BETA

25 Amendments of Sylvie GOULARD related to 2016/2247(INI)

Amendment 18 #
Motion for a resolution
Citation 14 a (new)
- having regard to its resolution of 12 April 2016 on the EU role in the framework of international financial, monetary and regulatory institutions and bodies (2015/2060(INI)),
2016/12/20
Committee: ECON
Amendment 75 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital D
D. whereas no non-euro area country has yet expressed a willingnessall Member States, with the exception of one having a derogation, are committed to joining the euro and therefore to joining the Banking Union;
2016/12/20
Committee: ECON
Amendment 97 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1
1. Notes the high level of non- performing loans (NPLs) in some jurisdictioncountries; considers that this issue is crucial and has yet to be solved; welcomes the work of the SSM and its draft guidance on this issue; looks forward to the results of the work on a minimum EU insolvency framework; calls on Member States to improve their insolvency legislationwelcomes the Commission proposal on insolvency and restructuring; calls on Member States to improve their insolvency legislation and more generally their legal framework concerning the restructuring of debt, and to stimulate growth in order to tackle NPLs;
2016/12/20
Committee: ECON
Amendment 109 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1 a (new)
1a. Notes the low profitability of a number of institutions in the euro area; considers that low profitability remains an important concern for the stability of the financial and banking sector; considers that resolute actions should be taken to strengthen the profitability of those institutions, while acknowledging the impact of the overall economic environment in that regard;
2016/12/20
Committee: ECON
Amendment 131 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 2
2. Considers that there are risks associated with sovereign debt; notes, however, that government bonds play a critical role as a source of high-quality, liquid collateral and that modifying its prudential treatment could have a significant effect on both the financial and the public sector, which calls for caution in reform efforts; awaits with interest theconsiders that, in the end, a better resgults of theatory framework, be it European or international, work on this issueill be needed; considers that, in the end, a better regulatory framework, be it European or international, will be neededEuropean framework should enable market discipline in delivering sustainable policies and providing safe assets for the financial sector and safe liabilities for governments;
2016/12/20
Committee: ECON
Amendment 146 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 3
3. Considers it essential to ensure the comparability of risk-weighted assets across institutions in order to allow for effective supervision; welcomes the work done internationally to streamline the resort to internal models and to re-establish the credibility of internal models, as well as the introduction of a leverage ratio to act as a backstop; recalls, however, that the regulatory changes planned should not result in significantunjustified increases in capital requirements, nor harm the ability of banks to finance the real economy, in particular SMEs;
2016/12/20
Committee: ECON
Amendment 156 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 4
4. Points out that guidance provided by international fora should be used in order to avoid the risk of regulatory fragmentation; stresses the importance of the role of the Commission, the European Central Bank and the European Banking Authority to engage in the work of the BCBS and provide the European Parliament and the Council with transparent and comprehensive updates on the status of the development of the BCBS discussions; considers that the EU should work on having an appropriate representation in the BCBS and notably for the euro area; calls for a stronger visibility of this role during ECOFIN meetings, as well as enhanced accountability towards the ECON Committee in the European Parliament with a regular de-brief by EU representatives party to the discussions;
2016/12/20
Committee: ECON
Amendment 175 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 5
5. SNotes that there are very different banking models within the Banking Union but stresses that national options and discretions are hindering the creation of a level playing field between Member States and the comparability of the financial reporting by banks to the public; welcomes the ECB guidance and regulation harmonising the exercise of some of these within the Banking Union; looks forward to the upcoming amendments to the CRR as a means of closing the most significant oneto keep only the ones strictly necessary because of the diversity of banking models;
2016/12/20
Committee: ECON
Amendment 182 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 5 a (new)
5a. Stresses that there has been a natural learning phenomenon for all the members of the Supervisory Board since the creation of the SSM to deal with a variety of different business models and entities of different sizes, which needs to be supported and accelerated;
2016/12/20
Committee: ECON
Amendment 199 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 7
7. Notes that the 'too-big-to-fail' issue still needs to be addressedis being addressed; recalls the words of Mark Carney, Chair of the Financial Stability Board, that agreement on proposals for a common international standard on total loss-absorbing capacity for G-SIBs is a watershed in ending "too big to fail" banks; stresses that these agreements, once implemented, will play important roles in enabling globally systemic banks to be resolved without recourse to public subsidy and without disruption to the wider financial system; notes that TLAC will complement EMIR's mandatory requirement to centrally clear and the capital surcharge for G-SIBs;
2016/12/20
Committee: ECON
Amendment 220 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 8 a (new)
8a. Underlines that the creation of the SSM has been accompanied by an increase of influence for the European Union on the international stage compared to the pre-existing situation;
2016/12/20
Committee: ECON
Amendment 221 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 8 b (new)
8b. Underlines that the separation of the supervisory tasks from monetary policy functions should enable the SSM to take an independent position on all relevant matters, including on potential effects of ECB interest rate targets on the financial position of supervised banks;
2016/12/20
Committee: ECON
Amendment 222 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 8 c (new)
8c. Takes note of the report of the European Court of Auditors on the SSM which stresses the insufficient levels of staffing;
2016/12/20
Committee: ECON
Amendment 230 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 9
9. Recalls the need to find, in the exercise of supervision, a balance between the need for proportionality and the need for a consistent approach; invites the SSM to reduce as much as possible the supervisory fees; points out that all banks should be subject to an appropriate level of supervision; reminds that an appropriate supervision is key to monitor all risks whatever the size of the banks;
2016/12/20
Committee: ECON
Amendment 236 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 9 a (new)
9a. Underlines that the safety and soundness of a bank cannot be captured by a point-in-time assessment of its balance sheet alone, as they are ensured through dynamic interactions between the bank and the markets, and affected by various elements in the entire economy; underlines therefore that a sound framework for financial stability and growth should be comprehensive and balanced to cover dynamic supervisory practices and not focus merely on static regulation with mainly quantitative aspects;
2016/12/20
Committee: ECON
Amendment 249 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 9 b (new)
9b. Notes that the outcome of the referendum on the UK membership to the EU makes an assessment of the whole European System of Financial Supervision (ESFS), including the voting modalities inside the EBA, necessary;
2016/12/20
Committee: ECON
Amendment 282 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 10
10. Recalls the need to adhere to State aid rules in the context of bank resolution and reminds that extraordinary public support shall only be of both precautionary and temporary nature, and cannot be used to offset losses that an institution has incurred or is likely to incur in the near future; takes the view that enough flexibility is embedded within the current framework to address specific situations and might be better exploited, in particular in the case of preventive measures involving the use of DGS funds; reminds that a report assessing the continuing need for allowing precautionary recapitalisations and the conditionality attached to such measures was due by 31 December 2015; calls on the Commission to submit such report as soon as possible;
2016/12/20
Committee: ECON
Amendment 298 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 11
11. Takes note of the differences between the FSB TLAC standard and the MREL; stresses, however, that both standards share the same objective: to make sure that banks have enough regulatory capital and loss-absorbing liabilities to make bail-in an effective instrument in resolution (without causing financial instability and without needing public money); concludes therefore that a holistic approach to loss-absorption can be reached by combining the two; highlights that due consideration should be given to retaining the two criteria of size and risk- weighted assets;
2016/12/20
Committee: ECON
Amendment 306 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 11 a (new)
11a. calls on the Commission to carefully assess the evolution of the global standard-setting process for the prudential regulation and its effective implementation following the latest political developments, in particular the setting-up of the new American administration;
2016/12/20
Committee: ECON
Amendment 320 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 13
13. Stresses that it is crucial to harmonise the hierarchy of claims in bank insolvency across Member States in order to make the implementation of the BRRD more consistent and effective; welcomes the Commission's proposal on this subject;
2016/12/20
Committee: ECON
Amendment 341 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 17 a (new)
17a. reminds that bail-in instruments should only be sold to appropriate investors in the first place which can absorb potential losses without being threatened in their own sound financial standing and considers it fundamental to address the mis-selling of bail-in instruments to retail investors; asks the Commission to carefully assess the EU Investor Protection Framework and to present proposals if necessary;
2016/12/20
Committee: ECON
Amendment 350 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 18
18. Regrets that the Commission did not allow for more time to assess the implementation of the DGSD before proposing the EDIS and did not conduct a proper impact assessment of the proposal; stands ready, however, to seize the opportunity generated by the proposal to discuss the DGSD and address some of the options and discretions it includes; takes note of the Commission services' non- paper of a supplementary analytical report on the effect of the proposal;
2016/12/20
Committee: ECON
Amendment 374 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 19
19. Is aware of the potential benefits of an EDIS; is nevertheless of the opinion that risk reduction measures are an indispensable counterparty to its establishment in order to prevent moral hazard, and that the work on such measures should preferably precede risk sharingstart as early as possible;
2016/12/20
Committee: ECON
Amendment 385 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 20
20. Welcomes a European approach to deposit insurance, which must make it possible to address outstanding DGSD implementation issues and phase in the risk reduction measures; is of the opinion that every final scheme should include enough time to build the trust necessary among all stakeholders and citizens; reminds that protection of deposits is a common concern for all EU citizens;
2016/12/20
Committee: ECON
Amendment 406 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 22
22. Highlights that Article 114 seems to be anis the appropriate legal basis for the establishment of both the EDIS and the DIF; considers therefore that a recourse to an IGA is not warranted and would create legal uncertainty;
2016/12/20
Committee: ECON