Procedure completed
Next event: Decision by Parliament, 1st reading/single reading 2014/04/15 more...
- Committee report tabled for plenary, single reading 2014/03/26
- Debate in Parliament 2014/04/14
- Vote in committee, 1st reading/single reading 2014/03/19
Role | Committee | Rapporteur | Shadows |
---|---|---|---|
Opinion | AFCO | DUFF Andrew (ALDE) | |
Lead | BUDG | DEHAENE Jean-Luc (EPP), KALFIN Ivailo (S&D) | JENSEN Anne E. (ALDE), TRÜPEL Helga (Verts/ALE), ASHWORTH Richard (ECR), MORGANTI Claudio (EFD) |
Opinion | EMPL | BERÈS Pervenche (S&D) | |
Opinion | FEMM | ||
Opinion | LIBE | GÖNCZ Kinga (S&D) | |
Opinion | REGI | OLBRYCHT Jan (EPP) |
Legal Basis RoP 048
Activites
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2014/04/15
Decision by Parliament, 1st reading/single reading
- T7-0378/2014
- 2014/04/14 Debate in Parliament
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2014/03/26
Committee report tabled for plenary, single reading
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A7-0254/2014
summary
The Committee on Budgets adopted the joint report by Jean-Luc DEHAENE (EPP, BE) and Ivailo KALFIN (S&D, BG) on negotiations on the MFF 2014-2020: lessons to be learned and the way forward. The Committee on Constitutional Affairs exercising its prerogatives as an associated committee in accordance with Rule 50 of the Rules of Procedure, was also consulted for an opinion on the report. Members recalled that the overall level of the next MFF (EUR 960 billion in commitments, EUR 908 billion in payments at 2011 prices). This represented a cut of 3.5 % in commitments and 3.7 % in payments compared to the 2007-2013 financial framework, despite the growing EU competences following the Lisbon Treaty and the enlargement of the Union to 28 Member States. Members stated that this level fell short of EU political goals and commitments, in particular in relation to the Europe 2020 strategy. The committee also recalled that the EU annual budget would continue to represent approximately 1% of EU GNI, a level well below the own resources ceiling of 1.29% of EU GNI, as decided in 1992. It stressed that, faced politically with the impossibility of changing the overall MFF figures decided by the European Council, Parliament had focused on improving the implementation of the MFF by successfully negotiating the inclusion of new provisions that will help to make the new financial framework and the new EU annual budget more operational, consistent, transparent and responsive to the needs of EU citizens. These provisions concerned, in particular, the new arrangements relating to the MFF revision, flexibility, the unity and transparency of the EU budget, along with a further engagement on reforming the financing of the EU budget. In general terms, Members regretted the fact that both the procedure leading up to the agreement on the MFF 2014-2020 and the political debate surrounding these negotiations demonstrated a clear lack of shared vision as regards the EU budget and political priorities, showed that there are very divergent approaches among the EU institutions, and fell short of Parliament’s increased role and prerogatives under the Treaty of Lisbon. Accordingly, Members wanted to draw the necessary political and institutional lessons, which could serve as a basis for the preparation of future negotiations. Political considerations: whilst acknowledging the need for fiscal consolidation in Member States, the committee pointed out that the EU budget was primarily an investment budget for enhancing national efforts made to regain growth, stimulate competitiveness and generate employment in the whole EU. It was concerned at the fact that budgetary debates in the Council had been for many years poisoned by the logic of ‘fair returns’ instead of being driven by the logic of the European added value. Members considered that, while this debate had already existed before the introduction of a GNI-based resource, the situation had seriously intensified due to the current system of EU financing, whereby some 74 % of revenues stemmed from national contributions based on GNI instead of genuine own resources. This logic also prevailed in the way the MFF agreement was struck by the European Council on 8 February 2013. Members criticised, in particular, the increased number of special allocations and ‘gifts’ granted in the course of negotiations between Heads of State and Government, which are not based on objective and verifiable criteria, but rather reflect the bargaining power of Member States, which denoted a lack of transparency. The report underlined that the European added value should prevail over national interests. Members strongly rejected this purely accounting vision of the EU budget, and regretted the fact that some Member States seemed to regard national contributions to the EU budget purely as a cost to be minimized. They also considered that: · any decision on the financial framework should be preceded by – and based on – a genuine political debate on the role, function and added value of the EU budget; · the EU should have a system of genuine, clear, simple and fair own resources, which would reduce the share of GNI-based contributions to a minimum. Institutional considerations: the committee recalled that Parliament was the first EU institution to present its vision on the MFF 2014-2020 and the need to reform the financing of the EU budget. It considered it regrettable that: (i) prior to the European Council agreement on the MFF of 8 February 2013, no meaningful negotiations were held between Parliament and the Council; (ii) despite Parliament’s strong objections, all successive ‘negotiating boxes’ presented by different Council presidencies and, ultimately, the European Council MFF agreement of 8 February 2013 contained a significant number of legislative elements that should have been decided under the ordinary legislative procedure; Drawing lessons from these observations, Members wanted: · Parliament to use all means available to strengthen its influence on the spirit, calendar and content of the negotiations with the Council, by making the Council better acknowledge Parliament’s arguments and positions; · a more constructive attitude on the part of Council negotiators instead of forcing Parliament to struggle, including at the highest political level, in order to engage in negotiations on every article of the MFF Regulation / IIA; · to significantly improve the modalities of any future MFF negotiations, in order to avoid deadlocks and save valuable time and resources in the course of negotiations. Members also called for a shift towards qualified majority voting for the MFF Regulation and stated the unanimity rule in the Council means that the agreement represented the lowest common denominator, based on the need to avoid the veto of a single Member State. The general passerelle clause (Article 48(7) TEU) could be deployed by the European Council to make the shift towards qualified majority voting and the ordinary legislative procedure for the own resources and MFF decisions. MFF 2014-2020: the way forward: Members declared their intention to ensure that all new provisions that were successfully incorporated into the MFF Regulation and IIA were utilised in full in the annual budgetary procedure, particularly the new rules on flexibility. They stressed, in this context, that the accumulated RALs had reached a critical level that might eventually lead the EU budget into structural deficit. They recalled that the next Commission was due to launch a compulsory review and revision of the MFF 2014-2020 by the end of 2016, at the request of Parliament. In this context, Members stressed the need for the next Parliament to reflect in good time on political priorities, to identify areas for which more investments will be deemed necessary in the second half of the MFF 2014-2020, focussing on areas of proven added value of EU spending. At the same time, Members strongly believed that a five-year MFF cycle would enhance democratic legitimacy, and improve the prioritisation of budgetary means. The report underlined that the Commission proposals for the MFF revision should take full account of the latest macroeconomic projections and include a thorough assessment of the operation of all special instruments, in particular the global margins in commitments and payments. Members reiterated their intention to make the compulsory MFF revision a key demand in the investiture of the next Commission. The next European Parliament was called upon make the election of the proposed candidate for President of the Commission conditional upon a strong and non-ambiguous commitment to implementing the post-electoral review/revision clause and engaging in a genuine and deep political dialogue on its content. The issue of own resources: lastly, Members recalled that debate on Own Resources represented a unique opportunity to overcome the deadlock that has arisen over the reform of the current own-resources system. They recalled that the High Level Group on Own Resources had a mandate to examine all aspects of the reform of the own resources system. Members stated that Parliament was firmly committed to working intensively at all stages of this process and counted on the Council’s equal commitment to this process.
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A7-0254/2014
summary
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2014/03/19
Vote in committee, 1st reading/single reading
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2014/02/06
Committee referral announced in Parliament, 1st reading/single reading
Documents
- Decision by Parliament, 1st reading/single reading: T7-0378/2014
- Committee report tabled for plenary, single reading: A7-0254/2014
- Debate in Parliament: Debate in Parliament
Amendments | Dossier |
36 |
2014/2005(INI)
2014/01/29
EMPL
30 amendments...
Amendment 1 #
Draft opinion Paragraph 1 1.
Amendment 10 #
Draft opinion Paragraph 5 5. Regrets that despite obvious time pressure stemming from the upcoming expiry of the MFF and the European elections, the negotiations on the EGF and the FEAD were substantially delayed, resulting in very tight timetables for reaching timely agreements; regrets the fact that the Commission proposal for FEAD came well behind the schedule;
Amendment 11 #
Draft opinion Paragraph 5 5. Regrets that despite obvious time pressure stemming from the upcoming expiry of the MFF and the European
Amendment 12 #
Draft opinion Paragraph 5 a (new) 5a. Notes that changes in negotiating positions were not always fully conveyed in good time between relevant actors in Parliament, which, at times, affected the consistency of Parliament's approach;
Amendment 13 #
Draft opinion Paragraph 6 6. Points out, based on the experience of EaSI, the difficulty of individually negotiating horizontal elements which are similar to several multiannual programmes in different policy areas thus leading to diverse outcomes and preventing uniform approach;
Amendment 14 #
Draft opinion Paragraph 6 6. Points out the difficulty of individually negotiating horizontal elements which are similar to several multiannual programmes in different policy areas and believes that a more systemic approach would deliver better results;
Amendment 15 #
Draft opinion Paragraph 6 6. Points out the difficulty of individually negotiating horizontal elements which are similar to several multiannual programmes in different policy areas; stresses that this has further weakened the Parliament's negotiation power;
Amendment 16 #
Draft opinion Paragraph 7 7. Stresses the problematic dependency of the negotiations concerning legislative
Amendment 17 #
Draft opinion Paragraph 8 8. Regrets that, despite the Treaty provisions, the Council decided to negotiate legislative proposals only on the basis of partial general approaches or general approaches without a mandate from the amendments proposed by Parliament
Amendment 18 #
Draft opinion Paragraph 8 a (new) 8a. Emphasizes that one of the aims of the reform of the Lisbon Treaty was to democratise the process of establishing the Union's financial framework and regrets that, in this context, and in relation to the legislative proposals for the 2014-2020 period, the opportunity to act fully in line with the spirit of the Treaty has not been properly used;
Amendment 19 #
Draft opinion Paragraph 8 b (new) 8b. Regrets that the European Parliament decided not to make full use of the possibilities provided by the ordinary legislative procedure in the negotiations with the Council on the legislative basis; considers, in this context, that special attention should be given to the cases where a legislative proposal has been recognised to fall in the competences of more than one committee; is of the view that in these special cases, the mandate for negotiations with the Council should be obtained from the plenary in order to assure broad support, strengthen the EP negotiation position and guarantee transparency;
Amendment 2 #
Draft opinion Paragraph 2 2. Regrets that the 2011 figures proposed by the Commission as the basis for the negotiation did not
Amendment 20 #
Draft opinion Paragraph 8 c (new) 8c. Considers that, while agreements negotiated with the Council should be given the possibility of a smooth adoption in plenary, this cannot be at the price of preventing plenary of any possibility to amend the agreed texts; is of the view that such procedures could only be applied when a very broad political consensus has been found on the agreed text; calls, therefore, on its competent committee to examine the possibility to apply the provisions of Rule 138 of the EP Rules of Procedure to first and second reading agreements;
Amendment 21 #
Draft opinion Paragraph 8 d (new) 8d. Recalls that margins left available below the MFF ceilings for commitment appropriations for the years 2014-2017 shall constitute a Global MFF Margin for commitments to be calculated by the European Commission and to be made available above the ceilings established in the MFF for the years 2016 - 2020 for policy objectives related to growth and employment, in particular for the Youth Employment Initiative;
Amendment 22 #
Draft opinion Paragraph 8 e (new) 8e. Suggests, if the Treaty remains unchanged, that in the next MFF negotiations the European Parliament should approach the MFF regulation and legislative proposals of the different multiannual programs as a whole package like it did it successfully in case of the Supervision System Mechanism;
Amendment 23 #
Draft opinion Paragraph 8 f (new) 8f. Invites the next European Commission and the next European Parliament to carefully look at the achievements of the EU 2020 strategy, especially at the employment-related targets, and to use the review clause to add financial resources to boost the Strategy, taking into account that the negative impact of the ongoing crisis has jeopardised it;
Amendment 24 #
Draft opinion Paragraph 8 g (new) 8g. Recalls that the foreseen revision of the MFF shall not have a downward impact on any pre-allocated national envelopes for cohesion policy and in particular on ESF allocations;
Amendment 25 #
Draft opinion Paragraph 8 h (new) 8h. Calls on the next European Commission to tackle the issue of youth unemployment by proposing a substantial increase of the Youth Employment Initiative budget in the framework of the MFF revision process;
Amendment 26 #
Draft opinion Paragraph 8 i (new) 8i. Brings the attention of the next European Commission and European Parliament to the fact that the Regulation on the European Social Fund foresees, on top of the MFF revision process, that 'the resources for the YEI may be revised upwards for the years 2016 to 2020 in the framework of the budgetary procedure in accordance with Article 14 of Regulation (EU) 1311/2013';
Amendment 27 #
Draft opinion Paragraph 8 j (new) 8j. Is deeply concerned with the fact that any budgetary debate in the Council has been for many years poisoned by the logic of 'fair returns' and stresses that this situation is largely due to the current system of EU financing, whereby some 85 % of revenues stem from national contributions instead of genuine own resources, as foreseen in the Treaty of Rome;
Amendment 28 #
Draft opinion Paragraph 8 k (new) 8k. Notes that the European Council took a top-down approach in deciding the overall size of the MFF 2014-2020, which in turn demonstrates a worrying discrepancy between EU political commitments which the European Council has been making and its reluctance to adequately finance them; underlines that the European Parliament has underestimated the ability of the European Council to evaluate the impact of the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty regarding the EP powers on the MFF adoption and to maintain this approach;
Amendment 29 #
Draft opinion Paragraph 8 l (new) 8l. Is convinced that any decision on the financial framework should be preceded by – and based on – a genuine political debate on the role, function and added value of the EU budget and on its compatibility with the political strategy adopted by the Union and operational objectives assigned to the Union;
Amendment 3 #
Draft opinion Paragraph 2 2. Regrets that the 2011 figures at constant prices proposed by the Commission as the basis for the negotiation did not reflect the reality
Amendment 30 #
Draft opinion Paragraph 8 m (new) 8m. Points out that the conclusions of the European Council are to be seen as negotiating instructions for the Council; deeply regrets the fact that this problem marked the negotiations on EU multiannual programmes, notably regarding the European Social Fund and the European Globalisation Adjustment Fund;
Amendment 4 #
Draft opinion Paragraph 2 2. Regrets that the 2011 figures proposed by the Commission as the basis for the negotiation did not reflect the reality of the needs of Member States;
Amendment 5 #
Draft opinion Paragraph 3 3. Regrets that elements pertaining to legislative proposals have been discussed and decided upon by the European Council instead of being negotiated and agreed on at the level of the appropriate Council formation and the committee responsible; stresses that the Council has ignored the European Parliament in his role as co- legislator in particular with regard to the Youth Employment Initiative;
Amendment 6 #
Draft opinion Paragraph 3 3. Regrets that elements pertaining to legislative proposals have been discussed and decided upon by the European Council instead of being agreed on at the level of the appropriate Council formation and the committee responsible; reminds the European Council that, according to the Treaty provisions, it has no legislative power; thus, warns both co-legislators to avoid in the future any shift of legislative power to the European Council;
Amendment 7 #
Draft opinion Paragraph 4 4. Regrets that where the co-legislators agreed to extend the scope of the proposed financial programmes this could not be matched by corresponding increases in financial allocations nor decreases could be prevented; regrets in particular that ESF allocation has constantly been decreased since its foundation despite the fact that the scope of the Fund was extended over time; deplores the fact that the proposed ESF envelope of 25 % of cohesion policy funds could not be maintained in the negotiations for 2014- 2020; deplores also the fact that EGF annual ceiling has been disproportionally reduced compared to other financial instruments;
Amendment 8 #
Draft opinion Paragraph 4 4. Regrets that where the co-legislators agreed to extend the scope of the proposed financial programmes this could not be matched by corresponding increases in financial allocations; deplores the fact that the proposed ESF envelope of 25 % of cohesion policy funds could not be maintained in the negotiations for 2014- 2020; regrets the invocation of rule 20 of the rules of procedure of the European Parliament for all MFF-related files as this limited the democratic rights of Members of Parliament to express themselves for example on the ESF envelopes minimum share;
Amendment 9 #
Draft opinion Paragraph 5 5. Regrets that despite obvious time pressure stemming from the upcoming expiry of the MFF and the European elections, the negotiations on the EGF and the FEAD were delayed for reasons not pertaining to content, resulting in tight timetables for reaching agreements;
source: PE-528.006
2014/02/12
REGI
6 amendments...
Amendment 1 #
Draft opinion Paragraph 2 2. Is of the opinion that the work on the MFF should under no circumstances interfere in the work on the regulations defining the scope of support and the rules of implementation of each fund, and should thus respect the role and the prerogatives of the European Parliament in the negotiations on the legal basis for cohesion policy; deeply regrets the fact that the negotiations on the MFF 2014-2020 did not follow this principle, which resulted in the work on the MFF having a substantial influence on the
Amendment 2 #
Draft opinion Paragraph 3 3. Stresses that the discussion about the resources for cohesion policy should be based on an analysis of the regional and local development needs and take account of the evaluation of the implementation of the policy in the
Amendment 3 #
Draft opinion Paragraph 3 3. Stresses that the discussion about the resources for cohesion policy should be based on an analysis of the needs and take account of the evaluation of the implementation of the policy in the previous programming period; recalls that cohesion policy is a pro-growth investment policy and will therefore gain importance as an EU instrument for boosting growth, creating jobs, stimulating public investment
Amendment 4 #
3. Stresses that the discussion about the resources for cohesion policy should be based on an analysis of the needs and take account of the evaluation of the implementation of the policy in the previous programming period; recalls that cohesion policy is a pro-growth investment policy fighting the crisis and will therefore gain importance as an EU instrument for boosting sustainable growth, creating jobs, stimulating public investment
Amendment 5 #
Draft opinion Paragraph 4 a (new) 4a. Objects to the precedent created by the Council of the European Union with the structural fund appropriations earmarked for the new outermost region of Mayotte under the 2014-2020 MFF; stresses that no region has ever been allocated flat-rate funding in the absence of any legal basis or applicable criteria; notes that this precedent undermines respect for the principle of equality between regions and for the classification of regions into categories defined by common fund rules;
Amendment 6 #
Draft opinion Paragraph 5 5. Is deeply concerned at the fact that the amount of unpaid bills at the end of the year is constantly growing and considers that cohesion policy is the most affected by the gap in the EU budget; c
source: PE-529.724
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