9 Amendments of Burkhard BALZ related to 2015/2344(INI)
Amendment 69 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital E
Recital E
E. whereas it became apparent during the sovereign debt crisis that the European Treaties do not provide the euro area with the instruments to deal effectively with shocks; countries which did not comply with the fiscal rules of the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP), which did not budget responsibly but triggered large budget deficits through high spending and had postponed relevant reforms of their labour markets and public administration, were more vulnerable and could not effectively handle economic shocks; whereas it became apparent that the lack of responsibility of one Member of the euro area is a risk for the euro area as a whole, meaning that one country not adhering to the rules can affect the economy of all Member States of the Union; whereas the currency union is only as strong as its Members, which requires all participating countries to respect economic and financial rules at national level and at the same time to strengthen their economies in their own interest and in that of the whole euro area, thus guaranteeing the well-being of all citizens in the long-term, as the consequences of irresponsible policies at national level have to be borne by the Union as a whole;
Amendment 167 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 4
Paragraph 4
4. Stresses that the introduction of the euro as a common currency has eliminated tried and tested policy options for counterbalancing asymmetric shocks such as exchange rate fluctuafluctuation risks, exchange costs as well as risks and lack of transparency in cross- border transactions; reiteratstresses that the relinquishing of autonomy over monetary policy therefore requires alternative adjustment mechbenefits of the euro are interconnected, as economic stability creates trust and credibility, reduces uncertainty for businesses and encourages companismes to cope with asymmetric macroeconomic shocks in order to make the euro zone an optimal currency area able, inter alia, to implement a proper policy mixinvest, creates more employment and better-quality jobs for citizens and allows for long-term planning of governments; stresses that the need for convergence and competitiveness are conditions for the functionality of a common currency area, since a country cannot restore its competitiveness in a sustainable manner by simply devaluating its currency;
Amendment 179 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 5
Paragraph 5
5. Considers that EMU exposed its vulnerability in the context of the global financial and economic crisis when unsustainable imbalancthe causes of the sovereign debt crisis were mainly unsustainable levels of public and private debt, lack of competitiveness and proper regulation in the banking and financial sectors; underlines, triggered by capital flows fhat high levels of debt limited the space of manoeuvre for eurom core euro area nations to the periphery and a rising public spending ratio in some Member States, aggravated and led to a sovereuntries and led to an increase in financing costs, which impeded the repayment of debt at maturity; stresses that high costs of servicing debt due to high interest rates were too big of a burden given the overall debt level of some euro countries; whereas too hignh debt crisis, in which government borrowing costs dramatically increased in some Member States, jeopardising, in the absence of a proper fiscal backstop, the merelevels entail high interest rates which have to be served instead of being able to invest in growth enhancing measures, social spending, healthcare and education; whereas the causes of the crises differed in existence of thet among euro area Member States;
Amendment 214 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 7
Paragraph 7
7. Observes that the stabilisation of the economic cycle since the beginning of the crisis has relied almost exclusively onRecalls first and foremost that the primary objective of the ECB is to maintain price stability, laid down in Article 127 (1) TFEU, and thereby contributing to the achievement of the objectives of the Union as laid down in Article 3 TEU; recalls that the ECB, and that the reduced options available for monetary policy in a context of zero lower bound rates have led the ECB to implement unconventional monetary policy measuresims at inflation rates of below, but close to, 2% over the medium term; recalls that when inflation rates dropped below 0% in December 2014, the ECB acted by introducing its asset purchase programme in 2015, in addition to fighting possible deflation and slowing growth by reducing the three key interest rates, which had the collateral effect of slightly increasing growth; stresses that the ECB pursued its mandate of price stability with the instruments defined in the Treaties to tackle weak growth and low inflation in the euro area, making use of all instruments at its disposal to steer inflation closer to 2%; recalls that the President of the ECB has called for integrated institutions, for a stronger and proactive fiscal policy on the euro area scale and for euro area Member States to deliver on structural reforms to improve the resilience and competitiveness of their economies, pursuing growth enhancing policies while at the same time pursuing fiscal consolidation and budget discipline;
Amendment 242 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 9
Paragraph 9
9. Recalls that in 2012 the Commission introduced in its ‘Blueprint for a deep and genuine EMU’ the idea of a Convergence and Competitiveness instrument for euro area Member States,Instrument (CCI) for euro area Member States, whereby ‘the implementation of structural reforms in the euro area Member States would be facilitated by the set-up of contractual arrangements to be agreed between them and the Commission’, building on the existing EU surveillance framework and the CSRs; states further that ‘by promoting structural reforms that enhance the adjustment capacity of a Member State the CCI would improve the economy’s capacity to absorb asymmetric shocks through enhancing market functioning’; whereby euro area Member States could get financial support for ‘reform packages that are agreed and important both for the Member States and for the good functioning of the euro areaEMU’, and that this financial support ‘could be set up in principle as part of the EU budget’ and be established by secondary law on the basis of Article 136 or alternatively Article 352 TFEU and financed by either a commitment on the part of the euro area Member States or a legal obligation to that effect enshrined in the EU’s own resources legislation as ‘assigned revenues’; considers the review by the Commission of the European Semester, including the Structural Reform Support Programme (SRSP), as a follow-up to this approach; demands from the European Commission to reflect upon further measures to improve the implementation rate of CSRs, as currently only 4% of CSRs are fully implemented while nearly half of the recommendations have not been implemented at all or only in a limited manner due to the non-binding character of CSRs, and should be followed up within the European Semester;
Amendment 267 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 12
Paragraph 12
12. BelievStresses that in order to regain trust, the euro must deliver on its promise of stability, convergence, growth and jobs; regards a fiscal capacity as a vital element in this entthe introduction of the euro led to closer economic and monetary cooperation that allowed the internal market to develop further, for the whole European economy to perform better, bringing more jobs and greater prosperity for European citizens benefiting individuals, businesses and whole economies in the euro area, including greater choice and stable prices for consumers and citizens, greater security and more opportunities for businesses and markets, promoting trade and investment, improving economic stability and growth, more integrated financial markets and stronger priese, which can be successful only if solidarity is closely linked tnce for the EU in the global economy; underlines that the single currency brings new strengths and opportunities arising from integration and scale of the euro aresponsibilita economy, meanaking that financial support is provided on the basis of clear criteria; e single market more efficient and doing business in the euro area more cost-effective and less risky; stresses that the euro remains an attractive reserve currency for third countries and a trustworthy currency for new Member States, which was proven by the fact that, despite the economic crisis, several countries recently decided to join the euro area: Cyprus and Malta in 2008, Slovakia in 2009, Estonia in 2011, Latvia in 2014 and Lithuania in 2015;
Amendment 329 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 16
Paragraph 16
16. Points out that effective stabilisation of large euro area Member States or a group of closely economically intertwined countries requires sufficient resources; more resources than a fiscal capacity could provide, thus it is too small to address shocks of this dimension and will not be able to rescue large euro area Member States, just as little as the ESM would be on its own merits; stresses that Member States are responsible for servicing their own debt and that the fiscal capacity should not have the task of rescuing euro countries in difficulties, which is explicitly forbidden by Article 125 TFEU; adds that the scope of any potential fiscal capacity should be to increase the competitiveness and resilience of an economy, therefore limit the extent of shocks that hit the economy and prevent future crises;
Amendment 450 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 22 a (new)
Paragraph 22 a (new)
22a. Emphasises that the current design of the EMU foresees the prohibition of monetary financing (Article 123 TFEU), the prohibition of privileged access to financial institutions (Article 124 TFEU), the no-bail-out clause (Article 125 TFEU), the fiscal provisions to avoid excessive government deficits (Article 126 TFEU, including the excessive deficit procedure), and the Stability and Growth Pact (secondary legislation based on Articles 121 and 126 TFEU) and any fiscal capacity should be set up under the current Treaty framework;
Amendment 612 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 29
Paragraph 29
29. Notes that the two models for the shock absorption function are featured most promshocks in the euro area are of a less asymmetric nature than assumed, but rather symmetric with a high correlation of business cycles of euro area Member States and stronger differences in the intensity of the business cycles, some countries experiencing more intently ise boom-bust cycles than othe academic literature: a Rainy Day Fund and a European Unemployment Benefit Schemers; stresses that countries with high levels of debt, high liabilities in the banking sector or countries that postponed the transposition of relevant reforms, were hit harder by the crisis and recover more slowly; concludes that in this case a European Unemployment Benefit Scheme creates at the same time an economic and a political problem, by forcing Member States in recession to transfer resources to Member States experiencing stronger recessions; notes that these developments have led to an increase of euro-sceptics and the emergence of right-wing parties in the recent past and should be avoided;