Procedure completed
2013/2277(INI) Enquiry report on the role and operations of the Troika (ECB, Commission and IMF) with regard to the euro area programme countries
Lead committee dossier: ECON/7/14607
Legal Basis RoP 052
| Role | Committee | Rapporteur | Shadows |
|---|---|---|---|
| Opinion | AFCO | SCHOLZ Helmut (GUE/NGL) | |
| Opinion | CONT | THEURER Michael (ALDE) | |
| Lead | ECON | KARAS Othmar (PPE), HOANG NGOC Liem (S&D) | GOULARD Sylvie (ALDE), TORVALDS Nils (ALDE), LAMBERTS Philippe (Verts/ALE), EPPINK Derk Jan (ECR), KLUTE Jürgen (GUE/NGL) |
| Opinion | EMPL |
Legal Basis RoP 052
Subjects
Activites
- 2014/03/13 Results of vote in Parliament
- 2014/03/12 Debate in Parliament
-
2014/02/28
Committee report tabled for plenary, single reading
-
A7-0149/2014
summary
The Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs has adopted an own-initiative report by Othmar KARAS (EPP, AT) and Liem HOANG NGOC (S&D, FR) on the enquiry on the role and operations of the Troika (European Central Bank (ECB), Commission and International Monetary Fund (IMF)) with regard to the euro area programme countries. The report is to evaluate the functioning of the Troika in the ongoing programmes in the four countries: Greece, Portugal, Ireland and Cyprus. The Troika: the institutional dimension and democratic legitimacy: because of the evolving nature of the EU’s response to the crisis, the unclear role of the ECB in the Troika and the nature of the Troika decision-making process, the report noted that the Troika’s mandate has been perceived as being unclear and lacking in transparency and democratic oversight. Members pointed out that the rescue mechanisms and the Troika are of an ad hoc nature, and regretted that there was no appropriate legal basis available for setting up the Troika on the basis of Union primary law, which has led to the establishment of intergovernmental mechanisms in the form of the European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF), and eventually the European Stability Mechanism (ESM). They asked that any future solution be based on Union primary law, which might lead to the need for a Treaty change. The report questioned the dual role of the Commission in the Troika as both an agent of Member States and an EU institution and asserted that there is a potential conflict of interest within the Commission between its role in the Troika and its responsibility as guardian of the Treaties and the acquis communautaire. It pointed equally to the potential conflict of interest between the current role of the ECB in the Troika as ‘technical advisor’ and its position as creditor of the four Member States. Furthermore, it regretted the fact that by reason of its statutes, the IMF cannot appear formally before or report in writing to national parliaments or the European Parliament. It stressed that the IMF’s involvement as lender of last resort providing up to one third of the funding places the institution in a minority role. Members regretted that the troika is lacking, because of its structure, the means of democratic legitimacy at EU level. They deplored the way EU institutions are being portrayed as the scapegoat for adverse effects in Member States' macroeconomic adjustment, when it is the Member States' finance ministers who bear the political responsibility for the Troika and its operations. It is therefore demanded that the Eurogroup, the Council and the European Council assume full responsibility for the operations of the Troika. Proposals and recommendations: 1) In the short to medium term, the report called for: i) the establishment of clear, transparent and binding rules of procedure for the interaction between the institutions within the Troika and the allocation of tasks and responsibility therein; ii) the development of an improved communication strategy for ongoing and future financial assistance programmes. Members recalled that the position adopted by the Parliament on Regulation (EU) No 472/2013 entailed introducing provisions requiring the macroeconomic adjustment programmes to include contingency plans in case baseline forecast scenarios should not materialise and in case of slippage due to circumstances outside the control of the Member State under assistance, such as unexpected international economic shocks. The report stressed that such plans are a prerequisite for prudent policymaking, given the fragility and poor reliability of economic models underpinning programme forecasts. The report also stressed that pursuing economic and financial stability in the Member States and the Union as a whole must not undermine social stability, the European social model or the social rights of EU citizens. It called for the necessary involvement of the social partners in the design and implementation of current and future adjustment programmes. The Commission is invited to start interinstitutional negotiations with Parliament in order to define a common procedure for informing the competent committee of Parliament on the conclusions drawn from the monitoring of the macroeconomic adjustment programme, as well as the progress made in the preparation of the draft macroeconomic adjustment programme. Members proposed that for each programme country the Commission should set up a ‘growth task force’ consisting inter alia of experts from (inter alia) the Member States and the EIB, in association with representatives of the private sector and civil society in order to suggest options to promote growth which would complement fiscal consolidation and structural reforms. By the end of 2015, the Commission should present a detailed study of the economic and social consequences of the adjustment programmes in the four countries. The report also called for: i) a reassessment of the decision-making process of the Eurogroup so as to include appropriate democratic accountability at both national and European levels; ii) the integration of the ESM in the Union's legal framework so that it becomes a Community-based mechanism. 2) In the longer term, the report recommended clarifying the respective roles and tasks of each participant in the Troika in the following ways: · The creation of a European Monetary Fund (EMF), which would combine the financial means of the ESM and the human resources that the Commission has acquired over the last few years, would take over the Commission's role, allowing the latter to act in conformity with Article 17 of the TEU and, in particular, to act as ‘guardian of the Treaties’; · the ECB would participate as a silent observer during the negotiation process, in order to enable it to raise strong concerns in its advising role to the Commission, and later to the European Monetary Fund if appropriate; · the IMF, should its involvement be strictly necessary, would be a marginal lender and therefore could leave the programme if in disagreement. The next Parliament would be invited to pursue the work of this report.
-
A7-0149/2014
summary
-
2014/02/24
Vote in committee, 1st reading/single reading
-
2013/11/21
Committee referral announced in Parliament, 1st reading/single reading
Documents
- Committee report tabled for plenary, single reading: A7-0149/2014
- Debate in Parliament: Debate in Parliament
- Results of vote in Parliament: Results of vote in Parliament
| Amendments | Dossier |
| 1196 |
2013/2277(INI)
2014/01/17
EMPL
244 amendments...
Amendment 1 #
Draft opinion Citation 1 a (new) 1a. having regard to its resolution of 11 June 2013 on “Social housing in the European Union” (2012/2293(INI)),
Amendment 10 #
Draft opinion Recital A a (new) Aa. whereas the so-called economic and financial assistance programmes are intended to achieve the three avowed main aims of reducing budgetary imbalances, improving competitiveness, and supporting the banks, but whereas the measures implemented have in practice resulted in a direct transfer of workers’ income to financial and economic monopolies; whereas, in Portugal, the fiscal consolidation policy has led to recession and a heavier tax burden for workers, and whereas, supposedly in the interests of competitiveness, employment has been deregulated, swingeing cuts have been made in workers’ pay, and the people and the country have to a large extent been made poorer;
Amendment 100 #
Draft opinion Paragraph 7 7. Warns that, if not remedied, these huge divergences, especially in the case of the younger generation, will result in structural
Amendment 101 #
Draft opinion Paragraph 7 7. Warns that, if not remedied, these huge divergences, especially in the case of the younger generation, will result in structural damage to the labour market of the four countries, limit their capacity for recovery,
Amendment 102 #
Draft opinion Paragraph 7 7. Warns that, if not remedied, these huge divergences, especially in the case of the younger generation, will in the long run, result in structural damage to the labour market of the four countries, limit their capacity for recovery,
Amendment 103 #
Draft opinion Paragraph 7 a (new) 7a. Is deeply concerned about the fact that, together with the job loss, there is an outstanding lack of job quality through precarisation and the deterioration of basic labour standards, notes that there is an increase of part time and temporary contracts, payless internships and apprenticeships, bogus self-employment as well as the activities of the black economy, notes furthermore that there is also a worrying degradation of working conditions with measures such as the increase of the working time or the reduction of health and safety conditions in the work place;
Amendment 104 #
Draft opinion Paragraph 7 a (new) 7a. Regrets the fact that in all 4 countries the adjustment programmes included direct interventions in wage developments, despite the fact that the setting or harmonising of minimum wages is not included in the competences of the European Union; notes that especially in Greece, the adjustment programme imposed cuts to the minimum wage by 22% and by 32% for young workers below 25;
Amendment 105 #
Draft opinion Paragraph 7 c (new) 7c. Warns that the crisis and the austerity policies might make themselves felt in terms of the brain drain and the exodus of highly skilled labour from the countries undergoing adjustment1; 1 In Portugal, in 2012, there was a nearly threefold increase, to 28 769, in the number of permanent emigrants in the more highly educated 20-24, 25-29, and 30-34 age groups.
Amendment 106 #
Draft opinion Paragraph 7 d (new) 7d. Expresses its disquiet at the forecasts that emigration will continue to increase; points out that the worsening phenomenon of enforced emigration has been such that in the years 2012 and 2013, in Portugal’s case alone, the numbers emigrating totalled more than 250 000;
Amendment 107 #
Draft opinion Paragraph 8 8. Recalls that the Europe 2020 strategy accurately states that the figure to watch is the employment rate, which indicates the availability of human and financial resources to ensure the sustainability of our economic and social model; regrets that the slowdown in the unemployment rate is confused with the recovery of jobs lost; recalls that in the last four years job losses have reached 2 million in the four countries, which is 15% of existing jobs; stresses that new jobs need to be quality jobs, meaning jobs with good wages and conditions and full trade union rights, so that employment is a guarantee for workers, and particularly young workers, for a life in dignity;
Amendment 108 #
Draft opinion Paragraph 8 8. Recalls that the Europe 2020 strategy accurately states that the figure to watch is the employment rate, which indicates the availability of human and financial resources to ensure the sustainability of our economic and social model; regrets that the slowdown in the unemployment rate is confused with the recovery of jobs lost; observes that the decline in industrial employment was already a problem long before the economic crisis and recalls that in the last four years job losses have reached 2 million in the four countries, which is 15% of existing jobs;
Amendment 109 #
Draft opinion Paragraph 8 8. Recalls that the Europe 2020 strategy accurately states that the figure to watch is the employment rate, which indicates the availability of human and financial resources to ensure the sustainability of our economic and social model;
Amendment 11 #
Draft opinion Recital A a (new) Aa. whereas fiscal and budgetary consolidation policies are the response to the economic and social situation facing Greece, Ireland, Portugal and Cyprus, and not the cause;
Amendment 110 #
Draft opinion Paragraph 8 8. Recalls that the Europe 2020 strategy accurately states that the
Amendment 111 #
Draft opinion Paragraph 8 8. Recalls that the Europe 2020 strategy accurately states that the figure to watch is the employment rate, which indicates the availability of human and financial resources to ensure the sustainability of our economic and social model; regrets that the slowdown in the unemployment rate is confused with the recovery of jobs lost and that it is not properly recognised that the fall in the unemployment rate is due essentially to the considerable increase in emigration and to the fact that the long- term unemployed give up looking for work; recalls that in the last four years job losses have reached 2 million in the four countries, which is 15% of existing jobs;
Amendment 112 #
Draft opinion Paragraph 8 a (new) 8a. Stresses that to reach full employment a radical break with neoliberal policies is necessary; radically different measures should be implemented, including a general reduction of the working time without loss of pay, the lowering of the pension age and a massive plan for public investment in socially useful, quality jobs; stresses that these measures should be implemented in a democratically planned way and funded through a system of progressive taxation aimed at making the super-rich and big business pay for the crisis they have caused;
Amendment 113 #
Draft opinion Paragraph 8 a (new) 8a. Points to the important role the Structural Funds and especially the ESF need to play in regard to assisting job creation;
Amendment 114 #
Draft opinion Paragraph 8 a (new) 8a. Regrets that the important role of wages in creating or stabilising domestic demand has been neglected; is deeply concerned about the impact of the programmes on the minimum wages in the 4 countries, where Ireland was force to a decrease of nearly 12%, even though it was later changed, and where a radical cut of the minimum wage of 22% was decreed in Greece.
Amendment 115 #
Draft opinion Paragraph 8 b (new) 8b. Notes that the economic adjustment programmes have imposed on the 4 countries pay cuts or freezes in the public sector and the non-renewal of the public employment offer which have been justified by the need for modernisation and efficiency improvement of public administrations but have in fact resulted in unacceptably high levels of unemployment; reminds that strong public administrations set a good framework for growth, competitiveness and social protection;
Amendment 116 #
Draft opinion Paragraph 8 b (new) 8b. Expresses concern at the fact that, in Portugal, not only is private sector employment in decline, but it is proving difficult to place unemployed workers in other sectors, more and more people are becoming discouraged, and long-term unemployment is rising;
Amendment 117 #
Draft opinion Paragraph 8 c (new) 8c. Notes that the phenomena of emigration, early school-leaving, and more limited access to welfare benefits are broadening the spectrum of poverty; points out that in the countries undergoing adjustment, the fall in GDP, the slump in public and private investment, and the drop in R & D investment are serving to reduce potential GDP and inevitably create long-term poverty;
Amendment 118 #
Draft opinion Paragraph 9 9. Is concerned that, among the conditions for financial assistance, the programmes include recommendations for specific cuts in fundamental areas of the fight against poverty
Amendment 119 #
Draft opinion Paragraph 9 9. Is
Amendment 12 #
Draft opinion Recital A a (new) Aa. whereas regressive budgetary measures are having a disproportionate impact on low-income groups leading to higher levels of poverty, deprivation and health inequalities due to the fact that low income groups are especially dependant on public health systems
Amendment 120 #
Draft opinion Paragraph 9 9. Is concerned that, among the conditions for financial assistance, the programmes include recommendations for specific cuts in fundamental areas of the fight against poverty, such as pensions, basic services, health care and pharmaceutical products for the basic protection of the most vulnerable;
Amendment 121 #
Draft opinion Paragraph 9 9. Is concerned that, among the conditions for financial assistance, the programmes include recommendations for specific cuts in fundamental areas of the fight against poverty, such as pensions, basic services, health care and pharmaceutical products for the basic protection of the most vulnerable; highlights the fact that the
Amendment 122 #
Draft opinion Paragraph 9 9. Is concerned that, among the conditions for financial assistance, the programmes include recommendations for specific cuts in fundamental areas of the fight against poverty, such as pensions, basic services, health care and pharmaceutical products for the basic protection of the most vulnerable;
Amendment 123 #
Draft opinion Paragraph 9 9. Is concerned that, among the conditions for financial assistance, the programmes include recommendations for specific cuts in fundamental areas of the fight against poverty, such as pensions, basic services, health care and pharmaceutical products for the basic protection of the most vulnerable; highlights the fact that the main
Amendment 124 #
Draft opinion Paragraph 9 9. Is concerned that, among the conditions for financial assistance, the programmes include recommendations for specific cuts in
Amendment 125 #
Draft opinion Paragraph 9 9. Is concerned that, among the conditions for financial assistance, the programmes include recommendations for specific cuts in fundamental areas of the fight against poverty, such as pensions, basic services, health care and pharmaceutical products for the basic protection of the most
Amendment 127 #
Draft opinion Paragraph 9 a (new) 9a. Recalls the tragic and sharp rise in suicide rates, most notably in Greece where suicide figures are estimated to have risen by 43% between 2008 and 2011; stresses that experts point to the crisis and the devastating effects of austerity measures as one of the key contributing factor for this rise;
Amendment 128 #
Draft opinion Paragraph 9 a (new) 9a. Expresses its concern that, during the preparation and implementation of the economic adjustment plans, insufficient attention was given to the impact of economic policy on employment or its social implications and that, in the case of Greece, the working hypothesis turned out to be based on a mistaken assumption regarding the economic multiplier effect, resulting in failure to act in time to protect the most vulnerable against poverty, in-work poverty and social exclusion; calls on the Commission to take account of social indicators also for the purpose of renegotiating the economic adjustment programmes and replacing the measures recommended for each Member State, with a view to ensuring the necessary conditions for growth and full compliance with the EU's basic social principles and values;
Amendment 129 #
Draft opinion Paragraph 9 a (new) 9a. In Portugal, the vulnerable groups have been particularly targeted by Active Labour Market Policies aimed at facilitating their access to the labour market and a Social Emergency Programme was launched in October 2011, open to new measures and solutions or even to customised solutions, in order to protect the most vulnerable parts of the population from the effects of the economic adjustment;
Amendment 13 #
Draft opinion Recital A b (new) Ab. whereas the economic adjustment programmes were implemented owing to the extremely difficult situation of their economies, which were even at risk of bankruptcy;
Amendment 130 #
Draft opinion Paragraph 9 a (new) 9a. Restates that fighting child poverty shall continue to be an objective to be achieved by Member States and that fiscal and budgetary consolidation policies shall not undermine this;
Amendment 131 #
Draft opinion Paragraph 9 a (new) 9a. Notes that despite the fact that the European Commission in its "EU Employment and Social Situation" Quarterly Review of October 2013 emphasizes the importance of Social Protection expenditure as a safeguard against social risks, Greece, Ireland and Portugal had the largest decreases in social spending after 2010 in EU;
Amendment 132 #
Draft opinion Paragraph 9 a (new) 9a. Calls on the Commission to draw lessons from the fact that labour market reforms in the programme countries have not succeeded in combatting labour market duality but instead led to a larger gap between insiders and outsiders
Amendment 133 #
Draft opinion Paragraph 9 a (new) 9a. Notes that the measures are causing serious problems to low income households, putting them under the poverty threshold, increasing inequality levels and undermining social cohesion, especially with the recommendations to place minimum pensions and salaries under the poverty levels, reminds that these measures have been condemned by the Council of Europe as a violation of the European Social Charter, and have also been subject to strong criticism by the ILO for the violation of Convention 102. Furthermore, reminds that the ILO pointed out its serious concerns about the cumulative effects of austerity measures on workers income levels, living standards and wage protection;
Amendment 134 #
Draft opinion Paragraph 9 b (new) 9b. Expresses concern that the (micro and macro) social and economic situation in these countries is aggravating regional and territorial disparities, thereby undermining the stated EUobjective of strengthening its internal regional cohesion;
Amendment 135 #
Draft opinion Paragraph 9 b (new) 9b. Highlights that new forms of poverty touching the middle and working class are arising in the 4 countries where the problems to pay mortgages and the high energy prices are creating energy poverty and increasing evictions and foreclosures;
Amendment 136 #
Draft opinion Paragraph 9 c (new) 9c. Is deeply concerned by evidence that levels of homelessness and housing exclusion are increasing in the programme countries; recalls that this represents a violation of fundamental rights and has enormous negative consequences for society and for the individuals affected, stresses that organisations working with homeless people estimate an increase in the 4 programme countries, in particular in Greece where the homeless population has risen by 25% between 2009 and 2011 to reach 20,000, stresses furthermore that, in the 4 countries, there is a big increase of people going to eat at soup kitchens, as well as of children eating at school because their families can´t guarantee them breakfast or lunch;
Amendment 137 #
Draft opinion Paragraph 9 d (new) 9d. Notes that international and social organizations have warned about a gender gap impact of the new pay-scale, grading and dismissals system in the public sector, notes that the ILO has expressed concern over the disproportionate impact of new flexible forms of employment on women's pay, furthermore notes that the ILO asked the governments to monitor the impact of austerity on remuneration of men and women in the private sector, stresses that, according to the Council of Europe, Ireland was not on conformity with the revised Charter for the too low level of maternity benefits;
Amendment 138 #
Draft opinion Paragraph 10 10. Notes that Eurostat and Commission figures and various studies show that between 2008 and 2012 income distribution inequality grew in
Amendment 139 #
Draft opinion Paragraph 10 10. Notes that Commission figures and various studies show that between 2008
Amendment 14 #
Draft opinion Recital A b (new) Ab. whereas the austerity policies are leading to rising unemployment and falling wages, an increase in the numbers of highly skilled and qualified workers and young people who are emigrating, and less investment in education, and are thus serving to decrease workers’ productive capacity;
Amendment 140 #
Draft opinion Paragraph 10 10. Notes that Commission figures and various studies show that between 2008 and 2012 income distribution inequality grew in the four countries, and that the cuts in social and unemployment benefits resulting from austerity measures, as well as the wage reductions due to structural reforms, are raising poverty levels; notes, furthermore, that the Commission report found relatively high levels of in-work poverty due to low minimum wages being cut or frozen as a result of the austerity measures; the decrease of income allows fewer people to afford private healthcare services which leads to an increased utilization of public health services whilst government policies see a shift of support from public to private healthcare services;
Amendment 141 #
Draft opinion Paragraph 10 10. Notes that Commission figures and various studies show that between 2008 and 2012 income distribution inequality grew in the four countries, and that the cuts in social and unemployment benefits resulting from
Amendment 142 #
Draft opinion Paragraph 10 a (new) 10a. Notes that people receiving retirement and other pensions are among the social groups most affected by poverty; notes that in Portugal 75.9% of people living on pensions receive pensions under EUR 419.22, and their living conditions have fallen even further as public services have been closed, hospital fees have risen, and they face increases in the cost of transport, electricity and rent, among other things; whereas it is these same people who are increasingly having to support their children, who are battling the problems of unemployment, precarious employment and low wages;
Amendment 143 #
Draft opinion Paragraph 11 11. Deplores the fact that the level of people at risk of poverty or social exclusion has increased in the four countries; points out that during the last three years alone, figures show that the proportion of people at risk of poverty or social exclusion has risen to 26% in
Amendment 144 #
Draft opinion Paragraph 11 11.
Amendment 145 #
Draft opinion Paragraph 11 a (new) 11a. Stresses that the rise in poverty, exclusion and uncertainty amongst the vast majority of the people living in the programme countries is mirrored by a sharp rise in wealth for a small minority; e.g. in Ireland since 2007 profits have increased by 21% and according to the Revenue Commissioners, the number of people earning more than €500,000 a year has grown to 3,443 in 2012 with a combined income of €1.8bn, while over 1 million taxpayers out of 2.16 million had incomes lower than €30,000; Similarly in Portugal 75% of pensioners receive pensions less than €419.22 while the 870 Portuguese millionaires increased their fortunes by €7,5 billion since 2012;
Amendment 146 #
Draft opinion Paragraph 11 a (new) 11a. Notes with concern that cases of hunger and malnutrition have increased, many families have had their water, electricity and gas supply cut off, people have lost their homes (because of bank repossessions or evictions), increasing numbers of families no longer have enough money to pay for crèches, kindergartens and old people's homes, for thousands of children the only meal of the day is the meal provided for them at school, there has been a dramatic increase in the number of requests for help from social institutions, which are unable to cope with the growing number of applications, and the public funds available to support groups at risk of poverty are increasingly scarce;
Amendment 147 #
Draft opinion Paragraph 12 12. Welcomes the fact that in those studies the Commission recognised that only a strong reversal of current trends will make it possible to meet the Europe 2020 targets; Considers however that these targets are insufficient and suggests that the aim should be the full elimination of poverty;
Amendment 148 #
Draft opinion Paragraph 12 12. Welcomes the fact that in those studies the Commission recognised that only a strong reversal of current trends will make it possible for the entire EU to meet the Europe 2020 targets;
Amendment 149 #
Draft opinion Paragraph 13 13. Regrets the fact that, for Greece, Ireland and Portugal at least, the programmes included a number of detailed prescriptions on health system reform and expenditure cuts, despite the fact that Article 168(7) TFEU prohibits such intervention; notes the example of Ireland where an additional €618 million will be cut from the Health Service Executive in 2014; stresses that this is a danger to health and safety of patients as hospitals had already lost 20% of their budget since 2009;
Amendment 15 #
Draft opinion Recital A c (new) Ac. whereas once the economic and budgetary sustainability of these four countries can be guaranteed, efforts should be focused upon social aspects, paying special attention to job creation;
Amendment 150 #
Draft opinion Paragraph 13 13. Regrets the fact that, for Greece, Ireland and Portugal at least, the programmes included a number of detailed prescriptions on health system reform and expenditure cuts, which have a significant impact on the quality and universal accessibility of social services, especially in health and social care, despite the fact that Article 168(7) TFEU prohibits such intervention;
Amendment 151 #
Draft opinion Paragraph 13 13. Regrets the fact that, for Greece, Ireland and Portugal at least, the programmes included a number of detailed prescriptions on health system reform and expenditure cuts,
Amendment 152 #
Draft opinion Paragraph 13 a (new) 13a. Regrets the lack of a targeted approach to find inefficiencies in health systems and the decision to make across- the-board cuts to health budgets. Warns that implementing co-payments could cause patients to delay seeking care and placing the financial burden on households. Cautions that the salary reductions for healthcare professionals could have a negative effect on patient safety and cause migration of healthcare professionals;
Amendment 153 #
Draft opinion Paragraph 13 a (new) 13a. Is deeply concerned about the cuts on health and pharmaceutical benefits of the public systems, which in some countries have radically changed the universal nature of the system to the benefit of other more insurable or commercial methods, stresses furthermore that many studies and research show that in discriminatory co-payments, sometimes even on basic services such as health urgencies or access to medicine for people with chronic diseases, is preventing de facto many citizens from receiving basic social and health care needs; notes that the measures have also deeply affected those working in the caring professions. Therefore, there has been a deprivation of basic human rights through economic barriers.
Amendment 154 #
Draft opinion Paragraph 13 a (new) 13a. Deplores the fact the cuts to education services for children with special needs is having a hugely detrimental effect on their life chances and that such negative impacts at an early age can never be reversed;
Amendment 155 #
Draft opinion Paragraph 13 b (new) 13b. Reiterates that International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) Article 12 provides for the right of everyone to the highest attainable standard of physical and mental health. Notes that all four countries are signatories to the Covenant and thus have recognised the right to health for everyone. Notes that in Greece and Portugal the Constitution recognises the right to health; is concerned that according to EU-SILC all four countries have seen an increase in unmet medical need from 2008-2011. Regrets the decision of Portugal and Ireland to reduce the scope of statutory benefit packages and services provided;
Amendment 156 #
Draft opinion Paragraph 14 a (new) 14a. Deplores that cuts to resources for independent living for persons with disabilities;
Amendment 157 #
Draft opinion Paragraph 15 a (new) 15a. Highlights that the increasing social poverty in the 4 countries is producing also an increase in solidarity among the most vulnerable groups thanks to private efforts, family networks and aid organisations; stresses that this type of intervention should not become the structural solution to the problem, even if it's alleviating the situation of the most deprived and showing the qualities of the European citizenship;
Amendment 158 #
Draft opinion Paragraph 15 a (new) 15a. Regrets that the Troika put a heavy pressure on national authorities in order to end the moratorium on evictions for inhabitants victims, while those people were severely hit by the crisis and by austerity measures, therefore unable to bear the costs of their mortgage credit; recommends to Member states and their local authorities to set up neutral housing policies favouring social and affordable housing, to tackle the issue of housing vacancy and to implement effective prevention policies to reduce the number of evictions.
Amendment 159 #
Draft opinion Paragraph 15 c (new) 15c. Notes with concern the steady rise in the Gini coefficient [1] in Greece, Spain, Ireland and Portugal, against the general downward trend in the Eurozone, which means that there has been a significant increase in wealth distribution inequalities in the adjustment countries; [1] According to Eurostat data, there has been a steady rise in the Gini coefficient in Portugal, from 33.7 in 2009 to 34.2 in 2011 and 34.5 in 2012.
Amendment 16 #
Draft opinion Recital B B. whereas Article 9 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU)
Amendment 160 #
Draft opinion Paragraph 16 16. Welcomes the fact that the levels of early school-leavers are falling in the four countries; notes, however, that this
Amendment 161 #
Draft opinion Paragraph 16 16. Welcomes the fact that the levels of early school-leavers are falling in the four countries; notes, however, that this is partially explained by the difficult
Amendment 162 #
Draft opinion Paragraph 16 a (new) 16a. Notes with concern that cuts in public funding for primary and secondary education have worsened significantly – including through the dismissal of tens of thousands of teachers in each country – and this has practical implications for the quality of education and the material and human resources available in schools; notes that these measures are leading to growing class sizes, the reorganisation of curricula, school mergers and increased concentration, with schools being closed in the most remote and rural areas, with the result that many young people are being deprived of access to public education; stresses that, as a result of this situation, public education is to a greater and increasing extent being replaced by private education, which only some people can afford, and this is adding to social inequalities among pupils;
Amendment 163 #
Draft opinion Paragraph 17 17. Welcomes the fact that tertiary education attainment levels have been rising in all four countries; notes, however, that this
Amendment 164 #
Draft opinion Paragraph 17 17. Welcomes the fact that tertiary education attainment levels have been rising in
Amendment 165 #
Draft opinion Paragraph 17 17. Welcomes the fact that tertiary education attainment levels have been rising in all four countries; notes
Amendment 166 #
Draft opinion Paragraph 17 a (new) 17a. Regrets that the quality of the education systems is not following this positive path because the 4 programme countries are under the EU average as regards the quality of their systems; recalls the urgent need to recover quality vocational training systems with a high level of social legitimacy, since this is one of the best ways to improve young peoples' employability.
Amendment 167 #
Draft opinion Paragraph 17 a (new) 17a. Stresses that for education to be truly accessible for all it should be public, democratically run and free at the point of use;
Amendment 168 #
Draft opinion Paragraph 17 a (new) 17α. Expresses great concern, however, that the continuation or aggravation of the social and economic situation might further exacerbate the NEET problem and that of growing educational inequalities;
Amendment 169 #
Draft opinion Paragraph 17 a (new) 17a. Regrets the negative impacts of mass emigration of young people in particular the social and economic consequences thereof;
Amendment 17 #
Draft opinion Recital C a (new) Ca. whereas Article 36 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union commits the Union to recognising and respecting "access to services of general economic interest as provided for in national laws and practices, in accordance with the Treaties, in order to promote the social and territorial cohesion of the Union"; whereas article 14 (TFEU) establishes that "given the place occupied by services of general economic interest in the shared values of the Union as well as their role in promoting social and territorial cohesion, the Union and the Member States, each within their respective powers and with the scope of application of the Treaties, shall take care that such services operate on the basis of principles and condition, particularly economic and financial conditions, which enable them to fulfil their missions"; whereas article 345 of the TFEU provides that the Treaties "shall in no way prejudice the rules in Member States governing the system of property ownership"; and whereas Protocol No.26 on services of general interest which elaborates on the shared values of the Union with respect to services of general economic interest.
Amendment 170 #
Draft opinion Paragraph 17 b (new) 17a. Notes with concern the downward trend in the number of pupils and students enrolled in the education system since the start of the crisis and the fact that Portugal, for example, has one of the highest percentages of young people who wish to continue their studies but cannot afford to do so (38%)[1]; [1] Education to Employment: Getting Europe's Youth into Work, McKinsey Center for Government, 2013
Amendment 171 #
Draft opinion Paragraph 18 18. Re
Amendment 172 #
Draft opinion Paragraph 18 18. Regrets the fact that the programmes imposed on the four countries allow firms to opt out of collective bargaining agreements and to review sectoral wage agreements directly affecting the structure and values of collective bargaining arrangements set out in the respective
Amendment 173 #
Draft opinion Paragraph 18 18. Regrets the fact that the programmes imposed on the four countries allow firms to opt out of collective bargaining agreements and to review sectoral wage agreements directly affecting the structure and values of collective bargaining arrangements set out in the respective national constitutions; notes that this resulted in a request by the ILO Expert Committee, in the case of Greece, to re- establish social dialogue, and, in the case of Portugal, for the Constitutional Court to annul certain legislative measures;
Amendment 174 #
Draft opinion Paragraph 18 18. Regrets the fact that the programmes imposed on the four countries allow firms to opt out of collective bargaining agreements and to review sectoral wage agreements directly affecting the structure and values of collective bargaining arrangements set out in the respective national constitutions; notes that this resulted in a request by the ILO Expert Committee, in the case of Greece, to re- establish social dialogue
Amendment 175 #
Draft opinion Paragraph 18 18. Regrets that the social partners at national level were not consulted or involved in the initial design of programmes and that the Troika proved unwilling to engage in a meaningful way with national social partners; regrets the fact that the programmes imposed on the four countries allow firms to opt out of collective bargaining agreements and to review sectoral wage agreements directly affecting the structure and values of collective bargaining arrangements set out in the respective national constitutions; notes that this resulted in a request by the ILO Expert Committee, in the case of Greece, to re-
Amendment 176 #
Draft opinion Paragraph 18 a (new) 18a. Denounces that the Troika has completely ignored article 153 (5) of TFUE which rules out any EU intervention on issues such as pay, the right of association, the right to strike and the right to impose lock-outs and article 152 of the TFUE which states "the Union recognises and promotes the role of Social Partners at its level, taking into account the diversity of national systems. It shall facilitate dialogue between social partners, respecting their autonomy", stresses that, on the contrary, the Troika has pushed for essential changes in the national wage-setting systems aiming at a radical decentralisation of collective bargaining and a sharp restriction of the criteria for the extension of collective agreements.
Amendment 177 #
Draft opinion Paragraph 18 a (new) 18a. Stresses that revitalised collective bargaining provides a fundamental guarantee for balanced labour relations and underpins the working of democracy itself;
Amendment 178 #
Draft opinion Paragraph 18 a (new) 18a. Supports unions that refuse to be made co-responsible for implementing austerity by accepting 'fairer cuts' and insist on their role to independently voice the interests of workers in rejecting neoliberalism and austerity;
Amendment 179 #
Draft opinion Paragraph 18 a (new) 18a. Notes that the recasting of industrial relations dictated by the logic of internal devaluation in line with the economic adjustment programmes has failed to produce the anticipated results, labour market reforms having proved most successful when drawn up and implemented in consultation with the social partners, particularly through social dialogue and consistently in line with national traditions, this being the only way to avoid labour market fragmentation and achieve the much- desired objective of harmonious industrial relations; accepts as clearly legitimate the demand for labour market reforms and cutbacks, given the constantly fluctuating social and economic conditions, while stressing the undeniable need to safeguard fundamental labour rights that have been established at national and European level in a bid to boost employment, prevent job losses and ensure full compliance with the core principles governing decent working conditions;
Amendment 18 #
Draft opinion Recital E E. whereas the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union provides for, inter alia, the right of collective bargaining and action (Article 28), protection in the event of unjustified dismissal (Article 30), fair and just working conditions (Article 31), recognition of and respect for the entitlement to social security benefits and social services and, in order to ‘combat
Amendment 180 #
Draft opinion Paragraph 18 a (new) 18a. Notes that the conditionality within the financial assistance has imposed the dismantling of existing wage-setting arrangements either by completely abolishing institutions of cross-sectorial wage setting, as in Ireland, or by continuously hollowing out existing systems of sectorial collective bargaining. These measures include: the abolition or termination of national collective agreements; facilitating the derogation of firm-level agreements from sectorial agreements or legislative provisions, for instance through opening or hardship clauses or by generally giving firm-levels agreements priority over (cross-) sectorial agreements; suspension of the favourability principle, the introduction of more restrictive criteria for the extension of collective agreements; the reduction of the after-effect of expired collective agreements and the extension of the possibility of non-union employee representatives to conclude collective agreements at company level.
Amendment 181 #
Draft opinion Paragraph 18 a (new) 18a. Notes that a social concertation agreement "Commitment for growth, competitiveness and employment" was signed in Portugal, in January of 2012, by all main Social Partners and Government;
Amendment 182 #
Draft opinion Paragraph 18 a (new) 18a. Points out that there is no single solution that can be applied across all the Member States;
Amendment 183 #
Draft opinion Paragraph 18 b (new) 18b. Is deeply concerned about the weakening of social dialogue which has implied a massive loss of workers covered by collective agreements, in some countries this loss represents more than 70% on the available figures before the Troika recommendations.
Amendment 184 #
Draft opinion Paragraph 18 b (new) 18b. Points out that, in the sphere of health, the austerity measures imposed by the troikas and implemented by governments have resulted in the closure of hospital services and facilities, the elimination of or cuts in local healthcare provision and the consequent reduction in preventive care and access to diagnosis, the withdrawal of support for the transport of patients – with the result that they are missing out on vital consultations and treatment – and a sharp rise in charges for public health services, and these measures have had the effect of restricting access to health services;
Amendment 185 #
Draft opinion Paragraph 18 b (new) 18b. Takes the view that the measures put forward by the troika to restrict collective bargaining and cut wages are not an effective way of combating inequalities or promoting economic growth; takes the view that the approach based on wage cuts with the aim of bringing about an increase in exports has led to a decline in domestic consumption and has also affected economic growth;
Amendment 186 #
Draft opinion Paragraph 18 c (new) 18c. Summarizes that the EU 2020 Strategy goals on employment and fight against poverty and social exclusion are further than ever from being achieved not only due to the economic situation, but also because of the harsh cuts imposed by the Troika programmes; highlights that the IMF has recently considered that the austerity policies might have gone too far (since they have obviously depressed economic growth and sharpened the increase of unemployment) and that the Chair of the UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural rights argues that austerity is a disincentive to economic growth and as such hampers the realisation of economic and social rights;
Amendment 187 #
Draft opinion Paragraph 18 c (new) 18c. Points out that unemployment, cuts in social benefits, poverty and a lack of prospects for the future are among the factors that may cause or worsen cases of depression which may lead to suicide attempts; notes that deteriorating working conditions and the increasingly precarious nature of employment are leading to a rise in psycho-social factors and a rise in depression among workers;
Amendment 188 #
Draft opinion Paragraph 19 19. Calls on the Commission to carry out a detailed study of the social and economic consequences of the
Amendment 189 #
Draft opinion Paragraph 19 19. Calls on the Commission to carry out a detailed study of the social and economic consequences of the adjustment programmes in the four countries in order to provide a precise understanding of both the short-term and long-term damage to the employment and social protection systems, with particular regard to the fight against poverty, the maintaining of good social dialogue and the balance between flexibility and security in labour relations; calls on the Commission to use its consultative bodies when drafting this study, as well as the Employment Committee and the Social Protection Committee; suggests that the EESC be asked to draft a specific report;
Amendment 19 #
Draft opinion Recital F a (new) Fa. whereas, according to "EU Employment and Social Situation" Quarterly Review of October 2013,the severe fall in the GDP of Greece, Portugal and Ireland was mostly translated in employment decline;
Amendment 190 #
Draft opinion Paragraph 19 19. Calls on the Commission to carry out a detailed study of the social and economic consequences of the adjustment programmes in the four countries in order to provide a precise understanding
Amendment 191 #
Draft opinion Paragraph 19 19. Calls on the Commission to carry out a detailed study of the social and economic consequences of the adjustment programmes in the four countries in order to provide a precise understanding of both the short-term and long-term
Amendment 192 #
Draft opinion Paragraph 19 – point 1 (new) (1) Calls on the European Commission to draw up a detailed report of the breaches made against the spirit and the principles of the European Social Aquis in the programme countries, with a view to proposing measures to restore the Social Aquis. Insists that national and European social partners, through the European Social Dialogue should be closely involved in this.
Amendment 193 #
Draft opinion Paragraph 19 a (new) 19a. Urges Member States, in particular those under the Memorandum of Understanding, to boost wages and social benefits, restoring stolen wages, incomes and social rights to their former level so as to resolve serious social problems, enhance domestic demand, revitalise economic activity and create more and better jobs; urges Member States to apply a policy of protecting and restoring public services, particularly as regards the social functions of the State, boosting their human and material resources in keeping with their key role in enabling citizens to realise their rights;
Amendment 194 #
Draft opinion Paragraph 19 a (new) 19a. Stresses that Greece has done an enormous amount, involving unprecedented sacrifices on the part of the Greek people; urges the EU to help ensure that society and the real economy in Greece benefit accordingly from initial economic achievements;
Amendment 195 #
Draft opinion Paragraph 19 b (new) 19b. Stresses that it is important for the Member States to consider ways of renegotiating public debts – deadlines, interest rates and the sums to be paid – that might offer states relief from the burden of servicing debts and channel resources to promoting productive investment and creating jobs;
Amendment 196 #
Draft opinion Paragraph 19 c (new) 19c. Highlights the importance of political convergence between countries with similar problems with the aim of halting the spiral of speculation;
Amendment 197 #
Draft opinion Paragraph 19 d (new) 19d. Stresses the importance of applying budgetary policies designed to combat extravagant spending, based on a fiscal component involving increased taxes on dividends and profits and a reduced burden for workers and small and medium-sized enterprises, guaranteeing the appropriations necessary for States to function effectively;
Amendment 198 #
Draft opinion Paragraph 20 20. Calls on the Commission to ask the ILO and the Council of Europe to draft reports on possible corrective measures and incentives, their funding and the sustainability of public finances, to ensure full compliance with the European Social Charter and the Protocol thereto and with the ILO Core
Amendment 199 #
Draft opinion Paragraph 20 20. Calls on the Commission to ask the ILO and the Council of Europe to draft reports on possible corrective measures and incentives to ensure full compliance with the European Social Charter and the Protocol thereto and with the ILO Core Conventions
Amendment 2 #
Draft opinion Citation 1 b (new) 1b. having regard to its resolution of 4 July 2013 entitled “Impact of the crisis on access to care for vulnerable groups” (2013/2044(INI)),
Amendment 20 #
Draft opinion Recital G G. whereas in its resolution of 21 November 2013, Parliament welcomed the Commission communication of 2 October 2013 entitled ‘Strengthening the social dimension of the Economic and Monetary Union’ and
Amendment 200 #
Draft opinion Paragraph 20 20. Calls on the Commission to ask the ILO and the Council of Europe to draft reports on possible corrective measures and incentives needed to ensure full compliance with
Amendment 201 #
Draft opinion Paragraph 20 20. Calls on the Commission to ask the ILO and the Council of Europe to draft reports on possible corrective measures and incentives to ensure full compliance with the European Social Charter and the Protocol thereto and with the ILO Core Conventions, since the obligations deriving from them have been affected by the budgetary adjustment measures and the structural reforms requested by the Troika including with regard to ILO Conventions 87 on Freedom of association, Convention 94 on Inclusion of labour clauses in public contracts or Convention 98 on Right to organise;
Amendment 202 #
Draft opinion Paragraph 20 20.
Amendment 203 #
Draft opinion Paragraph 20 a (new) 20a. Calls on the Commission, in cooperation with the national authorities , to provide additional assistance to countries implementing economic adjustment programmes, thereby ensuring that they make optimum use of the opportunities offered by the EU structural funds to improve public administration and education, boost employment, and combat poverty, unemployment and social exclusion for the public benefit;
Amendment 204 #
Draft opinion Paragraph 20 a (new) 20a. Points out that the November 2013 ILO report 'Tackling the jobs crisis in Portugal' advocates a strategy based on job creation and productive investment, preserving jobs and supporting unemployed people and vulnerable groups, better-quality jobs, social protection, higher wages, and the revitalisation and expansion of collective bargaining and the social dialogue;
Amendment 205 #
Draft opinion Paragraph 20 a (new) 20a. Calls on the relevant EU institutions to insist that adequate financial resources are dedicated to educations services in particular those services targeting children with special needs and persons with disabilities and furthermore to insist that the resources necessary for independent living are restored;
Amendment 206 #
Draft opinion Paragraph 20 b (new) 20b. Calls on the Commission to take measures, such as facilitating access to funding, to promote SMEs, which form the backbone of the European economy as well as playing a central economic role at national level in the countries concerned; calls on the Commission in this connection to examine the possibility of introducing a 'growth clause' in economic adjustment programmes, given that illiquidity, high taxation and prolonged recession in countries implementing economic adjustment programmes have seriously undermined entrepreneurship, particularly in small and medium enterprises, resulting in business closures or relocations, leading in turn to widespread job losses;
Amendment 207 #
Draft opinion Paragraph 21 21. Calls on the EU to provide support, after the assessment, including through financial resources where appropriate, for the recovery of social protection standards and of the fight against poverty reduction and the renewal of social dialogue through a social recovery plan; calls on the Commission to propose measures and address the severe problems that children face in Greece, Cyprus and even in other countries, in order to prevent worsening of the existing situation and support and protect the social cohesion and the children and students' rights; calls on the Commission, the ECB and the Eurogroup to phase out the exceptional measures that have been put in place;
Amendment 208 #
Draft opinion Paragraph 21 21. Calls on the EU to provide support
Amendment 209 #
Draft opinion Paragraph 21 21. Calls on the EU to provide support, after the assessment, in
Amendment 21 #
Draft opinion Recital G G. whereas in its resolution of 21 November 2013, Parliament welcomed the Commission communication of 2 October 2013 entitled ‘Strengthening the social dimension of the Economic and Monetary Union’ and its proposal to establish a scoreboard of key employment and social indicators to be included in the Macroeconomic Imbalances Procedure (MIP) and the Joint Employment Report (JER) as a first step towards building a social dimension of EMU, but regretted the fact that those indicators were insufficient to ensure comprehensive coverage of the Member States’ employment and social situations and the interdependence between them; whereas Parliament’s resolution stressed the need to ensure that this monitoring aims to reduce social divergences between Member States and to promote upward social convergence and social progress;
Amendment 210 #
Draft opinion Paragraph 21 21. Calls on the EU to provide support, after the assessment, including through financial resources where appropriate, for the recovery of social protection standards and of the fight against poverty reduction and the renewal of social dialogue through a social recovery plan aimed at ensuring a threshold of decency in welfare, in pensions and in wages and aimed at upward social convergence and social progress; calls on the Commission, the ECB and the Eurogroup to work towards this by phas
Amendment 211 #
Draft opinion Paragraph 21 21. Calls on the EU to provide support, after the assessment, including through financial resources where appropriate, for the
Amendment 212 #
Draft opinion Paragraph 21 21. Calls on the EU to provide support, after the assessment, including through sufficient financial resources
Amendment 213 #
Draft opinion Paragraph 21 a (new) 21a. Asks the Commission and the Member States, once the sustainability of public finances is assured, to focus their efforts on job creation, paying special attention to youth and the long-term unemployed;
Amendment 214 #
Draft opinion Paragraph 22 22. Calls for compliance with the above- mentioned legal obligations laid down in the Treaties and in the Charter of Fundamental Rights, as failure to comply constitutes an infringement of EU primary law; calls on the fundamental rights agency to thoroughly assess the impact of the measures on human rights and issue recommendations in case of breaches of the Charter;
Amendment 215 #
Draft opinion Paragraph 22 a (new) 22a. Calls on the ECB, the European Commission and the Eurogroup to consider the targets of "EUROPE 2020" strategy at the same level as the realisation of fiscal and economic adjustment targets for the evaluation of the programmes;
Amendment 216 #
Draft opinion Paragraph 23 Amendment 217 #
Draft opinion Paragraph 23 23. Calls on the EU not to apply such institutional and financial solutions
Amendment 218 #
Draft opinion Paragraph 23 23. Calls on the EU not to apply
Amendment 219 #
Draft opinion Paragraph 23 23. Calls on the EU
Amendment 22 #
Draft opinion Recital G G. whereas in its resolution of 21 November 2013, Parliament welcomed the Commission communication of 2 October 2013 entitled ‘Strengthening the social dimension of the Economic and Monetary Union’ and its proposal to establish a scoreboard of key employment and social indicators
Amendment 220 #
Draft opinion Paragraph 23 23. Calls on the EU not to apply such institutional and financial
Amendment 221 #
Draft opinion Paragraph 23 23. Calls on the EU
Amendment 222 #
Draft opinion Paragraph 24 24. Calls on the Commission and the Council to give
Amendment 223 #
Draft opinion Paragraph 24 24. Calls on the Commission and the Council to give the same attention to social imbalances, and to correcting them, as it does to macroeconomic imbalances, and to that end to put EPSCO and its priorities on an equal footing with ECOFIN and the Eurogroup so as to place the public finances of the Member States on a sustainable footing and put an end to their living on credit;
Amendment 224 #
Draft opinion Paragraph 24 24. Calls on the Commission and the Council to give the same attention to social imbalances, and to correcting them, as it does to macroeconomic imbalances, and to that end to put EPSCO and its priorities on an equal footing
Amendment 225 #
Draft opinion Paragraph 24 24. Calls on the Commission and the Council to give
Amendment 226 #
Draft opinion Paragraph 24 a (new) 24a. Calls on the Commission and the European Council to stop marginalising the role of the European Parliament and to put forward political and even institutional procedures and reforms so that no decision can be taken in the future about such issues and crises unless the voice of the European Parliament is heard and its position is taken into consideration.
Amendment 227 #
Draft opinion Paragraph 24 a (new) 24a. Calls for an immediate end to austerity policies;
Amendment 228 #
Draft opinion Paragraph 24 a (new) 24a. Recommends to the Commission and to the Member States to consider public health and education spending not as a spending exposed to cuts, but as a public investment in the future of the country which should be respected and increased so as to improve the economic and social recovery;
Amendment 229 #
Draft opinion Paragraph 24 a (new) 24a. Stresses the need, in this context, to implement virtuous austerity measures that are concerned to ensure social justice and enable a balance to be reached between economic growth and employment, the implementation of structural reforms and budget consolidation in bailed-out Member States, and that are based on the values of the European Union;
Amendment 23 #
Draft opinion Recital H H. whereas the available data show that in four countries the progress made towards achieving the Europe 2020 targets is rapidly declining (see Annex 1); whereas for Portugal, the situation is not the same in all indicators, the progress towards achievement of the Europe 2020 targets is mixed, while the trend is positive regarding the targets related to education, the trend in employment is more challenging;
Amendment 230 #
Draft opinion Paragraph 24 a (new) 24a. Calls on the EU institutions to prioritise employment creation and entrepreneurship support;
Amendment 231 #
Draft opinion Paragraph 24 a (new) 24a. Considers that only genuinely democratically accountable institutions should steer the political process of designing and implementing the adjustment programmes for countries in severe financial difficulties; Commission, should have the political steering role : calls for the ECB, IMF role to be limited to technical assistance furthermore calls for the ILO to be involved in an advisory capacity; calls for an increased transparency and political and societal ownership in the design and implementation of the adjustment programmes;
Amendment 232 #
Draft opinion Paragraph 24 b (new) 24b. Recommends that once the hardest moment of the financial crisis has passed, the EU Institutions, together with the Member States put in place the job recovery plan that should have been implemented years ago, since this is the only way to consolidate the macroeconomic adjustment and to equilibrate the unbalances of the public sector such as the debt and the deficit. For this to happen, an Employment Strategy must be put in place which takes into account the need to quickly repair the credit system, notably for SMEs, a real employment policy with active labour market policies, quality and European public employment services, an upward wage policy, a European youth employment guarantee and a programme for jobless households and finally a more careful fiscal management;
Amendment 233 #
Draft opinion Paragraph 24 b (new) 24b. Considers it imperative that fundamentally different, socialist policies are implemented to solve the social catastrophe caused by capitalism and the crisis; Stresses therefore that a truly progressive taxation system should be put in place, that the banking sector should be taken into democratic public ownership to be run in a democratically planned way and help fund a mass plan of investment in public works and services to create quality employment and services for all;
Amendment 234 #
Draft opinion Paragraph 24 b (new) 24b. Calls on the Commission and the Council to give the same attention to social imbalances, and to correcting them, as it does to macroeconomic imbalances, and to that end to put EPSCO and its priorities on an equal footing and ensure full coherence with those of the ECOFIN and the Eurogroup;
Amendment 235 #
Draft opinion Paragraph 24 c (new) 24c. Calls on the Commission to present a progress report on the EU2020 with specific attention to the lack of progress in programme countries and come forward with proposals to put these countries on a credible path towards all EU 2020 targets;
Amendment 236 #
Draft opinion Paragraph 24 c (new) 24c. Recommends that future labour reforms not only point to the flexibilisation of the Labour Market, but also to its securisation through the boost of companies competitiveness taking into account other elements such as energy costs, unfair competition, social dumping, a fair and efficient financial system, fiscal policies in favour of growth and employment, and in general, everything which helps real economy and entrepreneurship to develop.
Amendment 237 #
Draft opinion Paragraph 24 d (new) 24d. Calls for urgent measures to prevent the increase of homelessness in programme countries and on the European Commission to support this through policy analysis and promotion of good practices.
Amendment 238 #
Draft opinion Paragraph 24 d (new) 24d. Calls on the Commission to carry out social impact assessments prior to imposing major reforms in the programme countries and to consider the spill-over effects of these measures such as the effect on poverty, social exclusion, crime rates and xenophobia;
Amendment 239 #
Draft opinion Paragraph 24 d (new) 24d. Calls on the Council to consider creating a structure similar to the Eurogroup in which the Eurozone countries can coordinate common policies in the social sphere, with the aim of providing practical responses to social problems; takes the view that the creation of a 'social Eurogroup' could help raise the profile of social issues and promote a fairer economy that is more founded on solidarity and inclusiveness;
Amendment 24 #
Draft opinion Recital H H. whereas the available data show that in the four countries the progress made towards achieving the Europe 2020 targets is rapidly declining, with the exception of targets related to early leavers from education and training and tertiary education attainment (see Annex 1);
Amendment 240 #
Draft opinion Paragraph 24 e (new) 24e. Considers that the burden of adjustment should not only come from programme countries which are member states with current account deficits, but that member states with a current account surpluses should also contribute to a rebalancing of the eurozone economy; calls on the Commission to issue recommendations on macroeconomic policies to non-programme countries with this aim;
Amendment 241 #
Draft opinion Paragraph 24 e (new) 24e. Urges the EU to establish a programme to combat youth unemployment funded by the revenue accruing from the tax on financial transactions and 40% of the Community funds not used in the current Community framework;
Amendment 242 #
Draft opinion Paragraph 24 e (new) 24e. Invites the Commission and Member States to consult with civil society, patient organisations and professional bodies for future measures related to health in adjustment programmes and to make use of the Social Protection Committee, so as to ensure that the reforms increase the efficiency of the systems and the resources without endangering the most vulnerable groups and the most important social protection, including the acquisition and the use of medicines, the most basic needs and the consideration of the health staff;
Amendment 243 #
Draft opinion Paragraph 24 f (new) 24f. Calls on the EU to set an 11% limit on the unemployment rate by 2020 and to include this limit in the Fiscal Compact, whilst at the same time creating the necessary conditions for the mutualisation of mechanisms for social support and the payment of unemployment benefit in Member States exceeding this limit;
Amendment 244 #
Draft opinion Paragraph 24 f (new) 24f. Notes that according to Article 19 of Regulation (EU) No 472/2013 the Commission shall issue a report to the Parliament before 1 January 2014 on the application of this regulation; calls on the Commission to present this report without delay and to include the implications of this regulation for the economic adjustment programmes in place;
Amendment 25 #
Draft opinion Recital H H. whereas the available data show that in four countries the progress made towards achieving the Europe 2020 targets
Amendment 26 #
Draft opinion Recital H a (new) Ha. whereas the troika interventions in the programme countries displayed a serious democratic deficit, people were effectively subjected to economic blackmail and diktats by unelected, unaccountable and non-transparent bodies;
Amendment 27 #
Draft opinion Recital H a (new) Ha. whereas long-term economic prospects in these countries are improving; whereas this should begin to aid the creation of new jobs in these economies and reverse the trend of declining employment;
Amendment 28 #
Draft opinion Recital H a (new) Ha. whereas the policies conditional to financial assistance not only largely failed to achieve the Commission's primary aim of achieving fiscal sustainability, financial stability and restoring competitiveness, but also caused significant harm to pre-crisis progress made in policy areas such as environmental protection and health care.
Amendment 29 #
Draft opinion Recital H b (new) Hb. whereas the "success story" around Ireland exiting the programme has very little to do with actual accomplishments that have an impact on people's lives; whereas this story is mainly empty spin designed to support the Irish government's policies, and use Ireland as an example to force working people in southern Europe to accept more austerity; whereas in reality Ireland has the highest net emigration rate of all member states, investment as a percentage of Irish GDP is at 10.6%, the lowest rate in the EU, with the average at 20%, Ireland is still left with an unsustainable debt to GDP ratio of 125% and personal consumption is down 12% compared to 2008;
Amendment 3 #
Draft opinion Citation 1 a (new) 1a. having regard to the public hearing held by the Employment and Social Affairs Committee of the European Parliament on January 9th 2014, on "the employment and social aspects of the role and operations of the Troika with regard to euro area programme countries",
Amendment 30 #
Draft opinion Recital H c (new) Hc. whereas, despite of claims by the Troika and the Irish government, Ireland has not regained "economic sovereignty" since exiting the programme; whereas Ireland, in addition to being subject to EU 'economic governance' like all other EU countries, is also still subjected to "post- programme monitoring" by the IMF and "post-programme surveillance" by the Commission which include formal inspections and the power to impose further austerity; whereas the same will apply to other countries when they exit their programmes;
Amendment 31 #
Draft opinion Paragraph 1 1. Notes that the EU institutions (the ECB, the Commission and the Eurogroup) are fully co-responsible, together with national governments, for the conditions imposed under the economic adjustment programmes, and therefore for their social consequences;
Amendment 32 #
Draft opinion Paragraph 1 1. Notes that, quite clearly, without the economic adjustment programmes the social impact of the crisis would have been far worse than it is at present and that the EU institutions (the ECB, the Commission and the Eurogroup) are fully co-responsible for the conditions imposed under the economic adjustment programmes, and therefore for their social consequences in comparison with the consequences without economic adjustment programmes;
Amendment 33 #
Draft opinion Paragraph 1 1. Notes that the EU institutions (the ECB, the Commission and the Eurogroup) are fully
Amendment 34 #
Draft opinion Paragraph 1 1. Notes that the EU institutions (the ECB, the Commission and the Eurogroup) are fully co-responsible for the conditions imposed under the economic adjustment programmes
Amendment 35 #
Draft opinion Paragraph 1 1. Notes that the
Amendment 36 #
Draft opinion Paragraph 1 1. Notes that the EU institutions (the ECB, the Commission and the Eurogroup) are fully co-responsible for the conditions imposed under the economic adjustment programmes
Amendment 37 #
Draft opinion Paragraph 1 a (new) 1a. Notes that despite the need to guarantee the sustainability of public finances, the European Union has to fight to ensure its citizens have proper social protection;
Amendment 38 #
Draft opinion Paragraph 2 2. Deplores the fact that Parliament has been completely marginalised during all phases of the project: the preparatory phase, the development of mandates and the monitoring of the results achieved by the programmes and related measures; Notes that the European Parliament supported the same kind of neoliberal austerity policies, e.g. through its acceptance of inter alia the 2-pack, 6-pack or European Semester .
Amendment 39 #
Draft opinion Paragraph 2 2. Deplores the fact that
Amendment 4 #
Draft opinion Citation 1 b (new) 1b. having regard to the 4 draft policy notes on "Evaluation of the Social and Employment Aspects and Challenges" in Greece, Portugal, Ireland and Cyprus prepared for the DG Internal policies of the Union Directorate A "Economic and Scientific Policies Economic Governance Support Unit" in January 2014,
Amendment 40 #
Draft opinion Paragraph 2 2. Deplores the fact that Parliament has been completely marginalised during all phases of the pro
Amendment 41 #
Draft opinion Paragraph 2 2. Deplores the fact that Parliament has
Amendment 42 #
Draft opinion Paragraph 3 3. Regrets the fact that those programmes were designed without
Amendment 43 #
Draft opinion Paragraph 3 3.
Amendment 44 #
Draft opinion Paragraph 3 3. Regrets the fact that those programmes were designed without any assessment of the consequences by means of impact studies or coordination with the Employment Committee, the Social Protection Committee, the Employment, Social Policy, Health and Consumer Affairs Council (EPSCO) or the Commissioner for Employment and Social Affairs; regrets, too, that the ILO were not consulted and the fact that, despite the important social implications, the consultative bodies established by Treaty, in particular the European Economic and Social Committee (EESC) and the
Amendment 45 #
Draft opinion Paragraph 3 – point 1 (new) (1) Condemns the fact that many of the provisions and measures taken in the troika policy programs are not in line with the principles of the Treaty quoted in recitals B to E, is particularly concerned about the interventions in the field of wages and the systems of collective bargaining themselves. deplores the fact that the Commission has failed in this respect to function as the guardian of the Treaty;
Amendment 46 #
Draft opinion Paragraph 3 – point 2 (new) (2) Condemns the fact that the policy implemented under the troika went much further in those cases where social partners reached a joint agreement, thereby not respecting the balance reached by social partners in terms of wage measures and/or on labour market reform;
Amendment 47 #
Draft opinion Paragraph 3 a (new) 3a. Points out that since 2008 the EU has been going through an unprecedented economic and financial crisis;
Amendment 48 #
Draft opinion Paragraph 3 a (new) Amendment 49 #
Draft opinion Paragraph 3 a (new) 3a. Deplores that a fair distributional impact of the measures was not among the key objectives of the adjustment programmes;
Amendment 5 #
Draft opinion Recital A A. whereas the economic crisis and the economic adjustment programme measures adopted in response to it in Greece (May 2010 and March 2012), Ireland (December 2010), Portugal (May 2011) and Cyprus (June 2013) have had a direct and indirect impact on employment levels and dire consequences for the social situation; whereas, although all the programmes were formally signed by the Commission, they were designed, and their conditionality determined, jointly by the IMF, the
Amendment 50 #
Draft opinion Paragraph 3 b (new) 3b. Regrets that the programmes have only focused on labour market reforms and austerity measures, aiming to regain competitiveness through minimum wage cuts, decentralisation of collective bargaining, social benefit cuts, lighter employment regulations and limited action in surplus countries, not taking into account the importance of innovation and investment and without properly foreseen the dire effects that these measures will have on the employment rate;
Amendment 51 #
Draft opinion Paragraph 3 b (new) 3b. Notes that the EU was ill-prepared and ill-equipped to deal with the problems that arose, not least the immense sovereign debt crisis within the Economic and Monetary Union;
Amendment 52 #
Draft opinion Paragraph 3 c (new) 3c. Notes that the absence of European Institutions as well as of European financial mechanisms has forced to improvise them, leading to financial and institutional agreements outside the community method as well as to problems of coherence and conflict of interests, but condemns the fact that the Commission has acted as a mere lender and has forgotten its main role as Guardian of the Treaties. In the same way, the European Central Bank has clearly taken decisions falling outside of its mandate;
Amendment 53 #
Draft opinion Paragraph 3 b (new) 3b. Deplores the fact that, in spite of the Commission’s appeals, the EU funds left over from the 2007-2013 framework have not been put promptly to use to tackle the crisis or limit its economic and social effects;
Amendment 54 #
Draft opinion Paragraph 3 c (new) 3c. Notes that the global economic and financial crisis has highlighted and exacerbated the fragility of public finances in the four countries;
Amendment 55 #
Draft opinion Paragraph 3 c (new) 3c. Points out that the fiscal consolidation provided for in the Treaty should be a means of supporting economic growth and employment and not an end in itself; deplores the fact that the agenda for growth and jobs has not been incorporated in the fiscal compact in the way required to make growth and employment central goals ranking equally with fiscal consolidation and public debt management;
Amendment 56 #
Draft opinion Paragraph 3 d (new) 3d. Points out that the situation was such as to demand an immediate response, given that failure to act would have had serious consequences, and to leave the four countries with no alternative but to seek financial assistance in order to avert bankruptcy;
Amendment 57 #
Draft opinion Paragraph 3 e (new) 3e. Points out that the short time allowed to implement the adjustment programmes and the failure to produce an accurate picture of the economies of the bailout Member States have been the main causes of the deterioration in the social situation in those countries;
Amendment 58 #
Draft opinion Paragraph 3 f (new) 3f. Deplores the fact that the worsening economic and social situation in the four countries was not noticed in time, bearing in mind that, had that happened, measures could have been taken to mitigate the social consequences;
Amendment 59 #
Draft opinion Paragraph 4 4. Notes that the adjustment policies and structural reforms in the four countries have led to dramatic unemployment rates, historically high rates of job losses and worsening working conditions and therefore the relevant policies of the EU and the four countries should be reviewed and adapted in order to respond to the needs of the society and ensure social cohesion; points out that the consequences for activity rates, in particular as regards the sustainability of social protection and pension systems, are even more serious because the gap between the Europe 2020 targets and reality is
Amendment 6 #
Draft opinion Recital A A. whereas the e
Amendment 60 #
Draft opinion Paragraph 4 4. Notes that the
Amendment 61 #
Draft opinion Paragraph 4 4. Notes that the economic crisis and the adjustment policies and structural reforms deemed necessary to remedy it in the four countries have led to dramatic unemployment rates, historically high rates of job losses and worsening working conditions; points out
Amendment 62 #
Draft opinion Paragraph 4 4. Notes that the adjustment policies
Amendment 63 #
Draft opinion Paragraph 4 4. Notes that the
Amendment 64 #
Draft opinion Paragraph 4 4. Notes that the adjustment policies and structural reforms in the four countries
Amendment 65 #
Draft opinion Paragraph 4 4. Notes that the economic crisis and the adjustment policies and structural reforms in the four countries
Amendment 66 #
Draft opinion Paragraph 4 4. Notes th
Amendment 67 #
Draft opinion Paragraph 4 4. Notes that the adjustment policies and
Amendment 68 #
Draft opinion Paragraph 4 a (new) 4a. Notes that the crisis has highlighted and exacerbated macroeconomic imbalances in certain Member States and that it is therefore clearly necessary to initiate structural changes and reforms on a case-by-case basis, giving special attention to vulnerable sections of society with a view to achieving growth, accompanied by social cohesion and employment;
Amendment 69 #
Draft opinion Paragraph 4 a (new) 4a. Notes that, according to Eurostat data, the unemployment rate in Portugal fell in November 2013, for the ninth month running, to 15.5%;
Amendment 7 #
Draft opinion Recital A A. whereas
Amendment 70 #
Draft opinion Paragraph 4 a (new) 4a. Notes with concern that the troikas have imposed cuts across the board in public sector pay (even doing away with holiday and Christmas bonuses) and in retirement pensions and unemployment, sickness, and other welfare benefits, as well as imposing longer working hours, adding to the exploitation of workers; points out that wages in Portugal have fallen on average by about 9% in real terms; points out that many thousands of public sector jobs have been shed in the countries being bailed out and that labour law has been amended so as to make redundancy schemes easier to implement and cheaper;
Amendment 71 #
Draft opinion Paragraph 4 a (new) 4a. Points out that although new jobs are the final stage of the benefits of fiscal and budgetary consolidation, the four countries have to make an effort to create the favourable conditions needed for companies, and SMEs in particular, to be able to develop their business sustainably in the long term;
Amendment 72 #
Draft opinion Paragraph 4 a (new) 4a. Notes that the expectations of a return to growth and job creation through internal devaluation in order to regain competitiveness haven't been fulfilled, highlights that this unfulfillment is caused by the underestimation of the structural character of the crisis as well as of the importance of the maintenance of domestic demand, investment and the support with credit to the real economy; stresses that the procyclical character of the austerity measures and the fact that they haven't been accompanied by a parallel concern on growth and job creation has led to a notorious contraction of growth and employment;
Amendment 73 #
Draft opinion Paragraph 4 b (new) 4b. Notes that the labour market reforms have aroused a strong negative public response caused by the lack of social dialogue as well as of technical and political legitimacy in the different parts of the reform, and the total absence of a coherent European holistic vision, which would have incorporated medium and long-term concerns to the programmes;
Amendment 74 #
Draft opinion Paragraph 4 b (new) 4b. Stresses that, on the one hand, the adoption of the same solution for all Member States without taking individual circumstances into account and, on the other, the very brief period allowed for the implementation of economic adjustment programmes has made it difficult for both society and the business sector to adapt, thereby undermining social cohesion, employment and the real economy;
Amendment 75 #
Draft opinion Paragraph 4 b (new) 4b. Notes with concern that the gender pay gap has ceased to narrow in the countries undergoing adjustment, where the disparities are wider than the EU average; maintains that wage inequalities and the falling female employment rate need to receive greater attention in the Member States undergoing adjustment;
Amendment 76 #
Draft opinion Paragraph 4 c (new) 4c. Notes that high rates of unemployment and underemployment, combined with public and private sector pay cuts - in accordance with economic adjustment programmes - are undermining the sustainability and adequacy of pension systems as a result of diminishing insurance contributions and social security funding shortfalls;
Amendment 77 #
Draft opinion Paragraph 4 c (new) 4c. Notes that the massive destruction of SMEs is one of the main causes of job losses and the biggest threat to future recovery, because the possible improvement of exportations will not compensate the loss of assets as well as of future employment. Notes that the adjustment policies did not take into account strategic sectors which should have been protected in order to preserve future growth and social cohesion. This has led to a significant job losses in strategic sectors such as, industry or R+D+I, with dramatic consequences to basic public sectors such as health, education and social services;
Amendment 78 #
Draft opinion Paragraph 4 d (new) 4d. Notes with concern the lack of effective action in those Member States that are implementing economic adjustment programmes to combat tax evasion, contribution evasion and the underground economy, resulting in the excessive taxation of earnings, undermining social security systems and aggravating social inequalities;
Amendment 79 #
Draft opinion Paragraph 5 5. Notes with great concern that it is young people who are suffering the highest levels of unemployment, with the situation in countries such as Greece, where the rate is over 50%, or Portugal and Ireland, where it is in excess of 30%, or in Cyprus where it is about 26.4%, being quite devastating; regrets the fact that even those who do find a job often find themselves working under precarious conditions or on part-time contracts which make it hard to live independently;
Amendment 8 #
Draft opinion Recital A A. whereas the
Amendment 80 #
Draft opinion Paragraph 5 5.
Amendment 81 #
Draft opinion Paragraph 5 5. Notes with great concern that it is young people who are suffering the highest levels of unemployment, with the situation in countries such as Greece, where the rate is over 50%, or Portugal and Ireland, where it is in excess of 30%, being quite devastating; notes the increasing degree of employment mismatch and the resulting loss of the innovatory and expert resources affecting production and hence growth; regrets the fact that even those who do find a job often find themselves working under precarious conditions or on part-time contracts which make it hard to live independently;
Amendment 82 #
Draft opinion Paragraph 5 5. Notes with great concern that it is young people who are suffering the highest levels of unemployment, with the situation in countries such as Greece, where the rate is over 50%, or Portugal and Ireland, where it is in excess of 30%, being
Amendment 83 #
Draft opinion Paragraph 5 5. Notes with great concern that it is young people who are suffering the highest levels of unemployment, with the situation in countries such as Greece, where the rate is over 50%, or Portugal and Ireland, where it is in excess of 30%, being quite devastating; regrets the fact that even those who do find a job often find themselves working under precarious conditions or on part-time contracts which make it hard to live independently; points out that the much-vaunted fall in Portugal’s youth unemployment rate (36% in the third quarter of 2013) was influenced by the increase in young emigrants and by active employment policy measures based on insecure contracts;
Amendment 84 #
Draft opinion Paragraph 5 5. Notes with great concern that it is young people who are suffering the highest levels of unemployment, with the situation in countries such as Greece, where the rate is
Amendment 85 #
Draft opinion Paragraph 5 5. Notes with great concern that it is young people who are suffering the highest levels of unemployment, with the situation in countries such as Greece, where the rate is over 50%, or Portugal, and in Ireland, where it
Amendment 86 #
Draft opinion Paragraph 5 5. Notes with great concern that it is young people who are suffering the highest levels of unemployment, with the situation in countries such as Greece, where the rate is
Amendment 87 #
Draft opinion Paragraph 5 a (new) 5a. Stresses that the sharp rise in living costs due to budget cuts, privatisations and lack of investment in public services, has also made it more difficult for young people to find the financial means necessary to live independently from their families; stresses the need for massive investment in public services to make living independently a reality for young people;
Amendment 88 #
Draft opinion Paragraph 5 a (new) 5a. Notes that the plans being implemented in Portugal, including the active employment policies, are proving effective and that the youth unemployment rate has been falling;
Amendment 89 #
Draft opinion Paragraph 5 a (new) 5a. Expresses its concern at the fact that high rates of unemployment and long- term unemployment have resulted in loss of health coverage for a large part of the unemployed population and their dependents and an increase in the number of households forced to survive on meagre incomes or with no income at all, thereby increasing the risk of extreme poverty and social exclusion, as reflected by the growing number of destitute and homeless people and the lack of access to basic goods and services, particularly in the wake of the massive welfare restrictions introduced under the economic adjustment programmes;
Amendment 9 #
Draft opinion Recital A A. whereas the economic crisis and the adjustment programme measures in Greece (May 2010 and March 2012), Ireland (December 2010), Portugal (May 2011) and Cyprus (June 2013) have had a direct and indirect impact on employment levels and
Amendment 90 #
Draft opinion Paragraph 5 a (new) 5a. Considers, as regards the decision taken in some of the four countries, that it is unacceptable to increase the social security contributions payable by workers while lowering the contribution rates payable by companies, bearing in mind that this constitutes a setback for fairer redistribution of income and will jeopardise the sustainability of public social security systems;
Amendment 91 #
Draft opinion Paragraph 5 a (new) 5a. Notes that the increase of income inequality is not only bad for society but also for the economy and can hinder economic recovery and therefore needs to be addressed by bigger focus on redistribution, especially through taxation and welfare systems; low pay and the worrying rise in precarious employment need to be tackled;
Amendment 92 #
Draft opinion Paragraph 6 6. Notes that the most vulnerable groups – the long-term unemployed, women, migrant workers and the disabled – have been strongly hit and are suffering from higher unemployment rates than the national average; points out that high unemployment rates put pressure on working conditions, as workers do not know whether their jobs will be preserved or whether there will be alternatives to fall back on, they are more likely to suffer, and are more vulnerable to, violence, mobbing, and sexual harassment, they are made to multitask – in the sense of executing numerous tasks for which they have no aptitude – and, as a result of mass redundancies, are obliged to take on additional tasks previously performed by other workers;
Amendment 93 #
Draft opinion Paragraph 6 6. Notes that the most vulnerable groups – the long-term unemployed, women, migrant workers and the disabled – have
Amendment 94 #
Draft opinion Paragraph 6 6. Notes that the most vulnerable groups – the long-term unemployed, carers, women, migrant workers and the disabled – have
Amendment 95 #
Draft opinion Paragraph 6 a (new) 6a. Notes the severe rise in the long-term unemployment rate of women and senior workers and the additional difficulties these workers will face to get back to the labour market when the economy will eventually recover. Warns that these workers are not receiving the attention they deserve.
Amendment 96 #
Draft opinion Paragraph 7 7. Warns that, if not remedied, these huge divergences, especially in the case of the younger generation, will result in structural damage to the labour market of the four countries, limit their capacity for recovery, provoke massive forced migration with tremendous brain-drain effects and increase the persistent divergences between Member States supplying employment and those supplying a low-cost workforce; highlights that the long-term impact of brain drain jeopardises future development and is particularly harmful for the sustainability of social protection and pensions systems;
Amendment 97 #
Draft opinion Paragraph 7 7. Warns that,
Amendment 98 #
Draft opinion Paragraph 7 7. Warns that, if not remedied, these huge divergences, especially in the case of the younger generation, will result in structural damage to the labour market of the four countries, limit their capacity for recovery,
Amendment 99 #
Draft opinion Paragraph 7 7. Warns that, if not remedied, these huge divergences, especially in the case of the younger generation,
source: PE-526.372
2014/01/24
AFCO
37 amendments...
Amendment 1 #
Draft opinion Recital Aa (new) Aa. whereas the European Court of Justice referring to Article 13 (3) of the ESM Treaty has recently confirmed (Pringle Case) that the European Commission by its involvement in the ESM Treaty has to “promote the general interest of the Union” and to “ensure that the memoranda of understanding concluded by the ESM are consistent with European Union law”;
Amendment 10 #
Draft opinion Recital Ca (new) Ca. whereas the "emergency response" which the Troika was intended to be is now lasting for four years;
Amendment 11 #
Draft opinion Paragraph - 1 (new) -1. underlines that the creation of the EFSF and the ESM outside the institutions of the Union represents a setback in the evolution of the Union, essentially at the expense of Parliament, the Court of Auditors and the Court of Justice;
Amendment 12 #
Draft opinion Paragraph 1 1. Takes the view that the
Amendment 13 #
Draft opinion Paragraph 1 1. Takes the view that the current situation is damaging the image of the European Union; calls for a Treaty change in order to create a European Monetary Fund (EMF) as a single financial assistance instrument within the Community framework for all EU Member States;
Amendment 14 #
Draft opinion Paragraph 1a (new) 1a. Regrets that the system of financial assistance has not yet been brought under proper parliamentary scrutiny and accountability in the framework of the EU Treaties;
Amendment 15 #
Draft opinion Paragraph 1a (new) 1a. Considers that the current analysis of the Troika work on Programme Member States should be used as an important source of information to get lessons from the past and adopt new approaches on the new mechanisms that should be created to prevent high level of corrective costs on European economies in the future;
Amendment 16 #
Draft opinion Paragraph 1a (new) 1a. Points out that Troika was set up without the EU Primary Law providing for an appropriate legal basis;
Amendment 17 #
Draft opinion Paragraph 1b (new) 1b. Deplores the unpreparedness of the EU and its institutions to address swiftly and efficiently the sovereign debt crisis of large magnitude inside the monetary union;
Amendment 18 #
Draft opinion Paragraph 1b (new) 1b. Notes that, while the MoU negotiations and the Troika's mandate have been perceived as lacking some transparency, the national voters of the programme countries had the opportunity to express their approval to the general lines of the adjustment programmes;
Amendment 19 #
Draft opinion Paragraph 1c (new) 1c. Regrets deeply that the system of financial assistance established has not yet been brought under proper parliamentary scrutiny and accountability in the framework of the EU Treaties;
Amendment 2 #
Draft opinion Recital Ab (new) Ab. whereas Article 151 TFEU provides that action taken by the EU and its member states must be consistent with the fundamental social rights laid down in the 1961 European Social Charter and the 1989 Community Charter of the Fundamental Rights of Workers in order to improve, inter alia, the social dialogue.
Amendment 20 #
Draft opinion Paragraph 2 2. Insists that the European
Amendment 21 #
Draft opinion Paragraph 2 2. Insists that European institutions involved in decisions regarding financial assistance to EU Member States must be accountable to the European Parliament and that
Amendment 22 #
Draft opinion Paragraph 2 2. Insists that European institutions involved in decisions regarding financial assistance to EU Member States must be accountable to the European Parliament and that relevant decisions must be voted on by the European Parliament; takes the view that, where necessary, national parliaments should be involved in the economic dialogue; therefore takes the view that the European Commission, which agreed to take over within the Troika the role to lead and coordinate the definition of the concrete conditionalities for the requested financial support and to monitor the compliance of national governments economic adjustment programmes with the memoranda of understanding, should be accountable to the EP, appearing regularly before the competent committee of the EP at the request of the European Parliament or at its own initiative;
Amendment 23 #
Draft opinion Paragraph 2a (new) 2a. Notes with concern that in the adjustment programmes the Commission advocates inter alia labour market flexibility, changes to wage policies and the structure of collective-bargaining systems, direct freezes and cuts in wages and pensions and increased retirement ages, eliminating or reducing social subsidies together with an easing of restrictions on layoffs and limits on unemployment benefits; is of the opinion that all these had a profound and severe impact on fundamental rights and is weakening the European social model i.e. social dialogue and collective bargaining which this model is based on;
Amendment 24 #
Draft opinion Paragraph 2b (new) 2b. Stresses that the involvement of the social partners in the economic dialogue at European level must be on the political agenda and would be in full compliance with the Treaty;
Amendment 25 #
Draft opinion Paragraph 3a (new) 3a. Believes that, if the Commission is to continue to act as a member of the Troika, it should do so in full respect of its obligation under the Treaties, avoiding the possible contradictions with its role of “guardian of the Treaty”;
Amendment 26 #
Draft opinion Paragraph 3b (new) 3b. Expresses its concern that ECB participation in the Troika as defined in ESM Treaty raises constitutional concerns with regard to the ECB’s independence, enshrined in Art 130 TFEU;
Amendment 27 #
Draft opinion Paragraph 3c (new) 3c. Believes that the euro area relationship with the IMF should be redefined, with a view to gradually phasing out the direct involvement of the IMF in the resolution of euro area sovereign debt problems;
Amendment 28 #
Draft opinion Paragraph 4a (new) 4a. Is of the opinion that the European Convention on Human Rights, the ILO conventions, the European Social Charter as well as the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights legally bind all EU member states to not focus exclusively on the application of financial solutions to the crisis but to give equal weight to measures promoting social stability; calls on EU institutions to act accordingly;
Amendment 29 #
Draft opinion Paragraph 5 Amendment 3 #
Draft opinion Recital Ac (new) Ac. whereas Article 152 TFEU states that: "The Union recognises and promotes the role of the social partners at its level, taking into account the diversity of national systems. It shall facilitate dialogue between the social partners, respecting their autonomy;
Amendment 30 #
Draft opinion Paragraph 5 5.
Amendment 31 #
Draft opinion Paragraph 5 5. Takes the view that
Amendment 32 #
Draft opinion Paragraph 5a (new) 5a. underlines in this context that the European Court of Justice in its current jurisprudence has set high demands on financial and economic stabilization measures, especially with regard to their suitability in the public interest, their proportionality and a careful consideration of the measures;
Amendment 33 #
Draft opinion Paragraph 5a (new) 5a. Calls for all decisions related to the Economic and Monetary Union to be taken within the framework of the Treaties on which the European Union is founded, since any departure from the Community method and increased use of intergovernmental agreements would divide and weaken the Union.
Amendment 34 #
Draft opinion Paragraph 5a (new) 5a. Notes that recommendations contained in Memorandum of Unsderstdandings (MoUs) mark a clear departure from the aims of the “Lisbon Strategy” and the “Europe 2020 Strategies”, particularly to ensure high levels of growth, competitiveness and employment;.
Amendment 35 #
Draft opinion Paragraph 5b (new) 5b. Stresses that pursuing economic and financial stability in the Member States and the Union as a whole must not undermine social stability, the European social model and social rights of EU citizens; calls for the full involvement of social partners in the design and implementation of adjustment programmes, current and future;
Amendment 36 #
Draft opinion Paragraph 5c (new) 5c. Calls for the current Troika setting to be discontinued and points out that any future structure of the Troika has to be duly democratically legitimised and included in the Community framework; demands close cooperation with and full participation of the European Parliament and a greater involvement of National Parliaments, especially of those Member States under financial assistance programmes;
Amendment 37 #
5d. Calls for a Treaty change which will provide for all necessary instruments and means to allow the Union and its institutions to address swiftly and efficiently and in a duly democratically legitimised way challenges that might put in danger the economic, financial and social stability of the euro area and its Member States in the future;
Amendment 4 #
Draft opinion Recital B B. whereas the conditions for financial assistance are jointly agreed between relevant EU institutions, the ESM and the IMF, but the final decision is always taken by the ESM board, according to a MoU previously negotiated with the Member State concerned;
Amendment 5 #
Draft opinion Recital Ba (new) Ba. whereas both the EFSF and the ESM benefit from the services of prominent Union institutions, such as the Commission and the ECB, whereas control of these institutions is not in accordance with the procedure laid down in the TFEU;
Amendment 6 #
Draft opinion Recital Ba (new) Ba. whereas the Troika was an ad-hoc solution adopted under considerable time pressure in an emergency context arising from the economic crisis, to support countries in greatest difficulties, to avoid a disorderly default and the contagion of the crisis to other Member States, to stop speculation on sovereign debt, and to prevent the melt-down of the euro area;
Amendment 7 #
Draft opinion Recital C C. whereas the Memorandum signed by euro area countries seeking financial assistance, while recognising the conditions of urgency under which the decisions were taken, affects fundamental rights and the social situation of those countries, but the development and implementation of actions are not subject to democratic scrutiny
Amendment 8 #
Draft opinion Recital C C. whereas the M
Amendment 9 #
Draft opinion Recital C C. whereas the Memorandum signed by
source: PE-527.973
2014/02/03
ECON
915 amendments...
Amendment 1 #
Motion for a resolution Citation 1 – having regard to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, and in particular Article 7, Article 9, Article 136 in combination with Article 121 , Article 151, Article 152, Article 153, Article 168 and Article 174 thereof,
Amendment 10 #
Motion for a resolution Citation 13 b (new) - having regard to the Opinion ECO/334 "Where is the Euro headed?", published by the European Economic and Social Committee, 22 May 2013,
Amendment 100 #
Motion for a resolution Recital I I. whereas the economic situation and recent developments in some Member States have compromised the quality of employment, social protection and health and safety standards; whereas unemployment in these Member States has risen much more than anticipated and economic and social hardship is unmistakable;
Amendment 101 #
Motion for a resolution Recital I I. whereas the economic situation and recent developments in some Member States have significantly compromised the quality of
Amendment 102 #
Motion for a resolution Recital I I. whereas the economic situation and recent developments in some Member States have
Amendment 103 #
Motion for a resolution Recital I I. whereas the economic situation and recent developments in some Member States have compromised the quality of employment, social protection and health and safety standards, and whereas the loans received have helped to prevent the situation from deteriorating yet further;
Amendment 104 #
Motion for a resolution Recital I I. whereas the
Amendment 105 #
Motion for a resolution Recital I I. whereas as the consequence of Troika's involvement, the economic situation and recent developments in some Member States have compromised the quality of employment, social protection
Amendment 106 #
Motion for a resolution Recital I I. whereas the economic situation and recent developments in some Member States have c
Amendment 107 #
Motion for a resolution Recital I I. whereas the economic situation and
Amendment 108 #
Motion for a resolution Recital I I. whereas the
Amendment 109 #
Motion for a resolution Recital I I. whereas the economic situation and recent developments in some Member States, particularly those which have already been in crisis for years, have compromised the quality of employment, social protection and health and safety standards;
Amendment 11 #
Motion for a resolution Recital A A. whereas the Troika, consisting of the European Commission, the European Central Bank (ECB) and the International Monetary Fund (IMF), originated in the decision of 25 March 2010 by euro area Heads of State and Government to establish a joint programme and to provide conditional bilateral loans to Greece, thereby also building on recommendations from the Ecofin Council, and has since also been operational in Portugal, Ireland and Cyprus;
Amendment 110 #
Motion for a resolution Recital I I. whereas the economic situation and recent developments in some Member States have compromised the quantity and quality of employment, social protection, health services and health and safety standards;
Amendment 111 #
Motion for a resolution Recital I a (new) Ia. whereas the economies of Member States under Memoranda of Understanding are characterized by continuous recession, increase of government debt and decline of the GDP. Indicatively in Greece, the public debt in 2009 was 129% of the GDP while now is at 178% of the GDP, during the period 2008-2013 the Greek GDP decreased by 25%, which is the biggest percentage reduction in peacetime and the Greek economy has been in recession for the sixth consecutive year;
Amendment 112 #
Motion for a resolution Recital I a (new) Ia. whereas in October 2010 Chancellor Angela Merkel and President Nicholas Sarkozy met at Deauville, prior to a EU summit, and announced that sovereign bailouts from the European Stability Mechanism would require that losses be imposed on private creditors; whereas this triggered market speculation against the euro that dramatically aggravated yields demanded from Portuguese sovereign debt, forcing Portugal to request a bailout.
Amendment 113 #
Motion for a resolution Recital I a (new) Ia. whereas the costs of services to service users are rising in some Member States, which means that many people are no longer able to afford an adequate level of service to meet their basic needs, including access to vital treatments.
Amendment 114 #
Motion for a resolution Recital J J. whereas the Task Force for Greece
Amendment 115 #
Motion for a resolution Recital J J. whereas the Task Force for Greece was set up to strengthen the capacity of the Greek administration to design
Amendment 116 #
Motion for a resolution Recital J J. whereas the Task Force for Greece was initially set up to strengthen the capacity of the Greek administration to design and implement structural reforms to improve the functioning of the economy and society and create the conditions for sustained recovery and job creation, as well as to speed up the absorption of EU Structural and Cohesion Funds in Greece and to provide critical resources to finance investment;
Amendment 117 #
Motion for a resolution Recital J J. whereas the Task Force for Greece was set up to strengthen the capacity of the Greek administration to enhance fiscal consolidation, to design and implement structural reforms to improve the competitiveness and functioning of the economy and society and create the conditions for sustained recovery and job creation, as well as to speed up the absorption of EU Structural and Cohesion Funds in Greece and to provide critical resources to finance investment;
Amendment 118 #
Motion for a resolution Recital J J. whereas the Task Force for Greece was set up to strengthen the capacity of the Greek administration to design and implement structural reforms to improve the functioning of the economy and society and create the conditions for sustained recovery and job creation, as well as to speed up the absorption of EU Structural and Cohesion Funds in Greece and to
Amendment 119 #
Motion for a resolution Recital J J. whereas the Task Force for Greece was set up to strengthen the capacity of the Greek administration to design and implement structural reforms to improve the functioning of the economy and
Amendment 12 #
Motion for a resolution Recital A A. whereas the Troika, consisting of the European Commission, the European Central Bank (ECB) and the International Monetary Fund (IMF), originated in the decision of 25 March 2010 by euro area Heads of State and Government to provide conditional bilateral loans to Greece, and has since also been operational in Portugal, Ireland and Cyprus; notes the significant involvement of Euro area finance ministers in the decisions concerning the detail of the bilateral loans;
Amendment 120 #
Motion for a resolution Recital J a (new) Ja. whereas, given that several millions of citizens in Greece are not covered anymore by social security, a growing proportion of patients do not receive medically necessary care and treatments.
Amendment 121 #
Motion for a resolution Recital J a (new) Ja. whereas the crisis revealed considerable democratic deficits in economic and financial policies, areas of European policy of particular significance for the citizens; whereas some Member States now see themselves subject to policies which their parliaments would never have decided on their own, while other Member States see themselves forced to grant sizeable loans or guarantees in order to avoid a breakup of the euro; whereas, because of the spill over effects of national economic and fiscal policy decisions on the economies of other Euro area Member States, their national parliaments are thus effectively deprived of their budgetary autonomy;
Amendment 122 #
Motion for a resolution Recital J a (new) Ja. whereas the programmes and especially the Greek program, were in the short run primarily meant to avoid the transmission of the sovereign debt crisis to the European banks and to the rest Member States. Whereas the medium- term objective was the forced redistribution of income against the middle and low income people in Member States under Memoranda of Understanding
Amendment 123 #
Motion for a resolution Recital K K. whereas, in its resolution of 20 November 2012, Parliament calls for high standards of democratic accountability at Union level to be applied to the Troika; whereas such accountability
Amendment 124 #
Motion for a resolution Recital K K. whereas, in its resolution of 20 November 2012, Parliament calls for high standards of democratic accountability at Union level to be applied to the Troika; whereas such accountability notably requires the Troika to be heard in the European Parliament
Amendment 125 #
Motion for a resolution Recital K K. whereas, in its resolution of 20 November 2012, Parliament calls for high standards of democratic accountability at national and Union level to be applied to the Troika; whereas such accountability notably requires a closer involvement of national parliaments and the possibility of the Commission and the ECB in their capacity as members of the Troika to be heard in the European Parliament before taking up
Amendment 126 #
Motion for a resolution Recital K K. whereas, in its resolution of 20 November 2012, Parliament calls for high standards of democratic accountability at Union level to be applied to the Troika; whereas such accountability notably requires
Amendment 127 #
Motion for a resolution Recital K K. whereas, in its resolution of 20 November 2012, Parliament calls for high standards of democratic accountability at Union level to be applied to the Troika; whereas such accountability is imperative to the credibility of the assistance programmes and notably requires the Troika to be heard in the European Parliament before taking up its duties and to be subject to regular reporting to and democratic scrutiny by the European Parliament;
Amendment 128 #
Motion for a resolution Recital K K. whereas, in its resolution of 20 November 2012, Parliament calls for high standards of democratic accountability at Union level to be applied to the Troika; whereas such accountability notably requires the Commission representative(s) in the Troika to be heard in the European Parliament before taking up
Amendment 129 #
Motion for a resolution Recital K K. whereas, in its resolution of 20 November 2012, Parliament calls for high standards of democratic accountability at Union level to be applied to the EU institutions which are member of the Troika; whereas such accountability would notably requires the EU Members of the Troika to be heard in the European Parliament before taking up its duties on the basis of a clear mandate and to be subject to regular reporting to and democratic scrutiny by the European Parliament;
Amendment 13 #
Motion for a resolution Recital A A. whereas the Troika, consisting of the European Commission, the European Central Bank (ECB) and the International Monetary Fund (IMF), originated in the decision of 25 March 2010 by euro area Heads of State and Government to provide conditional bilateral loans to Greece, and
Amendment 130 #
Motion for a resolution Recital K a (new) Ka. whereas, for Member States in the euro area experiencing or threatened with serious difficulties with respect to their financial stability, the enhanced surveillance, the macroeconomic adjustment programmes and the evaluation of the sustainability of government debt are codified in the TwoPack, in particular in Regulation (EU) No 472/2013, stating clear competences and responsibilities for the Commission, the ECB, the IMF and the Member States concerned;
Amendment 131 #
Motion for a resolution Recital K a (new) Ka. whereas, despite the alleged lack of transparency which suggests that some pressure was brought to bear on the bailed-out Member States during the negotiations to accept more stringent measures, it should be pointed out that voters in those countries had an opportunity to express their views while being aware of the broad lines of the adjustment programmes;
Amendment 132 #
Motion for a resolution Recital K a (new) Ka. Whereas the system should evolve towards a bigger democratic accountability of EU institutions, including the possibility that the European Parliament votes on the approval of adjustment programs.
Amendment 133 #
Motion for a resolution Recital L L. whereas the programmes were in the short run primarily meant to avoid a disorderly default and stop speculation on sovereign debt; whereas the medium and long term aim
Amendment 134 #
Motion for a resolution Recital L L. whereas the programmes were in the short run primarily meant to avoid a disorderly default and stop speculation on sovereign debt; whereas the medium term aim was to ensure that the money that was lent would be reimbursed, thus avoiding a large financial loss that would rest on the shoulders of the taxpayers of the countries which are providing the assistance and guaranteeing the funds; whereas this also requires the programme to deliver sustainable growth and effective debt reduction in the medium and long term;
Amendment 135 #
Motion for a resolution Recital L L. whereas the programmes were in the short run primarily meant to avoid a disorderly default and stop speculation on sovereign debt; whereas the medium term aim was to ensure that the money that was lent would be reimbursed, thus avoiding a large financial loss that would rest on the shoulders of the taxpayers of the countries
Amendment 136 #
Motion for a resolution Recital L L. whereas the programmes were in the short run primarily meant to avoid a disorderly default and stop speculation on sovereign debt; whereas the medium term aim was to ensure that the money that was lent would be reimbursed, thus avoiding a large financial loss that would rest on the shoulders of the taxpayers of the countries which are providing the assistance and guaranteeing the funds; whereas this also requires the
Amendment 137 #
Motion for a resolution Recital L L. whereas the programmes were in the short run primarily meant to avoid a disorderly default and stop speculation on sovereign debt; whereas the medium term aim was to ensure that the money that was lent would be reimbursed, thus avoiding a large financial loss that would rest on the shoulders of the taxpayers of the countries which are providing the assistance and guaranteeing the funds; whereas this also requires the programme to deliver sustainable growth and effective debt reduction in the medium and long term; whereas the programmes were not suited to comprehensively correcting macroeconomic imbalances which had accumulated sometimes over decades, the latter task being left to the improved economic governance in form of the 6- pack, the 2-pack and the general framework of the European Semester;
Amendment 138 #
Motion for a resolution Recital L L. whereas the programmes were in the short run primarily meant to avoid a disorderly default and stop speculation on sovereign debt; whereas the medium term aim was to ensure that the money that was lent would be reimbursed, thus avoiding a large financial loss that would rest on the shoulders of the taxpayers of the countries which are providing the assistance and
Amendment 139 #
Motion for a resolution Recital L L. whereas the programmes were in the short run primarily meant to avoid a disorderly default and stop speculation on sovereign debt; whereas the
Amendment 14 #
Motion for a resolution Recital A a (new) Aa. whereas the troika was a solution that was adopted under enormous time pressure, in the context of an emergency marked by the need to support those countries facing the greatest difficulties and avoid the breakup of the single currency;
Amendment 140 #
Motion for a resolution Recital L L. whereas the programmes were in the short run primarily meant to avoid a disorderly default and resto
Amendment 141 #
Motion for a resolution Recital L L. whereas the programmes were in the short run primarily meant to avoid a disorderly default and stop speculation on sovereign debt; whereas the medium term aim was to ensure that the money that was lent would be reimbursed, thus avoiding a large financial loss that would rest on the shoulders of the taxpayers of the countries which are providing the assistance and guaranteeing the funds; whereas this also
Amendment 142 #
Motion for a resolution Recital L L. whereas the programmes were in the short run primarily meant to avoid a disorderly default and stop speculation on sovereign debt; whereas the medium term aim was to ensure that the money that was lent would be reimbursed, thus avoiding a large financial loss
Amendment 143 #
Motion for a resolution Recital L L. whereas the programmes were in the short run primarily meant to avoid a disorderly default and stop speculation on sovereign debt; whereas the medium term aim was to ensure that the money that was lent would be reimbursed, thus avoiding a large financial loss that would rest on the shoulders of the taxpayers of the countries which are providing the assistance and guaranteeing the funds; whereas this also requires the programme to deliver on sustainable public finances, sustainable growth and effective debt reduction in the medium
Amendment 144 #
Motion for a resolution Recital L L. whereas the programmes were in the short run primarily meant to avoid a disorderly default and stop speculation on sovereign debt; whereas the medium term aim was to ensure that the money that was lent would be reimbursed, thus avoiding a
Amendment 145 #
Motion for a resolution Recital L L. whereas the Troika arrangement was a pragmatic approach to deal with unprecedented problems; whereas the programmes were in the short run primarily meant to avoid a disorderly default and stop speculation on sovereign debt; whereas the medium term aim was to ensure that the money that was lent would be reimbursed, thus avoiding a large financial loss that would rest on the shoulders of the taxpayers of the countries which are providing the assistance and guaranteeing the funds; whereas this also requires the programme to deliver sustainable growth and effective debt reduction in the medium and long term; whereas the programmes were not suited to comprehensively correcting macroeconomic imbalances which had accumulated sometimes over decades;
Amendment 146 #
Motion for a resolution Recital L L. whereas the programmes were in the short run primarily meant to avoid a disorderly default and stop speculation on sovereign debt; whereas the medium term aim was to ensure that the money that was lent would be reimbursed, thus avoiding a large financial loss that would rest on the shoulders of the taxpayers of the countries which are providing the assistance and guaranteeing the funds; whereas this also requires the programme to deliver sustainable growth and effective debt reduction in the medium and long term; whereas the programmes were not suited to comprehensively correcting macroeconomic imbalances which had accumulated sometimes over decades; whereas these programmes were being implemented for the first time in the euro area and errors are now coming to light regarding planning and policy mix;
Amendment 147 #
Motion for a resolution Recital L L. whereas the programmes were in the short run primarily meant to avoid a disorderly default and stop speculation on sovereign debt; whereas the medium term aim was to ensure that the money that was lent would be reimbursed, thus avoiding a large financial loss that would rest on the shoulders of the taxpayers of the countries which are providing the assistance and guaranteeing the funds; whereas this also requires the programme to deliver sustainable growth and effective debt reduction in the medium and long term; whereas the programmes were not suited to comprehensively correcting macroeconomic imbalances which had accumulated sometimes over decades
Amendment 148 #
Motion for a resolution Recital L L. whereas the programmes were in the short run primarily meant to avoid a disorderly default and stop speculation on sovereign debt; whereas the medium term aim was to ensure that the money that was lent would be reimbursed, thus avoiding a large financial loss that would rest on the shoulders of the taxpayers of the countries which are providing the assistance and guaranteeing the funds; whereas this also requires the programme to deliver
Amendment 149 #
Motion for a resolution Recital L L. whereas the programmes were in the short run primarily meant to avoid a disorderly default and stop speculation on sovereign debt; whereas the medium term aim was to ensure that the money that was lent would be reimbursed, thus avoiding a large financial loss that would rest on the shoulders of the taxpayers of the countries which are providing the assistance and guaranteeing the funds; whereas this also requires the programme to deliver sustainable growth and effective debt reduction in the medium and long term; whereas the programmes were not
Amendment 15 #
Motion for a resolution Recital A a (new) Aa. whereas the Troika and its role have been enshrined in Regulation (EU) No 472/2013 of the European Parliament and the Council of 21 May 2013 and mentioned in the Treaty on the ESM;
Amendment 150 #
Motion for a resolution Recital L a (new) La. whereas, according to the latest Commission data (source: Eurostat) the government debt to GDP ratio in the euro area stands currently at 93.4%, compared with 80% in 2009, which confirms that high public debt is a European problem that requires a European solution with particular attention to countries which are affected the most;
Amendment 151 #
Motion for a resolution Recital L a (new) La. whereas at the Euro Area Summit on 29 June 2012, the heads of state or government affirmed to break the vicious circle between banks and sovereigns. The Summit also agreed that the Eurogroup will examine the situation of the Irish financial sector with the view of further improving the sustainability of the well- performing adjustment programme;
Amendment 152 #
Motion for a resolution Recital L a (new) La. whereas the short-term objectives of the troika intervention have been achieved but we must now focus on a long-term vision and solutions, geared to the targets of sustainable growth, debt reduction and the correction of accumulated macroeconomic imbalances;
Amendment 153 #
Motion for a resolution Recital L a (new) La. whereas it is crucial to recognize in this context that the four Member States under assistance were very different in terms of their industrial and financial structures and that for this reason one- size fits all policies could not work;
Amendment 154 #
Motion for a resolution Recital L a (new) La. Whereas programme countries have received several hundred billion euros from other countries in the eurozone.
Amendment 155 #
Motion for a resolution Recital L b (new) Lb. Whereas the European public should be aware that creditor countries risk losing several billion euros in case that an OSI materialises in the coming years.
Amendment 156 #
Motion for a resolution Recital L a (new) La. having regard to those exceptional measures to provide assistance to programme countries which the European Central Bank has taken and also the assistance provided through the Target system to the banks of programme countries and the ECB’s role as a technical adviser in the Troika;
Amendment 157 #
Motion for a resolution Recital L a (new) La. whereas an IMF Working Paper on "The Distributional Effects of Fiscal Consolidation" highlights that "Using episodes of fiscal consolidation for a sample of 17 OECD countries over the period 1978–2009, (...) fiscal adjustments have typically had significant distributional effects. In particular, (...) fiscal consolidation episodes have: (i) increased inequality by 0.1 percentage point (about 0.4 percent) in the very short term, and by 0.9 percentage point (about 3.4 percent) over the medium term; (ii) led to a significant and long-lasting fall in the wage income share of about 0.8 percentage point of GDP; and (iii) raised long-term unemployment by about 0.5 percent over the medium term.";
Amendment 158 #
Motion for a resolution Recital L b (new) Lb. Whereas in the recent crisis years the gap of poor and rich has widened across the Union and the programme countries in particular, with the wealthiest of society disposing of ever more wealth.
Amendment 159 #
Motion for a resolution Recital L c (new) Lc. whereas the IMF expressed that it would have favoured the bail in of unsecured creditors from early on
Amendment 16 #
Motion for a resolution Recital A b (new) Ab. whereas Regulation (EU) No 472/2013 of the European Parliament and the Council of 21 May 2013 has been adopted in the European Parliament with 528 votes in favour, 81 against and 71 abstentions;
Amendment 160 #
Motion for a resolution Recital L a (new) La. whereas the economic adjustment programme measures in Cyprus (June 2013) primary designed and defined by the IMF, the Eurogroup, the European Central Bank (ECB) and the Commission, have had a serious direct and indirect impact on the Cypriot economy, banking system, entrepreneurship, and growth levels;
Amendment 161 #
Motion for a resolution Recital L a (new) La. whereas the preservation of the monetary union will require ambitious steps towards the achievement of a social and fiscal union, also because without social stability there is no financial stability;
Amendment 162 #
Motion for a resolution Recital L a (new) La. whereas the debt crisis which has racked Europe in recent years has its ultimate roots in lack of competitiveness and obsolete economic structures; whereas, while these are more characteristic of some Member States than others, we all need to make an effort to enable Europe to resume its leadership of the global economy;
Amendment 163 #
Motion for a resolution Recital L b (new) Lb. whereas change is needed: a reduced tax burden, more flexible labour markets, abolition of private and public monopolies, more effective public administration, greater investment in research and knowledge, a genuine internal market in services, sustainable pension systems and an increase in the number of hours worked;
Amendment 164 #
Motion for a resolution Recital L c (new) Lc. whereas in various countries we have seen how fiscal stimulus programmes have rather aggravated than improved the situation; whereas in such Member States as Spain, Portugal and the United Kingdom, the situation was aggravated by the initial attempts to overcome the crisis by means of fiscal policy; whereas this not only aggravated the state of public finances: it also diverted the focus from the fundamental structural reforms which were necessary towards a belief that the crisis could be overcome by means of short-term stimuli;
Amendment 165 #
Motion for a resolution Recital L d (new) Ld. whereas in several Member States the crisis became so serious that it was not possible to tackle the challenges independently but became necessary to seek assistance from other Member States, for which purpose various temporary and permanent crisis funds were set up;
Amendment 166 #
Motion for a resolution Recital L e (new) Le. whereas as a condition for receiving emergency loans from these funds it was made a requirement that the recipient country should consolidate its finances and implement comprehensive structural reforms, which, from the point of view both of creditors and of lenders, was right and entirely reasonable; whereas the alternative for the creditors was that it would have become impossible to finance their deficits and current expenditure;
Amendment 167 #
Motion for a resolution Recital L f (new) Lf. whereas in mid-December 2013 Ireland was able, after three years of intensive economic and political efforts, to become the first Eurozone country which had passed through a crisis to leave the emergency financing programme set up by the EU and IMF in November 2010;
Amendment 168 #
Motion for a resolution Recital L g (new) Lg. whereas it is not by chance that within only three years Ireland managed to make the transition from the deepest crisis, with a budget deficit of fully 30 % of GNP in 2010, to standing on its own two feet again and, without guarantees from elsewhere, being able to meet its financing needs on the international capital markets; whereas this is the outcome of three years of very laborious and purposeful work;
Amendment 169 #
Motion for a resolution Recital L h (new) Lh. whereas this is the result of market- oriented reforms, a clean-up of the banking industry and austerity in public administration, but it was also thanks to the fact that the EU and IMF made EUR 85 bn available in emergency loans when no sources in the private sector were prepared to lend to Ireland any longer;
Amendment 17 #
Motion for a resolution Recital A c (new) Ac. whereas the ECJ has confirmed in its ruling on Pringle C-370/12 that the Commission and the ECB can be entrusted with the tasks conferred to them in the ESM Treaty;
Amendment 170 #
Motion for a resolution Recital L i (new) Li. whereas without these emergency loans the situation in Ireland would have remained far worse for a long time: unemployment would have risen even higher, cuts in the public sector and welfare would have had to be even more swingeing and the social impact even worse, as without emergency loans Ireland would not have had any budget funds at all; whereas the same applies to Greece, Portugal and Cyprus, which also benefited from these emergency financing programmes;
Amendment 171 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 1 1.
Amendment 172 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 1 1. Considers that the precise triggers for the crises differed in all four Member States and hence addressing the crisis and achieving recovery requires different approaches and policies in each case;
Amendment 173 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 1 1. Considers that the precise triggers for the crises differed in all four Member States; notes however that in all cases the build-up of massive macroeconomic imbalances was at the core of the problem, and public debt had risen to a level which became unsustainable;
Amendment 174 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 1 1. Considers that the precise triggers for the crises differed in all four Member States; points out that excessive public and private debt, and a loss of competitiveness played a crucial role all of which could not be prevented by the existing EU economic governance framework;
Amendment 175 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 1 1. Considers that the precise triggers for the crises differed in all four Member States; takes the view that in all four cases, however, the financial crisis caused by the financial services industry and the Troika's unbalanced austerity requirements must be regarded as factors aggravating the crisis;
Amendment 176 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 1 1. Considers that the precise triggers for the crises differed in all four Member States even though common patterns can be observed such a rapid increase in capital inflows during the years preceding the crisis;
Amendment 177 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 1 a (new) 1a. Notes that Europe's public finances were already in a poor state before the crisis: since the 1970s the level of Member States' public debt has gradually crept upwards under the impact of the various economic downturns the EU has experienced; notes that the cost of recovery plans, falling tax revenues and high welfare expenditure have caused both public debt and the ratio of public debt to GDP to rise in all Member States, although not to a uniform degree across the Union;1 a __________________ 1a Art 15 of the Report on the financial, economic and social crisis (CRIS mid- term report 2009/2182(INI)) as voted in plenary
Amendment 178 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 1 b (new) 1b. Recalls the triangle of inter-linked vulnerabilities, whereby the unbalanced fiscal policy of some Member States has amplified the pre-crisis public deficits and the financial crisis has contributed significantly to a further ballooning of those deficits, followed by tensions in sovereign debt markets in some Member States;2 a __________________ 2a = Art 1 of the Report on the financial, economic and social crisis (CRIS committee final resolution 2010/2242 (INI)) as voted in plenary
Amendment 179 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 1 c (new) 1c. Points out that the recent financial, economic and banking crisis is the most severe since World War II; acknowledges that without action being taken on European level, the crisis could have had even more severe consequences; notes in this respect that former ECB President Trichet has pointed out in a public hearing his concern that without swift and forceful action the sovereign debt crisis might have triggered a crisis of the scale of the Great Depression 1929;
Amendment 18 #
Motion for a resolution Recital A a (new) Aa. whereas several Executive Directors (EDs) of the IMF pointed to the immense risk of the programme, and in particular with regard to debt sustainability, with IMF staff stating that "on balance, staff considers debt to be sustainable over the medium term, but the significant uncertainties around this make it difficult to state categorically that this is the case with a high probability", whereas the Australian Executive Director "emphasised the risk of repeating mistakes made during the Asian crisis, in terms of imposing too much structural conditionality", whereas IMF staff " acknowledged that the programme will certainly test the Greek society", whereas the Executive Directors of Argentina, Brazil, India, Russia and Switzerland "lamented that the program has a missing element: it should have included debt restructuring and Private Sector Involvement (PSI), to avoid according to the Brazilian ED, a bailout of Greece's private sector bondholders, mainly European financial institutions"; (source: IMF Office Memorandum May 10, 2010)
Amendment 180 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 1 a (new) 1a. Underlines that the origins of the crises have to be taken into account, namely a widespread non-compliance with the requirements of the Stability and Growth Pact, severe macroeconomic imbalances inside the Member States concerned, a disproportionate increase of wage levels compared to the development of the Member State's competitiveness and the increase in public and private debt;
Amendment 181 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 1 a (new) 1a. Notes that while domestic policy mistakes were important factors in the development of the underlying vulnerabilities, all four Member States also fell victim to repercussions of the global financial crisis that first surfaced with Lehman Brothers and further spread to the euro area, exposing rigidities and incompleteness in the fiscal and structural architecture of the EMU;
Amendment 182 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 1 a (new) 1a. Observes that in many countries general causes of the debt problems of the public and private sectors were the large disparities in surpluses and deficits between countries and the granting of loans by banks in countries in surplus to banks in deficit countries and to Member States and hence to citizens and businesses primarily for purposes of consumption rather than productive investment and rapid wage rises in deficit countries;
Amendment 183 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 1 b (new) 1b. Considers that sooner or later living on credit always hits a wall, after which it is difficult to obtain further credit if lenders lose confidence in the creditor’s ability to repay the debt;
Amendment 184 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 1 c (new) 1c. Observes that an attempt has been made to solve structural problems of the euro area by tightening up the Stability and Growth Pact, because it had not been complied with strictly enough before the economic crisis; observes that, according to the so-called six-pack and two-pack legislative packages, Member States are required to reduce their debt burdens each year by 1/20th of the amount by which they exceed 60% of GDP and considers that the legislation should be complied with, but that it will be difficult if economic growth is slow and debt exceeds 100% of GDP, and notes that programme countries in particular will encounter major difficulties with this stipulation;
Amendment 185 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 2 2. Notes that, prior to the beginning of the EU-IMF assistance programme initiated in the spring of 2010, there was a dual fear associated with the
Amendment 186 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 2 2. Notes that, prior to the beginning of the EU-IMF assistance programme initiated in the spring of 2010, , the
Amendment 187 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 2 2. Notes that, prior to the beginning of the EU-IMF assistance programme initiated in the spring of 2010, there was a dual fear associated with the ‘insolvency’ and ’non- sustainability’ of the public finances of Greece as a result of the constantly declining competitiveness of the Greek economy and
Amendment 188 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 2 2. Notes that, prior to the beginning of the EU-IMF assistance programme initiated in the spring of 2010, there was a dual fear associated with the
Amendment 189 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 2 2. Notes that, prior to the beginning of the EU-IMF assistance programme initiated in
Amendment 19 #
Motion for a resolution Recital A b (new) Amendment 190 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 2 2. Notes that, prior to the beginning of the EU-IMF assistance programme initiated in the spring of 2010, there was a dual fear associated with the ‘insolvency’ and ’non- sustainability’ of the public finances of Greece as a result of the constantly declining competitiveness of the Greek economy and decades of imprudent fiscal policy, with the government deficit reaching 15.7% of GDP in 2009, and the debt-to-GDP ratio continuing on an upward trend since 2003 when it stood at 97.4%, reaching 129.7% in 2009 and 156.9% in 2012;
Amendment 191 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 2 2. Notes that, prior to the beginning of the EU-IMF assistance programme initiated in the spring of 2010, there was a dual fear associated with the ‘insolvency’ and ’non- sustainability’ of the public finances of Greece as a result of the constantly declining competitiveness of the Greek economy and decades of imprudent fiscal policy, with the government deficit reaching 15.7% of GDP in 2009, and the debt-to-GDP ratio continuing on an upward trend since 2003 when it stood at 97.4%, reaching 129.7% in 2009 and 156.9% in 2012;
Amendment 192 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 2 2. Notes that, prior to the beginning of the EU-IMF assistance programme initiated in the spring of 2010, there was a dual fear associated with the ‘insolvency’ and ’non- sustainability’ of the public finances of Greece as a result of the constantly declining competitiveness of the Greek economy and decades of imprudent fiscal policy, with the government deficit reaching 15.7% of GDP in 2009, and the debt-to-GDP ratio continuing on an upward trend since 2003 when it stood at 97.4%, reaching 129,7% in 2009 and 156.9% in 2012;
Amendment 193 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 2 a (new) 2a. Notes that Greek sovereign bonds rates started increasing at the end of November 2009; notes that the start of this speculative pressure followed closely the legislative elections held on 4th October 2009, the subsequent change of majority in the Greek legislature, and the announcement by the newly formed government of an upward revision of public deficit figures, the real statistics having been concealed by the previous government;
Amendment 194 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 2 b (new) 2b. Notes that the Central Bank of Greece in November 2010 significantly contributed to intensifying market turmoil by publicly warning investors that ECB liquidity operations could no longer be taken for granted in the case of Greek sovereign debt.
Amendment 195 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 2 a (new) 2a. Questions the reasons why the Bank of Greece, being part of the ESCB, in November 2010 significantly contributed to intensifying market turmoil by publicly warning investors that ECB liquidity operations could no longer be taken for granted in the case of Greek sovereign debt (ETUC input)
Amendment 196 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 2 b (new) Amendment 197 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 3 3. Notes that Greece entered recession in Q4 2008; notes that the country experienced six quarters of negative GDP growth rate in the seven leading to the assistance programme being activated; notes that there is a close correlation between the impact of the financial crisis and the increase in public debt, on the one hand, and between the increase in public debt and the cyclical downturn, on the other, with public debt increasing from EUR 254.7 billion at the end of Q3 2008 to EUR 314.1 billion at the end of Q2 2010; notes that, before the unbalanced austerity measures were implemented, the Greek debt mountain was lower than it is today and that it can be inferred from this that the cutbacks have made Greece's debt position worse and provided no remedy; notes that, as a result of the reluctance of important Member States to grant assistance - inter alia in the light of regional elections - and the resulting doubts as to euro zone cohesion, the costs of the crisis have risen;
Amendment 198 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 3 3. Notes that Greece entered recession in Q4 2008; notes that the country experienced six quarters of negative GDP growth rate in the seven leading to the assistance programme being activated;
Amendment 199 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 3 3. Notes that Greece entered recession in Q4 2008; notes that the country experienced six quarters of negative GDP growth rate in the seven leading to the assistance programme being activated; notes that there is a close correlation between the increase in public debt and the
Amendment 2 #
Motion for a resolution Citation 1 – having regard to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, and in particular Article 7, Article 9, Article 136 in combination with Article 121 , article 151, Article 152, Article 153, Article 168 and Article 174 thereof,
Amendment 20 #
Motion for a resolution Recital A a (new) Aa. whereas, prior to resorting to the IMF and to Memoranda of Understanding (MoU), a solution for financial assistance under the European framework was not scrutinized;
Amendment 200 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 3 a (new) 3a. Calls on the EU institutions and Member States to take into account the relationship between cyclical recession and public debt in their proposals for Greek public debt reduction according to the Eurogroup decision of the 12th of November 2012;
Amendment 201 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 3 a (new) Amendment 202 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 3 b (new) 3b. Points out that the IMF has admitted to lowering the bar for debt sustainability specially for the Greek programme, has acknowledged that "the baseline macro projections can also be criticised for being too optimistic", and accepted that "the depth of ownership of the program and the capacity to implement structural reforms were overestimated"; highlights that the IMF concludes that "Greece's recent experience demonstrates the importance of spreading the burden of adjustment across different strata of society", and urges staff "to be more sceptical about official data during regular surveillance."; stresses that the IMF concluded that within the Troika "there was no clear division of labour", that "areas of expertise and experience differed", that "none of the partners seemed to view the arrangement as ideal"; points to the IMF's assessment that "earlier debt restructuring could have eased the burden of adjustment on Greece and contributed to a less dramatic contraction in output", that "the delay provided a window for private creditors to reduce exposures and shift debt into official hands" and that "that shift occurred on a significant scale and left the official sector on the hook"; shares the view of the IMF that there is an urgent need for "more effective risk- sharing arrangements within the euro area" and "a true banking union" (source IMF May 20, 2013 "Greece: Ex Post Evaluation of Exceptional Access under the 2010 Stand-By Arrangement")
Amendment 203 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 4 Amendment 204 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 4 4. Notes that, at the beginning of the EU- IMF assistance programme, the Portuguese economy had suffered from low GDP and productivity growth for a number of years, and that this lack of growth, combined with the impact of the global financial crisis, had resulted in
Amendment 205 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 4 4. Notes that, at the beginning of the EU- IMF assistance programme, the Portuguese economy had suffered from low GDP and productivity growth for a number of years, and that this lack of growth, combined with an acceleration of expenditure, particularly discretionary spending, consistently above GDP growth, and the impact of the global financial crisis, had resulted in a large fiscal deficit and a high debt level, driving up Portugal
Amendment 206 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 4 4. Notes that, even before the beginning at the beginning of the EU-
Amendment 207 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 4 4. Notes that, at the beginning of the EU- IMF assistance programme, the Portuguese economy had suffered from low GDP and productivity growth for a number of years
Amendment 208 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 4 4. Notes that, at the beginning of the EU- IMF assistance programme, the Portuguese economy had suffered from low GDP and productivity growth for a number of years whilst public and private wages were rising out of proportion to productivity growth, and that this
Amendment 209 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 4 a (new) 4a. Notes that tensions on the Portuguese sovereign bonds market only started in mid April 2010, that is five months after Greek sovereign bonds rates had started increasing; notes that this timing coincides with the Greek government request for financial assistance on 23rd April 2010; deplores the lack of immediate reaction from the European Council and the ECB to the situation developing on financial markets in the first months of 2010; Is of the opinion that this inaction up to May 2010 contributed to the speculative pressure on Greek bonds spilling over to Portuguese bonds.
Amendment 21 #
Motion for a resolution Recital A a (new) Aa. whereas the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union provides for, inter alia, the right of collective bargaining and action (Article 28), protection in the event of unjustified dismissal (Article 30), fair and just working conditions (Article 31), recognition of and respect for the entitlement to social security benefits and social services and, in order to 'combat social exclusion and poverty', the right to 'a decent existence for all those who lack sufficient resources' (Article 34), the right of access to preventive health care and the right to benefit from medical treatment (Article 35) and respect for access to services of general economic interest (Article 36) ;
Amendment 210 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 4 a (new) 4a. Notes that the Growth and Stability Programmes (PEC), presented by the socialist government between May 2010 and March 2011 - four programmes in only one year (PEC 1 in March 2010, PEC 2 in May 2010, PEC 3 in September 2010 and PEC 4 in March 2011) - were completely unsuitable to the reality and unable to cope with the structural and budgetary problems that Portugal had.
Amendment 211 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 4 b (new) 4b. Points out that, as the international and national crises deepened, the four Growth and Stability Programmes presented by the socialist government between May 2010 and March 2011, shown successively and unrealistically, counter-cyclical, increasingly better projections. As an example, the forecast for the deficit in PEC 1, for 2013, was of 2.8% and in PEC 4, it was even more reduced, with only 2%. Conversely, for the year of 2012, the forecast of the deficit in all PECs was of less than 3%, however having been confirmed that the real deficit in this year was 6.4%, i.e. more than twice.
Amendment 212 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 4 c (new) 4c. Highlights that on January 21st 2014, in the European Parliament, the Commissioner for Economic Affairs, Olli Rehn, said that although the Portuguese adjustment programme had started in the summer of 2011, conversations had already taken place one year before, with the Minister of Finance of the Portuguese Socialist government, Teixeira dos Santos, about a possible economic and financial adjustment programme, taking into consideration the awareness that the Portuguese economic situation was becoming increasingly weak.
Amendment 213 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 4 a (new) 4a. Notes in this context that in 2007 Portugal’s growth rate reached 2.4%, its fiscal deficit 3.1%, its debt level 62.7% and its current account deficit 10.2% of GDP, with the unemployment rate standing at 8.1%; notes that in 2011, when assistance was requested, the growth rate stood at -2.2%, fiscal deficit had reached 5.9%, the debt level 101.7% and the current account deficit 12.7% of GDP, with the unemployment rate standing at 12.2%;
Amendment 214 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 4 b (new) 4b. Notes that the economic data used by the Portuguese Government responsible for the negotiations with the troika were subsequently revised downwards, which worsened the results and the impact of the ongoing economic measures, leading to a sharp rise in the social and economic costs of implementing the corresponding adjustment programme;
Amendment 215 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 4 c (new) 4c. Points out, further, that financial intervention in Portugal came at a late stage, which has exacerbated the negative consequences of the programme's implementation;
Amendment 216 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 5 a (new) 5a. Notes that, the EU-IMF assistance programme followed the severe impact on the Portuguese economy of the coordinated nationally based European fiscal-stimulus response to the global financial crisis which cause, in a short time, an increase in the fiscal deficit and debt levels; aggressive behaviour of financial markets, quickly drove up Portugal's refinancing costs in capital markets to unsustainable levels; notes in this context that, immediately before the crisis, in 2007, Portugal's growth rate reached 2.4%, its fiscal deficit 3.1%, its debt level 62.7% and its current account deficit 10.2% of GDP, with the unemployment rate standing at 8.1%;
Amendment 217 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 5 5. Notes that, at the beginning of the EU- IMF assistance programme, the Irish economy had just suffered a banking crisis of unprecedented dimensions that resulted largely from the exposure of the Irish financial sector to the US "subprime crisis", irresponsible risk taking by Irish banks and the widespread use of asset backed securities, causing Irish GDP to fall by 6.3% in 2009 (1.1% in 2010) from a positive growth level of 5% of GDP in 2007, unemployment to increase from 4.7% in 2007 to 13.7% in 2010 and - its most detrimental impact - the government balance of payments to experience a deficit in 2010 of 30.6%, down from a surplus in 2007 (0.2%); notes further notes in the decade prior to the
Amendment 218 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 5 5. Notes that, at the beginning of the EU- IMF assistance programme, the Irish economy had just suffered a banking crisis of unprecedented dimensions, causing Irish GDP to fall by 6.3% in 2009 (1.1% in 2010) from a positive growth level of 5% of GDP in 2007, unemployment to increase from 4.7% in 2007 to 13.7% in 2010 and - its most detrimental impact - the government balance of payments to experience a deficit
Amendment 219 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 5 5. Notes that, at the beginning of the EU- IMF assistance programme, the Irish economy had just suffered a banking crisis
Amendment 22 #
Motion for a resolution Recital A b (new) Ab. whereas Article 151 TFEU provides that action taken by the EU and its Member States must be consistent with the fundamental social rights laid down in the 1961 European Social Charter and the 1989 Community Charter of the Fundamental Rights of Workers in order to improve, inter alia, the social dialogue;
Amendment 220 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 5 5. Notes that, at the beginning of the EU- IMF assistance programme, the Irish economy had just suffered a banking and economic crisis of unprecedented dimensions, causing Irish GDP to fall by 6.
Amendment 221 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 5 5. Notes that, at the beginning of the EU- IMF assistance programme, the Irish economy had just suffered a banking crisis of unprecedented dimensions, causing Irish GDP to fall by 6.3% in 2009 (1.1% in 2010) from a positive growth level of 5% of GDP in 2007, unemployment to increase from 4.7% in 2007 to 13.7% in 2010
Amendment 222 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 5 5. Notes that, at the beginning of the EU- IMF assistance programme, the Irish economy had just suffered a banking crisis of unprecedented dimensions, causing Irish GDP to fall by 6.3% in 2009 (1.1% in 2010) from a positive growth level of 5% of GDP in 2007, unemployment to increase from 4.7% in 2007 to 13.7% in 2010 and - its most detrimental impact - the government balance of payments to experience a deficit in 2010 of 30.6%, down from a surplus in 2007 (0.2%); further notes in the decade prior to the assistance programme that the Irish economy experienced a
Amendment 223 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 5 5. Notes that,
Amendment 224 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 5 a (new) 5a. Notes that the Irish government's decision to provide a blanket guarantee to the banking sector largely explains the sharp increase of the public deficit in 2010, which directly contributed to the increase of public debt;
Amendment 225 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 5 b (new) 5b. Points to the inexistence of fiscal imbalances prior to the crisis in Ireland and to the extremely low level of public debt; points to the extended level of flexibility of the labour market prior to the crisis and the unecessity of further reforms in that respect; notes the development of asset bubbles in Ireland prior to the crisis, largely driven by the existence of large inflation differential between Ireland and the rest of the eurozone and the inadequacy of monetary policy for Ireland that resulted from it; points to the extreme financialization of the Irish economy in the years leading to the crisis, the financial sector representing close to 40% of Irish GDP;
Amendment 226 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 5 a (new) 5a. Notes that Ireland's debt/GDP ratio increased from 25% in 2007 to 117.4% in 2012, and that an amount representing around 40% of GDP was injected into the banking sector by the taxpayer at a time when bail-in was not available;
Amendment 227 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 6 6. Notes that
Amendment 228 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 6 6. Notes that, at the beginning of the EU- IMF assistance programme in 2013,
Amendment 229 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 6 6. Notes that, at the beginning of the EU- IMF assistance programme in 2013, speculations about the systemic instability in the Cypriot economy had been ongoing for a long time, owing inter alia to the exposure of Cypriot banks to overleveraged local property companies, the Greek debt crisis, the downgrading of Cypriot government bonds by international rating agencies, the inability to refund public expenditure from the international markets, and the initial reluctance of the government to restructure the troubled financial sector, opting instead to rely on a massive injection of capital by Russia, which was not linked to any conditionality;
Amendment 23 #
Motion for a resolution Recital A c (new) Ac. whereas Article 152 TFEU states that: "The Union recognises and promotes the role of the social partners at its level, taking into account the diversity of national systems. It shall facilitate dialogue between the social partners, respecting their autonomy."
Amendment 230 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 6 6. Notes that, at the beginning of the EU- IMF assistance programme in 2013,
Amendment 231 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 6 6. Notes that, at the beginning of the EU- IMF assistance programme in 2013, s
Amendment 232 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 6a (new) 6a. Deplores that requests for financial assistance were made at a very late stage, when countries were already close to default and had lost access to markets;
Amendment 233 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 6 a (new) 6a. Welcomes the pro-active stance taken by the ECB to restore stability on financial markets, in particular with respect to the use of non-conventional instruments; regrets however that the OMT programme was only launched in August 2012, as well as the general lack of transparency on the SMP programme; Is of the opinion that an earlier announcement of the OMT could have prevented the contagion of speculation from the Greek sovereign bonds market to other member states;
Amendment 234 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 6 a (new) 6a. recalls that cheap and excessive private capital flows were permitted to Member States, which have since become programme countries, from other Member States with their explicit or tacit support;
Amendment 235 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 6 b (new) 6b. notes that the allocation of EU funds, inter alia structural funds, was not optimal;
Amendment 236 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 6 a (new) 6a. Underlines that both the vitality of the European economy and the stability of the financial system in Europe are shared aims of all monetary union members and that hence the burden of preserving financial and economic stability cannot be left to the a small number of ‘debtor’ Member States
Amendment 237 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 7 7. Notes that the initial agreement between the Greek authorities on the one side and the EU and IMF on the other was adopted on 2 May 2010 in the relevant MoUs containing , the policy conditionality for EU-IMF financial assistance; further notes that, following five reviews and the insufficient success of the first programme, a second programme had to be adopted in March 2012, which has been reviewed three times since; deplores that the IMF did not take effectively into account the objections of one third of its board members in regards to the distribution of benefits and burden resulting from the first Greek programme
Amendment 238 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 7 7. Notes that the initial request for financial assistance was made by Greece on 23 April 2010 and that the agreement between the Greek authorities on the one side and the EU and IMF on the other was adopted on 2 May 2010 in the relevant MoUs containing , the policy conditionality for EU-IMF financial assistance; further notes
Amendment 239 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 7 7. Notes that the initial agreement between the Greek authorities on the one side and the EU and IMF on the other was adopted on 2 May 2010 in the relevant MoUs containing , the policy conditionality for EU-IMF financial assistance; further notes that, following five reviews and the insufficient success of the first programme, a second programme had to be adopted in March 2012, which has been reviewed three times since; recalls the legal uncertainties created because of the agreement made by two Member States on October 2010 (the "Deauville deal") in the absence of a European framework;
Amendment 24 #
Motion for a resolution Recital A d (new) Ad. whereas Article 153.5 TFEU states that the European Union has no competence on pay and whereas Article 153.4 TFEU states that the EU shall not affect the right of Member States to define the fundamental principles of their social security systems;
Amendment 240 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 7 7. Notes that the initial agreement between the Greek authorities on the one side and the EU and IMF on the other was adopted on 2 May 2010 in the relevant MoUs containing , the policy conditionality for EU-IMF financial assistance; further notes that, following five reviews and the insufficient success of the first programme, which was the result of a misconceived overemphasis on austerity, a second programme had to be adopted in March 2012, which has been reviewed three times since;
Amendment 241 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 7 a (new) 7a. Regrets that the first agreement of May 2010 did not contain provisions for a restructuring of the Greek debt, despite it being proposed by the IMF; points to the ECB's refusal to consider any form of debt restructuring in 2010 and 2011, and its refusal to participate to the restructuring agreed in February 2012; believes that an early restructuring was absolutely necessary in order to restore the sustainability of the Greek public debt; believes that an early restructuring could have reduce the intensity of fiscal austerity in Greece;
Amendment 242 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 7 a (new) 7a. Notes that there was a promise by Member States that their banks would retain their exposures to the Greek bond markets, which they were unable to keep, and thus the net result of the bail-out was that Greece literally bought time to protect the private sector in other Member States;
Amendment 243 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 7 a (new) 7a. Notes that, in the case of Greece the economic data deviate significantly from the objectives of the programmes of Memoranda and the considerations of the troika. Indicatively, in Greece the forecast for unemployment in 2011 was 15% and finally reached 20.7%, for 2012 was 15.2% and stood at 26%, the deficit forecast in 2011 was -7.5% and stood at - 9.5%, while for 2012 was -7.3% and stood at -10% and the recession was estimated at 5.5% for 2011 and was 7% and for 2012 was estimated at 2.8% and stood at 6.5%.
Amendment 244 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 7 b (new) 7b. notes that, especially in the case of Greece the memoranda of understanding were programs that were based on wrong conception of the problem and wrong and insufficient data and therefore were predesigned to fail. Non achievable goals and unsatisfactory results are the best vehicle for imposing new austerity measures, which more and more sharpen the recession and the unemployment, leading to a vicious cycle of recession, unemployment and underdevelopment
Amendment 245 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 8 Amendment 246 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 8 8. Notes that the initial request for financial assistance was made by Portugal on 7 April 2011 and that the agreement between the Portuguese authorities on the one side and the EU and IMF on the other was adopted on 17 May 2011 in the relevant MoUs containing the policy conditionality for EU-IMF financial assistance; further notes that the Portuguese programme has since been reviewed regularly, leading to the
Amendment 247 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 8 8. Notes that the initial agreement between the Portuguese authorities on the one side and the EU and IMF on the other was adopted on 17 May 2011 in the relevant MoUs containing the policy conditionality for EU-IMF financial assistance; further notes that the Portuguese programme has since been reviewed regularly, leading to the combined eighth and ninth quarterly reviews of Portugal’s economic adjustment programme, with good prospects to complete the programme soon;
Amendment 248 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 8 8. Notes that the initial agreement between the Portuguese authorities on the one side and the EU and IMF on the other was adopted on 17 May 2011 in the relevant MoUs containing the policy conditionality for EU-IMF financial assistance; further notes that the Portuguese programme has since been reviewed regularly, leading to the combined eighth and ninth quarterly reviews of Portugal’s economic adjustment programme, which suggest a successful conclusion to the Portuguese programme;
Amendment 249 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 8 8. Notes that the initial agreement between the Portuguese authorities on the one side and the EU and IMF on the other was adopted on 17 May 2011 in the relevant MoUs containing the policy conditionality for EU-IMF financial assistance; further notes that the Portuguese programme has since been reviewed regularly to adjust the targets and objectives, given the unrealistic and unattainable initial goals, leading to the combined eighth and ninth quarterly reviews of Portugal
Amendment 25 #
Motion for a resolution Recital A e (new) Ae. whereas Article 168.7 TFEU states that „the management of health services and medical care and the allocation of the resources assigned to them" falls under competence of the Member States;
Amendment 250 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 8 8. Notes that the initial agreement between the Portuguese authorities on the one side and the EU and IMF on the other was adopted on 17 May 2011, partly because no alternative proposals were put forward, in the relevant MoUs containing the policy conditionality for EU-IMF financial assistance; further notes that the Portuguese programme has since been reviewed regularly, leading to the combined eighth and ninth quarterly reviews of Portugal’s economic adjustment programme;
Amendment 251 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 9 a (new) 9a. Notes that the initial agreement between the Portuguese authorities on the one side and the EU and IMF on the other was adopted on 17 May 2011 in the relevant MoUs containing the policy conditionality for EU-IMF financial assistance; further notes that the Portuguese programme has since been reviewed regularly, leading to the combined eighth and ninth quarterly reviews of Portugal's economic adjustment programme;
Amendment 252 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 9 9.
Amendment 253 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 9 9. Notes that the initial request for financial assistance was made by Ireland on 21 November 2010 and that the agreement between
Amendment 254 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 9 9. Notes that the initial agreement between the Irish authorities and the EU and IMF was adopted on 7 December 2010 and 16 December 2010 respectively in the relevant MoUs containing the policy conditionality for EU-IMF assistance; further notes that the Irish programme has since been reviewed regularly, leading to a twelfth and final review on 9 December 2013 marking the imminent completion of the Irish programme;
Amendment 255 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 9 a (new) 9a. Deplores that the Irish government's demand, supported by the IMF, to include a contribution from senior bond-holders of the banking sector in the financing of the programme was rejected by the Commission, the ECB and the Eurogroup; regrets that this decision led to Irish citizens supporting the bulk of the cost of the bail-out, and severely deteriorated public finances; Is of the opinion that banks' bond holders should have been made liable for their own risk taking;
Amendment 256 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 10 10. Notes that the initial request for financial assistance was made by Cyprus on 25 June 2012, but that differences of positions as regards the conditionality, as well as the rejection of an initial draft programme by the Cypriot Parliament, which included bail-in of insured depositors, delayed the final agreement on the EU-
Amendment 257 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 10 10. Notes that the initial request for financial assistance was made by Cyprus on 25 June 2012, but that differences of positions as regards the conditionality, as well as the rejection of an initial draft programme by the Cypriot Parliament, because it was contrary to European law as it envisaged haircut of small deposits of less than 100,000 Euros, delayed the final agreement on the EU-
Amendment 258 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 10 10. Notes that the initial request for financial assistance was made by Cyprus on 25 June 2012, but
Amendment 259 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 10 10. Notes that the initial request for financial assistance was made by Cyprus on 25 June 2012, but
Amendment 26 #
Motion for a resolution Recital A f (new) Af. whereas the European Convention on Human Rights, the ILO conventions, the European Social Charter as well as the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights legally bind all EU Member States to give adequate weight to measures promoting social stability;
Amendment 260 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 10 a (new) 10a. Deplores that a first agreement between the troika and Cypriot authorities announced on 16 march 2013 contained provisions that conflicted with the Directive 2009/14/EC on deposit- guarantee schemes with regard to the imposition of a levy on deposits below 100,000 euros; notes that this agreement was not opposed by the Commission at the Eurogroup meeting where it was endorsed; condemn the Commission for failing to act as the guardian of the "acquis communautaire" in that instance;
Amendment 261 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 10 a (new) 10a. Believes that the decision for a "bail- in" was devastating for Cyprus economy; regrets that the decision was approved overnight without prior consultation of the national parliament; stresses that these decisions undermine the democratic accountability of the EU.
Amendment 262 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 10 a (new) 10a. Believes that the decision for a "bail- in" was devastating for Cyprus economy; regrets that the decision was approved overnight without prior consultation of the national parliament; stresses that these decisions undermine the democratic accountability of the EU;
Amendment 263 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 11 11. Notes that the IMF is the global institution tasked with providing states experiencing balance of payment problems with conditional financial assistance; points to the fact that all Member States are members of the IMF and have therefore the right to request its assistance; notes that in view of the magnitude of this crisis, a sole reliance on financial means of the IMF would not have been sufficient to tackle the problems of the countries in need of financial assistance;
Amendment 264 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 11 11. Notes that the IMF is the global institution tasked with providing states experiencing balance of payment problems with conditional financial assistance; points to the fact that all Member States are members of the IMF and have therefore the right to request its assistance, in cooperation with EU institutions, assessing the interests of the EU and the Member State in question;
Amendment 265 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 11 11. Notes that the IMF is the global institution tasked with providing states experiencing balance of payment problems with conditional financial assistance; points to the fact that all Member States are members of the IMF and have therefore the right to request its assistance; points out that the European level benefits from the involvement and expertise of the IMF;
Amendment 266 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 11 11. Notes that the IMF is the global institution tasked with providing states experiencing balance of payment problems with
Amendment 267 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 11 a (new) 11a. Notes that the programmes provided to the 4 countries establish conditions for companies to opt-out collective bargaining agreements and to review sectorial wage agreements;
Amendment 268 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 12 12.
Amendment 269 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 12 12.
Amendment 27 #
Motion for a resolution Recital A a (new) Aa. whereas the accession to the EU of countries such as Portugal, which had fragile economies and were forced to compete with economies enjoying a clear competitive advantage, led to deindustrialisation processes (with the country's industry being undermined relative to its needs); whereas the process of deindustrialisation has gone hand in hand with an increased tendency towards the destruction of productive capacity in farming and fisheries (CAP and CFP);
Amendment 270 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 12 12. Deplores the unpreparedness of
Amendment 271 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 12 12. Deplores the lack of foresight and unpreparedness of the EU
Amendment 272 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 12 12. Deplores the unpreparedness of the EU and international institutions, including the
Amendment 273 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 12 12. Deplores the unpreparedness of the EU and international institutions, including the IMF, for a sovereign debt crisis of a large magnitude inside a monetary union; regrets that the Council of Ministers has consistently refused to develop a long term and comprehensive approach and only based its decisions on a country by country approach;
Amendment 274 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 12 12. Deplores the unpreparedness of the EU and international institutions, including the IMF, for a sovereign debt crisis of a large magnitude
Amendment 275 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 12 12. Deplores the unpreparedness of the EU and international institutions, including the IMF, for a sovereign debt crisis of a large magnitude inside a monetary union; deplores that the EU structural funds and other policies aiming at long term economic convergence within the Union had not effectively delivered;
Amendment 276 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 12 12.
Amendment 277 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 12 12. Deplores the unpreparedness of the EU and international institutions, including the IMF, for a sovereign debt crisis of a large magnitude inside
Amendment 278 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 12 12. Deplores the unpreparedness of the EU and international institutions, including the IMF, for a sovereign debt crisis of a large magnitude
Amendment 279 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 12 12. Deplores the unpreparedness of the EU and international institutions, including the IMF, for a sovereign debt crisis of a large magnitude and its differentiated origins and consequences inside a monetary union;
Amendment 28 #
Motion for a resolution Recital A b (new) Ab. whereas public spending in Portugal rose from 42% of GDP in 2000 to 51% in 2010 owing to the crisis, as a result of moves to stimulate the economy whose main approach was defined by the EU; whereas in 2011 spending on social protection stood at 26.5% of GDP by comparison with an EU-28 average of 29.1%; whereas in 2007, before the international crisis, the public deficit stood at 3.1% and public debt at 68.3%, values close to those imposed by the rules of the Maastricht Treaty (and close to those recorded in countries such as Germany);
Amendment 280 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 12 12. Deplores the unpreparedness
Amendment 281 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 12 a (new) 12a. Notes the responsibilities of the EU institutions (ECB, European Commission) and of the Eurogroup for the undemocratic functioning of the Troika, the lack of democratic legitimacy of the economic policies and the hard austerity measures implemented to the Member States under fiscal adjustment programmes
Amendment 282 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 12 a (new) 12a. Believes that data should be published on the use that European funds from bail-outs. The quantity of funds directed to finance the deficit, fund the government and repay private creditors should be clarified.
Amendment 283 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 13 Amendment 284 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 13 Amendment 285 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 13 Amendment 286 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 13 Amendment 287 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 13 13. Acknowledges, however, that the immense challenge the Troika faced leading to the crisis was unique as a result of the poor state of regulation of financial services, large macroeconomic imbalances in both creditor countries and member states receiving financial assistance, and the fact that a number of instruments such as external devaluation were not available
Amendment 288 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 13 13. Acknowledges, however, that the immense challenge the Troika faced leading to the crisis was unique as a result of
Amendment 289 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 13 13. Acknowledges, however, that the immense challenge the Troika faced leading to the crisis was unique as a result of the poor state of regulation of financial services, large macroeconomic imbalances, and the fact that a number of instruments such as external devaluation were not available due to the constraints of monetary union; notes, moreover, that time was running out, legal obstacles had to be cleared, fear of a melt-down of the euro area was palpable, political assessments and agreements had to be reached, the world economy was in a downturn, and a number of countries which were intended to contribute financial support had seen their own public and private debt increase in alarming ways;
Amendment 29 #
Motion for a resolution Recital A c (new) Ac. whereas Portuguese public debt has virtually doubled since 2007; whereas Portuguese public debt shot up with the Memorandum of Understanding, rising by EUR 25.3 billion per year in 2011 and 2012, i.e. at a pace 6.4 times higher than that recorded between 2001 and 2004 and 2.7 times higher than that recorded between 2005 and 2010; whereas in August 2013, according to the Bank of Portugal, general government debt reached EUR 254 638 million (155.2% of GDP) and public debt according to the Maastricht criteria, which do not include the whole debt, reached EUR 214 880 million (131.4% of GDP), an unprecedented level;
Amendment 290 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 13 13. Acknowledges, however, that the immense challenge the Troika faced leading to the crisis was unique as a result of the poor state of regulation of financial services, large macroeconomic imbalances, and the fact that a number of instruments such as external devaluation were not available due to the constraints of monetary union; underlines that the safeguards of the Monetary Union address public debts as a potential danger for the functioning of the Monetary Union, whereas during the crisis private debt were at the core of asset price bubbles, economic booms and busts and external imbalances; notes, moreover, that time was running out, legal obstacles had to be cleared, fear of a melt-down of the euro area was palpable, political agreements had to be reached, the world economy was in a downturn, and a number of countries which were intended to contribute financial support had seen their own public and private debt increase in alarming ways;
Amendment 291 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 13 13. Acknowledges, however, that the immense challenge the Troika faced
Amendment 292 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 13 13. Acknowledges, however, that the immense challenge the Troika faced leading to the crisis was unique as a result of the poor state of public finances, overdue structural reforms, a lack of regulation of financial services, large macroeconomic imbalances inside the Member States concerned, and the fact that a number of instruments such as external devaluation were not available
Amendment 293 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 13 13. Acknowledges, however, that the immense challenge the Troika faced leading to the crisis was unique as a result of the poor state of regulation of financial services, large macroeconomic imbalances, and the fact that a number of instruments such as external devaluation were not available due to the constraints of monetary union; notes, moreover, that time was running out, legal obstacles had to be cleared,
Amendment 294 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 13 13. Acknowledges, however, that the immense challenge the Troika faced leading to the crisis was unique as a result of the poor state of regulation of financial services, large macroeconomic imbalances, and the fact that
Amendment 295 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 13 13. Acknowledges, however, that the immense challenge the Troika faced leading to the crisis was unique as a result of the poor state of regulation of financial services,
Amendment 296 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 13 13. Acknowledges, however, that the immense challenge the Troika faced leading to the crisis was unique as a result of the
Amendment 297 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 13 13. Acknowledges, however, that the immense challenge the Troika faced leading to the crisis was unique as a result of the poor state of European and national regulation of financial services, large macroeconomic imbalances, and the fact that a number of instruments such as external devaluation were not available due to the
Amendment 298 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 13 13. Acknowledges, however, that the immense challenge the Troika faced leading to the crisis was unique as a result of the poor state of regulation of financial services, large macroeconomic imbalances, and the fact that a number of instruments such as external devaluation were not available due to the constraints of monetary union; notes, moreover, that time was running out, legal obstacles had to be cleared, fear of a melt-down of the euro area was palpable, political agreements had to be reached, the world economy was in a severe downturn, and a number of countries which were intended to contribute financial support had seen their own public and private debt increase in alarming ways;
Amendment 299 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 13 a (new) 13a. Notes that the programs of memoranda of understanding in all cases were presented as a one-way road. There were used on the one hand to save and to shield the financial sector, recapitalizing the banks and converting private debt into public debt and on the other to repay the speculative rates of the accumulated debt. The programs of memoranda of understanding did not finance the real economy nor used for public and productive investments in order to lead the economy into a growth path, but on the opposite with the tough fiscal austerity measures imposed have led to a more profound and lasting recession and social misery.
Amendment 3 #
Motion for a resolution Citation 1 – having regard to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, and in particular Article 7, Article 9, Article 136 in combination with Article 121
Amendment 30 #
Motion for a resolution Recital A d (new) Ad. whereas studies show that reducing Portuguese public debt to levels close to 60% of GDP, as provided for in the so- called fiscal compact, will be possible only if two conditions are met at the same time over the next 20 years: significant economic growth of around 4% of nominal GDP and a positive primary balance of around 3.5%;
Amendment 300 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 13 a (new) 13a. Expresses concern about the role of Emergency Liquidity Assistance and the level to which it is or is not overseen by the ECB.
Amendment 301 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 13 a (new) 13a. Recognizes that the Memoranda do not promote sustainable and long-term growth for the people; Urges for alternative solutions to overcome the crisis, which will promote solidarity and social justice.
Amendment 302 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 13 a (new) 13a. Regrets the absence at any stage since the beginning of the crisis or since the beginning of the action of the Troika of assessments of the situations in terms of governance and financing of essential public services by the populations and how to guaranty minimal access to them.
Amendment 303 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 13 a (new) 13a. Recognizes that the Memoranda do not promote sustainable and long-term growth for the people; Urges for alternative solutions to overcome the crisis, which will promote solidarity and social justice.
Amendment 304 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 14 14. Regrets the lack of transparency
Amendment 305 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 14 14. Regrets the lack of transparency in the MoU negotiations and a clear lack of decision-making processes involved in the development of the economic adjustment programmes, both within the Troika as well as within relevant Member States; notes the necessity to evaluate whether formal documents were clearly communicated in due time to the national parliaments and the European Parliament; further notes the possible negative impact of such practices on citizens’ rights and the political situation within the countries concerned;
Amendment 306 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 14 14.
Amendment 307 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 14 14. Regrets the lack of transparency in the MoU negotiations; notes the necessity to evaluate whether formal documents were clearly communicated in due time to the national parliaments and the European Parliament;
Amendment 308 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 14 14. Regrets the lack of transparency in the MoU negotiations; notes the necessity to evaluate whether formal documents were clearly communicated in due time to the national parliaments and the European Parliament; calls on all the parties, when such negotiations are conducted in the future, to forward official documents of this kind to the national parliaments and the European Parliament in good time; further notes the possible negative impact of such practices on citizens’ rights and the political situation within the countries concerned;
Amendment 309 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 14 14. Regrets the lack of transparency in the MoU negotiations;
Amendment 31 #
Motion for a resolution Recital A e (new) Ae. whereas the European Central Bank is not genuinely autonomous and monetary policy gives priority to price stability to the detriment of each country's development towards higher wages and income; whereas the European Central Bank does not lend to States but only to banks, at interest rates of less than 1%; whereas banks are at the same time allowed to charge extortionate interest rates on their loans, particularly for States; whereas the continued overvaluation of the euro protects the interests of the countries with the strongest economies but makes it impossible for countries with fragile economies to recover;
Amendment 310 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 14 14.
Amendment 311 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 14 14. Regrets the lack of transparency in the MoU negotiations; notes the necessity to evaluate whether formal documents were clearly communicated and considered in due time at
Amendment 312 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 14 14.
Amendment 313 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 14 14.
Amendment 314 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 14 14.
Amendment 315 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 14 14.
Amendment 316 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 14 14. Regrets the lack of transparency in the MoU negotiations; notes the necessity to evaluate whether formal documents were clearly communicated in due time to the national parliaments and the European Parliament; further notes the
Amendment 317 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 14 14. Regrets the lack of transparency in the MoU negotiations; notes the necessity to evaluate whether formal documents were clearly communicated in due time to the national parliaments and the European Parliament; further notes the possible negative impact of such practices on citizens’ rights and the political situation within the countries concerned; notes that they may further aggravate the sense of a democratic deficit;
Amendment 318 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 14 14.
Amendment 319 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 14 14. Regrets the lack of transparency in the MoU negotiations; notes the necessity to evaluate whether formal documents were clearly communicated in due time to the national parliaments and the European Parliament; further notes the
Amendment 32 #
Motion for a resolution Recital A f (new) Af. whereas the European Union was actively complicit in the escalating interest rates on Portuguese public debt, since it failed to intervene when the current political and institutional context would have allowed it to put an end to the situation, as demonstrated by the ECB's actions in other cases;
Amendment 320 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 14 a (new) 14a. Regrets the absence of proposals within the MoUs to fight corruption, fraud, party clientelism and influence peddling through budget transparency, regulation of conflict of interests in decision-making, mechanisms for civic participation, tighter rules and supervision of party funding, fair taxation and effective tax collection;
Amendment 321 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 15 Amendment 322 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 15 Amendment 323 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 15 15. Deplores that recommendations contained in MoUs mark a departure from
Amendment 324 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 15 15.
Amendment 325 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 15 15.
Amendment 326 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 15 15. Deplores that recommendations contained in MoUs mark a departure
Amendment 327 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 15 15. Deplores that recommendations contained in MoUs mark a departure from the thinking initiated by the Lisbon strategy and the Europe 2020 strategies); points out however that this can be partly explained, even if not fully justified, by the fact that programmes had to be implemented under considerable time pressure, in an environment characterised by a high degree of uncertainty about the stability of the banking system and the possibility of chain reactions in other Member States, as well as in a difficult political environment;
Amendment 328 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 15 15. Deplores that recommendations contained in MoUs mark a departure from the thinking initiated by the Lisbon strategy and hamper the goals of the Europe 2020 strategies
Amendment 329 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 15 15. Deplores that recommendations contained in MoUs mark a departure from the thinking initiated by the Lisbon strategy and the Europe 2020 strategies);
Amendment 33 #
Motion for a resolution Recital A g (new) Ag. whereas the weaknesses of the Portuguese economy, exacerbated by successive policies supported by the EU, in particular the so-called SGPs (from 2010 onwards), have had a recessionary effect and led to spiralling interest rates, and blackmail and extortion by banks and investors in sovereign debt;
Amendment 330 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 15 15. Deplores that recommendations contained in MoUs
Amendment 331 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 15 15. Deplores that recommendations contained in MoUs mark a departure from the
Amendment 332 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 15 15. Deplores that recommendations contained in MoUs mark a departure from the thinking initiated by the Lisbon strategy and the Europe 2020 strategies); points out however that this can be partly explained
Amendment 333 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 15 15. Deplores that recommendations contained in MoUs mark a departure from the thinking initiated by the Lisbon strategy and the Europe 2020 strategies); points out however that this can be partly explained, even if not fully justified, by the fact that programmes had to be implemented under considerable time pressure, in a difficult political environment and in unexpected and extremely adverse economic conditions;
Amendment 334 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 15 15. Deplores that recommendations contained in MoUs mark a departure from the thinking initiated by the Lisbon strategy and the Europe 2020 strategies
Amendment 335 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 15 15. Deplores that recommendations contained in MoUs mark a departure from the thinking initiated by the Lisbon strategy and the Europe 2020 strategies); points out
Amendment 336 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 15 a (new) 15a. Strongly defends that fundamental principles and key objectives of European Treaties need to be respected, regardless of time or market pressure.
Amendment 337 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 15 b (new) 15b. insist that the consequences of policies contained in the memorandums clearly contradict the objectives of the European Union, that are the promotion of employment, improved living and working conditions, so as to make possible their harmonisation while the improvement is being maintained, proper social protection, dialogue between management and labour, the development of human resources with a view to lasting high employment and the combating of exclusion, as stated in Article 151 of the TFEU;
Amendment 338 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 15 c (new) 15c. Deplores the lack of consideration being given in the drafting of policy recommendations to necessary political debates at national and European level and the respect of normal democratic procedures;
Amendment 339 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 15 a (new) 15a. Notes that potential alternatives to the Troika, such as a breakup of the euro area or the temporary introduction of one or various parallel currencies to the euro currency in specific Member States, were easily disregarded;
Amendment 34 #
Motion for a resolution Recital A h (new) Ah. whereas the implementation of the Memorandum of Understanding dramatically worsened Portugal's economic indicators, causing a sharp drop in GDP and public investment, which fell below 1980s levels, as well as in public and private consumption; whereas household consumption has fallen considerably and agricultural, industrial and energy production has declined, as has trade; whereas overall employment has fallen by 8.1% in the past two years and 400 000 jobs have been destroyed;
Amendment 340 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 15 a (new) 15a. Underlines that even under exceptional circumstances European institutions as well as the Member States of the EU have to fully comply with the rights agreed on in the EU treaties.
Amendment 341 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 16 16.
Amendment 342 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 16 16.
Amendment 343 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 16 16.
Amendment 344 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 16 16. Regrets that the programmes for Greece, Ireland and Portugal comprise a number of detailed prescriptions for health systems reform and expenditure cuts;
Amendment 345 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 16 16.
Amendment 346 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 16 16. Regrets that the programmes
Amendment 347 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 16 16. Regrets that the programmes for Greece, Ireland and Portugal are not balanced in that they comprise a number of detailed prescriptions for health systems reform and expenditure cuts
Amendment 348 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 16 16.
Amendment 349 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 16 16. Regrets that the programmes for
Amendment 35 #
Motion for a resolution Recital A i (new) Ai. whereas the Portuguese people are being made to suffer increased poverty, unemployment, extreme deprivation, the collapse of various public services and emigration, and more than 220 000 Portuguese people have been forced to leave the country in the past two years;
Amendment 350 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 16 16. Regrets that the programmes for Greece, Ireland and Portugal comprise a number of detailed prescriptions for health systems reform and expenditure cuts and dismantle wage bargaining systems; regrets that the programmes
Amendment 351 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 16 16. Regrets that the programmes for Greece, Ireland and Portugal comprise a number of detailed prescriptions for
Amendment 352 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 16 16.
Amendment 353 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 16 16.
Amendment 354 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 16 16.
Amendment 355 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 16 16. Regrets that the programmes for Greece, Ireland and Portugal comprise a number of detailed prescriptions for the reform of health
Amendment 356 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 16 a (new) 16a. Leaves it for consideration whether a higher dose of transparency in the working method of the Troika would have translated into better quality work and improved results.
Amendment 357 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 16 a (new) 16a. Points out that the EU-IMF financial assistance grants time for an orderly economic adjustment of the Member States concerned, while, without the EU- IMF assistance, immediate and radical adjustment measures would have been necessary with unpredictable consequences for the economy and society of the relevant Member State concerned;
Amendment 358 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 16 a (new) 16a. Deplores the lack of respect for the rights, role and autonomy of social partners that the Troika has shown in its work with programme countries; underlines that all present and future programmes of this kind must be built on full respect for the rights of workers and employers, for the role of social partners and for national practices and institutions for wage formation;
Amendment 359 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 16 a (new) 16a. Deplores that the MoUs included forced privatization of state-controlled companies despite their clear strategic national and European interest; refers as examples the energy production and distribution companies in Portugal EDP and REN, which were ultimately sold to state-owned Chinese companies, thereby giving the Chinese State potential access and control to an advanced technology sector in Portugal and Europe, jeopardising the European Union's strategic autonomy;
Amendment 36 #
Motion for a resolution Recital A j (new) Aj. whereas the Memorandum of Understanding with Portugal helped bring about a dramatic cut in unit labour costs (with wages falling by close to 15% in real terms during this period) and a lengthy programme of privatisations, both of which have led to the unequal distribution of national income to the benefit of capital and to the detriment of labour, and an even greater concentration and centralisation of capital;
Amendment 360 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 16 a (new) 16a. Deplores that countries under such weak negotiating conditions should be forced to privatize major sectors of their economy, including utilities and quasy monopolies irrespective of the strategic character of such sectors, and of the actual institutional conditions for adequate supervision and regulation; electricity, telecommunications, communications, major infrastructures, banks, insurance companies, water and sewage became good bargains for powerful not necessarily democratic and liberal players.
Amendment 361 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 16 a (new) 16a. Points out that EU Finance Ministers approved the macroeconomic adjustment programmes;
Amendment 362 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 16 a (new) 16a. Endorses the Council of Europe's demand that the programmes' impact of human rights should be better taken into account, also endorses the Council of Europe's demand to strengthen the effectiveness of judicial and non-judicial National and European institutions entrusted with the protection and promotion of fundamental rights , such as ombudsmen, to handle complaints about social and economic rights while seeking their independent advice in the decision making process leading to the adoption of austerity measures and budgets, so as to better understand their impact on fundamental rights and living conditions
Amendment 363 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 16 b (new) 16b. deplores the demand in MoUs to privatise water supply as is the case in Portugal, points out that member states should refrain from these measures in the future since access to water is an essential precondition for human development
Amendment 364 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 16 c (new) 16 . Points out that of the three Troika members, the ECB and the Commission are even more reluctant than the IMF to admit to mistakes made and hence foster the discussion on improved solutions
Amendment 365 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 16 a (new) 16a. Deplores the fact that, for Greece, Ireland and Portugal at least, adjustment programmes included a number of detailed prescriptions on health system reform and expenditure cuts, despite the Treaties prohibit such intervention;
Amendment 366 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 16 b (new) 16b. Takes note of the Council of Europe's condemnation of spending cuts executed to the Greek public pension system, which it has considered to be a violation of Article 12 of the 1961 European Social Charter and of Article 4 of the Protocol thereto, stating that 'the fact that the contested provisions of domestic law seek to fulfil the requirements of other legal obligations does not remove them from the ambit of the Charter';
Amendment 367 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 16 c (new) 16c. Deplores that the ILO Convention No 102 stipulating that pension systems must allow for a decent life has not been respected in the design and implementation of the adjustment programmes;
Amendment 368 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 16 d (new) 16d. Takes note of the request by the ILO Expert Committee to re-establish the freedom of collective bargaining in Greece;
Amendment 369 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 16 e (new) 16e. Takes note that of the Council of Europe's social rights committee annual report 2013 which identifies 180 violations of European Social Charter provisions on access to health and social protection across 38 European countries;
Amendment 37 #
Motion for a resolution Recital A k (new) Ak. whereas the Community financial framework for the period 2007-2013 (like the current framework: 2014-2020) fell far below what would have been required to meet the needs in terms of offsetting the increasingly asymmetric impact of the EU single market and other common policies, which have accentuated the inequalities between countries and between different sections of society;
Amendment 370 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 16 f (new) 16f. Takes note of more than 5000 cases filed by Cypriot citizens against measures required by the Troika of international lenders whereas the vast majority of the applications concern the illegal bail-in in the case of the Bank of Cyprus as well as the use of the sale of business tool in the case of Laiki Bank;
Amendment 371 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 16 a (new) 16a. Deeply regrets that the return of credit to the healthy private sector is not one of the main objectives in rescue programmes directed to the banking sector.
Amendment 372 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 17 17. Deplores that
Amendment 373 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 17 17.
Amendment 374 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 17 17. Deplores that since 2008 the income distribution inequality has grown above average in the four countries and that cuts in social benefits and rising unemployment are raising poverty levels; support the revision of tax frameworks to provide incentives aimed at attracting investments, enhancing entrepreneurship and employment in strategic sectors of the economy and reducing social imbalances, with social and political consequences;
Amendment 375 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 17 17. Deplores the fact that the measures implemented in those four countries have not distributed the burden sufficiently, in such a way as to require the rich to pay relatively more while the poor are more protected, but on the contrary many rich people have removed their property from the reach of the measures, and that since 2008 the income distribution inequality has grown above average in the four countries and that cuts in social benefits and rising unemployment are raising poverty levels;
Amendment 376 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 17 17. Deplores that since 2008 the income distribution inequality has grown above average in the four countries and that cuts in social benefits and rising unemployment are raising poverty levels; points out the inequity in brutal tax increases targeting the middle classes, yet sparing the upper income segments of society and the large scale tax evaders who were given "tax amnesties";
Amendment 377 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 17 17. Deplores that since 2008 the income distribution inequality has grown above average in the four countries and that cuts in social benefits and rising unemployment are raising poverty levels; points out the devastating impact on citizens trust and life quality of massive cuts in pensions; deplores that major and unprecedented tax increases played a major role in the adjustment programmes with major impact on the middle class and small and medium enterprises.
Amendment 378 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 17 17.
Amendment 379 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 17 17. Deplores that since 2008 the income distribution inequality has grown above average in the four countries and that cuts in social
Amendment 38 #
Motion for a resolution Recital A l (new) Al. whereas the Memorandum of Understanding with Portugal is geared to attacking workers' rights and their wages and pensions, destroying public services and cutting jobs in this sector; whereas unemployment has reached extremely high levels, particularly among young people, and thousands of SMEs have gone bankrupt; whereas worsening social conditions and increased worker exploitation contrasts with the rise in the number of millionaires and the size of their fortunes in Portugal since the Memorandum of Understanding came into force;
Amendment 380 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 17 17. Deplores that
Amendment 381 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 17 17. Deplores that since 2008 the income distribution inequality has grown above average in the four countries destroying the social fabric and that cuts in social benefits and rising unemployment are raising destitution and poverty levels;
Amendment 382 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 17 17. Deplores that since 2008 and during the implementation of Memoranda of Understanding , the income distribution inequality has grown above average in the four countries and that cuts in social benefits and rising unemployment are raising poverty levels, resulting to social regression and humanitarian crisis;
Amendment 383 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 17 17. Deplores that since 2008 the income distribution inequality has grown above average in the four countries and that cuts in social benefits and rising unemployment
Amendment 384 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 17 17. Deplores that since 2008 the income distribution inequality has grown above average in the four countries and that cuts in social benefits and services and rising unemployment are raising poverty levels and have had a negative impact on the capacity of people from disadvantaged communities to engage in a meaningful way in decision-making;
Amendment 385 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 17 a (new) 17a. Condemns measures such as cutting minimum wages and weakening collective bargaining systems, since these impact heavily on domestic demand and as such on economic and employment performance; point to the contradiction between the objective of debt reduction and policies negatively impacting demand and thus economic growth
Amendment 386 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 17 a (new) 17a. Demands that any revision of MoUs should also include any conclusions and orientations offered through the evaluation of automatic stabilizers and their role in national economies, since such critical parameters were not fully investigated by the Troika when guidance was provided for the formulation of the adjustment programmes;
Amendment 387 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 17 a (new) 17a. Condemns the deregulatory measures for the labour market that are being promoted through the Memoranda of Understanding which lead to reductions in wages, constant undermining of collective bargaining agreements, facilitation of dismissals and reinforcement of flexible forms of employment.
Amendment 388 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 17 a (new) 17a. Points out that each Member State's reform efforts need to be tailor-made taking the experiences and histories of the respective country into consideration;
Amendment 389 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 17 a (new) 17a. Highlights the high levels of injustice perceived by many of the citizens of the four Member States that entered into economic adjustment programmes, which was exacerbated by a lack of transparency and reversals of policy measures in the decision-making process.
Amendment 39 #
Motion for a resolution Recital A m (new) Am. whereas the reforms to the common agricultural policy and common fisheries policy have accentuated the moves towards the liberalisation of farming and downgrading of the fishing industry, leaving small and medium-sized farmers, family farms and fishing communities facing even greater difficulties;
Amendment 390 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 17 b (new) 17b. Is concerned that despite Treaty obligations for the independence of the central bank there appear to have been pressures for changes of central bank governors following changes of government.
Amendment 391 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 18 18. Points to the
Amendment 392 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 18 18. Points to the highly unacceptable level of youth unemployment in the four Member States under assistance programmes; points especially to the sharp increase in youth unemployment in Greece, Cyprus and Portugal
Amendment 393 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 18 18. Points to the unacceptable level of youth unemployment in the four Member States under assistance programmes; points especially to the sharp increase in youth unemployment in Greece, Cyprus and Portugal; regrets that these Member States’ governments did not at an early date take measures at national level to counteract this;
Amendment 394 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 18 18. Points to the unacceptable level of youth unemployment in the four Member States under assistance programmes; points especially to the sharp increase in youth unemployment in Greece, Cyprus and Portugal; is concerned with the disastrous impact of the "brain drain" and emigration of the most qualified generation on the strategic development of those countries and the sustainability of their economy and social security systems;
Amendment 395 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 18 18. Points to the unacceptable, high level of youth unemployment in the four Member States under assistance programmes; points especially to the sharp increase in youth unemployment in Greece, Cyprus and Portugal and calls for enhanced political and economic focus for addressing this issue;
Amendment 396 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 18 18. Points to the unacceptable level of youth unemployment in the four Member States under assistance programmes; points out especially
Amendment 397 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 18 18. Points to the unacceptable level of youth unemployment in the four Member States under assistance programmes; points especially to the sharp increase in youth unemployment in Greece, Cyprus and Portugal; expresses its concern at the rise in in-work poverty and at the quality of jobs being created; welcomes the fall in youth unemployment in Ireland since early 2012, whilst acknowledging that some of this is due to continuing emigration;
Amendment 398 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 18 18. Points to the unacceptable level of unemployment, long term unemployment and youth unemployment in particular in the four Member States under assistance programmes; points especially to the sharp increase in youth unemployment in Greece, Cyprus and Portugal;
Amendment 399 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 18 18. Points to the unacceptable levels of unemployment and in particular youth unemployment in the four Member States under assistance programmes; points especially to the sharp increase in youth unemployment in Greece, Cyprus and Portugal;
Amendment 4 #
Motion for a resolution Citation 1 a (new) – having regard to Article 125 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,
Amendment 40 #
Motion for a resolution Recital B B. whereas, within the Troika, the Commission is responsible for negotiating the conditions for financial assistance for euro area Member States
Amendment 400 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 18 18. Points to the fact that the adjustment policies and structural reforms have led to dramatic unemployment rates and unacceptable level of youth unemployment in the four Member States under assistance programmes; points especially to the sharp increase in youth unemployment in Greece, Cyprus, Spain and Portugal and the increased "brain drain" observed;
Amendment 401 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 18 18. Points to the unacceptable level of
Amendment 402 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 18 18. Points to the unacceptable level of youth unemployment in the
Amendment 403 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 18 18. Points to the unacceptable level of youth unemployment in the four Member States under assistance programmes; points especially to the sharp increase in youth unemployment in Greece, Cyprus and Portugal which indicates shortcomings in education and training (including dual education);
Amendment 404 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 18 a (new) 18a. Expresses deep concerns about the fact that the lack of positive future perspective in program countries has led to an upsurge in emigration of young educated workers, thereby structurally undermining economic capacity.
Amendment 405 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 18 b (new) 18b. Stresses that similar negative longer term effects on economic potential can unfortunately also be expected from austerity driven cuts in education spending and from rising child poverty.
Amendment 406 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 18 c (new) 18c. Notes that the sharp decrease of wages in all four member states has led to a sizeable increase in profit margins, along with rising inequalities and rising poverty; notes that this decrease in unit labour cost has not however, translated into increased investment levels;
Amendment 407 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 18 d (new) 18d. Notes that EC data and diverse studies show that between 2008 and 2012, the income distribution inequality has grown in the 4 countries and that the cuts in the social benefits and unemployment resulting from austerity measures as well as lowered wages due to structural reforms are raising poverty levels. Furthermore Commission Report found relatively high levels of in work poverty due to low minimum wages cut or frozen by the austerity measures;
Amendment 408 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 18 a (new) 18a. Points out that Article 8 of Regulation (EU) No 472/2013 builds on the national ownership and the responsibilities of the Member States concerned to involve and seek the views of social partners as well as relevant civil society organisations, when preparing adjustment programmes;
Amendment 409 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 18 a (new) 18a. Regrets that forced migration from the periphery and these four countries in particular ended up in massive brain drain with the loss of national and European investment made over more than a decade in educating and training a new generation; recalls that education, training and a strong scientific and technological background were systematically identified as the critical path for the structural catching up of these economies.
Amendment 41 #
Motion for a resolution Recital B B. whereas, within the Troika, the Commission is responsible at technical level for negotiating the conditions for financial assistance for euro area Member States ‘in liaison with the ECB’ and ‘wherever possible together with the IMF’
Amendment 410 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 18 a (new) 18a. Regrets that, in all four countries the most vulnerable groups – the long-term unemployed, women, migrant workers, pensioners and the disabled – have been strongly hit and are suffering from higher unemployment rates and income reduction than the national average.
Amendment 411 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 18 a (new) 18a. Urges Member States, especially those covered by a Memorandum of Understanding, to boost wages and welfare benefits, restoring wages, incomes, and social entitlements to levels compensating for what has been stolen, so as to resolve serious social problems, enhance domestic demand, revitalise economic activity, and create more and better jobs; urges Member States to apply a policy of protecting and restoring public services, particularly as regards the social functions of the State, boosting their human and material resources in keeping with their key role in enabling citizens to realise their rights;
Amendment 412 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 18 a (new) 18a. Stress that the rise in poverty, social exclusion and uncertainty amongst the majority of people living in the programme countries is mirrored by a sharp rise in wealth for a small minority; e.g. in Ireland since 2007 profits have increased by 21% and according to the Revenue Commissioners, the number of people earning more than €500,000 a year has grown to 3,443 in 2012 with a combined income of €1.8bn, while over 1 million taxpayers out of 2.16 million had incomes lower than €30,000;
Amendment 413 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 18 a (new) 18a. Condemns the major cuts in spending on health care system promoted by the memoranda of understanding within the fiscal austerity context.
Amendment 414 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 18 b (new) 18b. Condemns the great inequality in the distribution of tax burden and the unfair and aggressive fiscal policy implemented in Greece in the context of the Memoranda of Understanding. Low and middle income groups, employees and retirees are affected even more by a series of new special taxes but simultaneously the big capital and multinational firms tax evade and speculate. Taxation of individuals was increased in 2013 to 7.9 billion from 6.4 billion in 2008 despite the decline in their incomes and the increase of unemployment, while the corporate tax was reduced in 2013 to 1.6 billion from 4.7 billion in 2008.
Amendment 415 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 18 c (new) 18c. notes that, even the Bank of Greece in its December 2013 Intermediary Report on Monetary Policy, calls for a reversal of the trend to excessively tax the vast majority of the citizens who have already been disproportionally taxed and calls the Government of Greece to act accordingly and put an end to the tax protection of the economic oligarchy.
Amendment 416 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 19 19. Welcomes the end of the programme for Ireland
Amendment 417 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 19 19. Welcomes the end of the programme for Ireland and the expected end of the programme for Portugal; regrets th
Amendment 418 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 19 19. Welcomes the successful end of the programme for Ireland and the expected end of the programme for Portugal
Amendment 419 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 19 19. Welcomes the end of the programme for Ireland and the expected end of the programme for Portugal; regrets the lack of progress in Greece despite unprecedented reforms and fiscal austerity having been undertaken; is of the opinion that this lack of results serious challenges the relevance of policies contained in MoUs
Amendment 42 #
Motion for a resolution Recital B B. whereas, within the Troika, the Commission, acting as an agent of the Eurogroup is responsible for negotiating the conditions for financial assistance for euro area Member States
Amendment 420 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 19 19. Welcomes the end of the programme for Ireland and the expected end of the programme for Portugal; regrets the
Amendment 421 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 19 19. Welcomes the end of the programme for Ireland and the expected end of the programme for Portugal;
Amendment 422 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 19 19. Welcomes the end of the programme for Ireland
Amendment 423 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 19 19. Welcomes the end of the programme for Ireland and the expected end of the programme for Portugal;
Amendment 424 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 19 19. Welcomes the end of the programme for Ireland and the expected end of the programme for Portugal; regrets the lack of progress in Greece despite unprecedented reforms having been undertaken; notes that the responses given in the Parliament's questionnaire are generally based on a positive assessment of the framework and work of the troika;
Amendment 425 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 19 19. Welcomes the end of the programme for Ireland and the expected end of the programme for Portugal; regrets the
Amendment 426 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 19 19. Welcomes the end of the programme for Ireland and the expected end of the programme for Portugal;
Amendment 427 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 19 19. Welcomes the end of the programme for Ireland
Amendment 428 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 19 19. Welcomes the end of the
Amendment 429 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 19 19. Welcomes the end of the programme for Ireland and the expected end of the programme for Portugal and the financial sector programme for Spain; regrets the lack of progress in Greece despite unprecedented reforms having been undertaken;
Amendment 43 #
Motion for a resolution Recital B B. whereas, within the Troika, the Commission is responsible for negotiating the conditions for financial assistance for euro area Member States ‘in liaison with the ECB’ and ’wherever possible together with the IMF’, the financial assistance hereinafter referred to as ‘EU-IMF assistance’, but the Council is responsible for approving the macroeconomic adjustment programme;
Amendment 430 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 19 19. Welcomes the end of the programme for Ireland and the expected end of the programme for Portugal; regrets the
Amendment 431 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 19 a (new) 19a. Acknowledges the very demanding efforts that have been requested to individuals, families, enterprises and other institutions of the civil societies of the countries under adjustment programmes;
Amendment 432 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 19 a (new) 19a. Welcomes that the first signs of recovery are showing in certain programme countries, however notes that the high unemployment rates remain unacceptable and underlines that continued and ambitious efforts are still needed;
Amendment 433 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 19 a (new) 19a. Draws attention on the dramatic decline of the public gross fixed capital formation as % of GDP in the programme counties between 2008 and 2013 which has been three times as severe as the drop for the euro area as a whole(1,9 Vs. 0,6 point of percentage): this again constitutes a major handicap for the economic recovery of these countries;
Amendment 434 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 19 b (new) 19b. Notes that the spread between lending rates on small and large loans in the euro area more than doubled between 2008 and March 2013, hampering the financial situation of SMEs , and that programme countries have been disproportionately affected by such a trend;
Amendment 435 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 19 a (new) 19a. Welcomes the fact that both Ireland and Portugal achieved their first debt issues in January 2014 since the beginning of their adjustment programme; believes that sustainable growth and job creation are necessary in order to secure a lasting return to market financing for these countries;
Amendment 436 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 19 a (new) 19a. Is concerned about the weakening of social dialogue in programme countries – for example seen in a sharply declining coverage of collective agreements in Spain – and the negative effects that this has brought about in the labour market; underlines that strengthening the social dialogue is now a crucial key to improving the overall social situation;
Amendment 437 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 19 a (new) 19a. Stresses that in Greece a primary surplus and a current account surplus are expected to be achieved thanks to the unprecedented reforms having been undertaken, stable governance as well as the large sacrifices of Greek citizens; underlines the necessity to continue reforms, adjustment policies and growth measures with the aim of Greece regaining, as well, access to the financial markets;
Amendment 438 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 19 a (new) 19a. Notes that 30 per cent of the existing debt to GDP ratio for Ireland relates to bank debt. Calls for the full implementation of the June 2012 commitment by EU leaders to break the vicious circle between banks and sovereigns and to further examine the situation of the Irish financial sector in a manner that substantially alleviates Ireland's burden of bank debt;
Amendment 439 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 19 a (new) 19a. Believes that the "success story" around Ireland exiting the programme has very little to do with actual accomplishments that have an impact on people's lives; whereas this story is mainly empty spin designed to support the Irish government's policies, and use Ireland as an example to force working people in southern Europe to accept more austerity; whereas in reality Ireland has the highest net emigration rate of all member states, investment as a percentage of Irish GDP is at 10.6%, the lowest rate in the EU, with the average at 20%, Ireland is still left with an unsustainable debt to GDP ratio of 125% and personal consumption is down 12% compared to 2008;
Amendment 44 #
Motion for a resolution Recital B B. whereas, within the Troika, the Commission is responsible for negotiating the conditions for financial assistance for euro area Member States ‘in liaison with the ECB’ and ’wherever possible together with the IMF’, the financial assistance hereinafter referred to as ‘EU-IMF assistance’; whereas each member of the Troika had to act within its own mandate and follow its own independent process;
Amendment 440 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 19 b (new) 19b. Is of the opinion that whereas, despite claims by the Troika and the Irish government, Ireland has not regained "economic sovereignty" since exiting the programme; whereas Ireland, in addition to being subject to EU 'economic governance' like all other EU countries, is also still subjected to "post-programme monitoring" by the IMF and "post- programme surveillance" by the Commission which include formal inspections and the power to impose further austerity; Stresses that this will also be the case if other countries exit their programme;
Amendment 441 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 19 a (new) 19a. Points to the importance of applying budgetary policies designed to combat extravagant spending, based on a fiscal component involving increased taxes on dividends and profits and a reduced burden for workers and small and medium-sized enterprises, providing states with the money enabling them to function effectively;
Amendment 442 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 19 a (new) 19a. Notes the complete failure of the budgetary goals the Troika programme for Portugal where public debt has risen from 94 % of GDP in 2010 to 127.8 % in 2013. Further notes the severe middle and long term damage done to the Portuguese economy with considerable emigration of skilled workers and qualified young people and a sharp and accelerating drop of investment activity over the whole period of the adjustment programme;
Amendment 443 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 20 20. Underlines that adequate economic models are necessary in order to produce credible and efficient adjustment programmes and that no such adequate economic model with adequate country- specific indicators, designed to calculate the impact of major changes, was available; deplores that adequate statistics and information were not always available; points out that in Greece large-
Amendment 444 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 20 20. Underlines that adequate economic models are necessary in order to produce credible and efficient adjustment programmes; deplores that adequate statistics and information were not always available;
Amendment 445 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 20 20. Underlines that adequate economic models are necessary in order to produce credible and efficient adjustment programme
Amendment 446 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 20 20. Underlines that adequate economic models are necessary in order to produce credible and efficient adjustment programmes; deplores that adequate statistics and information were not always available; points out that in Greece large- scale fraud was happening in this respect in
Amendment 447 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 20 20. Underlines that adequate economic models are necessary in order to produce credible and efficient adjustment programmes; deplores that adequate statistics and information were not always available; points out that in Greece large- scale fraud was happening in this respect in the years preceding the setting up of the programme, which were uncovered bit by bit over a long period, thus repeatedly forcing to readjust the multipliers, forecasts and proposed measures;
Amendment 448 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 20 20. Underlines that adequate economic models are necessary in order to produce credible and efficient adjustment
Amendment 449 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 20 20. Underlines that adequate economic models
Amendment 45 #
Motion for a resolution Recital B B. whereas, within the Troika, the Commission is
Amendment 450 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 20 20. Underlines that adequate
Amendment 451 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 20 20. Underlines that adequate economic models are necessary in order to produce credible and efficient adjustment programmes; deplores that adequate statistics and information were not always available; points out that in Greece large- scale fraud was happening in this respect in the years preceding the setting up of the programme; observes that the failure to detect such large-scale fraud indicates negligence on the part, inter alia, of the EU;
Amendment 452 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 20 20. Underlines that adequate economic models are necessary in order to produce credible and efficient adjustment programmes; deplores that in some situations adequate statistics and information were not always available in the short time given; points out that in Greece large-
Amendment 453 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 20 20. Underlines that adequate economic models of best practice are necessary in order to produce credible and efficient adjustment programmes; deplores that adequate statistics and information were not always available; points out that in Greece large-
Amendment 454 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 20 a (new) 20a. Notes that the hearings undertaken with representatives of the Commission, the ECB, the ESM and the IMF have shown that the member states under an adjustment programmes had no alternative but to go through the adjustment; further understands from the hearings that the economic and social consequences, although already very high and painful, would have been greater by a magnitude in case of a disorderly default;
Amendment 455 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 20 a (new) 20α. Notes in the case of Greece the lack of suitable monitoring mechanisms and clearly defined instruments for calculating the deficit at both European and national level in the years before the programme was drawn up, as well as disagreements between governments regarding methods of calculating financial data;
Amendment 456 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 20 a (new) 20a. Stresses that the interest rate spread between especially Greek and German sovereign bonds only lowered after the ECB announced its OMT programme suggesting the failure of the adjustment programmes for the purpose of crisis management;
Amendment 457 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 20 b (new) 20b. Considers that, from a political point of view, the European project cannot survive with a permanent division into creditor and debtor Members. Notes that, from an economic point of view, the Eurogroup's decision against a fiscal union and in favour of pushing a number of Member States into internal devaluation is leading the euro area as a whole into permanent recession, growing unemployment and deflation and continues to put the global economy at risk;
Amendment 458 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 20 c (new) 20c. Reminds of the fact that what has been conceived as a fiscal crisis has been in reality a balance of payment crisis combined with a banking crisis. Deplores further growing economic imbalances between Member States with a high level of exporting industry and Member States with a lower level of exports while the level of inflation in some Member States was significantly lower than 2%, in other countries significantly higher and that this mismatch further strengthened the build-up of economic imbalances between these Member States. Notes therefore that from a factual point of view the imposition of forced austerity was not justified in the majority of crisis countries, in particular in the cases of Ireland, Spain and Cyprus. Notes that between 2000 and 2007, the only deficit of the State budget in Ireland was in 2002 with only 0.4 per cent of GDP;
Amendment 459 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 20 a (new) 20a. Considers that the Memorandum of Understanding with Portugal has offered the banking industry and big business a millionaire support and guarantee package and delivered up public resources to usury and financial market speculation;
Amendment 46 #
Motion for a resolution Recital B a (new) Ba. whereas the EU-IMF assistance was provided to the four Member States in different formulations, sometimes involving the use of community resources.
Amendment 460 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 21 21. Notes that financial assistance achieved in the short run the avoidance of a disorderly default on sovereign debt that would have had extremely severe economic and social consequences
Amendment 461 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 21 21. Notes that financial assistance achieved in the short run the avoidance of a disorderly default on sovereign debt that would have had extremely severe economic and social consequences
Amendment 462 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 21 21. Notes that financial assistance achieved in the short run the avoidance of a disorderly default on sovereign debt that would have had extremely severe economic and social consequences, as well as spill-over effects for other countries of an incalculable magnitude, and possibly the forced exit of countries from the euro area;
Amendment 463 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 21 21. Notes that financial assistance achieved in the short run the avoidance of a disorderly default on sovereign debt that would have had extremely severe economic and social consequences, as well as spill-over effects for other countries of an incalculable magnitude, and possibly the forced exit of countries from the euro area; further notes that
Amendment 464 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 21 21. Notes that
Amendment 465 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 21 21. Notes that financial assistance achieved in the short run the avoidance of a disorderly default on sovereign debt that would have had extremely severe economic and social consequences, as well as spill-over effects for other countries of an incalculable magnitude, and possibly the forced exit of countries from the euro area; further notes that there is no guarantee this will be avoided in the long run; also notes that the financial assistance and adjustment programme in Greece have not prevented an orderly default nor contagion of the crisis to other Member States; deplores the economic and social downturn which became evident when the fiscal and macroeconomic corrections were put into place; stresses that draconian austerity plans were unable to restore market confidence and that high interest rate spreads on sovereign debt only started to come down slowly after the ECB finally announced its OMT program in August 2012
Amendment 466 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 21 21.
Amendment 467 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 21 21. Notes that financial assistance achieved in the short run the avoidance of a disorderly default on sovereign debt that would have had extremely severe economic and social consequences, as well
Amendment 468 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 21 21. Notes that financial assistance achieved in the short run the avoidance of a disorderly default on sovereign debt that would have had extremely severe economic and social consequences, as well as spill-over effects for other countries of an incalculable magnitude, and possibly the forced exit of countries from the euro area; further notes that there is no guarantee this will be avoided in the long run; also notes that the financial assistance and adjustment programme in Greece have not prevented an orderly default nor contagion of the crisis to other Member States; deplores the economic and social downturn which became evident when the fiscal and macroeconomic corrections were put into place and calls for taking into account such consequences in revised policies;
Amendment 469 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 21 21. Notes that financial assistance achieved in the short run the avoidance of a disorderly default on sovereign debt that would have had extremely severe economic and social consequences, as well as spill-over effects for other countries of an incalculable magnitude, and possibly the forced exit of countries from the euro area;
Amendment 47 #
Motion for a resolution Recital B a (new) Ba. whereas it is difficult to meaningfully separate the assistance to programme countries from the Commission's role in economic policy coordination (see Legal Opinion of EP legal service from 12.9.2013)
Amendment 470 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 21 21. Notes that financial assistance achieved in the short run the avoidance of a disorderly default on sovereign debt that would have had extremely severe economic and social consequences, as well as spill-over effects for other countries of an incalculable magnitude, and possibly
Amendment 471 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 21 21. Notes that financial assistance achieved in the short run the avoidance of a disorderly default on sovereign debt that would have had extremely severe economic and social consequences, as well as spill-over effects for other countries of an incalculable magnitude, and possibly the forced exit of countries from the euro area; further notes that there is no guarantee this will be avoided in the long run; also notes that the financial assistance and adjustment programme in Greece have not prevented an orderly default nor contagion of the crisis to other Member States; deplores the economic and social downturn
Amendment 472 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 21 21. Notes that financial assistance achieved in the short run the avoidance of a disorderly default on sovereign debt that would have had extremely severe economic and social consequences, as well as spill-over effects for other countries of an incalculable magnitude, and possibly the forced exit of countries from the euro area; further notes that there is no guarantee this will be avoided in the long run; also notes that the financial assistance and adjustment programme in Greece have not prevented an orderly default nor contagion of the crisis to other Member States; deplores the economic and social downturn which became evident when the economic crisis arose and the fiscal and macroeconomic corrections in response to it were put into place;
Amendment 473 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 21 21. Notes that financial assistance achieved in the short run the avoidance of a disorderly default on sovereign debt that would have had extremely severe economic and social consequences, as well as spill-over effects for other countries of an incalculable magnitude, and possibly the forced exit of countries from the euro
Amendment 474 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 21 21. Notes that financial assistance achieved in the short run the avoidance of a disorderly default on sovereign debt that would have had extremely severe economic and social consequences, as well as spill-over effects for other countries of an incalculable magnitude, and possibly the forced exit of countries from the euro area; further notes that there is no guarantee this will be avoided in the long run; also notes that the financial assistance and adjustment programme in Greece have not prevented an orderly default nor contagion of the crisis to other Member States; deplores the economic and social downturn which
Amendment 475 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 21 21. Notes that financial assistance achieved in the short run the avoidance of a disorderly default on sovereign debt that would have had extremely severe economic and social consequences, as well as spill-over effects for other countries of an incalculable magnitude, and possibly the forced exit of countries from the euro area; further notes that there is no guarantee this will be avoided in the long run; also notes that the financial assistance and adjustment programme in Greece have not prevented an orderly default nor contagion of the crisis to other Member States; deplores the economic and social downturn spiral which became evident when the fiscal and macroeconomic corrections were put into place;
Amendment 476 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 21 a (new) 21a. Regrets that decision-making at European level during the crisis has been at times fragmented, incoherent and delayed and notes that these shortcomings had a negative impact on crisis countries and facilitated spill-over effects;
Amendment 477 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 21 a (new) 21a. Regrets that the delayed restructuring of Greek debt and the inappropriate contributions of high private incomes and wealth, mainly due to the opposition of EU components of the Troika, and more particularly of the ECB, aggravated the debt sustainability prospects of the country; points out that the accumulated historic experience of sovereign debt crisis has shown that debt restructurings have often come too late and were insufficient, thereby impeding economic recovery, deterring investment and creating opportunities for private creditors to cash out in a run up to the inevitable restructuring, leaving the official creditors – that is the taxpayers - to bear the burden.
Amendment 478 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 21 b (new) 21b. Deplores the formalistic response of the ECB with regard to its non-objection to ELA programmes that were manifestly not in conformity with the ECBs rules on the support to insolvent financial institutions. Highlights that while procedures might have been respected, the non-objection led to the financing of insolvent banks.
Amendment 479 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 21 a (new) 21a. Notes that when it came to PSI in Greece, knock on effects on the Cyprus banking system were not sufficiently considered despite the issue having been raised in good time and it is also suggested that assets relating to some larger Member States were again protected.
Amendment 48 #
Motion for a resolution Recital B b (new) Bb. whereas technical assistance provided by the Commission and the ECB to programme countries constitutes implementation of Union law within the meaning of article 226 TFEU (see Legal Opinion of EP legal service from 12.9.2013)
Amendment 480 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 22 Amendment 481 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 23 23. Deplores
Amendment 482 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 23 23. Deplores however the sometimes over- optimistic assumptions and forecasts made by the Troika
Amendment 483 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 23 23. Deplores however the sometimes over- optimistic assumptions made by the Troika, especially as far as growth is concerned
Amendment 484 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 23 23. Deplores however the sometimes over- optimistic assumptions made by the Troika, especially as far as growth is concerned,
Amendment 485 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 23 23. Deplores however the
Amendment 486 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 23 23.
Amendment 487 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 23 23. Deplores however the sometimes over- optimistic assumptions made by the Troika, especially as far as growth is concerned, but also the insufficient recognition of political resistance to change in some Member States, which admittedly is difficult to assess in advance; deplores the fact that this also affected the Troika’s analysis of the interplay between fiscal consolidation and growth; notes that, as a result of political opposition and the poor implementation of the measures, fiscal targets could not be fulfilled;
Amendment 488 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 23 23. Deplores however the s
Amendment 489 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 23 23.
Amendment 49 #
Motion for a resolution Recital B a (new) Ba. whereas the European Court of Justice referring to Article 13 (3) of the ESM Treaty has recently confirmed (Pringle Case) that the European Commission by its involvement in the ESM Treaty has to "promote the general interest of the Union" and to "ensure that the memoranda of understanding concluded by the ESM are consistent with European Union law";
Amendment 490 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 22 22. Notes that from the onset the Troika published comprehensive documents on the diagnosis, the strategy to overcome the problems, a set of policy measures elaborated together with the national
Amendment 491 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 22 22. Notes that from the onset the Troika published comprehensive documents on the diagnosis, the strategy to overcome the problems, a set of policy measures elaborated together with the national government concerned, and economic forecasts, all of which are updated on a regular basis and should take into account the economy's and the society's actual conditions;
Amendment 492 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 22 22. Notes that from the onset the Troika published comprehensive documents on
Amendment 493 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 22 22. Notes that, although from the onset the Troika published comprehensive documents on the diagnosis, the strategy to overcome the problems, a set of policy measures elaborated together with the national government concerned, and economic forecasts, all of which are updated on a regular basis, these documents did not permit the public to form an overall view of the negotiations;
Amendment 494 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 22 22. Notes that from the onset the Troika published comprehensive documents on the diagnosis, the strategy to overcome
Amendment 495 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 23 23. Deplores however the sometimes over- optimistic assumptions made by the Troika, especially as far as growth and unemployment is concerned, but also the insufficient recognition of political resistance to change in some Member States; deplores the fact that this also affected the Troika
Amendment 496 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 23 23. Deplores however the
Amendment 497 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 23 23. Deplores however the sometimes over- optimistic assumptions made by the Troika, especially as far as growth
Amendment 498 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 23 23. Deplores however the sometimes over- optimistic assumptions made by the Troika, especially as far as growth is concerned, but also the insufficient recognition of political resistance to change in some Member States; deplores the fact that this also affected the Troika’s analysis
Amendment 499 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 23 23. Deplores however the sometimes over- optimistic assumptions made by the Troika, especially as far as growth is concerned, but also the insufficient recognition of political resistance to change in some Member States; deplores the fact that this also affected the
Amendment 5 #
Motion for a resolution Citation 2 a (new) - having regard to the European Social Charter,
Amendment 50 #
Motion for a resolution Recital C C. whereas the Troika is the basic structure for negotiation between the official lenders and the governments of the recipient countries, as well as for reviewing the implementation of adjustment programmes; whereas for the European side, the final decisions as regards financial assistance and conditionality are taken by the Eurogroup and the respective national parliaments;
Amendment 500 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 23 23. Deplores however the sometimes over- optimistic assumptions made by the Troika, especially as far as growth is concerned, but also the insufficient recognition of
Amendment 501 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 23 a (new) 23a. reminds that when decisions about the programmes were taken by the Eurogroup it was widely known and accepted that the structural deficits in the programme countries would further increase after the start of the assistance programmes; reminds that the deficit's increase was instrumental to giving the programme countries more time to re- adjust; lauds the Troika for having devised a plan which from the onset left the countries more breathing space rather than forcing cuts in expenditure for the sole aim of quickly reducing deficits;
Amendment 502 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 23 a (new) 23a. Understands from the hearings that a strict relationship exists between the length of the adjustment programme and the help made available through the dedicated funds such as the ESM, meaning that a longer adjustment period would inevitably have meant substantially larger amounts to be made available and guaranteed by the other euro area countries and the IMF, something which was not politically feasible in view of the already very high amounts involved; points out that the length of the adjustment programmes and the reimbursement periods are distinctly longer than in usual IMF financial assistance programmes;
Amendment 503 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 23 a (new) 23a. Notes the lack of evidence and inaccurate analysis on which the Troika policy were based. Further notes and deplores the non-involvement of national stakeholders and the disrespect of democratic procedures in the design and implementation of adjustment measures. Calls for an immediate and substantial revision of the Memoranda of Understanding that should prioritize investment and employment and include quantitative targets for poverty reduction. Calls for such revised programmes to be effectively bound by the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU and to be designed and monitored in cooperation with the Member States' social partners;
Amendment 504 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 23 a (new) 23a. notes that in Greece although the wages, the pensions and the allowances have been decreased dramatically, despite the rising of the unemployment at historically high levels, the reducing of social spending, the dismantling of the state and the social welfare, it didn´t lead neither at a substandard level to the estimated recovery nor to the desirable development.
Amendment 505 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 24 24.
Amendment 506 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 24 24. Regrets that the reduction of structural deficits in all programme countries since the start of their respective assistance programmes has not yet led to a reduction in the ratios of public debt to GDP, since policies implemented have led to prolonged recession, which negatively affected tax receipts and led to a predictable increase in social transfers ; underlines that the ratio of public debt to GDP has instead sharply increased in all programme countries; thus points to the inadequacy of the programmes to effectively reduce debt levels;
Amendment 507 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 24 24. Regrets that the significant reduction of structural deficits in all programme countries since the start of their respective assistance programmes which is in itself a positive sign of financial stabilization has not yet led to a reduction in the ratios of public debt to GDP; underlines that the ratio of public debt to GDP has instead sharply increased in all programme countries; stresses that in some of these countries a large part of the growth in debt and GDP derives from the recognition of pre-existing liabilities and the mandatory recognition of debt of various state owned enterprises that were not correctly considered in the initial design of the adjustment programmes;
Amendment 508 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 24 24. Regrets that the reduction of structural deficits in all programme countries since the start of their respective assistance programmes has so far not yet led to a reduction in the ratios of public debt to GDP;
Amendment 509 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 24 24. Regrets that the reduction of structural deficits in all programme countries since the start of their respective assistance programmes has not yet led to a reduction in the ratios of public debt to GDP; underlines that the ratio of public debt to GDP has instead sharply increased in all programme countries; believes that the accurate estimation of fiscal multipliers is of crucial importance for fiscal adjustment to be successful in reducing the debt to GDP ratio; calls the Commission and the ECB to take into account the larger values of multipliers in times of crisis while designing the adjustment programmes and recommended policies;
Amendment 51 #
Motion for a resolution Recital C C. whereas the Troika is the basic structure for negotiation between the official lenders and the governments of the recipient countries, as well as for reviewing the implementation of adjustment programmes; whereas for the European
Amendment 510 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 24 24. Regrets that the reduction of structural deficits in all programme countries since the start of their respective assistance programmes has not yet led to a reduction in the ratios of public debt to GDP; underlines that the ratio of public debt to GDP has instead sharply increased in all programme countries; supports the statement at the Euro area summit of 29 June 2012 on the imperative to break the vicious circle between banks and sovereigns.
Amendment 511 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 24 24.
Amendment 512 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 24 24. Regrets that the reduction of structural deficits in all programme countries since the start of their respective assistance programmes has not yet led to a reduction in the ratios of public debt to GDP; underlines that, owing to the one-sided demands for savings, the ratio of public debt to GDP has instead sharply increased in all programme countries;
Amendment 513 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 24 24. Regrets that the reduction of structural deficits in all programme countries since the start of their respective assistance programmes has not yet led to a reduction in the ratios of public debt to GDP; underlines that the ratio of public debt to GDP has instead sharply increased in all programme countries; notes that progression towards more sustainable levels of private debt is necessary for long- term stability.
Amendment 514 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 24 24.
Amendment 515 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 24 24.
Amendment 516 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 24 a (new) 24a. Takes note of the European Commission report on the "Fiscal consolidations and spillovers in the Euro area periphery and core" which highlights that "the symmetry of the fiscal adjustments in all euro area countries at the same time has hampered this adjustment, with negative spill-overs of consolidations in (...) core euro area countries further aggravating growth in deficit countries. These negative spillovers have made adjustment in the periphery harder, and have further exacerbated the temporary worsening of debt-to-GDP ratios in programme and vulnerable countries"
Amendment 517 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 24 a (new) 24a. notes that in the case of Greece the public debt to GDP ratio since 2009, has increased by approximately fifty percent (50%) and according to the Report of the OECD in 2020 the public debt will stand at 157% of GDP versus 124% which is foreseen by the Memorandum of Understanding
Amendment 518 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 24 a (new) 24a. Notes that the most relevant instrument to stabilize sovereign debt was a consequence not of the adjustment programmes but rather of the non- conventional measures by the ECB, in particular, the announcements during the summer of 2012.
Amendment 519 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 25 25. Considers that fiscal multipliers are difficult to assess with absolute certainty
Amendment 52 #
Motion for a resolution Recital C C. whereas the Troika is the basic structure for negotiation between the official lenders and the governments of the recipient countries, as well as for reviewing the implementation of adjustment programmes; whereas for the European side in case of EFSF and ESM support, the final decisions as regards financial assistance and conditionality are taken by the Eurogroup;
Amendment 520 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 25 25.
Amendment 521 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 25 25. Considers that fiscal multipliers are difficult to assess with certainty; recalls in this respect that the IMF admitted in several reports, including the ex-post evaluation of the first assistance programme of Greece, to underestimating the fiscal multiplier in its growth forecasts prior to October 2012 but that the Commission stated in November 2012 that forecast errors were not mainly due to the underestimation of fiscal multipliers; points out that this expression of public disagreement between the Commission and the IMF was not followed up; recalls that the IMF acknowledged once again its forecast error on the fiscal multipliers in the case of Greece and other Eurozone Member States in December 2013, with the multiplier for Greece proving to be at about 1.7.; points out that such a high fiscal multiplier means that this rhythm of austerity has led to a rising debt level, and hence a deterioration of the sustainability of public finances; stresses that this underestimation was used to justify excessive cuts in spending which had intolerable social consequences for significant parts of society
Amendment 522 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 25 25. Considers that fiscal multipliers are difficult to assess with certainty; recalls in this respect that the IMF admitted to underestimating the fiscal multiplier in its
Amendment 523 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 25 25. Considers that fiscal multipliers are difficult to assess with certainty; recalls in this respect that the IMF admitted to underestimating the fiscal multiplier in its growth forecasts prior to October 2012 but that the Commission stated in November 2012 that forecast errors were not due to the underestimation of fiscal multipliers;
Amendment 524 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 25 25.
Amendment 525 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 25 25. Considers that fiscal multipliers are difficult to assess with certainty; recalls in this respect that the IMF admitted to underestimating the fiscal multiplier in its growth forecasts prior to October 2012 but that the Commission stated in November 2012 that forecast errors were not due to the underestimation of fiscal multipliers;
Amendment 526 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 25 25. Considers that fiscal multipliers are difficult to assess with certainty; recalls in this respect that the IMF admitted to underestimating the fiscal multiplier in its growth forecasts prior to October 2012 but that the Commission stated in November 2012 that forecast errors were not due to the underestimation of fiscal multipliers; points out that this expression of public disagreement between the Commission and the IMF was not followed up and calls for an assessment of this issue and for information to be provided to the European Parliament;
Amendment 527 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 25 25. Considers that fiscal multipliers are difficult to assess with certainty; recalls in this respect that the IMF admitted to underestimating the fiscal multiplier in its growth forecasts prior to October 2012 but that the Commission stated in November 2012 that forecast errors were not due to the underestimation of fiscal multipliers; points out that this expression of public disagreement between the Commission and the IMF was not followed up and that the origin of the forecasting errors is still unknown;
Amendment 528 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 25 25. Considers that fiscal multipliers are difficult to assess with certainty; recalls in this respect that the IMF admitted to underestimating the fiscal multiplier in its growth forecasts prior to October 2012 but that the Commission stated in November 2012 that forecast errors were not due to the underestimation of fiscal multipliers; points out that this expression of public disagreement between the Commission and the IMF was not followed up or resolved;
Amendment 529 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 26 Amendment 53 #
Motion for a resolution Recital C C. whereas the Troika
Amendment 530 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 26 Amendment 531 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 26 26.
Amendment 532 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 26 26. Points out that while the IMF’s stated objective in its assistance operations within the frame of the Troika is internal devaluation, the Commission has never clearly endorsed this objective; notes that the objective emphasised by the Commission in all four programme countries under enquiry has rather been fiscal consolidation; notes that due to the absence of democratic deliberations on which strategy to favour, the two strategies were pursued simultaneously in all countries under assistance programmes; notes that the combination of fiscal austerity and restrictive wage policy depressed both public and private demand, thus leading to dramatic cumulative economic and social consequences.
Amendment 533 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 26 26. Points out that while the IMF’s stated objective in its assistance operations within the frame of the Troika is internal devaluation, the Commission has never clearly endorsed this objective; notes that the objective emphasised by the Commission in all four programme countries under enquiry has rather been fiscal consolidation; calls for cooperation and agreement between the EU and the IMF to conclude the programmes for achieving Greek debt sustainability and for the country to regain access to the financial markets;
Amendment 534 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 26 26. Points out that while the IMF’s stated objective in its assistance operations within the frame of the Troika is internal devaluation, which indeed was the correct objective given that external devaluation was not possible, the Commission has never clearly endorsed this objective; notes that the objective emphasised by the Commission in all four programme countries under enquiry has rather been fiscal consolidation, which naturally entails the objective of internal devaluation;
Amendment 535 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 26 26. Points out that while the IMF
Amendment 536 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 26 26. Points out that while the IMF
Amendment 537 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 26 26. Points out that while the IMF
Amendment 538 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 26 26. Points out that while the IMF’s stated objective in its assistance operations within the frame of the Troika is internal devaluation, the Commission has never clearly endorsed this objective; notes that the objective emphasised by the Commission in all four programme countries under enquiry has rather been
Amendment 539 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 26 a (new) 26a. Notes that recommendations on wage moderation or "adjustment" were common to all programs, thus effectively pursuing the IMF's objective;
Amendment 54 #
Motion for a resolution Recital C C. whereas the Troika is the basic structure for negotiation between the official lenders and the governments of the recipient countries, as well as for reviewing the implementation of adjustment programmes; whereas for the European side, the final decisions as regards financial assistance and conditionality are taken by
Amendment 540 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 26 a (new) 26a. Calls for a breakaway from these policies so that the problems of economic sustainable growth, unemployment, poverty, social exclusion, and (income) inequalities can be truly addressed and combated;
Amendment 541 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 26 a (new) 26a. Condemns the complete lack of measures to promote growth and employment in the Troika programmes, with Ireland to a certain degree being an exception where the Troika allowed half of the proceeds from privatisation to be spent on job schemes;
Amendment 542 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 26 a (new) 26a. Calls for a breakaway from these policies so that the problems of economic sustainable growth, unemployment, poverty, social exclusion, and (income) inequalities can be truly addressed and combated;
Amendment 543 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 27 Amendment 544 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 27 27. Considers that too little attention has been given by the Troika to alleviating the negative impact of adjustment strategies in the programme countries; regrets this lack of discernment, patent in its rejection of several governmental suggestions aiming to lessen such impact, and its harmful effect in the lives of citizens, families, enterprises and other institutions of these countries; takes note of several political declarations of Troika high officials subscribing to this need of alleviation, thus recognizing the need to moderate the rhythm and rigor of the measures, fiscal targets and conditionality of the adjustment programmes, and their prediction and judgement failures; and deplores that these were not duly and timely followed by the Troika´s technical teams that denoted unnecessary degrees of rigidity and intransigence which had negative social consequences;
Amendment 545 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 27 27. Considers that too little attention has been given to
Amendment 546 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 27 27. Considers that too little attention has been given to alleviating the negative impact of adjustment strategies in the programme countries, for example unemployment, social inequalities, and the fact that the burden has been placed mainly on lower income groups, whereas the highest income groups have been almost completely spared, and that there has been no political will to address these shortcomings in the Troika negotiations;
Amendment 547 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 27 27. Considers that far too little attention has been given to alleviating the negative
Amendment 548 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 27 27. Considers that too little attention has been given to alleviating the negative impact of adjustment strategies in the programme countries; recalls the origins of the crises; notes that the economic and social consequences would have been worse without the EU-IMF financial and technical assistance;
Amendment 549 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 27 27. Considers that too little attention has been given to alleviating the negative impact of adjustment strategies in the programme countries; deplores that too often the one-size fits all approach taken to crisis management did not fully consider the balance in the social impact of the prescribed policy measures;
Amendment 55 #
Motion for a resolution Recital C C. whereas the Troika is the basic structure for negotiation between the official lenders and the governments of the recipient countries, as well as for reviewing the implementation of economic adjustment programmes; whereas for the European side, the final decisions as regards financial assistance and conditionality are taken by the Eurogroup;
Amendment 550 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 27 27. Considers that too little attention has been given to alleviating the negative impact of adjustment strategies in the programme countries or correcting their massive non forecasted recessionary impacts;
Amendment 551 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 27 27. Considers that too little attention has been given to alleviating the negative impact of adjustment strategies in the programme countries in the sense that the distribution of burdens between the poor and the rich has not been balanced;
Amendment 552 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 27 27. Considers that
Amendment 553 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 27 27. Considers that the Troika should respond flexibly to new challenges and that too little attention has been given to alleviating the negative impact of adjustment strategies in the programme countries;
Amendment 554 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 27 27. Considers that too little attention has been given to avoiding or alleviating the negative impact of adjustment strategies in the programme countries;
Amendment 555 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 27 27. Considers that too little attention has been given to alleviating the negative social and political impact of adjustment strategies in the programme countries;
Amendment 556 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 27 27. Considers that too little attention has been given to alleviating the negative impact of adjustment strategies in the programme countries; regrets namely the absence of credit access for SMEs and programmes for fostering job creation and growth at national and European levels;
Amendment 557 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 27 27. Considers that
Amendment 558 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 27 27. Considers that
Amendment 559 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 27 a (new) 27a. Notes that in Cyprus unemployment levels increased by 10% between 2012 and 2013; progressive taxation, budget cuts and austerity hamper economic activity and increase gaps between the poor and the rich.
Amendment 56 #
Motion for a resolution Recital C a (new) Ca. whereas the Troika arrangement was a pragmatic approach to deal with unprecedented problems; whereas the Troika members pursued shared objectives in promoting economic and financial stability in Europe and in the euro area in particular;
Amendment 560 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 27 a (new) 27a. Is extremely concerned over the cumulative impact of massive and frontloaded cuts in fundamental areas of the fight against poverty, such as pensions, basic services, health care and pharmaceutical products on the most vulnerable groups and child poverty. Deplores the fact that, as a result, the level of people at risk of poverty or social exclusion has increased in all four programme countries. Notes that the already worrying statistics hide a much harsher reality, which is that when GDP per capita falls, the poverty threshold also falls;
Amendment 561 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 28 28. Stresses that national-level ownership is important, and that failure to implement agreed measures has consequences in terms of the expected results, and notes that in many of the programme countries there was no national consensus and ownership of the corrective measures, which is of course difficult to achieve initially but which should come about under the pressure of the situation, and that serious dissension and unrest hampered the stabilisation of the economic situation;
Amendment 562 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 28 28. Stresses that national-level ownership is important, and that failure to implement agreed measures has consequences in terms of the expected results; also points out, however, that the failures to implement requirements are attributable in part to the Troika’s ill-conceived and socially severely lopsided programmes; maintains in addition that the conditions might have been accepted much more willingly within society if the higher income groups in the programme countries, as well as the financial industry, had been made, through a financial transaction tax, to bear a share of the costs brought about by the crisis and if resolute action had been taken at European level to stamp out tax evasion and fraud;
Amendment 563 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 28 28. Stresses that national-level ownership is important, especially in the field of structural reforms and fiscal adjustments, and that failure to implement agreed measures has consequences in terms of the expected results; inducing additional hardship over an even longer period for the country concerned; takes note of the IMF's experience that country ownership could be seen as the single most important factor in the success of any financial assistance programme;
Amendment 564 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 28 28. Stresses that national-level ownership is important, and that failure to implement agreed measures has consequences in terms of the expected results; stresses however that national-level ownership cannot be achieved without proper democratic legitimacy and accountability at both national and EU level;
Amendment 565 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 28 28. Stresses that national-level ownership is important, and that failure to implement agreed measures has consequences in terms of the expected results; highlights in this regard that the approval by national parliaments of the budgets and laws to implement economic adjustment programmes is crucial to provide national level accountability and transparency;
Amendment 566 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 28 28. Stresses that national-level ownership is important, and that failure to implement agreed measures has consequences in terms of the expected results; notes also that wide political support for the goals of the programmes has been key for their successes and regrets that this has not always been the case in all crisis countries;
Amendment 567 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 28 28. Stresses that national-level ownership is important, and that failure to implement agreed measures has consequences in terms of the expected results and devastating impact on the confidence of citizens in the EU;
Amendment 568 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 28 28. Stresses that national-level ownership is
Amendment 569 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 28 a (new) 28a. Points to the possibility that positive results of reforms pursued by programme countries in the context of economic adjustment programmes inspire other EU Member States to promote the sustainability of their public finances by consolidating their budgets and foster their competitiveness through structural reforms.
Amendment 57 #
Motion for a resolution Recital C a (new) Ca. whereas the political decisions regarding the Troika and the adjustment programs are taken by the Eurogroup clearly aiming at the completion of the Single Market and the promotion of economic integration at all costs, especially at the expense of social and labour rights of the people; thus these policies lead to austerity instead of growth and job creation;.
Amendment 570 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 28 a (new) 28a. Deplores that the gender equality aspect has to a large extent been absent in the work of the Troika; stresses that enhanced gender equality is an important key to building stronger economies and that this factor should never be overlooked in economic analyses or recommendations;
Amendment 571 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 28 a (new) 28a. Observes that, pursuant to Article 125(1) TFEU, the Union or a Member State thereof is not liable for the Member States’ commitments, and that the original purpose of this provision was to compel the Member States to adhere to a strict economic policy, because they cannot expect anyone to come to their rescue; observes that rescue measures have nonetheless been taken, as a consequence of which citizens’ confidence in the legality of measures has been shaken, and that the mandates of the Commission and the ECB have been difficult to understand;
Amendment 572 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 28 a (new) 28a. Regrets that Member -States underadjustment programmes often promote even gravest austerity measures than the ones proposed by the Troika in order to fulfil programme targets.
Amendment 573 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 28 a (new) 28a. Considers that the privatization of telecommunications, electricity and port authorities in Cyprus a strategic mistake that will lead to private monopolies or oligopolies to dominate the relatively small and isolated Cypriot market at the detriment of consumers, enterprises and the functioning of the economy as a whole;
Amendment 574 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 28 a (new) 28a. Stresses that States must implement the necessary reforms as quickly as possible in order for growth to resume soon;
Amendment 575 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 28 a (new) 28a. Deplores the deliberate restriction of collective bargaining practices, such as in Portugal where the number of workers covered by collective bargaining agreements fell from more than 5 million ( 2010) to 300000 (2012), as well the record high unemployment in the programme countries. In this respect, highlights the need for an investigation into the prima facie contravention by the ECB and the Commission of article 153 paragraph 3 of TFEU. (This amendment is based on a contribution by the European Trade Union Confederation (ETUC).)
Amendment 576 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 28 b (new) Amendment 577 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 28 c (new) 28c. Condemns measures such as cutting minimum wages and weakening collective bargaining systems, since these impact heavily on domestic demand and as such on economic and employment performance (ETUC input)
Amendment 578 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 28 d (new) Amendment 579 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 28 e (new) 28e. Points out that the troika has been responsible for predicating the success of the programmes on favourable external conditions that failed to materialize;
Amendment 58 #
Motion for a resolution Recital C a (new) Ca. Whereas the political decisions regarding the Troika and the adjustment programs are taken by the Eurogroup clearly aiming at the completion of the Single Market and the promotion of economic integration at all costs, especially at the expense of social and labour rights of the people; thus these policies lead to austerity instead of growth and job creation;
Amendment 580 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 28 f (new) 28f. Calls for total transparency regarding the preparation and implementation of actions of the Troïka and the respective positions of IMF, European Commission and the ECB.
Amendment 581 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 28 g (new) 28g. Acknowledges that "the troika symbolises the exercise of enormous powers by technocratic actors and, as such, echoes the traditional critic of the EU 'democratic deficit'; underlines that the functioning of the troika must lead not only to a better assessment of the real nature and scope of EU powers regarding its Member States, but also to identify more clearly the way EU decisions are made and the 'input legitimacy' they are based on"[i]; [i] Betoncini and Kreilinger (2013)
Amendment 582 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 29 29.
Amendment 583 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 29 29. Notes that the Troika
Amendment 584 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 29 29. Notes that the Troika’s mandate has been perceived as being unclear and lacking transparency; welcomes however that since the entry into force of Regulation No 472/2013 which codifies the surveillance procedures to be employed in the euro for countries experiencing financial difficulties, a de facto mandate for the Troika has been established; calls for full implementation and full ownership of this regulation;
Amendment 585 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 29 29. Notes that the Troika’s mandate
Amendment 586 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 29 29. Notes that the Troika
Amendment 587 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 29 29. Notes that the Troika’s mandate has been perceived as being unclear and lacking transparency; underlines that the Troika is built on a clear mandate from the Eurogroup and is acting on the basis of MoUs that were concluded with the national governments (under participation of the national parliaments) of the Member States concerned;
Amendment 588 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 29 29. Notes that the Troika’s mandate has been perceived as being unclear and lacking transparency and should adjust to the actual economic situation;
Amendment 589 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 29 29. Notes that
Amendment 59 #
Motion for a resolution Recital D Amendment 590 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 29 29.
Amendment 591 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 29 29. Notes that the Troika’s mandate has been perceived as being unclear and lacking transparency; notes in addition that, as far as the Troika is concerned, the European Parliament has been bypassed; 1 By way of a legislative footprint see ‘Austeritätspolitik und Menschenrechte’, a legal opinion for the Vienna Chamber of Labour by Professor Dr Andreas Fischer-Lescano, LL.M. (EUI), Zentrum für europäische Rechtspolitik (ZERP), Faculty of Law, University of Bremen, 24 November 2013.
Amendment 592 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 29 29. Notes that the Troika
Amendment 593 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 29 29. Notes that the Troika
Amendment 594 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 29 29. Notes that the Troika’s mandate has been perceived as being
Amendment 595 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 29 29. Notes that the Troika
Amendment 596 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 29 29. Notes that the Troika’s mandate
Amendment 597 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 29 29. Notes that, in the
Amendment 598 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 29 a (new) 29a. Stresses that the European Commission, as the executive body of the E.U. and because of its special role regarding Troika, should provide information and be accountable to the European Parliament regarding not only the conclusion but also the implementation of fiscal adjustment programmes as well as the relevant policies. Stresses also that providing information regarding the decisions and conducting reviews of adjustment programmes should be included within the context of Eurogroup's inter- institutional dialogue with the European Parliament;
Amendment 599 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 29 a (new) 29a. Notes with huge concern the general impression of citizens in programme countries that all relevant policy decisions are imposed by an external rule which acts against the general interest of programme countries in order to spare the banking sector of ‚creditor' Member States. Further notes that as a result of Troika measures only one in three citizens in Southern Europe currently claims to be satisfied with the system of democracy;
Amendment 6 #
Motion for a resolution Citation 2 a (new) - having regard to the European Social Charter,
Amendment 60 #
Motion for a resolution Recital D D. whereas
Amendment 600 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 29 a (new) 29a. Points out that "from a legal perspective, Moue have become the object of high controversy regarding their compatibility with the National, European and International Law and in particular human dignity, the right to property, labour, social and economic rights in combination with the principles of legal certainty, rule of law, equality, proportionality and subsidiarity which are alleged to be violated in a certain number of legal cases, including in the case of Greece, where the Council of Europe concluded that the Greek State is in violation of the right to social security enshrined in the European Social Chart;
Amendment 601 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 29 b (new) 29b. Underlines that the strict conditionality applicable to loans granted in the framework of assistance programmes goes at the expense of the political space of the Member States under assistance as the national constitutional executive and legislative branches have little effective choice but to implement the measures necessary to meet concrete targets laid down in Moue;
Amendment 602 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 29 c (new) 29c. Underlines in particular that in the framework of the troika the Eurogroup members decide whether to provide assistance and control the actual lending through the ESM and that in the framework of the troikas the Commissions is formally an agent of the Eurogroup; stresses that such a situation is in sharp contrast with the normal function conferred to the Commission in the Treaties which is to act as an independent principal protecting the EU interest and implementing EU rules within the limits established by the treaties; emphasizes that such situation has represented a significant potential of conflict of interests in different EU policy areas such as social policy and state aid provisions;
Amendment 603 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 30 Amendment 604 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 30 30. Points out that
Amendment 605 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 30 30. Points out that due to its ad hoc nature there was no
Amendment 606 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 30 30. Points out that due to its ad hoc nature there was no appropriate legal basis for setting up the Troika on the basis of Union primary law; recalls that, in the context of the Regulation on the strengthening of economic and budgetary surveillance of Member States experiencing or threatened with serious difficulties with respect to their financial stability in the euro area (Gauzès report), the EP has already introduced some elements of accountability concerning the Troika;
Amendment 607 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 30 30. Points out that due to its ad hoc nature there was no appropriate legal basis for setting up the Troika on the basis of Union primary law, which led to the establishment of inter-governmental mechanisms such as the ESM; demands that any future solution shall be based on Union primary law; acknowledges that this might lead to the necessity of a Treaty change;
Amendment 608 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 30 30. Points out that
Amendment 609 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 30 30. Points out that due to its ad hoc nature there was no appropriate legal basis available for setting up the Troika on the basis of Union primary law;
Amendment 61 #
Motion for a resolution Recital D D. whereas the Troika
Amendment 610 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 30 30. Points out that
Amendment 611 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 30 a (new) 30a. Points to the central role of the Eurogroup with respect to both the decision to grant financial assistance and the determination of the conditions on which support has been granted, despite the Eurogroup not being an official institution of the European Union; deplores the absence of EU level democratic legitimity and accountability of the Eurogroup when it assumes EU level executive powers;
Amendment 612 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 30 b (new) 30b. Takes note of the Eurogroup President statement that the Eurogroup gives a mandate to the European Commission to negotiate on its behalf the details of the conditions attached to the assistance, while taking into account Member States' views on key elements of the conditionality and, in view of their own financial constraints, on the size of financial assistance;
Amendment 613 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 30 c (new) 30c. Notes that the above mentioned procedure whereby the Eurogroup confers a mandate to the European Commission is not specified in the Treaties; notes that Article 13(2) TEU explicitly prohibits EU institutions, such as the European Commission, to act beyond the attributions they are granted by the Treaties; therefore deems that the Commission's mandates for negotiation to act within the troika have been violating the EU primary law and are thus to be considered illegal;
Amendment 614 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 30 d (new) 30d. Notes that the President of the Eurogroup, in his reply to the European Parliament questionnaire, failed to comment on means of democratic legitimacy and accountability of the troika at EU level;
Amendment 615 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 30 a (new) 30a. Calls on the Commission to take note of the complaint by some of the Member States' authorities that their discussions with the Troika would have benefitted from a lower turnover among Troika personnel.
Amendment 616 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 30 a (new) 30a. Points out that the Troika and its role are defined in Article 6 and 7 of Regulation (EU) No 472/2013 of the European Parliament and the Council of 21 May 2013;
Amendment 617 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 30 b (new) 30b. Reminds that the Member State which requests financial assistance is responsible for the preparation of its macroeconomic adjustment programme and stresses that macroeconomic adjustment programmes are being approved by a qualified majority of EU Finance Ministers;
Amendment 618 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 30 c (new) 30c. Stresses that despite the Commission acting on behalf of the Member States the ultimate political responsibility for the design and approval of the macroeconomic adjustment programmes lies with EU Finance Ministers and their governments;
Amendment 619 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 30 d (new) 30d. Deplores that neither the President of the Eurogroup nor the President of the European Council did attend the hearings in the European Parliament on the role of the Troika;
Amendment 62 #
Motion for a resolution Recital D D. whereas the Troika together with the Member State concerned is also
Amendment 620 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 30 a (new) 30a. notes the non-institutional legitimacy of troika at a Union level and the responsibilities which the involved institutions of the Union have on the democratic deficit in its structure and its function
Amendment 621 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 30 a (new) 30a. Notes the temporary nature of the Troika and calls on the European Commission to investigate when or under what circumstances it is intended that the Troika’s activity should cease;
Amendment 622 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 31 31.
Amendment 623 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 31 31. Notes that the actual powers of the troïka go far beyond that of reviewing the implementation of memoranda in programme countries and proposing decisions to final decision makers (Eurogroup, IMF board, ECB board); Notes in that respect the admission by the President of the Eurogroup before the European Parliament that the Eurogroup endorsed the recommendations of the Troika without considering their specific policy implications; concludes that an effective decision making power has de facto been delegated to the troïka;
Amendment 624 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 31 31. Notes the admission by the former President of the Eurogroup before the European Parliament that the Eurogroup endorsed the recommendations of the Troika without considering their specific policy implications; stresses that, if accurate, this does not discharge euro area finance ministers from their political responsibility for the macroeconomic adjustment programmes and the MoUs;
Amendment 625 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 31 31.
Amendment 626 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 31 31. Notes the admission by the President of the Eurogroup before the European Parliament that the Eurogroup endorsed the recommendations of the Troika without considering their specific policy implications and without thoroughly addressing itself in the proper manner to the details of the programme proposals and the implications;
Amendment 627 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 31 a (new) 31a. Deplores the fact that some of the conditionalities set by the Troika violate fundamental rights as enshrined both in the EU treaties as in constitutions of the affected Member States. Takes note of the alarming sentences and opinions delivered so far by courts and international organizations;
Amendment 628 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 31 a (new) 31a. Underlines that the crisis-induced changes to the legal framework of the EU and its Member States do not only affect the economic decision making process at the European and at the level of Member States and namely the role of National Parliaments but also in a much more direct way the legal position of individuals; emphasizes therefore that such measures have been subject -and as the recent experience suggests- might be more and more subject to legal challenges before national Courts and before the ECJ and the ECHR given the far reaching consequences of assistance programmes for the delicate system of democratic legitimation of public power in the multidimensional legal order of the EU and the role that national and EU institutions play in this regard;
Amendment 629 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 31 b (new) 31b. Stresses that a formal democratic accountability is a necessary condition for effective democratic accountability and legitimacy but not a sufficient condition; points out that potential conflicts on interest inherent to the troika framework represent a threat to effective democratic accountability of the assistance programmes; emphasizes that a lack of effective democratic accountability is prejudicial to the consistency of the assistance programmes with fundamental rights objectives and obligations of EU institutions and Member States;
Amendment 63 #
Motion for a resolution Recital D D. whereas the Troika
Amendment 630 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 31 c (new) 31c. Stresses in particular that the ad-hoc involvement of EU institutions in the troika framework has created significant hurdles regarding the Council, the Eurogroup, the Commission and the ECB duties of democratic accountability by limiting the European Parliament effective rights to request the Court of Justice of the European Union to review the legality of the decisions underpinning the assistance programmes, as the formal decisions regarding the conditionalities attached to the programmes as well as the decisions to provide financial assistance are taken by Member States within the ESM and outside the community framework, and therefore, do not directly fall under the scope of potential legal actions that the Parliament could bring to the Court against other EU institutions as laid-down in article 263 TFEU; emphasizes that such developments have had far reaching consequences for the delicate system of balance of power within the Union and is prejudicial for the principle of sincere cooperation laid-down in the treaties;
Amendment 631 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 31 d (new) 31d. Is of the opinion that replacing the ad hoc troika system by an improved legal structure fully established under the community method is a necessary condition for addressing the deficit of democratic legitimacy and accountability of the programmes, increasing legal certainty; resolving and avoiding potential conflicts of interests; and thereby, creating a degree of ownership necessary for improving the effectiveness of the measures taken to tackle the consequences of the crisis adopted in the Union and more particularly in euro area Member States experiencing or threatened with serious difficulties with respect to their financial stability;
Amendment 632 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 31 e (new) 31e. Points out that the adoption Regulation (EU) No 472/2013 constitutes a first -even though insufficient- step towards such replacement; underlines however that further steps, are required with that purpose in the short, medium and long-term; underlines in particular than an effective and full integration of assistance programmes into the community framework will require a transformation of the ESM into an European monetary Funds within the community framework so as to achieve a more accountable and efficient integration of the different tasks involved in the preparation and follow-up of assistance programmes;
Amendment 633 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 31 f (new) 31f. Welcomes in particular the codification in EU law of procedures and standards for enhanced surveillance of euro area Member States threatened with serious difficulties with respect to their financial stability; including inter alia the provisions regarding the evaluation of the sustainability of the government debt; the more transparent procedures regarding the adoption of macroeconomic adjustment programmes including the need to integrate adverse spill-over effects as well as macroeconomic and financial shocks and the scrutiny rights devolved to the European Parliament; the provisions regarding the involvement of social partners; the requirements to take explicit account of national practices and institutions for wage formation; the need to ensure sufficient means for fundamental policies, such as education and health care; and the exemptions granted to Member States under assistance from the relevant requirements of the Stability and Growth Pact; underlines and welcomes the fact that such codification establishes an explicit ECJ jurisdiction on the legal acts referred to in Regulation (EU) No 472/2013;
Amendment 634 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 32 32. Takes note of the dual role of the Commission in the Troika as both an agent of Member States and an EU institution;
Amendment 635 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 32 32. Takes note of the dual role of the Commission in the Troika as both an agent of Member States and an EU institution;
Amendment 636 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 32 32. Takes note of the dual role of the Commission in the Troika a
Amendment 637 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 32 32.
Amendment 638 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 32 32. Takes note of the dual role of the Commission in the Troika as both an agent of Member States and an EU institution; warns that conflicts of interests may therefore exist within the Commission between its role in the Troika and its responsibility as a guardian of the Treaties, especially in policies such as competition
Amendment 639 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 32 32. Takes note of the dual role of the Commission in the Troika as both an agent of Member States and an EU institution; warns that conflicts of interests may therefore exist within the Commission between its role in the Troika and its responsibility as a guardian of the Treaties, especially in policies such as competition
Amendment 64 #
Motion for a resolution Recital D a (new) Da. whereas a legal basis and special instruments for the Troika have been progressively created;
Amendment 640 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 32 32.
Amendment 641 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 32 32. Takes note of the dual role of the Commission in the Troika as both an agent of Member States and an EU institution; warns that conflicts of interests may therefore exist within the Commission between its role in the Troika and its responsibility as a guardian of the Treaties, especially in policies such as competition and state aid as well as the objectives of social cohesion, convergence, respect to the acquis communautaire;
Amendment 642 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 32 32. Takes note of the dual role of the Commission in the Troika a
Amendment 643 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 32 a (new) 32a. Insists in this regards that the European Commission does not have any competence in wage policy;
Amendment 644 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 32 a (new) 32a. Underlines that all EU institutions are fully bound by Union law and that within the Troika they are obliged to act in accordance with fundamental rights, which, under Article 51 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, apply at all times;
Amendment 645 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 32 b (new) 32b. Strongly condemns the fact that the European Commission, instead of acting as the guardian of the Treaty, has apparently actively assisted in breaches against major principles of the European Social Acquis;
Amendment 646 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 33 33. Points equally to a possible conflict of interest between the current role of the ECB in the Troika as ‘technical advisor’ and its position as creditor of the four Member States as well as its mandate under the Treaty; requests that possible ECB conflicts of interest, especially as regards crucial liquidity policy are carefully scrutinized; notes that throughout the crisis, the ECB has had crucial information on the health of the banking sector and financial stability in general, and that it has subsequently exerted policy leverage on decision- makers, at least in the cases of the Greek debt-restructuring, the Cypriot ELA operations and the Irish non-inclusion of senior-bondholders in the bail-in; calls for the appropriate lessons to be learnt;
Amendment 647 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 33 33. Points
Amendment 648 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 33 33. Points equally to a
Amendment 649 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 33 33. Points equally to a possible conflict of interest between the current role of the ECB in the Troika as ‘technical advisor’ and its position as creditor of the four Member States as well as its mandate under the Treaty; hence, welcomes its contribution in addressing the crisis;
Amendment 65 #
Motion for a resolution Recital E a (new) Ea. whereas there was a broad political agreement to avoid a disorderly default by Member States in the EU, and especially in the euro area, in order to avoid economic and social chaos, with as a consequence the impossibility to pay pensions and civil servant's salaries, as well as dire knock-down effects on the economy, the banking system and social welfare, in addition to the sovereign being completely cut off from the capital markets for a prolonged period;
Amendment 650 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 33 33. Points equally to
Amendment 651 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 33 a (new) 33a. Notes that in all programme countries, the adoption of the Memoranda of Understanding in Parliament did not comply with democratic standards since Members were not in a position to fulfil their democratic duties, i.e. to consider the consequences of their votes or even read and discuss the MoU. Asks the Commission to make sure that such a situation will never be repeated and to this end to establish guidelines that shall inter alia ensure the appropriate democratic control of the implementation of measures at national level;
Amendment 652 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 34 34. Notes that the ECB’s role
Amendment 653 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 34 34. Notes that the ECB’s role is not sufficiently defined, as it is stated in the ESM Treaty that the Commission should work ‘in liaison with the ECB’, thus
Amendment 654 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 34 34. Notes that the ECB’s role is not sufficiently defined, as it is stated in the ESM Treaty that the Commission should work ‘in liaison with the ECB’, thus reducing the ECB’s role to that of a provider of expertise; further notes that the ECB mandate is limited by the TFEU to monetary policy
Amendment 655 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 34 34. Notes that the ECB’s role is not sufficiently defined, as it is stated in the ESM Treaty that the Commission should work ‘in liaison with the ECB’, thus reducing the ECB’s role to that of a provider of expertise; further notes that the ECB mandate is limited by the TFEU to monetary policy and that the involvement of the ECB in any matter related to budgetary, fiscal and structural policies is therefore on uncertain legal ground; notes, however, that the ECJ has ruled in its Case C-370/12 ("Pringle vs Ireland") that the tasks allocated to the ECB by the ESM Treaty are in line with the various tasks which the TFEU and the Statute of the ESCB [and the ECB] confer on the ECB;
Amendment 656 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 34 34. Notes that the ECB’s role is not sufficiently defined, as it is stated in the ESM Treaty that the Commission should work ‘in liaison with the ECB’, thus reducing the ECB’s role to that of a provider of expertise; further notes that the ECB mandate is limited by the TFEU to monetary policy and that the involvement of the ECB in any matter related to budgetary, fiscal and structural policies is therefore
Amendment 657 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 34 34. Notes that the ECB’s role is not sufficiently defined, as it is stated in the ESM Treaty that the Commission should work ‘in liaison with the ECB’, thus reducing the ECB’s role to that of a provider of expertise; further notes that the ECB mandate is limited by the TFEU to monetary policy and that the involvement of the ECB in any matter related to budgetary, fiscal and structural policies
Amendment 658 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 34 34. Notes that the ECB’s role is not sufficiently defined, as it is stated in the ESM Treaty that the Commission should work ‘in liaison with the ECB’, thus reducing the ECB’s role to that of a provider of expertise; further notes that the ECB mandate is limited by the TFEU to monetary policy and that the involvement of the ECB in any matter related to budgetary, fiscal and structural policies is not permitted by the Treaties; therefore con
Amendment 659 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 34 34. Notes that the ECB
Amendment 66 #
Motion for a resolution Recital E a (new) Ea. whereas the members of the Troika took it for granted that no programme country wanted to leave the euro zone;
Amendment 660 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 34 34. Notes that the ECB’s role is not sufficiently defined, as it is stated in the ESM Treaty that the Commission should work ‘in liaison with the ECB’, thus reducing the ECB’s role to that of a provider of expertise; further notes that the ECB mandate is limited by the TFEU to monetary policy as well as to stabilisation of the European economy and that the involvement of the ECB in any matter related to budgetary, fiscal and structural policies is therefore on uncertain legal ground;
Amendment 661 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 34 34. Notes that the ECB’s role is not sufficiently defined, as it is stated in the ESM Treaty that the Commission should work ‘in liaison with the ECB’, thus reducing the ECB’s role to that of a provider of expertise; further notes that the
Amendment 662 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 34 34. Notes that the ECB’s role in decisions leading up to the establishment of the Troika is unclear and that its role in the Troika is not sufficiently defined, as it is stated in the ESM Treaty that the Commission should work ‘in liaison with the ECB’, thus reducing the ECB’s role to that of a provider of expertise; further notes that the ECB mandate is limited by the TFEU to monetary policy and that the involvement of the ECB in any matter related to budgetary, fiscal and structural policies is therefore on uncertain legal ground;
Amendment 663 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 34 a (new) 34a. Notes that the mandate of the European Central bank is primarily limited to monetary policy and that it has no legal competence nor expertise to design, implement or monitor policy reforms in the field of labour market, economic affairs or good governance. Considers the current role of the ECB as full member of the Troika as unfit and calls for the ECB's membership in the Troika to be suspended until its mandate with regard to democratic control and objectives as defined in the Treaties including Art 130 TFEU will be revised;
Amendment 664 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 34 a (new) 34a. Notes that it is not possible to determine on the basis of published documents whether the ECB takes or not responsibility for programme decisions;
Amendment 665 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 34 b (new) 34b. Points out that the ECB close involvement in EU-IMF assistance programmes has carried significant potential conflicts of interest as it has made its own actions conditional on decisions that it is itself part of; points out that such situation places the ECB into a problematic 'driver in the backseat position';
Amendment 666 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 34 c (new) 34c. Notes that the ECB, unlike the IMF and the Commission does not produce assessment or programme monitoring documents even though it issues joint statements with the other troika members about programme implementation; point out that the ECB relies on its own crisis related instruments such as the collateral policy and the ex-ante and ex-post control mechanism on emergency liquidity assistance (ELAs) provided by national central banks within the euro area to banks within their jurisdiction;
Amendment 667 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 34 d (new) 34d. Notes that such conflicts have been particularly patent regarding its highly controversial role on the Greek sovereign debt restructuring (by delaying unreasonably the whole process and subsequently granting to itself a super- senior status and a waiver from the restructuring proceedings); as well as in Ireland by its insistence that private unguaranteed bondholders to be fully repaid although the Irish programme made no reference to such requirement;
Amendment 668 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 34 e (new) 34e. Points out that there several official sources have confirmed that the Irish government planned to impose losses on the unsecured and unguaranteed bondholders in the banks recapitalized with taxpayers money; points out that that both the IMF and the Irish authorities assessed that has the government done so, its liabilities would have been reduced by several billion euros and the value of its support to the surviving Irish banks enhanced, and thereby their solvency would have been improved since their guarantor would have benefited from significant savings in not paying bondholders; notes that the former ECB president objected such measure threatening to withdraw liquidity support to the Irish banks by considering them as insolvent, which would have resulted in a disorderly collapse of the Irish banking system;
Amendment 669 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 34 f (new) 34f. Points out that there are thus compelling allegations that the solvency concept used by the ECB lacks legal certainty and in particular that there a several grey areas surrounding the ELAs provisions in all Member States under assistance such as such as around the treatment of State guarantees underwriting ELAs provisions; reminds the implicit and explicit threats put forward by the ECB to withdraw liquidity support;
Amendment 67 #
Motion for a resolution Recital E a (new) Ea. whereas both the EFSF and the ESM benefit from the services of prominent Union institutions, such as the Commission and the ECB, whereas control of these institutions is not in accordance with the procedure laid down in the TFEU;
Amendment 670 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 35 35. Points to the generally weak democratic accountability of the Troika in programme countries at national level and the fact that national decision-makers in the programme countries acted in response to the threat that their economy might collapse and were in practice compelled to approve many conditions imposed by those providing assistance, although they indeed bear democratic responsibility for approving them, and that elected representatives were likewise accountable to their electorates in the parliaments of the countries providing the funding; notes however that this democratic accountability varies between countries, depending on the will of national executives;
Amendment 671 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 35 35. Points to the generally weak democratic accountability of the Troika in programme countries at national level; notes however that this democratic accountability varies between countries, depending on the will of national executives; Notes with concern that three independent institutions of the Troika with an uneven distribution of responsibility between them, coupled with differing mandates and negotiation and decision-making structures with different levels of accountability, resulted in a lack of appropriate scrutiny and democratic accountability of the Troika as a whole;
Amendment 672 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 35 35. Points to the generally weak democratic accountability of the Troika in programme countries at national level; notes however that this democratic accountability varies between countries,
Amendment 673 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 35 35. Points to the
Amendment 674 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 35 35.
Amendment 675 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 35 35. Points to the
Amendment 676 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 35 35. Points to the generally weak democratic accountability of the Troika in programme countries at national level;
Amendment 677 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 35 35. Points to the
Amendment 678 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 35 35. Points to the
Amendment 679 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 35 35. Points to the generally weak democratic accountability of the Troika in programme countries at national level; notes however that this democratic accountability
Amendment 68 #
Motion for a resolution Recital F F. whereas the EU created several ad hoc mechanisms to provide financial assistance for euro area countries, first through bilateral loans, including from several non- euro area countries, then through
Amendment 680 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 35 35. Points to the generally weak democratic accountability of the Troika in programme countries at national level; notes however that this democratic accountability varies between countries, depending on the will of national executives
Amendment 681 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 35 35. Points to the generally weak democratic accountability of the Troika in programme countries at national level;
Amendment 682 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 35 35. Points to the generally weak democratic accountability of the Troika in programme countries at national level; notes however that this democratic accountability varies between countries, depending also on the will of national executives;
Amendment 683 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 35 a (new) 35a. Notes that national ownership of the reforms associated with adjustment programmes was often lacking, with national authorities placing responsibility for consolidation measures on the European level. Stresses that this in turn decreased confidence in the Union.
Amendment 684 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 35 a (new) 35a. Notes the serious side effects of the application of the bail- in instrument, which include the imposition of capital controls; stresses that the real Cypriot economy continues to face major challenges. The severing of credit lines is bearing down on the productive sectors of the economy and unemployment is on the rise; regrets the fact that there was no previous assessment of the consequences in each programme country by means of impact studies or coordination with the Employment Committee, the Social Protection Committee, the Employment, Social Policy, Health and Consumer Affairs Council (EPSCO) or the Commissioner for Employment and Social Affairs; regrets, too, the fact that, despite the important social implications, the consultative bodies established by Treaty, in particular the European Economic and Social Committee (EESC) and the Committee of the Regions (CoR), were not consulted;
Amendment 685 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 35 a (new) 35a. Points out that the Troika is not sufficiently accountable at European level, as none of its three component bodies is subject to the necessary democratic control by the European Parliament;
Amendment 686 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 35 a (new) 35a. Deplores the political failure of EU institutions, in particular of the EU Council and the Eurogroup, to take clear responsibility for the policy measures and results that programme countries were forced to apply under the blunt financial pressure exerted by the Troika and lending Member States. Reminds that Member States deprived from access to financial markets were left without choice but to agree to the detailed terms presented by the Troika.
Amendment 687 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 35 a (new) 35a. Considers that the democratic accountability of the ECB, the Commission and the IMF should be increased by establishing in-depth hearings with the European Parliament at all stages of the processes. (This amendment is based on a contribution by the European Trade Union Confederation (ETUC).)
Amendment 688 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 35 a (new) 35a. Recalls that the Parliaments of the Member States requesting financial assistance approved the macroeconomic adjustment programmes; points out that a national parliament objected to such a programme and thereby proved wrong the criticism that there is no alternative but to approve as objection to and revision of programmes is possible;
Amendment 689 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 36 36. Notes that formal decisions are made by both the Eurogroup and the IMF, with a crucial role now given to the ESM as it is the organisation responsible for deciding on financial assistance
Amendment 69 #
Motion for a resolution Recital F F. whereas the EU and its Member States created several ad hoc mechanisms to provide financial assistance for euro area countries, first through bilateral loans, including from several non-
Amendment 690 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 36 36. Notes that formal decisions are made by both the Eurogroup and the IMF, with a crucial role now given to the ESM as it is the organisation responsible for deciding on financial assistance, thus putting
Amendment 691 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 36 36. Notes that
Amendment 692 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 36 36. Notes that formal decisions are made by both the Eurogroup and the IMF,
Amendment 693 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 36 36. Notes that formal decisions are made by both the Eurogroup and the IMF, which are consequently politically responsible for the Troika’s actions, with a crucial role now given to the ESM as it is the organisation responsible for deciding on financial assistance,
Amendment 694 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 36 36. Notes that formal decisions are made
Amendment 695 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 36 a (new) 36a. Is of the opinion that national level legitimacy and accountability is insufficient with regard to decisions taken collectively by euro area member states within the frame of the ESM; believes that in a multi-level polity such as the European Union, democratic legitimacy and accountability ought to be granted and carried out at the level at which decisions are taken;
Amendment 696 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 36 a (new) 3a. Deplores that EU institutions are being portrayed as the scapegoat for adverse effects in Member States' macroeconomic adjustment while it is the Member States' Finance Ministers that bear the political responsibility for the Troika and its operations; stresses that this may lead to increased Euroscepticism although responsibility lies with the national not the European level;
Amendment 697 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 36 b (new) 36b. Calls on the Eurogroup, the Council and the European Council to assume full responsibility for the operations of the Troika;
Amendment 698 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 37 37. Points to the fact that the ESM is an intergovernmental b
Amendment 699 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 37 37. Points to the fact that the ESM is intergovernmental by nature
Amendment 7 #
Motion for a resolution Citation 3 – having regard to the Treaty on European Union and in particular Article 3 and Article 13(2) thereof,
Amendment 70 #
Motion for a resolution Recital F a (new) Fa. whereas the IMF has decided in the context of the first Greek programme to modify by an emergency procedure its Exceptional Access Policy criterion on debt sustainability in order to make it possible to lend to Greece, Ireland and Portugal and in so doing has therefore deviated from its fundamental principle to lend only to countries where a rigorous and systemic analysis indicates that there is a high probability that the country's public debt is sustainable in the medium term;
Amendment 700 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 37 37. Points to the fact that the ESM is an intergovernmental
Amendment 701 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 37 37. Points to the fact that the ESM is intergovernmental by
Amendment 702 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 37 37. Points to the fact that the ESM is intergovernmental by nature, is bound by the unanimity rule, and is subject to political influence exerted by finance ministers, heads of state and government as well as national parliaments; for this reason, a spirit of mutual commitment and solidarity is required;
Amendment 703 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 37 37. Points to the fact that the ESM is intergovernmental by nature, is rightfully bound by the unanimity rule, and is subject to political influence exerted by finance ministers, heads of state and government as well as national parliaments;
Amendment 704 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 37 37. Points to the fact that the ESM is intergovernmental by nature, is bound by the unanimity rule, and is subject to
Amendment 705 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 37 37.
Amendment 706 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 37 a (new) 37a. Notes that the ESM Treaty has introduced the principle of loan conditionaly under the form of a macroeconomic adjustment programme; points out that the ESM treaty does not define further the content of conditionality or adjustment programme, thus giving a great deal of leeway to the troika in recommending such conditionality
Amendment 707 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 37 b (new) 37b. Calls for the current troïka setting to be discontinued;
Amendment 708 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 37 a (new) 37a. Calls on the Troika to observe its duty of care for the Single Market and legislative intent in their current and future recommendations, operations and oversight of the economic adjustment programmes.
Amendment 709 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 37 a (new) 37a. Regrets that Troika is not democratically legalised, and its actions are not based on community law; therefore, there is no clear balance, transparency or accountability on the important decisions it takes for which the European citizens are not aware; underlines that the different philosophy and perceptions of the three different institutions, ECB, European Commission and IMF as well as the lack of appropriate infrastructure within the Eurozone to combat the crisis led to premature and unbalanced decision- making for the MoU programmes imposing strict austerity measures without growth and investment to the aforesaid Southern European countries.
Amendment 71 #
Motion for a resolution Recital F b (new) Fa. whereas the doctrine of legitimate expectation, which has its roots in the principles of legal certainty and good faith, is also a central element of the general principle of legal certainty in European Union law; whereas the legitimate expectation doctrine holds that "those who act in good faith on the basis of law as it is or seems to be should not be frustrated in their expectations"; whereas a European Union institution, once it has induced implicitly or explicitly a party to take a particular course of action, must not renege on its earlier position if doing so would cause the party to suffer loss;
Amendment 710 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 37 a (new) 37a. Stresses that the main problem remains the insistence on the continued implementation and institutionalisation of the European Commission-Central Bank- IMF Troika's neo-liberal policies, hence leading to further attacks on democracy, on social and workers' rights and to the closure of small and medium size enterprises.
Amendment 711 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 37 a (new) 37a. Strongly regrets that as in the case of Cyprus late night meetings and resulting inappropriate decisions of the Eurogroup became the rule, due to months of collective procrastinating and lack of foresight, including insufficient bank sector health checks as well as imprudent debt sustainability assessments more generally,
Amendment 712 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 37 b (new) 37b. strongly criticises the way external consultants were hired, points out that the awarding of contracts often took place without a public tender - in the case of Ireland clearly due to Troika pressure and in case of Spain due to pressure from the European Commission, criticises that no attention was paid to conflicts of interest as in the case of Blackrock that was holding 3 % of the shares of the Bank of Ireland or in the case of Wyman that has clients in the banking world in programme countries, and ascertains that almost always including one of "big four" auditing firms, notes the unreasonably high fees paid to external consultants.
Amendment 713 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 37 c (new) 37c. Notes that the ECB, unlike the IMF and the Commission does not produce assessments or programme monitoring documents even though it issues joint statements with the other troika members about programme implementation; point out that the ECB relies on its own crisis related instruments such as the collateral policy and the ex-ante and ex-post control mechanism on emergency liquidity assistance (ELAs) provided by national central banks within the euro area to banks within their jurisdiction;
Amendment 714 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 37 d (new) 37d. Notes that it is not possible to determine on the basis of published documents whether the ECB takes or not responsibility for programme decisions;
Amendment 715 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 37 e (new) 37e. Points out that the ECB close involvement in EU-IMF assistance programmes has carried significant potential conflicts of interest as it has made its own actions conditional on decisions that it is itself part of; points out that such situation places the ECB into a problematic 'driver in the backseat position';
Amendment 716 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 37 f (new) 37f. Underlines that the IMF involvement as lender of last resort providing up to one third of the funding puts the institution in a minority role and carries the risk to jeopardize its ability to conduct its role objective; observes that in addition of accepting that programmes to be devised and negotiated by the troika, the IMF decided to modify its Exceptional Access Policy (EAP) criterion on debt sustainability in order to make it possible to lend to Greece, Ireland and Portugal and has therefore waived its fundamental principle to lend only to countries whenever a rigorous and systemic analysis indicates that there is a high probability that the country's public debt is sustainable in the medium term;
Amendment 717 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 37 g (new) 37g. Observes that the IMF has adopted a critical stance on the policy objectives and conflicts of interests of its European partners involvement in the programmes and more particularly its involvement in the two Greek programmes; agrees with the observers that have accurately pointed out that the fund "is risking damaging its reputation by intervening in programmes in which it does not even have faith[i]"; underlines that such risk is particularly high if the fund level of involvement as a lender avoids it to retain the critical option of exiting the programme in case of disagreement; [i] Statement of Guillermo Ortiz, former Mexican central bank governor.
Amendment 718 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 37 a (new) 37a. Notes that among the current members of the Troika, the International Monetary Fund has so far been the only institution up to its task in terms of technical expertise and able for at least a partial review of the design of the adjustment programmes, in particular with regard to the overly ambitious, frontloaded austerity measures, its underlying false scientific assumptions and devasting results; further notes several calls by IMF representatives to ‚creditor' Member States to allow for a balance between growth and austerity policies in the euro area;
Amendment 719 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 37 a (new) 37a. Stresses that the main problem remains the insistence on the continued implementation and institutionalisation of the European Commission-Central Bank- IMF Troika's neo-liberal policies, hence leading to further attacks on democracy, on social and workers' rights and to the closure of small and medium size enterprises.
Amendment 72 #
Motion for a resolution Recital F c (new) Fc. whereas the concept of legal certainty is recognised one of the general principles of European Union law by the European Court of Justice since the 1960s; whereas this principle implies that law must be certain, in that it is clear and precise, and its legal implications foreseeable;
Amendment 720 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 38 Amendment 721 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 38 Amendment 722 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 38 Amendment 723 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 38 38. Reiterates its call for all decisions related to the strengthening of the EMU to be taken on the basis of the Treaty on European Union;
Amendment 724 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 38 38. Reiterates its call for all decisions related to the strengthening of the EMU to be taken on the basis of the Treaty on European Union;
Amendment 725 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 38 38. Reiterates its call for
Amendment 726 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 38 38.
Amendment 727 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 38 38. Reiterates its call for all decisions related to the strengthening of the EMU to be taken on the basis of the Treaty on European Union; takes the view that any departure from the Community method and increased use of intergovernmental agreements would divide
Amendment 728 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 38 38. Reiterates its call for all decisions related to the strengthening of the EMU to be taken on the basis of the Treaty on European Union; takes the view that any departure from the Community method and increased use of intergovernmental agreements
Amendment 729 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 38 38. Reiterates its call for all decisions
Amendment 73 #
Motion for a resolution Recital F d (new) Fd. whereas the principle of conferral laid-down in article 5 TEU provides that the Union should act only within the limits of the competences conferred upon it by the Member States in the Treaties;
Amendment 730 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 38 a (new) 38a. Welcomes the adoption of the 6-pack and the 2-pack, with the ability to correcting imbalances at an early stage, as well as the establishment of a sound banking supervision; Urges all Member States to increase their national ownership in the European Semester's workings and decisions and to carry out all measures and reforms they have agreed to in the context of the Country Specific Recommendations; Reminds that the Commission has identified a significant degree of progress in comparison with previous years in only 15 % of the around 400 country-specific recommendations;
Amendment 731 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 38 b (new) 38b. Advocates a request for assistance to be made at the earliest possible moment in order to reduce uncertainties and costs, including the social costs that go hand in hand with a belated request;
Amendment 732 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 38 c (new) 38c. Welcomes the willingness of the Commission, the ECB, the President of the Eurogroup and the IMF as well as of the national governments and central banks of Cyprus, Ireland, Greece and Portugal to cooperate and participate in the evaluation of the European Parliament on the role and operations of the Troika, including by answering the detailed questionnaire and/or participating in formal and informal hearings;
Amendment 734 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 38 a (new) 38a. Calls on the next Parliament to pursue the work of this inquiry report and develop further its key findings by means of a next report; calls in particular to further investigate the allegations of maladministration in accordance with the provisions of article 226 TFEU including allegations related to: - potential infringements related to the implementation of the European fundamental rights including the Social Rights Chart; - the respect of the principle of conferral and the EU institutional balance of powers; - conflicts of interest within the troika institutions referred to explicitly in this report; - the provision of liquidity support by means of conventional monetary policy and ELAs; - the bank restructuring proceedings in the framework of assistance programmes and in particular the bank restructuring in Greece where a large amount of taxpayer money was injected into the banking system without the programme providing for a nationalisation of the sector; - the practices related to audit and procurement in the framework of the assistance programmes; - the treatment of bondholders and in particular the allegations related to fraudulent practices affecting retail clients in Cyprus and the absence of an effective remediation mechanism;
Amendment 735 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 38 b (new) 38b. Intends to use the key findings of this report and the follow-up report to consider, where appropriate, bringing actions to the ECJ as provided for in article 263 TFEU;
Amendment 736 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 38 c (new) 38c. Asks the troika to proceed to new debt sustainability assessments and as a matter of urgency to address the need to reduce the Greek public debt burden as well as the severe capital outflows from Greece which contributes significantly to the vicious circle of the current economic depression in the country;
Amendment 737 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 38 d (new) 38d. Reminds the Commission and the Parliament of its position adopted in plenary regarding Regulation (EU) No 472/2013; emphasises in particular that the European Parliament laid down provisions in this position which increase further the transparency and accountability of the decision-making process leading to the adoption of macroeconomic adjustment programmes, providing for a clearer and well- delimitated mandate and overall role for the Council, the Commission and the ECB; asks the Commission to reassess and integrate such provisions into the framework of a future proposal to amend Regulation(EU) No 472/2013;
Amendment 738 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 38 e (new) 38e. Recalls in the same context that the European Parliament position introduced provisions requiring the macroeconomic adjustment programmes to include contingency plans in case baseline forecasts scenarios would not materialize and in case of slippage due to circumstances outside the control of the Member State under assistance, such as unexpected international economic shocks; underlines that such plans are a prerequisite of prudent policy making given the fragility and poor reliability of economic models underpinning programme forecasts as illustrated in all Member States under assistance programmes;
Amendment 739 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 38 f (new) 38f. Calls on the Commission to start interinstitutional negotiations with the European Parliament in order to define a common procedure for informing the competent committee of the European Parliament on the conclusions drawn from the monitoring of the macroeconomic adjustment programme as well as progress the made in the preparation of the draft macroeconomic adjustment programme provided for in article 7 of Regulation (EU) No 472/2013;
Amendment 74 #
Motion for a resolution Recital G Amendment 740 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 38 g (new) 38g. Asks, in conformity with its prerogatives, the European Agency of Fundamental Rights to proceed to an encompassing impact assessment of the on-going and completed assistance programmes;
Amendment 741 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 38 h (new) 38h. Reminds the Commission to conduct and publish internal ex-post evaluations of its recommendations and its participation in the Troika; asks the Commission to include such assessments in the review report foreseen in Article 19 of Regulation (EU) No 472/2013;
Amendment 742 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 38 i (new) 38i. Asks the Commission to proceed to a thorough examination in the light of State Aid rules of liquidity provisions by the European system of Central Banks;
Amendment 743 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 38 j (new) 38j. Asks the ECB to conduct and publish internal ex-post evaluations of the impact of its recommendations and its participation in the Troika;
Amendment 744 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 38 k (new) 38k. Recommends the ECB to update its guidelines on ELAs and its collateral framework regulations in order to increase the transparency of liquidity provisions in Member States under assistance;
Amendment 745 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 38 l (new) 38l. Calls upon the ECB to limit its role in the troika to that of a silent observer obtaining information and hence refrain from being an party to programme negotiations that by their nature cover a scope that extends far beyond the remit of monetary policy and risks hence undermining its independence;
Amendment 746 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 38 m (new) 38m. Reminds the Council and the Commission that article 16 of Regulation (EU) No 472/2013 provides that Member States in receipt of financial assistance on 30 May 2013 shall be subject to that Regulation as from that date; calls upon the Council and the Commission in conformity with article 265 TFEU to act in order to streamline and align the ad hoc financial assistance programmes with the procedures and acts referred to in Regulation (EU) No 472/2013;
Amendment 747 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 38 n (new) 38n. Looks forward to the adoption of an updated Regulation (EC) No 332/2002 providing for balance of payment assistance to non-euro area Member States; reminds the Council and the Commission of the requests included in the Huebner report adopted by the Parliament in 2013; emphasizes in particular the need to streamline the provisions of the updated Regulation with Regulation (EU) No 472/2013;
Amendment 748 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 38 o (new) 38o. Points out that the integration within the Commission's overall strategy and working programme for the next term of the recommendations addressed to the Commission in this report will be a very important factor for the European Parliament's assessment of the candidates for the next President of the Commission and for the Commissioner responsible for the Economic and Monetary Affairs;
Amendment 749 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 38 p (new) 38p. Asks the Council to activate the framework it decided on direct recapitalisation and the treatment of legacy assets so as to break-down the vicious circle between sovereigns and the banks and alleviate the public debt burden in Ireland, Greece, Portugal and Cyprus;
Amendment 75 #
Motion for a resolution Recital G G. whereas a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) is based on a draft macroeconomic adjustment programme prepared by the Member State requesting financial assistance and approved by the Council; whereas a MoU is an agreement between the Member State concerned and the Troika, which results from negotiations and whereby a Member State undertakes to carry out a number of actions in exchange for financial assistance; whereas the Commission signs the MoU on behalf of euro area finance ministers; whereas it is stipulated in the ESM Treaty that a Member State requesting assistance from the ESM has also to address a request for assistance to the IMF;
Amendment 750 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 38 q (new) 38q. Asks the Council and Eurogroup to respect the commitment made by the President of the European Council to negotiate an interinstitutional arrangement with the European Parliament in order to establish an appropriate interim mechanism for increasing the accountability of the ESM; calls also in that context for the disclosure of minutes of the ESM governing council;
Amendment 751 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 38 r (new) 38r. Recommends the Commission, the Eurogroup and the FMI to explore further and integrate appropriate proposals relating to on-going and future programmes the concept of 'contingent convertible bonds' where the returns of newly issued sovereign debt in Member States under assistance are linked to economic growth;
Amendment 753 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 38 s (new) 38s. Calls on the IMF to redefine the scope of any future involvement in EU related assistance programmes to that of a catalytic lender providing minimum financing and expertise to the borrowing country and EU institutions while retaining the option of exit in case of disagreement;
Amendment 754 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 38 t (new) 38t. Recalls its position to transform the ESM into a European Monetary Fund (EMF) which would be a vertically integrated and dedicated EU institution responsible for assisting Member States experiencing or threatened with serious difficulties with respect to their financial stability; point out that such framework would avoid the conflicts of interest inherent to the Commission's current role as an Eurogroup agent and its much more encompassing role of 'guardian of the treaty'; recommends Member States to increase the ESM resource ceiling;
Amendment 755 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 38 u (new) 38u. Underlines that the ECJ 'Pringle' case-law and jurisprudence opens the possibility to bring the ESM within the community framework with a constant Treaty on the basis of article 352 TFEU; calls therefore upon the Commission to put forward by end of 2014 a legislative proposal with that objective;
Amendment 757 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 38 v (new) 38v. Calls for a Treaty review that would provide for a European Parliament validated mandate for future assistance programmes and for an assent procedure for the final approval of these programmes; intends to use its prerogatives to initiate a treaty revision proposal with that purpose during the next legislature;
Amendment 758 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 38 w (new) 38w. Calls for the extension of the ordinary legislative procedures to all social and economic policy areas not yet fully covered by such procedures such as the excessive deficit procedure, competition policy as well as the policies adopted under article 352 TFEU;
Amendment 759 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 38 x (new) 38x. Is of the opinion that a treaty revision will be required in order to fully anchor the EU crisis prevention and resolution framework within a legally sound and economically sustainable ground; underlines that further steps aiming at reducing negative spill-over effects and favouring positive spill over effects in the EMU still need to be put in place such as, inter alia, a mechanism for the mutualisation of sovereign debt and deposit guarantee schemes, macroeconomic stabilizers for the EMU and asymmetric shock mitigation mechanisms, including EU mechanisms for unemployment insurance, a genuine banking Union and a meaningful common backstop for banking resolution, a broader economic, social and environmental convergence process as well as an upward harmonization of tax policy;
Amendment 76 #
Motion for a resolution Recital G G. whereas a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) is, by definition, an agreement between the Member State concerned and the Troika, which results from negotiations and whereby a Member State undertakes to carry out a number of actions in exchange for financial assistance; whereas, however, it is not public knowledge how negotiations have been conducted in practice between the Troika and the relevant Member State and, furthermore, there is no transparency as to the extent to which a Member State seeking assistance has been able to influence the outcome of negotiations; whereas it is stipulated in the ESM Treaty that a Member State requesting assistance from the ESM has also to address a request for assistance to the IMF;
Amendment 760 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 38 y (new) 38y. Encourages the IMF and asks the Commission and the Council to bring the IMF to a common position to reignite the debate around an international sovereign debt restructuring mechanism (SDRM) with a view to adopting a fair and sustainable multilateral approach in this domain;
Amendment 761 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 38 a (new) 38a. Stresses that an adequate communication strategy on the need for fiscal consolidation and structural reforms was not pursued during the adoption and implementation of programmes in the Member States concerned. Calls for the development of a communication strategy for on-going and future financial assistance programmes. Urges to give this concern utmost priority as inaction on this front will ultimately damage the image of the Union.
Amendment 762 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 38 a (new) 38a. Deplores the fact that the European Council ignored the proposals contained in its resolution of 6 July 2011 on the financial, economic and social crisis; emphasises that implementing them would have fostered economic and social convergence in the Economic and Monetary Union and would have afforded the measures to coordinate economic and budgetary policy full democratic legitimacy;
Amendment 763 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 38 a (new) 38a. Calls for the Memorandum of Understanding with Portugal to be cancelled forthwith and for the Troika to be disbanded; recognises that the Portuguese public debt is unsustainable and calls for a process to begin without delay with a view to renegotiating the debt as regards the amounts, due dates, interest rates, and terms of payment, which should be brought into line with the economic and social needs and the economic and social development requirements of the country and the Portuguese people;
Amendment 764 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 38 b (new) 38b. Criticises the fact that the immediate cancellation of the Memorandum of Understanding would still not guarantee the Portuguese people’s inalienable right to development; calls for the Stability Pact, the six-pack, the two-pack, and the ‘Fiscal Compact‘ to be revoked without delay and for the European Semester and economic governance process to be halted;
Amendment 765 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 38 c (new) 38c. Considers that the course set by Economic and Monetary Union, in particular under the Stability and Growth Pact (now bolstered by the six-pack, the two-pack, and what is termed the Fiscal Compact), is creating growing inequalities among countries and is manifestly at odds with reality and with the specific needs of countries with fragile economies; considers that the obsession with making good the budget deficit, restrictive public investment policies, privatising and downgrading public services, and cutting wages, pensions, and other welfare benefits will serve to exacerbate the crisis;
Amendment 766 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 38 d (new) 38d. Rejects any diktats, conditions, and restrictions that infringe Portugal‘s sovereign right to determine its economic policies, including the management of its natural resources and its trading relations;
Amendment 767 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 38 e (new) 38e. Maintains that the agreements and treaties governing EU integration should be reversible and that every country’s status should be adjusted according to the will of its people and its actual situation, on the understanding that the necessary exception clauses must be permitted;
Amendment 768 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 38 f (new) 38f. Calls for the EU budget to be at least doubled and for an EU programme to be drawn up for the countries with a Memorandum of Understanding, laying down the priorities of resolving social problems and safeguarding, utilising, and promoting the national resources of each country concerned and its production capacity, especially in the agricultural and fisheries sectors and in industry, as is essential in order to protect workers and enhance their status and to restore the rights of which they have been stripped in terms of wages, pensions, and other social entitlements;
Amendment 769 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 38 g (new) 38g. Calls for radical change to the Statute, policies, and sham independence of the European Central Bank, allowing all Member States to be represented on an equal footing in its governing body, so as to enable them to exercise genuine political control and ensure that every Member State can control its national central bank and monetary policy – not least by using the currency tool – with a view to promoting economic growth and employment;
Amendment 77 #
Motion for a resolution Recital G G. whereas a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) is an agreement between the Member State concerned and the Troika, which results from negotiations and whereby a Member State undertakes to
Amendment 770 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 39 Amendment 771 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 39 Amendment 772 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 39 Amendment 773 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 39 39. Stresses that as long as Member States make direct contributions from their national budget to the ESM national parliaments should approve financial assistance; recommends for this purpose that all Member States establish an appropriate mechanism by which their parliaments approve financial assistance and monitor implementation to enhance ownership and democratic accountability; stresses that the ESM should evolve towards Community-method management as provided for in the ESM Treaty and demands that the ESM be made accountable to the European Parliament including with respect to decisions to grant financial assistance, in order to exert democratic accountability over the ESM;
Amendment 774 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 39 39.
Amendment 775 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 39 39.
Amendment 776 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 39 39. Stresses that the ESM should evolve towards Community-method management as provided for in the ESM Treaty and demands that the ESM
Amendment 777 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 39 39.
Amendment 778 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 39 39. Stresses that the ESM should
Amendment 779 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 39 39. Stresses that the ESM should evolve towards Community-method management as provided for in the ESM Treaty and demands that the ESM be made accountable to the European Parliament including with respect to decisions to grant financial assistance, in order to exert democratic accountability over the ESM at the European level as well;
Amendment 78 #
Motion for a resolution Recital G G. whereas a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) is an agreement between the Member State concerned and the Troika, which results from negotiations and whereby a Member State undertakes to carry out a number of actions in exchange for financial assistance; whereas it is stipulated in the ESM Treaty that a Member State requesting assistance from the ESM
Amendment 780 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 39 39. Stresses that the ESM should evolve towards Community-method management as provided for in the ESM Treaty and demands that the ESM be made accountable to the European Parliament
Amendment 781 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 39 39. Stresses that the ESM should evolve
Amendment 782 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 39 39. Stresses that the ESM should evolve towards Community-method management as provided for in the ESM Treaty and demands that the ESM be made accountable to the European Parliament including with respect to decisions to grant financial assistance, in order to exert democratic accountability over the ESM; urges the ESM to implement its direct recapitalisation instrument to allow it to recapitalise banks directly;
Amendment 783 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 39 a (new) 39a. Calls for a reform of the ESM in order to allow it to apply the community method and to be fully accountable to the European Parliament. Considers that the ESM's current voting system must be revised to allow for decisions via qualified majority. Insists that the board of the ESM steps into a structural dialogues with European social partners and to this purpose proposes the creation of a Social Partner Dialogue Board; Considers that the ESM must ensure that in the future, all measures taken in the context of financial assistance programmes will be screened with regard to their respect of the Social Acquis and fundamental rights;
Amendment 784 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 39 a (new) 39a. Calls on the European Commission to consult the European Parliament with due notice on the relevant decision- making processes involved in all developments in the economic Adjustment Programmes in order to enhance the accountability during the preparatory phrase as well as the responsibilities of the Troika component organisations, monitoring and enforcing results.
Amendment 785 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 39 a (new) 39a. Stresses the need for a thorough examination of the consistency with the relevant practices of other Eurozone member-states as to the statistical classification and accounting rules adopted with respect to the fiscal data of the year preceding the adoption of the initial agreement between, on the one hand the Government of Greece and, on the other EU and IMF, as well as of the first year of the implementation of the agreement, that is of the years 2009 and 2010.
Amendment 786 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 40 Amendment 787 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 40 Amendment 788 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 40 Amendment 789 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 40 Amendment 79 #
Motion for a resolution Recital G G. whereas a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) is an agreement
Amendment 790 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 40 40.
Amendment 791 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 40 40. Urges that
Amendment 792 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 40 40.
Amendment 793 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 40 40.
Amendment 794 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 40 a (new) 40a. Stresses that with the phasing out of the Troika, an institution will need to take over the scrutiny of on-going reforms. Calls for an assessment of whether the ESM should carry this work forward, whether a cooperation with other European institutions is needed or whether the creation of a new body will be necessary;
Amendment 795 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 40 a (new) 40a. Urges the EU to closely monitor the financial, fiscal and economic evolution in the Member States and to create an institutionalized system of positive incentives to duly reward those who meet best practices in this regard and those who utterly comply with their adjustment programmes;
Amendment 796 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 41 Amendment 797 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 41 41. Calls for the
Amendment 798 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 41 41. Calls for
Amendment 799 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 41 41. Calls for the involvement of social partners in the design and implementation of adjustment programmes, current and future; calls, where possible, for the involvement of the EIB in the design and the implementation of investment related measures;
Amendment 8 #
Motion for a resolution Citation 5 a (new) - having regard to its resolution of 16 June 2010 on EU 2020 (text adopted, P7_TA(2013)0447),
Amendment 80 #
Motion for a resolution Recital G a (new) Ga. whereas the authorities of the MS concerned also sign a MEFP (Memorandum of Economic and Financial Policies) which is to be aligned as closely as possible with the MoU;
Amendment 800 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 41 41. Calls for the real and effective involvement of social partners in the design and implementation of adjustment programmes, current and future; In those cases where social partner organisations are indeed able to reach a joint agreement or view, the troika should respect this and abstain from imposing its policy; (ETUC input)
Amendment 801 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 41 41. Calls for the involvement of social partners in the design and implementation of adjustment programmes, current and future
Amendment 802 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 41 41. Calls for the involvement of social partners in the design
Amendment 803 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 41 41. Calls for the involvement of social partners as discussion partners in the design and implementation of adjustment programmes, current and future;
Amendment 804 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 41 41. Calls for the involvement of
Amendment 805 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 41 41. Calls for
Amendment 806 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 41 41. Calls for
Amendment 807 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 41 a (new) 41a. Stresses that, there is a need for a balance between fiscal consolidation, structural reforms and incentives for growth and employment; therefore, the current synthesis/form of Troika should be dismantled and changed in favour of more solidarity, democratic legitimacy and transparency.
Amendment 808 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 41 a (new) 41a. Calls for radical change to the Statute, policies, and sham independence of the European Central Bank, allowing all Member States to be represented on an equal footing in its governing body, so as to enable them to exercise genuine political control and ensure that every Member State can control its national central bank and monetary policy – not least by using the currency tool – with a view to promoting economic growth and employment;
Amendment 809 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 41 a (new) 41a. Believes that alternative proposals should be examined in order to combat stagnation and unemployment in countries under Memorandum; considers that these proposals should aim at strengthening and not undermining the welfare state , boosting growth and active job creation policies.
Amendment 81 #
Motion for a resolution Recital G b (new) Gb. whereas the Greek, Irish and Cypriot Parliaments ratified the MoUs negotiated by their respective State authorities and the Troika; however, the Portuguese Parliament was not part of the negotiation process and did not ratify the MoU;
Amendment 810 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 41 a (new) 41a. Calls for the ESM board to step into a structural dialogue with European social partners
Amendment 811 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 41 b (new) 41b. Calls for any future involvement of the IMF in the Euro area to be optional and limited; calls for the consultation of the European Parliament on the involvement of the IMF in the Euro area on an ad-hoc basis;
Amendment 812 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 41 a (new) 41a. Notes that this initiative report is only a first step to draw some conclusions about the function and role of the troika and asks for the establishment in the beginning of the new legislature of a normal inquiry committee as referred by the Article 226 TFEU and Article 185 of the Rules in order to examine better and more thorough the role, the function and the results of troika.
Amendment 813 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 41 b (new) 41b. Stresses that programs of memoranda of understanding are unsuccessful and have caused huge social cost. Asks for the interruption of these programs and the provision by the Union´s side of all the necessary means in order the governments to restore salaries, pensions, social rights and labour relations in pre Memorandum levels and mitigate all the catastrophic consequences which they caused
Amendment 814 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 41 c (new) 41c. Calls for a definite solution for all over indebted Eurozone member-states in the context of a European Debt Conference and deletion of the biggest part of the debt after audit control.
Amendment 815 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 41 a (new) 41a. Believes that alternative proposals should be examined in order to combat stagnation and unemployment in countries under Memorandum; considers that these proposals should aim at strengthening and not undermining the welfare state , boosting growth and active job creation policies.
Amendment 816 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 42 42. Demands that the Troika constantly take stock of the
Amendment 817 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 42 42.
Amendment 818 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 42 42.
Amendment 819 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 42 42. Demands that the Troika take stock of the current debate on fiscal multipliers
Amendment 82 #
Motion for a resolution Recital H H. whereas the total amount of financial assistance in the four programmes is unprecedented, as are the duration and shape of the programmes, leading to an unusual situation where the assistance has almost exclusively replaced the usual financing provided by the markets; whereas the involvement of the IMF ensures not only a possible engagement in terms of co-financing, but also the availability of strong expertise resulting from the IMF financial assistance programmes conducted since 1947;
Amendment 820 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 42 42. Demands that the Troika take stock of the current debate on fiscal multipliers and consider the revision of MoUs on the basis of the latest empirical results regarding the consequences of fiscal adjustment on the real economy, society and recovery efforts;
Amendment 821 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 42 42. Demands that the Troika take stock of the current debate on fiscal multipliers and
Amendment 822 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 42 42.
Amendment 823 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 42 42. Demands that the Troika take stock of the current debate on fiscal multipliers
Amendment 824 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 42 42. Demands that the Troika take stock of the current debate on fiscal multipliers and
Amendment 825 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 42 42. Demands that the Troika take stock of the current debate on fiscal multipliers and
Amendment 826 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 42 a (new) 42a. Calls for memoranda to be revised within the frame of the community legislation so as to promote credible and sustainable consolidation strategy, and serve the objectives of the Union growth strategy and stated social cohesion and employment objectives; demands in particular that fiscal adjustment timeframes are prolonged; calls for revised memoranda to restore the principles of upward convergence and cohesion on which the EU was founded, as well as the principles contained in the Charter of fundamental right of the European Union;
Amendment 827 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 42 b (new) 42b. Strongly reject the Commission proposal for bilateral contractual arrangements, which represents the extension of the troika system to all member states of the euro area;
Amendment 828 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 42 a (new) 42a. Calls on the EU to support the economic recovery of programme countries and countries which have exited Troika programmes, urges the Eurogroup to deliver on its commitment to examine the situation of the Irish financial sector with the view of further improving the sustainability of the adjustment in Ireland, and, having regard to all of the above, urges the Eurogroup to make good on the commitment to Ireland to deal with this bank debt burden;
Amendment 829 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 42 a (new) 42a. Regrets that the burden has not been shared among all who acted irresponsibly and that the protection of bond holders was seen as an EU necessity in the interest of financial stability. Special consideration should be made in the Stability and Growth Pact for relevant legacy debt that is unfairly burdening Ireland under the flexibility provisions of the reformed pact. In the longer term the distribution of the costs should reflect distribution of the protected bond holders.
Amendment 83 #
Motion for a resolution Recital H H. whereas it has been necessary to provide financial assistance because the Member States in question were obtaining loans from the market only at extremely high interest rates and whereas the total amount of financial assistance in the four programmes is unprecedented, as are the duration and shape of the programmes, leading to an unusual situation where the assistance has almost exclusively replaced the usual financing provided by the markets;
Amendment 830 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 42 b (new) 42b. Notes that thinking on bail-in evolved over time; in the case of Ireland in 2010, the bail-in of senior bondholders was not an option available to the Irish Authorities while in Cyprus in 2013, the bail-in of insured depositors was put forward as a policy measure. This has led to an unlevel playing field and to unequal treatment across the euro area.
Amendment 831 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 42 c (new) 42c. Points out that bail-in of a minimum of 8% of total liabilities in priority order beginning with shareholders since the conclusion of BRRD on December 11th is now mandatory and recalls the strengthened protection of depositors under Deposit Guarantee Schemes Directive.
Amendment 832 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 42 d (new) 42d. Stresses that as the recovery in the EU picks up, all possibilities for relief for the Member States in programme countries should be explored, including the possibility of direct recapitalisation by the ESM.
Amendment 833 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 42 a (new) 42a. Calls on the Troika to take duly into account cross-border interrelations such as fiscal spill-overs and global value chains when adjusting their models, recommending measures and reforms and monitoring their implementation;
Amendment 834 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 42 b (new) 42b. Demands that complementary to structural funds the Commission tables a proposal for an asymmetric shock absorption mechanism to support temporarily Member States and especially programme countries whose catch up process with respect to the Growth and Jobs Strategy is imperilled
Amendment 835 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 42 c (new) 42c. Calls on the ECB and NCBs to publish comprehensive information on ELAs in a timely fashion, including concerning the conditions for support such as solvability, the way the ELAs are financed by the NCBs, the legal framework and practical functioning
Amendment 836 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 42 d (new) 42d. Calls for an independent inquiry into the awarding of contracts to external consultants, the lack of public tender, the very high fees paid and the conflicts of interests.
Amendment 837 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 42 a (new) 42a. Calls on the Commission and the Council to give the same attention to social imbalances, and to correcting them, as it does to macroeconomic imbalances, and to that end, give adequate weight to EPSCO and its priorities in the framework of the Eurogroup;
Amendment 838 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 42 a (new) 42a. Notes that several international financial consulting firms have played a central role in the bailout in the countries being supervised by the Troika and that the countries concerned have spent a total of EUR 80 million to secure those firms’ services; calls on the Commission, therefore, to lay down a framework for the future selection of financial consultants entailing at least the obligation of transparency;
Amendment 839 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 43 43.
Amendment 84 #
Motion for a resolution Recital H H. whereas the total amount of financial assistance in the four programmes is unprecedented, as are the duration and shape of the programmes, leading to an unusual situation where the assistance has almost exclusively replaced the usual financing provided by the markets; thereby shielding the banking sector from losses by transferring large amounts of programme country sovereign debt from the balance sheet of the private sector to the balance sheet of the public sector; (ETUC Input)
Amendment 840 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 43 43. Is concerned, in particular, to improve the full accountability of the Commission to the European Parliament when it acts in its future capacity as a
Amendment 841 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 43 43. Is concerned, in particular, to improve the accountability of the Commission when it acts in its capacity as a member of the Troika; requests that the Commission representative(s) in the Troika should be heard in the European Parliament before taking up their duties and should be subject to regular reporting to the European Parliament; notes that the European Court of Auditors has a role in auditing the activities of the Commission in relation to the programmes of support for the programme countries, and in reporting to the Parliament, and calls on the European Court of Auditors to complete its ongoing work programme in relation to the activities of the Commission in the context of the financial crisis;
Amendment 842 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 43 43.
Amendment 843 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 43 43.
Amendment 844 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 43 43. Is concerned, in particular, to improve the accountability of the Commission when it acts in its capacity as a member of the Troika; requests that the Commission representative(s) in the Troika should be heard in
Amendment 845 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 43 43. Is concerned, in particular, to improve the accountability of the Commission when it acts in its capacity as a member of the Troika; requests that the Commission representative(s) in the Troika
Amendment 846 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 43 43. Is concerned
Amendment 847 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 43 43. Is concerned, in particular, to improve the accountability of the Commission when it acts in its capacity as a member of the Troika; requests that the Commission representative(s) in the Troika should be heard in the European Parliament before taking up their duties and should be subject to regular reporting to the European Parliament; reform programmes on the European level (as MoU) should be legitimised by decisions of the European Parliament.
Amendment 848 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 43 43. Is concerned, in particular, to improve and clarify the accountability of the Commission when it acts in its capacity as a member of the Troika; requests that the Commission representative(s) in the Troika should be heard in the European Parliament before taking up their duties and should be subject to regular reporting to the European Parliament;
Amendment 849 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 43 a (new) 43a. calls for the establishment of clear, transparent and binding rules of procedure for the interaction between the institutions within the Troika and the allocation of tasks therein; strongly believes that a clear definition and division of tasks is needed in order to enhance transparency, enable a stronger democratic control over and to underpin the credibility of the work of the Troika;
Amendment 85 #
Motion for a resolution Recital H H. whereas the total amount of financial assistance in the four programmes is unprecedented, as are the duration
Amendment 850 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 43 a (new) 43a. Requests that in any reform of the Troika framework the ECB role is carefully analysed in order to align it with the ECB mandate; requests especially to assess the viability granting the ECB a transparent and clearly defined advisory role while not allowing it to be a full negotiation partner and discontinuing ECB co-signing mission statements;
Amendment 851 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 43 b (new) 43b. Is concerned, in particular, to improve the accountability of decisions of the Eurogroup with regard to financial assistance as finance ministers bear the ultimate political responsibility for macroeconomic adjustment programmes and their implementation while often neither being directly accountable to their national parliament nor the European Parliament for specific decisions; believes that before financial assistance is being granted the President of the Eurogroup should be heard before the European Parliament and the EU finance ministers in their respective parliament; stresses that the President of the Eurogroup and the finance ministers should both be required to regularly report to the European parliament and national parliaments;
Amendment 852 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 43 a (new) 43a. Believes that in political actions derived from the adjustment programmes conditionality, the Commission should be fully accountable to the MEPs and should answer all the parliamentary questions presented.
Amendment 853 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 43 a (new) 43a. Calls on the Commission to compile a study on the social impact of the programmes implemented so as to enable the resulting information to be used for future assistance measures;
Amendment 854 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 43 a (new) 43a. Notes that the ECB's mandate is, according to the Treaty, primarily limited to monetary stability; points out that the ECB has no mandate, no competence and no expertise on labour market policy; thus call for the ECB to be no longer involved in the preparation of structural reforms in the member states; calls for the association of the ECB in the Union's assistance programme to be discontinued;
Amendment 855 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 43 a (new) 43a. Underlines the relevance of the ECB or a European public bank applicable of money creation to act as a lender of last resort; demands nevertheless that conditions like those which have been set for the ECB's OMT programme would have to be reformulated in order to prevent Member States from misusing this refinancing facility and to stop financial markets from speculating against any EU Member State whilst not intervening in social, economic or political decisions which have to be taken by elected bodies in the respective Member State and on EU level;
Amendment 856 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 43 a (new) 43a. Calls for the European Parliament to be allowed to carry out checks, both beforehand and retrospectively, on all persons implementing the future oversight procedure;
Amendment 857 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 43 b (new) 43b. Calls in addition for an arrangement to be established whereby, if a further crisis were to occur in one of the Member States, the European Parliament could decide to set up a future supervisory body and would exercise regular scrutiny over it thereafter;
Amendment 858 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 44 Amendment 859 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 44 44. Calls for a re
Amendment 86 #
Motion for a resolution Recital H H. whereas the total amount of financial assistance in the four programmes is unprecedented, as are the duration and shape of the programmes, leading to an unusual situation where the assistance has almost exclusively replaced the usual financing provided by the markets; whereas the timing of the adjustments was due to the amount of funding available;
Amendment 860 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 44 44. Calls for a reassessment of the decision-making process of the Eurogroup
Amendment 861 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 44 44. Calls for an
Amendment 862 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 44 44. Calls for a reassessment of the decision-making process of the Eurogroup,
Amendment 863 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 44 44. Calls for a reassessment of the decision-making process of the Eurogroup,
Amendment 864 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 44 44. Calls for a reassessment of the decision-making process of the Eurogroup,
Amendment 865 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 44 44. Calls for a reassessment of the decision-making process of the Eurogroup, amending MoUs with the Member States receiving EU-IMF financial assistance to include appropriate democratic accountability at both national and European levels; calls for European guidelines to be established in order to ensure appropriate democratic control on the implementation of measures at national level; proposes the creation of a permanent chairman of the Eurogroup, who would be one of the Vice-chairs of the Commission and accountable in front of the European parliament;
Amendment 866 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 44 a (new) 44a. Demands that comprehensive social impact assessments of changes in social security systems and provision of care services due to austerity measures be carried in order to avoid making a bad situation worse, creating long-term problems and undermining other policy goals: that is a task for the EU in the Troika and in the assessment of National Reform Plans.
Amendment 867 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 44 b (new) 44b. Points out that innovative legislative tools and actions should be developed to ensure access to basic services such as access to vital health care services and treatments.
Amendment 868 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 44 a (new) 44a. Asks the Commission and the Council not to apply such institutional and financial solutions in future, and to put in place mechanisms enabling all Member States to achieve social goals and policies set out in the Treaties, in particular those relating to the individual and collective rights of those at greatest risk of social exclusion; calls for concrete and binding mechanisms to rebalance the economic pillar of the Union and the Monetary Union in particular, with the European Social Acquis;
Amendment 869 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 44 b (new) 44b. Demands a significantly higher level of transparency of Troika negotiations; the agendas of meetings should be published in advance to give social partners and stakeholders the possibility to get involved, minutes or proceedings of the meetings should be published as soon as technically possible after the respective negotiations; in case parts of the negotiations should remain confidential to prevent market participants from taking advantage of the discussed measures or to prevent market disruptions representatives of the European Parliament and the Parliaments of Member States involved should be informed; these representatives are to be appointed by the respective Parliament;
Amendment 87 #
Motion for a resolution Recital H H. whereas the total amount of financial assistance in the four programmes is unprecedented, as are the duration and shape of the programmes, leading to a
Amendment 870 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 44 c (new) 44c. Calls for examination of the possibility to develop a health rescue fund in order to guaranty access to essential services and treatments;
Amendment 871 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 44 c (new) 44c. As a first urgent step towards a sovereign monetary union, intends to negotiate a concrete and binding roadmap on the reform of own resources, defining the most urgent steps of the process even during the current MFF; calls on the Commission to present concrete legislative proposals on the own resources package, including a revised proposal on a VAT-based own resource, at the latest by the time of the MFF revision; expresses its conviction that revenues from the Financial Transaction Tax should wholly or partly be allocated to the EU budget as a genuine own resource. Stresses the importance of reaching a political agreement on an in-depth reform of the own resources system; is convinced that the EU budget should be financed by genuine own resources as provided for in the Treaty; states, therefore, its commitment that such reform should reduce the share of GNI-based contributions to the EU budget to a maximum of 40% and phase out all existing rebates and correction mechanisms;
Amendment 872 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 45 Amendment 873 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 45 Amendment 874 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 45 Amendment 875 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 45 45. Is of the opinion that the option of a Treaty change
Amendment 876 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 45 45. Is of the opinion that
Amendment 877 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 45 45. Is of the opinion that the option of a Treaty change allowing for the extension of the scope of the present Art. 143 TFEU to all Member States, instead of being restricted to non-euro Member States, should be explored ; similarly, takes the view that the option of a Treaty change to create a European Monetary Fund within the Community framework as an alternative to the IMF should also be explored; further considers that other issues to be evaluated include the current institutional framework of the Troika, the involvement of the ILO and of the Council of Europe, ensuring compliance with the Charter of Fundamental Rights and the social commitments under the Europe 2020 strategy, the involvement of the ECB in the review of
Amendment 878 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 45 45. Is of the opinion that the option of a Treaty change allowing for the extension of the scope of the present Art. 143 TFEU to all Member States, instead of being restricted to non-euro Member States, should be explored; similarly, takes the view that the option of a Treaty change to create a European Monetary Fund within the Community framework
Amendment 879 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 45 45. Is of the opinion that the option of a Treaty change allowing for the extension of the scope of the present Art. 143 TFEU to all Member States, instead of being restricted to non-euro Member States, should be explored ; similarly, takes the view that the option of a Treaty change to create a European Monetary Fund within the Community framework as an alternative to the IMF should also be explored; further considers that other issues to be evaluated include the current institutional framework of the Troika, the involvement of the ECB in the review of the programmes and the
Amendment 88 #
Motion for a resolution Recital H H. whereas the total amount of financial assistance in the four programmes is unprecedented, as are the duration and shape of the programmes, leading to an unusual situation where the assistance has almost exclusively replaced the usual financing
Amendment 880 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 45 45. Is of the opinion that the option of a Treaty change allowing for the extension of the scope of the present Art. 143 TFEU to all Member States, instead of being restricted to non-euro Member States, should be explored
Amendment 881 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 45 45. Is of the opinion that the option of a Treaty change allowing for the extension of the scope of the present Art. 143 TFEU to all Member States, instead of being restricted to non-euro Member States, should be explored
Amendment 882 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 45 a (new) 45a. Calls for the creation of a European Monetary Fund on the basis of Union law, which shall act according to the Community method; points out that such a EMF should combine the financial means of the ESM geared to support countries experiencing balance of payments problems or facing state insolvency with the expertise that the Commission (DG ECFIN) has gained over the last few years in this field;
Amendment 883 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 45 b (new) 45b. Is of the opinion that the option of developing a mechanism with clear procedural steps for states, which are in danger of insolvency, should be explored, accompanying the rules of the 6-pack and the 2-pack;
Amendment 884 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 45 a (new) 45a. After these years of experience in designing and implementing financial programs, the European institutions have acquired the necessary know-how to design and implement them by themselves without resorting to the IMF in the future;
Amendment 885 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 45 a (new) 45a. Calls for a Treaty change to create a European Monetary Fund within the Community framework as an alternative to the IMF and the ESM in its current form; believes that this European Monetary Fund should be based on joint and several guarantees from the member states; believes that it should take over the attributions of the ESM, and that it should be subjected to the highest democratic standards of accountability and legitimacy;
Amendment 886 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 45 b (new) 45b. Calls for a convention to be convened for the preparation of any change to the Treaties;
Amendment 887 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 45 c (new) 45c. Supports the Irish authorities' demand for a transfer of a share of public debt corresponding to the cost of the bail out of the financial sector to the ESM, on the basis that bail in instruments that have been made available to other member states under a programme were not granted to Ireland when it requested assistance; Is of the opinion that this transfer would strongly benefit the Irish economy and financial stability in the eurozone overall
Amendment 888 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 45 d (new) 45d. Calls for an immediate restructuring of the Greek public debt, in particular that owned by the ECB, the EFSF and the IMF; believes that the existence of the OMT provides sufficient guarantees to alleviate negative market reactions to a restructuring; recalls that a number of possibilities exist for such a restructuring, besides a haircut on bonds principals, including bond swapping, extending bonds maturities and reducing coupons;
Amendment 889 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 45 a (new) 45a. Stresses that the EU and the euro area in particular need to continue the path of economic reforms to increase the overall competitiveness of the Union, to create growth and jobs, and to make it more resilient to external shocks;
Amendment 89 #
Motion for a resolution Recital H H. whereas the total amount of financial assistance packages in the four programmes is unprecedented, as are the duration and shape of the programmes, leading to an un
Amendment 890 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 45 a (new) Amendment 891 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 45 b (new) 45b. Asks the Commission, in accordance with article 138 TFEU, to propose appropriate measures to ensure unified representation of the euro area within the international financial institutions and conferences and particularly in the IMF, in order to replace the current system of individual Member State representation at the international level;
Amendment 892 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 45 c (new) 45c. Calls for the full implementation of the 6-pack and the 2-pack, allowing notably for a better and public dialogue between all parties involved (through the European Semester and the Economic Dialogue); believes that the EP could act as an arbitration court when a Member State calls into question a sanction which has been proposed and not been opposed by the Council in the framework of the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) or the Macroeconomic Imbalances Procedure (MIP);
Amendment 893 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 45 d (new) 45d. Proposes that for each programme country the Commission sets up a "growth task force" composed inter alia of experts coming, among others, from the Member States, the EIB, in association with representatives of the private sector and civil society in order to allow ownership, to suggest options to promote growth which would complement fiscal consolidation and structural reforms; this task force would have the objective of restoring confidence and therefore enabling investments; the Commission should build on the experience of the "Twinning" instrument for cooperation between Public Administrations of EU Member States (MS) and of beneficiary countries;
Amendment 894 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 45 e (new) 45e. Is of the opinion that the situation of the euro area as a whole (including spill- over effects resulting from national policies on other Member States) should be better taken into account when looking at the Macroeconomic Imbalances Procedure (MIP) or when the Commission is drafting the AGS;
Amendment 895 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 45 f (new) 45f. Believes that the Macroeconomic Imbalances Procedure (MIP) should also clearly assess any Member State's overreliance on a particular sector of activity;
Amendment 896 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 45 g (new) 45g. Recalls the necessity of measures to safeguard tax revenues, in particular for programme countries enshrined in the regulation n°472/2013 of the European parliament and of the Council on the strengthening of economic and budgetary surveillance of Member States in the euro area experiencing or threatened with serious difficulties with respect to their financial stability (Gauzès report), by taking "measures in close cooperation with the Commission and in liaison with the ECB and, where appropriate, with the IMF, aiming to reinforce the efficiency and effectiveness of revenue collection capacity and the fight against tax fraud and evasion, with a view to increasing its fiscal revenue"; recalls that effective steps to fight and prevent fiscal fraud both within and outside the EU should be taken rapidly;
Amendment 897 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 45 h (new) 45h. Is convinced of the need for a thorough analysis of the use of EU funds in order to assess their real effects, to dramatically increase their consistency with the objectives of the macroeconomic adjustment programme and to better take into account the use of EU funds in the euro area as whole;
Amendment 898 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 45 a (new) 45a. Calls on the Commission and the co- legislators to draw the lessons from the troika experience when designing and implementing the next steps of the EMU; including when revision regulation 412/2013
Amendment 899 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 45 b (new) 45b. Considers that the work started with this report should be followed up and deepened by the new EP legislature in December 2014 at latest.
Amendment 9 #
Motion for a resolution Citation 13 a (new) - having regard to the 29th annual report 2011 of the International Labour Organisation (ILO),
Amendment 90 #
Motion for a resolution Recital H H. whereas the total amount of financial assistance in the four programmes is unprecedented, as are the conditions, duration and shape of the programmes, leading to an unusual situation where the assistance has almost exclusively replaced the usual financing provided by the markets;
Amendment 900 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 45 c (new) 45c. Suggests that the International Labour Organisation (ILO) specifically monitors the impact of labour market reforms in the crisis to ensure that the ILO core labour standards are respected in these reform efforts (This amendment is based on a contribution by the European Trade Union Confederation (ETUC).)
Amendment 901 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 45 d (new) 45d. Considers that the European Parliament should actively exploit its access to the ECJ to ensure that the Commission, the Council and the ECB respect the key provisions of the European Treaties (This amendment is based on a contribution by the European Trade Union Confederation (ETUC).)
Amendment 902 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 45 e (new) 45e. Stresses that also times of crisis the European institutions need to respect Union law and no exceptional situation can lead to the suspension of Union law. They are bound by fundamental rights, particularly by the Charter of fundamental rights of the European Union, the European Convention of Human Rights and the European Social Charter (This amendment is based on a contribution by the European Trade Union Confederation (ETUC).)
Amendment 903 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 45 f (new) 45f. Urges the board of the ESM to enter into a social dialogue with European social partners by way of for example, the creation of a Social Partner Dialogue Board (This amendment is based on a contribution by the European Trade Union Confederation (ETUC).)
Amendment 904 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 45 g (new) 45g. Calls on Commission and Council to ensure full involvement of DG Employment and national Social Ministries in MoU discussions and decisions, at both an EU and a national level, to ensure that the social dimension is a key consideration in the negotiations, and the social impact is minimized. (This amendment is based on a contribution by the European Trade Union Confederation (ETUC).)
Amendment 905 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 45 h (new) 45h. Recommends that future emergency programmes be placed under the sole responsibility of the European Commission; that the latter assumes responsibility for any assistance and advice accepted from third parties such as the ECB, IMF or other bodies
Amendment 906 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 45 i (new) 45i. Recommends that in order for assistance programmes to be vested with appropriate democratic legitimacy, both negotiation mandates as well as the resulting MoU's be submitted to a binding (yes/no) vote by the European Parliament
Amendment 907 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 45 a (new) 45a. Notes the persistent refusal of the IMF to accept democratic accountability by the European Parliament and therefore believes that the euro area relationship with the IMF should be redefined, with a view to quickly phasing out the direct involvement of the IMF in the resolution of euro area sovereign debt problems;
Amendment 908 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 45 b (new) 45b. Instructs the President of the European Parliament to make active use of the Parliament's privileged access to the European Court of Justice in order to challenge certain clauses in MoUs and to ensure that the Commission, the European Central Bank and the Council will fully respect the key provisions of the European Treaties; considers that such a legal challenge would lead to the MoUs to be repelled entirely;
Amendment 909 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 45 c (new) 45c. Instructs the European Commission as „guardian of the Treaty" to present by 1st March 2015, a detailed study of the social and economic consequences of the adjustment programmes in the four countries in order to provide a precise understanding of both the short-term and long-term damage to the social protection systems, with particular regard to the fight against poverty, the maintaining of good social dialogue and the balance between flexibility and security in labour relations. Asks the Commission to use its consultative bodies as well as the Employment Committee and the Social Protection Committee when drafting this study and to fully cooperate with the European Parliament's inquiry committee. Asks for the current programmes to be interrupted with immediate effect and only be resumed after the Commission's study will be published and an independent social screening of a newly negotiated program will be concluded successfully;
Amendment 91 #
Motion for a resolution Recital H a (new) Ha. whereas the ECJ has stated in its Pringle ruling that the prohibition laid down in Article 125 TFEU ensures that the Member States remain subject to the logic of the market when they enter into debt, since that ought to prompt them to maintain budgetary discipline and that compliance with such discipline contributes at Union level to the attainment of a higher objective, namely maintaining the financial stability of the monetary union; it stresses, however, that Article 125 TFEU does not prohibit the granting of financial assistance by one or more Member States to a Member State which remains responsible for its commitments to its creditors provided that the conditions attached to such assistance are such as to prompt that Member State to implement a sound budgetary policy;
Amendment 910 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 45 d (new) 45d. Asks the Commission to ask the ILO and the Council of Europe to draft reports on possible corrective measures and incentives to ensure full compliance with the European Social Charter and the Protocol thereto and with the ILO Core Conventions, since the obligations deriving from them have been affected by the budgetary adjustment measures and the structural reforms requested by the Troika;
Amendment 911 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 45 e (new) 45e. Calls on the Commission to elaborate a fully-fledged Economic and Social Recovery Plan that must enable current programme countries to make up years of social and economic setback. Underlines that in order to allow for a recovery of social protection and for a successful fight against poverty and social exclusion, such a recovery plan must be endowed with annual financial resources corresponding to two per cent of the Union's Gross Domestic Product. Further supports the currently discussed proposal of installing a European Fiscal Capacity which aims to tackle economic imbalances by addressing macroeconomic surpluses as well as deficits under the condition that this Fiscal Capacity is subject to supervision by the European Parliament, is bound to the Treaties of the European Union and the Charter of Fundamental Rights and has to ensure a high level of social security, employment, decent working conditions, non- discrimination and social cohesion all over the EU
Amendment 912 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 45 f (new) 45f. Calls for a Treaty change in order to create a single financial assistance instrument within the Community framework for all EU Member States and that allows for the development of a substantial fiscal and social union. Considers this project must include the perspective of creating a sovereign monetary union allowing for a monetary and fiscal policy from a macroeconomic perspective. Hence, a European treasury should have the right to introduce a European tax of its own, to monitor and prevent economic imbalances among Member States and to secure a single market for government bonds in Euro. The European Central Bank, on the other hand should be enabled to act as a lender of last resort and the obligation to balance economic growth with monetary goals
Amendment 913 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 45 a (new) 45a. Considers that the analysis of the Troika’s work should be used as a major source of information in order to learn from the past and adjust future approaches as regards the new means that will need to be provided if the high cost of corrective action is, in future, to be averted in European economies;
Amendment 914 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 46 46. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council and the Commission, and to the European Central Bank
Amendment 915 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 46 46. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council and the Commission,
Amendment 92 #
Motion for a resolution Recital H a (new) Ha. whereas bail outs of the financial sector have directly contributed to increasing the level of public debts; whereas private households have born an unduly share of the cost of the crisis;
Amendment 93 #
Motion for a resolution Recital I I. whereas the economic situation and recent developments in some Member States
Amendment 94 #
Motion for a resolution Recital I I. whereas the economic situation and recent developments in some Member States have compromised the quality of employment, social protection and health and safety standards; whereas without the EU-IMF financial and technical assistance the consequences for the quality of employment, social protection and health and safety standards would have been considerably worse and probably hardly bearable;
Amendment 95 #
Motion for a resolution Recital I I. whereas the
Amendment 96 #
Motion for a resolution Recital I I. whereas the economic situation and recent developments in some Member States have
Amendment 97 #
Motion for a resolution Recital I I. whereas the economic situation and recent developments in some Member States have
Amendment 98 #
Motion for a resolution Recital I I. whereas the economic situation
Amendment 99 #
Motion for a resolution Recital I I. whereas the economic situation and recent developments in some Member States have compromised the quality of employment, social protection and health and safety standards; economic growth and financial stability have in addition been seriously damaged and strong deterioration of the government deficit and debt position is observed in some Member States.
source: PE-528.079
|
History
(these mark the time of scraping, not the official date of the change)
2019-07-06Show (19) Changes | Timetravel
| activities |
|
| commission |
|
| committees/0 |
|
| committees/0 |
|
| committees/1 |
|
| committees/1 |
|
| committees/2 |
|
| committees/2 |
|
| committees/3 |
|
| committees/3 |
|
| docs |
|
| events |
|
| links |
|
| other |
|
| procedure/dossier_of_the_committee |
Old
ECON/7/14607New
|
| procedure/legal_basis/0 |
Rules of Procedure EP 052
|
| procedure/legal_basis/0 |
Rules of Procedure of the European Parliament EP 052
|
| procedure/selected_topics |
|
| procedure/subject |
Old
New
|
2014-11-09Show (31) Changes | Timetravel
| activities/0/committees/0/rapporteur/0/mepref |
Old
4de1889e0fb8127435bdc386New
4f1adb31b819f207b30000af |
| activities/0/committees/1/rapporteur/0/mepref |
Old
4de188eb0fb8127435bdc3f0New
4f1adbe7b819f207b30000ee |
| activities/0/committees/2/rapporteur/0/group |
Old
EPPNew
PPE |
| activities/0/committees/2/rapporteur/0/mepref |
Old
4de185d20fb8127435bdbf7dNew
4f1ac975b819f25efd000139 |
| activities/0/committees/2/rapporteur/1/mepref |
Old
4de185760fb8127435bdbf04New
4f1ac918b819f25efd00010d |
| activities/0/committees/2/shadows/0/mepref |
Old
4de185280fb8127435bdbe97New
4f1ac85db819f25efd0000e3 |
| activities/0/committees/2/shadows/2/mepref |
Old
4de1865d0fb8127435bdc04dNew
4f1ad22ab819f2759500000c |
| activities/0/committees/2/shadows/3/mepref |
Old
4de184830fb8127435bdbda4New
4f1ac7c9b819f25efd0000ac |
| activities/0/committees/2/shadows/4/mepref |
Old
4de186050fb8127435bdbfcaNew
4f1ac9a2b819f25efd000147 |
| activities/1/committees/0/rapporteur/0/mepref |
Old
4de1889e0fb8127435bdc386New
4f1adb31b819f207b30000af |
| activities/1/committees/1/rapporteur/0/mepref |
Old
4de188eb0fb8127435bdc3f0New
4f1adbe7b819f207b30000ee |
| activities/1/committees/2/rapporteur/0/group |
Old
EPPNew
PPE |
| activities/1/committees/2/rapporteur/0/mepref |
Old
4de185d20fb8127435bdbf7dNew
4f1ac975b819f25efd000139 |
| activities/1/committees/2/rapporteur/1/mepref |
Old
4de185760fb8127435bdbf04New
4f1ac918b819f25efd00010d |
| activities/1/committees/2/shadows/0/mepref |
Old
4de185280fb8127435bdbe97New
4f1ac85db819f25efd0000e3 |
| activities/1/committees/2/shadows/2/mepref |
Old
4de1865d0fb8127435bdc04dNew
4f1ad22ab819f2759500000c |
| activities/1/committees/2/shadows/3/mepref |
Old
4de184830fb8127435bdbda4New
4f1ac7c9b819f25efd0000ac |
| activities/1/committees/2/shadows/4/mepref |
Old
4de186050fb8127435bdbfcaNew
4f1ac9a2b819f25efd000147 |
| activities/2/docs/0/text |
|
| activities/4/docs |
|
| activities/4/type |
Old
Decision by Parliament, 1st reading/single readingNew
Results of vote in Parliament |
| committees/0/rapporteur/0/mepref |
Old
4de1889e0fb8127435bdc386New
4f1adb31b819f207b30000af |
| committees/1/rapporteur/0/mepref |
Old
4de188eb0fb8127435bdc3f0New
4f1adbe7b819f207b30000ee |
| committees/2/rapporteur/0/group |
Old
EPPNew
PPE |
| committees/2/rapporteur/0/mepref |
Old
4de185d20fb8127435bdbf7dNew
4f1ac975b819f25efd000139 |
| committees/2/rapporteur/1/mepref |
Old
4de185760fb8127435bdbf04New
4f1ac918b819f25efd00010d |
| committees/2/shadows/0/mepref |
Old
4de185280fb8127435bdbe97New
4f1ac85db819f25efd0000e3 |
| committees/2/shadows/2/mepref |
Old
4de1865d0fb8127435bdc04dNew
4f1ad22ab819f2759500000c |
| committees/2/shadows/3/mepref |
Old
4de184830fb8127435bdbda4New
4f1ac7c9b819f25efd0000ac |
| committees/2/shadows/4/mepref |
Old
4de186050fb8127435bdbfcaNew
4f1ac9a2b819f25efd000147 |
| procedure/legal_basis/0 |
Old
Rules of Procedure of the European Parliament EP 048New
Rules of Procedure of the European Parliament EP 052 |
2014-03-18Show (7) Changes | Timetravel
| activities/2/docs |
|
| activities/3/date |
Old
2014-03-13T00:00:00New
2014-03-12T00:00:00 |
| activities/3/docs |
|
| activities/3/type |
Old
Vote in plenary scheduledNew
Debate in Parliament |
| activities/4/date |
Old
2014-03-12T00:00:00New
2014-03-13T00:00:00 |
| activities/4/type |
Old
Debate in plenary scheduledNew
Decision by Parliament, 1st reading/single reading |
| procedure/stage_reached |
Old
Awaiting Parliament 1st reading / single reading / budget 1st stageNew
Procedure completed |
2014-03-01Show (2) Changes | Timetravel
| activities/2 |
|
| procedure/stage_reached |
Old
Awaiting committee decisionNew
Awaiting Parliament 1st reading / single reading / budget 1st stage |
2014-02-28Show (2) Changes | Timetravel
| activities/2/type |
Old
Indicative plenary sitting date, 1st reading/single readingNew
Debate in plenary scheduled |
| activities/3 |
|
2014-02-26Show (2) Changes | Timetravel
| activities/1/committees |
|
| activities/1/type |
Old
Vote scheduled in committee, 1st reading/single readingNew
Vote in committee, 1st reading/single reading |
2014-02-20Show (4) Changes | Timetravel
| activities/0/committees/3/date |
2013-10-09T00:00:00
|
| activities/0/committees/3/rapporteur |
|
| committees/3/date |
2013-10-09T00:00:00
|
| committees/3/rapporteur |
|
2014-01-23Show (1) Changes | Timetravel
| activities/1/date |
Old
2014-02-17T00:00:00New
2014-02-24T00:00:00 |
2014-01-18Show (1) Changes | Timetravel
| activities/1 |
|
2014-01-09Show (1) Changes | Timetravel
| other/0 |
|
2013-12-21Show (7) Changes | Timetravel
| activities/0/committees/0/date |
2013-12-17T00:00:00
|
| activities/0/committees/0/rapporteur |
|
| activities/1 |
|
| committees/0/date |
2013-12-17T00:00:00
|
| committees/0/rapporteur |
|
| procedure/selected_topics |
|
| procedure/subtype |
Old
InitiativeNew
Strategic initiative |
2013-12-11Show (4) Changes | Timetravel
| activities/0/committees/1/date |
2013-12-02T00:00:00
|
| activities/0/committees/1/rapporteur |
|
| committees/1/date |
2013-12-02T00:00:00
|
| committees/1/rapporteur |
|
2013-12-06Show (7) Changes | Timetravel
| activities/0 |
|
| activities/1/committees |
|
| activities/1/date |
Old
2013-11-21T00:00:00New
2014-02-17T00:00:00 |
| activities/1/type |
Old
Committee referral announced in Parliament, 1st reading/single readingNew
Vote scheduled in committee, 1st reading/single reading |
| committees/2/date |
|
| committees/2/rapporteur |
|
| committees/2/shadows |
|
2013-11-28Show (1) Changes | Timetravel
| procedure/subject/1 |
Old
5.20.02 Single currency, euroNew
5.20.02 Single currency, euro, euro area |
2013-11-27Show (5) Changes
| activities |
|
| committees |
|
| links |
|
| other |
|
| procedure |
|