2013/2021(INI) | [ParlTrack]

Motion for a resolution
Recital A a (new)

Aa. whereas these state financed bailouts lead to a massive increase of public indebtedness in the EU member states;

Amendment 100 #

Motion for a resolution
Recital J a (new)

Ja. whereas capital markets need to be able to meet European financial needs at a time of very constrained bank lending. There is a need in Europe to increase the availability of alternative financing sources, in particular through the development of capital market alternatives, to decrease the dependency on bank funding, as identified in the Commission's green paper on Long-Term Financing of the European Economy;

Amendment 101 #

Motion for a resolution
Recital J a (new)

Ja. whereas enhanced competition in the European banking industry is highly desirable; whereas the aggregated amount of legislative and regulatory requirements on banks, although indeed warranted for many reasons, risk to create barriers to entry and, therefore, facilitate the cementation of the current banking groups' dominant positions;

Amendment 102 #

Krišjānis KARIŅŠ, Gunnar HÖKMARK

Motion for a resolution
Recital J a (new)

Ja. whereas the EU banking sector faces far-reaching structural changes resulting from changes in the market situation and comprehensive regulatory reforms such as implementation of the Basel III rules;

Amendment 103 #

Motion for a resolution
Recital J a (new)

Ja. whereas the EU needs growth and jobs as businesses need capital and credit; EU banking sector plays an important role to initiate growth, therefore any reforms for the EU banking sector that would impede growth should be avoided;

Amendment 104 #

Motion for a resolution
Recital J a (new)

Ja. Whereas there is no evidence from the past that a separation model could positively contribute to avoid a future financial crisis or to diminish the risk of it;

Amendment 105 #

Motion for a resolution
Recital J a (new)

Ja. whereas the funding of the real economy by banks is significantly higher in most of the Member States than it is in the UK or the US;

Amendment 106 #

Motion for a resolution
Recital J b (new)

Jb. whereas the report of the Independent Commission on Banking and the Vickers reforms in the UK state several times that its recommendations are a policy approach for UK banks;

Amendment 107 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1

1. Welcomes the HLEG's analysis and recommendations on banking reform ~~and considers them a sound basis for initiating reforms~~. However, considers that legislative initiatives currently processed or recently adopted, such as the Single supervisory mechanism, the capital and prudential requirements regulation and directive, the Bank recovery and resolution directive, the Deposit guarantee scheme, MiFID and MiFIR, the Market abuse regulation and directive, the European markets infrastructure regulation, the Alternative investment fund managers' directive, the Financial transaction tax, the Insurance mediation directive, the Insurance guarantee schemes, the Investor compensation schemes, Omnibus II, Solvecny II, UCITS II, the Credit rating agencies legislation and Short-selling legislation, should be implemented and allowed to come into operation and that the outcome thereof should be taken as a basis for the assessment of what might be needed in the future;

Amendment 108 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1

1. Welcomes the HLEG's analysis and recommendations on banking reform and considers them a sound ~~basis for initiating reform~~contribution; is of the opinion that any reform should take into account the EU funding opportunities available to the real economy, and in this respect, the role played by the banks;

Amendment 109 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1

1. Welcomes the HLEG's analysis and recommendations on banking reform and considers them a sound basis for initiating reforms, subject to a comprehensive impact assessment proving that such reforms are necessary taking into account the impact of the full implementation of the existing package of reforms to capital, liquidity, resolution and capital markets;

Amendment 11 #

Motion for a resolution
Recital B

B. whereas in the five years since the 2008 global economic and financial crisis, the EU economy has remained in a state of recession, with Member States providing subsidies and implicit guarantees to banks through such schemes as the deposit guarantee scheme as well as liquidity provision from central banks and outright nationalisation of banks which are at risk of insolvency;

Amendment 110 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1

1. Welcomes the HLEG's analysis and recommendations on banking reform and considers them a ~~sound basis for~~useful contribution to initiat~~ing~~e reforms and fully assess their impact;

Amendment 111 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1

1. Welcomes the HLEG's analysis and recommendations on banking reform and considers them a sound basis for ~~initiating~~discussions about necessity of potential additional reforms;

Amendment 112 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1

1. Welcomes the ~~HLEG~~Liikanan Group’s analysis and recommendations on banking reform and considers them a sound basis for initiating reforms;

Amendment 113 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1

1. Welcomes the HLEG's analysis and recommendations on banking reform and considers them a sound basis for the first steps initiating reforms;

Amendment 114 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1 a (new)

1a. Takes the view that mandatory separation could damage the market making function in fixed-income markets. This would have adverse effects on the real economy. In particular, it would increase the costs and risks borne by both sovereign borrowers, corporates and the functioning of the financial sector as a whole.

Amendment 115 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1 a (new)

1a. Stresses that many of the issues identified in the HLEG's report are addressed by currently processed and already adopted legislative initiatives, most importantly by the proposal for a Directive on bank recovery and resolution;

Amendment 116 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1 b (new)

1b. Believes that higher capital and liquidity buffers in combination with robust recovery and resolution regimes and reduced interconnectivity are essential in order to create financial stability. The proposal from the HLEG in relation to mandatory separation of banking activities has to be carefully assessed and be regarded as a possible complement to enhanced capital and liquidity requirements and other reforms already agreed upon. The impact assessment has to assess whether structural reform is needed. A proposal from the Commission to require separation along the lines proposed by the HLEG should not be taken until other legislative reforms have taken full effect.

Amendment 117 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1 b (new)

1b. Highlights that HLEG's analysis shows that no particular business model did better than others during the financial crisis of 2008-09; underlines that this insight must be a point of departure of the analysis for further initiatives;

Amendment 118 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 2

2. Takes the view that while current proposals for reforms of EU banking sector rules (including the Capital Requirements Directive and Regulation, the Recovery and Resolution Directive, the Single Supervisory Mechanism, the Deposit Guarantee Schemes Directive and shadow banking initiatives) are vital, ~~a more fundamental reform of the banking structure is essential, and complementary to the other proposals~~they must be fully implemented and their cumulative effects assessed inter alia concerning complexity, risk-taking incentives and systemic risk; underlines that further reforms are necessary of banking structures as well as resolution, taking into account the global banking framework;

Amendment 119 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 2

2. Takes the view that while current proposals for reforms of EU banking sector rules (including the Capital Requirements Directive and Regulation, the Recovery and Resolution Directive, the Single Supervisory Mechanism, the Deposit Guarantee Schemes Directive and shadow banking initiatives) are ~~vital, a more fundamental reform of the banking structure is essential, and complementary to the other proposals~~already leading to fundamental structural changes, a reform of the banking structure should only be considered if it brings about proven incremental benefits in respect of the other proposal and after a thorough assessment of the impact on the European economy;

Amendment 12 #

Motion for a resolution
Recital B

B. whereas in the five years since the 2008 global economic and financial crisis, the EU economy has remained in a state of recession, with Member States providing subsidies and implicit guarantees to banks; whereas the vicious circle involving the solvency of states and banks must be broken once and for all;

Amendment 120 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 2

2. Takes the view that ~~while current~~existing and forthcoming proposals for reforms of EU banking sector rules (including the Capital Requirements Directive and Regulation, the Recovery and Resolution Directive, the Single Supervisory Mechanism, the Deposit Guarantee Schemes Directive and shadow banking initiatives, as well as the European Market Infrastructure Regulation and the Markets in Financial Instruments Directive and Regulation) are vital, a ~~more~~nd contribute to a fundamental reform of the ~~banking structure is essential~~European banking sector; underlines that additional proposals for structural reform of the banking sector must be consistent with, and complementary to, the other proposals;

Amendment 121 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 2

2. Takes the view that while current proposals for reforms of EU banking sector rules (including the Capital Requirements Directive and Regulation, the Recovery and Resolution Directive, the Single Supervisory Mechanism, the Deposit Guarantee Schemes Directive and shadow banking initiatives) are vital, a more fundamental reform of the banking structure is essential, and complementary to the other proposals; notes that the above initiatives do not tackle the issue of 'too big to fail' but are primarily about strengthening existing structures; suggests that further reform is required in order to allow markets to function, which would in turn allow banks to be resolved without state intervention.

Amendment 122 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 2

2. Takes the view that while current proposals for reforms of EU banking sector rules (including the Capital Requirements Directive and Regulation, the Recovery and Resolution Directive, the Single Supervisory Mechanism, the Deposit Guarantee Schemes Directive and shadow banking initiatives) are vital, ~~a more fundamental reform of the banking structure is essential~~but should still come into effect; underlines that the cumulative impact of the new European financial regulation should be assessed and evaluated; stresses that such impact analysis should be taken into account when considering essential and more fundamental reforms of the banking structure, and complementary to the other proposals;

Amendment 123 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 2

2. Takes the view that while current proposals for reforms of EU banking sector rules (including the Capital Requirements Directive and Regulation, the Recovery and Resolution Directive, the Single Supervisory Mechanism, the Deposit Guarantee Schemes Directive ~~and shadow banking initiatives) are vital, a more fundamental~~, European Markets Infrastructure Regulation, Markets in Financial Instruments Directive and shadow banking initiatives) in conjunction with the regulations on the European Supervisory Authorities and the European Systemic Risk Board are vital, further reform of the banking structure ~~is essential, and~~may only be required, where complementary to the other proposals;.

Amendment 124 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 2

2. Takes the view that while current proposals for reforms of EU banking sector rules (including the Capital Requirements Directive and Regulation, the Recovery and Resolution Directive, the Single Supervisory Mechanism, the Deposit Guarantee Schemes Directive and shadow banking initiatives) ~~are vital, a more fundamental reform of the banking structure is essential, and complementary to the other proposals~~should be adopted, implemented and allowed to come into operation before the need for further legislative initiatives is assessed;

Amendment 125 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 2

2. Takes the view that ~~while~~ current proposals for reforms of EU banking sector rules (including the Capital Requirements Directive and Regulation, the Recovery and Resolution Directive, the Single Supervisory Mechanism, the Deposit Guarantee Schemes Directive and shadow banking initiatives) are ~~vital, a more fundamental reform of the banking structure is essential, and complementary to the other proposals~~present fundamental steps towards reform which will be complemented by other reform measures set out in this own-initiative report;

Amendment 126 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 2

2. Takes the view that ~~while~~ current proposals for reforms of EU banking sector rules (including the Capital Requirements Directive and Regulation, the Recovery and Resolution Directive, the Single Supervisory Mechanism, the Deposit Guarantee Schemes Directive and shadow banking initiatives) are ~~vital, a more~~essential in achieving a fundamental reform of the banking structure ~~is essential, and complementary to the other proposals~~;

Amendment 127 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 2

2. Takes the view that while current proposals for reforms of EU banking sector rules (including the Capital Requirements Directive and Regulation, the Recovery and Resolution Directive, the Single Supervisory Mechanism, the Deposit Guarantee Schemes Directive and shadow banking initiatives) ~~are vital, a more fundamental reform of the banking structure is essential, and~~establish better oversight and protection, structural reforms are complementary to th~~e other~~ose proposals;

Amendment 128 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 2

2. Takes the view that ~~while~~ current proposals for reforms of EU banking sector rules (including the Capital Requirements Directive and Regulation, the Recovery and Resolution Directive, the Single Supervisory Mechanism, the Deposit Guarantee Schemes Directive and shadow banking initiatives) are vital~~, a more fundamental reform of the banking structure is essential, and complementary to the other proposals~~;

Amendment 129 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 2

2. Takes the view that while current proposals for reforms of EU banking sector rules (including the Capital Requirements Directive and Regulation, the Recovery and Resolution Directive, the Single Supervisory Mechanism, the Deposit Guarantee Schemes Directive and shadow banking initiatives) are vital, a more fundamental reform of the banking structure is essential, and complementary to the other proposals, as it would further address issues such as risk-taking incentives, complexity, intra-group subsidies, resolvability and systemic risk;

Amendment 13 #

Motion for a resolution
Recital B

B. whereas in the five years since the 2008 global economic and financial crisis, the EU economy ~~has remained~~continues to be in a state of recession, with Mmember Sstates providing subsidies and implicit guarantees to banks due to also inadequate implementation of the economic and fiscal framework;

Amendment 130 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 2

2. Takes the view that while current proposals for reforms of EU banking sector rules (including the Capital Requirements Directive and Regulation, the Recovery and Resolution Directive, the Single Supervisory Mechanism, the Deposit Guarantee Schemes Directive and shadow banking initiatives) are vital and their structural impacts have to take effect, a more fundamental reform of the banking structure is essential, and complementary to the other proposals;

Amendment 131 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 2

2. Takes the view that ~~while~~ current proposals for reforms of EU banking sector rules (including the Capital Requirements Directive and Regulation, the Recovery and Resolution Directive, the Single Supervisory Mechanism, the Deposit Guarantee Schemes Directive and shadow banking initiatives) are vital, but that a more fundamental reform of the banking structure is also essential, and complementary to the other proposals;

Amendment 132 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 2

2. Takes the view that while current proposals for reforms of EU banking sector rules (including the Capital Requirements Directive and Regulation, the Recovery and Resolution Directive, the Single Supervisory Mechanism, the Deposit Guarantee Schemes Directive and shadow banking initiatives) are vital, a more fundamental reform of the banking structure is ~~essential~~called for, and complementary to the other proposals;

Amendment 133 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 2 a (new)

2a. notes that consumer confidence in the financial services sector can only be restored if banks act in the interests of their customers, and not solely in the interests of their shareholders and employees; emphasises the need for customers to be alerted to the fact that their money is not kept in the bank itself but lent out to other enterprises, companies and governments; notes that on this basis, deposits are in fact investments in the bank and that retail investors must have this made clear to them when opening deposit accounts;

Amendment 134 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 2 a (new)

2a. Urges the Commission to come forward with a proposal for a principles based approach to structural reforms of the European banking sector that is consistent with, and complementary to, already existing and forthcoming Union legislation for financial services; takes the view that EBA should play a key role by developing relevant technical standards to ensure consistent application and enforcement by the competent authorities, including the ECB, across the Union;

Amendment 135 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 2 a (new)

2a. Maintains that structural reform, particularly if it results in a simpler and more modular banking system, is a more effective approach to achieving financial stability, competitivity and market discipline than a regulatory arms race in which ever more complex banking products, activities and structures are countered ex-post with increasingly unwieldy and equally complex sectoral legislation;

Amendment 136 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 2 a (new)

2a. Stresses that particularly the higher capital requirements and clearing obligations for OTC-traded derivatives will make a significant contribution to reducing risk in the financial sector;

Amendment 137 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 2 a (new)

2a. It is noted that capital rules are overly complex and that structural reforms should not add to complexity and should be aimed at paving the way for simplification and thereby greater transparency. Simplicity should also be emphasised in the approval of recovery and resolution plans;

Amendment 138 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 2 a (new)

2a. Considers that financial stability at the national level should not come at the expense of the free movement of capital and single market integration.

Amendment 139 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 2 a (new)

2a. Underlines the importance the funds for DGS and RRD measures stipulated in the Recovery and Resolution Directive and the Deposit Guarantee Schemes Directive will have for the financial stability;

Amendment 14 #

Motion for a resolution
Recital B

B. whereas in the five years since the 2008 global economic and financial crisis, the EU economy has remained in a state of recession, with Member States providing s~~ubsidies~~tate anid i~~mplicit guarantees to banks~~n form of capital and guarantees to banks and markets that have remained fragmented;

Amendment 140 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 2 a (new)

2a. Deplores the national initiatives in France, Germany and UK that, although well intended, risk to undermine the Single Market and distort competition in the EU banking sector;

Amendment 141 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 2 b (new)

2b. Underscores that while, for a bank with a given business model, prudential requirements aim at reducing the probability of failure and recovery and resolution requirements aim at limiting the cost of such a failure, the most effective way to prevent future systemic instability is to directly address the size, complexity, interconnectedness, degree of maturity mismatch and other factors that lead to market-distorting implicit subsidies for many banks in the first place, and are inherent in their business models;

Amendment 142 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 2 b (new)

2b. Considers there is a strong need in Europe for harmonization and common rules. The creation of the Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM), a Single Rulebook and a Single Resolution Mechanism reinforces the need for a European approach towards reform of bank structures, avoiding a patchwork of national initiatives.

Amendment 143 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 2 b (new)

2b. Urges the Commission to conduct, in any further legislative initiatives, a thorough analysis, in advance, of the effects of the laws on regulation in the banking sector which are currently under discussion or have already been adopted and to include the results in an impact study on the legislative proposal;

Amendment 144 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 2 c (new)

2c. Emphasizes the importance of a well- balanced and diversified funding structure in terms of sources of financing, maturity and other risk exposures, nonetheless cautions that separation of banks will make the different structures less diversified and more expensive.

Amendment 145 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 3

3. Insists that the Commission's impact assessment include a thorough assessment of the cost to both public finances and financial stability of the failure of an EU- based bank during the current crisis, together with information on the nature of the EU's current universal banking model, including the size and balance sheets of the retail and investment activities of all universal banks operating in the EU, broken down by individual bank and countryincluding all cumulative costs and benefits of adopted legislation for the EU banking sector together with information on additional costs and benefits of other proposals currently discussed and expected to be adopted;

Amendment 146 #

Pervenche BERÈS

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 3

3. Insists that the Commission's impact assessment include a thorough assessment of the cost to both public finances and financial stability of the failure of an EU- based bank during the current crisis~~, together with information on the nature of the EU's current universal~~ and adopt a comparative approach concerning the costs, losses and advantages associated to the various banking model~~, includ~~s existing ing the ~~size and balance sheets of the retail and investment activities of all universal banks operating in the EU, broken down by individual bank and country~~different member States in terms of resilience in the crisis, contribution to the stability of financial markets, relationship with shadow banking system, financing of SMEs and long term investment;

Amendment 147 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 3

3. Insists that the Commission’s impact assessment include a thorough assessment of the cost to both public finances and financial stability of the failure of an EU- based bank during the current crisis, ~~together with~~as well as an assessment of the costs which would be entailed by a structural reform as regards the role of banks in financing the European economy, expressly taking account of the significant differences in the structure of the banking sectors of the various Member States, and also taking into account the impact of the measures which are currently being devised or have already been adopted both under the aegis of the Basel Committee and at EU level, and that the assessment provide information on the nature of the EU’s current universal banking model, including the size and balance sheets of the ~~retail~~depository/lending activities and trading and investment activities of all universal banks operating in the EU, broken down by individual bank and country;

Amendment 148 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 3

3. Insists that the Commission's impact assessment include a thorough assessment of the cost to both public finances and financial stability of the failure of an EU- based bank during the current crisis, together with information on the nature of the EU's current universal banking model, including the size and balance sheets of the retail and investment activities of all universal banks operating in the EU, broken down by individual bank and country; the impact assessment should also explore: the present financing needs of the European economy; the effects on the competitive landscape; incremental benefits, considering the regulatory changes already underway (as stressed in the ECB opinion); the impact on diversity of funding sources for the real economy and on European businesses' access to capital markets financing;

Amendment 149 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 3

3. Insists that the Commission's impact assessment include a thorough assessment of the value of implicit guarantees provided by Member States to banks, including a methodology for regularly monitoring that value at Member State and Union level as an essential prerequisite for being able to assess the effectiveness of legislation at reducing the value of those guarantees, as well as the cost to both public finances and financial stability of the failure of an EU- based bank during the current crisis, together with information on the nature of the EU's current universal banking model, including the size and balance sheets of the retail ~~and investment~~banking and proprietary market risk taking activities of all universal banks operating in the EU, broken down by individual bank and country;

Amendment 15 #

Motion for a resolution
Recital B

B. whereas in the f~~ive~~our years since the 2008/2009 global economic and financial crisis, the EU economy has remained in a state of recession, with Member States providing subsidies and implicit guarantees to banks;

Amendment 150 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 3

3. ~~Insists that~~Urges the Commission’ to include in its impact assessment ~~include a thorough assessment~~an evaluation of the cost to both public finances and financial stability of the failure of an EU- based bank during the current crisis, together with information on the nature of the EU’s current universal banking model, including the size and balance sheets of the retail and investment activities of all universal banks operating in the EU, broken down by individual bank and country;

Amendment 151 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 3

3. Insists that the Commission's impact assessment includes a ~~thorough~~comprehensive assessment of the ~~cost to bo~~impact of the p~~ublic finances and financial stabilit~~otential structural reforms on funding costs, as well as possible unintended consequences namely ofn the ~~failure of an EU- based bank during the current crisis~~provision of credit to the real economy, together with information on the nature of the EU's current universal banking model, including the size and balance sheets of the retail, client-related services and investment activities of all universal banks operating in the EU, broken down by individual bank and country;

Amendment 152 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 3

3. Insists that the Commission's impact assessment include a thorough assessment of the cost to both public finances and financial stability of the failure of an EU- based bank during the current crisis, together with information on the nature of the EU's current universal banking model, including the size and balance sheets of the retail and investment activities of all universal banks operating in the EU, broken down by individual bank and country; reminds in this regard of the funding requirements stipulated for RRD and DGS and underlines the important contribution these will make in enhancing financial stability;

Amendment 153 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 3

3. Insists that the Commission’s impact assessment include a thorough assessment of the cost to both public finances and financial stability of the failure of an EU- based bank during the current crisis, together with information on the nature of the EU’s current universal banking model, including the size and balance sheets of the retail and investment activities of all universal banks operating in the EU, broken down by individual bank and country;(does not affect the English version)

Amendment 154 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 3 a (new)

3a. Stresses that also an impact assessment of the cost to the EU economy of splitting up certain banks needs to be taken into account when developing possible measures; underlines that such an impact assessment should also provide a clear picture on the desired timing of such possible reforms given the difficult economic situation within the European Union;

Amendment 155 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 3 a (new)

3a. Requires that the Commission's impact assessment take account of all other regulatory proposals designed to mitigate the costs of future bank failure and promote financial stability, in particular CRD IV and the Recovery and Resolution directive;

Amendment 156 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 3 a (new)

3a. Considers, moreover, that in view, inter alia, of the current difficult economic situation in the European Union, this impact assessment should also investigate the desirable timetable for such structural reforms;

Amendment 157 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 4

4. Reminds the Commission of the warning issued by the European Banking Authority and the European Central Bank (ECB) that financial innovation can undermine the objectives of structural reforms, and iconsistders that ~~structural reforms be subject to periodic review7~~ the eventual need for structural reforms might be considered once the current and recently concluded legislative procedures have come into operation7;

Amendment 158 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 4

4. Reminds the Commission of the warning issued by the European Banking Authority and the European Central Bank (ECB) that financial innovation can undermine the objectives of structural reforms, and ~~insists that~~the necessity for structural reforms to be subject to periodic review7 having regard that it is critical not to create a sense of continuous uncertainty for financial institutions which would be detrimental to strategic planning ;

Amendment 159 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 4

4. Reminds the Commission of the warning issued by the European Banking Authority and the European Central Bank (ECB) that financial innovation can undermine the objectives of structural reforms, and insists that structural reforms be subject to periodic review7 to ensure that financial institutions are not benefiting from regulatory arbitrage;

Amendment 16 #

Motion for a resolution
Recital B a (new)

Ba. whereas the OECD in its 2012 report estimates the value of implicit state guarantees, in terms of cost savings to EU banks, at around 100 Billion USD for 2012 with wide variations between banks and Member States and the greatest benefit accruing to the banks of greatest size, particularly if they are perceived to be weak, and to banks based in the Member States with the highest sovereign credit rating. Furthermore the report finds that such guarantees extend beyond those banks classified as SIFIs under the FSB's methodology;

Amendment 160 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 4

4. Reminds the Commission of the warning issued by the European Banking Authority and the European Central Bank (ECB) that financial innovation can undermine the objectives of structural reforms, and insists that structural reforms be subject to ~~periodic review7~~reviews at least every two years;

Amendment 161 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 4

4. Reminds the Commission of the warning issued by the European Banking Authority and the European Central Bank (ECB) that financial innovation can undermine the objectives of structural reforms, and insists that structural reforms be subject to periodic review7;(does not affect the English version)

Amendment 162 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 4 a (new)

4a. Invites the Commission to consider legislation applicable to the whole EU financial sector that explicitly prohibits activities and transactions whose primary purpose is deemed by the relevant authorities to be regulatory arbitrage or any other circumvention of sectoral legislation;

Amendment 163 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 5

5. Urges the Commission to ~~ensure that the core principles of reform detailed in paragraph 7 also apply to the shadow banking sector and un~~bring forward a legislative proposal on the regulation of shadow banks in order to ensure that the same capital and liquidity standards as well as risk management and governance requirements apply to still unregulated areas as those already set up for the regulated areas of the financial services sector;

Amendment 164 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 5

5. Urges the Commission to ensure that the core principles of reform detailed in paragraph 7 also apply to the shadow banking sector and unregulated areas of the financial services sector in a way that is tailored to the specific nature of the services they provide;

Amendment 165 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 5

5. Urges the Commission to ensure that the core principles of reform ~~detailed in paragraph 7~~s also apply to the shadow banking sector and unregulated areas of the financial services sector;

Amendment 166 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 5

5. Urges the Commission to ensure that the core principles of reform detailed in paragraph 7 also apply to the shadow banking sector and unregulated areas of the financial services sector if a structural review was to be initiated;

Amendment 167 #

Syed KAMALL, Theodor Dumitru STOLOJAN, Sharon BOWLES, Wolf KLINZ, Sven GIEGOLD

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 5 a (new)

5a. Notes that the HLEG did not look at the issue of accounting standards and their role in financial crisis in sufficient depth; notes that European company law requires that accounts must be true and fair in order for directors of a company to discharge their liabilities to creditors and shareholders of companies; suggests that as a consequence of international financial reporting standards being overly complex and being principally about providing information to the share trading part of capital markets, these standards did and do not give a true and fair view of banks' accounts; notes that despite commitments from the IASB to update IAS 39 on loan loss provisioning from an incurred to expected loss model, its adoption has been delayed due to concerns expressed by FASB that the revised IASB model is still not a lifetime expected loss model; notes that although moving to an expected loss model recognises the problems caused by IAS 39 during the crisis, the added complexity may well create problems of their own; argues that, therefore, structural reform must include a thorough assessment of what role accounts should play in driving better governance of banks;

Amendment 168 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 5 a (new)

5a. recalls that any banking reform would not deliver if the supervision is not undertaken at the relevant level or is not provided with appropriate means; underlines that the transmission of information is key to ensure quality work by supervisors;

Amendment 169 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 5 a (new)

5a. Invites the EC to transpose the recommendations of the different workstreams of the FSB on shadow banking, in particular the proposals on repo transaction and security lending.

Amendment 17 #

Motion for a resolution
Recital C

C. whereas excessive risk-taking, excessive leverage, inadequate equity capital and liquidity requirements ~~and~~, the excessive complexity of the overall banking system ~~were at the root of~~, excessively-large banking sectors in small economies, a lack of checks and supervision, excessive expansion of trading in derivatives, incorrect rating assessments and excessive bonus systems contributed to causing the financial crisis;

Amendment 170 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 6

6. Considers that ~~the core principle of~~every banking reform must ~~be to~~ deliver a safe, stable and efficient banking system that serves the needs of the real economy, customers and consumers; takes the view that ~~structural reform must stimulate economic growth by supporting the provision of credit to the economy, in particular to SMEs and start-ups,~~legislation must provide ~~greater~~strong resilience against potential financial crises, enhance financial stability, restore trust and confidence in banks and remove risks to public finances and aim to foster economic growth by supporting the provision of credit to the economy, in particular to SMEs and start- ups;

Amendment 171 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 6

6. Considers that the core principle of banking reform must be to deliver a safe, stable and efficient banking system that serves the needs of the ~~real~~ economy, customers and consumers; takes the view that structural reform m~~ust stimulate~~ight in fact hamper economic growth by ~~support~~reducing the ~~provision~~overall supply of credit to the economy, in particular to SMEs and start-ups~~, provide gre~~ which often imply risks to those who lend to them, but also risking to reduce rather ~~resilience against potential financial crises, restore trust an~~than increase the resilience of the banking system as funding sources will be less diversified, and increase risks to public finances. Therefore, is of the opinion that an eventual structural reform must be based con~~fidence in banks and remove risks to public financ~~ a clear analysis whether it would increase or decrease risk, whether it would be compatible with bail-in and in the perspective of current and recently concluded legislative initiatives;

Amendment 172 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 6

6. Considers that the core principle of banking reform must be to deliver a safe, stable, competitive, transparent and efficient banking system, where ultimately no bank benefits from implicit public subsidies and all banks that reach the point of non-viability can be wound up or resolved without the need for extraordinary public support, that serves the needs of the real economy through the economic cycle, customers and consumers; takes the view that structural reform must stimulate economic growth by supporting the provision of credit to the economy, in particular to SMEs and start-ups, provide greater resilience against potential financial crises, restore trust and confidence in banks and remove risks to public finances;

Amendment 173 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 6

6. Considers that the core principle of banking reform must be to deliver a safe, stable and efficient banking system that serves the needs of the real economy, customers and consumers; takes the view that structural reform must stimulate economic growth by supporting the provision of credit to the economy, in particular to SMEs and start-ups, provide greater resilience against potential financial crises, restore trust and confidence in banks and remove risks to public finances; Recognises also that market making is an essential part of the infrastructure of fixed-income markets in EU-countries and that the importance of market making for fixed-income markets has been recognised by the European Parliament in the current review of MiFID/MiFIR.

Amendment 174 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 6

6. Considers that the core principle of banking reform must be to deliver a safe, stable and efficient banking system that serves the needs of the real economy, customers and consumers; takes the view that shat any reforms, including structural ~~reform~~ones, must stimulate economic growth by supporting the provision of credit and banking services to the economy, in particular to SMEs and start-ups, provide greater resilience against potential financial crises, restore trust and confidence in banks and re~~mov~~duce risks to public finances;

Amendment 175 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 6

6. Considers that the core principle of banking reform must be to deliver a safe, stable and efficient banking system that serves the needs of the real economy, customers and consumers; takes the view that structural reform must stimulate economic growth by supporting the provision of credit to the economy, in particular to SMEs and start-ups, provide greater resilience against potential financial crises~~, restore trust and confidence in banks~~ and remove risks to public finances;

Amendment 176 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 6

6. Considers that the core principle of potential banking reform must be to deliver a safe, stable and efficient banking system that serves the needs of the real economy, customers and consumers; takes the view that ~~structur~~every additional reform must stimulate economic growth by supporting the provision of credit to the economy, in particular to SMEs and start-ups, provide greater resilience against potential financial crises, restore trust and confidence in banks and remove risks to public finances;

Amendment 177 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 6

6. Considers that the core principle of banking reform must be to deliver a safe, stable and efficient banking system that serves the needs of the real economy, customers and consumers; takes the view that structural reform must stimulate economic growth by supporting the provision of credit to the economy, in particular to SMEs and start-ups, provide greater resilience against potential financial crises, restore trust and confidence in banks, harmonise liability and risk and remove risks to public finances;

Amendment 178 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 6

6. Considers that the core principle of banking reform, if conducted, must be to deliver a safe, stable and efficient banking system that serves the needs of the real economy, customers and consumers; takes the view that structural reform must stimulate economic growth by supporting the provision of credit to the economy, in particular to SMEs and start-ups, provide greater resilience against potential financial crises, restore trust and confidence in banks and remove risks to public finances;

Amendment 179 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 6

6. Considers that the core principle of banking reform must be to deliver a safe, stable and efficient banking system that serves the needs of the real economy, customers and consumers; takes the view that structural reform must stimulate economic growth by supporting the provision of sustainable credit to the economy, in particular to SMEs and start- ups, provide greater resilience against potential financial crises, restore trust and confidence in banks and remove risks to public finances;

Amendment 18 #

Motion for a resolution
Recital C

C. whereas excessive risk-taking, excessive leverage, inadequate capital and liquidity requirements ~~and the excessive complexity of the overall banking system~~, disincentives in the compensation systems of many financial institutions, an excessive share of the financial sectors of the economies of some Member States and incorrect ratings were at the root of the financial crisis;

Amendment 180 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 6 a (new)

6a. notes that existing proposals, although welcome, seek to tackle specific activities, relationships and products that are perceived to be problematic; argues that the ongoing crisis is in part due to the fact that banks and sovereigns are inappropriately connected via implicit and explicit state guarantees as a consequence of certain banks being too big to fail; suggests that further reform is required in order to ensure that banks do not benefit from implicit or explicit state guarantees and they are subject to market forces as other private companies are;

Amendment 181 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 6 a (new)

6a. Observes that while investment firms are often portrayed as 'casino banks', it should be noted that they do play an important role in our economy by connecting investors, including pension funds to companies. Further, creating and trading financial assets, is important for allocating capital to people, entrepreneurs and businesses that are likely to be profitable and beneficial to society; these activities should not be prejudiced by structural reforms but unnecessary financial churning should be targeted;

Amendment 182 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 6 a (new)

6a. Remembers that one of the main reasons why the situation in Cyprus has been so difficult to deal with is the fact that the banking system was more or less solely dependent on retail deposits for its funding. Highlights that had there been a larger share of unsecured debt-holders in the funding mix of Cypriot banks, the extraordinarily unfortunate debacle of bailing in insured depositors most probably would not have taken place;

Amendment 183 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 6 a (new)

6a. Recognises the importance of market making activities to the provision of credit and risk management services to the real economy, the value that universal banks can provide to their customers and the risks associated with structural measures;

Amendment 184 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 6 a (new)

6a. Calls for more legal certainty and clarity in all ongoing and additional reforms, which have direct impact on funding costs for banks and - in consequence - also effect lending to the real economy;

Amendment 185 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 6 b (new)

6b. Considers that banking activities that are essential for the functioning of the EU capital markets, such as market making, certain hedging activities, certain types of forex and interest related derivatives transactions, must not be hampered by new reform initiatives, these activities should be analysed and addressed on the basis of their importance for the functioning of the capital markets and creating long term economic growth;

Amendment 186 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 6 b (new)

6b. Suggests that banking reform must identify which financial systems, services and processes must be protected in the event of a crisis to ensure civil order is maintained; argues that it is only appropriate for the state to guarantee these essential systems, services and processes; points out that non essential services should be priced at the market rate;

Amendment 187 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 6 b (new)

6b. Acknowledges the potential problems posed by large and overly complex banking groups. Is of the opinion that such concerns are most effectively mitigated through a credible recovery and resolution framework whereby it is ensured shareholders and bank creditors will be the ones to bear the losses from bank failures;

Amendment 188 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 6 c (new)

6c. Underlines that banks which are solely dependent on deposits and retail activities, thereby reducing the possible scope for bail-in, might pose a risk to public finances, as was clearly seen in Cyprus;

Amendment 189 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 7

7. Considers that an effective banking system must deliver a change in banking culture in order to reduce complexity, enhance competition, limit interconnectedness between risky and commercial activities, improve corporate governance, create a responsible remuneration system, allow effective bank resolution and recovery, reinforce bank capital and deliver credit to the ~~real~~ economy. Reiterates there are multiple ways of achieving these goals and that some 20 legislative initiatives have already been proposed to address these very issues;

Amendment 19 #

Motion for a resolution
Recital C

C. whereas excessive risk-taking, excessive leverage, inadequate capital and liquidity requirements and ~~the excessive complexity of the overall banking system were at the root of the financial crisis;~~ inadequate risk management were at the root of the financial crisis, which had been largely fuelled by excessive real-estate exposures, rather than capital market activities, and by insufficient supervision;

Amendment 190 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 7

7. Considers that an effective banking system must deliver a change in banking culture in order to reduce complexity, enhance competition, limit interconnectedness between risky and commercial activities, improve corporate governance, create a responsible remuneration system, allow effective bank resolution and recovery, reinforce bank capital and deliver credit to the real economy; suggests that this will be achieved by introducing a greater degree of personal liability to ensure the managers of companies take responsibility for the actions and decisions of their employees;

Amendment 191 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 7

7. Considers that an effective banking system must deliver a change in banking culture ~~in order to~~and reduce complexity, ~~enhance competition~~simplify the structure, limit interconnectedness between ~~risky and commercial~~core banking and non-banking holding activities, improve corporate governance, create a responsible and sustainable remuneration system based on long-term incentives, allow effective bank resolution and recovery, reinforce the customer oriented banking, reinforce bank capital and deliver credit to the real economy;

Amendment 192 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 7

7. Considers that an effective banking system must deliver a change in banking culture in order to reduce complexity, enhance competition, limit interconnectedness between risky and commercial activities, improve corporate governance, improved accountability for product design and marketing, quality of service to customers and enhance the personal liability for irresponsible risk taking for senior managers, create a responsible remuneration system, allow effective bank resolution and recovery, reinforce bank capital and deliver credit to the real economy;

Amendment 193 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 7

7. Considers that an effective banking system must deliver a change in banking culture in order to reduce complexity, enhance competition, limit interconnectedness between risky and ~~commerc~~essential activities, improve corporate governance, risk management and compliance, create incentives for banks to establish more transparent organisational structures, create a responsible remuneration system, allow effective bank resolution and recovery, reinforce bank capital and deliver credit to the real economy;

Amendment 194 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 7

7. Considers that an effective banking system must deliver a change in banking culture in order to reduce complexity, enhance competition, limit interconnectedness between risky ~~and commercial~~trading and investment activities and depository/lending activities, improve corporate governance, create a responsible remuneration system, allow effective bank resolution and recovery, reinforce bank capital and deliver credit to the real economy;

Amendment 195 #

Marisa MATIAS

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 7

7. Considers that an effective banking system must deliver a change in banking culture in order to reduce complexity, enhance competition, ~~limit interconnectedness between risky and commercia~~separate risky activities from retail activities, improve corporate governance, create a responsible remuneration system, allow effective bank resolution and recovery, reinforce bank capital and deliver credit to the real economy;

Amendment 196 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 7

7. Considers that an effective banking system must deliver a change in banking culture in order to reduce complexity, enhance competition, limit interconnectedness between risky and commercial activities, improve corporate governance, create a responsible remuneration system, allow effective bank resolution and recovery, reinforce bank capital and deliver credit and provide important service functions to the real economy;

Amendment 197 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 7

7. Considers that an effective banking system must deliver a change in banking culture in order to reduce complexity, enhance competition, limit interconnectedness between risky and commercial activities, improve corporate governance, create a responsible and moderate remuneration system, allow effective bank resolution and recovery, reinforce bank capital and deliver credit to the real economy;

Amendment 198 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 7

7. Considers that an effective banking system must deliver a change in banking culture in order to reduce complexity, enhance competition, limit interconnectedness between ~~risky and commercial~~investment and purely banking-related activities, improve corporate governance, create a responsible remuneration system, allow effective bank resolution and recovery, reinforce bank capital and deliver credit to the real economy;

Amendment 199 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 7

7. Considers that an effective banking system must deliver a change in banking culture in order to reduce complexity, enhance fair and sustainable competition, limit interconnectedness between ~~risky~~investment and commercial activities to a minimum, improve corporate governance, create a responsible remuneration system, allow effective bank resolution and recovery, reinforce bank capital and deliver credit to the real economy;

Amendment 2 #

Motion for a resolution
Citation 4 a (new)

- having regard to the Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing a framework for the recovery and resolution of credit institutions and investment firms and amending Council Directives 77/91/EEC and 82/891/EC, Directives 2001/24/EC, 2002/47/EC, 2004/25/EC, 2005/56/EC, 2007/36/EC and 2011/35/EC and Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010

Amendment 20 #

Motion for a resolution
Recital C

C. whereas excessive risk-taking, excessive leverage, inadequate capital and liquidity requirements ~~and~~, the excessive complexity of the overall banking system ~~were at the root of the financial crisis~~and the strong interconnection between banks and sovereigns acted as a catalyst for the financial and economic crisis in the European Union;

Amendment 200 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 7

7. Considers that an effective banking system must deliver a change in banking culture and practice in order to reduce complexity, enhance competition, limit interconnectedness between risky market- related activities and commercial activities, improve corporate governance, create a responsible remuneration system, allow effective bank resolution and recovery, reinforce bank capital and deliver credit to the real economy;

Amendment 201 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 7

7. Considers that an effective banking system must deliver a change in banking culture in order to reduce complexity, enhance competition, limit interconnectedness between risky and commercial activities, improve corporate governance, create a responsible remuneration system, allow effective bank resolution and recovery, reinforce bank capital and deliver sustainable credit to the real economy;

Amendment 202 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 7 a (new)

7a. Notes that, some risks such as concentration risk, interest rate risk and operational risk are unlikely to be made 'safer' by structural reform and that many banking problems have in fact been concentrated on the retail side or result from sovereign bond capital holdings. In this respect urges the Commission to work closely with the Basel committee and swiftly implement any further recommendations from them in these areas;

Amendment 203 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 7 a (new)

7a. Considers that structural reform must be complemented by legislation setting out simple, clear and enforceable rules that ensure that activities not permitted for certain banks do not end up being carried out by under regulated shadow banking entities, especially those to which regulated banks are directly or indirectly exposed;

Amendment 204 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 7 a (new)

7a. Considers that the transmission funds efficiently from savers to investors is a key component of a well functioning economy and necessary for long term economic growth within the EU and that market making activities which service clients and provide liquidity are key contributors to this process.

Amendment 205 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 7 a (new)

7a. Considers that, as stressed by the ECB, published on January, 24, the diversity of business models in the EU should be preserved; no one-size-fits-all solution should be imposed;

Amendment 206 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 7 b (new)

7b. Considers that free movement of capital and the great potential of the Single Market should not be compromised for the sake of uncoordinated and disproportionate measures taken with a view to preserving financial stability exclusively at national level. The current practices of 'ring-fencing' assets, which could, in practice, restrict cross-border transfers of banks' capital and potentially constrain the free flow of capital throughout the European Union should be forbidden;

Amendment 207 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 7 b (new)

7b. Considers that it is essential to establish regulatory regimes for activities, such as securitisation and repo funding, which can provide a benefit to the real economy but entail potentially large systemic risks. Such regimes could consist of specific limited purpose banking licences for such entities and rules governing their permitted activities and related prudential requirements as well as their interactions with other components of the financial system;

Amendment 208 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 7 b (new)

7b. Urges the Commission to finalise its impact assessment and on the basis of it come forward with an appropriate follow up taking into account the aims, results and effects of the ongoing regulatory reform agenda.

Amendment 209 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 7 c (new)

7c. Considers there is a strong need in Europe for harmonization and common rules. The creation of the Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM), a Single Rubebook and a Single Resolution Authority reinforces the need for a European approach towards reform of bank structures avoiding a patchwork of national initiatives;

Amendment 21 #

Motion for a resolution
Recital C

C. whereas excessive risk-taking, excessive leverage, inadequate capital ~~and~~requirements for trading and investment activities, the absence of liquidity requirements and the excessive complexity of the overall banking system were at the root of the financial crisis;

Amendment 210 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 7 c (new)

7c. Urges the Commission to not prejudge the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision's ongoing review of the Trading Book;

Amendment 211 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 7 d (new)

7d. Considers that the Liikanen report explained that poor funding structures are one of the main sources of the banking crisis. Emphasizes in this respect the importance of a well-balanced and diversified funding structure in terms of sources of financing, maturity and other risk exposures;

Amendment 212 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 7 e (new)

7e. Considers that with the introduction of the bail-in concept of the RRD, owners and all creditors of banks will be the ones bailing out banks in the next crisis and that the power to separate activities vested in the resolution authority will be an important tool under the Bank Recovery and Resolution directive and it will represent a proportionate, tailored and risk-sensitive approach;

Amendment 213 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 7 f (new)

7f. Underlines the important role of banks in providing capital market services to governments, companies and investors to issue bonds and securities in the markets and stresses in this respect the vital role of market making;

Amendment 214 #

Motion for a resolution
Subheading 2

B. Key elements of eventual structural reform

Amendment 215 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 8

~~8. Urges the Commission to come forward with a proposal for mandatory separation of banks’ retail and investment activities;~~deleted

Amendment 216 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 8

~~8. Urges the Commission to come forward with a proposal for mandatory separation of banks' retail and investment activities;~~deleted

Amendment 217 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 8

~~8. Urges the Commission to come forward with a proposal for mandatory separation of banks' retail and investment activities;~~deleted

Amendment 218 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 8

8. Urges the Commission to c~~ome forward with a propos~~arefully assess the complementarity of structural reform with the new EU banking framework, including in particular CRD4, the Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive, Banking Union before any decision is taken on structural refor m and~~atory separation of banks' retail and investment activitie~~ in particular on legal separation between deposits and proprietary trading and other significant trading activities, if the activities to be separated amount to a significant share of a bank's business;

Amendment 219 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 8

8. ~~Urges the Commission to come forward with a proposal for mandatory separation of banks' retail and investment activities~~Given the proposals for structural separation already underway in several Member States, urges the Commission to come forward with a proposal to set down principles and options for structural reform of banks which safeguard the single market and free flow of capital and recognise the need for banks to perform and provide services to clients efficiently and remain globally competitive. Such proposals may include options for total separation of banks' retail and investment activities as well as methods of internal isolation or 'ring fencing';

Amendment 22 #

Motion for a resolution
Recital C

C. whereas excessive risk-taking, excessive leverage, inadequate capital and liquidity requirements ~~and~~, the excessive complexity and consequent opacity of the overall banking system were ~~at the root~~causes of the financial crisis, resulting in markets not functioning properly;

Amendment 220 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 8

8. Urges if the Commission to comes forward with a proposal for ~~mandatory~~appropriate separation of banks' retail and investment activities, should such an approach be justified by a balanced and comprehensive impact assessment which proves that the real economy, the fixed-income markets or EU competitiveness will not be disadvantaged. The form of appropriate separation, legal or otherwise, for various activities should depend on the determination of supervisory authorities based on the risks and costs involved;

Amendment 221 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 8

8. Urges the Commission to come forward with a proposal for mandatory separation of banks’ ~~retail and investment activities~~depository/lending activities and significant trading and investment activities, adhering to the two-stage procedure and the separation criteria set out in the HLEG report, although for the purpose of calculating the thresholds the less risky assets available for sale (the ‘AFS’ category), as to be more precisely defined by the EBA, should not be taken into account;

Amendment 222 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 8

8. Urges the Commission to come forward with a proposal for ~~mandatory separation of banks' retail and investment activities;~~ a principles based approach to structural reforms of the European banking sector, including mandatory separation of certain significant activities in the trading book of financial institutions that are not associated to the provision of client- related services, as well as separation of certain activities conditional on the assessment of the recovery and resolution plans;

Amendment 223 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 8

8. Urges the Commission to co~~me forward with a proposal for mandatory~~nduct a thorough impact assessment of a possible separation of banks' retail and investment activities on the basis of the Report of the High-level Expert Group on reforming the structure of the EU banking sector and to take into account legislation already adopted and initiated at the European level;

Amendment 224 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 8

8. Urges the Commission to come forward with a proposal for mandatory separation of ~~banks’ retail and investment activitie~~commercial banks and merchant banks, safeguarding the financial deposit- taking and credit activities forming part and parcel of the real economy, as distinct from activities linked to investment and speculation on national and international financial markets;

Amendment 225 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 8

8. Urges the Commission ~~to come forward with a proposal for mandatory separation of banks’ retail and investment activities~~, taking account of the legal structures which have evolved in the various banking models in Europe, to come forward with a proposal for mandatory separation of banks’ retail and investment activities which will only be implemented if the investment activity represents a significant share of the turnover of the bank in question;

Amendment 226 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 8

8. UConsidering the legal structure and the different European banking models urges the Commission to ensure to come forward with a proposal for ~~mandatory~~a conditional separation of banks' retail and investment activities, if the activities to be separated represent a significant share of the overall bank activity;

Amendment 227 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 8

8. Urges the Commission to come forward with a proposal for mandatory separation of banks’ ~~retail and investment activities~~activities serving the real economy from speculation;

Amendment 228 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 8

8. Urges the Commission to come forward with a proposal for mandatory separation of banks' retail and investment activities in order to ensure that the state only guarantees essential banking services;

Amendment 229 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 8

8. Urges the Commission to come forward with a proposal for mandatory separation of ~~banks’~~the retail and investment activities of those banks which engage in significant commercial activity;

Amendment 23 #

Motion for a resolution
Recital C

C. whereas excessive risk-taking, excessive leverage, inadequate capital and liquidity requirements, inadequate governance, risk management and compliance and the excessive complexity of the overall banking system were at the root of the financial crisis;

Amendment 230 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 8

8. Urges the Commission to come forward with a proposal for mandatory separation of banks' retail and ~~investment~~proprietary market risk taking activities;

Amendment 231 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 8

8. Urges the Commission to come forward with a proposal for mandatory separation of banks' ~~retail and investment~~trading activities;

Amendment 232 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 8

8. Urges the Commission to analyse the need to come forward with a proposal for mandatory separation of banks' retail and investment activities;

Amendment 233 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 8 a (new)

8a. Urges the Commission, rather than attempting to exhaustively define what retail banks are not permitted to do, to base the key definition of what should be inside a "ring-fence" on a positive definition of the core financial services provided by banks to the real economy that cannot be allowed to be interrupted, and therefore will continue to receive an implicit government guarantee; Believes that only such an approach can serve as a basis for a clear and enforceable way of preventing disruption to these services by problems other banking activities. Such a definition should take account of which activities constitute services of general economic interest as referred to in Article 14 TFEU;

Amendment 234 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 8 a (new)

8a. Urges the Commission to carry out a thorough impact analysis of such a legislative proposal including whether the main aim of a banking structural reform, increasing the solvability and the resolvability of European banks, has already been achieved by ongoing European legislation;

Amendment 235 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 8 a (new)

8a. underlines that keeping both entities in one single bank holding will not entirely eliminate the risk of spillover effects, as in stress situations, reputational risk may spread within the banking group thus reducing the potential benefits of separation.

Amendment 236 #

Krišjānis KARIŅŠ, Gunnar HÖKMARK

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 8 a (new)

8a. urges the Commission to include into their proposal a cap on bank leverage, a cap on size as well as an implementation of a rigorous bail-in regime that will see all creditors bear the risk of absorbing banks' losses;

Amendment 237 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 8 a (new)

8a. Underlines that such proposal might hinder the functioning of the whole banking sector of the EU, distort competition and pose far-reaching negative effects on the economic growth;

Amendment 238 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 8 b (new)

8b. Recommends that any definition of proprietary market risk taking cover at least any activity resulting in a marginal increase in net exposure of the bank to market risk where either a) the activities are not undertaken as a service requested by a client in relation to the prudent management of the client's financial needs in the clients best interest or b) it is possible to transfer the resulting market risk to a legally separate entity, but this is not, in fact, done;

Amendment 239 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 8 c (new)

8c. Stresses that, where core banking services provided by retail banks to the real economy unavoidably result in proprietary market risk taking, that this risk be required to be fully hedged where possible or subject to strict limits on the level and duration of such exposure for particular activities;

Amendment 24 #

Motion for a resolution
Recital C

C. whereas a weak European regulatory framework with excessive risk-taking, excessive leverage, inadequate capital and liquidity requirements and the excessive complexity of the overall banking system were at the root of the financial crisis;

Amendment 240 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 9

9. Urges the Commission to come forward with a proposal for such mandatory separation through the establishment of a thorough, transparent and credible ‘ring fence’ around bank activities that are vital for the real economy, such as those relating to credit functions, payment systems and deposits; takes the view that in the event of a bank failure, the ring fence must ensure that the retail entity continues business unaffected by operational problems, financial losses, funding shortages or reputational damage resulting from the resolution or insolvency of the investment entity;deleted

Amendment 241 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 9

9. Urges the Commission to co~~me forward with a proposal for such mandatory separation through the establishment of a thorough, transparent and credible ‘ring fence’ around bank activities that are vital~~ ntribute to the conclusion of already existing legislative initiatives before the real economy, such as those relating to credit functions, payment systems and deposits; takes the view that in the event of a bank failure, the ring fence must ensure that the retail entity continues business unaffected by operational problems, financial losses, funding shortages or reputational damage resulting from the resolution or insolvency of the investment entityneed for further legislative acts is assessed. Reminds the Commission that a number of legislative proposals have been in deadlock for a long time and that the physical capacity of the Parliament and Council to professionally deal with all outstanding dossiers is already significantly over-stretched;

Amendment 242 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 9

9. Urges the Commission to come forward with a proposal for such mandatory separation through the establishment of a thorough, transparent and credible ‘ring fence’ around bank activities that are vital for the real economy, such as those relating to credit functions, payment systems and deposits; takes the view twhereby: (a) commercial banks, that is to say, banks which accept deposits from the public, would be prohibited from carrying out activities related to securities trading and brokerage, and commercial bank functions would be separated from merchant in the event of a bank failure, the ring fence must ensure that the retail entity continues business unaffected by operational problems, financial losses, funding shortages or reputational damage resulting from the resolution or insolvency of the investment entitybank functions; (b) commercial banks would be prohibited from holding interests in, or entering into business cooperation agreements of any kind with, the following: merchant banks, investment banks, securities brokerage firms, and, in general, finance companies which accept deposits from the public;

Amendment 243 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 9

9. Urges the Commission to come forward with a proposal for such mandatory separation through the establishment of a thorough, transparent and credible ‘ring fence’ around bank activities that are vital for the real economy, such as those relating to credit functions, payment systems and deposits; takes the view that in the event of a bank failure, the ring fence must ensure that the retail entity continues business unaffected by operational problems, financial losses, funding shortages or reputational damage resulting from the resolution or insolvency of the investment entitysupport the legislators in a fast and credible implementation of the banking crisis management and resolution directive proposal, foreseeing a mandatory simplification of banking structure in case of a stated non-resolvability in the resolution plan of an institution;

Amendment 244 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 9

9. Urges the Commission to come forward with a proposal for such mandatory separation through the establishment of a thorough, transparent and credible ‘ring fence’ ~~around~~, or even complete hiving-off into an entity outside the banking group, around those risky trading and investment activities of significant volume, on the basis of an evaluation process which closely adheres to the two-stage procedure and the separation criteria set out in the HLEG report, although for the purpose of calculating the thresholds the less risky assets available for sale (the ‘AFS’ category), as to be more precisely defined by the EBA, should not be taken into account, in order not to contaminate bank activities that are vital for the real economy, such as those relating to credit functions, payment systems and deposits; takes the view that in the event of a bank failure, the ring fence must ensure that the ~~retail~~deposit/lending bank entity continues business unaffected by operational problems, financial losses, funding shortages or reputational damage resulting from the resolution or insolvency of the investment entity;

Amendment 245 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 9

9. Urges the Commission to come forward with a proposal for such mandatory separation through the establishment of a thorough, transparent and credible ‘ring fence’ around bank activities that are vital for the real economy, such as those relating to credit functions, payment systems and deposits; takesassess the necessity and models of a possible separation of bank activities that are vital for the real economy, such as those relating to credit functions, payment systems and deposits and investment banking activities, for all credit institutions in the Single Market, and to also assess potentially adverse consequences of such a separation. The Commission shall take the view that in the event of a bank failure, ~~the ring fence~~a potential separation model must ensure that the cre~~tail entity~~dit institution can continues business unaffected by operational problems, financial losses, funding shortages or reputational damage resulting from the resolution or insolvency of ~~the investment entity~~an entity that is part of the credit institution;

Amendment 246 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 9

9. Urges the Commission to come forward with a proposal for such mandatory separation through the establishment of a thorough, transparent and credible ‘ring fence’ around bank activities that are vital for the real economy, such as those relating to credit functions, payment systems and depositof certain significant activities in the trading book of financial institutions that are not associated to the provision of client-related services; takes the view that in the event of a bank failure, the ~~ring fence~~separation must ensure that the ~~retail entity continues busines~~entity providing retail and other client-related activities that are vital for the real economy remains unaffected by operational problems, financial losses, funding shortages or reputational damage resulting from the resolution or insolvency of the ~~investment~~separated entity;

Amendment 247 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 9

9. Urges the Commission to come forward with a proposal for such mandatory separation through the establishment of a thorough, transparent and credible ‘ring fence’ around bank activities that are vital for the real economy, such as those relating to credit functions, payment systems and deposits; takes the view that in the event of a bank failure, the ring fence must ensure that the retail entity continues business unaffected by operational problems, financial losses, funding shortages or reputational damage resulting from the resolution or insolvency of the investment entity; considers a holding structure to be one way of ensuring that the requisite ring fence is put in place under one roof; urges the Commission to investigate how the joint and several liability of individual business units can be effectively brought to an end and economies of scope and scale put into practice with a holding structure in place;

Amendment 248 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 9

9. Urges the Commission to come forward with a proposal for such mandatory separation through the establishment of a thorough, transparent and credible ‘ring fence’ around bank activities that are vital for the real economy, such as those relating to credit functions, payment systems and deposits; takes the view that in the event of a bank failure, the ring fence must ensure that the retail entity continues business unaffected by operational problems, financial losses, funding shortages or reputational damage resulting from the resolution or insolvency of the investment entity; notes that simply banning certain activities does not tackle the problem of the state guarantees and subsidies being used by the arms of the bank involved in non essential banking services;

Amendment 249 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 9

9. Urges the Commission to come forward with a proposal for such mandatory separation through the establishment of a thorough, transparent and credible ‘ring fence’ around bank activities that are vital for the real economy, such as those relating to credit functions, payment systems and deposits; takes the view that in the event of a bank failure, the ring fence must ensure that the retail entity continues business unaffected by operational problems, financial losses, funding shortages or reputational damage resulting from the resolution or insolvency of the investment entity, the 'ring fence' must be part of a technicality that protects EU tax payers from bailing out both retail and investment entities;

Amendment 25 #

Motion for a resolution
Recital C

C. whereas excessive risk-taking, excessive leverage, inadequate capital and liquidity requirements and ~~the excessive complexity~~a strong interconnectedness of the overall banking system were at the root of the financial crisis;

Amendment 250 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 9

9. Urges the Commission to co~~me forward with a proposal for such~~nsider the impact of mandatory separation through the establishment of a thorough, transparent and credible ‘ring fence’ on the current European economic landscape and on the role of the European banks in financing the European economy, around bank activities that are vital for the real economy, such as those relating to credit functions, market making, payment systems and deposits; takes the view that in the event of a bank failure, the ring fence must ensure that the retail entity continues business unaffected by operational problems, financial losses, funding shortages or reputational damage resulting from the resolution or insolvency of the investment entity;

Amendment 251 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 9

9. Urges the Commission to come forward with a proposal for such mandatory separation through the establishment of a thorough, transparent, complete and credible ~~‘ring fence’ around~~measures insulating and protecting bank activities that are vital for the real economy, such as those relating to credit functions, payment systems and deposits; takes the view that in the event of a bank failure, the ~~ring fence~~measures must ensure that the retail entity continues independent business unaffected by operational problems, financial losses, funding shortages or reputational damage resulting from the resolution or insolvency of the investment entity;

Amendment 252 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 9

9. Urges the Commission to ~~come forward with a proposal for such mandatory separation through the~~propose mechanisms for establish~~ment of~~ing a thorough, transparent and credible ‘'ring fence~~’ around~~' separating bank activities that are vital for the real economy, such as those relating to credit functions, payment systems and deposits from some or all investment activities; takes the view that in the event of a bank failure, the ring fence must ensure that the retail entity continues business unaffected by operational problems, financial losses, funding shortages or reputational damage resulting from the resolution or insolvency of the investment entity;

Amendment 253 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 9

9. Urges the Commission to come forward with a proposal for ~~such mandatory~~a conditional separation through the establishment of a thorough, transparent and credible ‘ring fence’ around bank activities that are vital for the real economy, such as those relating to credit functions, payment systems ~~and deposits~~, deposits and other services for the real economy through a universal banking concept; takes the view that in the event of a bank failure, the ring fence must ensure that the retail entity continues business unaffected by operational problems, financial losses, funding shortages or reputational damage resulting from the resolution or insolvency of the investment entity;

Amendment 254 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 9

9. Urges the Commission to come forward with a proposal for ~~such mandatory separation through~~ the establishment of a thorough, transparent and credible ‘ring fence’ ~~around~~between bank activities that are vital for the real economy, such as those relating to credit functions, payment systems ~~and deposits~~, deposits, business support services and high-risk activities relating to trading; takes the view that in the event of a bank failure, the ring fence must ensure that the retail entity continues business unaffected by operational problems, financial losses, funding shortages or reputational damage resulting from the resolution or insolvency of the investment entity;

Amendment 255 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 9

9. Urges the Commission to come forward with a proposal for such mandatory separation through the establishment of a thorough, transparent and credible ‘ring fence’ around bank activities that are ~~vital for~~customer-related and connected to the real economy, such as those relating to credit functions, payment systems and deposits; takes the view that in the event of a bank failure, the ring fence must ensure that the r~~etail~~ing-fenced entity continues business unaffected by operational problems, financial losses, funding shortages or reputational damage resulting from the resolution or insolvency of the ~~investment~~trading entity;

Amendment 256 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 9

9. Urges the Commission to come forward with a proposal for such mandatory separation through the establishment of a thorough, transparent and credible ‘'ring fence’' around bank activities that are vital for the real economy, such as those relating to credit functions, payment systems and deposits, market making and risk management,; takes the view that in the event of a bank failure, the ring fence must ensure that the retail entity is able to continues its business ~~unaffected by~~without significant operational problems, financial losses, or funding shortages ~~or reputational damage~~ resulting from the resolution or insolvency of the investment entity;

Amendment 257 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 9

9. Urges the Commission to come forward with a proposal for such mandatory separation through the establishment of a thorough, transparent and credible ‘cri~~ng fence’ around~~teria for the protection of bank activities that are vital for the real economy, such as those relating to credit functions, payment systems and deposits; takes the view that in the event of a bank failure, ~~the ring fence must ensure that~~ the retail entity must continues business unaffected by operational problems, financial losses, funding shortages or reputational damage resulting from the resolution or insolvency of the investment entity;

Amendment 258 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 9

9. Urges the Commission to come forward with a proposal for such mandatory separation through the establishment of a thorough, transparent and credible ‘ring fence’ around bank activities that are vital for the real economy, such as those relating to credit functions, payment systems and deposits; takes the view that in the event of a bank failure, the ring fence must ensure that the retail entity continues business unaffected by operational problems, financial losses, funding shortages or reputational damage resulting from the resolution or insolvency of ~~the investment entity~~an entity engaged in proprietary market risk taking;

Amendment 259 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 9

9. Urges the Commission to come forward with a proposal for ~~such mandatory separation through~~ the establishment of a thorough, transparent and credible ‘'ring fence’' around bank activities that are vital for the real economy, such as those relating to credit functions, payment systems and deposits; takes the view that in the event of a bank failure, the ring fence must ensure that the ~~retail entity~~se bank activities continues business unaffected by operational problems, financial losses, funding shortages or reputational damage resulting from the resolution or insolvency of the investment entity;

Amendment 26 #

Motion for a resolution
Recital C

C. whereas excessive risk-taking, excessive leverage, inadequate capital and liquidity requirements, weak banking and markets supervision and the excessive complexity of the overall banking system were at the root of the financial crisis;

Amendment 260 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 9

9. Urges the Commission to come forward with a proposal for such mandatory separation through the establishment of a thorough, transparent and credible ‘ring fence’ around bank activities that are ~~vital for~~essential for the functioning of the real economy, such as those relating to credit functions, payment systems and deposits; takes the view that in the event of a bank failure, the ring fence must ensure that the retail entity continues business unaffected by operational problems, financial losses, funding shortages or reputational damage resulting from the resolution or insolvency of the investment entity;

Amendment 261 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 9

9. Urges the Commission to come forward with a proposal for such mandatory separation through the establishment of a thorough, transparent and credible ‘ring fence’ around bank activities that are vital for the real economy, such as those relating to credit functions, payment systems and deposits; takes the view that in the event of a bank failure, the ring fence must ensure that the retail entity continues business unaffected by operational problems, financial losses, financial losses to customers and consumers, funding shortages or reputational damage resulting from the resolution or insolvency of the investment entity;

Amendment 262 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 9 a (new)

9a. Encourages the Commission to explore bank models that increase transparency, improve competition, facilitate supervision and regulatory intervention and reduce contagion risk in case of a crisis.

Amendment 263 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 9 a (new)

9a. Urges the Commission to include in its thorough impact assessment alternatives to separation including higher risk management standards for trading activities and proprietary trading;

Amendment 264 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 10

10. Urges the Commission to ensure that trading activities do not benefit from implicit guarantees, the use of insured deposits or taxpayer bailouts and that these activities do not pose a risk to the delivery of ring-fenced retail serviceresponsible management of banks and competent supervisors to ensure that trading activities in the banking system do not pose a systemic risk and are subject to robust risk management controls;

Amendment 265 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 10

10. Urges the Commission to ensure th~~at trading activities do not benefit from implicit guarantees, the use of insured deposits or taxpayer bailouts and that these activities do not pose a risk to the delivery of ring-fenced retail servi~~e implicit guarantee of the banking system in its entirety is reducesd;

Amendment 266 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 10

10. Urges the Commission to ensure that ~~trading activities do not benefit from implicit guarantees, the use of insured deposits or taxpayer bailouts and that these~~proprietary trading and certain high risk financial activities do not pose a risk to the delivery of ~~ring-fenced~~ retail services;

Amendment 267 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 10

10. Urges the Commission to ensure that ~~trading~~investment activities which are separated as a result of their significant share of a bank’s turnover do not benefit from implicit guarantees, the use of insured deposits or taxpayer bailouts and that these activities do not pose a risk to the ~~delivery of ring-fenced retail services~~retail arm;

Amendment 268 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 10

10. Urges the Commission to ensure that proprietary trading activities on own account that are not related to the facilitation of client orders or hedging of risks do not benefit from implicit public guarantees, the use of insured deposits or taxpayer bailouts and that these activities do not pose a risk to the delivery of ~~ring-fenced~~ retail services;

Amendment 269 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 10

10. Urges the Commission to ensure that trading and investment activities do not benefit from implicit guarantees, the use of insured deposits or taxpayer bailouts and that these activities do not pose a risk to the ~~delivery of ring-fenced retail~~provision of depository/lending services;

Amendment 27 #

Syed KAMALL, Wolf KLINZ, Sharon BOWLES, Theodor Dumitru STOLOJAN, Sven GIEGOLD

Motion for a resolution
Recital C a (new)

Ca. whereas the loss of prudence in accounting standards as a consequence of the adoption of international financial reporting standards played and continues to play a central role in allowing banks to give a view of their accounts that was and is not always true and fair with particular reference to IAS 39 on loan loss provisioning;

Amendment 270 #

Pervenche BERÈS

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 10

10. Urges the Commission to ensure that trading activities do not benefit from implicit guarantees, the use of insured deposits or taxpayer bailouts and that these activities ~~do not pose a risk to the delivery of ring-fenced retail services~~effectively contribute to the real economy;

Amendment 271 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 10

10. Urges the Commission to ensure that trading activities that are not related to the provision of client-related services do not benefit from implicit guarantees, the use of insured deposits or taxpayer bailouts and that these activities do not pose a risk to the delivery of r~~ing-fenced retail~~etail and other client-related services;

Amendment 272 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 10

10. Urges the Commission to ensure that trading activities do not benefit from implicit guarantees, the use of ~~insured~~retail deposits or taxpayer bailouts and that these activities do not pose a risk to the delivery of rin~~g-fenc~~sulated and protected retail services;

Amendment 273 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 10

10. Urges the Commission to ensure that trading activities do not benefit from implicit guarantees, the use of insured deposits or taxpayer bailouts and that these activities do not pose a risk to the delivery of ring-fenced retail services;, noting that bail-in arrangements must be clear for investors.

Amendment 274 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 10

10. Urges the Commission to ensure that ~~trad~~proprietary market risk taking activities do not benefit from implicit guarantees, the use of insured deposits or taxpayer bailouts and that these activities do not pose a risk to the delivery of ring-fenced retail services;

Amendment 275 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 10

10. Urges the Commission to ensure that trading activities are priced by the market and do not benefit from implicit guarantees, the use of insured deposits or taxpayer bailouts and that these activities do not pose a risk to the delivery of ring- fenced retail services;,

Amendment 276 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 10

10. Urges the Commission to ensure that speculative trading activities do not benefit from implicit guarantees, the use of insured deposits or taxpayer bailouts and that these activities do not pose a risk to the delivery of ring-fenced retail services;

Amendment 277 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 10

10. Urges the Commission to ensure that trading activities do not benefit from implicit guarantees, the use of insured deposits or taxpayer bailouts and that these activities do not pose a risk to the delivery of ring-fenced ~~retail~~ services;

Amendment 278 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 10 a (new)

10a. In the case where there is no separate investment banking entity, it might be possible for a deposit-taking bank to conduct limited trading activities to the benefit of its non-financial clients proving that: i) These trading activities are limited to simple financial instruments undertaken with / on behalf of non-financial clients, ii) The amount of trading activities within the deposit-taking bank is capped as a % of total balance sheet. The amount of the threshold should be precisely assessed in the impact assessment.

Amendment 279 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 10 a (new)

10a. Urges the commission to take into account efficiency as well as safety when proposing separation of bank activities given that costs will be passed on to consumers and customers and have an immediate cost to society whereas the effectiveness of structural separation is not proven, not least as failures in the crisis have predominantly been in retail operations, mainly mortgage related, or due to over-expansion in mergers; notes that total guarantees for the retail side of banking may in fact continue to encourage overly risky mortgage lending.

Amendment 28 #

Motion for a resolution
Recital C a (new)

Ca. whereas taking into account the weak situation of the European economy, the completion and implementation of existing new regulation (CRD IV, Banking Union...) should be prioritised and not disturbed by new reforms with high destabilizing capabilities;

Amendment 280 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 10 a (new)

10a. Urges the Commission to investigate which commercial activities should be permitted for banks, and on what scale, to enable them effectively to support the real economy and to ensure the stability of individual institutions and of the financial sector overall;

Amendment 281 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 11

11. Urges the Commission to ensure that ~~where banks undertake trading activities, the risks and costs associated with those activities are borne by their trading~~supervisors conduct an analysis of where banks undertake risky proprietary trading activities compared with market making which is a core activity of banks important to the financing of the economy, managing government debt and in particular the financing of corporations which need access to primary markets, the risks and costs associated with those risky proprietary trading activities properly capitalized and costs of losses arme a~~nd not by their ring-fence~~bsorbed first by shareholders and cre~~tail arm;~~ ditors.

Amendment 282 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 11

11. Urges the ~~Commission~~management of banks and supervisors to ensure that where banks undertake trading activities, the risks and costs associated with those activities are borne by their trading ~~arm and not~~unit; calls for internal control mechanisms to ensure that losses are not borne by othe~~ir ring-fenced retail arm~~r units and asks for mandatory reporting of profits and losses borne by all relevant units;

Amendment 283 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 11

11. Urges the Commission to ensure that where banks undertake trading activities, to be understood as but not limited to market making, underwriting, proprietary trading and credit to leveraged investment funds, the risks and costs associated with those activities are borne by their trading arm and not by ~~their ring-fenced retail arm~~deposit-taking activities;

Amendment 284 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 11

11. Urges the Commission to ensure that where a banks undertake ~~trading activities~~s investment activities and this area was earmarked for separation as a result of its significant share of the bank’s turnover, the risks and costs associated with those activities are borne by ~~their trading~~its investment arm and not by ~~their ring-fenced~~its retail arm;

Amendment 285 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 11

11. Urges the Commission to ensure that where banks undertake particularly risky investment and trading activities, the risks and costs associated with those activities are borne by their ~~trading~~ring-fenced investment arm and not by their ~~ring-fenced retail~~depository/lending arm;

Amendment 286 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 11

11. Urges the Commission to ensure that where banks undertake purely financial trading activities in derivatives, the risks and costs associated with those activities ~~are borne by their trading arm and not by their ring-fenced~~do not impact on the retail arm;

Amendment 287 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 11

11. Urges the Commission to ensure that where banks undertake ~~trad~~proprietary market risk taking activities, the risks and costs associated with those activities are borne by their ~~trad~~proprietary market risk taking arm and not by their ring-fenced retail arm;

Amendment 288 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 11

11. Urges the Commission to ensure that where banks undertake ~~trading~~particular trading risk type of activities, the risks and costs associated with those activities are borne by their trading arm and not by their ring- fenced retail arm;

Amendment 289 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 11

11. Urges the Commission to ensure that where banks undertake speculative trading activities, the risks and costs associated with those activities are borne by their trading arm and not by their ring-fenced retail arm;

Amendment 29 #

Motion for a resolution
Recital C a (new)

Ca. whereas in Europe, risks were also accumulated by commercial banks, which issued loans in the real estate sector on the basis of short-sighted, defective risk management;

Amendment 290 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 11

11. Urges the Commission to ensure that where banks undertake trading activities, the risks and costs associated with those activities are borne by their trading arm and not by their ring-fenced ~~retail~~ arm;

Amendment 291 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 11 a (new)

11a. Urges the Commission to take account, in its proposal, of the fact that a bank’s retail arm must be allowed to conduct certain investment activities if they form part of its services provided for the real economy or serve to safeguard their own risk positions; urges the Commission to provide for suitable derogations and to stipulate thresholds;

Amendment 292 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 11 a (new)

11a. Urges the Commission to consider the need for retail and commercial banks to maintain certain investment banking activities in order to service the real economy or to mitigate own risk positions and to include in its considerations adequate thresholds or product-related exceptions;

Amendment 293 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 12

12. Urges the Commission to ensure that separation results in: (a) separate legal entities, with separate sources of funding for the bank's retail and investment entities; (b) limits on the extent to which the two entities are reliant on each other for funding and/or resources; in particular, there should be no legal basis for shifting capital and liquidity from ring-fenced entities to other entities in the group; (c) the application of adequate, thorough and separate capital, leverage and liquidity rules to each entity, including separate balance sheets; (d) net and gross large exposure limits for intra-group transactions between ring- fenced and non-ring-fenced activities, which are at least as strict as those for third-party exposure, including strict limits on the exposure of ring-fenced activities to the investment entity's riskier activities;deleted

Amendment 294 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 12

12. Urges the Commission to ensure that separation results in: (a) separate legal entities, with separate sources of funding for the bank's retail and investment entities; (b) limits on the extent to which the two entities are reliant on each other for funding and/or resources; in particular, there should be no legal basis for shifting capital and liquidity from ring-fenced entities to other entities in the group; (c) the application of adequate, thorough and separate capital, leverage and liquidity rules to each entity, including separate balance sheets; (d) net and gross large exposure limits for intra-group transactions between ring- fenced and non-ring-fenced activities, which are at least as strict as those for third-party exposure, including strict limits on the exposure of ring-fenced activities to the investment entity's riskier activities;deleted

Amendment 295 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 12 – introductory part

12. Urges the Commission to ensure that separation results in: (a) separate legal entities, with separate sources of funding for the bank's retail and investment entities; (b) limits on the extent to which the two entities are reliant on each other for funding and/or resources; in particular, there should be no legal basis for shifting capital and liquidity between from ring- deposit-taking and investment banking entities to other entities in the group. Strict firewalls are required between individual business entities. The group can still take advantage of synergies and scale economies, including a common technology platform, but without unwanted financial contamination of the banking affiliates' balance sheet. (c) the application of adequate, thorough and separate capital, leverage and liquidity rules to each entity, including separate balance sheets; (d) net and gross large exposure limits for intra-group transactions between ring- fenced and non-ring-fenced activities the commercial banking entity and the trading / investment banking entity, which are at least as strict as those for third- party exposure, including strict limits on the exposure of ring-fenced activities to the investment entity's riskier activities

Amendment 296 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 12 – introductory part

12. Urges the Commission to ensure that ~~separation~~in the event that the removal of impediments to resolution in accordance with Article 14 and 15 of the Recovery and Resolution Directive have been insufficient to achieve the objectives set out above, and where supervisors determine there are risky proprietary activities which are not a core activity for banks, separation of such activities results in:

Amendment 297 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 12 – introductory part

12. Urges the Commission to ensure ~~that separation~~, taking into account the legal structures which have evolved in the different European banking models, that the separation of the investment arm – where this is necessary owing to its accounting for a significant share of the bank’s turnover – results in:

Amendment 298 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 12 – introductory part

12. ~~Urges the Commission to ensure~~Considering the legal structure and the different European banking models urges the Commission to ensure, if the activities to be separated represent a significant share of the overall bank activity, that separation results in:

Amendment 299 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 12 – introductory part

12. Urges the Commission to ensure that any separation ~~results in~~of certain high-risk activities that are not associated with the provision of client-related services:

Amendment 3 #

Motion for a resolution
Citation 6 a (new)

- having regard to the proposal of 6 June 2012 for a directive of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing a framework for the recovery and resolution of credit institutions and investment firms and amending Council Directives 77/91/EEC and 82/891/EC, Directives 2001/24/EC, 2002/47/EC, 2004/25/EC, 2005/56/EC, 2007/36/EC and 2011/35/EC and Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010,

Amendment 30 #

Motion for a resolution
Recital C a (new)

Ca. whereas profits in the financial sector were often privatised but risks and losses were nationalised; whereas in a social market economy, risk and liability must go hand in hand;

Amendment 300 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 12 – introductory part

12. Urges the Commission to ~~ensure that separation results in~~respect the diversity of the European banking sector and to ensure that a potential separation model shall:

Amendment 301 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 12 – introductory part

12. Urges the Commission to ensure that ~~separation~~in the case of an obligatory separation this would results in:

Amendment 302 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 12 – introductory part

12. Urges the Commission to ensure that separation at least results in:

Amendment 303 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 12 – subparagraph 1 (new)

(i) results in:

Amendment 304 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 12 – point a

(a) functionally separate ~~legal~~ entities, with ~~separat~~diverse sources of funding for the bank's retail and investment entities, physical and IT segregation and separate organisational and reporting lines with appropriate internal controls to prevent breaches;

Amendment 305 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 12 – point a

(a) separate legal entities, with separate sources of funding for the bank's retail and investment entities, in order to ensure that the state guarantee and subsidy for the retail arm does not cross subsidise the investment entity;

Amendment 306 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 12 – point a

(a) separate legal entities, with separate sources of funding for the bank’s ~~retail and investment~~entities engaged in economically important activities and its speculative trading entities;

Amendment 307 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 12 – point a

(a) separate legal entities, with separate sources of funding for the bank's retail and investment entities, as well as separate management and accounting departments;

Amendment 308 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 12 – point a

(a) separate legal entities, with separate sources of funding for the bank’s ~~retail~~depository banking and investment entities;

Amendment 309 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 12 – point a

(a) separate legal entities, with separate sources of funding for the bank's retail and ~~investment~~proprietary market risk taking entities;

Amendment 31 #

Motion for a resolution
Recital C a (new)

Ca. whereas, as highlighted in the HLEG's analysis, no particular business model did particularly well or particularly poorly during the financial crisis;

Amendment 310 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 12 – point a

(a) ensure the viability of possible separate legal entities, with separate sources of funding for the bank's retail and investment entities;

Amendment 311 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 12 – point a

(a) separate legal entities, with separate sources of funding for the bank's r~~etail and investment~~ing- fenced and trading entities;

Amendment 312 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 12 – point a

(a) separate legal entities, with separate sources of funding for the bank's retail and purely financial investment entities;

Amendment 313 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 12 – point a a (new)

(aa) rules to ensure that the executive and controlling bodies of these separate entities and their respective members act independently from each other and that members of the legal bodies of one entity cannot be members of the legal bodies of the other entity in the same group

Amendment 314 #

Marisa MATIAS

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 12 – point b

(b) ~~limits on the extent to which the two entities are reliant on each other for funding and/or resources; in particular, there should be no legal basis for shifting~~the total separation of funding, in particular, a ban on the transfer of capital and liquidity from ring-fenced entities to other entities in the group;

Amendment 315 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 12 – point b

(b) not unnecessarily limit~~s on~~ the extent to which the two entities are reliant on each other for funding and/or resources; in particular, there should ~~be no legal basi~~not be any unnecessary legal obstacles for shifting capital and liquidity ~~from ring-fenced entities to other~~between separated entities in the group;

Amendment 316 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 12 – point b

(b) limits on the extent to which the two entities are reliant on each other for funding and/or resources; in particular, there should be no legal basis for shifting capital and liquidity ~~from ring-fenced entities to other~~between deposit- taking and investment banking entities inof the group;

Amendment 317 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 12 – point b

(b) limits on the extent to which the two entities are reliant on each other for funding and/or resources; in particular, there should be no legal basis for shifting capital and liquidity from r~~ing-fenced~~etail entities to other non retail entities in the group;

Amendment 318 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 12 – point b

(b) limits on the extent to which the two entities are reliant on each other for funding and/or resources; in particular, there should be no legal basis for unduly and unnecessarily shifting capital and liquidity from ring-fenced entities to other entities in the group;

Amendment 319 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 12 – point b

(b) limits on the extent to which the two entities are reliant on each other for funding and/or resources; in particular, there should be no legal basis for shifting capital and liquidity from ring-fenced entities to other entities in the group, and vice versa;

Amendment 32 #

Motion for a resolution
Recital D

D. whereas the ~~current post-crisis weakness in the structure of EU banks demonstrates the need for reform in order to serve the wider needs of the economy~~overall set-up of the EU banking legislation should contribute to the stabilization and credit supply of the European economy, and in particular ensure the access to capital by small and medium-sized enterprises;

Amendment 320 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 12 – point b a (new)

(ba) Limits on the extent to which securitisation results in the expansion of unsustainable lending or investment in higher risk areas whether within or outside the group containing the originator;

Amendment 321 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 12 – point c

~~(c) the application of adequate, thorough and separate capital, leverage and liquidity rules to each entity, including separate balance sheets;~~deleted

Amendment 322 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 12 – point c

(c) the application of adequate, thorough and separate capital, leverage and liquidity rules to each entity appropriately calibrated to the business models of those entities, including separate balance sheets;

Amendment 323 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 12 – point c

(c) the application of adequate, thorough and separate capital, leverage and liquidity rules to each entity not subject to consolidated supervision, including separate balance sheets; or

Amendment 324 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 12 – point d

(d) net and gross large exposure limits for intra-group transactions between ring- fenced and non-ring-fenced activities, which are at least as strict as those for third-party exposure, including strict limits on the exposure of ring-fenced activities to the investment entity’s riskier activities;deleted

Amendment 325 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 12 – point d

(d) net and gross large exposure limits for intra-group transactions between ~~ring- fenced and non-ring-fenc~~separated activities, which are at least as strict as those for third-party exposure, including strict limits on the exposure of ~~ring-fenced activities~~the retail entity to the investment entity’s riskier activities where the latter entity was earmarked for separation as a result of its significant share of the bank’s turnover; the competent authorities of the Member States must be able, as set out in Article 389(2)(c) and (d) of the CRR, to exclude certain risks from the restriction within a group;

Amendment 326 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 12 – point d

(d) net and gross large exposure limits for intra-group transactions between ring- fenced and non-ring-fenced activities, which are at least as strict as those for third-party exposure, ~~including~~as well as strict limits on the exposure of ring-fenced activities to ~~the investment entity's riskier activities~~banks and shadow banks inside or outside the same group that are permitted to engage in proprietary market risk taking;

Amendment 327 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 12 – point d

(d) net and gross large exposure limits for intra-group transactions between rin~~g- fenced and non-ring-fenced~~sulated and protected activities and the rest of activities, which are at least as strict as those for third-party exposure, including strict limits on the exposure of ~~ring-fenced~~the former activities to the investment entity's riskier activities;

Amendment 328 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 12 – point d

(d) not discriminate net and gross large exposure limits for intra-group transactions between ~~ring- fenced and non-ring-fenc~~possibly separated activities, which ~~are at least~~may be as strict as those for third- party exposure, including ~~strict~~ limits on the exposure of r~~ing-fenced~~etail activities to the investment entity's riskier activities;

Amendment 329 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 12 – point d

(d) net and gross large exposure limits for intra-group transactions between ~~ring- fenced and non-ring-fenced~~deposit taking activities and investment/trading activities, which are at least as strict as those for third-party exposure, including strict limits on the exposure of ~~ring-fenced~~deposit taking activities to the investment entity's riskier activities;

Amendment 33 #

Motion for a resolution
Recital D

D. whereas the c~~urrent post-crisis weakness in the structure of EU banks demonstrates the need for reform~~risis made clear the need for reform of the structure of EU banks in order to serve the wider needs of the real economy;

Amendment 330 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 12 – point d

(d) net and gross large exposure limits taking into account the operation of concentration limits for intra-group transactions between ring- fenced and non- ring-fenced activities, which are at least as strict as those for third-party exposure, including strict limits on the exposure of ring-fenced activities to the investment entity’s riskier activities, so as to guarantee the market-oriented nature of such transactions;

Amendment 331 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 12 – point d

(d) net and gross large exposure limits for intra-group transactions between ring- fenced and non-ring-fenced activities, which are at least as strict as those for third-party exposure, including strict limits on the exposure of ~~ring-fenced~~depository/lending activities to the ring-fenced investment entity’s riskier activities;

Amendment 332 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 12 – point d a (new)

(da) clear-cut rules serving to determine which activities are to be considered economically important. In particular, as regards market-making, criteria and indicators need to be laid down, depending on whether or not there is a market-maker standing ready on the market at all times or on the size of the orders concerned in relation to the market and proceeding from the necessary exact quantitative reference points (time threshold for continuous operation on the market, bid-ask spread, etc.), which should be adjusted according to the particular financial instruments involved. Revenue from market-making should come from fees, commission, and bid-ask spreads, rather than being generated by position price trends. The methods for calculating traders’ pay must not encourage risk-taking;

Amendment 333 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 12 – point d a (new)

(da) (ii) does not result in: (a) increasing dependency on non-EU banks or unregulated sources of funding; (b) increasing regulatory arbitrage (inside and outside the EU) and a global unlevel playing field; (c) a discrepancy between overly regulated retail banks and lite-regulated investment banks; (d) fragmentation of the internal market;

Amendment 334 #

Marisa MATIAS

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 12 – point d a (new)

(da) limits being placed on the possibility of risk transfer from entities engaged in retail activities to other entities, for example through debt securitisation;

Amendment 335 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 12 – point d b (new)

(db) increasing the uneven level playing field for market makers in Europe at the benefit of other jurisdictions;

Amendment 336 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 12 a (new)

12a. Urges the commission to ensure that separation does not result in: (a) a fragmentation of the single market, in particular it should not entail disproportionate adverse effects on the whole or parts of the financial system in other Member States or of the EU as a whole forming or creating an obstacle to the functioning of the internal market or the free flow of capital; (b) excessive operational or infrastructure costs that would be passed onto the customer or consumer or pose an entry barrier to having a basic bank account; (c) becoming overly prescriptive;

Amendment 337 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 12 a (new)

12a. Stresses the crucially important role of banks as market makers in order to uphold liquidity and, thereby, reduce the funding costs for firms, public authorities and sovereigns; reminds of the significant technical difficulties in defining what is a "pure" market making activity; is concerned that with an inferior definition of market making activities, structural separation would have considerably detrimental effect to the smooth functioning of capital markets;

Amendment 338 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 12 a (new)

12a. Urges the Commission to consider the alternative approach resulting from the application of the future Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive, whereby structural separation can result from the resolvability assessment of the firm;

Amendment 339 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 13

13. Urges the Commission to take into account the ECB's proposal to establish clear and enforceable criteria for separation8 ; __________________ 8 http://www.ecb.int/pub/pdf/other/120128_ eurosystem_contributionen.pdf, p. 2.deleted

Amendment 34 #

Motion for a resolution
Recital D

D. whereas ~~the~~ current ~~post-crisis weakness in the structure~~weakness (capital, liquidity, risk management, supervision) of EU banks post-crisis demonstrates the need for reform ~~in order~~ to serve the wider needs of the economy. The current weakness also highlights the effects that macroeconomic imbalances have on the banking system, on wholesale markets and on consumer trust;

Amendment 340 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 13

13. Urges the Commission to take into account the ECB's proposal to establish clear and enforceable criteria for separation8 and to take in to account ECB's comment whereby it "sees merit in separating certain high risk activities of financial institutions that are not associated to the provision of client- related services" , its suggestion that such mandatory separation would require clear and enforceable criteria for separation and its recommendation to further analyse whether market-making activities should be allowed in the deposit taking entity;

Amendment 341 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 13

13. Urges the Commission to take into account the ECB's proposal to establish clear and enforceable criteria for separation8 ; urges the Commission to identify services essential to the functioning of the real economy; argues that such services should be within the ringfence and that all other non essential services should be outside the ringfence to ensure they are priced by the market free from distortion by state guarantees and subsidies;

Amendment 342 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 13

13. Urges the Commission to take into account the ECB's proposal to establish c~~lear and enforceable c~~riteria for separation8 that also allow for flexibility to the national and European supervisor when evaluating the whole financial status of a given bank and its market;

Amendment 343 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 13

13. Urges the Commission to, if structural separation eventually was to be considered, take into account the ECB's proposal to establish clear and enforceable criteria for separation8 ;

Amendment 344 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 13

13. Urges the Commission to take into account the ECB's proposal to establish clear and enforceable criteria ~~for separation8~~ , if potential models of separation are considered8;

Amendment 345 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 13

13. Urges the Commission to take into account the ECB's proposal in order to establish clear, complete and enforceable criteria for separation8 ;

Amendment 346 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 13 a (new)

13a. Calls on the Commission to examine the extent to which the Volcker Rules applied in the USA and the recommendations of the Vickers Commission which are implemented in the UK could be applied EU-wide; considers it necessary to establish a separate EU banking system which takes into account national structures and social models which have evolved over time;

Amendment 347 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 13 a (new)

13a. Market making which provides an essential service to the clients should be allowed to remain in the deposit taking entity as it enables banks to support European corporate clients to gain access to the markets;

Amendment 348 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 14

14. Underlines the necessity of assessing the systemic risk presented by ~~both~~ the retail and investment entities~~, as well as by the group as a whole, with a view to the application of appropriate capital buffers and liquidity requirements for each entity~~ – where the latter could be separated, given its considerable share of the bank’s turnover – as well as by the group as a whole;

Amendment 349 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 14

14. Underlines the necessity of assessing the systemic risk presented by both the retail and investment ~~entitie~~banks, as well as by ~~the group as a whole~~universal banks, with a view to the application of appropriate capital buffers and liquidity requirements for each entity as well as regular checks of the quality of assets held by banks across the EU since RWAs lost their credibility in the financial crisis;

Amendment 35 #

Motion for a resolution
Recital D

D. whereas the current post-crisis weakness in the ~~structure of EU bank~~capitalisation of EU banks, massive deleveraging and rising funding costs for banks in some Member States demonstrates the need for ~~reform~~further reform of capital requirements in order to serve the wider needs of the economy, break the link between sovereigns and banks and restore the confidence in capital markets;

Amendment 350 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 14

14. Underlines the necessity of assessing the systemic risk presented by both the retail and investment entities, as well as by the group as a whole~~, with a view to the application of appropriate capital buffers and liquidity requirements for each entity~~;

Amendment 351 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 14

14. Underlines the necessity of assessing the systemic risk presented by both by the ~~retail and investment~~entities engaged in economically important activities and by speculating entities, as well as by the group as a whole, with a view to the application of appropriate capital buffers and liquidity requirements for each entity;

Amendment 352 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 14

14. Underlines the necessity of assessing the systemic risk presented by both the retail and ~~investment~~proprietary market risk taking entities, as well as by the group as a whole, with a view to the application of appropriate capital buffers and liquidity requirements for each entity taking off balance sheet exposures fully into account;

Amendment 353 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 14

14. Underlines the necessity of assessing the systemic risk presented by both ~~the~~ retail and investment ~~ent~~activities, as well as by the group as a whole, with a view to the application of appropriate capital buffers and liquidity requirements ~~for each entity~~;

Amendment 354 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 14

14. Underlines the necessity of assessing the systemic risk presented by both the retail and investment ~~ent~~activities, as well as by the group as a whole, with a view to the application of appropriate capital buffers and liquidity r~~equiremen~~isk weights for each ~~ent~~activity;

Amendment 355 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 14

14. Underlines the necessity of assessing the systemic risk presented by both the ~~retail an~~deposit banks and ring-fenced investment entities, as well as by the group as a whole, with a view to the application of appropriate capital buffers and liquidity requirements for each entity;

Amendment 356 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 14

14. Underlines the necessity of assessing the systemic risk presented by both the r~~etail and investment~~ing-fenced and trading entities, as well as by the group as a whole, with a view to the application of appropriate capital buffers and liquidity requirements for each entity;

Amendment 357 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 14

14. Underlines the necessity of assessing the systemic risk presented by ~~both the retail and investment~~separated entities, as well as by the group as a whole, with a view to the application of appropriate capital buffers and liquidity requirements for each entity;

Amendment 358 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 14 a (new)

14a. Stresses the need for enhanced macro-surveillance as one of the crucial aspects to mitigate risks in the interconnected EU banking sector;

Amendment 359 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 15

15. Urges the EBA and the Commission to ensure that the retail entity has sufficient capital and liquid assets to enable it, in the event of the bank's failure, to maintain depositors' access to funds, to protect the essential services of the ring-fenced arm from the risk of disorderly failure and to prioritise paying out depositors in a timely fashionMember States have in place a clear and credible crisis management framework, based on the Recovery and Resolution Directive and the Deposit Insurance Directive to safeguard retail depositors in the event of bank failure;

Amendment 36 #

Motion for a resolution
Recital D

D. whereas the current ~~post-crisis weakness in the structur~~state of European markets, in particular the weak financial state of EUmany banks, demonstrates the need for further reform in order to ~~serve~~ensure that the banks do not benefit from being 'too big to fail', ensuring that the markets once again can begin serving the wider needs of the economy;

Amendment 360 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 15

15. Urges the Commission to ensure that ~~the retail entity~~every bank has sufficient capital ~~and~~, liquid assets and bail-inable instruments to enable it, in the event of the bank's failure, to maintain depositors' access to funds, and to protect the essential services ~~of the ring-fenced arm~~ from the risk of disorderly failure ~~and to prioritise paying out depositors in a timely fash~~through an efficient resolution;

Amendment 361 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 15

15. Urges the Commission to ensure that the retail entity has sufficient capital and liquid assets to enable it, in the event of the bank's failure, to maintain depositors' access to funds, to protect the essential services ofin the ~~ring-fenced arm from the risk of disord~~case of bank failure in accordance with the individual resolution plans drawn up in accordance to the Directive of Recoverly ~~failure~~and Resolution and to prioritise paying out depositors in a timely fashion;

Amendment 362 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 15

15. Urges the Commission to ensure that the ~~retail entity~~bank has sufficient capital and liquid assets to enable it, in the event of it~~he bank'~~s failure, to maintain depositors' access to funds, to protect the essential services ~~of the ring-fenced arm~~ from the risk of disorderly failure and to prioritise paying out depositors in a timely fashion and avoid adverse effects on financial stability;

Amendment 363 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 15

15. Urges the Commission to ensure that the retail entity has sufficient capital and liquid assets to enable it, in the event of the bank's failure, to maintain depositors' access to a minimum of 100,000 Euro of their private funds, to protect the essential services of the ring-fenced arm from the risk of disorderly failure and to prioritise paying out depositors ~~in a timely fash~~within 90 days after the bank's resolution;

Amendment 364 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 15

15. Urges the Commission to ensure that the ~~retail entity~~entity engaged in economically important activities has sufficient capital and liquid assets to enable it, in the event of the bank’s failure, to maintain depositors’ access to funds, to protect the essential services of the ring-fenced arm from the risk of disorderly failure and to prioritise paying out depositors in a timely fashion;

Amendment 365 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 15

15. Urges the Commission to ensure that the ~~retail entity~~bank's activity in retail business has sufficient capital and liquid assets to enable it, in the event of the bank's failure, to maintain depositors' access to funds, to protect ~~the~~ essential services ~~of the ring-fenced arm~~ from the risk of disorderly failure and to prioritise paying out depositors in a timely fashion;

Amendment 366 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 15

15. Urges the Commission to ensure that the ~~retail entity~~deposit bank has sufficient capital and liquid assets to enable it, in the event of the bank’s failure, to maintain depositors’ access to funds, to protect the essential services of the ring-fenced arm from the risk of disorderly failure and to prioritise paying out depositors in a timely fashion;

Amendment 367 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 15

15. Urges the Commission to ensure that the retail entity has sufficient capital, bail- inable liabilities and liquid assets to enable it, in the event of the bank's failure, to maintain depositors' access to funds, to protect the essential services of the ring- fenced arm from the risk of disorderly failure and to prioritise paying out depositors in a timely fashion;

Amendment 368 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 15

15. Urges the Commission to ensure that the retail entity has sufficient capital and liquid assets to enable it, in the event of the bank's failure, to maintain depositors' access to funds, to protect the essential services of the ring-fenced arm from the risk of disorderly failure and to p~~rioritise paying~~ay out depositors in a timely fashion;

Amendment 369 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 15

15. Urges the Commission to ensure that the retail entity has sufficient capital and liquid assets to enable it, in the event of the bank’s failure, to maintain depositors’ access to funds, to protect the essential services of the ring-fenced arm from the risk of disorderly failure and to prioritise paying out depositors ~~in a timely fashion~~within 90 days;

Amendment 37 #

Motion for a resolution
Recital D

D. whereas the current post-crisis weakness inof the ~~structure of EU banks~~European banking system demonstrates the need for reinformcing the architecture of European financial supervision and crisis management, including structural reforms for certain banks in order to serve the wider needs of the economy;

Amendment 370 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 15

15. Urges the Commission to ensure that the r~~etail~~ing-fenced entity has sufficient capital and liquid assets to enable it, in the event of the bank's failure, to maintain depositors' access to funds, to protect the essential services of the ring-fenced arm from the risk of disorderly failure and to prioritise paying out depositors in a timely fashion;

Amendment 371 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 15

15. Urges the Commission to ensure that the retail entity has sufficient capital and liquid assets to enable it, in the event of the bank's failure, to maintain depositors' access to funds, to protect the essential services of the ~~ring-fenced~~separated retail arm from the risk of disorderly failure and to prioritise paying out depositors in a timely fashion;

Amendment 372 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 15 a (new)

15a. In order to ensure a consistent treatment across the EU, the EBA in cooperation with competent authorities, including the ECB, should play a key role in this context by developing relevant binding standards, including the calibration of the appropriate thresholds for mandatory separation to be applied by competent authorities.

Amendment 373 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 15 a (new)

15a. Urges the Commission to ensure that any form of separation should only be required in such circumstances where it is demonstrable that increased capital requirements would be not be sufficient mitigate the identified risks;

Amendment 374 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 16

16. Urges the Commission to ensure that adequate differentiation exists in terms of capital, leverage and liquidity requirements between the investment and retail entities, with an emphasis on higher capital requirements for the investment entity;deleted

Amendment 375 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 16

16. Urges the Commission to ensure that adequate ~~differentiation exists in term~~requirements ofn capital, leverage and liquidity ~~requirements between the investment and retail entities, with an emphasis on higher capital requirements for the investment enti~~exist for the bank in its entirety;

Amendment 376 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 16

16. Urges EBA and the Commission to ensure that adequate differentiation exists in terms of capital, leverage and liquidity requirements between the ~~investment and retail~~separated entities, with an emphasis on higher capital requirements for ~~the investment entity~~activities that pose the highest risks, in line with the provisions of the Capital Requirements Directive and Regulation and the ongoing Basel review of the trading book;

Amendment 377 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 16

16. Urges the Commission and competent supervisors to ensure that adequate differentiation exists in terms of capital, leverage and liquidity requirements between ~~the~~ investment ~~and~~, retail ~~entities, with~~and universal banks, and e~~mphasis on higher capital requirements for the investment entity~~specially appropriate and needed capital and liquidity flows within banking groups operating in different Member States are ensured;

Amendment 378 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 16

16. Urges the Commission to ensure that adequate differentiation exists in terms of capital, leverage and liquidity requirements between the investment and ~~retail~~depository/lending entities, with an emphasis on higher capital requirements for the ring-fenced investment entity;

Amendment 379 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 16

16. Urges the Commission to ensure that adequate differentiation exists in terms of capital, leverage, bail-inable liabilities and liquidity requirements between the ~~investment~~proprietary market risk taking and retail entities, with an emphasis on higher capital requirements for the ~~investment entity~~entity engaged in proprietary market risk taking;

Amendment 38 #

Motion for a resolution
Recital D

D. whereas the current post-crisis weakness in the structure of EU banks demonstrates th~~e need fo~~at there may be a need for further reform in order to serve the wider needs of the economy and that moreover significant disparities between Member States are perceptible as regards the nature and degree of the reforms of their banking sectors which they have implemented and planned;

Amendment 380 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 16

16. Urges the Commission to ensure that adequate differentiation exists in terms of capital, leverage and liquidity requirements between the ~~investment and retail~~entity engaged in economically important activities and the speculating entit~~ies~~y, with an emphasis on higher capital requirements for the investment entity;

Amendment 381 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 16

16. Urges the Commission to ensure that adequate differentiation exists in terms of capital, leverage and liquidity requirements between the ~~investment and retail~~trading and ring-fenced entities, with an emphasis on higher capital requirements for the ~~investment~~trading entity;

Amendment 382 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 16

16. Urges the Commission, within the bounds of CRD IV, to ensure that adequate differentiation exists in terms of capital, leverage and liquidity requirements between the investment and retail entities, with an emphasis on higher capital requirements for the investment entity;

Amendment 383 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 16

16. Urges the Commission to ensure that adequate differentiation exists in terms of capital, leverage and liquidity requirements between the investment and retail ~~ent~~activities, with an emphasis on higher capital requirements for the investment ~~entity~~activities;

Amendment 384 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 16

16. Urges the Commission to ensure that adequate differentiation exists in terms of capital, leverage and liquidity requirements between the investment and retail entities, with an emphasis on higher capital requirements and higher capital buffers for the investment entity;

Amendment 385 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 16 a (new)

16a. Asks the Commission to develop rules limiting the size of groups and separate legal entities as well in the retail as in the commercial sphere. The size of the separated entities and the groups should be measured by the balance sheet and related to the GDP of the home member state and the funding of the to be established Recovery and Resolution Funds to prevent institutions form becoming too big or too interconnected to fail and to ensure that the respective means and measures are sufficient to recover failing institutes

Amendment 386 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 16 a (new)

16a. Urges the Commission, in order to manage the risks of loans for real estate operations more effectively, to ensure that limits on the size of loans are adopted in the Member States on the basis of the loan-to-value ratio of the property (LTV) or the loan-to-income ratio of the borrower (LTI) and form part of the instruments of micro- and macro- prudential supervision;

Amendment 387 #

Arlene McCARTHY, Peter SIMON

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 16 a (new)

1a. In order to avoid circumvention of these structural measures, strict monitoring should take into account possible movement of activities outside the perimeter of regulation and supervision or lead to the relocation of activities to jurisdictions that are less stringent.

Amendment 388 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 16 a (new)

16a. Urges the Commission to assist in reaching an agreement on the proposed Deposit Guarantee Scheme Directive and to increase consumer protection by introducing depositor preference.

Amendment 389 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 16 a (new)

16a. Believes that the possible scope for allowing market-making to be carried out by the deposit taking entity, subject to certain limits, should be further analysed;

Amendment 39 #

Motion for a resolution
Recital D

D. whereas the current post-crisis weakness in the structure of EU banks demonstrates the need for reform in order to serve ~~the wider needs of the economy~~especially the socially desirable needs and to strengthen growth and employment enhancing investments of small and medium enterprises;

Amendment 390 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 16 b (new)

16b. Recalls that any structural reform does not remove the need for continuous supervision and, where necessary, adaptation of the legislation, through co- decision or implementing measures, while avoiding legislation which permits inconsistent transposition and application;

Amendment 391 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 16 b (new)

16b. Asks the Commission to require from banks with a balance sheet total above EUR 200 bn that at least 50% of their balance sheet be dedicated to lending to non financial entities and at least 33% to lending to GDP contributing activities and entities such as SMEs;

Amendment 392 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 16 c (new)

16c. Asks the Commission to assess the potential effects for lending to SMEs of a limitation of the size of banks by putting a cap on the size of assets that a bank can hold;

Amendment 393 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 17

17. Calls on the Commission to ~~implement~~assess the proposals set out in the HLEG's report in the area of corporate governance of ~~separated~~ banks, including a) governance and control mechanisms, b) risk management, c) incentive schemes, d) risk disclosure and e) sanctions, taking into account where the proposals have been addressed in adopted legislation and aiming at enforcing faster change of bankers' behaviours;

Amendment 394 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 17

17. Calls on the Commission to ~~implement~~consider the proposals set out in the HLEG's report in the area of corporate governance ~~of separated bank~~for its thorough impact assessment of potential separation and alternatives, including a) governance and control mechanisms, b) risk management, c) incentive schemes, d) risk disclosure and e) sanctions;

Amendment 395 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 17

17. Considering the legal structure, the different European banking models and the principle of proportionality calls on the Commission to implement the proposals set out in the HLEG's report in the area of corporate governance of separated banks, including a) governance and control mechanisms, b) risk management, c) incentive schemes, d) risk disclosure and e) sanctions;

Amendment 396 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 17

17. Calls on the Commission ~~to implement~~, if a future assessment shows there is a need for structural separation, to consider the proposals set out in the HLEG's report in the area of corporate governance of separated banks, including a) governance and control mechanisms, b) risk management, c) incentive schemes, d) risk disclosure and e) sanctions;

Amendment 397 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 17

17. Calls on the Commission to implement the proposals set out in the HLEG's report in the area of corporate governance of separated banks, including a) governance and control mechanisms, b) risk management, c) incentive schemes, d) risk disclosure ~~and~~, e) sanctions and additionally a reimbursement scheme for depositors;

Amendment 398 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 19

19. Urges the Commission to ensure that separation delivers independent decision- making and governance for each entity, with separate executive and non-executive board members and whereby neither side of the ring fence is owned by or reports to the other;deleted

Amendment 399 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 19

19. Urges the Commission to ensure that separation delivers independent decision- making and governance for each entity, with separate executive and non-executive board members and whereby neither side of the ring fence is owned by or reports to the other;deleted

Amendment 4 #

Motion for a resolution
Citation 9

– having regard to the 2012 report of the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) entitled ‘Implicit Guarantees for Bank Debt: Where Do We Stand?’2 ,and to the 2009 report of the OECD 'The Elephant in the Room: The Need to Deal with What Banks Do'[1]; [1] http://www.oecd.org/daf/fin/financial- markets/44357464.pdf

Amendment 40 #

Motion for a resolution
Recital D

D. whereas the current post-crisis weakness in the structure of EU banks demonstrates the need for reform in order to serve the wider needs of the economy; and to safeguard European taxpayers' money against the risks that arise from the sheer size of the EU banking sector as a whole in relation to the overall economy.

Amendment 400 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 19

19. Urges the Commission to ensure that separation delivers independent decision- making and governance for each entity, with separate executive and non-executive board members and whereby neither side of the ring fence is owned by or reports to the other;deleted

Amendment 401 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 19

19. Urges the Commission to ensure that separation delivers independent decision- making and governance for each entity, with separate executive and non-executive board members and whereby neither side of the ring fence is owned by or reports to the otherIs of the opinion that the recently adopted directive on prudential supervision of credit institutions and investment firms contains an appropriate framework of requirements on the governance of banks, including their executive and non-executive board members;

Amendment 402 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 19

19. Urges the Commission to ensure that separation – where this was earmarked owing to the considerable share of the bank’s turnover attributable to investment entities – delivers independent decision- making and governance for each entity, with separate executive ~~and non-executive board members and whereby neither side of th~~board members; calls on the Commission to take rin~~g fence~~to account in its ~~owned by or reports to the other~~proposals the legal and institutional structures which have evolved in the different European banking models;

Amendment 403 #

Nils TORVALDS, Olle SCHMIDT

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 19

19. Urges the Commission to ensure that separation delivers sufficiently independent decision- making and governance for each entity, with separate executive and non-executive board members and whereby neither side of the ring fence is owned by or reports to the other; nevertheless ring fencing must not create entities without sufficient understanding and expertise in all aspects of markets and transactions that reflect on their business;

Amendment 404 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 19

19. Urges the Commission to ensure that separation delivers independent decision- making and governance for each entity, ~~with separate executive and non-executive board members and~~ whereby neither side of the ring fence is owned by or reports to the other;

Amendment 405 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 20

20. Calls on the Commission to include provisions establishing an obligation for all board members of the retail entity, both executive and non-executive, and all levels of management and risk-takers to originate from, and only have responsibility for, the retail entity and not the investment entity;deleted

Amendment 406 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 20

20. Calls on the Commission to include provisions establishing an obligation for all board members of the retail entity, both executive and non-executive, and all levels of management and risk-takers to originate from, and only have responsibility for, the retail entity and not the investment entity;deleted

Amendment 407 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 20

20. Calls on the Commission to include provisions establishing an obligation for all board members of the retail entity, both executive and non-executive, and all levels of management and risk-takers to originate from, and only have responsibility for, the retail entity and not the investment entity;deleted

Amendment 408 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 20

20. Calls on the Commission to include provisions establishing an obligation for all board members of the retail entity, both executive and non-executive, and all levels of management and risk-takers to originate from, and only have responsibility for, the retail entity and not the investment entity;deleted

Amendment 409 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 20

20. Calls on the Commission to include provisions establishing an obligation for all board members of the retail entity, both executive and non-executive, and all levels of management and risk-takers to originate from, and only have responsibility for, the retail entity and not the investment entity;deleted

Amendment 41 #

Motion for a resolution
Recital D

D. whereas ~~the current post-crisis weakness in the structure of EU bank~~weaknesses and excessive interconnectedness exposed in the financial crisis demonstrates there is a need for banking reform in order to serve the wider needs of the economy;

Amendment 410 #

Nils TORVALDS, Olle SCHMIDT

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 20

20. Calls on the Commission to include provisions establishing an obligation for all executive board members ~~of the retail entity, both executive and non-executive, and all levels of management and risk-takers to originate from, and only have responsibilit~~in an entity of a bank to have responsibility as executive board members only for, th~~e retail entity and not the investment entity~~is entity of the bank;

Amendment 411 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 20

20. Calls on the Commission to include provisions establishing an obligation for all ~~board members of the retail entity, both executive and non-executive, and all~~ levels of management and risk-takers to originate from, and only have responsibility for, the retail entity and not the investment entity;

Amendment 412 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 20

20. Calls on the Commission to include provisions establishing an obligation for all board members of the ~~retail~~depository entity, both executive and non-executive, and all levels of management and risk-takers to originate from, and only have responsibility for, the ~~retail~~depository entity and not the investment entity;

Amendment 413 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 20

20. Calls on the Commission to include provisions establishing an obligation for all board members ~~of the retail entity~~, both executive and non- executive, engaged in economically important activities and all levels of management and risk-takers to originate from, and only have responsibility for, the retail entity and not the investment entity;

Amendment 414 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 20

20. Calls on the Commission to include provisions establishing an obligation for all board members of the retail entity, both executive and non-executive, and all levels of management and risk-takers to originate from, and only have responsibility for, the retail entity and not the ~~investment~~proprietary market risk taking entity;

Amendment 415 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 21

21. Urges the Commission to include provisions introducing personal accountability and liability for board members on both sides of the ring fence and at group level; suggests that in this context the Commission should explore how to encourage a return to the partnership model of company management;

Amendment 416 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 21

21. ~~Urge~~Reminds the Commission t~~o include provisions introducing~~hat the personal accountability and liability for board members ~~on both sides of the ring fence and at group~~is regulated at Member State level;

Amendment 417 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 21

21. Urges the Commission to ~~includ~~explore possible and adequate provisions introducing personal accountability and liability for board members ~~on both sides of the ring fence and at group level~~;

Amendment 418 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 21

21. ~~Urge~~Asks the Commission to ~~include~~consider strengthening provisions ~~introducing~~on personal accountability and liability for board members ~~on both sides of the ring fence and at group level~~;

Amendment 419 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 21

21. Urges the Commission to ~~include~~ascertain whether provisions introducing personal accountability and liability for board members on both sides of the ring fence and at group level are included;

Amendment 42 #

Motion for a resolution
Recital D a (new)

Da. whereas the 1933 US Glass-Steagall Act on banking separation helped to provide a way out of the worst global financial crisis to have occurred before the present crisis and whereas since the Act was repealed in 1999, there has been a considerable increase in speculative bank investment and financial failures;

Amendment 420 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 22

22. Urges the Commission to continue the reform of banks’ compensation and remuneration culture by prioritising long- term incentives for variable remuneration with larger deferral periods up to retirement;deleted

Amendment 421 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 22

22. Urges EBA and the Commission to ~~continue the reform of~~ensure correct implementation of the relevant provisions for banks's compensation and remuneration ~~culture by prioritising long- term incentives for v~~policies from the Capital Requirements Directive; calls on EBA and the Commission to present an annual report to the European Parlia~~ble remuneration with larger deferral per~~ment and the Council on the implementation and enforcement of the relevant provisiodns ~~up to retirement~~by the Member States;

Amendment 422 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 22

22. Urges the Commission to continue the reform of banks' compensation and remuneration culture by prioritising long- term incentives for variable remuneration with larger deferral periods up to retirement as well as to promote transparency including at least explanations and assessments on internal remuneration spreads, relevant changes and comparative sectorial deviations;

Amendment 423 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 22

22. Urges the Commission to continue the reform of banks' compensation and remuneration culture by prioritising long- term incentives for variable remuneration with ~~larger~~appropriate deferral periods up to ~~retirement~~5 years;

Amendment 424 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 23

~~23. Urges the Commission to ensure that remuneration systems prioritise the use of instruments such as bonds subject to bail- in, and shares, rather than cash;~~deleted

Amendment 425 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 23

~~23. Urges the Commission to ensure that remuneration systems prioritise the use of instruments such as bonds subject to bail- in, and shares, rather than cash;~~deleted

Amendment 426 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 23

23. Urges the Commission to ensure that remuneration systems prioritise the use of instruments such as bonds subject to bail- in, and shares, rather than cash; Urges the Commission to ensure that remuneration systems are aligned with international principles and effectively incentivise the use of deferred instruments such as bonds subject to bail-in, rather than cash, and shares which are subject to clawback for top management, but for also for all levels in the institutions;

Amendment 427 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 23

23. Urges the Commission, EBA and the competent authorities to ensure that remuneration systems prioritise the use of instruments such as bonds subject to bail- in, and shares, rather than cash, in line with the provisions of the Capital Requirements Directive;

Amendment 428 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 23

23. Urges the Commission to ensure that remuneration systems ~~prioritis~~might include the use of instruments such as shares, options and bonds subject to bail- in, a~~nd shares, rather than~~longside cash;

Amendment 429 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 23

23. Urges the Commission to ensure that remuneration systems prioritise the use of instruments such as bonds subject to bail- in, and shares, rather than cash, commissions or value-based items;

Amendment 43 #

Motion for a resolution
Recital D a (new)

D a. Whereas a number of important EU initiatives have been taken to prevent a new banking crisis, increase protection of tax payers and retail clients and create robust and sustainable payment systems.

Amendment 430 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 23

23. Urges the Commission to ensure that remuneration systems prioritise the use of instruments such as shares and bonds subject to bail- in, ~~and shares~~, rather than cash;

Amendment 431 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 23 a (new)

23a. Urges the Commission to ensure that the banks' compensation and remuneration policy are transparent to investors and the public. Not all Member States have audit legislation that makes public the remuneration and compensation scheme in their annual reports. This is valuable information to the banks' investors as well as current and future customers;

Amendment 432 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 24

24. Urges the Commission to ensure that compensation and remuneration systems at all levels of a bank reflect its overall performance and are focused on quality customer service and long-term financial stability rather than short-term profits;deleted

Amendment 433 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 24

24. Urges the Commission to ensure that compensation and remuneration systems at all levels of a bank reflect its overall performance and are focused on quality customer service and long-term financial stability rather than short-term profits;deleted

Amendment 434 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 24

24. Urges the Commission, EBA and the competent authorities to ensure that compensation and remuneration systems at all levels of a bank reflect its overall performance and are focused on quality customer service and long-term financial stability rather than short-term profits, in line with the provisions of the Capital Requirements Directive;

Amendment 435 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 24

24. Urges the Commission to ensure that compensation and remuneration systems at all levels of a bank reflect its overall performance and are focused on quality customer service, social-economic and environmental impact and long-term financial stability rather than short-term profits;

Amendment 436 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 24

24. Urges the Commission to ensure that compensation and remuneration systems at all relevant levels of a bank reflect its overall performance and are focused on quality customer service and long-term financial stability rather than short-term profits;

Amendment 437 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 25

25. Urges the Commission to make provision for effective, dissuasive and proportionate sanctioning regimes for legal and natural persons, and for the publication of sanction levels and of information on those in breach of the rules;deleted

Amendment 438 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 26

~~26. Urges the Commission to make provision for national supervisors to have the power to implement full and legal separation of banks;~~deleted

Amendment 439 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 26

~~26. Urges the Commission to make provision for national supervisors to have the power to implement full and legal separation of banks;~~deleted

Amendment 44 #

Motion for a resolution
Recital D a (new)

D a. whereas banks should not be sovereign over public interest;

Amendment 440 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 26

~~26. Urges the Commission to make provision for national supervisors to have the power to implement full and legal separation of banks;~~deleted

Amendment 441 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 26

~~26. Urges the Commission to make provision for national supervisors to have the power to implement full and legal separation of banks;~~deleted

Amendment 442 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 26

26. Urges the Commission to make relevant provisions for national supervisors ~~to have the power to implement full and legal separation of banks~~;

Amendment 443 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 26

26. Urges the Commission to make provision for national supervisors, where appropriate in a coordinated manner with the single supervisory mechanism, to have the power to implement full and legal separation of banks;

Amendment 444 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 26

26. Urges the Commission to make provision for national supervisors to have the power to implement full and legal separation of banks in accordance with the Single Supervisory Mechanism;

Amendment 445 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 26

26. Urges the Commission to make provision for national supervisors, in cooperation with the EU authorities, to have the power to implement full and legal separation of banks;

Amendment 446 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 26

26. Urges the Commission to make provision for ~~national~~competent supervisors to have the power to implement full and legal separation of banks;

Amendment 447 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 27

~~27. Asks the Commission to propose that adequate resources and powers be allocated to national supervisors;~~deleted

Amendment 448 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 27

27. Asks the Commission to propose that adequate resources and powers be allocated to ~~national~~competent supervisors; y authorities including SSM;

Amendment 449 #

Syed KAMALL, Theodor Dumitru STOLOJAN, Sharon BOWLES, Wolf KLINZ, Sven GIEGOLD

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 27 a (new)

27a. Urges the Commission to conduct a study to ensure that accounting standards used by financial institutions give a genuinely true and fair view of banks' financial health; points out that accounts are the main source of information for an investor to understand whether or not a company is a going concern or not; notes that auditors can only sign off accounts if they are true and fair, independent of the financial standards used by preparers of financial statements; believes that if auditors are unsure that a company is a going concern they should not sign off the company's accounts, even if they have been drawn up in line with accounting standards; this should however be a driver of better management of the company in question; suggests that international financial reporting standards do not necessarily give a true and fair view of accounts, as shown by numerous examples of banks collapsing despite their accounts having been signed off by auditors;

Amendment 45 #

Motion for a resolution
Recital E

E. whereas the eighth (December 2012) edition of the Commission’s Consumer Markets Scoreboard clearly indicates that consumer trust in the EU in banking se~~ctor~~rvices is at an all-time low ~~and that the industry has high levels of noncompliance with consumer protection legislation5~~;

Amendment 450 #

Motion for a resolution
Subheading 4

D. Enhancing fair and sustainable competition

Amendment 451 #

Motion for a resolution
Subheading 4

D. Enhancing competition and competitiveness

Amendment 452 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 28

28. Stresses that effective competition is necessary in order to ensure a well- functioning and efficient banking sector which funds the ~~real~~ economy by reducing the cost of banking services; Is concerned that the aggregated amount of legislative and regulatory requirements on banks, although warranted for many reasons, risk to pose significant barriers to entry and, therefore, facilitate the cementation of the current banking groups' dominant positions, thereby increasing the dependence of the financial system on a limited number of big players;

Amendment 453 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 28

28. Stresses that effective and fair and sustainable competition is necessary in order to ensure a well- functioning and efficient banking sector which funds the real economy by reducing the cost of banking services where inter alia supervisory rules should take into account the risk profile, the regional scope and the business model of the respective institutions;

Amendment 454 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 28

28. Stresses that effective competition is necessary in order to ensure a well- functioning and efficient banking sector which serves consumers and funds the real economy by reducing the cost of banking services and that this requires the dominance of excessively large institutions to be reduced;

Amendment 455 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 28

28. Stresses that effective competition is necessary in order to ensure a well- functioning and efficient banking sector which funds the real economy by ensuring universal access to banking services and reducing the cost of banking services;

Amendment 456 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 28

28. Stresses that effective competition is necessary in order to ensure a well- functioning and efficient banking sector which f~~unds~~acilitates the funding of the real economy by reducing the cost of banking services;

Amendment 457 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 28

28. Stresses that effective competition is necessary in order to ensure a well- functioning and efficient banking sector which ~~funds~~improves funding of the real economy by reducing the cost of banking services;

Amendment 458 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 28

28. Stresses that effective competition and EU bank competitiveness is necessary in order to ensure a well- functioning and efficient banking sector which funds the real economy by reducing the cost of banking services;

Amendment 459 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 28 a (new)

28a. Urges the Commission to require banks to explain to their customers when opening deposit accounts that their money is in fact loaned to the bank and is not necessarily on deposit; emphasises that customers be made fully aware of what their deposits are being spent on; suggests that such information should be given to the customer before the account is opened; argues that this will incentivise individuals to learn more about how risky a bank's business model is and will ensure consumers are fully aware of the risks of their money being left with the bank in question; notes that deposit guarantee schemes protect up to €100,000 but also notes that deposit guarantee schemes can be bypassed, that they are only as resilient as the state that stands behind them and that they encourage moral hazard;

Amendment 46 #

Motion for a resolution
Recital E

E. whereas the eighth (December 2012) edition of the Commission's Consumer Markets Scoreboard clearly indicates that consumer trust in the EU banking sector is at an all-time low and that the industry has high levels of noncompliance with consumer protection legislation5 and the consumers' confidence needs to be restored ;

Amendment 460 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 28 a (new)

28a. Urges the Commission to ensure that competition and an international level playing field is maintained and that any possible initiative does not lead to increased capital markets fragmentation within the EU or globally.

Amendment 461 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 29

29. Urges the Commission and the Member States to work together to promote greater diversification of the EU's banking sector by encouraging and facilitating more consumer-oriented banking, for example through cooperative, building society, peer-to-peer lending and saving bank models;deleted

Amendment 462 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 29

29. Urges the Commission and the Member States to work together to promote greater diversification of the EU’s banking sector by encouraging and facilitating more consumer-oriented banking, for example through cooperative, building society, peer-to-peer lending and saving bank models; calls also for commercial banks and investment banks to be treated differently for tax purposes, favouring banks in the former category, taking into account their activities in support of the real economy and of small and medium- sized enterprises in particular;

Amendment 463 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 29

29. Urges the Commission and the Member States to work together to promote greater diversification of the EU's banking sector by encouraging and facilitating more consumer- oriented banking, for example through cooperative, building society, peer- to- peer lending, crowd funding and saving bank models, noting the different levels of risk the consumer is exposed to are transparently disclosed;

Amendment 464 #

Krišjānis KARIŅŠ, Gunnar HÖKMARK

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 29

29. Urges the Commission and the Member States to work together to promote greater diversification of the EU's banking sector by encouraging and facilitating more consumer-oriented banking which is closed to the territory of the banking activities and the real economy, for example through cooperative, building society, peer-to-peer lending and saving bank models;

Amendment 465 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 29

29. Urges the Commission and the Member States to work together to promote greater diversification and competition of the EU's banking sector by encouraging and facilitating more consumer-oriented banking, for example through cooperative, building society, peer-to-peer lending and saving bank models; stresses that fully functioning Single Market is the key;

Amendment 466 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 29 a (new)

29a. Notes that, in order to boost the competitiveness and stability of the European banking system, it is vital to address effectively the issue of systemically important financial institutions (i.e. those that are too big to fail), whose problems resulted in an escalation of the adverse effects of the financial crisis, by rationalising the scale of the activities of banking groups and by reducing dependency where groups are concerned;

Amendment 467 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 29 a (new)

29a. Urges the Commission to find ways to encourage and promote 'relationship lending' or 'knowledge based lending' in legislative initiatives. These should aim to avoid a 'tick box' approach and focus instead on promoting vocational and ethical training for those who intermediate and lend to businesses;

Amendment 468 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 30

30. Urges the Member States to ensure that their national supervisors have the clear objective of promoting ~~effectiv~~fair and sustainable competition in their banking sectors with the aim to efficiently allocate savings into productive investments to the benefit of the society as a whole; encourages the Member States and the Commission to examine options for more stakeholder involvement in the provision of financial services to private persons and to enterprises;

Amendment 469 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 30

30. Urges the ~~Member States to ensure that their national supervisors have the clear objective of promoting~~Commission, the competent authorities and the Member States to promote and ensure effective competition in their European banking sectors;

Amendment 47 #

Motion for a resolution
Recital E a (new)

Ea. whereas the recent bailout package in Cyprus originally included a tax on all bank deposits, thereby undermining confidence in the deposit guarantee scheme of that country;

Amendment 470 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 30

30. Urges the Member States to ensure that their national supervisors ~~hav~~create the c~~lear objective of promoting~~onditions for effective competition in their banking sectors in order to create greater diversity and customer- orientation;

Amendment 471 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 30

30. Urges the Member States to ensure that their national supervisors have the clear objective of promoting effective competition in their banking sectors as well as having the legal basis for implementing a separation of the banking system;

Amendment 472 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 30

30. Urges the ~~Member States~~Commission to ensure that ~~their national supervisors~~competent supervisory authorities including SSM have the clear objective of promoting effective competition in their banking sectors;

Amendment 473 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 30

30. Urges the Member States to ensure that their national supervisors, in cooperation with EU authorities, have the clear objective of promoting effective competition in their banking sectors;

Amendment 474 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 31

31. Asks the Commission to bring forward measures to facilitate consumer switching between banks and assist in improving consumer choice in the banking sector by reducing the barriers to entry and exit and applying proportionate rules to new entrants to the market;deleted

Amendment 475 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 31

31. Asks the Commission to bring forward measures to ~~facilitate~~promote accessible websites allowing consumers to compare both prices and financial strength among banks thus enhancing discipline through informed consumer switching between banks and assist in improving consumer choice in the banking sector by reducing the barriers to entry and exit and applying proportionate rules to new entrants to the market;

Amendment 476 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 31

31. Asks the Commission to bring forward measures to facilitate consumer switching between banks, limit excessive market power in card services and assist in improving consumer choice in the banking sector by banning tied practices, reducing the barriers to entry and exit and applying proportionate rules to new entrants to the market;

Amendment 477 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 31

31. Asks the Commission to bring forward measures to ensure access to basic banking services to all consumers, to facilitate consumer switching between banks and assist in improving consumer choice in the banking sector by reducing the barriers to entry and exit and applying proportionate rules to new entrants to the market;

Amendment 478 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 31

31. Asks the Commission to bring forward measures to facilitate consumer switching between banks including the idea of bank account number portability and assist in improving consumer choice in the banking sector by reducing the barriers to entry and exit and applying proportionate rules to new entrants to the market;

Amendment 479 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 31

31. Asks the Commission to bring forward measures to facilitate consumer switching between banks and assist in improving consumer choice in the banking sector by reducing the barriers to entry and exit, a transferable bank account number or customer 'LEI' and applying proportionate rules to new entrants to the market;

Amendment 48 #

Motion for a resolution
Recital F

F. whereas research by the Bank of International Settlements (BIS) suggests that once bank assets exceed a country's GDP, its financial sector has a negative impact on economic growth, as human and financial resources are drained from other areas of economic activity6 ; __________________ 6 ‘Reassessing the impact of finance on growth’, by Stephen G. Cecchetti and Enisse Kharroubi, Monetary and Economic Department of the Bank of International Settlements, July 2012: www.bis.org/publ/work381.pdfdeleted

Amendment 480 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 32

32. Calls on the Commission to bring forward the necessary structural reforms outlined in this report, which, while maintaining the integrity of the internal market, respect the diversity of national banking systems and ensure Member States' ability to reinforce them where appropriate;deleted

Amendment 481 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 32

32. ~~Calls on the Commission to bring forward the necessary~~Stresses that structural reforms as outlined in this e HLEG-report, w~~hich, while maintaining the integrity of the internal market, respect the diversity of national banking systems and ensure Member States' ability to reinforce them where appropria~~ould risk to reduce the diversity of national as well as the European banking system;

Amendment 482 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 32

32. Calls on the Commission to bring forward the necessary structural reforms outlined in this report, ~~which,~~ while maintaining the integrity of the internal market, respect the diversity of national banking systems ~~and ensure Member States' ability to reinforce them where appropriate;~~, protecting the interests of the real economy, in particular lending to SMEs, the fixed-income markets and the functioning of the internal market and promoting competitiveness.

Amendment 483 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 32

32. Calls on the Commission to brevaluate the need for any additional banking refor~~ward the necessary structural reforms outlined in this report~~ms considered in this report, provided their necessity will be proven in the Commission impact assessment analysing all costs and benefits of all adopted proposals, which, while maintaining the integrity of the internal market, respect the diversity of national banking systems and ensure Member States' ability to reinforce them where appropriate;

Amendment 484 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 32

32. Calls on the Commission to bring forward the necessary structural reforms outlined in this report~~, which, whil~~ and at the same time maintain~~ing~~ the integrity of the internal market~~, respect the diversity of national banking systems and ensure Member States’ ability to reinforce them where appropriate~~;

Amendment 485 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 32

32. Calls on the Commission to bring forward the necessary structural reforms outlined in this report, which, while maintaining the integrity of the internal market, respect the diversity of national banking systems and ensure ~~Member States' ability to reinforce them where appropriate~~a strong role for EBA to ensure correct application across the Union;

Amendment 486 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 32 a (new)

32a. Asks the Commission to conduct a thorough impact assessment on the recommendations of the HLEG, thereby taking into account legislation already adopted and initiated at the European level, and to also include alternatives to separation models in this assessment, such as higher regulatory requirements for proprietary trading and other high- risk trading activities;

Amendment 49 #

Motion for a resolution
Recital F

F. whereas research by the Bank of International Settlements (BIS) suggests that once bank assets exceed a country’s GDP, its financial sector has a negative impact on economic growth, as human and financial resources are drained from other areas of economic activity6; __________________ 6 ‘Reassessing the impact of finance on growth’, by Stephen G. Cecchetti and Enisse Kharroubi, Monetary and Economic Department of the Bank of International Settlements, July 2012: www.bis.org/publ/work381.pdfdeleted

Amendment 5 #

Motion for a resolution
Citation 10 a (new)

- Having regard to the Eurogroup Statement of 25 March 2013 regarding the crisis in Cyprus2 __________________ 2 http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/c ms_data/docs/pressdata/en/ecofin/136487. pdf

Amendment 50 #

Motion for a resolution
Recital F

F. whereas ~~research~~a study by the Bank of International Settlements (BIS) suggests that once ~~bank asset~~the volume of private sector loans exceeds a country’s GDP~~, its financial sector has a negative impact on economic growth~~ as a measure of the size of the financial sector and relative employment in that sector rises rapidly, an excessively large financial sector can have a negative effect on the increase in productivity, as human and financial resources are drained from other areas of economic activity6;

Amendment 51 #

Motion for a resolution
Recital F

F. whereas research by the Bank of International Settlements (BIS) suggests that once bank assets exceed a country's GDP, its financial sector has a negative impact on economic growth, as human and financial resources are drained from other areas of economic activity6 ; also notes that the ability for any country to withstand the fallout from a collapse of such a systemically relevant bank will be called into question and that the fiscal health of the country in question will be severely undermined;

Amendment 52 #

Motion for a resolution
Recital F

F. whereas research by the Bank of International Settlements (BIS) suggests that once bank assets exceed a country's GDP, its financial sector has a negative impact on economic growth, as human and financial resources are drained from other areas of economic activity6 . Nevertheless, other reports (IMF) indicate economies can benefit from specialisation; further, with regard to banking it is the domestic exposure rather than the total sector size that should be considered for affordability;

Amendment 53 #

Motion for a resolution
Recital F

F. whereas research by the Bank of International Settlements (BIS) suggests that once bank assets exceed a country's GDP, its financial sector has a negative impact on economic growth, as human and financial resources are drained from other areas of economic activity6 ; in addition, the right reference to compare banks size is at the level of Europe as a whole and not at individual national level;

Amendment 54 #

Motion for a resolution
Recital F

F. whereas research by the Bank of International Settlements (BIS) suggests that once bank assets markedly exceed a country’s GDP, – as is the case in over 80% of EU 27 states – its financial sector has a negative impact on economic growth, aswith the result that human and financial resources are drained from other areas of economic activity6;

Amendment 55 #

Motion for a resolution
Recital F

F. whereas research by the Bank of International Settlements (BIS) suggests that once bank assets exceed a country's GDP, its financial sector ~~has~~might have a negative impact on economic growth, as human and financial resources are drained from other areas of economic activity6 ;

Amendment 56 #

Motion for a resolution
Recital F a (new)

Fa. whereas, in relation to the crisis in Cyprus, the Eurogroup has confirmed the principle that the size of the banking sector relative to [a Member State's] GDP should be limited in order to address banking sector imbalances and promote financial stability, from which it follows that, in the absence of substantial EU- level funds for resolution, limits on the size, complexity and interconnectedness of banks will be beneficial to systemic stability;

Amendment 57 #

Motion for a resolution
Recital F a (new)

Fa. whereas the pure separation of financial institutions to investment- and retail branches does not address the problem concerning SIFIs and the relation between the volume of the Recovery and Resolution Fund on the one hand and the balance of institutions systemically relevant for credit, payment and deposit on the other;

Amendment 58 #

Motion for a resolution
Recital F a (new)

Fa. Whereas the transformation process towards a more sustainable, less systemic and viable banking sector seems to differ between members states.

Amendment 59 #

Motion for a resolution
Recital G

G. whereas the HLEG concludes that the financial crisis has demonstrated th~~e problem of cross- contamination between banks' retail and investment activitie~~at no particular business model fared particularly well, or particularly poorly in the European banking sector; whereas the HLEG analysis revealed excessive risk- taking, often in trading highly complex instruments or real estate related lending not matched with adequate capital protection, excessive reliance on short term funding and strong linkages between financial institutions causing a high level of systemic risk in the run up to the financial crisis;

Amendment 6 #

Motion for a resolution
Recital A

A. whereas ~~the Commission estimates that the financial crisis cost EU governments around~~, since the beginning of the crisis, state aid of more than EUR 1.6 trillion (13 2.8% of EU GDP) ~~in state aid through bailouts of the financial sector4; __________________ 4 Some Member States, such as the UK, used up to two thirds of their GDP on account of the size of their financial sectors.~~was granted to the financial sector between 2008 and the end of 2011 (including the recapitalisation of Northern Rock in 2007), some EUR 1 080 billion of which went on guarantees, EUR 320 billion on recapitalisation measures, EUR 120 billion on impaired assets and EUR 90 billion on liquidity measures4; __________________ 4 COM(2012)778

Amendment 60 #

Motion for a resolution
Recital G

G. whereas the financial crisis demonstrated the problem of cross- contamination between banks' retail and investment activities; whereas the report of the HLEG underlines that "there are important systemic benefits of having diversity of business models" and the Eurosystem states in its contribution of January 2013 that "diversity implies that different institutional forms, business and earnings models coexist which strengthens resilience and mitigates contagion vulnerabilities";

Amendment 61 #

Motion for a resolution
Recital G

G. whereas the financial crisis demonstrated the problem of cross- contamination between ~~banks’ retail and investment activitie~~the different business areas of banks, whilst the experience of recent years shows that the cross-contamination in the various Member States stemmed from different business sectors;

Amendment 62 #

Motion for a resolution
Recital G

G. wWhereas the financial crisis demonstrated th~~e problem of cross- contamination between banks' retail and investment activities~~at no particular banking structure had a clear advantage in terms of resilience;

Amendment 63 #

Motion for a resolution
Recital G

G. whereas the financial crisis demonstrated the problem of ~~cross- contamination~~exposures and interconnectedness of banks and raises concerns over internal conflicts between ~~banks'~~ retail and investment activities;,

Amendment 64 #

Motion for a resolution
Recital G

G. whereas the financial crisis demonstrated the problem of cross- contamination between banks’ ~~retail~~depository/lending activities and their risky trading and investment activities;

Amendment 65 #

Motion for a resolution
Recital G

G. whereas ~~the financial crisis demonstrate~~requirements for risk management and capital and the supervision thereof should be the priority in order to avoid the problem of cross- contamination between banks' retail and investment activities;

Amendment 66 #

Motion for a resolution
Recital G

G. whereas the financial crisis demonstrated the problem of cross- contamination between banks' retail and investment activities, whilst also noting that 'risky' activities took place in both retail and investment arms of banks;

Amendment 67 #

Motion for a resolution
Recital G

G. whereas the financial crisis demonstrated the problem of potential cross- contamination between banks' ~~retail and investment~~core business and non-banking holding activities;

Amendment 68 #

Motion for a resolution
Recital G

G. whereas the financial crisis demonstrated the problem of ~~cross- contamination~~networking between banks’ retail and investment activities;

Amendment 69 #

Motion for a resolution
Recital G a (new)

Ga. whereas the HLEG underlines that simple labels, such as retail bank or investment bank, do not adequately describe the business model of a bank and its performance and riskiness; whereas business models are diverse along different key dimensions, such as size, activities, income model, capital and funding structure, ownership, corporate structure, and geographic scope, and have evolved substantially over time;

Amendment 7 #

Motion for a resolution
Recital A

A. whereas the Commission ~~estimates that the financial crisis cost EU governments~~has supervised Member States' massive bank bailouts under the EU's state aid rules and has authorised around EUR 1.6 trillion (13 % of EU GDP) in used state aid ~~through bailouts of the fin~~; whereas the Commission required substanctial ~~sector4 ; __________________ 4 Some Member States, such as the UK, used up to two thirds of~~ restructuring of banks receiving aid, including cutting certain activities, to ensure their future viability without furtheir ~~GDP on account of the size of their financial sectors.~~public support and to offset distortions of competition caused by the subsidies received;

Amendment 70 #

Motion for a resolution
Recital G a (new)

Ga. whereas more banks have had significant losses from the types of activities that are supposed to remain in the deposit bank, in particular real estate lending, than those caused by losses in trading related activities, let alone market making in fixed-income markets.

Amendment 71 #

Motion for a resolution
Recital G a (new)

Ga. Whereas it became clear that risks can originate in both the retail, as well as in the investment part of the bank.

Amendment 72 #

Motion for a resolution
Recital G b (new)

Gb. whereas there is no analysis in the HLEG report of whether mandatory separation within a holding company is sufficient to insulate the deposit bank from what happens to the trading bank. A mandatory separation does not necessarily hinder banks from transferring funds from the deposit taking entity at a subsidized price to the trading entity. Contagion effects cannot be excluded if the deposit bank and the trading bank work under similar brands. Liquidity stress can be triggered by rumour rather than fact, which can adversely affect the deposit bank. Thus, the need for government intervention may still arise. In addition it is not obvious that a mandatory separation will reduce governments' incentives to bail out troubled banks. Governments may want to protect systemically important banks regardless from where the losses originate. Moreover it is unclear how a legal separation would be accomplished in a bank with a wide range of cross-border activities. The Group may thus be advocating a measure that is neither necessary, nor sufficient to achieve the stated objective. An impact assessment of the cost and benefits must therefore be made before rules on mandatory separation are adopted.

Amendment 73 #

Motion for a resolution
Recital G c (new)

Gc. whereas there is little evidence to support that a mandatory separation into trading banks and deposit banks would have helped to prevent the financial crisis or even ease the consequences. Had the global banking system carried more capital, bigger liquidity buffers and longer term funding the crisis would have had less severe consequences.

Amendment 74 #

Motion for a resolution
Recital H

H. whereas the Commission proposal should provide for a strong, stable and resilient banking sector for the internal market while respecting the diversity ofin the ~~Member States' banking sectors~~European banking sector; whereas maintaining and deepening the internal market for banking services is essential in order to foster economic growth in the Union and provide for adequate funding of the real economy;

Amendment 75 #

Motion for a resolution
Recital H

H. whereas all upcoming legislative initiatives by the Commission ~~proposal~~ should provide for a strong, stable and resilient banking sector for the internal market while respecting the diversity of the Member States' banking sectors and taking into account national specificities;

Amendment 76 #

Motion for a resolution
Recital H

H. whereas the Commission proposal should provide for a strong, stable and resilient banking sector with access to a variety of funding sources for the internal market while respecting the diversity of the Member States' banking sectors; and be based on a thorough impact assessment and cost benefit analysis.

Amendment 77 #

Motion for a resolution
Recital H

H. whereas ~~the Commission proposal~~EU legislation should provide for a strong, stable and resilient banking sector with access to wide variety of funding sources for the internal market while respecting the diversity of ~~the M~~EU member Sstates' banking sectors;

Amendment 78 #

Motion for a resolution
Recital H

H. whereas the Commission proposal should provide for a strong, stable, competitive, transparent and resilient banking sector for the internal market while respecting the diversity of the Member States' banking sectors;

Amendment 79 #

Motion for a resolution
Recital H

H. whereas ~~the~~every adopted Commission proposal should provide for a strong, stable and resilient banking sector for the internal market while respecting the diversity of the Member States' banking sectors;

Amendment 8 #

Motion for a resolution
Recital A

A. whereas the Commission estimates that ~~the financial crisis cost EU governments~~ around EUR 1.6 trillion (13 % of EU GDP) in state aid ~~through~~was granted by EU governments in bailouts of the financial sector4 during the financial crisis;

Amendment 80 #

Motion for a resolution
Recital H

H. whereas a legislative proposal by the Commission ~~proposal~~ should provide for a strong, stable and resilient banking sector for the internal market while respecting the diversity of the Member States’ banking sectors;

Amendment 81 #

Motion for a resolution
Recital H a (new)

Ha. whereas the Commission proposal should provide for a principles based approach to structural reforms of the European banking sector consistent with, and complementary to, already existing and forthcoming Union legislation for financial services; whereas EBA should play a key role by developing relevant technical standards to ensure consistent application and enforcement by the competent authorities, including the ECB, across the Union;

Amendment 82 #

Motion for a resolution
Recital H a (new)

Ha. whereas decentralised local and regional institutions within the banking sector in the Member States have shown themselves to be stable and beneficial in terms of financing the real economy;

Amendment 83 #

Motion for a resolution
Recital H a (new)

Ha. whereas it is necessary that banks hold higher levels and better quality of capital; have greater liquidity buffers and longer-term funding.

Amendment 84 #

Motion for a resolution
Recital I

I. whereas, since it is neither feasible nor desirable to effect a bank separation post- failure, an effective recovery and resolution regime is needed in order to provide authorities with a credible set of tools, including a bridge bank, so that they can intervene sufficiently early and quickly in an unsound or failing bank to enable its essential financial and economic functions to continue, while minimising the impact on financial stability and ensuring an effective recovery and resolution regime is needed in order to ensure that appropriate losses are imposed on the shareholders and creditors who bore the risk of investing in the institution in question, and not by taxpayers or depositors;

Amendment 85 #

Motion for a resolution
Recital I

I. whereas, since it is neither feasible nor desirable to effect a bank separation post- failure, an effective recovery and resolution regime is needed in order to provide authorities with a credible set of tools, including a bridge bank, so that they can intervene sufficiently early and quickly in an unsound or failing bank to enable its essential financial and economic functions to continue, while minimising the impact on financial stability and ensuring that appropriate losses are imposed on the shareholders and creditors who bore the risk of investing in the institution in question, and not by taxpayers or depositors; whereas such recovery and resolution plans are not necessary for other types of private company, suggesting that there is a specific problem with the market in financial services; whereas if the market were functioning properly, financial institutions would be able to fail without any need for a recovery and resolution plan; whereas therefore the problem lies within the structures and interconnections between financial institutions;

Amendment 86 #

Motion for a resolution
Recital I

I. whereas, since it is neither feasible nor desirable to effect a bank separation post- failure, an effective recovery and resolution regime is needed in order to provide authorities with a credible set of tools, including ~~a bridge bank~~legislation to split banks into separate investment and retail entities, so that they can intervene sufficiently early and quickly in an unsound or failing bank ~~to enable its essential financial and economic functions to continue~~, so that it would be possible to separate and if necessary shut down the investment entity without this having any adverse effects on purely banking-related activities, while minimising the impact on financial stability and ensuring that appropriate losses are imposed on the shareholders and creditors who bore the risk of investing in the institution in question, and not by taxpayers or depositors;

Amendment 87 #

Motion for a resolution
Recital I

I. whereas~~, since it is neither feasible nor desirable to effect a bank separation post- failure,~~ an effective recovery and resolution regime is needed in order to provide authorities with a credible set of tools, including a bridge bank, so that they can intervene sufficiently early and quickly in a~~n unsound or~~ failing bank to enable its essential financial and economic functions to continue, while minimising the impact on financial stability and ensuring that appropriate losses are imposed on the shareholders and creditors who bore the risk of investing in the institution in question, and not by taxpayers or depositors;

Amendment 88 #

Motion for a resolution
Recital I

I. whereas, since it is neither feasible nor desirable to effect a bank separation post- failure, an effective recovery and resolution regime as currently discussed in the legislative procedure on the Recovery and Resolution Directive is needed in order to provide authorities with a credible set of tools, including a bridge bank, so that they can intervene sufficiently early and quickly in an unsound or failing bank to enable its essential financial and economic functions to continue, while minimising the impact on financial stability and ensuring that appropriate losses are imposed on the shareholders and creditors who bore the risk of investing in the institution in question, and not by taxpayers or depositors;

Amendment 89 #

Motion for a resolution
Recital I

I. whereas, since it is neither feasible nor desirable to effect a bank separation post- failure, an effective recovery and resolution regime is needed in order to provide authorities with a credible set of tools, including pre-defined bail-inable debt instruments and a bridge bank, so that they can intervene sufficiently early and quickly in an unsound or failing bank to enable its essential financial and economic functions to continue, while minimising the impact on financial stability and ensuring that appropriate losses are imposed on the shareholders and creditors who bore the risk of investing in the institution in question, and not by taxpayers or depositors;

Amendment 9 #

Motion for a resolution
Recital A

A. wWhereas the Commission estimates that the financial crisis cost EU governments around EUR ~~1.6 tr~~322.18 billion (13 2% of EU GDP) in ~~state aid~~recapitalization measures through bailouts tof the financial sector4 , EUR 32 billion of which have been repaid;

Amendment 90 #

Motion for a resolution
Recital I

I. whereas, since it is neither feasible nor desirable to effect a bank separation post- failure, an effective recovery and resolution regime is needed in order to provide authorities with a credible set of tools, including a bridge bank, so that they can intervene sufficiently early and quickly in an unsound or failing bank to enable its essential financial and economic functions to continue, while minimising the impact on financial stability and ensuring that appropriate losses are imposed on the shareholders and creditors who bore the risk of investing in the institution in question, and not by taxpayers or insured depositors;

Amendment 91 #

Motion for a resolution
Recital I a (new)

Ia. whereas supervisory and resolution authorities must be given the requisite authority to be able effectively to remove impediments to the resolvability of credit institutions and the banks must be forced to prove their resolvability; whereas the introduction of compulsory recovery and resolutions regimes provides an opportunity to influence the banking structure, reduce the complexity of institutions and restrict or terminate business sectors and products;

Amendment 92 #

Motion for a resolution
Recital I a (new)

Ia. whereas, with regard to ending the implicit guarantee that many banks enjoy, one of the most important tools in the recovery and resolution regime proposed by the Commission is the power for authorities to intervene early, well before the point of non-viability, to require banks to change their business strategy, size or risk profile so that they can be resolvable without recourse to extraordinary public financial support;

Amendment 93 #

Motion for a resolution
Recital I a (new)

Ia. whereas banks should never be so big anymore that their failure causes systemic risks for the entire economy and therefore requiring the government and tax payers to rescue them, thus bringing the too-big- to-fail problem to an end;

Amendment 94 #

Motion for a resolution
Recital I a (new)

Ia. whereas banks must no longer reach such a size – even in one single Member State – that they constitute a systemic risk in a nation state with taxpayers having to bear the cost of losses;

Amendment 95 #

Motion for a resolution
Recital J

J. whereas the EU banking sector remains highly concentrated: 14 European banking groups are global systemically important financial institutions (SIFIs), and 15 European banks own 43 % of the market (in terms of asset size) and represent 150 % of EU-27 GDP, with individual Member States citing even higher ratios; whereas the ratio of bank size to GDP has tripled since 2000;deleted

Amendment 96 #

Motion for a resolution
Recital J

J. whereas the EU banking sector remains highly concentrated: 14 European banking groups are global systemically important financial institutions (SIFIs), and 15 European banks ~~own~~share 43 % of the market ~~(in terms of asset size) and represent~~and exceed 150 % of EU-27 GDP, with individual Member States citing ~~even~~considerably higher ratios; whereas the ratio of bank size to GDP has ~~tri~~quadrupled sin~~ce 2000~~ Luxembourg, Ireland, Cyprus, Malta and Great Britain;

Amendment 97 #

Motion for a resolution
Recital J

J. whereas the EU banking sector remains highly concentrated: the total assets of the banking sector in the EU amount to EUR 43 trillion, which represents 349% of EU-27 GDP. 14 European banking groups are global systemically important financial institutions (SIFIs), and 15 European banks ~~own~~alone own EUR 20 000 billion in assets, which corresponds to 43 % of the market (in terms of asset size) ~~and~~. They thus represent 150 % of EU-27 GDP, with individual Member States citing even higher ratios of up to 800% of GDP; whereas the ratio of bank size to GDP has tripled since 2000;

Amendment 98 #

Motion for a resolution
Recital J

J. whereas the EU banking sector remains highly concentrated: 14 European banking groups are global systemically important financial institutions (SIFIs), and 15 European banks own 43 % of the market (in terms of asset size) and represent 150 % of EU-27 GDP, with individual Member States citing even higher ratios; whereas the ratio of bank size to GDP has tripled since 2000; whereas there is a huge degree of diversity in the European banking sector both in terms of size and business model;

Amendment 99 #