Procedure completed
2017/2072(INI) Banking union. Annual report 2017
Lead committee dossier: ECON/8/09629
Legal Basis RoP 52
| Role | Committee | Rapporteur | Shadows |
|---|---|---|---|
| Lead | ECON | LOONES Sander (ECR) | HÜBNER Danuta Maria (EPP), DELVAUX Mady (S&D), CORNILLET Thierry (ALDE), VIEGAS Miguel (GUE/NGL), URTASUN Ernest (Verts/ALE), VALLI Marco (EFD), KAPPEL Barbara (ENF) |
Legal Basis RoP 52
Subjects
Activites
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2018/03/01
Results of vote in Parliament
- Results of vote in Parliament
- Debate in Parliament
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T8-0058/2018
summary
The European Parliament adopted by 476 votes to 116, with 25 abstentions, a resolution on the banking union - 2017 annual report. Members considered that the banking union, as a fundamental objective to guarantee the financial stability of the euro area and indispensable foundation of a genuine economic and monetary union, should be strengthened. Further efforts are needed, however, as the banking union remains incomplete until it has a single budget back-stop for the Single Resolution Fund and a third pillar for deposit re/insurance. The risks to financial stability remain but have already been substantially reduced since the start of the establishment of the banking union. Members stated that the current favourable economic conditions constitute a window of opportunity to push necessary reforms to complete the banking union. Resistance tests: Parliament noted the upcoming EBA stress tests in 2018. It called on the EBA, the ESRB, the ECB and the Commission to use consistent methodologies, scenarios and assumptions when defining the stress tests. It stressed however that the soundness of a bank cannot be captured by a point-in-time assessment of its balance sheet alone. Furthermore, that the ECB’s own stress test for additional banks under its supervision could benefit from more transparency. Supervision: Members welcomed the fact that the Banking Union has improved the exchange of relevant information between supervisory authorities and has improved the collection and exchange of data on the European banking system, contributing for example to better benchmarking and enabling a more holistic supervision of cross-border banking groups. The exchange of information and coordination between the ECB’s banking supervision and the SRB should be improved, in particular as regards the crucial issues of whether an institution is eligible for precautionary recapitalisation and whether it is failing or likely to fail. The resolution stressed the need to: (i) clarify the use of asset quality reviews in order to determine whether the conditions for precautionary recapitalisation are met; (ii) increase transparency when assessing the solvency of credit institutions and considering resolution decisions. Non-performing loans: the stock of non-performing loans (NPLs) stood at EUR 1 trillion in total according to the ESRB report of July 2017. Concerned about the presence of the high-level of non-performing loans in some countries, Members supported the Commission’s decision to explore the potential harmonisation in prudential terms at EU level of new loans that become non-performing. Members also called on the Commission to propose legislative and non-legislative actions to encourage the provision of information to potential investors, the establishment of dedicated asset management companies (‘bad banks’) and the development of secondary markets for NPLs in order to deal with the overwhelming problem of non-performing loans. Sovereign debt risks: Parliament noted that in some Member States financial institutions have over invested in bonds issued by their own governments, constituting excessive ‘home bias’. They also noted that, with a view to limiting financial stability risks, it would be better if banks' sovereign bond portfolios were more diverse. Members also stressed the need to address the flaws identified in internal models in order to re-establish their credibility and achieve a level playing field across institutions. Noting, in this context, the BCBS endorsement of the amendments for the finalisation of Basel III, Members considered that the agreement should not result in a significant increase in capital requirements at Union level or harm the ability of banks to finance the real economy, in particular SMEs. IFRS 9: Parliament stressed the importance of the fast-track procedure that led to the agreement on the phasing-in of International Financial Reporting Standard (IFRS) 9, as well as the transitional arrangements for the exemption from the large exposure limit available to exposures to certain public sector debt of Member States denominated in currencies of any Member States. Members considered, however, that a transition should not unduly delay the application of IFRS. In addition, the impact IFRS 9 and the nature and allocation of loans by banks should be monitored. The ESRB and the MSU are invited to discuss these issues. Proportionality: Members pointed out that the high costs associated with the implementation of supervisory arrangements may be particularly difficult for smaller institutions to manage. They called for the principle of proportionality to be better taken into account in certain supervisory arrangements by the ECB in the context of its supervisory activities. Brexit: Parliament welcomed the work done in promoting supervisory convergence in the context of the UK’s withdrawal from the EU in order to limit the development of regulatory and supervisory arbitrage risks. It stated that any supervisory cooperation model to be developed between the EU and the UK should respect the financial stability of the EU and its regulatory and supervisory regime and standards and their application. Resolution: welcoming the work done by the SRB to intensify its bank resolution capacity at Union level, Parliament noted that resolution planning is currently still very much a work in progress. It called on the SRB to intensify its recruitment efforts and on national authorities to make seconded experts easily available to the SRB. It also called for greater transparency, in particular as regards the European Parliament's access to key documents supporting resolution decisions. Members pointed out that one of the causes of the arbitration opportunities revealed by recent resolution cases is the divergence between the state aid rules, applied under the current resolution regime, and the national insolvency law. They therefore invited the Commission to review the bank insolvency frameworks in the Union in order to draw lessons from the 2017 banking cases. Recalling the objectives of the directive establishing a framework for the recovery and resolution of credit institutions and investment firms (BRRD), Parliament stated that extraordinary public financial support measures may only be used to remedy ‘a serious disturbance in the economy’ and to ‘preserve financial stability’ and that they ‘shall not be used to offset losses that an institution has incurred or is likely to incur in the near future’. It considered that extraordinary public financial support should also be accompanied, where appropriate, by remedial actions. While welcoming the improvement in the resolvability of credit institutions, Parliament stressed the importance of operational and credible resolution plans and that the minimum requirement for own funds and eligible liabilities should take account of the institutions’ business models to ensure the resolvability of these institutions. It called on the SRB to provide a comprehensive list of obstacles to resolvability encountered in national or European legislation; stresses that the revision of the BRRD should in no way lag behind internationally agreed standards. Deposit insurance: Parliament recalled that the deposit protection is a common concern of all EU citizens and that the banking union remains incomplete without a third pillar. It stressed that further harmonisation of the rules applying to deposit guarantee schemes is necessary in order to achieve a level playing field within the Banking Union.
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2018/02/07
Committee report tabled for plenary, single reading
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A8-0019/2018
summary
The Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs has adopted an own-initiative report by Sander LOONES (ECR, BE) on banking union - 2017 annual report. Members considered that the banking union, as a fundamental objective to guarantee the financial stability of the euro area and indispensable foundation of a genuine economic and monetary union, should be strengthened. Further efforts are needed, however, as the banking union remains incomplete until it has a single budget back-stop for the Single Resolution Fund and a third pillar for deposit re/insurance. The risks to financial stability remain but have already been substantially reduced since the start of the establishment of the banking union. Members stated that the current favourable economic conditions constitute a window of opportunity to push necessary reforms to complete the banking union. Resistance tests: the report notes that the upcoming EBA stress tests in 2018. It called on the EBA, the ESRB, the ECB and the Commission to use consistent methodologies, scenarios and assumptions when defining the stress tests. It stressed however that the soundness of a bank cannot be captured by a point-in-time assessment of its balance sheet alone. Furthermore, that the ECB’s own stress test for additional banks under its supervision could benefit from more transparency. Supervision: Members welcomed the fact that the Banking Union has improved the exchange of relevant information between supervisory authorities and has improved the collection and exchange of data on the European banking system, contributing for example to better benchmarking and enabling a more holistic supervision of cross-border banking groups. The exchange of information and coordination between the ECB’s banking supervision and the SRB should be improved, in particular as regards the crucial issues of whether an institution is eligible for precautionary recapitalisation and whether it is failing or likely to fail. The report stressed the need to: (i) clarify the use of asset quality reviews in order to determine whether the conditions for precautionary recapitalisation are met; (ii) increase transparency when assessing the solvency of credit institutions and considering resolution decisions. Non-performing loans: concerned about the presence of the high-level of non-performing loans (NPLs) in some countries, Members called on the Commission to propose legislative and non-legislative actions to encourage the provision of information to potential investors, the establishment of dedicated asset management companies (‘bad banks’) and the development of secondary markets for NPLs in order to deal with the overwhelming problem of non-performing loans. Sovereign debt risks: Members noted that in some Member States financial institutions have over invested in bonds issued by their own governments, constituting excessive ‘home bias’. They also noted that, with a view to limiting financial stability risks, it would be better if banks' sovereign bond portfolios were more diverse. Members also stressed the need to address the flaws identified in internal models in order to re-establish their credibility and achieve a level playing field across institutions. IFRS 9: the report stressed the importance of the fast-track procedure that led to the agreement on the phasing-in of International Financial Reporting Standard (IFRS) 9, as well as the transitional arrangements for the exemption from the large exposure limit available to exposures to certain public sector debt of Member States denominated in currencies of any Member States. Members considered, however, that a transition should not unduly delay the application of IFRS. In addition, the impact IFRS 9 and the nature and allocation of loans by banks should be monitored. The ESRB and the MSU are invited to discuss these issues. Proportionality: Members pointed out that the high costs associated with the implementation of supervisory arrangements may be particularly difficult for smaller institutions to manage. They called for the principle of proportionality to be better taken into account in certain supervisory arrangements by the ECB in the context of its supervisory activities. Brexit: the report welcomed the work done in promoting supervisory convergence in the context of the UK’s withdrawal from the EU in order to limit the development of regulatory and supervisory arbitrage risks. It stated that any supervisory cooperation model to be developed between the EU and the UK should respect the financial stability of the EU and its regulatory and supervisory regime and standards and their application. Resolution: the report welcomed the work done by the Board to increase its bank resolution capacity at Union level. It noted, however, that resolution planning is currently still very much a work in progress. Recalling the objectives of the directive establishing a framework for the recovery and resolution of credit institutions and investment firms (BRRD), Members that extraordinary public financial support measures may only be used to remedy ‘a serious disturbance in the economy’ and to ‘preserve financial stability’ and that they ‘shall not be used to offset losses that an institution has incurred or is likely to incur in the near future’. Members welcomed the SRB’s stated prioritisation of enhancing resolvability of credit institutions, as well as the progress made towards setting binding targets regarding individual minimum requirement for own funds and eligible liabilities (MREL) targets at consolidated level. The report emphasised the importance of operational and credible resolution plans and the need for an effective regime to address breaches of this requirement and that MREL should be mindful of institutions’ business models for the purpose of ensuring the resolvability of these institutions. The SRB is called on to provide a comprehensive list of obstacles to resolvability encountered in national or European legislation. Members also welcomed the agreement reached on the additional harmonisation of the priority ranking of unsecured debt instruments. They called for rapid implementation by Member States so that banks can issue debt in the new insolvency class and thereby build up the required buffers. Deposit insurance: Members recalled that the deposit protection is a common concern of all EU citizens and that the banking union remains incomplete without a third pillar. They stressed that further harmonisation of the rules applying to deposit guarantee schemes is necessary in order to achieve a level playing field within the Banking Union.
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A8-0019/2018
summary
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2018/01/24
Vote in committee, 1st reading/single reading
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2017/05/18
Committee referral announced in Parliament, 1st reading/single reading
Documents
- Committee report tabled for plenary, single reading: A8-0019/2018
- Results of vote in Parliament: Results of vote in Parliament
- Debate in Parliament: Debate in Parliament
- Decision by Parliament, 1st reading/single reading: T8-0058/2018
| Amendments | Dossier |
| 392 |
2017/2072(INI)
2017/11/24
ECON
392 amendments...
Amendment 1 #
Motion for a resolution Citation 2 — having regard to the feedback of the Commission and the European Central Bank (ECB) on Parliament’s resolution of 1
Amendment 10 #
Motion for a resolution Citation 8 a (new) - having regard to the Commission’s targeted consultation on statutory prudential backstops addressing insufficient provisioning for newly originated loans that turn non- performing,
Amendment 100 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 1 a (new) 1a. Stresses that the disappearance of a significant proportion of small banks since 2008 reflects an alarming trend towards concentration of the banking sector;regrets that this has exacerbated the unresolved problem of banks too big to fail that lies at the heart of the post- crisis global financial reform agenda;
Amendment 101 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 1 a (new) 1 a. Notes with concern that there are strong indications that Banca Popolare di Vicenza and Veneto Banca were treated as solvent, merely for the purpose of and in need of a precautionary recapitalization in one week, and then as ‘failing or likely to fail’ the next week, without this being due to sudden changes in their capital or liquidity position;
Amendment 102 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 1 a (new) 1 a. Takes note of the fact that Banco Popular Español S.A. has been saved by private bondholders and Banca Popolare di Vicenza and Veneto Banca have been saved by state aid;
Amendment 103 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 1 b (new) 1 b. Is concerned about the market consolidation of Santander after the acquisition of Banco Popular;
Amendment 104 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 2 Amendment 105 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 2 Amendment 106 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 2 2.
Amendment 107 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 2 2. Notes th
Amendment 108 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 2 2. Notes the ECB’s determination in the context of the precautionary recapitalisation of Monte dei Paschi di Siena that the bank is solvent and meets the capital requirements;
Amendment 109 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 2 2. Notes the ECB’s determination in the context of the precautionary recapitalisation of Monte dei Paschi di Siena that the bank is solvent and meets the capital requirements;
Amendment 11 #
Motion for a resolution Citation 8 a (new) - having regard to the Commission's public consultation on insufficient provisioning for newly originated loans that turn non performing,
Amendment 110 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 2 2. Notes the ECB’s determination in the context of the precautionary recapitalisation of Monte dei Paschi di Siena that the bank is solvent and meets the capital requirements;
Amendment 111 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 2 2. Notes the ECB’s determination in the context of the precautionary recapitalisation of Monte dei Paschi di Siena that the bank is solvent and meets the capital requirements; notes, in this regard, that the determination of solvency leaves room for an element of subjectivity, which may be filled in by political considerations, as this determination greatly depends on how a bank’s assets are valued; points, in this regard, to the Banca Popolare di Vicenza and Veneto Banca cases; calls, therefore, on the Commission, the SSM and the SRB to reflect on ways to increase transparency when assessing the solvency of credit institutions and considering resolution decisions;
Amendment 112 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 2 2. Notes the ECB’s determination in the context of the precautionary recapitalisation of Monte dei Paschi di Siena that the bank is solvent and meets the capital requirements; notes, in this regard, that the determination of solvency leaves room for an element of subjectivity as this determination greatly depends on how a bank’s assets are valued; observes that the credibility of subscription to bonds and bail-ins has at all events suffered, because the bank was rescued by means of State aid;
Amendment 113 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 2 2. Notes the ECB’s determination in the context of the precautionary recapitalisation of Monte dei Paschi di Siena that the bank is solvent and meets the capital requirements; notes, in this regard, that the determination of solvency leaves room for an element of subjectivity as this determination greatly depends on how a bank’s assets are valued; notes that the market return of the bank implied a large paper loss for Italian tax payers;
Amendment 114 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 2 – subparagraph 1 (new) Is worried that the Italian government has bought up Monte dei Paschi bonds from private bondholders at 6.5 euro per share, while their market value was fluctuating between 4 and 5 euro;underlines that this constitutes a loss of 29% for the Italian taxpayer;regrets that the Italian state at this rate will acquire a share of 50 to 70% of the shares in Monte dei Paschi;
Amendment 115 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 2 a (new) 2 a. Reiterates the need to accompany any action on the regulation of the banking sector by appropriate regulation of the shadow banking sector; regrets that the Commission failed to address the issue in its replies to last year’s report 1a; takes note of the 2017 EU Shadow Banking Monitor by the ESRB that underlines several risks and vulnerabilities which need to be monitored in the EU shadow banking system including liquidity risk and risks associated with leverage among some types of investment funds, interconnectedness and contagion risk, pro-cyclicality, leverage and liquidity risk created through the use of derivatives and securities financing transactions as well as vulnerabilities in some parts of the other financial institutions sector, where significant data gaps prevent definitive risk assessments; calls, therefore, for coordinated action to address these risks in order to ensure fair competition and financial stability; _________________ 1aEuropean Parliament, Resolution of 15 February 2017 on ‘Banking Union – Annual Report 2016’, paragraph 9.
Amendment 116 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 2 a (new) 2 a. Recalls that cooperation and exchange of information between supervision authorities and resolution authorities is crucial for the smooth and effective conduct of resolution actions;agrees in this regard with the Commission that recent resolution cases have demonstrated that cooperation between those authorities worked well in the Banking Union;notes however that the Commission has identified areas for improvements concerning exchange of information and coordination between the ECB banking supervision and the SRB, in particular as regards the crucial issues of whether an institution is eligible for precautionary recapitalisation and whether it is failing or likely to fail;calls on the ECB and the SRB to keep improving their day-to-day cooperation and strengthening their working relationship;
Amendment 117 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 2 a (new) 2a. Notes that the exclusion of a large part of the German credit system from the cross section of European banks subject to direct ECB scrutiny is a source of major asymmetries in the banking union;stresses that the German system is made up of small or medium-sized banks characterized by strong interconnections that can give rise to systemic risks for the whole euro area;recalls in this connection that 68 German banks not subject to ECB supervision failed to pass the stress tests conducted by Bundesbank and Bafin linked to interest rate and property market disruption ;
Amendment 118 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 2 a (new) 2 a. Calls on EBA, the ESRB, the ECB and the Commission to use consistent methodologies, scenarios and assumptions when defining the stress tests to apply to financial institutions in order to avoid the mismatch, as seen, between stress tests results and resolution decisions taken closely after the presentation of these results;
Amendment 119 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 2 a (new) 2a. Notes that the current supervisory system focuses on credit risk, completely ignoring exposure to risky trading activities and legal risks possibly affecting the sustainability of financial institutions;
Amendment 12 #
Motion for a resolution Citation 15 Amendment 120 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 2 a (new) 2 a. Notes that Monte dei Paschi has been trading again since 25 October 2017;
Amendment 121 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 2 b (new) 2b. Notes the obvious disparity between real and effective significance regarding ECB supervision of the German banking sector;direct supervision of the German system is relatively light when measured against its assets and compared to the significance that that the banking system of the largest economy of the monetary area should have;while German banking assets amount to 27.6% of the euro area total, supervised German assets amount to 20.6% of total directly supervised assets;while consolidated loans from the German banking system represent 26.4% of total euro area lending, higher than all other countries, the figure falls to 18.2% of the subtotal for loans subject to direct supervision;while German deposits amount to 27.9% of the total, again the highest value, the figure falls to 17.6% of the total for supervised banks;
Amendment 122 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 2 b (new) 2b. Points out that in-depth analysis of bank balance sheets is still producing distorted results owing to differences in the treatment of countries that have in the past provided massive state aid for struggling banks and those that did not grant such aid prior to the Communication of 2013 and now have much less room for manoeuvre;urges the SSM, in fulfilment of its supervisory role, to address this disparity;calls on the Commission also to investigate distortions of competition resulting from the sudden change of tack regarding state aid for banks and propose suitable measures to reinstate a level equal playing field in the banking union and eliminate the competitive advantage enjoyed by banking systems that have received substantial public aid in the wake of the crisis;
Amendment 123 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 2 b (new) 2 b. Stresses that the Italian taxpayer already invested almost 4 billion euro in Monte dei Paschi di Siena;
Amendment 124 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 2 c (new) 2 c. Is concerned about the estimated share value at reintroduction on the stock exchange at 6.5 euro, while the real value fluctuated between 4 and 5 euro;stresses that at such market rates, the Italian government will lose 1 billion euro;
Amendment 125 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 2 d (new) 2 d. Is deeply concerned about the insidious nationalisation of Monte dei Paschi;
Amendment 126 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 2 e (new) 2 e. Notes that the overvaluation of Monte dei Paschi's rate after reintroduction suggests that investors have no confidence in the Italian and EU supervisory mechanisms;
Amendment 127 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 3 3.
Amendment 128 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 3 3. Reiterates its concerns about the high level of non-performing loans (NPLs) in certain jurisdictions; agrees with the Commission that ‘Member States and banks themselves have a primary responsibility in tackling non-performing loans’4;
Amendment 129 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 3 3.
Amendment 13 #
Motion for a resolution Citation 25 a (new) - having regard to the opinion of the European Central Bank of 8 November 2017 on revisions to the Union crisis management framework (CON/2017/47),
Amendment 130 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 3 3. Reiterates its concerns about the high level of non-performing loans (NPLs) in certain jurisdictions; agrees with the Commission that whereas ‘Member States and banks themselves have a primary responsibility in tackling non-performing loans
Amendment 131 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 3 3. Reiterates its concerns about the high level of non-performing loans (NPLs) in certain jurisdictions; agrees with the Commission that ‘Member States and banks themselves have a primary responsibility in tackling non-performing loans’4 ; welcomes, nonetheless, the work done by different EU institutions and bodies on this issue; calls on these actors and the Member States to duly implement the Council conclusions of 11 July 2017 on the action plan to tackle non-performing loans in Europe; recognises that the SSM's powers to influence a bank's provisioning policy with regards to NPLs - within the limits of the applicable accounting framework and to apply specific adjustments where necessary for prudential purposes - can only be applied on a case-by-case basis, depending on the individual circumstances of the bank; underlines that the exercise of the minimum supervisory powers granted to competent authorities depends on the specific situation of each supervised bank and only allows for the adoption of measures addressed to the individual bank concerned; _________________ 4 Commission communication on completing the Banking Union, 11 October 2017, p. 15 (COM(2017)0592).
Amendment 132 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 3 3. Reiterates its concerns about the high level of non-performing loans (NPLs) in certain jurisdictions; agrees with the Commission that ‘Member States and banks themselves have a primary responsibility in tackling non-performing loans’4 ; welcomes, nonetheless, the work done by different EU institutions and bodies on this issue; supports, in this respect, the Commission’s decision to explore the potential harmonisation in prudential terms at EU level of new loans that become non-performing in order to ensure sufficient and timely provisioning levels for NPLs across Member States and banks, which will also help ensure a level playing field for banks in the Banking Union; looks forward to the results of the work on a EU insolvency framework aimed at renegotiating the conditions of the loans and safeguarding the most vulnerable debtors such as SMEs and households; calls on these actors and the Member States to duly implement the Council conclusions of 11 July 2017 on the action plan to tackle non-performing loans in Europe; _________________ 4 Commission communication on completing the Banking Union, 11 October 2017, p. 15 (COM(2017)0592).
Amendment 133 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 3 3. Reiterates its concerns about the high level of non-performing loans (NPLs) in certain jurisdictions; agrees with the Commission that
Amendment 134 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 3 3. Reiterates its concerns about the high level of non-performing loans (NPLs) in certain jurisdictions and of Level III assets within the largest EU area banks; agrees with the Commission that ‘Member States and banks themselves have a primary responsibility in tackling non- performing loans’
Amendment 135 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 3 3. Reiterates its concerns about the high level of non-performing loans (NPLs) in certain jurisdictions; agrees with the Commission that ‘Member States and banks themselves have a primary responsibility in tackling non-performing loans’4 ; welcomes, nonetheless, the work done by different EU institutions and bodies on this issue; welcomes, in particular, the Commission’s ongoing work on statutory prudential backstops for new loans that turn non-performing, as well as the ECB’s draft addendum to its guidance to banks on NPLs; calls on these actors and the Member States to duly implement the Council conclusions of 11 July 2017 on the action plan to tackle non- performing loans in Europe; _________________ 4 Commission communication on completing the Banking Union, 11 October 2017, p. 15 (COM(2017)0592).
Amendment 136 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 3 3. Reiterates its concerns about the high level of non-performing loans (NPLs) in certain jurisdictions; agrees with the Commission that ‘Member States and banks themselves have a primary responsibility in tackling non-performing loans’4 ; welcomes, nonetheless, the work done by different EU institutions and bodies on this issue; calls on these actors and the Member States to duly implement the Council conclusions of 11 July 2017 on the action plan to tackle non-performing loans in Europe; welcomes the ECB’s intention to accelerate the clean-up of bank balance sheets and calls for a concerted effort to find a legally sound and practical way to get there without further delay; _________________ 4 Commission communication on completing the Banking Union, 11 October 2017, p. 15 (COM(2017)0592).
Amendment 137 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 3 3. Reiterates its concerns about the high level of non-performing loans (NPLs) in certain jurisdictions; agrees with the Commission that ‘Member States and banks themselves have a primary responsibility in tackling non-performing loans’4 ; welcomes, nonetheless, the work done by different EU institutions and bodies on this issue; stresses that in the time of low interest rates and favourable financial conditions more actions at EU and MS’s level should be done to support debt restructuring and resolving NPLs; calls on these actors and the Member States to duly implement the Council conclusions of 11 July 2017 on the action plan to tackle non-performing loans in Europe; _________________ 4 Commission communication on completing the Banking Union, 11 October 2017, p. 15 (COM(2017)0592).
Amendment 138 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 3 3.
Amendment 139 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 3 3. Reiterates its concerns about the high level of non-performing loans (NPLs) in certain jurisdictions; agrees with the Commission that ‘Member States and banks themselves have a primary responsibility in tackling the legacy of non-performing loans’4 ; welcomes, nonetheless, the work done by different EU institutions and bodies on this issue; calls on these actors and the Member States to duly implement the Council conclusions of 11 July 2017 on the action plan to tackle non-performing loans in Europe; recalls the necessity for the Commission and Member States to improve and harmonise where necessary the insolvency framework; _________________ 4 Commission communication on completing the Banking Union, 11 October 2017, p. 15 (COM(2017)0592).
Amendment 14 #
Motion for a resolution Citation 25 b (new) - having regard to the European Commission’s withdrawal of the proposal on structural measures improving the resilience of EU credit institutions COM(2014)0043,
Amendment 140 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 3 3.
Amendment 141 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 3 3.
Amendment 142 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 3 3. Reiterates its concerns about the high level of non-performing loans (NPLs) in certain jurisdictions; agrees with the Commission that ‘Member States and banks themselves have a primary responsibility in tackling non-performing loans’4 ; welcomes, nonetheless, the work done by different EU institutions and bodies on this issue as well as the efforts done in some Member States; calls on these actors and the Member States to duly implement the Council conclusions of 11 July 2017 on the action plan to tackle non- performing loans in Europe; _________________ 4 Commission communication on completing the Banking Union, 11 October 2017, p. 15 (COM(2017)0592).
Amendment 143 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 3 3. Reiterates its concerns about the high level of non-performing loans (NPLs) in certain jurisdictions; agrees with the Commission that ‘Member States and banks themselves have a primary responsibility in tackling non-performing loans
Amendment 144 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 3 3. Reiterates its concerns about the high level of non-performing loans (NPLs) in certain jurisdictions; agrees with the Commission that ‘Member States and banks themselves have a primary responsibility in tackling non-performing loans’4; welcomes, nonetheless, the work done by different EU institutions and bodies on this issue; calls on these actors and the Member States to duly and swiftly implement
Amendment 145 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 3 a (new) 3a. Notes with concern the systemic risks to the stability of the entire euro area because of the high exposures of certain banking systems engaged in level 2 and level 3 activities;regrets that such illiquid and complex instruments have not been among the single ECB supervision priorities since its inception;welcomes in this regard the inclusion by the EBA in the 2018 stress test procedures of specific risk management measures relating to level 2 and level 3 instruments;strongly reaffirms the appeal to the SSM to make the issue a single supervision priority for 2018 in order to ensure a more robust and realistic assessment of the real systemic risks inherent in the European banking system and bring about their necessary reduction;
Amendment 146 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 3 a (new) 3 a. Points out that the European Commission referred Croatia, Cyprus, Portugal and Spain to the Court of Justice for failing to fully enact the Mortgage Credit Directive (2014/17/EU), a failure which resulted in the their citizens not being able to benefit from the protection guaranteed by the Directive when taking out their mortgage loans or when they experience difficulties repaying it;notes with concern that, in Spain alone, since the beginning of the crisis 500.000 families have lost their houses and are still paying the debt to the bank due to the foreclosure law;
Amendment 147 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 3 a (new) 3 a. Reiterates its concerns about the risks stemming from the holding of level 3 assets, including derivatives, within large euro area banks, and in particular from the difficulty of their valuation;notes that these risks should be reduced and that this calls for a progressive reduction of the holdings of these assets;calls on the SSM to make this issue one of its supervisory priorities, and to organise, jointly with the EBA, a quantitative stress test on it;
Amendment 148 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 3 a (new) 3 a. The establishment of an asset management company (bad bank) for dealing with the overwhelming problem of non-performing loans should be an option for Member States;welcomes EBA's proposal on NPLs;
Amendment 149 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 3 a (new) 3 a. Rejects any European solution to the problem of non-performing loans that would go beyond guidelines for selling NPLs on secondary markets;
Amendment 15 #
Motion for a resolution Citation 25 c (new) - having regard to the European Commission’s April infringements package:key decisions (MEMO/17/1045),
Amendment 150 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 3 b (new) 3b. Notes that scrupulously close attention to credit risk in the course of individual bank supervision, contrasted with the tendency to underestimate market and operational risks, is a major factor in distorting the level playing field for national banking systems, as well as revealing an alarming weakness in the single supervision process;points out that this asymmetry has placed banking systems based more on traditional credit activities at a major disadvantage, penalizing above all the outlying euro area member countries that have been most affected by the economic crisis, to the advantage of the more exposed banking systems at the centre of the euro area that are engaged in speculative financial activities;
Amendment 151 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 4 Amendment 152 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 4 4. Recalls that there are risks associated with sovereign debt; notes that in some Member States financial institutions have overly invested in bonds issued by their own governments, constituting excessive ‘home bias’;
Amendment 153 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 4 4. Recalls that there are risks associated with sovereign debt; notes that in some Member States financial institutions have overly invested in bonds issued by their own governments, constituting excessive ‘home bias’; recalls that one of the main objectives of the Banking Union is to break the bank- sovereign-risk-nexus; considers that the EU regulatory framework on prudential treatment of sovereign debt should be consistent with the international standard; awaits, therefore the results of the FSB’s work on sovereign debt with great interest in order to guide future decisions; stresses the crucial role of government bonds in providing high- quality and liquid assets for the financial sector and safe liabilities for governments; takes note, in this respect, of the Commission’s ongoing work on the idea of so-called sovereign bond-backed securities
Amendment 154 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 4 4. Recalls that there are risks associated with sovereign debt; notes that in some Member States financial institutions have overly invested in bonds issued by their own governments, constituting excessive ‘home bias’;
Amendment 155 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 4 4. Recalls that there are risks associated with sovereign debt; notes that in some Member States financial institutions have overly invested in bonds issued by their own governments, constituting excessive ‘home bias’ while one of the main objectives of the BU is to break the bank-sovereign-risk nexus; considers, therefore, as a potential solution charging capital on banks’ sovereign portfolios in proportion to the extent to which they deviate from an EU sovereign benchmark portfolio representing a well- diversified holding of such assets; takes note, in this respect, of the Commission’s ongoing work on the idea of so-called sovereign bond-backed securities (SBBS) as a possible way of addressing the issue;
Amendment 156 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 4 4. Recalls that there are risks associated with sovereign debt;continuously lowering structural government debt and anchoring financial discipline in national law and regulations is key to further foster growth and financing of real social investments, such as paid maternity leave and vocational training, hence bolstering labour market participation and increasing tax revenues in order to strengthen public finances; notes that in some Member States financial institutions have overly invested in bonds issued by their own governments, constituting excessive ‘home bias’; takes note, in this respect, of the Commission’s ongoing work on the idea of so-called sovereign bond-backed securities (SBBS);
Amendment 157 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 4 4.
Amendment 158 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 4 4. Recalls that there are risks associated with sovereign debt; notes that in some Member States financial institutions have overly invested in bonds issued by their own governments, constituting excessive ‘home bias’;
Amendment 159 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 4 4. Recalls that there are risks associated with sovereign debt; notes that in some Member States financial institutions have overly invested in bonds issued by their own governments, constituting excessive ‘home bias’;
Amendment 16 #
Motion for a resolution Citation 25 d (new) - having regard to the EBA Risk Dashboard, the ESMA Report on Trends, Risks and Vulnerabilities No. 2, 2017, the ESRB Risk Dashboard, the ESRB Annual Report 2016, ESRB Review of Macro- prudential Policy in the EU of April 2017 and the EU Shadow Banking Monitor No. 2 of May 2017,
Amendment 160 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 4 4. Recalls that there are risks associated with sovereign debt which are artificially maintained by the constraints imposed on central banks by the Treaties; notes that in some Member States financial institutions
Amendment 161 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 4 4. Recalls that there are risks associated with sovereign debt; notes that in some Member States financial institutions have overly invested in bonds issued by their own governments,
Amendment 162 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 4 4.
Amendment 163 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 4 4. Recalls that there are risks associated with sovereign debt; notes that in some Member States financial institutions have overly invested in bonds issued by their own governments, constituting excessive ‘home bias’;
Amendment 164 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 4 4. Recalls that there are risks associated with sovereign debt and sovereign bonds should therefore be covered by equity capital; notes that in some Member States financial institutions have overly invested in bonds issued by their own governments, constituting excessive ‘home bias’;
Amendment 165 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 4 4. Recalls that there are risks associated with sovereign debt;
Amendment 166 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 4 4. Recalls that there are risks associated with sovereign debt; notes that in some Member States financial institutions have overly invested in bonds issued by their own governments, constituting excessive ‘home bias’;
Amendment 167 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 4 4. Recalls that there are risks associated with sovereign debt; notes that
Amendment 168 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 4 4. Recalls that there are risks associated with sovereign debt; notes that in some Member States financial institutions have overly invested in bonds issued by their own governments, constituting
Amendment 169 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 4 a (new) 4 a. Stresses the need to monitor the impact of IFRS 9 on the nature and allocation of credits by banks as well as on the potential pro-cyclical effects derived from the cyclical sensitivity of credit risk parameters;calls on the ESRB and the SSM to investigate these issues;asks the EBA and the BIS to provide the appropriate guidance in this regard;
Amendment 17 #
Motion for a resolution Citation 27 a (new) - having regard to its resolution of 19 January 2016 on stocktaking and challenges of the EU Financial Services Regulation:impact and the way forward towards a more efficient and effective EU framework for Financial Regulation and a Capital Markets Union,
Amendment 170 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 4 a (new) 4 a. Recalls that SBBSs would not constitute a form of debt mutualisation;
Amendment 171 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 5 5. Welcomes the work done by the ECB to assess the adequacy of internal models, including its new guide to the TRIM, with a view to addressing the variability in risk-weights applied to risk- weighted assets of the same class across credit institutions;
Amendment 172 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 5 5.
Amendment 173 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 5 5. Welcomes the work done by the ECB to assess the adequacy of internal models, including its new guide to the TRIM, with a view to addressing the variability in risk-weights applied to risk- weighted assets of the same class across credit institutions; calls for a rapid conclusion of negotiations on output floors within the BCBS; stresses the importance of the current negotiations at the BCBS, which must not result in a significant increase in capital requirements at Union level, as this would damage economic growth and the Union's financing model; also stresses that, with a view to preventing certain jurisdictions from engaging in any regulatory arbitrage, those negotiations should not be finalised until all the countries concerned have committed to applying the agreements in full;
Amendment 174 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 5 5.
Amendment 175 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 5 5.
Amendment 176 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 5 5. Welcomes the work done by the ECB to assess the adequacy of internal models, including its new guide to the TRIM, with a view to addressing the variability in risk-weights applied to risk- weighted assets of the same class across credit institutions; calls for a rapid conclusion of negotiations on output floors within the BCBS; considers that the capital position of banks can be strengthened by reducing dividend payments and raising fresh equity and that to strengthen the overall financial position of European banks and should remain a priority;
Amendment 177 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 5 5.
Amendment 178 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 5 5.
Amendment 179 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 5 5. Welcomes the work done by the ECB to assess the adequacy of internal models, including its new guide to the TRIM, with a view to addressing the variability in risk-weights applied to risk- weighted assets of the same class across credit institutions; calls for a
Amendment 18 #
Motion for a resolution Citation 28 a (new) - having regard to the Opinion of the Legal Service of the European Parliament concerning the legal effects of the draft document entitled “Addendum to the ECB Guidance to banks on non- performing loans: Prudential provisioning backstop for non-performing exposures” issued by the European Central Bank,
Amendment 180 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 5 5. Welcomes the work done by the ECB to assess the adequacy of internal models, including its new guide to the TRIM, with a view to addressing the variability in risk-weights applied to risk- weighted assets of the same class across credit institutions;
Amendment 181 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 5 5.
Amendment 182 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 5 a (new) 5 a. Believes that the first pillar of the Banking Union has proven to work well over its first years of existence and welcomes the work done by the SSM in particular as regards the review of models, the functioning of colleges and the closing of national options and discretions;recalls that the creation of a common supervisory culture is a learning process and therefore requires time;
Amendment 183 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 5 a (new) 5 a. Stresses the need to introduce a more robust leverage ratio, especially for global systemically important institutions (G-SIIs);asks the Union legislators to speed up its work on the leverage ratio and not to await the finalisation of technical talks at Basel level on this issue;
Amendment 184 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 5 a (new) 5a. Stresses that any further measures proposed by the ECB, a purely technocratic institution, should respect the principle of accountability and democratic transparency;
Amendment 185 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 5 a (new) 5a. Stresses that the proposals made by international bodies should be translated into European law in such a way as to take due account of the specific characteristics of the European banking sector;
Amendment 186 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 5 b (new) 5 b. Recalls the principle of separation between the monetary policy function and the supervisory function of the SSM and considers its respect crucial in order to avoid conflicts of interests;takes the view that this principle has been in general well complied with;believes that the test to be used in order to determine the suitableness of shared services shall be the policy relevance of the tasks they perform;therefore, considers that shared services are unproblematic when they deal with issues that are non-critical in terms of policy making but could be a cause for concerns and could warrant additional safeguards where and when this is not the case;
Amendment 187 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 5 b (new) 5b. Stresses that the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) standards in particular should not be enacted wholesale into European law without taking proper account of the specific characteristics of the European banking system and of the proportionality principle;
Amendment 188 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 5 c (new) 5 c. Stresses the importance of the cooperation between the EBA as a regulatory authority and the SSM as a supervisory authority;notes however the difference in the geographical scope of activities of each institution;recommends that concrete coordination of the regulatory initiatives to be taken by both institutions be improved wherever practicable in order to ensure the consistency of the single rulebook, while acknowledging that the SSM shall have a leading role when Banking Union-specific issues or regulatory gaps are identified;
Amendment 189 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 5 d (new) 5 d. Stresses the importance of a clear delineation between bank-specific decisions, which are matter for supervisors including the SSM, and pillar 1 decisions which are governed by legislation approved by the co-legislators;
Amendment 19 #
Motion for a resolution Citation 28 b (new) - having regard to the Commission’s targeted consultation on statutory prudential backstops addressing insufficient provisioning for newly originated loans that turn non- performing,
Amendment 190 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 5 e (new) 5 e. Takes the view that the involvement of more ECB staff in on-site inspections could contribute to further enhance the independence of banking supervision from national considerations;
Amendment 191 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 6 6. Welcomes the banking reform package proposed by the Commission in November 2016; underlines the importance of the fast-track procedure for the phasing- in of International Financial Reporting Standard (IFRS) 9 in order to avoid cliff effects on the regulatory capital of credit institutions; supports the efforts made to reduce the reporting burden for smaller banks;
Amendment 192 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 6 6. Welcomes the banking reform package proposed by the Commission in November 2016; underlines the importance of the fast-track procedure for the phasing- in of International Financial Reporting Standard (IFRS) 9 in order to avoid cliff effects on the regulatory capital of credit institutions; supports the efforts made to reduce the reporting burden for smaller banks;
Amendment 193 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 6 6.
Amendment 194 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 6 Amendment 195 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 6 6. Welcomes the banking reform package proposed by the Commission in November 2016; underlines the importance of the fast-track procedure for the phasing- in of International Financial Reporting Standard (IFRS) 9 in order to avoid cliff effects on the regulatory capital of credit institutions;
Amendment 196 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 6 6. Welcomes the banking reform package proposed by the Commission in November 2016; underlines the importance of the fast-track procedure for the phasing- in of International Financial Reporting Standard (IFRS) 9 in order to avoid cliff effects on the regulatory capital of credit institutions; notes, however, the opinions of ECB and EBA that a transitional should not lead to unduly delay the positive effect of IFRS 9 on banks’ timely risk provisioning; supports the efforts made to reduce the reporting burden for smaller banks; is concerned, however, about the proposed amendments to the waivers in Articles 7 and 8 of the CRR, and more generally, about the proposed shift in the home-host balance; is concerned that deviations from FRTB delay the full implementation of higher capital requirements for market risks; is concerned that the overall effect of the Commission’s banking reform package on banks’ capital requirements is unclear due to the absence of a proper impact assessment;
Amendment 197 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 6 6.
Amendment 198 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 6 6. Welcomes the banking reform package proposed by the Commission in November 2016; underlines the importance of the fast-track procedure for the phasing- in of International Financial Reporting Standard (IFRS) 9 in order to avoid cliff effects on the regulatory capital of credit institutions; supports the efforts made to reduce the reporting burden for smaller banks; is concerned, however, about the proposed amendments to the waivers in Articles 7 and 8 of the CRR, and more generally, about the proposed shift in the home-host balance; Recalls the absence or the poor action of market making in many small EU government bonds market, resulting in high volatility and a wide bid ask spread;
Amendment 199 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 6 6. Welcomes the banking reform package proposed by the Commission in November 2016; underlines the importance of the fast-track procedure for the phasing- in of International Financial Reporting Standard (IFRS) 9 in order to avoid cliff effects on the regulatory capital of credit institutions; supports the efforts made to reduce the reporting burden for smaller banks
Amendment 2 #
Motion for a resolution Citation 4 a (new) - having regard to the opinion of the European Central Bank of 8 November 2017 on amendments to the Union framework for capital requirements of credit institutions and investment firms (CON/2017/46),
Amendment 20 #
Motion for a resolution Citation 29 a (new) - having regard to the Five Presidents' Report of 22 June 2015 on completing Europe's Economic and Monetary Union,
Amendment 200 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 6 6. Welcomes the banking reform package proposed by the Commission in November 2016; underlines the importance of the fast-track procedure for the phasing- in of International Financial Reporting Standard (IFRS) 9
Amendment 201 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 6 6.
Amendment 202 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 6 6. Welcomes the banking reform package proposed by the Commission in November 2016;stresses that this package is not in itself a sufficient response to the concern about risk reduction; underlines the importance of the fast-track procedure for the phasing-
Amendment 203 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 6 6. Welcomes the banking reform package proposed by the Commission in November 2016; underlines the importance of the fast-track procedure for the phasing- in of International Financial Reporting Standard (IFRS) 9 in order to avoid cliff effects on the regulatory capital of credit institutions; supports the efforts made to reduce the reporting burden for smaller banks
Amendment 204 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 6 6. Welcomes the banking reform package proposed by the Commission in November 2016; underlines the importance of the fast-track procedure for the phasing- in of International Financial Reporting Standard (IFRS) 9 in order to avoid cliff effects on the regulatory capital of credit institutions; supports the efforts made to
Amendment 205 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 6 6. Welcomes the banking reform package proposed by the Commission in November 2016 and in particular the commitment by the European Commission to maintain and extend the SME Supporting Factor; underlines the importance of the fast-track procedure for the phasing-
Amendment 206 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 6 6. Welcomes the banking reform package proposed by the Commission in November 2016
Amendment 207 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 6 – subparagraph 1 (new) points out that institutions are required, under the rules on supervision, to make numerous similar reports, in various formats, to a range of authorities and that this represents a substantial additional burden; calls, therefore, for the introduction of a uniform reporting system, whereby the questions from all the authorities responsible for supervision would be collated by a central contact point which would forward them to the institutions under supervision and would then transmit the data collected to the competent authorities; emphasises that this could be a means of preventing duplicated questions and requests for identical data, thus considerably reducing the administrative burden on the banks and competent authorities, and that it would also make for more efficient supervision;
Amendment 208 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 6 a (new) 6a. Stresses the importance of having a level playing field in terms of supervision rules; emphasises, however, that that will not be not achieved by making all institutions subject to the same rules because smaller institutions face proportionately higher compliance costs than larger ones; stresses, therefore, the urgent need for further efforts to make banking supervision arrangements more proportionate for small, low-risk institutions; emphasises that improving proportionality by no means implies lowering supervisory standards, it simply means the administrative burden, in terms of compliance and disclosure requirements, for example, will be considerably lessened;
Amendment 209 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 6 a (new) 6a. Points out that the purpose of the Maximum Distributable Amount (MDA) is to ensure that the distribution of profits does not jeopardise the regulatory capital position of a credit institution; is concerned that the introduction of capital guidance might encourage supervisors to reclassify Pillar 2 capital requirements as Pillar 2 capital guidance so as to allow distributions; calls therefore for clear incentives for banks to comply in a timely manner with guidance such as progressive increases in restrictions on distributions proportional to the time since the guidance was established;
Amendment 21 #
Motion for a resolution Citation 33 a (new) - having regard the ESRB EU Shadow Banking Monitor Nº 2 from May 2017,
Amendment 210 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 6 a (new) 6a. Recalls that the options and discretionary powers set out in EU law concerning banking supervision must be harmonised as far as possible. They must as far as possible be transitory, and withdrawn when there is no further need for them, to avoid over-complicating the everyday work of European and national supervisors;
Amendment 211 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 6 a (new) 6a. Stresses that the regulatory framework should accommodate the particular operating principles and respect the specific mission of the cooperative and mutual banks as well as that supervisory authorities should keep these in regard and reflect them in their practices and approaches;
Amendment 212 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 6 a (new) 6a. Calls for the repeal of the BRRD, which has already shown itself to be ineffective and dangerous for investors, bondholders and savers and for the stability of the financial system as a whole;
Amendment 213 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 6 b (new) Amendment 214 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 6 b (new) 6b. Points out that the leverage ratios of European banks of global systemic importance are already well above the 3% proposed by the Commission; recommends therefore that a higher leverage ratio be set for global systemically important banks because such banks are particularly vulnerable to excessive leverage and represent a particular risk in terms of financial stability;
Amendment 215 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 7 7.
Amendment 216 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 7 7. Recalls its resolution of 17 May 2017 on FinTech;
Amendment 217 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 7 7. Recalls its resolution of 17 May 2017 on FinTech; welcomes, in this respect, the work of the Commission, the proposed inclusion of technological innovation in the mandates of the ESAs and the ongoing public consultation on the ECB’s draft guidance to assessments of FinTech bank licence applications; calls on the supervisory authorities to closely monitor and assess cyber security risks as well as on the financial institutions across the EU to be very ambitious in protecting consumer data and guaranteeing cyber- security;
Amendment 218 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 7 7. Recalls its resolution of 17 May 2017 on FinTech;
Amendment 219 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 7 a (new) 7a. Notes that capital market union initiatives, in particular the relaunch of securitisation, are having the alarming effect of increased financialisation of the economy, the spread of shadow banking and greater financial interconnectivity; highlights the urgent need to introduce adequate and stringent provisions for regulation of the shadow banking system and of systemic risks, in line with the lessons learned from the crisis;
Amendment 22 #
Motion for a resolution Citation 35 a (new) - having regard to the ESRB March 2015 report on the regulatory treatment of sovereign exposures,
Amendment 220 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 7 a (new) 7a. Supports efforts to date to streamline reporting requirements and particularly the idea behind the European Reporting Framework (ERF) and AnaCredit; calls on the institutions involved to ensure balance between user demands for the data and the efforts required to produce the data and to ensure that the data is processed in a way useful to all stakeholders;
Amendment 221 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 8 Amendment 222 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 8 8. Welcomes the work done by the EBA and ESMA on promoting supervisory convergence in the context of the UK’s withdrawal from the EU with a view to limiting the development of regulatory and supervisory arbitrage risks;
Amendment 223 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 8 8. Welcomes the work done by the EBA and ESMA on promoting supervisory convergence in the context of the UK’s withdrawal from the EU with a view to limiting the development of regulatory and supervisory arbitrage risks; believes that
Amendment 224 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 8 8. Welcomes the work done by the EBA
Amendment 225 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 8 8.
Amendment 226 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 8 a (new) 8a. Recalls the importance of preparedness and of adequate contingency planning by banks to mitigate the disruptive effect of Brexit; is concerned that some banks, in particular smaller ones, might be lagging behind in their preparations for Brexit and calls on them to intensify their work; recalls that the process for obtaining banking licences and have internal models approved takes several years and that this should be factored in;
Amendment 227 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 9 Amendment 228 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 9 9. Takes note of the proposals on the review of the European system of financial supervision (ESFS); calls on the Union legislators to find an appropriate equilibrium between the tasks and powers of the national competent authorities (NCAs) and the ESAs; emphasises that the core task of the ESFS is to establish supervision arrangements that are consistent;
Amendment 229 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 9 9. Takes note of the proposals on the review of the ESFS, including the ‘omnibus’ proposal amending the ESAs’ governance, funding and powers; calls on the Union legislators to find an appropriate equilibrium between the tasks and powers
Amendment 23 #
Motion for a resolution Recital –A (new) -A. whereas the Banking Union has protected the interests of banks and not those of populations and countries;
Amendment 230 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 9 9. Takes note of the proposals on the review of the ESFS; calls on the Union legislators to find an appropriate equilibrium between the tasks and powers of the national competent authorities (NCAs) and the ESAs with due regard to the principle of proportionality;
Amendment 231 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 10 Amendment 232 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 10 Amendment 233 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 10 10.
Amendment 234 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 10 10.
Amendment 235 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 10 10. Looks forward to the Commission’s proposal on
Amendment 236 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 10 10. Looks forward to the Commission’s
Amendment 237 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 10 10.
Amendment 238 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 10 a (new) 10a. Welcomes the progress made in allowing some delegation in the area of fit and proper decisions by the Decision of the ECB of June 2017;reiterates its assessment that a change in the regulations is needed to allow more and easier delegation of decision-making on certain routine issues, from the Supervisory Board to relevant officials; reiterates its favourable view of such a change which would contribute to making the ECB’s banking supervision more efficient and effective; calls on the ECB to specify tasks for the delegation of decision-making;
Amendment 239 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 10 a (new) 10a. Underlines that the safety and soundness of a bank cannot be captured by a point-in-time assessment of its balance sheet alone, as they are ensured through dynamic interactions between the bank and the markets, and affected by various elements in the entire economy; underlines, therefore, that a sound framework for financial stability and growth should be comprehensive and balanced so as to cover dynamic supervisory practices and not focus merely on static regulation with mainly quantitative aspects;
Amendment 24 #
Motion for a resolution Recital –A a (new) -Aa. whereas the Banking Union has further weakened the capacity for public control of banking systems by the Member States and has, moreover, served to promote and ultimately bring about several mergers and acquisitions in the banking sector of different countries;
Amendment 240 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 10 a (new) 10a. Welcomes that the Banking Union has widely eliminated the home-host issue in supervision by the establishment of a single supervisor and the greatly improved exchange of relevant information between supervisory authorities, enabling a more holistic supervision of cross-border banking groups;
Amendment 241 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 10 a (new) 10a. Notes the upcoming EBA stress tests in 2018;in this regard recalls the need for a high level of transparency behind the results of the stress tests and that potential distortions of results are avoided as much as possible;
Amendment 242 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 10 a (new) 10a. Calls for European oversight of large Central Counterparties (CCPs) based on an architecture similar to that of the Banking Union;
Amendment 243 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 10 a (new) 10a. emphasises that the proportionality principle, in particular, has not, thus far, been sufficiently taken into account in the supervision arrangements;
Amendment 244 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 10 b (new) 10b. Welcomes the ECB initiative to oblige supervised banks to report significant cyber-attacks under a real time alert service and the SSM on-site inspections to supervise cyber-security; calls for the establishment of a legal framework which facilitates the exchange of sensitive information relevant to prevent cyber-attacks between banks;
Amendment 245 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 10 b (new) 10b. Regrets the withdrawal of the Bank Structural Reform file by the European Commission and calls for a renewed attempt to implement the findings of the Liikanen report and to introduce a reversal of the burden of proof regarding the risks contained in the balance sheets of the largest global banks;
Amendment 246 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 10 b (new) 10b. Stresses that managing cyber security is first and foremost banks’ own responsibility; recognises the SSM work to address cyber security through various angles; calls however on the SSM to increase its efforts and to make it formally one of its high-level priorities;
Amendment 247 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 10 b (new) 10b. Acknowledges the high costs of implementing supervision requirements; is concerned that these costs can be especially difficult to handle for smaller banks; welcomes therefore the efforts of the Commission to introduce more proportionality in supervision;
Amendment 248 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 10 b (new) 10b. Draws attention to the division of responsibilities between the ECB and the European Banking Authority (EBA);stresses that the ECB should not become the de facto standard-setter for non-SSM banks;
Amendment 249 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 10 c (new) 10c. stresses that, in the processes of monitoring and assessment under the banking supervision arrangements, the ECB may not impinge in any way upon the prerogatives of the EU legislature; stresses that decisions under the supervision arrangements as to lending institutions' appropriate capital requirements should be taken on a bank- by-bank basis;
Amendment 25 #
Motion for a resolution Recital –A b (new) -Ab. whereas the Banking Union has been operating as a political tool to force a process of capital centralisation and concentration;
Amendment 250 #
10c. Welcomes that the Commission in its reply to the Banking Union Annual Report 2016 shares the Parliament’s view that reporting requirements should be streamlined in order to avoid double reporting and unnecessary additional costs of regulation;
Amendment 251 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 10 c (new) 10c. Stresses the crucial role of cyber- security for banking services and the need to incentivise financial institutions to be very ambitious in protecting consumer data and guaranteeing cyber-security;
Amendment 252 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 10 d (new) 10d. Is concerned with the massive size of the shadow banking in the European Union that amounted to EUR 40 trillion of total assets at the end of the fourth quarter of 2016 and EUR 31 trillion of total assets in the euro area at the same date; recognises, however, that since the financial crisis, policies have been introduced to address financial instability risks resulting from the shadow banking; encourages authorities to continue to vigilantly monitor and address emerging financial stability risks and to expand regulation to all banking activities;
Amendment 253 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 10 d (new) 10d. Reiterates its stressing of the importance of strong and well- functioning IT systems corresponding to the needs of the supervisory functions of the SSM and security concerns; acknowledges that the increased digitalisation of all aspects of banking has left them significantly more vulnerable to cyber security risks; welcomes the progress made by many actors; however calls on them to be more ambitious;
Amendment 254 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 10 e (new) 10e. Welcomes the good functioning of the SSM; especially welcomes the excellent work of the JSTs; is however concerned about reports of insufficient staff allocations to JSTs; reiterates its call to dedicate more ECB personnel to the JSTs in order to strengthen the European element of supervision and to reduce reliance on staff from NCAs in order to further improve the independence of supervision; is concerned about the high level of external experts employed by the ECB on supervisory tasks;
Amendment 255 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 10 f (new) 10f. Is concerned that the Commission has not issued a proposal for on overall review of the macro-prudential framework which was planned for 2017;
Amendment 256 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 10 g (new) 10g. Welcomes that the Banking Union has significantly improved the collection and exchange of data on the European banking system, contributing for example to better benchmarking;
Amendment 257 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 10 h (new) 10h. Calls for an interinstitutional agreement between the ECB and the ECA to specify the exchange of information between both institutions;
Amendment 258 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 11 Amendment 259 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 11 11. Is concerned about the high number of legal applications lodged before the General Court of the EU in relation to the Banco Popular Español S.A. case; asks the Commission to assess whether this could endanger the effectiveness of the new resolution regime; calls on the SRB and the Commission to provide more transparency in future resolution decisions, including access, under appropriate conditions, by Members of the Parliament to key documents informing resolution decisions such as the valuation reports by independent valuers such as that produced by Deloitte in the case of Banco Popular; stresses, in this respect, that the justification of decisions including the application of proportionality may only be challenged on the basis that the decision was arbitrary and unreasonable at the time it was taken, based on the information then readily available and shall not lead to an excessive burden of proof to be met by the relevant authorities in litigation proceedings that would deter regulatory action and render the resolution framework in effect inapplicable;
Amendment 26 #
Motion for a resolution Recital –A c (new) -Ac. whereas the establishment of a pan-European banking oligopoly is both a major goal and a direct consequence of the Banking Union;whereas, as a result, this project does not tackle the ‘too-big-to- fail’ problem but rather magnifies it, does not serve the populations’ interests and is very far from addressing depositors’ security effectively;
Amendment 260 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 11 11.
Amendment 261 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 11 11. Is concerned about the high number of legal applications lodged before the General Court of the EU in relation to the Banco Popular Español S.A. case; asks the Commission to assess whether this could endanger the effectiveness of the new resolution regime; calls on the SRB and the Commission to provide more transparency in future resolution decisions; deplores the double standards applied by the resolution board to a number of cases in 2017, namely those concerning Banco Popular Español S.A., Banca Popolare di Vicenza and Veneto Banca;
Amendment 262 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 11 11. Is concerned about the high number of legal applications lodged before the General Court of the EU in relation to the Banco Popular Español S.A. case and the opaque nature of its sale to Banco Santander; invites the Commission and the SRB to jointly publish a summary of the issues most criticized by the legal applications; asks the Commission to assess whether this could endanger the effectiveness of the new resolution regime; calls on the SRB and the Commission to provide more transparency in future resolution decisions;
Amendment 263 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 11 11.
Amendment 264 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 11 11. Is concerned about the high number of legal applications lodged before the General Court of the EU in relation to the Banco Popular Español S.A. case; asks the Commission to assess whether this could endanger the effectiveness of the new resolution regime; calls on the SRB and the Commission to provide the needed information for the correct assessment of Banco Popular resolution process and asks for more transparency in future resolution decisions;
Amendment 265 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 11 11. Is concerned about the
Amendment 266 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 11 11. Is concerned about the high number of legal applications lodged before the General Court of the EU in relation to the Banco Popular Español S.A. case; asks the Commission to assess
Amendment 267 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 11 a (new) 11a. Draws attention to the fundamental importance of achieving an ambitious structural reform of the banking sector based on a clear and compulsory separation between investment and traditional credit transactions; opposes the Commission's wish to withdraw its proposal on this matter; points out that this reform was promoted by the Commission itself as an important complement to the BRRD for bank crisis resolution; stresses that separation is indispensable in order to facilitate crisis resolution while ensuring full protection of savers and depositors and effectively address the problem of banks too large to fail; calls on the Commission to re-launch the proposal and to promote the conclusion of an agreement between the co-legislators;
Amendment 268 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 11 a (new) 11a. Notes that the lack of harmonisation of national insolvency laws in the field of banking results in different treatments of creditors depending on the jurisdictions where the institution in resolution is established; calls therefore on the Commission and Member States to take further steps towards the harmonisation of bank insolvency law in order to ensure a more level playing field within the banking union and within the Union as a whole across those institutions that will not be subject to resolution;
Amendment 269 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 12 12. Notes that, while the concern about the mismatch between state aid rules and Union legislation as expressed in the previous report5 related to the ability of deposit guarantee schemes (DGSs) to participate in resolution as provided for in the BRRD and DGSD, the 2017 banking cases brought to light other areas of mismatch, in particular the possibility for
Amendment 27 #
Motion for a resolution Recital A A. whereas at the end of 2016 the total number of credit institutions in the euro area stood at 5 073 on an unconsolidated basis
Amendment 270 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 12 12.
Amendment 271 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 12 12. Notes that
Amendment 272 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 12 12. Notes that, while the concern about the mismatch between state aid rules and Union legislation as expressed in the previous report5 related to the ability of deposit guarantee schemes (DGSs) to participate in resolution as provided for in the BRRD and DGSD, the 2017 banking cases brought to light other areas of mismatch, in particular the possibility for Member States to avoid being subject to the discipline of the BRRD by paying ‘liquidation aid’; points to the principle that creditors should not be better off under national insolvency proceedings rules than under European resolution rules; _________________ 5 European Parliament, Resolution of 15 February 2017 on ‘Banking Union – Annual Report 2016’, paragraph 38.
Amendment 273 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 12 12. Notes that, while the concern about the mismatch between state aid rules and Union legislation as expressed in the
Amendment 274 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 12 12. Notes that, while the concern about the mismatch between state aid rules and Union legislation as expressed in the previous report5 related to the ability of deposit guarantee schemes (DGSs) to participate in resolution as provided for in the BRRD and DGSD, the 2017 banking cases
Amendment 275 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 12 12. Notes that, while the concern about the mismatch between state aid rules and Union legislation as expressed in the previous report5 related to the ability of deposit guarantee schemes (DGSs) to participate in resolution as provided for in the BRRD and DGSD, the 2017 banking cases brought to light other areas of mismatch, in particular
Amendment 276 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 12 12.
Amendment 277 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 12 a (new) 12a. Expresses strong concern about the adverse repercussions of bail-in on the confidence of European investors and citizens; points out that the bail-in mechanism may have the perverse effect of accelerating crises and increasing financial instability, triggering panic and contagion on the markets; condemns the underlying injustice of the bail-in principle, under which responsibility for bank failures is partially borne by small investors, savers and current account holders, despite the fact that they have no control over the soundness of banks or influence over their management;
Amendment 278 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 12 a (new) 12a. Points out, in the case of Veneto Banca and Banca Popolare di Vicenza , investors suffering from mis-selling could have been protected without removing the responsibilities of all creditors, as the Commission stated “In situations where banks that have mis-sold financial instruments have left the market, it is up to Member States to decide whether to take exceptional measures to address social consequences of mis-selling as a matter of social policy” 4a; _________________ 4a http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getAl lAnswers.do?reference=E-2017- 004987⟨ uage=EN
Amendment 279 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 13 Amendment 28 #
Motion for a resolution Recital A A. whereas
Amendment 280 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 13 13. Calls on the Commission to undertake as soon as possible the review referred to in the last subparagraph of Article 32(4) of the BRRD, taking into account the interplay between the NPL problem and the BRRD and State Aid rules, as well as the interplay between the new resolution regime and the 2013 Banking Communication, in order to draw lessons from the 2017 banking cases; calls on the Commission to pay particular attention in its evaluation to the condition that the precautionary recapitalisation ‘shall not be used to offset losses that the institution has incurred or is likely to incur in the near future’, as this condition seems difficult to fulfil in reality, especially when dealing with banks suffering from a high stock of NPLs;
Amendment 281 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 13 13. Calls on the Commission to undertake as soon as possible the review referred to in the last subparagraph of Article 32(4) of the BRRD, overdue since 2015, taking into account the interplay between the new resolution regime and the 2013 Banking Communication, in order to draw lessons
Amendment 282 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 13 13. Calls on the Commission to undertake as soon as possible the review referred to in the last subparagraph of Article 32(4) of the BRRD, taking into account the interplay between the new resolution regime and the 2013 Banking Communication, in order to draw lessons from the 2017 banking cases; notes, in this respect, that extraordinary support may only be used to remedy "a serious disturbance in the economy" and "to preserve financial stability", and that precautionary recapitalization should, as a minimum requirement, be confined to significant institutions supervised by the SSM; underlines that these requirements should be applied in the same way under state aid rules;
Amendment 283 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 13 13.
Amendment 284 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 13 13.
Amendment 285 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 13 13. Calls on the Commission to undertake as soon as possible the review
Amendment 286 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 13 13.
Amendment 287 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 13 a (new) 13a. Calls on the Commission to re- examine on a yearly basis whether the requirements for the application of Article 107(3)(b) TFEU regarding the possibility of State Aid in the financial sector continue to be fulfilled;
Amendment 288 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 13 a (new) 13a. Calls on the Commission to assess whether the banking sector has benefited since the beginning of the crisis from implicit subsidies and state aid by means of the provision of unconventional liquidity support;
Amendment 289 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 14 14. Welcomes the SRB’s prioritisation of enhancing resolvability of credit institutions, as well as the progress made in developing minimum requirement for own funds and eligible liabilities (MREL) targets in the framework of institution- specific resolution strategies; underlines that MREL should be mindful of institutions’ business models, as in many countries there are banks predominantly funded via deposits of retail and SME customers and that are not active on capital markets; notes that for these institutions the issuance of eligible liabilities could be a burdensome exercise and MREL compliance can be mostly reached via a strengthening of equity, which requires time; stresses that MREL targets should be realistic and proportionate to the different banking business models in the EU Member States;
Amendment 29 #
Motion for a resolution Recital A A. whereas at the end of 2016 the total number of credit institutions in the euro area stood at 5 073 on an unconsolidated basis, down from 5 475 in 2015, 5 614 in 2014 and 6 767 in 20083, which sparked a greater concentration of market power in the sector, exacerbating the ‘too-big-to- fail’ problem;
Amendment 290 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 14 14. Welcomes the SRB’s prioriti
Amendment 291 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 14 14. Welcomes the SRB’s prioritisation of enhancing resolvability of credit institutions, as well as the progress made in developing minimum requirement for own funds and eligible liabilities (MREL) targets in the framework of institution- specific resolution strategies; stresses that EU proposals on MREL should in no way lag behind internationally agreed standards;
Amendment 292 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 14 14.
Amendment 293 #
14.
Amendment 294 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 14 14. Welcomes the SRB’s prioritisation of enhancing resolvability of credit institutions, as well as the progress made
Amendment 295 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 14 14. Welcomes the SRB’s
Amendment 296 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 14 a (new) 14a. Regrets that the EC proposal on the revision of the BRRD defines maximum thresholds for own funds and eligible liabilities (MREL) to be held by institutions that are lower than the current levels as stipulated in the MREL RTS;
Amendment 297 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 14 b (new) 14b. Calls on the Single Resolution Board (SRB) to present the results on the resolvability assessments for G-SIB and other banks, including the proposed measures to overcome impediments to resolution; is concerned that there is no evidence to date that any major bank has been asked to remove obstacles to resolvability; calls on the Single Resolution Board to provide a comprehensive list of obstacles to resolvability encountered in national or European legislation;
Amendment 298 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 15 15. Welcomes the progress made in further harmonising the priority ranking of unsecured debt instruments through the Commission’s proposal of November 2016; calls for rapid implementation by Member States so that banks can issue debt in the new insolvency class and thereby build up the required buffers; underlines that the new approach to business in solvency which is promoting early restructuring and a second chance to restart a business has an important impact not only for addressing the barriers to the free flow of capital but also for supporting banks' operations in tackling NPLs;
Amendment 299 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 15 15.
Amendment 3 #
Motion for a resolution Citation 4 a (new) - having regard to the report of the Subgroup on Non-Performing Loans (NPLs) of the Council’s Financial Services Committee of 31 May 2017;
Amendment 30 #
Motion for a resolution Recital A A. whereas at the end of 2016 the total number of credit institutions in the euro area stood at 5 073 on an unconsolidated basis, down from 5 475 in 2015, 5 614 in 2014 and 6 767
Amendment 300 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 15 15. Welcomes the progress made in further harmonising the priority ranking of unsecured debt instruments through the Commission’s proposal of November 2016;
Amendment 301 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 15 15. Welcomes the
Amendment 302 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 15 15. Welcomes the
Amendment 303 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 15 a (new) 15a. Reiterates its position, as expressed in the previous report 5a, to enforce and enhance the consumer protection framework for banking services and that bail-inable instruments should be sold to appropriate investors who can absorb potential losses without threatening their own financial standing; calls, therefore, that resolution authorities shall monitor the extent to which instruments susceptible to bail-in are held by non professional investors and that the EBA shall proceed to an annual disclosure of these amounts as well as ,where appropriate, issue warnings and recommendations for remedial action; further calls, for senior non-preferred debt instruments to be treated as complex instruments for the purposes of the MIFID Directive and investment firms providing these instruments to non- professional investors to be considered as not fulfilling their obligations under that Directive; _________________ 5aEuropean Parliament, Resolution of 15 February 2017 on ‘Banking Union – Annual Report 2016’, paragraph 48
Amendment 304 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 16 Amendment 305 #
16. Calls for progress to be made on the legislative proposals implementing total loss-absorbing capacity (TLAC) in Union law;
Amendment 306 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 16 16.
Amendment 307 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 16 16. Calls for progress to be made on the legislative proposals implementing total loss-absorbing capacity (TLAC) in Union law and for it to be broadened and completed, separating investment banking and retail banking from each other; supports the inclusion of a pre-
Amendment 308 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 16 16. Calls for progress to be made on the legislative proposals implementing total loss-absorbing capacity (TLAC) in Union law;
Amendment 309 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 16 16. Calls for
Amendment 31 #
Motion for a resolution Recital A A. whereas at the end of 201
Amendment 310 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 16 16.
Amendment 311 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 16 16. Calls for progress to be made on the legislative proposals implementing total loss-absorbing capacity (TLAC) in Union law;
Amendment 312 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 16 16. Calls for progress to be made on the legislative proposals implementing total loss-absorbing capacity (TLAC) in Union law;
Amendment 313 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 16 16. Calls for progress to be made on the legislative proposals implementing total loss-absorbing capacity (TLAC) in Union law;
Amendment 314 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 16 16. Calls for progress to be made on the
Amendment 315 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 16 16. Calls for progress to be made on the legislative proposals implementing total loss-absorbing capacity (TLAC) in Union law;
Amendment 316 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 17 17.
Amendment 317 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 17 17. Notes th
Amendment 318 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 17 17. Notes the ongoing technical work by the Council on a common fiscal backstop
Amendment 319 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 17 17.
Amendment 32 #
Motion for a resolution Recital A a (new) A a. whereas, even though there is an urgent need to limit the damage due to failures within the current structure of the banking system, structural reforms aimed at reducing a priori the systemic risks due to interconnections and complexity, underpinning the “too big to fail problem”, would be much more effective;
Amendment 320 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 17 17. Notes the ongoing technical work by the Council on a common fiscal backstop for the Single Resolution Fund (SRF); calls for the ex-ante contributions to the Single Resolution Fund to be calculated in a transparent manner, through the provision of information on the calculation methodology, along with efforts to harmonise information on calculation outcomes;
Amendment 321 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 17 17. Notes the ongoing technical work by the Council on a common fiscal backstop for the Single Resolution Fund (SRF); wishes, however, to see this budgetary support system prevent any kind of contagion of the banking sector as a whole from a crisis initially confined to one establishment in particular;
Amendment 322 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 17 17. Notes the ongoing technical work by the Council on a common fiscal backstop for the Single Resolution Fund (SRF), highlighting the fragility of the banking union and its inability to meet one of its fundamental objectives: avoiding recourse to publicly-funded bank bailouts;
Amendment 323 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 17 17. Notes the ongoing technical work by the Council on a common fiscal backstop for the Single Resolution Fund (SRF); emphasises that this work may in no way undermine the principle that taxpayers should not be liable for banks' risk;
Amendment 324 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 17 17. Notes the ongoing technical work by the Council on a common
Amendment 325 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 17 17. Notes the ongoing technical work by the Council on a common fiscal backstop for the Single Resolution Fund (SRF) and calls for its rapid conclusion in order to set up this tool as swiftly as possible;
Amendment 326 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 17 17. Notes the ongoing technical work by the Council on a common fiscal backstop for the Single Resolution Fund (SRF) and calls for its swift approval;
Amendment 327 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 17 a (new) 17a. Calls on the Commission to bring forward a proposal, on the basis of the provision in Recital 27 of Delegated Regulation (EU) 2015/63 for reviewing the calculation of contributions to resolution financing arrangements, for an amendment to the delegated regulation so as to ensure that better account is taken, when contributions to resolution financing arrangements are being calculated, of the lower risk profile of less complex institutions;
Amendment 328 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 17 a (new) 17a. Recalls that the substance of the Intergovernmental Agreement on the Single Resolution Fund (SRF) is to be ultimately incorporated into the Union's legal framework; asks the Commission to reflect on ways of doing so; is of the opinion that the proposal on the integration of the ESM into the EU legal framework could provide a useful template;
Amendment 329 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 17 a (new) 17a. Considers that a similar architecture to the Single Resolution Mechanism and Single Resolution Fund is required for Central Counterparties (CCPs) given their interconnectedness with systematically important banks and the cross-border implications of any resolution actions;
Amendment 33 #
Motion for a resolution Recital A a (new) Aa. whereas the Commission has announced in its Work Programme for 2018 that it intends to withdraw its proposal on banking separation;
Amendment 330 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 17 a (new) 17a. Recalls that the substance of the Intergovernmental Agreement on the Single Resolution Fund (SRF) is to be ultimately incorporated into the Union legal framework; reiterates its calls on the Commission to reflect on ways of doing so;
Amendment 331 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 17 a (new) 17a. Notes that 'preventive recapitalisation' is continuing to hamper the use of public funds to boost the capital of private banks;
Amendment 332 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 17 b (new) 17b. Calls for an improvement of the practical modalities of cooperation and exchange of information between all European and national bodies involved in early intervention and resolution;
Amendment 333 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 17 c (new) 17c. Insists on the importance of improved cooperation for swift and effective coordination between supervisory and resolution authorities; would welcome in this respect change in the relevant SSM Regulation to allow for a representative of the Single Resolution Board as a permanent observer at meeting of the Supervisory Board of the SSM;
Amendment 334 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 17 d (new) 17d. Emphasises the importance of operational and credible resolution plans and in that context acknowledges the problems that single point of entry strategies could imply for the financial stability of host countries if not appropriately designed; calls therefore for the completion of the mechanisms foreseen in resolution plans by operational loss upstreaming mechanisms through sufficiently high buffers of internal MREL and by arrangements preventing that losses can be downstreamed within the resolution group when resolution tools are applied to the resolution entity;
Amendment 335 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 17 e (new) 17e. Is concerned about the influence that resolution decisions can have on the structure of the banking system; calls on the Commission to closely monitor this issue, follow-up on decisions taken and inform the European Parliament about its findings on a regular basis;
Amendment 336 #
18. Welcomes the EBA’s decision to publish on an annual basis data received by it in accordance with Article 10(10) of the DGSD;
Amendment 337 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 18 18. Welcomes the EBA’s decision to publish on an annual basis data received by it in accordance with Article 10(10) of the DGSD; regrets that the data do not allow for a direct comparison of the adequacy of funding between deposit guarantee schemes (DGSs);
Amendment 338 #
18. Welcomes the EBA’s decision to publish on an annual basis data received by it in accordance with Article 10(10) of the DGSD;
Amendment 339 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 18 18. Welcomes the EBA’s decision to publish on an annual basis data received by it in accordance with Article 10(10) of the DGSD; regrets that the data do not allow for a direct comparison of the adequacy of funding between deposit guarantee schemes (DGSs); notes, nonetheless, the need for several DGSs to accelerate the build-up of available financial means in order to achieve
Amendment 34 #
Motion for a resolution Recital B B. whereas the
Amendment 340 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 18 18. Welcomes the EBA’s decision to publish on an annual basis data received by it in accordance with Article 10(10) of the DGSD;
Amendment 341 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 18 18. Welcomes the EBA’s decision to publish on an annual basis data received by it in accordance with Article 10(10) of the DGSD; regrets that the data do not allow for a direct comparison of the adequacy of funding between deposit guarantee schemes (DGSs); notes, nonetheless, the need for several DGSs to accelerate the build-up of available financial means in order to achieve their target level
Amendment 342 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 18 18. Welcomes the EBA’s decision to publish on an annual basis data received by it in accordance with Article 10(10) of the DGSD; regrets that the data do not allow for a direct comparison of the adequacy of funding between deposit guarantee schemes (DGSs); notes, nonetheless, the need for several DGSs to accelerate the build-up of available financial means in order to achieve the agreed target level
Amendment 343 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 20 Amendment 344 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 20 Amendment 345 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 20 20. Asks the Commission to shed light on the applications for a target level lower than 0.8 % of covered deposits as received and approved by it in accordance with Article 10(6) of the DGSD; draws attention to the implications of the availability of such an exception for the potential design of an EDIS; points out that the absence of a proper impact assessment of the EDIS proposal is fundamentally at odds with the principles of sound regulation;
Amendment 346 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 20 20. Asks the Commission to shed light
Amendment 347 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 20 20. Asks the Commission to shed light on the applications for a target level lower than 0.8 % of covered deposits as received and approved by it in accordance with Article 10(6) of the DGSD;
Amendment 348 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 20 20. Asks the Commission to shed light on the applications
Amendment 349 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 21 Amendment 35 #
Motion for a resolution Recital B B. whereas the stock of non- performing loans of significant institutions (SIs) stood at EUR 865 billion at the end of March 2017, having significantly decreased from 950 billion at the same time in 2016, showing a declining trend;
Amendment 350 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 21 21. Recalls that deposit protection is a common concern for all EU citizens and echoes the statement of the Five Presidents on Completing Europe’s Economic and Monetary Union Report, which pointed out that a single banking system can only be truly single if the European protection of bank deposits is the same irrespective of the Member State in which a bank operates; is currently debating the proposal on an EDIS at committee level;
Amendment 351 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 21 21. Recalls that deposit protection is a common concern for all EU citizens and that an EDIS would contribute to boost both the confidence in the banking system and the solidity of this sector, by reducing the depositors’ vulnerability and the link between banks and sovereigns; is currently debating the proposal on an EDIS at committee level; notes, in this respect, the Commission’s more proportionate ‘new approach’ to an EDIS as put forward in its communication of 11 October 2017;
Amendment 352 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 21 21. Recalls that deposit protection is a common concern for all EU citizens and that tax payers have to pick up the tab for the failure of non-performing loans and too-big-to fail banks; is currently debating the proposal on an EDIS at committee level; notes, in this respect, that the Commission’s
Amendment 353 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 21 21. Recalls that deposit protection is a common concern of
Amendment 354 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 21 21. Recalls that deposit protection is a common concern for all EU citizens and supports the principle of an EDIS as the third pillar of a fully completed and harmonised Banking Union; is currently debating the proposal on an EDIS
Amendment 355 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 21 21. Recalls that deposit protection is a common concern for all EU citizens;
Amendment 356 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 21 21. Recalls that deposit protection is a common concern for all EU citizens and that the Banking Union remains incomplete without its third pillar; is currently debating the proposal on an EDIS at committee level; notes, in this respect, the Commission’s
Amendment 357 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 21 21. Recalls that deposit protection is a common concern for all EU citizens and therefore recalls that the Banking Union is open to all Member States; is currently debating the proposal on an EDIS at committee level; notes, in this respect, the Commission’s more proportionate ‘new approach’ to an EDIS as put forward in its communication of 11 October 2017;
Amendment 358 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 21 21. Recalls that deposit protection is a common concern for all EU citizens that should be managed at national level; is currently debating the proposal on an EDIS at committee level;
Amendment 359 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 21 21. Recalls that deposit protection is a common concern for all EU citizens; is currently debating the proposal on an EDIS at committee level; notes, in this respect, th
Amendment 36 #
Motion for a resolution Recital B B. whereas the stock of non- performing loans of significant institutions (SIs) stood at EUR 865 billion at the end of March 2017
Amendment 360 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 21 21. Recalls that deposit protection is a common concern for all EU citizens; is currently debating the proposal on an EDIS at committee level; notes
Amendment 361 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 21 21. Recalls that deposit protection is a common concern
Amendment 362 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 21 21. Recalls that deposit protection is a common concern and a public good for all EU citizens; is currently debating the proposal on an EDIS at committee level; notes, in this respect, the Commission’s
Amendment 363 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 21 21. Recalls that deposit protection is a common concern for all EU citizens; is currently debating the proposal on an EDIS at committee level; notes, in this respect, the Commission’s
Amendment 364 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 21 21. Recalls that deposit protection is a common concern for all EU citizens; is currently debating the proposal on an EDIS at committee level; notes, in this respect, the Commission’s
Amendment 365 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 21 21. Recalls that deposit protection is a common concern for all EU citizens; is currently debating the proposal on an EDIS at committee level; notes, in this respect, the Commission’s
Amendment 366 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 21 21. Recalls that deposit protection is a common concern for all EU citizens; is currently debating the proposal on an EDIS at committee level;
Amendment 367 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 21 a (new) 21a. Welcomes the Commission's approach in their communication and the remarks made by ECB President Draghi during the Monetary Dialogue of 20 November 2017 that risk sharing and risk reduction need to go hand-in-hand and that, among other things, an adequate reduction of risks on the balance sheet of banks needs to achieved before deposit insurance losses should be shared at Banking Union level;
Amendment 368 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 21 a (new) 21a. Recalls that the moral hazard of deposit protection spurs deposit banks to engage in overly risky behaviour; recalls that deposit protection disincentives deposit holders to scrutinize their bank and its investment and management decisions;
Amendment 369 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 21 a (new) 21a. Regrets the delay in establishing a Single European Deposit Guarantee Scheme and calls for a fully mutualised EDIS by 2022;
Amendment 37 #
Motion for a resolution Recital B B. whereas the stock of non- performing loans of significant institutions (SIs) stood at EUR 865 billion at the end of March 2017 and remains at an unacceptably high level across the Banking Union as a whole;
Amendment 370 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 22 Amendment 371 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 22 Amendment 372 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 22 Amendment 373 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 22 22. Notes the
Amendment 374 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 22 22. Notes the
Amendment 375 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 22 22. Notes the potential benefits and the likely risks related to the introduction of an EDIS; considers, therefore, risk reduction measures to be essential building blocks laying the foundations for an EDIS; recalls that a common EDIS would reduce the vulnerability of national DGS to large local shocks, ensuring that the level of depositor confidence in a bank would not depend on the bank's location and weakening the link between banks and their national sovereigns;
Amendment 376 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 22 22. Notes the potential benefits and the likely risks related to the introduction of a
Amendment 377 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 22 22. Notes th
Amendment 378 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 22 22. Notes the
Amendment 379 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 22 22.
Amendment 38 #
Motion for a resolution Recital B B. whereas the stock of non- performing loans of significant institutions (SIs) stood at EUR 865 billion at the end of March 2017, but it is desirable to make a reference to how the number has developed during the crisis;
Amendment 380 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 22 22. Notes the potential benefits
Amendment 381 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 22 22. Notes the potential benefits and the likely risks related to the introduction of an EDIS; considers, therefore, that risk reduction
Amendment 382 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 22 22.
Amendment 383 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 22 22. Notes the potential benefits and the likely risks related to the introduction of an EDIS; considers, therefore,
Amendment 384 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 22 22. Notes the potential benefits
Amendment 385 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 22 22. Notes the potential benefits
Amendment 386 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 22 a (new) 22a. Underlines that, as in all advanced systems, a public backstop is needed to ensure effective deposit protection; points out that the ECB is the institution able to guarantee unlimited protection for all euro-denominated current accounts in the banking union;
Amendment 387 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 23 a (new) 23a. Stresses that any new primary, secondary rules or even guidelines must be accompanied by an in-depth impact analysis which makes clear the overall impact on the real economy - in particular on SMEs and on the financing of households - on employment and on the demand for investment;
Amendment 388 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 23 a (new) 23a. Stresses that any new primary, secondary rules or even guidelines must be accompanied by an in-depth impact analysis which makes clear the overall impact on the real economy - in particular on SMEs and the financing of households - on employment and on the demand for investment;
Amendment 389 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 22 a (new) 22a. Points out that there are still significant doubts regarding the appropriate legal basis for the establishment of both the EDIS and the DIF;
Amendment 39 #
Motion for a resolution Recital B B. whereas the stock of non- performing loans of significant institutions (SIs) stood at EUR
Amendment 390 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 23 b (new) 23b. Recalls the powers of the European Parliament in the issuance of Pillar 1 rules.
Amendment 391 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 23 b (new) 23b. Recalls the powers of the European Parliament in the issuance of Pillar 1 rules.
Amendment 392 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 23 23. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council, the Commission, the E
Amendment 4 #
Motion for a resolution Citation 4 b (new) - having regard to the ESRB report on Financial Stability Implications of IFRS of 9July 2017,
Amendment 40 #
Motion for a resolution Recital B B. whereas the stock of non- performing loans of significant institutions (SIs) stood at EUR 865 billion at the end of March 2017 and it is steadily declining;
Amendment 41 #
Motion for a resolution Recital B B. whereas the stock of non- performing loans of significant institutions (SIs) stood at EUR
Amendment 42 #
Motion for a resolution Recital B a (new) B a. whereas, according to the EBA's quarterly Risk Dashboard, Europe's main banks reported a weighted average NPL Ratio (non performing loans, gross of impairments, divided by total loans) of 4,47% as of June 30, 2017, which has been steadily decreasing for the last 30 months, with a sharper drop since September 2016, with Germany and Italy, among the EU's large national banking systems, having achieved also significant increases in coverage;
Amendment 43 #
Motion for a resolution Recital B a (new) Ba. whereas, according to a recent study by the European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA), the derivatives market in the European Union has a total notional value of 453 000 billion;
Amendment 44 #
Motion for a resolution Recital B a (new) B a. whereas there is great dispersion of the total amount and ratios of non- performing loans between Member States and whereas there are substantial differences across banks in those countries with the highest NPL ratios;
Amendment 45 #
Motion for a resolution Recital B a (new) B a. whereas the non-performing loans ratio of significant institutions (SIs) stood at 5.48% at the end of June 2017 and has shown a declining trend;
Amendment 46 #
Motion for a resolution Recital C Amendment 47 #
Motion for a resolution Recital C Amendment 48 #
Motion for a resolution Recital C C. whereas the 2017 banking cases have shown that the move from bail-out to bail-in has
Amendment 49 #
Motion for a resolution Recital C C. whereas the 2017 banking cases have shown that
Amendment 5 #
Motion for a resolution Citation 6 — having regard to the ECB’s guidance to banks on non-performing loans of 20 March 2017,
Amendment 50 #
Motion for a resolution Recital C C. whereas the 2017 banking cases have shown that the move from bail-out to bail-in
Amendment 51 #
Motion for a resolution Recital C C. whereas the 2017 banking cases have shown that the move from bail-out to bail-in has yet to be finalised and the rules on banking recovery and resolution are being insufficiently applied;
Amendment 52 #
Motion for a resolution Recital C C. whereas the 2017 banking cases have shown that the
Amendment 53 #
Motion for a resolution Recital C a (new) C a. whereas the establishment of the Banking Union is an indispensable component of a monetary union and a fundamental building block of a genuine economic and monetary union;
Amendment 54 #
Motion for a resolution Recital C a (new) C a. whereas risks in certain national banking systems remain insufficiently addressed;
Amendment 57 #
Motion for a resolution Recital D D. whereas the Banking Union
Amendment 58 #
Motion for a resolution Recital D D. whereas the
Amendment 59 #
Motion for a resolution Recital D D. whereas the Banking Union remains incomplete without the introduction of a common deposit insurance and a Bank Structural Reform in the spirit of the Liikanen Report to effectively address the too-big-to-fail problem and to safeguard taxpayers and depositors;
Amendment 6 #
Motion for a resolution Citation 6 a (new) - having regard to the Commission's Consultation document of 10 November 2017 on statutory prudential backstops addressing insufficient provisioning for newly originated loans that turn non- performing,
Amendment 60 #
Motion for a resolution Recital D D. whereas the Banking Union
Amendment 61 #
Motion for a resolution Recital D D. whereas further and swift efforts are needed to the accomplishment of the Banking Union as it remains incomplete as long as it lacks a fiscal backstop and its third pillar of a European Deposit Insurance Scheme (EDIS);
Amendment 62 #
Motion for a resolution Recital D D. whereas the Banking Union remains incomplete and incapable of preventing and managing crises without generating panic among savers and forfeiting the confidence of tax payers;
Amendment 63 #
Motion for a resolution Recital D D. whereas the Banking Union remains incomplete, which is at least partially due to insufficient progress in risk reduction;
Amendment 64 #
Motion for a resolution Recital D a (new) D a. whereas the establishment of a European Deposit Insurance Scheme (EDIS) is necessary to ensure the homogeneous protection of depositors and the completion of the Banking Union;
Amendment 65 #
Motion for a resolution Recital D a (new) D a. whereas the Banking Union is acting on the consequences of the crisis and not on the causes;
Amendment 66 #
Motion for a resolution Recital D a (new) Da. whereas the Single Supervisory Mechanism has yet again revealed its limitations;
Amendment 67 #
Motion for a resolution Recital D b (new) D b. whereas a proper structural reform of banks based on a clear separation between trading and credit activities is the only way to prevent the risk of bail-out at the expense of taxpayers and ensure financial stability;
Amendment 68 #
Motion for a resolution Recital D b (new) D b. whereas a completed Banking Union is fundamental to break the sovereign-banks nexus;
Amendment 69 #
Motion for a resolution Recital D c (new) D c. whereas in order to function properly the Banking Union needs the establishment of a European safe asset;
Amendment 7 #
Motion for a resolution Citation 6 a (new) - having regard to the opinion of the European Parliament's Legal Service of 9 November 2017 on the addendum to the ECB guidance to banks on non- performing loans (SJ-0693/17),
Amendment 70 #
Motion for a resolution Recital D d (new) D d. whereas participation in the Banking Union is open to Member States that have not yet adopted the euro;
Amendment 71 #
Motion for a resolution Recital E Amendment 72 #
Motion for a resolution Recital E a (new) Ea. whereas the Banking Union is not serving any of its major fundamental purposes - to tackle the problems posed by institutions that are 'too-big-to-fail’ and avoid the use of public funds in the resolution process - that were so loudly proclaimed by its supporters;
Amendment 73 #
Motion for a resolution Recital E a (new) E a. whereas our work on the capital market union should not move away pressure from the completion of our work on the banking union, which still is a pre- requirement for financial stability in the bank-reliant landscape of the European Union;
Amendment 74 #
Motion for a resolution Recital E a (new) E a. whereas any Member State which is not part of the euro area can decide to join in the Banking union on a voluntary basis;whereas no EU member State has so far decided to do so;
Amendment 75 #
Motion for a resolution Recital E a (new) Ea. whereas in carrying out its supervisory activities the European Central Bank has so far failed to take sufficient account of the proportionality principle;
Amendment 76 #
Motion for a resolution Recital E a (new) E a. whereas a proper clean-up of bank balance sheets after the crisis has been delayed, still hampering economic growth;
Amendment 77 #
Motion for a resolution Recital E a (new) E a. whereas the primary responsibility of banks is to provide finance to the real economy;
Amendment 78 #
Motion for a resolution Recital E b (new) E b. whereas overall the capital and liquidity ratios of EU banks have slightly improved over the last year while many banks, including several large banks, remain significantly undercapitalised;whereas risks to financial stability remain;
Amendment 79 #
Motion for a resolution Recital E b (new) Eb. whereas the separation between commercial and investment banking should constitute a basic priority measure;regrets, therefore, that this has been abandoned by the Commission in its work programme;
Amendment 8 #
Motion for a resolution Citation 6 b (new) - having regard to the European Parliament resolution of 4 September 2007 on institutional and legal implications of the use of “soft law” instruments (P6_TA(2007)0366),
Amendment 80 #
Motion for a resolution Recital E b (new) Eb. whereas the ECB needs some flexibility in carrying out its supervisory activities, but far-reaching decisions of principle must ultimately be left to the European legislator;
Amendment 81 #
Motion for a resolution Recital E b (new) E b. whereas the European Parliament has so far failed to agree on a position with regard to the Commission proposal for a regulation on structural measures improving the resilience of EU credit institutions;
Amendment 82 #
Motion for a resolution Recital E b (new) E b. whereas a coherent, fully-fledged framework for macroprudential supervision at European level is still lacking;whereas microprudential tools are insufficient to address macroeconomic risks;
Amendment 83 #
Motion for a resolution Recital E c (new) E c. whereas the risks in the banking sector have already been substantially reduced since the start of the establishment of the Banking Union and the institutional and regulatory framework for European banks has been fundamentally reinforced;whereas advances on risk sharing however remain very limited;
Amendment 84 #
Motion for a resolution Recital E c (new) E c. whereas ECB president Draghi made the statement on the 20th of November 2017 in Frankfurt, that `risk reduction and risk sharing should go in parallel´ but that ´EDIS remains a fundamental pillar of the Banking Union´;
Amendment 85 #
Motion for a resolution Recital E c (new) E c. whereas current favourable economic conditions constitute a window of opportunity to push necessary reforms to complete the Banking Union;
Amendment 86 #
Motion for a resolution Recital E d (new) E d. whereas Member States which have not yet adopted the euro are welcome to join the Banking Union;whereas financial institutions see advantages in being situated within the Banking Union;whereas Denmark, Sweden and Bulgaria are in discussions about the possibility to join the Banking Union;
Amendment 88 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph –1 (new) -1. Considers that, even though improvements are desirable notably in terms of communication and transparency, the Banking Union remains a very positive and fundamental change for the Member States having the euro;encourages all Member States that have not yet adopted the euro to take all necessary steps to do so, or to join the BU, in order to progressively align the BU with the entire internal market; Or. en ((This paragraph should go under the new heading "Introduction"))
Amendment 89 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph –1 a (new) Amendment 9 #
Motion for a resolution Citation 8 a (new) - having regard to the Commission consultative document of 10 November 2017 on statutory prudential backstops addressing insufficient provisions for newly originated loans that turn non- performing,
Amendment 90 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph –1 b (new) Amendment 91 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph –1 (new) -1 Encourages all Member States that have not yet adopted the euro to take all necessary steps to do so, or to join the Banking Union, in order to progressively align the Banking Union with the entire internal market;
Amendment 92 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph –1 a (new) -1 a Considers that the Banking Union should be underpinned by a risk-free asset issued by the Union and/or the euro area;
Amendment 93 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph –1 (new) -1. Rejects the Banking Union and calls for it to be dissolved, since it believes that the only way of addressing the ‘too- big-to-fail’ problem, depositors’ security and the urgent need to have a banking system that serves the populations’ interests and countries' needs in terms of development entails the end of the Banking Union and the promotion of public control and decentralisation of the banking and financial sectors;
Amendment 94 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 1 Amendment 95 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 1 Amendment 96 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 1 1.
Amendment 97 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 1 1. Takes note of the ECB’s ‘failing or likely to fail’ assessments in respect of Banco Popular Español S.A., Banca Popolare di Vicenza and Veneto Banca; in that context, notes also that the supervisory and single resolution mechanisms have been working effectively in this context and that the BRRD rules have been properly applied;
Amendment 98 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 1 1. Takes note of the ECB’s ‘failing or likely to fail’ assessments in respect of Banco Popular Español S.A., Banca Popolare di Vicenza and Veneto Banca; whereas Banco Popular Español S.A. has been saved by private bond holders but Banca Popolare di Vicenza and Veneto Banca have been saved by state aid;
Amendment 99 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 1 1. Takes note of the ECB’s ‘failing or likely to fail’ assessments in respect of Banco Popular Español S.A., Banca Popolare di Vicenza and Veneto Banca and notes the failure of the single supervisory mechanism in the case of Banco Popular;
source: 613.640
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History
(these mark the time of scraping, not the official date of the change)
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