Procedure completed
2010/2006(INI) Cross-border crisis management in the banking sector
Lead committee dossier: ECON/7/01765
Legal Basis RoP 042
| Role | Committee | Rapporteur | Shadows |
|---|---|---|---|
| Opinion | BUDG | ||
| Lead | ECON | FERREIRA Elisa (S&D) | |
| Opinion | EMPL | ||
| Opinion | JURI | BODU Sebastian Valentin (EPP) |
Legal Basis RoP 042
Subjects
Activites
-
2010/07/07
Text adopted by Parliament, single reading
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T7-0276/2010
summary
The European Parliament adopted a resolution, based on Article 42 of the Rules of Procedure, with recommendations to the Commission on Cross-Border Crisis Management in the Banking Sector. The resolution notes that there is at present insufficient international regulation of crisis management in the banking sector and that existing EU and international supervisory mechanisms for the financial sector have proven ineffective in preventing or sufficiently containing contagion. As a result of the crisis, there is a need for, and citizens expect, the EU institutions, working in dialogue with the G-20 and other international fora, urgently to create an adequate framework which, in the event of a crisis, preserves financial stability, minimises the cost to taxpayers, preserves basic banking services and protects depositors. Parliament calls on the Commission to submit to Parliament by 31 December 2010, on the basis of Articles 50 and 114 of the TFEU, one or more legislative proposals relating to an EU crisis-management framework, an EU financial stability fund, and a resolution unit following the detailed recommendations made in the Annex hereto, taking into account initiatives taken by international bodies, such as the G-20 and the International Monetary Fund, in order to ensure a global level playing field and based on a profound analysis of all alternatives available, including an impact assessment. The European Parliament considers that the legislative act to be adopted should take account of the following detailed recommendations: Recommendation 1 relating to a common EU crisis-management framework: create a European crisis-management framework with a common minimum set of rules and ultimately a common resolution and insolvency law, applicable to all banking institutions operating in the Union; progressively converge existing national resolution and insolvency laws and supervisory powers and, within a reasonable calendar, establishing an effective single EU regime; establish a single EU resolution authority as a separated body or as a unit within the EBA; carry out peer reviews of supervisors on a regular basis under the leadership of the EBA building on prior self-assessment; where the need for a resolution or the winding-up of a cross-border institution arises, carry out an in-depth investigation (via independent experts appointed by the EBA) in order to highlight the causes and responsibilities involved; attribute to the relevant supervisor the responsibility for crisis management (including powers of early intervention) and the approval of each bank's contingency plan; design a common set of rules for crisis management including common methodologies, definitions and terminology, and a set of relevant criteria for stress test for cross-border banks; ensure that resolution plans become a mandatory regulatory requirement. They should include an in-depth self-assessment of the institution and details of a fair distribution of assets and capital; design, before December 2011, a European supervisory rating for banks (Risk Dashboard) based on a common set of quantitative and qualitative indicators; empower supervisors to intervene on the basis of thresholds of the supervisory rating, in full accordance with the principle of proportionality, and provide for reasonable remedy periods for the institutions to address the weaknesses by themselves; provide supervisors with appropriate legal tools for intervention by amending the relevant sectoral legislation or by introducing new sectoral legislation to require adjustments of capital (above the minimum regulatory requirements) or liquidity and changes in the business mix and internal process; recommend or impose changes of management; impose dividend retention and restrictions in order to consolidate capital requirements; limit the terms of banking licences, etc. Recommendation 2 relating to cross-border systemic banks: cross-border systemic banks, due to their special role in the internal market of financial services, need to be addressed urgently by way of a new special regime to be known as European Bank Company Law, to be designed by the end of 2011; cross-border systemic banks shall adhere to the new reinforced special regime; that regime shall overcome legal impediments to effective action across borders while ensuring the clear, equal and predictable treatment of shareholders, depositors, creditors, employees and other stakeholders, in particular after intra-group asset transfers; the Commission shall adopt a measure setting up, before April 2011, criteria for definition of cross-border systemic banks; the Commission shall adopt a measure proposing a mechanism of asset transfers within Cross-Border Systemic Banks taking due regard of the need to protect the rights of host countries; an EU financial stability fund and a resolution unit shall support interventions led by the EBA relating to crisis management, resolution or insolvency, as regards cross-border systemic banks. Recommendation 3 relating to an EU financial stability fund: an EU Financial Stability Fund shall be created, under the responsibility of the EBA, to finance interventions (rehabilitation or orderly winding-up) aimed at preserving the system's stability and limiting contagion from failing banks. The Commission shall present to Parliament, by April 2011, a proposal with details of the Fund's charter, structure, governance, size, operating model as well as a precise calendar for implementation. Recommendation 4 relating to a resolution unit: an independent resolution unit shall be established within the EBA to lead the resolution and insolvency procedures for cross-border systemic banks.
- Results of vote in Parliament
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T7-0276/2010
summary
-
2010/07/07
Commission response to text adopted in plenary
- SP(2010)6850
- DG Internal Market and Services, BARNIER Michel
-
2010/07/06
Debate in Parliament
- 2010/06/28 Committee report tabled for plenary, single reading
- 2010/06/28 Committee report tabled for plenary, single reading
-
2010/06/22
Vote in committee, 1st reading/single reading
-
2010/04/27
Deadline Amendments
- 2010/04/07 Committee draft report
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2010/01/21
Committee referral announced in Parliament, 1st reading/single reading
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2010/01/14
EP officialisation
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2009/10/20
Non-legislative basic document published
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COM(2009)0561
summary
PURPOSE: to open consultations on the necessary measures for the creation of an EU Framework for Cross-Border Crisis Management in the Banking Sector. BACKGROUND: the recent financial crisis has exposed the EU's lack of an effective crisis management for cross-border financial institutions. The events surrounding the failures of Fortis, Lehman and Icelandic banks in the recent financial crisis illustrate how damaging the absence of an adequate resolution framework can be for financial stability of the whole EU banking system. The European Commission is proposing a fundamental reform of the regulation and supervision of financial markets to address the failings exposed by the banking crisis (see COM(2009)0114). Measures have already been taken to upgrade deposit insurance, strengthen capital requirements and reform the EU supervisory infrastructure: measures that are essential for a more robust framework for prudential supervision and financial stability. The Commission considers that the existing arrangements are clearly insufficient to stabilise and control the systemic impact of cross border financial institutions and that a new legal framework needs to be put in place. Measures have already been taken to upgrade deposit insurance, strengthen capital requirements and reform the EU supervisory infrastructure. These reforms must be complemented by a clear framework that will, in future, enable authorities to stabilise and control the systemic impact of failing cross-border financial institutions. Europe needs a strong regulatory framework that covers prevention, early intervention, bank resolution and winding up. The new framework should equip authorities with the right tools and provide the legal certainty to handle cross-border banking failures, in ways that minimise costs to taxpayers and allow even the largest banks to fail without damaging financial stability. An EU resolution framework for cross-border banks is also a vital complement to the new supervisory architecture that the Commission proposed on 23 September 2009 (COD/2009/0142; COD/2009/0143 and COD/2009/0144). CONTENT: the purpose of the Communication is to consult as widely as possible on a broad range of issues aimed at safeguarding financial stability and the continuity of banking services in a cross border banking crisis. The Commission feels that changes are needed to make possible effective crisis management and resolution or orderly winding up of a failing cross-border bank. The main focus is on deposit-taking banks, which play a unique role as providers of credit, deposit takers and payment intermediaries. This Communication considers measures to deliver two distinct, but connected objectives. · to ensure that all national supervisors have adequate tools to identify problems in banks at a sufficiently early stage and to intervene to restore the health of the institution or group, or prevent further decline. This will require amendments to the supervisory regime on bank capital. Those core amendments might also be accompanied by a framework to enable asset transfers between group entities as a means of financial or liquidity support before the problems of particular group entities become critical; · to make it possible for cross-border banks to fail without serious disruption to vital banking services or contagion to the financial system as a whole. This will mean the development of an EU resolution framework as well as measures to address the obstacles to effective cross-border resolution that arise from the territorial and separate entity approach to insolvency, and arrangements for financing such resolutions, including the sharing of any direct fiscal costs by Member States. The Communication covers three areas. Early intervention, covering actions by supervisors aimed at restoring the stability and financial soundness of an institution when problems are developing, together with intra-group asset transfer between solvent entities for the purposes of financial support. These actions would be taken before the thresholds conditions for resolution are met, and before the institution is or likely to become insolvent. The new European Banking Authority could play a role in coordinating supervisory early intervention in a cross-border group. The Commission asks which additional tools should supervisors have in order to address developing problems, how their use should be triggered, and how important wind-down plans ("living wills") are as a tool for crisis management? Resolution, covering measures taken by national resolution authorities to manage a crisis in a banking institution, to contain its impact on financial stability and, where appropriate, to facilitate an orderly winding up of the whole or parts of the institution. These measures take place outside the framework of banking supervision, and may be taken by authorities other than supervisors, although it is by no means precluded that supervisors might be involved. The Communication discusses what measures are needed and how national actions can be coordinated or integrated when applied to a cross-border group. One option considered is coordination by an EU resolution authority. The Communication also examines what the key objectives and priorities for an EU bank resolution framework should be; the key tools for an EU resolution regime; the appropriate thresholds for the use of resolution tools; the scope of the bank resolution framework; stakeholders' rights in bank resolution procedures; the application of resolution measures to a banking group. The Communication addresses the issue of financing resolution measures. The emphasis is on avoidance of public sector bail-outs and on facilitating private sector solutions. However, there is also recognition that use of public funds may be unavoidable at some stage of a resolution, and that progress is needed in clarifying how the potential costs of managing a crisis in a cross-border bank would be shared between affected Member States. Insolvency, covering reorganisation and winding up that takes place under the applicable insolvency regime. The Communication asks what changes are necessary to insolvency law to support resolution measures, and whether greater coordination or integration of insolvency regimes is needed to deal with the reorganisation or winding up of cross-border groups. Although these measures are - for the purposes of discussion - presented as conceptually distinct, they do not necessarily constitute separate and sequential 'phases' of a crisis. In practice, there may be considerable overlap between resolution and insolvency, in particular, and supervisory early intervention may move rapidly into resolution measures. The Communication sets out questions on the tools that the Commission considers would be necessary for an EU crisis management framework. The Commission invites both general views and detailed comments on the matters discussed in this Communication by 20th January 2010. Further details on the issues raised in the Communication, together with specific questions are to be found in the accompanying staff working document. The Commission plans to organise a public hearing in early 2010 in order to present the results of the consultation and to set out how it intends to proceed.
-
COM(2009)0561
summary
-
2009/10/20
Date
-
2009/10/20
Non-legislative basic document
-
COM(2009)0561
summary
PURPOSE: to open consultations on the necessary measures for the creation of an EU Framework for Cross-Border Crisis Management in the Banking Sector. BACKGROUND: the recent financial crisis has exposed the EU's lack of an effective crisis management for cross-border financial institutions. The events surrounding the failures of Fortis, Lehman and Icelandic banks in the recent financial crisis illustrate how damaging the absence of an adequate resolution framework can be for financial stability of the whole EU banking system. The European Commission is proposing a fundamental reform of the regulation and supervision of financial markets to address the failings exposed by the banking crisis (see COM(2009)0114). Measures have already been taken to upgrade deposit insurance, strengthen capital requirements and reform the EU supervisory infrastructure: measures that are essential for a more robust framework for prudential supervision and financial stability. The Commission considers that the existing arrangements are clearly insufficient to stabilise and control the systemic impact of cross border financial institutions and that a new legal framework needs to be put in place. Measures have already been taken to upgrade deposit insurance, strengthen capital requirements and reform the EU supervisory infrastructure. These reforms must be complemented by a clear framework that will, in future, enable authorities to stabilise and control the systemic impact of failing cross-border financial institutions. Europe needs a strong regulatory framework that covers prevention, early intervention, bank resolution and winding up. The new framework should equip authorities with the right tools and provide the legal certainty to handle cross-border banking failures, in ways that minimise costs to taxpayers and allow even the largest banks to fail without damaging financial stability. An EU resolution framework for cross-border banks is also a vital complement to the new supervisory architecture that the Commission proposed on 23 September 2009 (COD/2009/0142; COD/2009/0143 and COD/2009/0144). CONTENT: the purpose of the Communication is to consult as widely as possible on a broad range of issues aimed at safeguarding financial stability and the continuity of banking services in a cross border banking crisis. The Commission feels that changes are needed to make possible effective crisis management and resolution or orderly winding up of a failing cross-border bank. The main focus is on deposit-taking banks, which play a unique role as providers of credit, deposit takers and payment intermediaries. This Communication considers measures to deliver two distinct, but connected objectives. · to ensure that all national supervisors have adequate tools to identify problems in banks at a sufficiently early stage and to intervene to restore the health of the institution or group, or prevent further decline. This will require amendments to the supervisory regime on bank capital. Those core amendments might also be accompanied by a framework to enable asset transfers between group entities as a means of financial or liquidity support before the problems of particular group entities become critical; · to make it possible for cross-border banks to fail without serious disruption to vital banking services or contagion to the financial system as a whole. This will mean the development of an EU resolution framework as well as measures to address the obstacles to effective cross-border resolution that arise from the territorial and separate entity approach to insolvency, and arrangements for financing such resolutions, including the sharing of any direct fiscal costs by Member States. The Communication covers three areas. Early intervention, covering actions by supervisors aimed at restoring the stability and financial soundness of an institution when problems are developing, together with intra-group asset transfer between solvent entities for the purposes of financial support. These actions would be taken before the thresholds conditions for resolution are met, and before the institution is or likely to become insolvent. The new European Banking Authority could play a role in coordinating supervisory early intervention in a cross-border group. The Commission asks which additional tools should supervisors have in order to address developing problems, how their use should be triggered, and how important wind-down plans ("living wills") are as a tool for crisis management? Resolution, covering measures taken by national resolution authorities to manage a crisis in a banking institution, to contain its impact on financial stability and, where appropriate, to facilitate an orderly winding up of the whole or parts of the institution. These measures take place outside the framework of banking supervision, and may be taken by authorities other than supervisors, although it is by no means precluded that supervisors might be involved. The Communication discusses what measures are needed and how national actions can be coordinated or integrated when applied to a cross-border group. One option considered is coordination by an EU resolution authority. The Communication also examines what the key objectives and priorities for an EU bank resolution framework should be; the key tools for an EU resolution regime; the appropriate thresholds for the use of resolution tools; the scope of the bank resolution framework; stakeholders' rights in bank resolution procedures; the application of resolution measures to a banking group. The Communication addresses the issue of financing resolution measures. The emphasis is on avoidance of public sector bail-outs and on facilitating private sector solutions. However, there is also recognition that use of public funds may be unavoidable at some stage of a resolution, and that progress is needed in clarifying how the potential costs of managing a crisis in a cross-border bank would be shared between affected Member States. Insolvency, covering reorganisation and winding up that takes place under the applicable insolvency regime. The Communication asks what changes are necessary to insolvency law to support resolution measures, and whether greater coordination or integration of insolvency regimes is needed to deal with the reorganisation or winding up of cross-border groups. Although these measures are - for the purposes of discussion - presented as conceptually distinct, they do not necessarily constitute separate and sequential 'phases' of a crisis. In practice, there may be considerable overlap between resolution and insolvency, in particular, and supervisory early intervention may move rapidly into resolution measures. The Communication sets out questions on the tools that the Commission considers would be necessary for an EU crisis management framework. The Commission invites both general views and detailed comments on the matters discussed in this Communication by 20th January 2010. Further details on the issues raised in the Communication, together with specific questions are to be found in the accompanying staff working document. The Commission plans to organise a public hearing in early 2010 in order to present the results of the consultation and to set out how it intends to proceed.
- DG Internal Market and Services, BARNIER Michel
-
COM(2009)0561
summary
Documents
- Non-legislative basic document published: COM(2009)0561
- Non-legislative basic document: COM(2009)0561
- Committee draft report: PE440.108
- Committee report tabled for plenary, single reading: A7-0213/2010
- Committee report tabled for plenary, single reading: A7-0213/2010
- Decision by Parliament, 1st reading/single reading: T7-0276/2010
- Results of vote in Parliament: Results of vote in Parliament
- Commission response to text adopted in plenary: SP(2010)6850
| Amendments | Dossier |
| 259 |
2010/2006(INI)
2010/05/05
ECON
247 amendments...
Amendment 1 #
Motion for a resolution Citation 1 a (new) - having regard to its resolution of 13 April 2000 on the Commission communication on implementing the framework for financial markets: Action plan1,
Amendment 10 #
Motion for a resolution Recital F F. whereas citizens demand that the EU institutions, working in step with the G20 and other international fora, urgently create an adequate framework which, in the event of crisis, would preserve financial stability, would minimise the cost to taxpayers, would preserve basic banking services and would protect depositors,
Amendment 100 #
Motion for a resolution Annex – recommendation 1 – paragraph 8 – subparagraph 1 – introductory part 8. Expand the
Amendment 101 #
Motion for a resolution Annex – recommendation 1 – paragraph 8 – subparagraph 1 – introductory part 8. Expand the
Amendment 102 #
Motion for a resolution Annex – recommendation 1 – paragraph 8 – subparagraph 1 – indent 2 • recommend or impose changes of management;
Amendment 103 #
Motion for a resolution Annex – recommendation 1 – paragraph 8 – subparagraph 1 – indent 2 a (new) Amendment 104 #
Motion for a resolution Annex – recommendation 1 – paragraph 8 – subparagraph 1 – indent 3 a (new) • allow supervisors to trigger separation of stand-alone modules, both failing and successful, from the institution to ensure core functions can continue to operate;
Amendment 105 #
Motion for a resolution Annex – recommendation 1 – paragraph 8 – subparagraph 1 – indent 3 a (new) • impose transfer of assets among the entities of the group;
Amendment 106 #
Motion for a resolution Annex – recommendation 1 – paragraph 8 – subparagraph 1 – indent 4 Amendment 107 #
Motion for a resolution Annex – recommendation 1 – paragraph 8 – subparagraph 1 – indent 4 a (new) • impose a suspension of all the claims against the bank (“moratorium”);
Amendment 108 #
Motion for a resolution Annex – recommendation 1 – paragraph 8 – subparagraph 1 – indent 5 Amendment 109 #
Motion for a resolution Annex – recommendation 1 – paragraph 8 – subparagraph 1 – indent 5 Amendment 11 #
Motion for a resolution Recital F F. whereas
Amendment 110 #
Motion for a resolution Annex – recommendation 1 – paragraph 8 – subparagraph 1 – indent 6 Amendment 111 #
Motion for a resolution Annex – recommendation 1 – paragraph 8 – subparagraph 1 – indent 6 Amendment 112 #
Motion for a resolution Annex – recommendation 1 – paragraph 8 – subparagraph 1 – indent 6 • require swaps of debt into equity, or other convertible capital depending on the nature of the institution, with appropriate haircuts;
Amendment 113 #
Motion for a resolution Annex – recommendation 1 – paragraph 8 – subparagraph 1 – indent 6 a (new) • authorise the access to the EU Financial Stability Fund for emergency medium term collateralised funding;
Amendment 114 #
Motion for a resolution Annex – recommendation 1 – paragraph 8 – subparagraph 1 – indent 6 b (new) • grant guarantees through the EU Financial Stability Fund to facilitate merger and acquisition operations;
Amendment 115 #
Motion for a resolution Annex – recommendation 1 – paragraph 8 – subparagraph 1 – indent 7 Amendment 116 #
Motion for a resolution Annex – recommendation 1 – paragraph 8 – subparagraph 1 – indent 7 Amendment 117 #
Motion for a resolution Annex – recommendation 1 – paragraph 8 – subparagraph 1 – indent 8 Amendment 118 #
Motion for a resolution Annex – recommendation 1 – paragraph 8 – subparagraph 1 – indent 8 Amendment 119 #
Motion for a resolution Annex – recommendation 1 – paragraph 8 – subparagraph 1 – indent 8 a (new) • determination of the principles and the methodology of the re-valuation of the impaired banking assets as well as the established provisions which would be applicable upon intra-group asset transfers in the financial crisis situation.
Amendment 12 #
Motion for a resolution Recital F F
Amendment 120 #
Motion for a resolution Annex – recommendation 1 – paragraph 8 – subparagraph 1 – indent 8 a (new) • impose profits and dividend retention and restrictions in order to consolidate capital requirements and to insure that shareholders and creditors pay before taxpayers;
Amendment 121 #
Motion for a resolution Annex – recommendation 1 – paragraph 8 – subparagraph 1 – indent 8 b (new) • restructure and transfer assets and liabilities to other institutions with the objective to ensure continuity of systemically important operations;
Amendment 122 #
Motion for a resolution Annex – recommendation 1 – paragraph 8 – subparagraph 1 – indent 8 c (new) • define criteria in order to value impaired assets.
Amendment 123 #
Motion for a resolution Annex – recommendation 1 – paragraph 8 – subparagraph 1 – indent 8 a (new) • request the intervention of the EU Financial Stability Fund.
Amendment 124 #
Motion for a resolution Annex – recommendation 1 – paragraph 8 – subparagraph 1 – indent 8 a (new) • control the process of intra-group asset transfers;
Amendment 125 #
Motion for a resolution Annex – recommendation 1 – paragraph 8 – subparagraph 1 – indent 8 a (new) • control the process of intra-group asset transfers;
Amendment 126 #
Motion for a resolution Annex – recommendation 1 – paragraph 8 – subparagraph 1 – indent 8 a (new) • control the process of intra-group asset transfers;
Amendment 127 #
Motion for a resolution Annex – recommendation 1 – paragraph 8 – subparagraph 1 – indent 8 b (new) • impose on an institution a specified time limit in any aspect of their activities, to reduce their risks or the institution to take other action;
Amendment 128 #
Motion for a resolution Annex – recommendation 1 – paragraph 8 – subparagraph 1 – indent 8 c (new) • impose that the CEO of the bank and / or member of the Executive Board should resign and at the same time appoint a replacement until the bank has appointed a new CEO and /or member of the Executive Board;
Amendment 129 #
Motion for a resolution Annex – recommendation 1 – paragraph 8 – subparagraph 1 – indent 8 d (new) • impose a minimum amount of capital, which is greater than the sum of capital requirements for credit risk, market risk and operational risk, as calculated in accordance with the law, if there are deficiencies in the institution's solvency, liquidity, risk management, transparency and internal instructions;
Amendment 13 #
Motion for a resolution Recital F F. whereas
Amendment 130 #
Motion for a resolution Annex – recommendation 1 – paragraph 8 – subparagraph 2 Amendment 131 #
Motion for a resolution Annex – recommendation 1 – paragraph 8 – subparagraph 2 Amendment 132 #
Motion for a resolution Annex – recommendation 1 – paragraph 8 – subparagraph 2 Amendment 133 #
Motion for a resolution Annex – recommendation 1 – paragraph 8 – subparagraph 2 Amendment 134 #
Motion for a resolution Annex – recommendation 1 – paragraph 8 – subparagraph 2 – introductory part For banks contributing in the EU Financial Stability Fund, the supervisory powers to be undertaken in coordination with the EU Financial Stability Fund, shall include:
Amendment 135 #
Motion for a resolution Annex – recommendation 1 – paragraph 8 – subparagraph 2 – introductory part For banks contributing in the EU Financial Stability Fund and the network of national Funds, the supervisory powers shall also include:
Amendment 136 #
Motion for a resolution Annex – recommendation 1 – paragraph 8 – subparagraph 2 – indent 2 a (new) • administrative and reparation measures for those institutions using the fund.
Amendment 137 #
Motion for a resolution Annex – recommendation 1 – paragraph 9 9. All the above-mentioned tools shall be applied in full compliance with the EU competition rules and equal treatment of creditors and depositors across Member States. In this perspective, competition rules must be permanently assessed and updated in order to deter ‘too big or interconnected to fail’ institutions.
Amendment 138 #
Motion for a resolution Annex – recommendation 1 – paragraph 9 a (new) 9a. In crisis situation the application of the relevant provisions of the EU Company Law Directives should be permitted to be ignored, along which within 21 days the shareholders' general assembly is to be convened. If the shareholders do not advocate the banking resolution, the EU Company Law Directives should not prevent the relevant supervisory authorities from conferring the decision making ability of the general assembly to the designated supervisory officer in order for the urgent reorganisation measures to be put in place without requesting the approval of the general assembly.
Amendment 139 #
Motion for a resolution Annex – recommendation 2 Amendment 14 #
Motion for a resolution Recital F a (new) Fa. whereas in any rescue of a financial institution, shareholders should be called upon in the first instance and the use of public money should be limited to a minimum; whereas any public intervention should be made conditional upon respect for criteria relating to State participation in the board of directors of the institution concerned, restructuring, loan level and job creation,
Amendment 140 #
Motion for a resolution Annex – recommendation 2 – title Recommendation 2 on Systemic and Cross-Border Banks
Amendment 141 #
Motion for a resolution Annex – recommendation 2 – title Recomm
Amendment 142 #
Motion for a resolution Annex – recommendation 2 – title Recommendation 2 on
Amendment 143 #
Motion for a resolution Annex – recommendation 2 – title Recommendation 2 on
Amendment 144 #
Motion for a resolution Annex – recommendation 2 – title Recommendation 2 on
Amendment 145 #
Motion for a resolution Annex – recommendation 2 – title Recommendation 2 on
Amendment 146 #
Motion for a resolution Annex – recommendation 2 – paragraph 1 Amendment 147 #
Motion for a resolution Annex – recommendation 2 – paragraph 1 1.
Amendment 148 #
Motion for a resolution Annex – recommendation 2 – paragraph 1 1.
Amendment 149 #
Motion for a resolution Annex – recommendation 2 – paragraph 1 1.
Amendment 15 #
Motion for a resolution Recital F a (new) Fa. whereas all cross-border institutions should be supervised and regulated on a cross-border basis,
Amendment 150 #
Motion for a resolution Annex – recommendation 2 – paragraph 1 1.
Amendment 151 #
Motion for a resolution Annex – recommendation 2 – paragraph 1 1.
Amendment 152 #
Motion for a resolution Annex – recommendation 2 – paragraph 1 1.
Amendment 153 #
Motion for a resolution Annex – recommendation 2 – paragraph 1 1. Systemic Banks, due to their special risk profile, require to be urgently addressed by a new special regime to be known as the European Bank Company Law to be designed until the end of 2011. New rules shall demand their restructuration in Non-Operating Holding Company structures, as the OECD recommends it.
Amendment 154 #
Motion for a resolution Annex – recommendation 2 – paragraph 1 1. Systemic Banks, due to their special risk profile, require to be urgently addressed by a new special regime to be known as the European Bank Company Law to be designed
Amendment 155 #
Motion for a resolution Annex – recommendation 2 – paragraph 2 Amendment 156 #
Motion for a resolution Annex – recommendation 2 – paragraph 2 2. Systemic
Amendment 157 #
Motion for a resolution Annex – recommendation 2 – paragraph 2 2.
Amendment 158 #
Motion for a resolution Annex – recommendation 2 – paragraph 2 2.
Amendment 159 #
Motion for a resolution Annex – recommendation 2 – paragraph 2 2.
Amendment 16 #
Motion for a resolution Recital F b (new) Fb. whereas financial stability and integrated financial markets require cross-border supervision of cross-border and systemic financial institutions,
Amendment 160 #
Motion for a resolution Annex – recommendation 2 – paragraph 2 2.
Amendment 161 #
Motion for a resolution Annex – recommendation 2 – paragraph 2 2.
Amendment 162 #
Motion for a resolution Annex – recommendation 2 – paragraph 2 2.
Amendment 163 #
Motion for a resolution Annex – recommendation 2 – paragraph 2 2. Systemic Banks shall adhere to the new special regime which shall overcome legal impediments to effective action across borders while ensuring clear, equal and predictable treatment of shareholders, depositors, creditors and other stakeholders, in particular after intra- group asset transfers.
Amendment 164 #
Motion for a resolution Annex – recommendation 2 – paragraph 2 2. Systemic Banks shall adhere to the new reinforced special regime which shall overcome legal impediments to effective action across borders while ensuring clear and predictable treatment of shareholders, depositors, creditors and other stakeholders.
Amendment 165 #
Motion for a resolution Annex – recommendation 2 – paragraph 2 2. Systemic Banks shall adhere to the new special regime which shall overcome legal impediments to effective action across borders while ensuring clear and predictable treatment of shareholders, depositors, creditors, employees and other stakeholders.
Amendment 166 #
Motion for a resolution Annex – recommendation 2 – paragraph 3 Amendment 167 #
Motion for a resolution Annex – recommendation 2 – paragraph 3 Amendment 168 #
Motion for a resolution Annex – recommendation 2 – paragraph 3 Amendment 169 #
Motion for a resolution Annex – recommendation 2 – paragraph 3 Amendment 17 #
Motion for a resolution Recital I I. whereas a strict
Amendment 170 #
Motion for a resolution Annex – recommendation 2 – paragraph 3 Amendment 171 #
Motion for a resolution Annex – recommendation 2 – paragraph 3 3. The
Amendment 172 #
Motion for a resolution Annex – recommendation 2 – paragraph 3 3. The Commission shall adopt a measure setting up, before April 2011, criteria for definition of relevant cross-border institutions and Systemic Banks based on a draft elaborated by the European
Amendment 173 #
Motion for a resolution Annex – recommendation 2 – paragraph 3 3. The Commission shall adopt a measure setting up, before April 2011, criteria for definition of
Amendment 174 #
Motion for a resolution Annex – recommendation 2 – paragraph 4 Amendment 175 #
Motion for a resolution Annex – recommendation 2 – paragraph 4 Amendment 176 #
Motion for a resolution Annex – recommendation 2 – paragraph 4 Amendment 177 #
Motion for a resolution Annex – recommendation 2 – paragraph 4 Amendment 178 #
Motion for a resolution Annex – recommendation 2 – paragraph 4 Amendment 179 #
Motion for a resolution Annex – recommendation 2 – paragraph 4 4. The ESRB shall draw, until December 2011, a list of Systemic Banks and a list of relevant cross-border banks and update it on a regular basis.
Amendment 18 #
Motion for a resolution Recital I I. whereas
Amendment 180 #
Motion for a resolution Annex – recommendation 2 – paragraph 4 a (new) 4a. The proposal shall observe the recommendations of the OECD on the separation of traditional deposit banking activities and investment banking in order to avoid failure contagion.
Amendment 181 #
Motion for a resolution Annex – recommendation 2 – paragraph 5 5.
Amendment 182 #
Motion for a resolution Annex – recommendation 2 – paragraph 5 5. For each of the Systemic Banks and for each of the relevant cross-border institutions, the EBA shall lead the college of supervisors, act under normal circumstances through national supervisors and retain the ultimate decision power and a binding mediating role.
Amendment 183 #
Motion for a resolution Annex – recommendation 2 – paragraph 5 5. For each of the
Amendment 184 #
Motion for a resolution Annex – recommendation 2 – paragraph 5 5. For each of the
Amendment 185 #
Motion for a resolution Annex – recommendation 2 – paragraph 5 5. For each of the
Amendment 186 #
Motion for a resolution Annex – recommendation 2 – paragraph 5 5. For each of the
Amendment 187 #
Motion for a resolution Annex – recommendation 2 – paragraph 5 5. For each of the
Amendment 188 #
Motion for a resolution Annex – recommendation 2 – paragraph 5 5. For each of the Systemic Banks, the EBA shall lead the college of supervisors, act under normal circumstances through national supervisors
Amendment 189 #
Motion for a resolution Annex – recommendation 2 – paragraph 5 a (new) 5a. The Commission shall adopt a measure proposing a system of asset transfers within systemic and cross-border banks taking due regard of the need to protect the rights of host countries.
Amendment 19 #
Motion for a resolution Recital J J. whereas moral hazard must be avoided to prevent excessive risk taking, and a framework that protects the system, not the “delinquent”, is called for, in particular no resolution funds should be used to bail out shareholders of banks, who must face full consequences of any losses, and no resolution funds should be used for the payment of bonuses,
Amendment 190 #
Motion for a resolution Annex – recommendation 2 – paragraph 6 Amendment 191 #
Motion for a resolution Annex – recommendation 2 – paragraph 6 Amendment 192 #
Motion for a resolution Annex – recommendation 2 – paragraph 6 6.
Amendment 193 #
Motion for a resolution Annex – recommendation 2 – paragraph 6 6. An EU Financial Stability Fund and a Resolution Unit shall support interventions
Amendment 194 #
Motion for a resolution Annex – recommendation 2 – paragraph 6 6. An EU Financial Stability Fund and a Resolution Unit shall support interventions led by the EBA (crisis management and resolution or insolvency) as regards
Amendment 195 #
Motion for a resolution Annex – recommendation 2 – paragraph 6 6. An EU Financial Stability Fund and a Resolution Unit shall support interventions led by the EBA (resolution or insolvency) as regards
Amendment 196 #
Motion for a resolution Annex – recommendation 2 – paragraph 6 6. An EU Financial Stability Fund and a Resolution Unit shall support interventions led by the EBA (resolution or insolvency) as regards
Amendment 197 #
Motion for a resolution Annex – recommendation 2 – paragraph 6 6. An EU Financial Stability Fund and a Resolution Unit shall support interventions led by the EBA (resolution or insolvency) as regards
Amendment 198 #
Motion for a resolution Annex – recommendation 2 – paragraph 6 – subparagraph 1 a (new) Amendment 199 #
Motion for a resolution Annex – recommendation 3 Amendment 2 #
Motion for a resolution Citation 11 a (new) - having regards to the OECD analysis "The Elephant in the Room: The Need to Deal with What Banks Do"1 , 1 OECD Journal: Financial Market Trends, Volume 2009_Issue 2, ISSN 1995-2864.
Amendment 20 #
Motion for a resolution Recital J J. whereas moral hazard must be avoided to prevent excessive risk taking, and a framework that protects the system, not the “delinquent”, is called for; in this context those institutions which make use of an EU resolution fund should face consequences such as administrative and reparation measures,
Amendment 200 #
Motion for a resolution Annex – recommendation 3 – title Recommendation 3 on EU Financial Stability Fund and the network of national stability funds
Amendment 201 #
Motion for a resolution Annex – recommendation 3 – paragraph 1 1. An EU Financial Stability Fund and a network of National Funds governed by the same binding rules including ex ante mechanisms for fiscal burden sharing shall be created, under the responsibility of the EBA, to finance interventions (rehabilitation or orderly winding-up) aimed at preserving the system’s stability and limit contagion from failing banks. The Commission shall present to the
Amendment 202 #
Motion for a resolution Annex – recommendation 3 – paragraph 1 1. An EU Financial Stability Fund shall be created, under the responsibility of
Amendment 203 #
Motion for a resolution Annex – recommendation 3 – paragraph 1 1. An EU Financial Stability Fund shall be created,
Amendment 204 #
Motion for a resolution Annex – recommendation 3 – paragraph 1 1.
Amendment 205 #
Motion for a resolution Annex – recommendation 3 – paragraph 2 – introductory part 2. The Fund and the network of national funds shall be:
Amendment 206 #
Motion for a resolution Annex – recommendation 3 – paragraph 2 – indent 1 Amendment 207 #
Motion for a resolution Annex – recommendation 3 – paragraph 2 – indent 1 •
Amendment 208 #
Motion for a resolution Annex – recommendation 3 – paragraph 2 – indent 2 • funded
Amendment 209 #
Motion for a resolution Annex – recommendation 3 – paragraph 2 – indent 2 • funded
Amendment 21 #
Motion for a resolution Recital J a (new) Ja. whereas other financial sectors should not be expected to contribute to a fund that will be used to bailout the banking sector,
Amendment 210 #
Motion for a resolution Annex – recommendation 3 – paragraph 2 – indent 2 • funded ex-ante by the
Amendment 211 #
Motion for a resolution Annex – recommendation 3 – paragraph 2 – indent 2 • funded ex-ante by
Amendment 212 #
Motion for a resolution Annex – recommendation 3 – paragraph 2 – indent 2 • funded ex-ante by
Amendment 213 #
Motion for a resolution Annex – recommendation 3 – paragraph 2 – indent 2 • funded ex-ante by
Amendment 214 #
Motion for a resolution Annex – recommendation 3 – paragraph 2 – indent 2 • funded ex-ante by the
Amendment 215 #
Motion for a resolution Annex – recommendation 3 – paragraph 2 – indent 2 • funded ex-ante by the
Amendment 216 #
Motion for a resolution Annex – recommendation 3 – paragraph 2 – indent 2 a (new) • the bank levy should be adjustable in order to slow down rapid credit growth and risk accumulation;
Amendment 217 #
Motion for a resolution Annex – recommendation 3 – paragraph 2 – indent 3 • separate and independent from Deposit Guarantee Schemes
Amendment 218 #
Motion for a resolution Annex – recommendation 3 – paragraph 2 – indent 3 • separate from Deposit Guarantee Schemes
Amendment 219 #
Motion for a resolution Annex – recommendation 3 – paragraph 2 – indent 5 a (new) Amendment 22 #
Motion for a resolution Recital K a (new) Ka. whereas it should be noted that the asset transfer within a banking group should not endanger in any case the financial and liquidity stability of the transferor,
Amendment 220 #
Motion for a resolution Annex – recommendation 3 – paragraph 2 – indent 5 a (new) In order to ensure a level playing field and the financial stability of the EU single market of financial services, Member States shall establish national stability funds to support the crisis management of local banks. An EU framework should be established to regulate the creation of a national stability fund in each Member State; existing national stability funds should comply with the newly established EU framework.
Amendment 221 #
Motion for a resolution Annex – recommendation 3 – paragraph 2 – indent 5 a (new) • built in order to limit exposure to uninsured short-term funding and therefore target the risk of sudden withdrawals of wholesale funding;
Amendment 222 #
Motion for a resolution Annex – recommendation 3 – paragraph 2 – indent 5 b (new) • set up in order to exempt insured deposits;
Amendment 223 #
Motion for a resolution Annex – recommendation 3 – paragraph 2 – indent 5 c (new) • complementary to counter-cyclical capital requirements and progressive with respect to the size of the institution as it targets liquidity risks irreducible to credit and market risk;
Amendment 224 #
Motion for a resolution Annex – recommendation 3 – paragraph 2 – indent 5 d (new) • set in order to discourage banks from running large proprietary trading with cheap short-term funding;
Amendment 225 #
Motion for a resolution Annex – recommendation 3 – paragraph 2 – indent 5 a (new) • designed in a way that does not create moral hazard and does not bail out bank shareholders;
Amendment 226 #
Motion for a resolution Annex – recommendation 3 – paragraph 2 – indent 5 b (new) • designed in a way that ensures no resources from the fund are used for the payment of bonuses;
Amendment 227 #
Motion for a resolution Annex – recommendation 3 – paragraph 3 – introductory part 3. Accordingly with provisions of the binding regulation defining guidelines for fiscal burden-sharing and governance of the EU fund and the network of national funds. The Commission shall also address:
Amendment 228 #
Motion for a resolution Annex – recommendation 3 – paragraph 3 – indent 1 • investment guidelines for the Fund’s and national network of funds' assets (risk, liquidity, alignment with EU targets);
Amendment 229 #
Motion for a resolution Annex – recommendation 3 – paragraph 3 – indent 1 a (new) • guidelines on the tax base for financing the resolution funds, allowing for a differentiated approach that taxes risky assets and the activities of investment banks more heavily than those of retail banks;
Amendment 23 #
Motion for a resolution Recital K a (new) Ka. whereas proposals for an EU framework for cross-border crisis management in the banking sector should take into account initiatives taken by international bodies, such as the G20 and IMF, in order to ensure a global level playing field,
Amendment 230 #
Motion for a resolution Annex – recommendation 3 – paragraph 3 – indent 4 Amendment 231 #
Motion for a resolution Annex – recommendation 3 – paragraph 3 – indent 4 Amendment 232 #
Motion for a resolution Annex – recommendation 3 – paragraph 3 – indent 4 Amendment 233 #
Motion for a resolution Annex – recommendation 3 – paragraph 3 – indent 4 a (new) • administrative measures or reparations for those Systemic Banks which make use of the EU Financial Stability Fund.
Amendment 234 #
Motion for a resolution Annex – recommendation 4 – paragraph 1 1. A resolution unit shall be established within the E
Amendment 235 #
Motion for a resolution Annex – recommendation 4 – paragraph 1 1. A resolution unit shall be established within the EBA to lead the resolution and insolvency procedures for
Amendment 236 #
Motion for a resolution Annex – recommendation 4 – paragraph 1 1. An independent resolution unit shall be established
Amendment 237 #
Motion for a resolution Annex – recommendation 4 – paragraph 1 1. An independent resolution unit shall be established
Amendment 238 #
Motion for a resolution Annex – recommendation 4 – paragraph 1 1. A resolution unit shall be established within the EBA to lead the resolution and insolvency procedures for
Amendment 239 #
Motion for a resolution Annex – recommendation 4 – paragraph 1 1. A resolution unit shall be established within the EBA to lead the resolution and insolvency procedures for Systemic Banks. This unit shall: • operate within the strict boundaries defined by the legal framework and the EBA’s competencies; • be a pool of legal and financial expertise specially skilled in bank restructurings, turnarounds and liquidation; • cooperate closely with national authorities on implementation, technical assistance and sharing of staff;
Amendment 24 #
Motion for a resolution Recital K a (new) Ka. whereas the measures applied in the banking sector must favour a differentiated approach so as not to penalise retail banking in its mission to provide finance for long-term investment,
Amendment 240 #
Motion for a resolution Annex – recommendation 4 – paragraph 1 1. A resolution unit shall be established within the EBA to lead the resolution and insolvency procedures for
Amendment 241 #
Motion for a resolution Annex – recommendation 4 – paragraph 1 a (new) 1a. Provided by the establishment of criteria for when a cross-border bank should be considered in crisis and that decision is taken on such a state of crisis, the resolution unit is given adequate powers to deal with the situation.
Amendment 242 #
Motion for a resolution Annex – recommendation 4 – paragraph 1 b (new) 1b. A clear distinction should be made between the powersthat the resolution unit should be given under "normal circumstances" and those powers the resolution unit shall be given in case of crisis.
Amendment 243 #
Motion for a resolution Annex – recommendation 4 – paragraph 1 c (new) Amendment 244 #
Motion for a resolution Annex – recommendation 4 – paragraph 1 a (new) 1a. The independent resolution unit’s toolbox should include at least the power to: • create a Bridge Bank or Good Bank/Bad Bank; • require swaps of debt into equity with appropriate haircuts; • take temporary public control; • winding-up.
Amendment 245 #
Motion for a resolution Annex – recommendation 4 – paragraph 1 d (new) 1d. The independent resolution unit’s toolbox should include at least the power to: • impose a total or partial sale; • create a Bridge Bank or Good Bank/Bad Bank; • require swaps of debt into equity with appropriate haircuts; • take temporary public control; • winding-up; • impose the opportunity for redemption of shares in certain specified cases.
Amendment 246 #
Motion for a resolution Annex – recommendation 4 – paragraph 1 b (new) 1b. For banks contributing to the EU Financial Stability Fund, the powers shall include: • provision of direct loans; • injection of capital.
Amendment 247 #
Motion for a resolution Annex – recommendation 4 – paragraph 1 e (new) 1e. For banks contributing to the EU Financial Stability Fund, the powers shall include: • provision of direct loans; • injection of capital.
Amendment 25 #
Motion for a resolution Recital L L. whereas Europe will have to build a
Amendment 26 #
Motion for a resolution Recital M M. whereas wide gaps between national regulatory and insolvency regimes must be bridged through a harmonised framework and reinforced dialogue among national supervisors and authorities within the Cross Border Stability Groups,
Amendment 27 #
Motion for a resolution Recital N N. whereas
Amendment 28 #
Motion for a resolution Recital N N. whereas
Amendment 29 #
Motion for a resolution Recital N N. whereas
Amendment 3 #
Motion for a resolution Recital A A. whereas there is at present insufficient
Amendment 30 #
Motion for a resolution Recital N N. whereas
Amendment 31 #
Motion for a resolution Recital N N. whereas a
Amendment 32 #
Motion for a resolution Recital N N. whereas a limited number of banks (“Systemic Banks”) represent an extremely high level of systemic risk due to their size, investment strategies, complexity and interconnectedness across Europe, calling for an urgent and targeted special regime; more generally equitable resolution regimes are required for other cross- border financial institutions,
Amendment 33 #
Motion for a resolution Recital N N. whereas a limited number of banks (“Systemic Banks”) represent an extremely high level of systemic risk due to their size, complexity and interconnectedness
Amendment 34 #
Motion for a resolution Recital N N. whereas a limited number of
Amendment 35 #
Motion for a resolution Recital N a (new) Na. whereas a framework for crisis resolution should be applicable to all cross border financial institutions,
Amendment 36 #
Motion for a resolution Recital N a (new) Na. whereas insurance entities are already structured so they have internal “resolution regimes”, and should one fail it would do so over time, being put into run off closes it to new business but allows it to honour its commitments to policyholders,
Amendment 37 #
Motion for a resolution Recital O O. whereas a
Amendment 38 #
Motion for a resolution Recital O O. whereas a
Amendment 39 #
Motion for a resolution Recital O O. whereas a special regime for
Amendment 4 #
Motion for a resolution Recital A a (new) Aa. having regard to Recommendation 13 of the report by the High-Level Group chaired by Jacques de Larosière submitted to President Barroso on 25 February 2009, in which 'The Group calls for a coherent and workable regulatory framework for crisis management in the EU',
Amendment 40 #
Motion for a resolution Recital O O. whereas a special regime for
Amendment 41 #
Motion for a resolution Recital O O. whereas a special regime for
Amendment 42 #
Motion for a resolution Recital P Amendment 43 #
Motion for a resolution Recital P Amendment 44 #
Motion for a resolution Recital P Amendment 45 #
Motion for a resolution Recital P Amendment 46 #
Motion for a resolution Recital P P. whereas the
Amendment 47 #
Motion for a resolution Recital P P. whereas the fast-track special framework for Systemic Banks should evolve in the medium/long term towards a universal regime covering all
Amendment 48 #
Motion for a resolution Recital P P. whereas the fast-track special framework for
Amendment 49 #
Motion for a resolution Recital P a (new) Pa. whereas a fundamental principle of regulation should be that no bank should be allowed to become "too big to fail",
Amendment 5 #
Motion for a resolution Recital B B. whereas existing
Amendment 50 #
Motion for a resolution Recital P b (new) Pb. whereas the elimination of "moral hazard" must be a guiding principle in future financial supervision,
Amendment 51 #
Motion for a resolution Recital P c (new) Amendment 52 #
Motion for a resolution Recital P d (new) Pd. whereas it is the duty of regulators in the Member States to develop early intervention tools and a resolution framework,
Amendment 53 #
Motion for a resolution Recital P e (new) Pe. whereas the experience of Northern Rock, AIG, and Lehman Brothers shows that systemic risk is not confined to banks, their type, or to their size or interconnectedness, and the main focus should be on identifying and restricting the behaviour that leads to systemic failure,
Amendment 54 #
Motion for a resolution Recital P a (new) Pa. whereas any stability fund developed on a pan-European basis must be ring- fenced for future crises resolution only and not useable for financial interventions for crises emerging as result of ongoing problems resulting from the financial crisis of 2007/2008,
Amendment 55 #
Motion for a resolution Recital P a (new) Pa. whereas national resolution authorities should have the legal authority to temporarily delay immediate operation of contractual early termination clauses in order to complete a transfer of certain financial market contracts to another sound financial institution, a bridge financial institution or other public entity,
Amendment 56 #
Motion for a resolution Recital P b (new) Pb. whereas supervision, early intervention powers and measures related to resolution should be considered as three interlinked steps of a common framework,
Amendment 57 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 1 1. Requests the Commission to submit to Parliament by 3
Amendment 58 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 1 1
Amendment 59 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 1 1. Requests the Commission to submit to Parliament by 31 December 2011, on the basis of Article 50 and Article 114 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,
Amendment 6 #
Motion for a resolution Recital C a (new) Ca. whereas the participation of shareholders at first and then of creditors to the burden sharing is crucial for reducing to the minimum the cost for taxpayers arising from any crisis of financial markets and institutions,
Amendment 60 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 3 3. Considers that the financial implications of the requested proposal should be covered by appropriate budgetary
Amendment 61 #
Motion for a resolution Annex – recommendation 1 – paragraph 1 – indent 7 a (new) • ensure that the interests of employees are taken into account;
Amendment 62 #
Motion for a resolution Annex – recommendation 1 – paragraph 1 – indent 8 a (new) • internalise negative externalities created by financial markets and institutions;
Amendment 63 #
Motion for a resolution Annex – recommendation 1 – paragraph 1 a (new) Amendment 64 #
Motion for a resolution Annex – recommendation 1 – paragraph 1 a (new) 1a. Make sure that no private customer deposit as well as central bank liquidity facilities should be used by big universal banks for refinancing high risk investment activities. For this purpose, internal fire walls should be set up by universal banks, also in order to enable supervisors to monitor this principle. This reduces risks for deposits and ensures that deposits and central bank liquidity will serve as main source of financing the real economy.
Amendment 65 #
Motion for a resolution Annex – recommendation 1 – paragraph 1 b (new) 1b. Ensure that no private customer deposit or central bank liquidity support is used by universal banks for refinancing high-risk investments; for this purpose, internal firewalls between a bank's areas of business should be set up in the banks.
Amendment 66 #
Motion for a resolution Annex – recommendation 1 – paragraph 2 2. Progressively
Amendment 67 #
Motion for a resolution Annex – recommendation 1 – paragraph 2 a (new) Amendment 68 #
Motion for a resolution Annex – recommendation 1 – paragraph 2 b (new) 2b. A binding regulation should define thresholds for triggering intervention of supervision and resolution authorities as well as binding guidelines for fiscal burden sharing in the framework of crisis management.
Amendment 69 #
Motion for a resolution Annex – recommendation 1 – paragraph 2 c (new) 2c. As a part of these guidelines, special provisions should be defined in order to guarantee fair treatment of all subsidiaries and branches of the same cross-border institution in all Member States and therefore avoid decapitalising subsidiaries and branches detrimental to host Member States' financial stability.
Amendment 7 #
Motion for a resolution Recital D D. whereas the lack of European regulations and supervision encouraged uncoordinated actions by national authorities which increased the risk of protectionist behaviour, distortion of competition and threatened the construction of an internal market for financial services,
Amendment 70 #
Motion for a resolution Annex – recommendation 1 – paragraph 2 d (new) 2d. Once the process related to harmonisation of insolvency and supervision provisions is completed at the end of the transition period there should be a single EU resolution authority as a separated body or as a unit within EBA.
Amendment 71 #
Motion for a resolution Annex – recommendation 1 – paragraph 2 e (new) 2e. National resolution authorities should have the legal authority to temporarily delay immediate operation of contractual early termination clauses in order to complete a transfer of certain financial market contracts to another sound financial institution, a bridge financial institution or other public entity. Accordingly, Directive 2002/47/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 6 June 2002 on financial collateral arrangements1 should be amended in order for resolution authorities to be able to complete such transfers. 1 OJ L 168, 27.6.2002, p. 43.
Amendment 72 #
Motion for a resolution Annex – recommendation 1 – paragraph 2 f (new) 2f. Resolution authorities should be entitled to derogate from a number of provisions of Directive 77/91/EEC, Directive 2004/25/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 April 2004 on takeover bids1, and Directive 2007/36/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 July 2007 on the exercise of certain rights of shareholders in listed companies2, adherence to which may delay or even block the rapid recapitalisation or the restructuring of a failing bank. 1 OJ L 142 , 30/04/2004 p.12. 2 OJ L 184, 14.7.2007, p. 17.
Amendment 73 #
Motion for a resolution Annex – recommendation 1 – paragraph 2 g (new) 2g. In order to improve cooperation and transparency, peer reviews of supervisors should be carried out on a regular basis under the lead of the European Banking Authority and should be built on prior self-assessment.
Amendment 74 #
Motion for a resolution Annex – recommendation 1 – paragraph 2 h (new) 2h. Whenever a resolution or a wind-up of a cross border institution arises, an in- depth investigation should be carried out by independent experts appointed by the European Banking Authority in order to highlight the causes and responsibilities involved. These investigations should be reported to the EP.
Amendment 75 #
Motion for a resolution Annex – recommendation 1 – paragraph 3 3. Attribute to the relevant supervisor the responsibility for crisis management and the approval of each bank’s contingency plan
Amendment 76 #
Motion for a resolution Annex – recommendation 1 – paragraph 3 3. Attribute
Amendment 77 #
Motion for a resolution Annex – recommendation 1 – paragraph 3 3. Attribute to the relevant supervisor the responsibility for crisis management and the approval of each bank’s contingency plan, as follows: • for
Amendment 78 #
Motion for a resolution Annex – recommendation 1 – paragraph 3 3. Attribute to the relevant supervisor the responsibility for
Amendment 79 #
Motion for a resolution Annex – recommendation 1 – paragraph 3 3. Attribute to the relevant supervisor the responsibility for crisis management and the approval of each bank’s contingency plan, as follows: • for
Amendment 8 #
Motion for a resolution Recital D D. whereas uncoordinated actions by
Amendment 80 #
Motion for a resolution Annex – recommendation 1 – paragraph 3 3. Attribute to the relevant supervisor the responsibility for crisis management and the approval of each bank’s contingency plan, as follows: • for
Amendment 81 #
Motion for a resolution Annex – recommendation 1 – paragraph 3 3. Attribute to the relevant supervisor the responsibility for crisis management and the approval of each bank’s contingency plan, as follows: • for
Amendment 82 #
Motion for a resolution Annex – recommendation 1 – paragraph 3 3. Attribute to the relevant supervisor the responsibility for crisis management and the approval of each bank’s contingency plan, as follows: • for Systemic Banks: the European Banking Authority (EBA) in close cooperation with the college of national supervisors and the Cross
Amendment 83 #
Motion for a resolution Annex – recommendation 1 – paragraph 3 3. Attribute to the relevant supervisor the responsibility for crisis management and the approval of each bank’s contingency plan, as follows: • for
Amendment 84 #
Motion for a resolution Annex – recommendation 1 – paragraph 3 3. Attribute to the relevant supervisor the responsibility for crisis management and the approval of each bank’s contingency plan, as follows: • for
Amendment 85 #
Motion for a resolution Annex – recommendation 1 – paragraph 3 3. Attribute to the relevant supervisor the responsibility for crisis management and the approval of each bank’s contingency plan, as follows: • for Systemic Banks: the European Banking Authority (EBA) in close cooperation with the college of national supervisors and the Cross
Amendment 86 #
Motion for a resolution Annex – recommendation 1 – paragraph 3 3. Attribute to the relevant supervisor the responsibility for crisis management and the approval of each bank’s contingency plan, as follows: • for Systemic Banks: the national financial supervisor in close cooperation with the European Banking Authority (EBA) in close cooperation with the college of national supervisors and the Cross
Amendment 87 #
Motion for a resolution Annex – recommendation 1 – paragraph 4 4. Design a
Amendment 88 #
Motion for a resolution Annex – recommendation 1 – paragraph 4 4. Design a
Amendment 89 #
Motion for a resolution Annex – recommendation 1 – paragraph 4 4. Design an EU supervisors’ common set of
Amendment 9 #
Motion for a resolution Recital E a (new) Ea. whereas players in the banking sector must be made accountable and whereas this accountability must contribute to the crucial objective of rebuilding the financial markets to serve the long-term financing of the economy,
Amendment 90 #
Motion for a resolution Annex – recommendation 1 – paragraph 4 4. Design an EU supervisors’ common set of rules for crisis management including common methodologies, definitions and terminology, as well as a set of relevant criteria for stress test of cross-border banks.
Amendment 91 #
Motion for a resolution Annex – recommendation 1 – paragraph 5 5. Resolution plans to become a mandatory regulatory requirement and to include details of a fair distribution of assets and capital, with appropriate clawback of transfers from subsidiaries and branches to other units, and identification of cleavage planes that allow separation of stand alone modules, especially those providing vital infrastructure such as payment services.
Amendment 92 #
Motion for a resolution Annex – recommendation 1 – paragraph 5 5. Resolution plans to become a mandatory regulatory requirement. The requirement for the content of the plan should be proportionate to the bank's size, activities and geographical spread.
Amendment 93 #
Motion for a resolution Annex – recommendation 1 – paragraph 5 5. Resolution plans to become a mandatory regulatory requirement on a regular basis, these plans must include an in depth self- assessment of the institution.
Amendment 94 #
Motion for a resolution Annex – recommendation 1 – paragraph 6 – introductory part 6. Design, before December 2011, a
Amendment 95 #
Motion for a resolution Annex – recommendation 1 – paragraph 6 – introductory part 6. Design, before December 2011, a
Amendment 96 #
Motion for a resolution Annex – recommendation 1 – paragraph 6 – indent 2 • leverage and desegregated short-term and long-term leverage;
Amendment 97 #
Motion for a resolution Annex – recommendation 1 – paragraph 7 7. Empower supervisors to intervene on the basis of
Amendment 98 #
Motion for a resolution Annex – recommendation 1 – paragraph 8 – subparagraph 1 – introductory part 8. Expand the crisis management minimum intervention toolbox available to supervisors
Amendment 99 #
Motion for a resolution Annex – recommendation 1 – paragraph 8 – subparagraph 1 – introductory part 8.
source: PE-441.146
2010/05/10
JURI
12 amendments...
Amendment 1 #
Draft opinion Recital A A. whereas there is a
Amendment 10 #
Draft opinion Paragraph 7 7. Believes that a uniform approach to preventing the failure of banking groups would be more in keeping with the concept of a single
Amendment 11 #
Draft opinion Paragraph 7 a (new) 7a. Emphasises the importance of respecting the principle of subsidiarity in any consideration of possible legislation for the banking sector;
Amendment 12 #
Draft opinion Paragraph 7 b (new) 7b. Reminds the Commission of the importance of carrying out full impact assessments in any consideration of the question whether new guidelines for the management of companies would be appropriate.
Amendment 2 #
Draft opinion Paragraph 1 1. Believes that the European Banking Authority should have the power to implement binding measures at EU level applicable to all Member States, whilst also empowering national supervisors to conduct day-to-day supervision to the highest possible level;
Amendment 3 #
Draft opinion Paragraph 2 2. Takes the view that ‘living wills’ should
Amendment 4 #
Draft opinion Paragraph 2 a (new) 2a. Believes that dismantling a banking group should also be an option at the initial stage (early intervention);
Amendment 5 #
Draft opinion Paragraph 4 a (new) 4a. Takes the view that the purpose of a European legislative framework for crisis resolution is to empower the authorities to adopt measures that include intervention in the management of banking groups, when this is necessary (and especially, but not exclusively, in deposit-taking banks, where there is a possibility of systemic risk);
Amendment 6 #
Draft opinion Paragraph 4 b (new) 4b. Considers, similarly, that the purpose of a European legislative framework for crisis resolution is also to regulate both cross-border banking groups and individual banks conducting cross-border operations solely through branches; believes also that there should be uniform regulation of the first of these categories;
Amendment 7 #
Draft opinion Paragraph 5 a (new) 5a. Expresses the opinion that derogations should nevertheless be made from certain of the requirements imposed by EU company law, to permit intervention by an authority in banking activities where this is justified in the public interest (interest of shareholders, creditors and the business environment concerned);
Amendment 8 #
Draft opinion Paragraph 6 a (new) 6a. Believes that cooperation and communication between authorities and administrators responsible for the resolution and insolvency of cross-border banking groups can be improved by establishing a set of ex-ante guidelines;
Amendment 9 #
Draft opinion Paragraph 6 b (new) 6b. Is of the view that any public aid or resolution fund must be designed in such a way as to avoid moral hazard and prevent excessive risk-taking; considers, in particular, that no resolution funds should be used to bail out shareholders of banks, who must face the full consequences of any losses, and that no resolution funds should be used for the payment of bonuses;
source: PE-441.250
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History
(these mark the time of scraping, not the official date of the change)
2012-02-09Show (5) Changes
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