under this Regulation; (b) where there is evidence that the credit institution, individually or as part of a group of credit institutions, is about to pose a threat to the orderly functioning and integrity of the Union financial market and/or to the stability of the financial system, or to exacerbate a pre- existing threat; 4. The decision to which paragraph 3 refers shall be notified to the national competent authority and to the credit institution concerned. 5. When the ECB takes a major supervisory decision with a disproportionate impact and which may seriously endanger the national economy and/or financial stability of a Euro area Member State, the respective competent national authority shall warn and have the right to appeal against such decision.

2012/10/30
Committee: ECON

Proposal for a regulation
Article 14 – paragraph -1 (new)

-1. The existence of Colleges of Supervision, under the exclusive guidance and control of the ECB, shall continue to exist for credit institutions with cross- border activity, for the purposes of regular supervision and most particularly for the purposes of dealing with a threat to the orderly functioning and integrity of the Union financial market and/or stability of the financial system.

2012/10/30
Committee: ECON

Proposal for a regulation
Article 15 – paragraph 1

1. For the purpose of carrying out the tasks conferred upon it by this Regulation, where credit institutions, financial holding companies, or mixed financial holding companies, intentionally or negligibly, breach a requirement under directly applicable Union acts in relation to which administrative pecuniary sanctions shall be available to competent authorities under Union law, the ECB may impose administrative pecuniary sanctions of up to twice the amount of the profits gained or losses avoided because of the breach where those can be determined, or up to 105% of the total annual turnover of a legal person in the preceding business year. The sanctions shall be apply using the principle of proportionality and they shall guarantee that the institution is not placed in a scenario that might threaten its stability.

2012/10/30
Committee: ECON

Proposal for a regulation
Article 15 – paragraph 1 a (new)

1a. The upper limit of the administrative pecuniary sanctions applied to an institution, in a one year period, is of up to 5% of the annual turnover of a legal person in the preceding business year.

2012/10/30
Committee: ECON

Proposal for a regulation
Article 15 – paragraph 6

6. The ECB shall publish any sanction referred to paragraph 1 without undue delay including information on the type and nature of the breach and the identity of persons responsible for it, unless such publication would seriously jeopardise the stability of the financial markets. ~~Where publication would cause a disproportionate damage to the parties involved, the ECB shall publish the sanction on an anonymous basis.~~

2012/10/30
Committee: ECON

Proposal for a regulation
Article 15 – paragraph 7 a (new)

7a. A credit institutions, financial holding company, or mixed financial holding company shall have the right to appeal to the European Court of Justice when it considers that the pecuniary sanction applied to it is disproportionate and likely to affect its sustainability.

2012/10/30
Committee: ECON

Proposal for a regulation
Article 19 – paragraph 1

1. The ~~planning and execution of the~~Governing Council is the ultimate responsible for the development and implementation of a common supervisory framework and rule book as well as for the supervisory tasks conferred upon the ECB~~, shall be undertaken by~~. The Governing Council may delegate the responsibilities and tasks under Article 4 and paragraph 1 of Article 4a, on an internal body composed of four representatives of the ECB appointed by the Executive Board of the ECB and one representative of the national authority competent for the supervision of credit institutions in each participating Member State (hereinafter ‘"supervisory board’").

2012/10/30
Committee: ECON

Proposal for a regulation
Article 19 – paragraph 3

3. The Governing Council of the ECB may delegate clearly defined supervisory tasks and related decisions regarding individual or a set of identifiable credit institutions, financial holding companies or mixed financial holding companies to the supervisory board, subject to the oversight and responsibility of the Governing Council.deleted

2012/10/30
Committee: ECON

Proposal for a regulation
Article 19 – paragraph 4

~~4. The supervisory board may appoint from among its members a steering committee with a more limited composition which supports its activities, including preparing the meetings.~~deleted

2012/10/30
Committee: ECON

Proposal for a regulation
Article 19 – paragraph 7

7. The Governing Council, in accordance with its rules of procedure and voting mechanism shall adopt the rules of procedure of the supervisory board including rules on the term of office of the Chair and the Vice-Chair. Each Member of the Supervisory Board shall have one vote. The term of office shall not exceed five years and shall not be renewable.

2012/10/30
Committee: ECON

Proposal for a regulation
Article 24 – paragraph 1

1. The ECB shall levy fees on credit institutions which shall ~~cover expenditures relating to its tasks, and not exceed those expenditures~~be proportionate and which shall not amount to a duplication of fees paid to the national supervisor and to the ECB.

2012/10/30
Committee: ECON

Proposal for a regulation
Article 27 – paragraph 1

1. From the 1st of Julanuary 2013, the ECB shall carry out the supervisory tasks conferred on it also in relation to the most significant credit institutions, financial holding companies and mixed financial holding companies of European systemic importance at the highest level of consolidation, based on their size as reflected in, the sum of exposure values of all assets and off-balance sheet liabilities not deducted when determining the common equity tier 1 capital for regulatory purposes, and their cross- border activity as reflected in cross- jurisdictional claims such as deposits and other assets in respect of customers or other financial operators located in another country and cross-jurisdictional liabilities such as loans and notes in respect of customers or other financial operators located in another country, which together cover at least half of the banking sector in the Euro area as a whole, on 1 January 2013. The ECB shall adopt and make public the list of those institutions before 1 March 2013by this Regulation.

2012/10/30
Committee: ECON

Proposal for a regulation
Article 27 – paragraph 2

2. The ECB shall assume in full the tasks conferred on it by this regulation on the 1 January 2014 at ~~latest~~the earliest, in accordance with a phasing-in plan which takes into account the amount of preparation required to set up a common supervisory framework and rule book, as well as for the supervisory tasks.

2012/10/30
Committee: ECON

Proposal for a regulation
Article 27 – paragraph 3

3. Before 1 January 2014 the ECB may, by a decision addressed to the credit institution, financial holding company or mixed financial holding company and the national competent authority of the participating Member States concerned, start carrying out the tasks conferred on it by this Regulation, in particular where a credit institution, financial holding company or mixed financial holding company has received or requested public financial assistance.deleted

2012/10/30
Committee: ECON

Proposal for a regulation
Article 27 – paragraph 4

4. From the entry into force of this Regulation, in view of the assumption of its tasks ~~in accordance with paragraph 1 to 3~~, the ECB may require the competent authorities of the participating Member States and the persons referred to in Article 9 to provide all relevant information for the ECB to carry out a comprehensive assessment of the credit institutions of the participating Member State. The credit institution and the competent authority shall supply the information requested.

2012/10/30
Committee: ECON