BETA

Activities of Burkhard BALZ related to 2015/2221(INI)

Plenary speeches (2)

Banking Union - Annual report 2015 (debate) DE
2016/11/22
Dossiers: 2015/2221(INI)
Banking Union - Annual report 2015 (debate) DE
2016/11/22
Dossiers: 2015/2221(INI)

Amendments (28)

Amendment 8 #
Motion for a resolution
Citation 11 a (new)
– having regard to the European Systemic Risk Board report on the regulatory treatment of sovereign exposures of March 2015,
2015/12/14
Committee: ECON
Amendment 11 #
Motion for a resolution
Citation 12 a (new)
– having regard to its resolution of ...1 a on Stocktaking and challenges of the EU Financial Services Regulation: impact and the way forward towards a more efficient and effective EU framework for Financial Regulation and a Capital Markets (2015/2106(INI)), __________________ 1a Please insert date of plenary adoption of 2015/2106 (INI)
2015/12/14
Committee: ECON
Amendment 15 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital A
A. whereas the Banking Union (BU) is an indispensable component of a monetary union and a fundamental building block of a gessential part of a genuine economic and monetary union (EMU), in particular by contributing to financial stability and a risk-based regulation of the banking sector and by strengthenuine economic and monetary union (EMU)g the resolvability of banks to prevent the use of taxpayers' money in case of bank failures;
2015/12/14
Committee: ECON
Amendment 25 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital B
B. whereas the BU is instrumental to ensuring stability and restoring confidence in euro area banks, enhancing financial integration, fostering risk sharing within the monetary union and a substantial risk reduction in the European banking system and contributing to breaking the link between sovereigns and banks at national level;
2015/12/14
Committee: ECON
Amendment 33 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital C
C. whereas in a BU a Single Rulebook must be complementthe development of a Single Rulebook is fostered by a Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM), a Single Resolution Mechanism (SRM) and a common deposit guarantee scheme (DGS), and should be provided with an efficient fiscal backstop at EU levelhigh and uniform level of protection of covered deposits;
2015/12/14
Committee: ECON
Amendment 37 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital D
D. whereas the SSM is the first pillar of the BU and aims to ensure a uniform and homogeneous supervision of euro area banklarge banks of participating Member States, create a level playing field in the banking market, and contribute to the safety and soundness of credit institutions and the stability of the financial system and respect the diversity of credit institutions and their business models in the European banking sector;
2015/12/14
Committee: ECON
Amendment 52 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital F
F. whereas a commonthe system of DGSs, originally intendconsidered as the third pillar of the BU, so far consists only in an approximation of national DGSs, while ait is important to fully enforce the existing common DGSrules that is able to ensure the same level of protection for deposits, irrespective of their location, is a necessary component of a true BUwill ensure a high and uniform level of protection for covered deposits; whereas any future legislative steps will be subject to the co-legislators' decision;
2015/12/14
Committee: ECON
Amendment 78 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 2 – point b
(b) the drafting, building on national best practices, of the Supervisory Manual, which should be made public, laying down common processes, procedures and methods for conducting a euro-wide supervisory review process;
2015/12/14
Committee: ECON
Amendment 82 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 2 – point e
(e) the processes devised to work off the common procedures (authorisation of qualifying holdings, licensing, passporting, fit and proper assessments);
2015/12/14
Committee: ECON
Amendment 99 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 6
6. Emphasises the need to avoid double reporting requirements and multiple reporting channels, and more generally an unnecessary and disproportionate administrative burden on credit institutions, in particular smalleron primarily nationally supervised banks;
2015/12/14
Committee: ECON
Amendment 124 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 9
9. Underlines that economic recovery is underway but is still fragile and modest, inflation remains below its target, credit dynamics are still subdued in many jurisdictions, while tangible improvements could be observed here in the recent past, and a large stock of non- performing loans weighs on many European banks’ balance sheets, limiting their capacity to finance the economy;
2015/12/14
Committee: ECON
Amendment 200 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 21
21. Believes that the ECB’s supervisory strategy, while avoiding any differentiation along national lines, should reflect and safeguard pluralism of banking models across the EU, and comply with the principle of proportionality;
2015/12/14
Committee: ECON
Amendment 217 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 24 a (new)
24a. Highlights the necessity to ensure that the ECB and SSM fully comply with the obligation to strictly separate the supervisory tasks from the monetary policy function; recalls that SSM tasks and operations shall neither interfere with, nor be determined by, the ECB tasks relating to monetary policy;
2015/12/14
Committee: ECON
Amendment 246 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 28
28. Encourages the conclusion of a memorandum of understanding (MoU) on mutual cooperation and data sharing between the SRB and the ECB as single supervisor, in order to increase efficiency and avoid double reporting for banks, while allowing the SRB to have access to therelevant SSM data necessary to fulfil its institutional mandate;
2015/12/14
Committee: ECON
Amendment 252 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 33
33. Calls for timely progress in drawing up resolution plans and the setting of a binding and sufficiently high minimum requirement for own funds and eligible liabilities (MREL) for institutions in the scope of the SRM, in order to be able to ensure an orderly resolution of failing banks with a minimum impact on the real economy and public finances; calls on the Commission to swiftly adopt the regulatory technical standard on MREL with a standard of at least 8% MREL for all SRB banks;
2015/12/14
Committee: ECON
Amendment 256 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 33 a (new)
33a. Highlights the importance of a full implementation and enforcement of the bail-in principle; calls on the Commission to present proposals to further reduce the legal risks of claims under the no- creditor-worse-off-principle;
2015/12/14
Committee: ECON
Amendment 259 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 33 b (new)
33b. Points to the necessity to analyse whether the SRB and the National Resolution Authorities are equipped with sufficient early intervention powers and sufficient early intervention instruments; calls for a thorough assessment to evaluate whether and to which extent the SRB and the National Resolution Authorities need additional tools and additional powers in order to ensure a timely invention and a use of their competences which comes early enough to contain outflows and hence prevent the haemorrhaging of banks;
2015/12/14
Committee: ECON
Amendment 271 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 35
35. Calls on Member States to fully and swiftly implement the Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive (BRRD) and the intergovernmental agreement (IGA) on transfer and mutualisation of contributions to the Single Resolution Fund; regretcalls the decision to set up the fund through an IGA rather than through Union law;
2015/12/14
Committee: ECON
Amendment 274 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 35 a (new)
35a. Calls on Member States to collect the BRRD and SRM-related contributions fully, effectively and in a timely manner at the national level in order to transfer them to the SRF in accordance with the IGA;
2015/12/14
Committee: ECON
Amendment 290 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 36
36. Stresses the need, as a consequence of the existence of the national compartments in the SRF, to rapidly put in place an adequate bridge financing mechanism in order to provide the fund, if necessary, with sufficient resources in the period before its completion; recalls that the Eurogroup and the Ecofin ministers identified, in their statement of 18 December 2013, the possibility of having recourse to botheither to national sources and, backed by bank levies, or to the European Stability Mechanism (ESM), and considers the latter the most effective and credible solution, which could be implemented either through a swift revision of the ESM treaty or through appropriate implementation of the provisions of Article 13 thereof in accordance with the agreed procedures;
2015/12/14
Committee: ECON
Amendment 298 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 37
37. Welcomes, nonetheless, the progress made so far in securing public bridge financing to help ensure the availability of funds for concrete resolution through national resources; underlines, however, that the specificities of the arrangements currently being discussed (uncommitted credit lines, prior national approval, staggered payments) may reduce the usefulness of public bridge financing;
2015/12/14
Committee: ECON
Amendment 300 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 37 a (new)
37a. Stresses the necessity to substantially and continuously reduce risks in the banking sector, and reiterates the necessity to enforce the liability principle whereby risk takers remain liable for their risk-taking;
2015/12/14
Committee: ECON
Amendment 301 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 37 b (new)
37b. Believes that steps towards a risk- based treatment of sovereign exposures should be carefully and thoroughly assessed and welcomes the work of the ESRB and BCBS in this regard;
2015/12/14
Committee: ECON
Amendment 304 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 38
38. RecallNotes that the credibility of the BU, and in particular of bail-in and single resolution provisions, requires a common backstop in order to be able to suppcommon backstop to the SRF may be developed at a later stage during the transitional period to facilitate borrowings by the SRF, if necessary; underlines that the banking sector should remain liable fort the SRF, if necessary, beyond its capacity of EUR 55 billion, and considers that its setting-up should start swiftly and be based on the ESMrepayment by bank levies in all participating Member States, including ex-post; highlights that any common backstop has to be fiscally neutral over the medium term to protect taxpayers;
2015/12/14
Committee: ECON
Amendment 326 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 39
39. Underlines that, together with the SSM and the SRM, the capacity to afford the samea high and uniform level of protection to deposits, irrespective of their location, is an indispensable component for completing thshould be ensured in an effective BU;
2015/12/14
Committee: ECON
Amendment 337 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 40
40. Welcomes the Commission’s announcement regarding the presentation of a legislative proposal for the first steps towards a European Deposit Insurance Scheme (EDIS) by establishing a reinsurance mechanism at EU level forIs astonished about the Commission’s proposal for the first steps towards a European Deposit Insurance Scheme (EDIS), in the view of recently adopted legislation which, as determined by the co-legislators, sets the ndational deposit guarantee schemese for review of the present instruments to 2019;
2015/12/14
Committee: ECON
Amendment 356 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 40 a (new)
40a. Points to the Commission Communication of 24 November 2015 "Towards the completion of the Banking Union", in particular on the emphasis on further reducing risks in the banking sector and breaking the link between banks and sovereigns;
2015/12/14
Committee: ECON
Amendment 361 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 40 b (new)
40b. Calls on the Commission to present comprehensive proposals in 2016 on measures aiming at a further risk reduction in the banking sector; points to the announcement of the Commission in the Communication "Towards the Completion of the Banking Union" that the adequacy of the prudential treatment of banks' exposures to sovereign risk should be reconsidered;
2015/12/14
Committee: ECON