Activities of Sylvie GOULARD related to 2015/2344(INI)
Shadow opinions (1)
OPINION on budgetary capacity for the Eurozone
Amendments (55)
Amendment 1 #
Draft opinion
Paragraph -1 (new)
Paragraph -1 (new)
-1. Recalls that, although still a young currency and despite having experienced a serious crisis over recent years, the euro is solidly established as a global reserve currency;
Amendment 3 #
Draft opinion
Paragraph 1
Paragraph 1
1. Believes, however, that the crisis enhanced the need for improvement in EU economic governance and that the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) must be progressively completed; considers that public confidence will only be rebuilt through the development of a progressive and comprehensive roadmap; calls for this roadmap to be urgently established;
Amendment 11 #
Draft opinion
Paragraph 1 a (new)
Paragraph 1 a (new)
1a. Recalls that 26 Member States are committed to joining the euro area and that in the Treaties the euro is recognised as the currency of the economic and monetary union (article 3(4) TEU); underlines that this single currency is the reason for the current single institutional framework which means that all MEPs, Commissioners and European judges participate fully in decisions concerning the euro area;
Amendment 18 #
Motion for a resolution
Citation 9
Citation 9
– having regard to Regulation (EU) No 472/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 May 2013 on the strengthening of economic and budgetary surveillance of Member States in the euro area experiencing or threatened with serious difficulties with respect to their financial stability, Regulation (EU) No 473/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 May 2013 on common provisions for monitoring and assessing draft budgetary plans and ensuring the correction of excessive deficit of the Member States in the euro area, Regulation (EU) no 1173/2011 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 November 2011 on the effective enforcement of budgetary surveillance in the euro area, Regulation 1174/2011 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 November 2011 on enforcement measures to correct excessive macroeconomic imbalances in the euro area, Regulation (EU) no 1175/2011 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 November 2011 amending Council Regulation (EC) No 1466/97 on the strengthening of the surveillance of budgetary positions and the surveillance and coordination of economic policies, Regulation 1176/2011 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 November 2011 on the prevention and correction of macroeconomic imbalances, Regulation (EU) no 1177/2011 of 8 November 2011 amending Regulation (EC) No 1467/97 on speeding up and clarifying the implementation of the excessive deficit procedure;
Amendment 25 #
Draft opinion
Paragraph 3
Paragraph 3
3. Takes note of different proposals for this purpose, with different designs and assigning different functions; points out that some options are possible under the current Treaties, whereas others would require Treaty change; stresses the importance of examining this issue from a holistic perspective - a budgetary capacity of the euro area is a tool which can complement others, notably a greater focus on convergence, or the completion of the Single Market, in order to reinforce both the euro area and the European Union - as an isolated measure it cannot be a panacea;
Amendment 34 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital A
Recital A
A. whereas the Treaty on European Union establishes the creation of the single market, whose currency is the euro; whereas the European Monetary Union referred to in TEU article 3.4 currently consists of 19 members, two of whom having the Euro, two members haveing opt-out clauses, and the remaining seven EU Member States having yetbound to join; whereas no financial liability will be incurred by the two countries with opt-outs from EMU in the framework of any fiscal capacity for the euro area;
Amendment 38 #
Draft opinion
Paragraph 4
Paragraph 4
Amendment 47 #
Draft opinion
Paragraph 5
Paragraph 5
5. Points out that, pursuant to Article 311 TFEU, it is possible to raise the own resources ceilings, to establish new categories of own resources (even if only from a limited number of Member States) and to assign certain revenue to finance specific items of expenditure, as provided for in Article 21 of the Financial Rules1 ; believes that the best option would be to generate own resources specifically linked to the euro area, in order to avoiding mixing the budget of the EU 28 and the budget of the euro area, which each have different goals; __________________ 1 Regulation (EU, Euratom) No 966/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 October 2012 on the financial rules applicable to the general budget of the Union and repealing Council Regulation (EC, Euratom) No 1605/2002.
Amendment 69 #
Draft opinion
Paragraph 8
Paragraph 8
8. Recalls that the protocols on the application of the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality and on the role of national parliaments offer ample opportunities for national parliaments’ involvement in this respect; states that responsibilities must be assigned at the level where decisions are taken or implemented, with national parliaments scrutinising national governments and the European Parliament scrutinising the European executives; believes that this is the only way to ensure the required increased accountability of decision- making;
Amendment 71 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital E
Recital E
E. whereas it became apparent during the sovereign debt crisis that the European Treaties do not provide the euro area with the instruments to deal effectively with shocks; whereas the rules-based system, with loose adherence to the rules by the Member States, and mere coordination of national economic policies failed to provide the required resilience during the crisis;
Amendment 74 #
Draft opinion
Paragraph 8 a (new)
Paragraph 8 a (new)
8a. Stresses that using own resources specifically linked to the euro area would ensure the necessary clarity, transparency and democratic legitimacy concerning control and accountability, as these resources would be generated and controlled at the European level;
Amendment 79 #
Draft opinion
Paragraph 9
Paragraph 9
9. Believes that non-eurozone Member States should be involved, if they so desire, although in a differentiated way, and with no decision-making capacity, and depending on the design of the budgetary capacity.;
Amendment 82 #
Draft opinion
Paragraph 9 a (new)
Paragraph 9 a (new)
9a. Considers it essential to differentiate between discussion concerning policies for the euro area and related decision making; modalities must be found to allow all Member State who are committed to joining the euro area to participate in discussions concerning the euro area, if they so wish, however only Member States who are members of the euro area and contribute to rescue funds and the budgetary capacity should be able to vote on these decisions;
Amendment 84 #
Draft opinion
Paragraph 9 b (new)
Paragraph 9 b (new)
9b. Considers that, in parallel to the euro area decision-making body within the European Parliament, it will also be essential to foresee an equivalent decision-making structure within the Council of Ministers; suggests that the Euro Group could be the appropriate formation, with its accountability improved;
Amendment 85 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital F a (new)
Recital F a (new)
Fa. whereas the Euro acted as a shield during the financial crisis and whereas many Member States would have experienced a worse situation without it; whereas improvements are however required for the Euro to really meet its promises and potential;
Amendment 85 #
Draft opinion
Paragraph 9 c (new)
Paragraph 9 c (new)
9c. Believes that a clearly defined role for the European Court of Justice will be crucial in order to guarantee fairness and efficiency in the implementation of the new framework;
Amendment 86 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital F b (new)
Recital F b (new)
Fb. whereas any budgetary capacity for the euro area should not be seen independently from the other necessary evolutions required for the euro area to be an optimal currency area, nor from other tools that already exist (inter alia EIB/EIF), nor from existing rules;
Amendment 86 #
Draft opinion
Paragraph 9 d (new)
Paragraph 9 d (new)
9d. Underlines that improvements of the euro area can already be implemented under the current Treaties; considers, however, that Treaty revision or an ad- hoc euro area Treaty should not be excluded; recalls that recourse to an intergovernmental agreement was the option chosen for the UK settlement; considers that the current single institutional framework is no longer justified; considers that any evolution would need to respect the "Community" framework and its spirit, for example maintaining the existing institutions but modifying their structure to reflect the new reality rather than creating new ones, as much as possible;
Amendment 104 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital H
Recital H
H. whereas the Community method was abandoned in favour of intergovernmental agreements in order to allow for rapid responses in the crisis; whereas this has made the European Council the leading actor in the crisis, while the European Parliament and its national counterparts have been side-lined and the European Commission relegated to a role of secretariat of the European Council;
Amendment 154 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 3
Paragraph 3
3. Considers, against this background, that shortcomings have existed in the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) since its inception under the Maastricht Treaty with the attribution of monetary policy to the European level, while budgetary policy remains within the competencies of the Member States and is only framed by provisions on light coordination of national policies; recalls that the Stability and Growth Pact is a necessary set of rules allowing Member States to share a single currency but is not, per se, a European economic policy;
Amendment 171 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 4
Paragraph 4
4. Stresses that the introduction of the euro as a common currency has eliminated tried and tested policy options for counterbalancing asymmetric shocks such as exchange rate devaluation; acknowledges that the Euro in itself is a shield against exchange rate fluctuations; reiterates that the relinquishing of autonomy over monetary policy therefore requires alternative adjustment mechanisms to cope with asymmetric macroeconomic shocks in order to make the euro zone an optimal currency area able, inter alia, to implement a proper policy mix;
Amendment 203 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 6
Paragraph 6
6. Points out that the crisis has proved that a common monetary policy without a common fiscal policy cannot address asymmetric shocks to the euro area; reiterates that mere coordination of national fiscal policies without credible enforcement mechanisms, as well as loose adherence by Member States to the common fiscal framework, has not prevented an investment gap, has proved insufficient to trigger growth-enhancing, sustainable and socially balanced structural reforms and has not enhanced the national capacity to absorb economic shocks;
Amendment 212 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 6 a (new)
Paragraph 6 a (new)
6a. Believes that the Macroeconomic Imbalance Procedure has not been used to its full potential to prevent imbalances and to foster greater convergence;
Amendment 262 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 11
Paragraph 11
11. Makes it clear that rapid action is needed to ensure the sustainabila well-defined roadmap is needed to realise the full benefitys of the eurocommon currency; stresses that this requires strong joint efforts on the part of the EU and its Member States to complete the EMU and to restore the trust of citizens and markets;
Amendment 269 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 12
Paragraph 12
12. Believes that in order to regain trust, the euro must deliver on its promise of stability, convergence, growth and jobs; regards a fiscal capacity as a vital element in this enterprise, which can be successful only if solidarity is closely linked to responsibility, meaning that financial support is provided on the basis of clear criteria; considers that it should go hand in hand with completion of the internal market, with an EU budget funding European and future oriented investments;
Amendment 281 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 13
Paragraph 13
13. Argues that convergence, good governance and conditionality enforced through institutions being held democratically accountable at the euro-area and national level are key, notably to preventing permanent transfers and moral hazard; states that responsibilities must be assigned at the level where decisions are taken or implemented, with national parliaments scrutinising national governments and the European Parliament scrutinising the European executives; believes that this is the only way to ensure the required increased accountability of decision-making;
Amendment 302 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 14
Paragraph 14
14. Takes the view that incentives for sound fiscal policymaking and for addressing structural weaknesses at national level, taking into account the aggregate euro area fiscal stance, are core elements for the functioning of the euro area; considers that a fiscal capacity should, moreover, address specific concerns for the euro area in the case of absorbing shocksto prevent shocks and in order to enable daily political management;
Amendment 317 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 15
Paragraph 15
15. Stresses that, while seeking complementarities and avoiding overlaps, a fiscal capacity must be created on top of existing EU funding instruments, within its legal framework, in order to ensure consistent development between euro and non-euro Member States; considers however that the option of an ad-hoc Euro area Treaty should not be disregarded, as this has been the tool chosen for the UK settlement;
Amendment 330 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 16
Paragraph 16
16. Points out that effective stabilisation of large euro area Member States or a group of closely economically intertwined countries requires sufficient resourcesadequate own resources, drawing lessons from one of the main failures of the EU budget coming from the expectation of a "fair return", calculated only in numerical terms; recalls the creation of the interinstitutional group on own resources (the Monti group), whose creation in itself reveals an awareness of this problem;
Amendment 342 #
Motion for a resolution
Subheading 3
Subheading 3
Amendment 344 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 16 a (new)
Paragraph 16 a (new)
16a. Considers that, in opposition to the ESM, EFSF, EFSM which were conceived as emergency tools, the budgetary capacity of the euro area should be seen as a permanent governance tool and fund the stability of the Euro area, labour mobility, investment to bring prosperity, in order to make it an optimal currency area;
Amendment 350 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 17
Paragraph 17
17. Considers that three different functions have to be fulfilled; argues, first, that in ordera sound management of the Euro area must include notably the following elements: to foster economic and social convergence within the euro area and to improve the economic competitiveness and resilience of the euro area, Member States’ structural reforms should be incentivised in good economic times; argues, secondly, that differences in the business cycles of euro area Member States stemming from structural differences create the need for an instrument to address asymmetric shocks; considers, thirdly, that symmetric shocks should be addressed so asto address asymmetric shocks, to increase the resilience of the euro area as a whole;
Amendment 365 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 18
Paragraph 18
Amendment 394 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 19
Paragraph 19
19. Demands that the ESM be integrated into the Union’s legal framework and evolve towards a Community mechanism, as provided for in the ESM Treaty and as constantly requested by the European Parliament and foreseen in the Five Presidents’ report; underlines that the ECJ Pringle case-law and jurisprudence open up the possibility of bringing the ESM within the Union’s framework, within the existing Treaties, on the basis of Article 352 TFEU; calls, therefore, on the Commission to bring forward as a matter of urgency a legislative proposal to that end; demands that the ESM be made fully accountable to the Members of European Parliament elected in the contributing Member States;
Amendment 412 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 20
Paragraph 20
20. Calls for the ESM, whilst fulfilling its ongoing tasks, to be further developed and turned into a European Monetary Fund (EMF) with adequate lending and borrowing capacities and a clearly defined mandate, including its contribution to a euro area fiscal capacity; stresses that an EMF should be managed by the Commission and held democratically accountable by the Members of the European Parliament elected in the contributing Member States; emphasises that national parliaments would be adequately involved in the process, given thatif their constitutional prerogatives regarding financial resources couldwere to be affected;
Amendment 427 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 21
Paragraph 21
21. Insists that once it is integrated into Community law, the fiscal capacity for the euro area should be integrated into the EU budget, provided control and accountability is the responsibility of those contributing to it, but over and above the ceilings of the Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF);
Amendment 453 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 23
Paragraph 23
Amendment 461 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 23
Paragraph 23
23. Believes that compliance with a convergence code should be the condition for access to fundborrowing from the ESM/EMF; reiterates its call on the Commission to put forward a legislative proposal to this end;
Amendment 464 #
Motion for a resolution
Subheading 4
Subheading 4
Amendment 499 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 25
Paragraph 25
25. Reiterates its call for the adoption of a ‘convergence code’, based on the MIP, as a legal act resulting from the ordinary legislative procedure, to streamline the existing coordination of economic policies into a more effective convergence of economic policies within the European Semester;
Amendment 524 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 26 – indent 1
Paragraph 26 – indent 1
– taxation: base and rate of corporate taximplementation of a CCCTB and modification of fiscal rules detrimental to the optimal allocation of capital as underlined in the Werner report,
Amendment 536 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 26 – indent 2
Paragraph 26 – indent 2
– labour market, including minimum wages within sectors (within the Member State), and pension systems,
Amendment 589 #
Motion for a resolution
Subheading 5
Subheading 5
Amendment 610 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 29
Paragraph 29
Amendment 628 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 30
Paragraph 30
Amendment 644 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 31
Paragraph 31
Amendment 675 #
Motion for a resolution
Subheading 6
Subheading 6
Amendment 701 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 34
Paragraph 34
34. Considers that in the case of symmetric shocks brought about by a lack of internal demand, monetary policy alone cannot reignite the economy, particularly in a context of zero lower bounds; is therefore convinced that public and private investment must be increased, the administrative burden reduced and a proper, simpler regulatory framework developed and implemented, with a view to stimulating potential growth;
Amendment 751 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 38
Paragraph 38
Amendment 768 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 39
Paragraph 39
39. Calls urgently for the European Parliament and national parliaments to be given a strengthened role in the renewed economic governance framework in order to reinforce democratic accountability; calls for increased national ownership in the European Semester in order to improve compliance with the CSRs;
Amendment 790 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 41
Paragraph 41
41. Considers that in order to provide for a genuine EMU, a euro area treasury should be created for collective decision- making, supervision and management of the budgetary capacity for the euro area; calls for the inclusion of this treasury within the European Commission with full macroeconomic, fiscal and financial competences; calls for a vice-president of the European Commission to head the treasury and simultaneously to act as president of the Eurogroup; urges full accountability of this treasury to the European Parliament with appropriate accountability;
Amendment 798 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 41 a (new)
Paragraph 41 a (new)
41a. Is convinced that the macroeconomic governance of the euro area should evolve towards a system of surveillance centred on a limited number of fiscal indicators with clear and simple rules; considers that a strong enforcement of these rules coupled with an ambitious fiscal capacity should allow for less intrusion from the European level into policy-making at national level; stresses that such an application of the subsidiarity principle would allow for a more credible and more democratic governance of the euro area, which would foster ownership by citizens;
Amendment 801 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 41 b (new)
Paragraph 41 b (new)
41b. Notes that the European Parliament should review its internal organisation so as to allow an expression of these MEPs elected in the euro area;
Amendment 808 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 42
Paragraph 42
42. Considers that those non-euro countries that do not have an opt-out will eventually become part of the EMU and therefore may join the governance framework on a voluntary basis with a special status; considers it essential to differentiate between discussion concerning policies for the euro area and related decision making; modalities must be found to allow all Member States who are committed to joining the euro area to participate in discussions concerning the euro area, if they so wish, however only Member States who are members of the euro area should be able to vote on these decisions;
Amendment 822 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 43
Paragraph 43
43. Acknowledges that the current political climate characterised by deep inequality, mistrust and uncertainty is not conducive to proper reforms to achieve and complete EMU; believes, therefore,Believes that a comprehensive roadmap, including clear milestones and convergence criteria within an agreed timetable and taking into account the political situation, should be urgently adopted with a clear commitment by euro area Heads of State and Government to achieving a genu; considers that the roadmap should also address the issue of sovereign debt stock ine and complete EMU appropriate manner;