Progress: Awaiting Council's 1st reading position
Role | Committee | Rapporteur | Shadows |
---|---|---|---|
Lead | ECON | LUCKE Bernd ( ECR), CALVET CHAMBON Enrique ( ALDE), SCHIRDEWAN Martin ( GUE/NGL), URTASUN Ernest ( Verts/ALE), MONOT Bernard ( EFDD), ZANNI Marco ( ENF) |
Lead committee dossier:
Legal Basis:
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Legal Basis:
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The European Parliament adopted by 448 votes to 199, with 8 abstentions, a legislative resolution on the proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on sovereign bond-backed securities.
The European Parliament’s position adopted at first reading under the ordinary legislative procedure amended the Commission proposal as follows:
Creating a SBBS framework
The proposal aims to provide a framework for the market-led development of sovereign bond backed securities (SBBS). SBBSs might be able to help banks and other financial institutions better diversify their sovereign exposures, further weaken the bank-sovereign nexus and enhance the supply of low-risk euro denominated assets facilitating the implementation of monetary policy.
SBBSs do not involve any mutualisation of risks and losses among Member States because Member States will not mutually guarantee their respective liabilities within the portfolio of sovereign bonds underlying the SBBSs.
Surveillance by ESMA
The amended Regulation assigns to the European Supervisory Authority (European Securities and Markets Authority - ESMA) the duty of monitoring the markets for SBBSs and the underlying government bonds for signs of disruption.
ESMA should be informed about the issuance of SBBSs and should receive from SPEs all the relevant information needed to perform its supervisory tasks
On the basis of ESMA’s observations and supported by their reports, the Commission shall be empowered to provide a clear definition of “market liquidity” and a method for its calculation, and to determine the criteria by which ESMA shall assess whether a Member State no longer enjoys market access for the purposes of this Regulation.
Given that SBBSs are new products, whose effects on the markets for the underlying sovereign debt securities is unknown it is appropriate that the European Systemic Risk Board (ESRB) and the national competent and designated authorities for macroprudential instruments oversee the SBBSs market.
To that end, the ESRB shall avail itself of the powers conferred on it under Regulation (EU) No 1092/2010 of the European Parliament and of the Council and, if appropriate, should issue warnings and make suggestions for remedial actions to the competent authorities.
Structure of tranches, payments and losses
Under the Regulation, SBBSs issue shall be composed of one senior tranche and one or more subordinated tranches. The outstanding nominal value of the senior tranche shall be seventy percent of the outstanding nominal value of the entire SBBSs issue. The number and the outstanding nominal values of the subordinated tranches shall be determined by the SPE, subject to the limitation that the nominal value of the junior tranche shall be at least five percent of the outstanding nominal value of the entire SBBSs issue.
Issuance of SBBS and obligations of special purpose entities
SBBS shall be developed by private entities established by the European Union and created for the sole purpose of issuing and managing these instruments.
Member States shall ensure that holdings of sovereign bonds by SPEs enjoy the same treatment as any other holdings of the same sovereign bond or of other sovereign bonds issued with the same terms.
SBBS notification requirements
An SPE shall submit an application for certification of an SBBS issue by notifying ESMA at least one week before issuance of an SBBSs issue by means of the template that an SBBSs issue meets the requirements of the Regulation.
ESMA shall certify an SBBS issue only where it is fully satisfied that the applicant SPE and the SBBS issue comply with all the requirements laid down in this Regulation. ESMA shall inform the applicant SPE without undue delay whether certification has been granted or refused.
ESMA shall withdraw the certification for an SBBS issue if for example the SPE has obtained the certification by making false statements or by any other irregular means or no longer meets the conditions under which it was certified.
The withdrawal of the certification shall have immediate effect throughout the Union.
ESMA shall maintain on its official website a list of all SBBSs issues that have been certified by ESMA.
Supervisory fees
ESMA shall charge the SPE fees. Those fees shall be in proportion to the turnover of the SPE concerned and shall fully cover ESMA’s necessary expenditure relating to the licensing of SBBSs and supervision of SPEs.
Text adopted by Parliament, 1st reading/single reading
The Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs adopted the report by Jonás FERNÁNDEZ (S&D, ES) on the proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on sovereign bond-backed securities.
The proposal aims to provide a framework for the market-led development of sovereign bond backed securities (SBBS). SBBSs might be able to help banks and other financial institutions better diversify their sovereign exposures, further weaken the bank-sovereign nexus and enhance the supply of low-risk euro denominated assets facilitating the implementation of monetary policy.
The committee recommended that the European Parliament's position adopted at first reading under the ordinary legislative procedure should amend the Commission's proposal as follows:
Surveillance by ESMA
The amended Regulation assigns to the European Supervisory Authority (European Securities and Markets Authority) established by Regulation (EU) No 1095/2010 of the European Parliament and of the Council (ESMA) the duty of monitoring the markets for SBBSs and the underlying government bonds for signs of disruption.
On the basis of ESMA’s observations and supported by their reports, the Commission shall be empowered to provide a clear definition of “market liquidity” and a method for its calculation, and to determine the criteria by which ESMA shall assess whether a Member State no longer enjoys market access for the purposes of this Regulation.
Given that SBBSs are new products, whose effects on the markets for the underlying sovereign debt securities is unknown it is appropriate that the European Systemic Risk Board (ESRB) and the national competent and designated authorities for macroprudential instruments oversee the SBBSs market.
To that end, the ESRB shall avail itself of the powers conferred on it under Regulation (EU) No 1092/2010 of the European Parliament and of the Council and, if appropriate, should issue warnings and make suggestions for remedial actions to the competent authorities.
Structure of tranches, payments and losses
Under the Regulation, SBBSs issue shall be composed of one senior tranche and one or more subordinated tranches. The outstanding nominal value of the senior tranche shall be seventy percent of the outstanding nominal value of the entire SBBSs issue. The number and the outstanding nominal values of the subordinated tranches shall be determined by the SPE, subject to the limitation that the nominal value of the junior tranche shall be at least five percent of the outstanding nominal value of the entire SBBSs issue.
Issuance of SBBS and obligations of special purpose entities
SBBS shall be developed by private entities created for the sole purpose of issuing and managing these instruments.
Member States shall ensure that holdings of sovereign bonds by SPEs enjoy the same treatment as any other holdings of the same sovereign bond or of other sovereign bonds issued with the same terms.
SBBS notification requirements
An SPE shall submit an application for certification of an SBBS issue by notifying ESMA at least one week before issuance of an SBBSs issue by means of the template that an SBBSs issue meets the requirements of the Regulation.
ESMA shall certify an SBBS issue only where it is fully satisfied that the applicant SPE and the SBBS issue comply with all the requirements laid down in this Regulation. ESMA shall inform the applicant SPE without undue delay whether certification has been granted or refused.
ESMA shall withdraw the certification for an SBBS issue if for example the SPE has obtained the certification by making false statements or by any other irregular means or no longer meets the conditions under which it was certified.
The withdrawal of the certification shall have immediate effect throughout the Union.
Supervisory fees
ESMA shall charge the SPE fees. Those fees shall be in proportion to the turnover of the SPE concerned and shall fully cover ESMA’s necessary expenditure relating to the licensing of SBBSs and supervision of SPEs.
Committee report tabled for plenary, 1st reading/single reading
PURPOSE: to create a framework for sovereign bond-backed securities (SBBSs), to support further integration and diversification within Europe's financial sector.
PROPOSED ACT: Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council.
ROLE OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT: the European Parliament decides in accordance with the ordinary legislative procedure and on an equal footing with the Council.
BACKGROUND: sovereign bond-backed securities (‘SBBSs’) can address some vulnerabilities that have been exposed by or have resulted from the 2007-2008 financial crisis.
Reducing risks to financial stability by facilitating the diversification of banks' sovereign portfolios and further weakening the bank-sovereign nexus is of high importance for the completion of the Banking Union.
This legislative proposal is part of the Commission's efforts to enhance Banking Union and Capital Markets Union. It aims to enable the emergence of an efficient market for SBBSs over time. In turn, SBBSs could support further portfolio diversification in the financial sector, while creating a new source of high-quality collateral particularly suited for use in cross-border financial transactions.
In mid-2016, the European Systemic Risk Board (ESRB) established a high-level task force (henceforth, the ESRB task force) to assess SBBSs' merits and feasibility. The ESRB task force concluded that a market for SBBSs can develop under certain conditions. Yet, whether or not SBBSs are viable can ultimately only be ascertained by putting them to a market test. This proposal paves the way for such a market test.
A key finding of the ESRB task force, corroborated also by interactions with market participants and other stakeholders, is that the current regulatory framework constitutes a significant hindrance to the development of SBBSs . Under the existing regulatory framework, SBBSs would be defined as securitisation products, and hence would be treated significantly less favourably than their underlying portfolio of euro area sovereign bonds. However, due to the nature of their underlying assets and their standardised and simple nature, SBBSs carry risks that are comparable to the underlying sovereign bonds rather than regular securitisations.
The Commission will also adopt the necessary changes to the prospectus schedules and building blocks to ensure that appropriate disclosure for this new type of financial instrument, tailored to the characteristics of the product, are set out.
IMPACT ASSESSMENT: because the proposed framework only enables the private-sector led development of an SBBSs market, but does not guarantee it, the impact assessment considered two distinct scenarios to evaluate impacts, one in which SBBSs reach only a limited volume (EUR 100 billion) and a steady-state one in which they reach EUR 1.5 trillion.
As regards the impact of SBBSs on the diversification of banks' sovereign portfolios, the assessment showed that the impact would be small in the limited volume scenario, but significant under the steady state scenario.
CONTENT: this proposal aims to provide an enabling framework for a market-led development of Sovereign Bond-Backed Securities.
SBBS operation : SBBSs would be created by the private sector specifically set up for the sole purpose of issuing to investors a series of securities representing claims on the proceeds from this underlying portfolio. The various securities issued would bear any losses from the underlying portfolio in a certain sequence (i.e., losses would accrue first to holders of sub-senior, or subordinated, securities and only after such securities have been completely wiped out would they also accrue to the holders of senior claims). SBBSs would not rely on any risk sharing or fiscal mutualisation between Member States. Only private investors would share risks and possible losses . SBBSs are therefore very different from Eurobonds. Composition and structure of a SBBS issue : the proposal provides a set of rules that define the constitutive elements of SBBSs. These rules are necessary to ensure that as standardised a product as possible is produced by the markets. This in turn favours its liquidity and appeal to investors. Under the proposal, the underlying portfolio of SBBSs should be composed of sovereign bonds of all EU Member States whose currency is the euro . A SBBSs issue should be composed of a senior tranche, corresponding to 70 percent of the nominal value of SBBSs issue, and one or more subordinated tranches. The purpose of the subordinated tranches is to provide protection to the senior tranche, which therefore is a low risk instrument. Notification and transparency : the proposal provides rules that define notification and transparency requirements for the issuing entity to ensure that self-attestation is performed in a harmonised and credible way. To ensure that investors are protected from the risk of insolvency of the institution that acquires the sovereign bonds (original purchaser, typically a bank), the issuance of SBBSs should be undertaken by a Special Purpose Entity (SPE) that is exclusively devoted to the issuance and management of SBBSs. The SPEs are responsible for compliance with the product and notification requirements. The European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA) is entrusted with the publication of notifications on its website. This will ensure that the SPEs take responsibility for claiming that a product qualifies as an SBBS and that there is transparency in the market. SPEs shall be liable for any loss or damage resulting from incorrect or misleading notifications under the conditions stipulated by national law. Monitoring : the proposal contains rules regarding the supervision of SBBSs and possible sanctions in case of non-compliance and/or fraudulent behaviour of the issuing entity. It requires Member States to designate competent authorities in accordance with existing EU financial services legislation. The sanctions inflicted to a special purpose entity should be published. In addition, an SBBS which is found not fulfilling the requirements of the proposed Regulation should be removed without undue delay from the list of SBBS established by ESMA.
Lastly, the proposal contains a set of amendments to the existing legal framework required to grant SBBSs regulatory treatment in line with their unique design and properties.
Legislative proposal
PURPOSE: to create a framework for sovereign bond-backed securities (SBBSs), to support further integration and diversification within Europe's financial sector.
PROPOSED ACT: Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council.
ROLE OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT: the European Parliament decides in accordance with the ordinary legislative procedure and on an equal footing with the Council.
BACKGROUND: sovereign bond-backed securities (‘SBBSs’) can address some vulnerabilities that have been exposed by or have resulted from the 2007-2008 financial crisis.
Reducing risks to financial stability by facilitating the diversification of banks' sovereign portfolios and further weakening the bank-sovereign nexus is of high importance for the completion of the Banking Union.
This legislative proposal is part of the Commission's efforts to enhance Banking Union and Capital Markets Union. It aims to enable the emergence of an efficient market for SBBSs over time. In turn, SBBSs could support further portfolio diversification in the financial sector, while creating a new source of high-quality collateral particularly suited for use in cross-border financial transactions.
In mid-2016, the European Systemic Risk Board (ESRB) established a high-level task force (henceforth, the ESRB task force) to assess SBBSs' merits and feasibility. The ESRB task force concluded that a market for SBBSs can develop under certain conditions. Yet, whether or not SBBSs are viable can ultimately only be ascertained by putting them to a market test. This proposal paves the way for such a market test.
A key finding of the ESRB task force, corroborated also by interactions with market participants and other stakeholders, is that the current regulatory framework constitutes a significant hindrance to the development of SBBSs . Under the existing regulatory framework, SBBSs would be defined as securitisation products, and hence would be treated significantly less favourably than their underlying portfolio of euro area sovereign bonds. However, due to the nature of their underlying assets and their standardised and simple nature, SBBSs carry risks that are comparable to the underlying sovereign bonds rather than regular securitisations.
The Commission will also adopt the necessary changes to the prospectus schedules and building blocks to ensure that appropriate disclosure for this new type of financial instrument, tailored to the characteristics of the product, are set out.
IMPACT ASSESSMENT: because the proposed framework only enables the private-sector led development of an SBBSs market, but does not guarantee it, the impact assessment considered two distinct scenarios to evaluate impacts, one in which SBBSs reach only a limited volume (EUR 100 billion) and a steady-state one in which they reach EUR 1.5 trillion.
As regards the impact of SBBSs on the diversification of banks' sovereign portfolios, the assessment showed that the impact would be small in the limited volume scenario, but significant under the steady state scenario.
CONTENT: this proposal aims to provide an enabling framework for a market-led development of Sovereign Bond-Backed Securities.
SBBS operation : SBBSs would be created by the private sector specifically set up for the sole purpose of issuing to investors a series of securities representing claims on the proceeds from this underlying portfolio. The various securities issued would bear any losses from the underlying portfolio in a certain sequence (i.e., losses would accrue first to holders of sub-senior, or subordinated, securities and only after such securities have been completely wiped out would they also accrue to the holders of senior claims). SBBSs would not rely on any risk sharing or fiscal mutualisation between Member States. Only private investors would share risks and possible losses . SBBSs are therefore very different from Eurobonds. Composition and structure of a SBBS issue : the proposal provides a set of rules that define the constitutive elements of SBBSs. These rules are necessary to ensure that as standardised a product as possible is produced by the markets. This in turn favours its liquidity and appeal to investors. Under the proposal, the underlying portfolio of SBBSs should be composed of sovereign bonds of all EU Member States whose currency is the euro . A SBBSs issue should be composed of a senior tranche, corresponding to 70 percent of the nominal value of SBBSs issue, and one or more subordinated tranches. The purpose of the subordinated tranches is to provide protection to the senior tranche, which therefore is a low risk instrument. Notification and transparency : the proposal provides rules that define notification and transparency requirements for the issuing entity to ensure that self-attestation is performed in a harmonised and credible way. To ensure that investors are protected from the risk of insolvency of the institution that acquires the sovereign bonds (original purchaser, typically a bank), the issuance of SBBSs should be undertaken by a Special Purpose Entity (SPE) that is exclusively devoted to the issuance and management of SBBSs. The SPEs are responsible for compliance with the product and notification requirements. The European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA) is entrusted with the publication of notifications on its website. This will ensure that the SPEs take responsibility for claiming that a product qualifies as an SBBS and that there is transparency in the market. SPEs shall be liable for any loss or damage resulting from incorrect or misleading notifications under the conditions stipulated by national law. Monitoring : the proposal contains rules regarding the supervision of SBBSs and possible sanctions in case of non-compliance and/or fraudulent behaviour of the issuing entity. It requires Member States to designate competent authorities in accordance with existing EU financial services legislation. The sanctions inflicted to a special purpose entity should be published. In addition, an SBBS which is found not fulfilling the requirements of the proposed Regulation should be removed without undue delay from the list of SBBS established by ESMA.
Lastly, the proposal contains a set of amendments to the existing legal framework required to grant SBBSs regulatory treatment in line with their unique design and properties.
Legislative proposal
Documents
- Commission response to text adopted in plenary: SP(2019)440
- Decision by Parliament, 1st reading: T8-0373/2019
- Results of vote in Parliament: Results of vote in Parliament
- Debate in Parliament: Go to the page
- Committee report tabled for plenary, 1st reading: A8-0180/2019
- Amendments tabled in committee: PE630.618
- Contribution: COM(2018)0339
- Committee draft report: PE629.500
- ESC: CES2774/2018
- Document attached to the procedure: Go to the pageEur-Lex
- Document attached to the procedure: SWD(2018)0252
- Legislative proposal: COM(2018)0339
- Legislative proposal: Go to the pageEur-Lex
- Document attached to the procedure: Go to the pageEur-Lex
- Document attached to the procedure: SWD(2018)0253
- Legislative proposal published: COM(2018)0339
- Legislative proposal published: Go to the page Eur-Lex
- Committee draft report: PE629.500
- Amendments tabled in committee: PE630.618
- Document attached to the procedure: Go to the pageEur-Lex SWD(2018)0252
- Legislative proposal: COM(2018)0339 Go to the pageEur-Lex
- Document attached to the procedure: Go to the pageEur-Lex SWD(2018)0253
- Commission response to text adopted in plenary: SP(2019)440
- Contribution: COM(2018)0339
- ESC: CES2774/2018
Activities
- Valdis DOMBROVSKIS
Plenary Speeches (2)
- 2016/11/22 Sovereign bond-backed securities (debate)
- 2016/11/22 Sovereign bond-backed securities (debate)
- Notis MARIAS
Plenary Speeches (2)
- Enrique CALVET CHAMBON
Plenary Speeches (1)
- 2016/11/22 Sovereign bond-backed securities (debate) ES
- Stefan GEHROLD
Plenary Speeches (1)
- 2016/11/22 Sovereign bond-backed securities (debate) DE
- Ralph PACKET
Plenary Speeches (1)
- 2016/11/22 Sovereign bond-backed securities (debate) NL
Votes
A8-0180/2019 - Jonás Fernández - Proposition de la Commission 16/04/2019 12:32:18.000 #
A8-0180/2019 - Jonás Fernández - Proposition de la Commission #
Amendments | Dossier |
140 |
2018/0171(COD)
2018/11/20
ECON
140 amendments...
Amendment 100 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 4 – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 1 2. The weight of sovereign bonds of every Member State within an SBBSs' underlying portfolio (‘baseline weight’) shall be equal to the product of the ratio of a Member State’s central government debt securities to that Member State’s gross domestic product and the relative weight of the contribution to the European Central Bank (ECB) by that Member State in accordance with the key for subscription, by the national central banks of Members States, of the ECB's paid-in capital as laid down in Article 29 of the Protocol on the Statute of the European System of Central Banks and of the European Central Bank annexed to the Treaty on European Union and to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union. The ratio of a Member State’s central government debt securities to that Member State’s gross domestic product shall be understood as an annual mean. ESMA shall compute and publish this mean, which will be binding for all SBBS issuance during the full calendar year following its publication.
Amendment 101 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 4 – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 1 2. The relative weight of sovereign bonds of every Member State within an SBBSs' underlying portfolio
Amendment 102 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 4 – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 2 Amendment 103 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 4 – paragraph 3 Amendment 104 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 4 – paragraph 3 – subparagraph 1 – introductory part 3.
Amendment 105 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 4 – paragraph 3 – subparagraph 1 – point a a (new) (aa) SBBS issuance has had a significant negative impact on the market liquidity of any of the sovereign bonds included in the underlying portfolio;
Amendment 106 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 4 – paragraph 3 – subparagraph 2 Amendment 107 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 4 – paragraph 3 a (new) 3a. Sovereign bonds of a Member State, which is subject to an ongoing procedure pursuant to Article 7(1) or (2) of the Treaty on the European Union, shall be excluded from the SBBS’s underlying portfolio.
Amendment 108 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 4 – paragraph 4 Amendment 109 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 4 – paragraph 4 Amendment 110 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 4 – paragraph 5 Amendment 111 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 4 – paragraph 5 Amendment 112 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 4 – paragraph 5 a (new) 5a. When ESMA finds that one of the situations described in points (a) or (aa) of paragraph 3 exists it shall request an opinion from the ECB. On the basis of its own assessment and the ECB opinion, it may request the Commission to adjust the baseline weight of the Member State. Within 48 hours of receiving such a request, the Commission shall consider it and do one of the following: (a) adopt an implementing act that adjusts the baseline weights of the Member State concerned; or (b) reject the requested measure.
Amendment 113 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 4 – paragraph 5 b (new) 5b. When ESMA finds that the situation described in point (b) of paragraph 3 exists it shall request an opinion from the ECB. On the basis of its own assessment and the ECB opinion, it may request the Commission to take appropriate remedies, either by excluding the concerned Member State from the underlying portfolio or by adjusting the baseline weight of the Member State concerned. Within 48 hours of receiving such a request, the Commission shall consider it and do one of the following: (a) adopt an implementing act that either excludes sovereign bonds of the Member State from the underlying portfolio of the SBBS or adjusts the baseline weights of relevant Member States; or (b) reject the requested measures.
Amendment 114 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 4 – paragraph 5 c (new) 5c. Any implementing act adopted pursuant to paragraphs 5a or 5b shall be adopted in accordance with the examination procedure referred to in Article 26(2). When a Member State is excluded from the underlying portfolio of an SBBS following an implementing act under paragraph 5a or 5b, the baseline weights of the sovereign bonds of the remaining Member States shall be determined by excluding the sovereign bonds of the Member State referred to in the first subparagraph and applying the calculation method set out in paragraph 2. The exclusion or adjustment shall be valid for an initial period of one month. The Commission may, after consulting ESMA, extend the exclusion or adjustment of the baseline weights referred to in this Article for additional periods of one month by way of an implementing act. Where the exclusion or adjustment is not renewed by the end of the initial period or by the end of any subsequent renewal period, it shall automatically expire.
Amendment 115 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 6 – paragraph 1 1. An SBBSs issue shall be composed of one senior tranche and one or more subordinated tranches. The outstanding nominal value of the senior tranche shall be at most seventy percent of the outstanding nominal value of the entire SBBSs issue and shall be determined by the SPE in response to market demand. The number and the outstanding nominal values of the subordinated tranches shall be determined by the SPE, subject to the limitation that the nominal value of the junior tranche shall be at least two percent of the outstanding nominal value of the entire SBBSs issue.
Amendment 116 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 6 – paragraph 1 1. An SBBSs issue shall be composed of one senior tranche
Amendment 117 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 6 – paragraph 1 1. An SBBSs issue shall be composed of one senior tranche and one or
Amendment 118 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 6 – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 1 2. Where adverse developments severely disrupt the functioning of sovereign debt markets in a Member State or in the Union, and where that disruption has been confirmed by the Commission in accordance with paragraph 4, SPEs shall lower the outstanding nominal value of the senior tranche
Amendment 119 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 8 – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 1 1. An SPE shall invest payments of principal or interest from the sovereign bonds referred to in Article 4(1)(a) that are due prior to payments of principal or interest under the SBBS only in cash
Amendment 120 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 9 – paragraph 1 – point b (b) ESMA has
Amendment 121 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 9 – paragraph 1 – point b (b) ESMA has
Amendment 122 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 9 – paragraph 1 – point b (b) ESMA has
Amendment 123 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 10 – title SBBS notification and certification requirements
Amendment 124 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 10 – paragraph 1 1. An SPE shall submit an application for certification of an SBBS issue by notifying ESMA at least one week before issuance of an SBBSs issue by means of the template referred to in paragraph 5 of this Article that an
Amendment 125 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 10 – paragraph 1 1. An SPE shall
Amendment 126 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 10 – paragraph 1 1. An SPE shall
Amendment 127 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 10 – paragraph 1 a (new) 1a. The application shall include an explanation by the SPE of how it has complied with each of the requirements set out in Articles 4, 5, 6, 7 and 8.
Amendment 128 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 10 – paragraph 1 b (new) 1b. ESMA shall inform the applicant SPE without undue delay whether certification has been granted or refused.
Amendment 129 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 10 – paragraph 2 2. ESMA shall maintain on its official website a list of all SBBSs issues that have been
Amendment 130 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 10 – paragraph 2 2. ESMA shall maintain on its official website a list of all SBBSs issues that have been
Amendment 131 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 10 – paragraph 3 3.
Amendment 132 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 10 – paragraph 3 a (new) 3a. ESMA shall withdraw the certification for an SBBS issue if any of the following conditions is met: (a) the SPE has expressly renounced the certification or has not made use of it within six months after the certification has been granted; (b) the SPE has obtained the certification by making false statements or by any other irregular means; (c) the SBBS issue no longer meets the conditions under which it was certified. The withdrawal of the certification shall have immediate effect throughout the Union.
Amendment 133 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 11 – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 1 – introductory part 1. An SPE shall, without undue delay, provide ESMA, investors and competent authorities with the following information:
Amendment 134 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 11 – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 1 – introductory part 1. An SPE shall, without undue delay, provide investors and
Amendment 135 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 11 – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 1 – point d (d) the notification referred to in Article 10(1) and the certification under Article 10(1b).
Amendment 136 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 11 – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 1 – point d (d) the
Amendment 137 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 13 – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 1 1.
Amendment 138 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 13 – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 1 1.
Amendment 139 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 13 – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 1 1. In addition to ESMA, Member States shall designate one or more competent authorities to supervise the compliance of SPEs with this Regulation. Member States shall inform the Commission and ESMA about those competent authorities and, where relevant, about how their functions and duties are divided.
Amendment 140 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 13 – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 2 Amendment 141 #
Amendment 142 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 13 – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 1 Amendment 143 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 13 – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 1 Amendment 144 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 13 – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 2 – introductory part Amendment 145 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 13 – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 2 – introductory part Amendment 146 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 13 – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 2 – introductory part Amendment 147 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 14 – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 1 1.
Amendment 148 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 14 – paragraph 2 2. A competent authority that has clear and demonstrable grounds that an SPE is in breach of this Regulation shall promptly inform ESMA in a detailed manner
Amendment 149 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 14 – paragraph 2 2. A competent authority that has clear and demonstrable grounds that an SPE is in breach of this Regulation shall promptly inform ESMA in a detailed manner
Amendment 150 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 14 – paragraph 2 2. A competent authority that has clear and demonstrable grounds that an SPE is in breach of this Regulation shall promptly inform in a detailed manner ESMA and the competent authority of the Member State where the SPE is established.
Amendment 151 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 14 – paragraph 3 3. Where the SPE persists in acting in a manner that is clearly in breach of this Regulation despite measures taken by
Amendment 152 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 14 – paragraph 3 3. Where the SPE persists in acting in a manner that is clearly in breach of this Regulation despite measures taken by
Amendment 153 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 14 – paragraph 3 3. Where the SPE persists in acting in a manner that is clearly in breach of this Regulation despite measures taken by ESMA and the competent authority of the Member State where it is established, or because that competent authority has failed to take measures within a reasonable time, ESMA and the competent authority that has detected a breach of this Regulation may, after informing the competent authority of the Member State where the SPE is established
Amendment 154 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 15 – paragraph 1 1. Where there are reasons to believe that an SPE in infringement of Article 9 has used the designation ‘SBBS’ to market a product that fails to comply with the requirements set out in that Article, ESMA, in cooperation with the competent authority of the Member State where the SPE is established, shall follow the procedure provided for in paragraph 2.
Amendment 155 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 15 – paragraph 1 1. Where there are reasons to believe that an SPE in infringement of Article 9 has used the designation ‘SBBS’ to market a product that fails to comply with the requirements set out in that Article,
Amendment 156 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 15 – paragraph 1 1. Where there are reasons to believe that an SPE in infringement of Article 9
Amendment 157 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 15 – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 1 2. Within 15 days after becoming aware of the possible infringement referred to in paragraph 1
Amendment 158 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 15 – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 1 2. Within 15 days after becoming aware of the possible infringement referred to in paragraph 1
Amendment 159 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 15 – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 1 2. Within 15 days after becoming aware of the possible infringement referred to in paragraph 1 ESMA, in close cooperation with the competent authority of the
Amendment 160 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 15 – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 2 Amendment 161 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 15 – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 2 Amendment 162 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 15 – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 3 Where
Amendment 163 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 15 – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 3 Where
Amendment 164 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 16 – paragraph 1 – introductory part 1. Without prejudice to the right for Member States to lay down criminal sanctions pursuant to Article 17,
Amendment 165 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 16 – paragraph 1 – introductory part 1. Without prejudice to the right for Member States to lay down criminal sanctions pursuant to Article 17,
Amendment 166 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 16 – paragraph 3 – introductory part 3.
Amendment 167 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 16 – paragraph 3 – introductory part 3.
Amendment 168 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 16 – paragraph 3 – introductory part 3.
Amendment 169 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 16 – paragraph 4 4.
Amendment 170 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 16 – paragraph 4 4.
Amendment 171 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 16 – paragraph 4 4.
Amendment 172 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 17 – paragraph 1 Member States that have laid down criminal sanctions for the infringement referred to in Article 16(1) shall
Amendment 173 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 17 – paragraph 1 Member States that have laid down criminal sanctions for the infringement referred to in Article 16(1) shall
Amendment 174 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 18 – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 1 1.
Amendment 175 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 18 – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 1 1.
Amendment 176 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 18 – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 1 – introductory part 2.
Amendment 177 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 18 – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 1 – introductory part 2.
Amendment 178 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 18 – paragraph 3 3.
Amendment 179 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 18 – paragraph 3 3.
Amendment 180 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 18 a (new) Amendment 181 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 19 – paragraph 1 Within the limits of its mandate laid down in Regulation (EU) No 1092/2010 of the European Parliament and of the Council26 , the ESRB shall be responsible for the macroprudential oversight of the Union’s SBBSs market and act in accordance with the powers set out in that Regulation. If it finds that SBBS markets are posing a severe risk to the orderly functioning of the markets for the sovereign debt securities of those Member States whose currency is the Euro, the ESRB shall avail itself of the powers under Articles 16, 17 and 18 of Regulation (EU) No 1092/2010 of the European Parliament and of the Council, as appropriate. In particular it shall consider issuing warnings and suggesting remedial measures, including a halt to SBBS certification, to ESMA. _________________ 26 Regulation (EU) No 1092/2010 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 November 2010 on European Union macro-prudential oversight of the financial
Amendment 182 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 20 Amendment 183 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 20 Amendment 184 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 21 – paragraph 1 Directive 2009/65/EC Article 54a – paragraph 1 – point a (a) apply the same derogation or grant the same waiver for UCITS to invest up to 100% of their assets in the senior tranches of SBBSs as defined in Article 3(3) of Regulation [reference of the SBBS Regulation to be inserted] in accordance with the principle of risk-
Amendment 185 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 22 Directive 2009/138/EC Article 104 – paragraph 8 Amendment 186 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 22 – paragraph 1 Directive 2009/138/EC Article 104 – paragraph 8 – subparagraph 1 For the purposes of the calculation of the Basic Solvency Capital Requirement, exposures to the senior tranches of sovereign bond-backed securities as defined in Article 3(3) of Regulation [reference of the SBBS Regulation to be inserted] shall be treated as exposures to Member States' central governments or central banks denominated and funded in their domestic currency.
Amendment 187 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 23 Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 Articles 268, 325 and 390 Amendment 188 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 23 – paragraph 1 – point -1 (new) Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 Article 254 – paragraph 6 a (new) (-1) in Article 254, the following paragraph is inserted: “6a. By way of derogation from paragraph 1, for positions held in a subordinated tranche of sovereign bond- backed securities as defined in Article 3(3) of Regulation [reference of the SBBS Regulation to be inserted], institutions shall use the SEC-ERBA in accordance with Articles 263 and 164 of this Regulation. The exemption in the first subparagraph for the senior tranche shall also apply to positions where institutions hold all tranches of a specific sovereign bond- backed security exactly in the proportion in which these tranches were issued in accordance with Article 6(1) of Regulation [reference of the SBBS Regulation to be inserted].”
Amendment 189 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 23 – paragraph 1 – point 1 Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 Article 268 – paragraph 5 Amendment 190 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 23 – paragraph 1 – point 1 Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 Article 268 – paragraph 5 5. By way of derogation from the first paragraph, the senior tranches of sovereign bond-backed securities as defined in Article 3(3) of Regulation [reference of the SBBS Regulation to be inserted] may always be treated in accordance with the first paragraph of this Article.;
Amendment 191 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 23 – paragraph 1 – point 2 Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 Article 325 – paragraph 4 4. For the purpose of this Title, institutions shall treat exposures in the form of the senior tranche of sovereign bond-backed securities
Amendment 192 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 23 – paragraph 1 – point 2 Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 Article 325 – paragraph 4 4. For the purpose of this Title, institutions shall treat exposures in the form senior tranches of sovereign bond- backed securities as defined in Article 3(3) of Regulation [reference of the SBBS Regulation to be inserted] as exposures to the central government of a Member State.;
Amendment 193 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 23 – paragraph 1 – point 2 a (new) Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 Article 325 – paragraph 4 a (new) (2a) in Article 325, the following paragraph 4a is added: ‘4a. The treatment of the senior tranche in the first subparagraph shall also apply to positions where institutions hold all tranches of a specific sovereign bond- backed security exactly in the proportion in which these tranches were issued in accordance with Article 6(1) of Regulation [reference of the SBBS Regulation to be inserted].’
Amendment 194 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 23 – paragraph 1 – point 3 Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 Article 390 – paragraph 7 – subparagraph 2 The first subparagraph shall apply to exposures t
Amendment 195 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 24 Directive (EU) 2016/2341 Article 18a Amendment 196 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 24 – paragraph 1 Directive (EU) 2016/2341 Article 18a – paragraph 1 1. In their national rules regarding the valuation of assets of IORPs, the calculation of own funds of IORPs, and the calculation of a solvency margin for IORPs, Member States shall treat the senior tranches of sovereign-bond backed securities, as defined in Article 3(3) of Regulation [reference of the SBBS Regulation to be inserted], in the same way as euro area sovereign debt instruments.
Amendment 197 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 25 – paragraph 1 No sooner than five years after the date of entry into force of this Regulation and once sufficient data have become available, the Commission shall carry out an evaluation of this Regulation assessing whether it has achieved its objectives to eliminate undue regulatory hindrances to the emergence of SBBSs. It shall in particular evaluate whether ESMA should assume the role of the sole competent authority with regard to the provisions of this Regulation.
Amendment 62 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 1 (1) Sovereign Bond-Backed Securities (‘SBBSs’) can address some vulnerabilities that have been exposed by or have resulted from the 2007-2008 financial crisis. More specifically, SBBSs can help banks and other financial institutions better diversify their sovereign exposures, further weaken the bank-sovereign nexus and enhance the supply of low-risk euro denominated assets facilitating the implementation of monetary policy and working as another step for a future fiscal union. SBBSs could in addition render bonds issued in small and less liquid national markets more attractive for international investors, which can foster private sector risk sharing and risk reduction and promote a more efficient allocation of risks among financial operators.
Amendment 63 #
(1) Sovereign Bond-Backed Securities (‘SBBSs’)
Amendment 64 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 1 a (new) (1a) As there are risks in everything, the fiction of regulatory zero risk weight does not conform to reality. At the same time, zero risk weight has created a regulatory privilege for sovereign bonds and is the major reason that there is a nexus between banks and sovereigns in the first place. Artificially creating SBBS as yet another privileged asset will neither weaken nor break the nexus, but enhance it.
Amendment 65 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 1 b (new) (1b) A competitive and sustainable financial industry that aims to serve its customers can only be created by abolishing regulatory privileges, which in fact have the same effect as subsidies. The idea of the rule of law demands equal treatment, a level playing field, and ending regulatory privilege that favours big corporates.
Amendment 66 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 2 (2) Under the existing legal framework, SBBSs would be treated as securitisations and thus be subject to additional charges and discounts relative to the charges and discounts faced by the euro area sovereign bonds in the underlying portfolio. Those additional charges and discounts would hinder the production and use of SBBSs by the private and public sector, despite the fact that SBBSs do not carry the risks associated with securitisations that justify such charges and discounts. SBBS should therefore be subject to a regulatory framework that better takes into account the unique features and properties of SBBSs to enable that product to emerge on
Amendment 67 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 2 (2) Under the existing legal framework, SBBSs would be treated as securitisations and thus be subject to additional charges and discounts relative to the charges and discounts faced by the euro area sovereign bonds in the underlying portfolio. Those additional charges and discounts would hinder the production and use of SBBSs by the private sector, despite the fact that SBBSs
Amendment 68 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 2 a (new) (2a) A sufficiently large first-loss tranche outside the banking system will be key to reducing the bank-sovereign nexus. Accordingly, only the senior tranche of SBBSs should enjoy the full removal of regulatory restrictions for securitisation provided for in this Regulation.
Amendment 69 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 3 (3) Enabling a market-led development of SBBSs is part of the Commission's efforts to reduce risks to financial stability and advance towards completion of the Banking Union. SBBSs could support further portfolio diversification in the banking sector, while creating a new source of high-quality collateral, which is particularly suited for use in cross-border financial transactions as well as for the activities of central banks in the Eurosystem and those of central counterparties. Furthermore, enabling SBBSs could also increase the number of instruments available for cross-
Amendment 70 #
(3) Enabling a market-led development of SBBSs is part of the Commission's efforts to reduce risks to financial stability and advance towards completion of the Banking Union. SBBSs could support further portfolio diversification in the banking sector, while creating a new source of high-quality collateral, which is particularly suited for use in cross-border financial transactions. Furthermore, enabling SBBSs could also increase the number of instruments available for cross- border investment and risk sharing, which feeds into the Commission's efforts to complete Banking Union and deepen and integrate further Europe's capital markets in the context of the Capital Markets Union.
Amendment 71 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 4 (4) SBBSs do not involve any mutualisation of risks and losses among Member States because Member States will not mutually guarantee their respective liabilities within the portfolio of sovereign bonds underlying the SBBSs. Enabling the emergence of SBBSs neither involves any changes to the current regulatory treatment of sovereign exposures. However, risk sharing and joint fiscal facilities are ultimately needed to deal with future sovereign debt crises in the Eurozone. Over the medium term, a gradual mutualisation of sovereign debt instruments should be implemented through, inter alia, Eurobonds. This will allow a gradual reduction of debt-to-GDP ratios and compliance with the economic governance framework as well as social and environmental targets.
Amendment 72 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 5 (5) T
Amendment 73 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 5 (5) To achieve the objectives of geographic risk diversification within the Banking Union and the internal market, the underlying portfolio of SBBSs should be composed of sovereign bonds of Member States whose currency is the euro. To avoid currency risks only euro-denominated sovereign bonds issued by Member States whose currency is the euro should be allowed for inclusion in the SBBSs underlying portfolio. To ensure that sovereign bonds of each euro-area Member State contribute to the production of SBBSs in line with each Member State's stake in the stability of the overall euro area, the relative weight of the national sovereign bonds in the SBBSs’ underlying portfolio should be
Amendment 74 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 5 a (new) (5a) Issuers of SBBS should be free to determine the relative weights of the national sovereign bonds in the SBBSs’ underlying portfolio. This is beneficial because it increases product diversity and allows issuers to tailor SBBS supply to market demand. As such it increases the likelihood that a viable market for SBBS will develop. Implementing powers should be conferred on the Commission to decide whether the size of the senior tranche of an SBBS issue whose relative weights differ significantly from Member States’ shares in the capital of the ECB should be set to a level lower than seventy percent.
Amendment 75 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 6 (6) To provide for a high quality low- risk asset and at the same time cater for investors' different levels of risk appetite, an SBBS issue should be composed of
Amendment 76 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 6 (6) To provide for a high quality low- risk asset and at the same time cater for investors' different levels of risk appetite, an SBBS issue should be composed of both a senior tranche and one or more subordinated tranches. The senior tranche, corresponding to at most seventy percent of the nominal value of an SBBS issue, should keep the SBBS issue expected loss rate in line with that of the safest euro area sovereign bonds, taking into account the risk and correlation of the sovereign bonds in the SBBSs underlying portfolio of sovereign bonds. The subordinated tranches should provide for protection to the senior tranche. The seniority of the tranches should determine the order in which losses on the underlying portfolio of sovereign bonds should be borne by investors. To limit the risk of the junior tranche (the tranche bearing losses before any other tranche), the nominal value of the junior tranche should however be at least
Amendment 77 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 6 (6) To provide for a high quality low- risk asset and at the same time cater for investors' different levels of risk appetite, an SBBS issue should be composed of both a senior tranche and one or more subordinated tranches. The senior tranche, corresponding to seventy percent of the nominal value of an SBBS issue, should keep the SBBS issue expected loss rate in line with that of the safest euro area sovereign bonds, taking into account the risk and correlation of the sovereign bonds in the SBBSs underlying portfolio of sovereign bonds. The subordinated tranches should provide for protection to the senior tranche. The seniority of the tranches should determine the order in which losses on the underlying portfolio of sovereign bonds should be borne by investors. To limit the risk of the junior tranche (the tranche bearing losses before any other tranche), the nominal value of the junior tranche should however be at least
Amendment 78 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 9 Amendment 79 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 9 a (new) (9a) SBBSs are a novel instrument. The absence of relevant historical experience means that its effects on sovereign bond markets can only be estimated. Commentators and stakeholders have raised concerns about the potential for negative impacts on the liquidity of the markets for the underlying government bonds. There is no consensus about this question, but it deserves to be taken seriously. To that end, this Regulation assigns to ESMA the duty of monitoring the markets for SBBSs and the underlying government bonds for signs that the former negatively affect the latter. In such an event, ESMA shall request the Commission to adjust the composition of the government bond portfolio to ease any strains on liquidity, although the Commission shall not be bound by this request.
Amendment 80 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 10 (10) The
Amendment 81 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 11 (11) Investors should be protected as much as possible from the risk of insolvency of the institution that acquires the sovereign bonds ('original purchaser') for the purposes of assembling the SBBSs underlying portfolio. For that
Amendment 82 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 13 (13) Only the senior tranches from products that fulfil the requirements regarding the composition and maturity of the underlying portfolio as well as the size of the senior and the subordinated tranches as provided for in this Regulation should enjoy the same regulatory treatment as the regulatory treatment granted to sovereign exposures in terms of capital requirements, concentration limits, and liquidity.
Amendment 83 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 14 (14) A system of
Amendment 84 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 14 (14) A system of
Amendment 85 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 14 (14) A system of
Amendment 86 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 15 (15) Investors should be able to rely on the
Amendment 87 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 15 (15) Investors should be able to rely on the
Amendment 88 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 15 (15) Investors should be able to rely on the
Amendment 89 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 16 (16) To prevent abusive behaviour and to ensure that trust in SBBSs is maintained, appropriate administrative sanctions and remedial measures should be provided for by
Amendment 90 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 16 (16) To prevent abusive behaviour and to ensure that trust in SBBSs is maintained, appropriate administrative sanctions and remedial measures should be provided for by
Amendment 91 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 17 (17) Investors in different financial sectors should be able to invest in SBBSs under the same conditions as they invest in the underlying euro area sovereign bonds. Directive 2009/65/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council15 , Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council16 , Directive 2009/138/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council17 and Directive (EU) 2016/2341 of the European Parliament and of the Council18 should therefore be amended to ensure that SBBS are granted the same regulatory treatment as their underlying assets across the various regulated financial sectors. However, for prudential reasons different rules should apply to banks that hold SBBSs. Only senior SBBS tranches on banks’ balance sheets should be treated like sovereign bonds, unless the bank holds all the tranches of a specific SBBS issue exactly in the proportion in which they were issued, as this would be equivalent to holding the entire diversified portfolio of government bonds. _________________ 15 Directive 2009/65/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 July 2009 on the coordination of laws, regulations and administrative provisions relating to undertakings for collective investments in transferable securities (UCITS) (OJ L 302, 17.11.2009, p. 32).
Amendment 92 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 17 (17) Investors in different financial sectors should be able to invest in SBBSs under the same conditions as they invest in the underlying euro area sovereign bonds. Directive 2009/65/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council15, Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council16, Directive 2009/138/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council17
Amendment 93 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 17 (17) Investors in different financial sectors should be able to invest in the senior tranches of SBBSs under the same conditions as they invest in the underlying euro area sovereign bonds. Directive 2009/65/EC of the European
Amendment 94 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 18 (18) To safeguard financial stability, ensure investors' confidence and promote liquidity, a proper and effective supervision of SBBSs markets is important. To that end, ESMA and competent authorities should be informed about the issuance of SBBSs and should receive from SPEs all the relevant information needed to perform their supervisory tasks. Supervision of compliance with this Regulation should primarily be performed to ensure investors’ protection and, where applicable, on aspects that may be linked to the issuance and holding of SBBSs by regulated financial entities.
Amendment 95 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 18 (18) To safeguard financial stability, ensure investors' confidence and promote liquidity, a proper and effective supervision of SBBSs markets is important. To that end,
Amendment 96 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 19 (19)
Amendment 97 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 20 (20) Given that SBBSs are new products, whose effects on the markets for the underlying sovereign debt securities is unknown, it is appropriate that the European Systemic Risk Board (ESRB) and the national competent and designated authorities for macro-prudential instruments oversee the SBBSs market. To that end, the ESRB should avail itself of the powers granted to it under Regulation (EU) No 1092/2010 of the European Parliament and of the Council and, if appropriate, issue warnings and make suggestions for remedial actions to the competent authorities. Such remedial action may include calling for a halt to the certification of SBBSs.
Amendment 98 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 21 (21) As a body with highly specialised expertise regarding securities markets, it is appropriate to entrust ESMA with the development of draft regulatory technical standards concerning the types of investment that the SPE may conduct with
Amendment 99 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 3 – paragraph 1 – point 10 a (new) (10a) ‘market liquidity’ means the relation between supply and demand on the market for sovereign bonds as measured by the bid-ask spread for central government bonds.
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committees/0 |
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committees/0 |
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committees/0 |
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docs/5/docs/0/url |
/oeil/spdoc.do?i=32485&j=0&l=en
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committees/0 |
|
committees/0 |
|
docs/5/docs/0/url |
/oeil/spdoc.do?i=32485&j=0&l=en
|
procedure/stage_reached |
Old
Awaiting Council 1st reading position / budgetary conciliation convocationNew
Awaiting Council's 1st reading position |
docs/2/docs/0/url |
https://dmsearch.eesc.europa.eu/search/public?k=(documenttype:AC)(documentnumber:2774)(documentyear:2018)(documentlanguage:EN)
|
docs/3/docs/0/url |
Old
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?type=COMPARL&mode=XML&language=EN&reference=PE629.500New
https://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?type=COMPARL&mode=XML&language=EN&reference=PE629.500 |
docs/4/docs/0/url |
Old
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?type=COMPARL&mode=XML&language=EN&reference=PE630.618New
https://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?type=COMPARL&mode=XML&language=EN&reference=PE630.618 |
events/3/docs/0/url |
Old
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/A-8-2019-0180_EN.htmlNew
https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/A-8-2019-0180_EN.html |
events/4/docs/0/url |
Old
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?secondRef=TOC&language=EN&reference=20190415&type=CRENew
https://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?secondRef=TOC&language=EN&reference=20190415&type=CRE |
events/6/docs/0/url |
Old
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/TA-8-2019-0373_EN.htmlNew
https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/TA-8-2019-0373_EN.html |
docs/5/body |
EC
|
events/3/docs/0/url |
Old
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?type=REPORT&mode=XML&reference=A8-2019-0180&language=ENNew
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/A-8-2019-0180_EN.html |
events/6/docs/0/url |
Old
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?type=TA&language=EN&reference=P8-TA-2019-0373New
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/TA-8-2019-0373_EN.html |
docs/5 |
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events/5 |
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committees/0 |
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committees/0 |
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activities |
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commission |
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committees/0 |
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committees/0 |
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docs |
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events |
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links/Research document |
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other |
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otherinst |
|
procedure/Mandatory consultation of other institutions |
European Economic and Social Committee
|
procedure/dossier_of_the_committee |
Old
ECON/8/13261New
|
procedure/instrument |
Old
RegulationNew
|
procedure/other_consulted_institutions |
European Economic and Social Committee
|
procedure/stage_reached |
Old
Awaiting committee decisionNew
Awaiting Council 1st reading position / budgetary conciliation convocation |
procedure/subject |
Old
New
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procedure/summary |
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activities/0/commission/0 |
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activities/0/docs/0/text |
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activities/1 |
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committees/0/date |
2018-05-31T00:00:00
|
committees/0/rapporteur |
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committees/0/shadows |
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other/0 |
|
procedure/Mandatory consultation of other institutions |
European Economic and Social Committee
|
procedure/dossier_of_the_committee |
ECON/8/13261
|
procedure/stage_reached |
Old
Preparatory phase in ParliamentNew
Awaiting committee decision |
activities |
|
committees |
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links |
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other |
|
procedure |
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