2018/2100(INI) | [ParlTrack]

Motion for a resolution
Citation 11 e (new)

– having regard to the Council conclusions of 17 July 2017 on the action plan to reduce non-performing loans in Europe,

Amendment 100 #

11a. Urges Member States to prevent a return to competitive deregulation and harmful tax competition, induced by the scramble of Member States to attract financial service business from the City of London, and calls on the EU27 to deepen common regulation and common supervision to pre-empt such harmful competition while enhancing the depth and breadth of the capital markets within the EU27;

Amendment 101 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 12

12. Urges all negotiators to work towards the adoption of the legislative package to reduce risk in the banking system before the European elections in 2019; remains concerned, however, about the proposed changes to Articles 7 and 8 of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013, and more generally, about the proposed shift in the home-host balance, which might jeopardise financial stability in numerous Member States;

Amendment 102 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 12

12. Urges all negotiators to work towards the adoption of the legislative package to reduce risk in the banking system before the European elections in 2019; urges the Council, in particular, to negotiate in good faith, taking due account of the diversity of EU banking models and the balanced package adopted by the European Parliament;

Amendment 103 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 12

12. Urges all negotiators to work towards the adoption of tha balanced and sustainable legislative package to reduce risk in the banking system ~~before the European elections in 2019~~, taking into account any disproportionate and pro- cyclical effects within the EU banking sector and the need to preserve the ability of European banks to support the real economy;

Amendment 104 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 12

12. Urges all negotiators to work towards the adoption of the legislative package to reduce risk in the banking system ~~before the European elections in 2019~~as swiftly as possible;

Amendment 105 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 12 a (new)

12a. Is concerned that the costs arising from prudential requirements impose a disproportionate burden on small banks; considers that the ECB still needs to take even better account of the proportionality principle;

Amendment 106 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 13

13. Takes note of the on-going negotiations on the NPL package; welcomes the ECB addendum on NPLs and the work of the EBA on guidelines on management of non-performing and forborne exposures; welcomes the reduction ~~in volum~~of the average rate of NPLs over the past years, from 6.4% in December 2014 to 4.2% at the end of September 2017; stresses that the risk to financial stability posed by NPLs is still significant and that the current NPL level in the EU is still higher than in other major developed countries such as the United States of America and Japan, where NPL ratios are lower than 2%; stresses that in 9 Member States NPL ratios are still well over 10%3a; expresses concern that the coverage ratio differ significantly from one Member State to another, reflecting various levels of collateralisation and heterogeneous accounting practices; agrees with the Commission that the primary responsibility for reducing NPLs lies with the banks themselves and Member States, notably through efficient insolvency laws, and ~~banks themselves;~~ the establishment of asset management companies themselves; _________________ 3a EBA Risk Dashboard.

Amendment 107 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 13

13. Takes note of the on-going negotiations on the NPL package; welcomes the ECB addendum on NPLs and the work of the EBA on guidelines on management of non-performing and forborne exposures; welcomes the reduction in volume of NPLs over the past years; stresses that the risk to financial stability posed by NPLs is still significant; agrees with the Commission that ~~the primary responsibility for reducing NPLs lies with the Member States, notably through efficient insolvency laws, and b~~, while Member States and banks themselves have a primary responsibility for tackling NPLs, integrating national and European Union level efforts is warranted to make an impact on NPL stocks and to prevent the future build-up of new Non Performing Loans on banks’ balance sheets1a ; believes that the spillover effects at the Banking Union and EU levels resulting from high NPL ratios in some Member States and the diverging approaches taken by Member States to deal with the issue are also factors that call for EU action to tackle this problem; expects the efforts made to bring results soon, which would enable further progress towards the completion of the Banking Union and of the Economic and Monetary Union; _________________ 1a Communication to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Central Banks, the~~mselves;~~ European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions on completing the Banking Union, European Commission, 11 October 2017, p.15.

Amendment 108 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 13

13. Takes note of the on-going negotiations on the NPL package; welcomes the ECB addendum on NPLs and the work of the EBA on guidelines on management of non-performing and forborne exposures; welcomes the reduction in volume of NPLs to EUR 713 billion over the past years; reiterates its concern that the total number, and proportion, of non-performing loans remains above average in some Member States; stresses, at the same time, that, according to the EBA Risk Dashboard, the NPL ratio in the EU is falling slowly but still remains too high at 3.6 % in June 2018; stresses that the Banking Union, while making progress in tackling non- performing loans (NPLs), is still lagging behind in global terms when compared with countries such as the US and Japan; stresses that the risk to financial stability posed by NPLs is still significant; agrees with the Commission that the primary responsibility for reducing NPLs lies with the Member States, notably through efficient insolvency laws, and banks themselves;

Amendment 109 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 13

13. Takes note of the ~~on-going negotiations on the NPL package; welcomes~~Commission's legislative proposals concerning minimum loss coverage for non-performing exposures and the development of a secondary market for NPLs, of the ECB addendum on NPLs and the work of the EBA on guidelines on management of non- performing and forborne exposures; welcomes the reduction in volume of NPLs over the past years; stresses that the risk to financial stability posed by NPLs ~~is still significant~~today is less significant than it was a few years ago; agrees with the Commission that the primary responsibility for reducing NPLs lies with the Member States, notably through efficient insolvency laws, and banks themselves; considers that the causal link between economic growth and the decline in non-performing exposures should be properly assessed, as there is no empirical evidence that the supply of credit is causally determined by the level of NPLs in the European banking system;

Amendment 11 #

Motion for a resolution
Recital A

~~A. whereas entrusting the ECB with the supervision of financial institutions has proven to be successful;~~deleted

Amendment 110 #

Sander LOONES, Roberts ZĪLE

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 13

13. Takes note of the on-going negotiations on the NPL package; w~~elcomes the ECB addendum on NPLs and the work of the EBA on guidelines on management of non-performing and forborne exposures; welcomes the~~arns that its economic and social implications have been insufficiently addressed and little understood; reiterates its concerns over the adoption by the ECB of the addendum on NPLs without any quantitative impact assessment of its effects on financial stability and the real economy, including the real estate market; highlights the important reduction in volume of NPLs achieved over the past years; stresses ~~that the risk to f~~, however, that de facto mandatory disposals of NPLs in an~~cial stability posed by NPLs is still significant~~ illiquid and opaque market pose significant risks to the stability of specific institutions, while raising concerns in terms of their impact on pricing and competition in the market for NPLs; agrees with the Commission that the primary responsibility for reducing NPLs lies with the Member States, notably through efficient insolvency laws, and banks themselves, through effective and transparent internal systems;

Amendment 111 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 13

13. Takes note of the on-going negotiations on the NPL package; strongly warns against weakening the Commission proposals, as this would jeopardise the overarching goal of risk reduction and hinder efforts to complete the Banking Union; welcomes the ECB addendum on NPLs and the work of the EBA on guidelines on management of non- performing and forborne exposures; welcomes the reduction in volume of NPLs over the past years; stresses that the risk to financial stability posed by NPLs is still significant; agrees with the Commission that the primary responsibility for reducing NPLs lies with the Member States, notably through efficient insolvency laws, and banks themselves;

Amendment 112 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 13

13. Takes note of the on-going negotiations on the NPL package; welcomes the ECB addendum on NPLs and the work of the EBA on guidelines on management of non-performing and forborne exposures; welcomes the reduction in volume of NPLs over the past years; stresses that the risk to financial stability posed by NPLs is still significant; agrees with the Commission that the primary responsibility for reducing NPLs lies with the Member States, notably through efficient insolvency laws, and banks themselves but emphasises the interest of the EU to reduce the share of NPLs;

Amendment 113 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 13

13. ~~Takes note of the on-going negotiations on the NPL package; welcomes the ECB addendum on NPLs and the work of the EBA on guidelines on management of non-performing and forborne exposures; w~~Welcomes the reduction in volume of NPLs over the past years; stresses that the risk to financial stability posed by NPLs is still significant in some jurisdictions; agrees with the Commission that the primary responsibility for reducing NPLs lies with the Member States, notably through efficient insolvency laws, and the banks themselves; takes note of the on- going negotiations on the NPL package; calls upon the negotiators to reach a swift agreement;

Amendment 114 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 13

13. Takes note of the on-going negotiations on the NPL package; welcomes the ECB addendum on NPLs and the work of the EBA on guidelines on management of non-performing and forborne exposures; welcomes the reduction in volume of NPLs over the past years; stresses that the risk to financial stability posed by NPLs is still significant; ~~agrees with the Commission that the primary responsibility for reducing NPLs lies with the Member States, notably through efficient insolvency laws, and banks themselves~~expects the efforts made to bring results soon, which would enable further progress towards the completion of the Banking Union and of the Economic and Monetary Union;

Amendment 115 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 13 a (new)

13a. Expresses concern that, as evidenced by some recent liquidation cases, namely the Veneto Banks in Italy and ABLV in Latvia, whether the resolution of a bank (that has been deemed failing or likely to fail) is in the public interest or whether a bank should be liquidated in the absence of a public interest has been assessed differently at the EU and at national level based on the current legal framework;

Amendment 116 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 13 a (new)

13a. Reiterates the concern over the risks stemming from the holding of level II and III assets in bank's balance sheets due to the difficulty of their evaluation; calls on the SSM to address this problem urgently;

Amendment 117 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 13 b (new)

13b. Recalls that the BRRD and the SRM Regulation have only partially harmonised insolvency law so far (i.e. ranking of claims for the purposes of applying the bail-in tool) although implementation of resolution action remains rooted in national insolvency law for the purposes of protection of creditors and of applying resolution tools at legal entity level;

Amendment 118 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 13 b (new)

13b. Is concerned at the wide use of internal models by the banking institutions; calls on the SSM and EBA to continue their work on the adequacy of using internal models in order to establish their credibility and achieve a level playing field across institutions;

Amendment 119 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 13 c (new)

13c. Rejects any solution at EU level to the problem of NPLs that would go beyond guidelines for selling NPLs on secondary markets;

Amendment 12 #

Motion for a resolution
Recital A

A. whereas entrusting the ECB with the supervision of financial institutions has proven to be successful; whereas, in its supervisory activities, the ECB has sovereignty, but whereas far-reaching decisions must be left to the European legislator; whereas, in its supervisory activities, the ECB is not yet taking sufficient account of the principle of proportionality;

Amendment 120 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 14

14. Takes note of the on-going negotiations on the European System of Financial Supervision (ESFS); believes that a single market needs appropriate supervisory powers at EU level in those cases where issues affecting the whole of the internal market are of relevance; stresses the important coordinating role of the European System of Financial Supervision in order to ensure that the common rules are applied consistently;

Amendment 121 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 14

14. Takes note of the on-going negotiations on the European System of Financial Supervision (ESFS); believes that a single market needs appropriate supervisory powers at EU level; stresses that the core task of the ESFS is to ensure effective supervisory action;

Amendment 122 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 14

14. Takes note of the on-going negotiations on the European System of Financial Supervision (ESFS); ~~believes that a single market needs appropriate supervisory powers at EU level~~calls on the Union legislators to find an appropriate equilibrium between the tasks and powers of the national competent authorities (NCAs) and the ESAs;

Amendment 123 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 14

14. Takes note of the on-going negotiations on the European System of Financial Supervision (ESFS); believes that ~~a single market needs~~supervision at the national level needs to be complemented by appropriate supervisory powers at the EU level;

Amendment 124 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 14

14. Takes note of the on-going negotiations on the European System of Financial Supervision (ESFS); ~~believes that a single market needs appropriate supervisory powers at EU level;~~

Amendment 125 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 15

15. Welcomes the Commission communication on FinTech; recognises the great potential of FinTech and the need to encourage innovation; notes, however, the need for clear regulation and appropriate supervision that protects consumers and ensures financial stability as well as a level playing field for financial market actors; ~~underlines the need to continuously strengthen the cyber resilience of the EU financial sector~~considers that FinTech, which carries out the same kinds of activities as other players in the financial system, should therefore be subject to the same operating rules; acknowledges that the increased digitalisation of all aspects of banking has left banks significantly more vulnerable to cyber security risks; stresses that cyber security is first and foremost banks’ own responsibility; underlines the need to continuously strengthen the cyber resilience of the EU financial sector; calls for more comprehensive monitoring of cyber security measures by supervisory authorities;

Amendment 126 #

15. Welcomes the Commission communication on FinTech; recognises the great potential of FinTech and the need to encourage innovation; notes, however, the need for clear regulation and appropriate supervision that protects consumers and ensures financial stability as well as a level playing field for financial market actors; underlines the need to continuously ~~strengthen~~improve the cyber resilience of the EU financial sector;

Amendment 127 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 16

16. Remains concerned about the spread of shadow banking in the EU; recalls that the problem needs to be addressed at both EU and global level in order to ensure fair competition, transparency and financial stability; calls on the Commission to urgently identify remaining gaps in the current regulations;deleted

Amendment 128 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 16

16. Remains concerned about the ~~spread~~extent of shadow banking in the EU; recalls that at the ~~problem needs to be addressed at both EU and global level~~end of 2017 it accounted for around 40% of the EU financial system; encourages authorities to continue vigilantly monitoring the risks posed by these activities and to address them as soon as possible in order to ensure fair competition~~, transparency~~ and financial stability; calls on the Commission to urgently identify remaining gaps in the current regulations;

Amendment 129 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 16

16. Remains concerned about the spread of shadow banking in the EU; recalls that the problem needs to be addressed at both EU and global level in order to ensure fair competition, transparency and financial stability; calls on the Commission to urgently identify remaining gaps in the current regulations, and to put the problem on the agenda at international level;

Amendment 13 #

Motion for a resolution
Recital A

A. whereas entrusting the ECB with the prudential supervision of financial institutions has proven to be successful; whereas the ECB currently lacks the investigative powers to uncover breaches of anti-money laundering; whereas some directly-supervised financial institutions have been actively facilitating money laundering;

Amendment 130 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 16

16. Remains concerned about the spread of shadow banking in the EU; recalls that the problem needs to be addressed at ~~both~~national, EU and global level in order to ensure fair competition, transparency and financial stability; calls on the Commission to urgently identify remaining gaps in the current regulations;

Amendment 131 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 16

16. Remains concerned about the spread of shadow banking in the EU; recalls that the problem needs to be addressed at ~~both~~national, EU and global level in order to ensure fair competition, transparency and financial stability; calls on the Commission to urgently identify remaining gaps in the current regulations;

Amendment 132 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 17

17. Recalls the initial debate on the role of the ECB as both monetary and supervisory authority; ~~considers that, overall, the ECB has succeeded in keeping the two roles separate; believes, however,~~regrets that doubts have risen about the success of the ECB in keeping the two roles separate, such as in the context of fiscal dominance, since monetary policy was largely dominated by the lack of sound fiscal policies in some Member States; points out that the balance sheet of the ECB has surpassed 40% of GDP of the Euro area, which inevitably affects the capacity of the ECB to supervise the risk of its own balance sheet; points out that the ECB's ultra- loose interest policies has negatively affected return on invested capital and average cost of capital, which has driven investors to higher yielding investments, in turn leading to rapidly rising property prices in certain Member States; is convinced that further debate is necessary to avoid the risk of a conflict of interests between the two tasks;

Amendment 133 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 17

17. Recalls the initial debate on the role of the ECB as both monetary and supervisory authority; considers that, overall, the ECB has succeeded in adequately keeping the two roles separate; believes, however, that ~~further debate is necessary to avoid~~in order to ensure there ris~~k of a~~ no confusion or conflict of interests between the two ~~task~~roles of the ECB, there should be an institutional, as well as operational, separation of the ECB's monetary policy and supervisory functions;

Amendment 134 #

17. Recalls the initial debate on the role of the ECB as both monetary and supervisory authority; considers that, overall, the ECB has succeeded in keeping the two roles separate; believes, however, that further debate is necessary to avoid the risk of a conflict of interests between the two tasks; stresses the importance of the cooperation between the EBA as a regulatory authority and the SSM as a supervisory authority;

Amendment 135 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 17

17. Recalls the initial debate on the role of the ECB as both monetary and supervisory authority; ~~considers that, overall,~~believes that the ECB ~~has~~will not succeeded in keeping the two roles separate~~; believes, however, that further debate is necessary to avoid the risk of a conflict of interests between the two tasks~~, especially once the crisis of the EMU and the European financial system reaches another peak;

Amendment 136 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 17 a (new)

17a. Considers that further harmonisation of practices concerning the assessment of whether a bank is failing or likely to fail as well as a clearer distinction between supervisory powers and early intervention powers would help to make crisis management by competent authorities, prior to resolution, more effective;

Amendment 137 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 17 a (new)

17a. Calls on the ECB to conduct annually an external professional audit of its legally required organisational separation of supervisory and monetary policy functions, and immediately to publish the report;

Amendment 138 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 17 a (new)

17a. Stresses that the proportionality principle, in particular, has not been sufficiently taken into account thus far in the exercise of supervision;

Amendment 139 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 17 a (new)

17a. Calls on the Commission to effectively address the "too-big-to-fail" problem in order to reduce systemic risks;

Amendment 14 #

Motion for a resolution
Recital A

A. whereas entrusting the ECB with the supervision of financial institutions has ~~proven to be successful~~created an internal conflict of interest between its supervisory and monetary functions;

Amendment 140 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 17 b (new)

17b. Draws attention to the division of responsibilities between the ECB and the European Banking Authority (EBA); stresses that the ECB should not become the de facto standard-setter for non-SSM banks;

Amendment 141 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 17 b (new)

17b. Calls on the SSM to periodically report to the European Parliament any exchange of information between policy functions under the Decision of the European Central Bank of 17 September 2014 (ECB/2014/39);

Amendment 142 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 17 a (new)

17a. Stresses that the problem of too- big-to-fail banks is still very relevant and poses significant risks to bank resolvability; recalls the need for a structural reform of the banking sector based on clear and mandatory separation of the core credit activities from the trading ones; points out that this reform represents a fundamental complement to the crisis resolution framework, as highlighted by the lessons learned from the 2008 financial crisis;

Amendment 143 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 17 b (new)

17b. Takes note of the Resolution of Banco Popular, the first Single Resolution Board resolution case, commonly considered a “text-book like” resolution; stresses, nonetheless, that lessons need to be taken on transparency and access to and clarity of the information provided after resolution; calls upon the SRB to do a "mea culpa" exercise to avoid repeating the same faults in future cases;

Amendment 144 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 18

18. Welcomes the agreement reached at the Euro Summit meeting of 29 June 2018 that the European Stability Mechanism (ESM) will ~~provide the common backstop to the Single Resolution Fund (SRF) and~~ be turned into a true European Monetary Fund (EMF) based on strict conditions ensuring responsibility and the principle of avoiding moral hazard; stresses the need for proper democratic scrutiny; recalls Parliament’s position that the EMF should be fully incorporated into the Union's institutional framework;

Amendment 145 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 18

18. ~~Welcomes~~Takes note of the agreement reached at the Euro Summit meeting of 29 June 2018; is concerned that the European Stability Mechanism (ESM) will provide the common backstop to the Single Resolution Fund (SRF) and be turned into a true European Monetary Fund (EMF) ~~based on strict conditions ensuring responsibility and the principle of avoiding moral hazard~~, in line with the risk reduction measures such as MREL, TLAC, rules and adequate amounts for the bail-inable buffers; calls for strict conditions ensuring responsibility and the principle of avoiding moral hazard if the EMF were ever to be implemented, such as maintaining the lead role of the Member States and the unanimity procedure; stresses that substantial risk- reduction should be a prerequisite to the potential establishment of an EMF; stresses the need for proper democratic scrutiny by the Parliament and the Member States; recalls Parliament’s position that the EMF should be fully incorporated into the Union's institutional framework;

Amendment 146 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 18

18. ~~Welcomes the~~ Considers totally inadequate the 'non-agreement' reached at the Euro Summit meeting of 29 June 2018 ~~that~~- an agreement in principle according to which the European Stability Mechanism (ESM) will provide the common backstop to the Single Resolution Fund (SRF) and be turned into a ~~true~~ European Monetary Fund (EMF), based ~~on strict conditions ensuring responsibility and the principle of avoiding moral hazard; stresses the need for proper democratic scrutiny; recalls Parliament’s position that the EMF should~~, however, on conditions which make it extremely difficult to be used from a counter-cyclical and crisis management viewpoint; takes the view that in order to be truly effective as an anti-crisis instrument, a fiscal support tool for the Banking Union should not be limited in its dimensions and should be able to issue debt on the markets to finance itself; stresses that only once it has been fully incorporated into the Union's institutional framework will proper democratic scrutiny be ensured for the EMF;

Amendment 147 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 18

18. Welcomes the agreement reached at the Euro Summit ~~meeting of~~on 29 June 2018 that the European Stability Mechanism (ESM) will provide the common backstop to the Single Resolution Fund (SRF) and be ~~turned into a true~~come a fully-fledged European Monetary Fund (EMF), based on strict conditions, with a view to ensuring ~~responsi~~accountability and the principle of ~~avoiding~~ moral hazard prevention, ensuring the protection of public funds, protecting client funds and assets as well as covered depositors and safeguarding the principle that taxpayers are not liable for banking risks; stresses the need for proper democratic scrutiny; recalls Parliament’s position that the EMF should be fully incorporated into the Union's institutional framework;

Amendment 148 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 18

18. ~~Welcom~~Notes the agreement reached at the Euro Summit meeting of 29 June 2018 that the European Stability Mechanism (ESM) will provide the common backstop to the Single Resolution Fund (SRF) and be turned into a true European Monetary Fund (EMF) based on strict conditions ensuring responsibility and the principle of avoiding moral hazard; stresses the need for proper democratic scrutiny; recalls Parliament’s position that the EMF should be fully incorporated into the Union's institutional framework; stresses the need for proper democratic scrutiny;

Amendment 149 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 18

18. Welcomes the agreement reached at the Euro Summit meeting of 29 June 2018 that the European Stability Mechanism (ESM) will provide the common backstop to the Single Resolution Fund (SRF) and ~~be turn~~that the ESM will be reformed into a true European Monetary Fund (EMF) based on strict conditions ensuring responsibility and the principle of avoiding moral hazard; stresses the need for proper democratic scrutiny; asks the EMF to be transformed into a genuine European Stability Fund (ESF) and recalls Parliament’'s position t~~hat the EMF should be~~o fully incorporated it into the Union's institutional framework; urges its quick adoption;

Amendment 15 #

Motion for a resolution
Recital A

A. whereas entrusting the ECB with the supervision of systemically important financial institutions has proven to be successful;

Amendment 150 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 18

18. ~~Welcome~~Rejects the agreement reached at the Euro Summit meeting of 29 June 2018 that the European Stability Mechanism (ESM) will provide the common backstop to the Single Resolution Fund (SRF) and be turned into a ~~true~~ European Monetary Fund (EMF) based on strict conditions ensuring responsibility and the principle of avoiding moral hazard; stresses the need for proper democratic scrutiny; recalls Parliament’s position that the EMF should be fully; warns that there will be no proper democratic scrutiny, if the EMF is incorporated into the Union's institutional framework;

Amendment 151 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 18 a (new)

18a. Recalls that normal insolvency proceedings are the procedure applying when resolution action is not deemed to be in the public interest and, as such, likely to be even more frequently resorted to than resolution; believes, however, that insolvency legislation, and at the very least insolvency legislation applying to banks, urgently needs further harmonisation across the Banking Union and across the Union as a whole, in the light of its importance and of its interplay with the resolution regime;

Amendment 152 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 18 a (new)

18a. Recalls the constitutional review of the ESM by the German Constitutional Court in 2014, concerning the question of adequate democratic control by national parliaments on ESM decisions; points out that the introduction of a qualified majority rule could potentially substantially reduce such democratic control4a; _________________ 4a BVerfG (2014) Urteil des Zweiten Senats vom 18. März 2014. Bundesverfassungsgericht, 2 BvR 1390/12 - Rn. (1-245).

Amendment 153 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 18 a (new)

18a. Welcomes the work done by the SRB on resolution planning and resolution preparedness; considers that the fact that none of the cases of bank failures witnessed in 2017 and 2018 gave raise to lasting spillover effects or negative repercussions has illustrated the success of the resolution regime in the Banking Union;

Amendment 154 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 18 a (new)

18a. Notes that the ‘too-big-to-fail’ issue has still not been properly addressed; considers that market-oriented activity is inconceivable if there are some market actors that are considered to be too significant to fail; urges, therefore, that the banking system must finally be organised in a more market-oriented manner;

Amendment 155 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 18 b (new)

18b. Recalls that normal insolvency proceedings are the procedure applying when resolution action is not deemed to be in the public interest and, as such, likely to be even more frequently resorted to than resolution; also recalls that normal insolvency proceedings represent the counterfactual used to determine whether resolution action has left any creditor worse off;

Amendment 156 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 18 c (new)

18c. Is aware that divergences in insolvency legislation reflect well- established national and cultural preferences; believes, however, that insolvency legislation, and at the very least insolvency legislation applying to banks, urgently needs further harmonisation across the Banking Union and across the Union as a whole, in the light of its importance and of its interplay with the resolution regime;

Amendment 157 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 19

19. Reaffirms its position that the rules for precautionary recapitalisation need to be clarified; notes that precautionary recapitalisation can be an instrument for crisis management but believes that its use needs to be strictly limited to exceptional cases where the bank is solvent and where compliance with EUNotes that precautionary recapitalisation can be a crucial and legitimate instrument for the prevention management of bank crises; believes that this instrument should be made fully available where the bank is solvent but is facing a temporary liquidity crisis and there is a need to remedy a serious disturbance in the economy of a Member State aind ~~rules is ensured~~preserve financial stability; recalls that the ~~objective of the~~ EU resolution regime ~~is to make~~ should ensure that taxpayers are protected, the cost of bank management failures is borne by its shareholders and creditors, excluding retail and depositors, and that the stability of the financial system as a whole is preserved; stresses in this regard that, in order to avoid adverse social and economic consequences and restore public confidence in the banking system, bank losses should be borne exclusively by professional investors that have sufficient loss-bearing capacity, while retail investors and depositors should always be protected;

Amendment 158 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 19

19. Reaffirms its position that the rules for precautionary recapitalisation need to be clarified; notes that precautionary recapitalisation can be an instrument for crisis management but believes that its use needs to be strictly limited to exceptional cases where the bank is solvent, i.e., compliant with the harmonised minimum regulatory capital levels, and where compliance with EU State aid rules is ensured; recalls that the objective of the EU resolution regime is to make sure that taxpayers are protected, the cost of bank management failures is borne by its shareholders and creditors, and that the stability of the financial system as a whole is preserved; stresses, nonetheless, that the impact on the local market financial stability and growth must be taken into consideration prior to the decision of using or not of precautionary recapitalisation measures;

Amendment 159 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 19

19. Re~~affirms its position that~~jects the rules for precautionary recapitalisation need to be clarified; notes that precautionary recapitalisation can be an instrument for crisis management but believes that its use needs to be strictly limited to exceptional cases where the bank is solvent and where compliance with EU State aid rules is ensured; recalls that the objective of the EU resolution regime is to make sure that taxpayers are protected, the cost of bank management failures is borne by its shareholders and creditors, and that the stability of the financial system as a whole is preserved; is convinced, however, that the current framework cannot fulfil this objective;

Amendment 16 #

Motion for a resolution
Recital A

A. whereas entrusting the ECB with the supervision of financial institutions has proven to be generally successful;

Amendment 160 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 19

19. Reaffirms its position that the rules for precautionary recapitalisation need to be clarified; notes that precautionary recapitalisation can be an instrument for crisis management but believes that its use needs to be strictly limited to exceptional cases where the bank is solvent and where compliance with EU State aid rules is ensured; recalls that the objective of the EU resolution regime is to make sure that taxpayers are protected, the cost of bank management failures is borne by its shareholders and creditors, and that the stability of the financial system as a whole is preserved; stresses that the rules on the resolution of credit institutions need to be even better applied;

Amendment 161 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 19

19. Reaffirms ~~its position that the rules for precautionary recapitalisation need to be clarified; notes that precautionary recapitalisation can be an~~that precautionary recapitalisation is a legitimate instrument for bank crisis -management ~~but believes that it~~; notes that the conditions use ~~needs to be strictly limited to exceptional cases where the bank is~~ t for it by the Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive (BRRD) are restrictive and have so far been effective in preventing its inappropriate use on insolvent ban~~d where~~ks, in addition to ensuring compliance with EU State aid rules ~~is ensured~~; recalls that the objective of the EU resolution regime is to make sure that taxpayers are protected, the cost of bank management failures is borne by its shareholders and creditors, and that the stability of the financial system as a whole is preserved;

Amendment 162 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 19 a (new)

19a. Calls on the Commission to assess the recovery and resolution of credit institutions in the light of state aid rules; calls on the Commission to examine regulation in the light of the Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive; calls on the Commission to propose transparent application of the rules on state aid in relation to the BRRD;

Amendment 163 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 19 a (new)

19a. Stresses the importance of access to liquidity for banks in resolution, during and immediately after resolution proceedings; follows with interest ongoing debates on a possible tool for the provision of liquidity in resolution;

Amendment 164 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 19 b (new)

19b. Stresses the issues resulting from the asymmetry between the burden- sharing rules applying in, respectively, insolvency and resolution; believes that this asymmetry should be corrected once legacy issues are solved, in order to ensure common rules and a level playing field for all banks, investors and creditors in the Banking Union;

Amendment 165 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 20

20. Calls on the Commission to regularly assess whether the banking sector has benefited from implicit subsidies and State aid by means of the provision of unconventional liquidity support; underlines the distortive effect State aid can have on the functioning of the internal market; recalls the strict requirements for the application of Article 107(3)(b) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU);

Amendment 166 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 20

20. Calls on the Commission to ~~regularly~~ assess whether the banking sector has benefited from implicit subsidies and State aid since the beginning of the crisis and to publish a report in this regard; underlines the distortive effect State aid can have on the functioning of the internal market; recalls the strict requirements for the application of Article 107(3)(b) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU);

Amendment 167 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 20

20. Calls on the Commission to regularly assess whether the banking sector has benefited from implicit subsidies and State aid; underlines the distortive effect State aid ~~can have~~has on the functioning of the internal market; recalls the strict requirements for the application of Article 107(3)(b) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU);

Amendment 168 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 20 a (new)

20a. Welcomes the adoption of the agreement on emergency liquidity assistance (ELA), which clarifies the allocation of responsibilities, costs and risks; notes that this agreement is to be reviewed in 2019 at the latest; takes the view that certain recent banking scandals, in particular in north-eastern Europe, have highlighted the need for greater centralisation within the ECB of the procedures for providing ELA and the inadequacy of the sole criterion of ‘interference in monetary policy’ as the justification for intervention in an ELA operation by the ECB’s Executive Committee and Governing Council;

Amendment 169 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 20 a (new)

20a. Calls again on the Commission – as it did in the previous annual report – to re-examine on a yearly basis whether the requirements for the application of Article 107(3)(b) TFEU regarding the possibility of State aid in the financial sector continue to be fulfilled;

Amendment 17 #

Motion for a resolution
Recital A a (new)

Aa. whereas the ECB has to date not always taken the proportionality principle sufficiently into account in its direct and indirect supervisory activities;

Amendment 170 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 21

21. Welcomes the conclusion of the ECA, in its report on the operational efficiency of the ECB’s crisis management for banks, that the organisational set-up of the ECB and its resourcing for the assessment of recovery plans and the supervision of banks in crisis are satisfactory, while noting that there are outstanding issues concerning information sharing and efficiency of coordination; recalls that cooperation and exchange of information between authorities are essential for the smooth implementation of resolution measures;

Amendment 171 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 21

21. ~~Welcomes~~Takes note of the conclusion of the ECA, in its report on the operational efficiency of the ECB’s crisis management for banks, that the organisational set-up of the ECB and its resourcing for the assessment of recovery plans and the supervision of banks in crisis are satisfactory, while noting that there are outstanding issues concerning information sharing and efficiency of coordination;

Amendment 172 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 22 a (new)

22a. Welcomes the progress made in developing minimum requirement for own funds and eligible liabilities (MREL) targets in the framework of institution- specific resolution strategies; underlines that MREL should be mindful of institutions’ business models, as in many countries there are banks that are predominantly funded via deposits of retail and SME customers and that are not active on capital markets; notes that for these institutions the issuance of eligible liabilities could be a burdensome exercise and that MREL compliance can be mostly reached via a strengthening of equity, which requires time; stresses that MREL targets should be realistic and proportionate to the different banking business models in the EU Member States;

Amendment 173 #

23. Takes note of the agreement reached at the Euro Summit meeting of 29 June 2018 on the European Deposit Insurance Scheme (EDIS); underlines the necessity of EDIS as the third pillar of the Banking Union; believes it should be fully implemented once significant risk reduction has taken place;deleted

Amendment 174 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 23

23. Takes note of the agreement reached at the Euro Summit meeting of 29 June 2018 on the European Deposit Insurance Scheme (EDIS); underlines the necessity of EDIS as the third pillar of the Banking Union; believes it should be fully implemented once significant risk reduction has taken place; notes that discussions have yet to be held on the appropriate legal basis for the establishment of EDIS; stresses the need to reduce risks in some Member States and their banks as a prerequisite for the introduction of EDIS;

Amendment 175 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 23

23. Takes note of the agreement reached at the Euro Summit meeting of 29 June 2018 concerning the European Deposit Insurance Scheme (EDIS); underlines the necessity of EDIS as the third pillar of the Banking Union~~; believes it~~ in order to ensure equal protection for all depositors across the Banking Union, strengthen confidence, foster cross-border financial integration and make recourse to insolvency less problematic when it is needed; believes EDIS should be fully implemented ~~once~~in parallel with significant risk reduction ~~has taken place~~;

Amendment 176 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 23

23. Takes note of the agreement reached at the Euro Summit meeting of 29 June 2018 on the European Deposit Insurance Scheme (EDIS); underlines the necessity of risk reduction in view of establishing EDIS as the third pillar of the Banking Union; believes it should be ~~fully~~ implemented once significant risk reduction has taken place; notes, in this respect, the Commission’s more proportionate ‘new approach’ to an EDIS as put forward in its communication of 11 October 2017;

Amendment 177 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 23

23. Takes note of the agreement reached at the Euro Summit meeting of 29 June 2018 on the European Deposit Insurance Scheme (EDIS); underlines the necessity of EDIS as the third pillar of the Banking Union~~; believes it should be fully implemented once significant risk reduction has taken place~~ since its inception; stresses that it should be fully implemented in order to increase depositor confidence as well as the shock-absorbing capacity of the EU banking system; recalls that risk sharing and risk reduction should move forward in parallel;

Amendment 178 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 23

23. TConsiders that risk reduction and risk sharing measures should go in parallel in view of the establishment of an EDIS; takes note of the agreement reached at the Euro Summit meeting of 29 June 2018 on the European Deposit Insurance Scheme (EDIS); underlines the necessity of EDIS as the third pillar of the Banking Union; ~~believes it should be fully implemented once significant risk reduction has taken place;~~urges all negotiators to work towards the establishment of the European Deposit Insurance Scheme.

Amendment 179 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 23

23. Takes note of the agreement reached at the Euro Summit meeting of 29 June 2018 on the European Deposit Insurance Scheme (EDIS); ~~underlines the necessity of~~rejects EDIS as the third pillar of the Banking Union; ~~believes it should be fully implemented once significant risk reduction has taken place;~~

Amendment 18 #

Motion for a resolution
Recital A a (new)

Aa. whereas significant financial risks stemming from the holding of complex and illiquid financial instruments in certain jurisdictions remain insufficiently addressed and largely underestimated;

Amendment 180 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 23

23. Takes note of the agreement reached at the Euro Summit meeting of 29 June 2018 on the European Deposit Insurance Scheme (EDIS); underlines the necessity ~~of EDIS as the third pillar of the Banking Union~~effective risk-reduction before discussing tools for risk-sharing such as EDIS; believes it shcould be ~~fully~~ implemented, but only once significant and substantial risk reduction has ~~taken place~~been implemented;

Amendment 181 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 23

23. ~~Takes note of the agreement reached~~Underlines the urgency of establishing EDIS ats the ~~Euro Summit meeting of 29 June 2018 on the European Deposit Insurance Scheme (EDIS); underlines the necessity of EDIS as the third~~third pillar of the Banking Union; recalls that the two risk reduction pillars of ~~the~~ Banking Union~~; believes it should be fully implemented once significant risk reduction has taken place~~, European supervision and resolution, are already fully implemented and positively doing their job; stresses that it is now time to advance with the risk sharing pillar;

Amendment 182 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 23

23. Takes note of the agreement reached at the Euro Summit meeting of 29 June 2018 on the European Deposit Insurance Scheme (EDIS); underlines the ne~~cessity of EDIS as the third pillar of the Banking Union; believes it should be fully implemented once significant risk reduction has taken place~~ed for EDIS to be implemented in full, since it is the third pillar of the Banking Union; points out that effective risk sharing ensures the stability of the European banking and financial system;

Amendment 183 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 23 a (new)

23a. Recalls that the moral hazard of deposit protection spurs deposit banks to engage in overly risky behaviour; recalls that deposit protection disincentivizes deposit holders to scrutinise their bank and its investment and management decisions;

Amendment 184 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 23 a (new)

23a. Considers it an erroneous interpretation of the law to view Article 114 as an appropriate legal basis for the establishment of the EDIS;

Amendment 185 #

Sander LOONES, Roberts ZĪLE

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 23 b (new)

23b. Stresses that any new primary, secondary rules or even guidelines must be accompanied by an in-depth impact analysis which makes clear the overall impact on the real economy, especially on SMEs and on the financing of households, on employment and on the demand for investment;

Amendment 186 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 24

24. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council, the Commission, the E~~CB and the EBA~~BA, the ECB, the SRB, the national parliaments and the competent authorities as defined in point (40) of Article 4(1) of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013.

Amendment 19 #

Motion for a resolution
Recital A a (new)

Aa. whereas prudential and anti- money laundering supervision cannot be treated as separate;

Amendment 2 #

Motion for a resolution
Citation 7 a (new)

– having regard to the Commission communication on the application, from 1 August 2013, of state aid rules to support measures in favour of banks in the context of the financial crisis (‘Banking Communication’)1a, _________________ 1a OJ C 216, 30.7.2013, p. 1.

Amendment 20 #

Motion for a resolution
Recital A b (new)

Ab. whereas, according to the first Annual Statistical Report published by ESMA in October 2018, based on data submitted by trade repositories, the EU’s derivatives markets amounted to EUR 660 trillion of gross notional outstanding transactions by the end of 2017;

Amendment 21 #

Motion for a resolution
Recital A c (new)

Ac. whereas the number of credit institutions in the EU has consistently fallen for about 10 years in a row, the main reduction being among small banks;

Amendment 22 #

Motion for a resolution
Recital B

~~B. whereas the role of the EBA needs to be significantly strengthened in order to effectively implement anti-money laundering measures;~~deleted

Amendment 23 #

Motion for a resolution
Recital B

B. whereas the role and capacity of the EBA needs to be significantly strengthened in order to effectively implement anti-money laundering measures and common framework; whereas the role and functions of national regulators and Financial Intelligence Units (FIUs) level cannot be effectively replaced by a single EU body; whereas cooperation between the national supervisors, FIUs and EBA is key in order to help prevent systemic money- laundering problems at the national and the EU level;

Amendment 24 #

Motion for a resolution
Recital B

B. whereas the role of the EBA needs to be significantly strengthened in order to effectively implement and monitor anti- money laundering measures;

Amendment 25 #

Motion for a resolution
Recital B

B. whereas the role of the EBA needs to ~~be significantly strengthened in order to effectively implement~~play an important role in the implementation and coordination of anti- money laundering measures;

Amendment 26 #

Motion for a resolution
Recital B a (new)

Ba. whereas the latest CumEx Files scandal revealed that more than EUR 55 billion in taxes on share dividends were lifted out of the public coffers of several EU Member States over 15 years thanks to the active involvement of European largest banks; whereas this shows once again the crucial role played by the EU banking sector in facilitating and supporting mass-scale organised tax fraud, in the absence of adequate financial supervision and effective mechanisms of exchange of information between authorities;

Amendment 27 #

Motion for a resolution
Recital C

~~C. whereas it is important to clarify the treatment of State aid in actions by deposit guarantee schemes9 ; _________________ 9 OJ C 145 25.4.2016, p. 34.~~deleted

Amendment 28 #

Motion for a resolution
Recital C a (new)

Ca. whereas the weighted average NPL ratio for Europe’s main banks stood at 3.6% as of 30 June 2018, according to the EBA’s quarterly Risk Dashboard; whereas over the past 14 quarters this percentage has constantly fallen, particularly since the last quarter of 2016, and in particular with regard to the upper quartile of averages by country;

Amendment 29 #

Motion for a resolution
Recital C a (new)

Ca. whereas participation in the Banking Union is open to Member States that have not yet adopted the euro; whereas no EU Member State has so far decided to participate on that basis; whereas several Member States are discussing the possibility of joining the Banking Union; whereas different financial institutions see advantages in being situated within the Banking Union;

Amendment 3 #

Motion for a resolution
Citation 7 a (new)

– having regard to the ESMA Annual Statistical Report on the EU derivatives markets of 18 October 2018,

Amendment 30 #

Motion for a resolution
Recital C a (new)

Ca. whereas participation in the Banking Union is open to Member States that have not yet adopted the euro; whereas no EU Member State has so far decided to participate on that basis;

Amendment 31 #

Motion for a resolution
Recital C a (new)

Ca. whereas further efforts are needed to complete the Banking Union, as it remains incomplete as long as it lacks a fiscal backstop for the SRF and a third pillar, a European Deposit Insurance scheme;

Amendment 32 #

Motion for a resolution
Recital C a (new)

Ca. whereas the stock of non- performing loans is still worryingly high in the banking systems of some Member States;

Amendment 33 #

Motion for a resolution
Recital C a (new)

Ca. whereas the number and ratios of non-performing loans (NPLs) still vary substantially between Member States;

Amendment 34 #

Motion for a resolution
Recital C a (new)

C a. whereas a common DGS or EDIS is inadequate as long as risks differ greatly from one national banking system to another;

Amendment 35 #

Motion for a resolution
Recital C b (new)

Cb. whereas risk reduction should be assigned the highest priority in the further development of the Banking Union;

Amendment 36 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1

1. Takes note of the achievements of the Banking Union in fostering a truly single market, a level playing field and predictability for market actors; ~~considers that a fully completed Banking Union will further strengthen financial stability and growth prospects in the EU;~~

Amendment 37 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1

1. ~~Takes note of the achievement~~Recalls the aims of the Banking Union inof fostering a truly single market, a level playing field and predictability for market actors; considers ~~that a fully completed Banking Union will further strengthen~~, however, that the current supervisory framework and practices have resulted in asymmetric effects on the EU traditional banking systems, whereby credit risk exposures have been subject to extensive attention, whereas market risk exposures related to illiquid securities, including derivatives, have been disregarded; believes that a full revision of the design of Banking Union and a more adequate identification of supervisory priorities will be necessary in order to strengthen the level playing field, financial stability and growth prospects in the EU;

Amendment 38 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1

1. Takes note of the achievements of the Banking Union in fostering a truly single market, a level playing field, financial stability and predictability for market actors; considers that a fully completed Banking Union will further strengthen financial stability and growth prospects in the EU; recalls that the European Deposit Insurance Scheme (EDIS) remains a fundamental pillar of the Banking Union which completion is overdue; reiterates the need to finalise the common backstop to the Single Resolution Fund (SRF); stresses that EDIS and the fiscal backstop are key to ensuring a credible and efficient resolution framework and the ability to cope with systemic crisis in the Banking Union;

Amendment 39 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1

1. Takes note of the ~~achievements of~~results hitherto achieved by the Banking Union in fostering a truly single market, a level playing field and predictability for market actors; considers that a fully completed Banking Union, which therefore includes the European Deposit Insurance Scheme, will further strengthen financial stability and growth prospects in the EU;

Amendment 4 #

Motion for a resolution
Citation 8 a (new)

– having regard to the report of European Systemic Risk Board of September 2018 on ‘Approaching non- performing loans from a macroprudential angle’,

Amendment 40 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1

1. Takes note of the achievements of the Banking Union in fostering a truly single market, a level playing field and predictability for market actors; considers that a fully completed Banking Union will further strengthen financial stability and growth prospects in the EU and the completion of banking union needs to be pursued with greater urgency;

Amendment 41 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1

1. Takes note of the achievements of the Banking Union in helping to foster~~ing~~ a truly single market, a level playing field and increased predictability for market actors; considers that a fully completed Banking Union will help to further strengthen financial stability and growth prospects in the EU;

Amendment 42 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1

1. Takes note of the achievements of the Banking Union in fostering a truly single market, a level playing field and predictability for market actors; considers that a fully completed Banking Union ~~will~~should further strengthen financial stability and growth prospects in the EU;

Amendment 43 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1

1. ~~Takes note of~~Welcomes the achievements of the Banking Union in fostering a truly single market, a level playing field and predictability for market actors; considers that a fully completed Banking Union will further strengthen financial stability and growth prospects in the EU;

Amendment 44 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1

1. Takes note of the achievements of the Banking Union in ~~fostering a truly~~strengthening the single market, a level playing field and predictability for market actors; considers that a ~~fully complet~~strengthened Banking Union will further ~~strengthen~~enhance financial stability and growth prospects in the EU;

Amendment 45 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 2

2. Stresses the importance of completing the capital markets union, which will help to channel credit into the real economy, further enable private risk sharing and complement funding through banks; stresses the importance of completing the capital markets union and building a true single capital market in the EU where investors can freely invest their money across borders and companies can raise the necessary funds from a wide range of sources in order to contribute to better financing of the real economy, allow further private risk- sharing and complement funding by banks;

Amendment 46 #

Sander LOONES, Roberts ZĪLE

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 2

2. Stresses the importance of completing the capital markets union, which will help to channel credit into the real economy, further enable private risk sharing and complement funding through banks; considers, however, that efforts towards creating a Capital Markets Union should not reduce the emphasis put on the completion of the work on the Banking Union, which is still a prerequisite for financial stability in the bank-reliant landscape of the European Union;

Amendment 47 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 2

2. Stresses the importance of completing the capital markets union, which will help to channel credit into the real economy, further enable private risk sharing, reduce the need for public risk- sharing and complement funding through banks;

Amendment 48 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 2

2. Stresses the importance of completing the capital markets union, which will help to ~~channel credit into~~stabilize the real economy, further enable private risk sharing and complement funding through banks;

Amendment 49 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 2 a (new)

2a. Recalls that the Banking Union is open to all Member States; encourages all other non-euro area Member States to take the necessary steps to join the Banking Union, which would progressively align the Banking Union with the entire internal market; takes note that there are some apparently unattractive features of the Banking Union "close cooperation" which is the mechanism for Member States, whose currency is not the euro, to join the Single Supervisory Mechanism. A "close cooperation" country will face extremely asymmetrical treatment: It will not have access to liquidity support from the ECB; it will remain excluded from the final decision-making on supervisory matters in the Governing Council of the ECB; the ECB supervision decisions that are not legally binding outside of the euro area will need to be reproduced by acts of the local supervisor, which will be legally liable in any disputes; different treatment of euro area and non-euro area Member States is further strengthened upon entry into the Single Resolution Mechanism in which the country joining the Banking Union under "close cooperation" is automatically included because the country does not have access to the Single Resolution Fund. The above considerations explain why the inclusion in the Banking Union remains somehow unattractive for non-euro area Member States; calls for urgent legislative changes in this regard (Banking Union "close cooperation" legal framework);

Amendment 5 #

Motion for a resolution
Citation 8 a (new)

– having regard to the ESRB EU shadow Banking Monitor N° 3/September 2018,

Amendment 50 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 2 a (new)

2a. Recalls that the Banking Union is open to all Member States; encourages all non-euro area Member States to take the necessary steps to join the Banking Union, which would progressively align the Banking Union with the entire internal market;

Amendment 51 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 3

3. Considers that one of the aims of the Banking Union should be to preserve the diversity of EU banking models, as this enables the requirements of citizens and of their projects to be met, as well as acting as a diversification tool, a key feature to cope with potential shocks; stresses, in this connection, the importance of the proportionality principle as a way of avoiding penalising in particular smaller banks in the implementation of regulatory provisions;

Amendment 52 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 3

3. Considers that one of the aims of the Banking Union should be to preserve the diversity of EU banking models, as this enables the requirements of citizens and of their projects to be met, as well as acting as a diversification tool, a key feature to cope with potential shocks; regrets that the approach hitherto taken by the SSM, however, tends to be guiding the European banking system towards a single operational and commercial banking model for all;

Amendment 53 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 3

3. Considers that one of the aims of the Banking Union should be to preserve the diversity of EU banking models that are sustainable, lawful, non-corrupt and well-functioning, as this enables the requirements of citizens and of their projects to be met, as well as acting as a diversification tool, a key feature to cope with potential shocks;

Amendment 54 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 3

3. Considers that one of the aims of the Banking Union should be to preserve the diversity of EU banking models, a~~s this enables the requirements of~~nd national banking contexts, thus providing for the best financial service for citizens and ofor their ~~projects to be met~~investments and savings, as well as acting as a diversification tool, a key feature to cope with potential shocks;

Amendment 55 #

3. Considers that one of the aims of the Banking Union should be to ensure financial stability while preserveing the diversity of EU banking models, as this enables the requirements of citizens and of their projects to be met, as well as acting as a diversification tool, a key feature to cope with potential shocks;

Amendment 56 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 3 a (new)

3a. Stresses that the proposals made by international bodies should be translated into European law in such a way as to take due account of the specific characteristics of the European banking sector;

Amendment 57 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 3 a (new)

3a. Deplores those financial institutions and the related banking models which have actively facilitated, or prevented putting a stop to, systemic money laundering;

Amendment 58 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 3 b (new)

3b. Stresses that the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) standards in particular should not be enacted wholesale into European law without taking proper account of the specific characteristics of the European banking system and of the proportionality principle;

Amendment 59 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 4

4. Recalls the need for a coherent set of rules for the proper functioning of the Banking Union; calls on the Commission to prioritise regulations over directives as the legislative tool for the Banking Union and to make it a priority to fully ensure that all relevant legislation is fully implemented in all Member Statstresses, however, that in the case of small and non-systemic banks in particular, a supervisory regime should be applied that is proportionate and in line with regional circumstances; calls on the Commission, in cooperation with the European supervisory authorities, to identify and remove obstacles to the internal market;

Amendment 6 #

Motion for a resolution
Citation 11 a (new)

– having regard to the Commission report of 11 October 2017 on the Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM) under Regulation (EU) No 1024/2013,

Amendment 60 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 4

4. Recalls the need for a coherent and concise set of rules for the proper functioning of the Banking Union; calls on the Commission to ~~prioritise regulations over directives as the legislative tool for the Banking Union and to~~ make it a priority to fully ensure that all relevant legislation is ~~ful~~adequately implemented in all Member States; calls on the Commission, in cooperation with the European supervisory authorities, to identify and remove obstacles to the internal market;

Amendment 61 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 4

4. Recalls the need for a coherent set of rules for the proper functioning of the Banking Union; calls on the Commission to ~~prioritise regulations over directives as the legislative tool for the Banking Union and to make it a priority to fully~~ ensure that all relevant legislation is fully and correctly implemented in all Member States; calls on the Commission, in cooperation with the European supervisory authorities, to identify and remove obstacles to the internal market;

Amendment 62 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 4

4. Recalls the need for a coherent set of rules for the proper functioning of the Banking Union; calls on the Commission to prioritise ~~regulations over directives as the legislative tool for the Banking Un~~the principle of proportionality in EU banking regulation, a~~nd to make it a priority to fully ensure that all relevant legislation is fully implemented~~s well as the full and the correct implementation of EU financial regulation in all Member States; calls on the Commission, in cooperation with the European supervisory authorities, to identify and remove obstacles to the internal market;

Amendment 63 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 5

5. Believes that decisions by the supervisory and resolution authorities must be coherent, properly explained, transparent and made public; urges the supervisory and resolution authorities to be as restrictive as possible in applying the provisions that allow them to refuse access to documents;

Amendment 64 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 6

6. Takes note of the ECB’s recent ‘failing or likely to fail’ assessments, carried out in 2018; is deeply concerned that some of these cases raised issues concerning the enforcement of anti-money laundering rules in the Banking Union; underlines the urgent need for a common EU approach in this regard with clearly assigned powers; notes that issues concerning the enforcement of anti- money laundering legislation have also been revealed outside the Banking Union; considers that, as membership of the Banking Union brings about increased effectiveness of banking supervision, joining the Banking Union could benefit non euro area Member States experiencing issues with the application of anti-money laundering legislation;

Amendment 65 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 6

6. Takes note of the ECB’s recent ‘failing or likely to fail’ assessments, carried out in 2018; stresses the need to improve the response times of European banking supervision, as shown by the case of a Latvian bank in March 2018; is deeply concerned that some of these cases raised issues concerning the enforcement of anti-money laundering rules in the Banking Union; underlines the urgent need for a common EU approach in this regard with clearly assigned powers;

Amendment 66 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 6

6. Takes note of the ECB’s recent ‘failing or likely to fail’ assessments, carried out in 2018; is deeply concerned that some of these cases raised issues concerning the enforcement of anti-money laundering rules in the Banking Union; underlines the urgent need for a common EU approach in this regard with clearly assigned powers; welcomes, in this regard, the European Commission’s proposal to strengthen the European Banking Authority in the field of money laundering;

Amendment 67 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 6

6. Takes note of the ECB’s recent ‘failing or likely to fail’ assessments, carried out in 2018; is ~~deeply~~ concerned that in one episode such assessment was countered by a national court; notes that some of these cases raised issues concerning the enforcement of anti-money laundering rules in the Banking Union; underlines the urgent need for a common EU approach in this regard with clearly assigned powers;

Amendment 68 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 6 a (new)

6a. Expresses its concern about recent cases of breaches or alleged breaches of anti-money laundering rules, such as the liquidation of the directly supervised ABLV Bank in Latvia, and the liquidation of Versobank in Estonia, as well as about the limits of the supervisory framework as shown by cooperation between the Danish and Estonian financial supervisory institutions during the investigation of Danske Bank's Estonian operations1a. _________________ 1a https://www.fi.ee/index.php?id=22493

Amendment 69 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 6 a (new)

6a. Notes with concern that most cases of money laundering - in particular ABLV in Latvia and Danske Bank in Estonia - have been reported by non-EU jurisdictions; takes the view that in addition to endangering the reputation of the entire European banking system, cases of money laundering (such as, for example, those linked to ING in the Netherlands) expose the European economy to financial and political instability;

Amendment 7 #

Motion for a resolution
Citation 11 b (new)

– having regard to the proposals to amend Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 on prudential requirements for credit institutions and investment firms and amending Regulation (EU) No 648/2012 (CRR) and Directive 2013/36/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 on access to the activity of credit institutions and the prudential supervision of credit institutions and investment firms, amending Directive 2002/87/EC and repealing Directives 2006/48/EC and 2006/49/EC (CRD IV),

Amendment 70 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 6 a (new)

6a. Calls on the SSM to regularly update the European Parliament about the information exchange which takes place between staff carrying out monetary policy and supervisory functions in accordance with the European Central Bank decision of 17 September 2014 (ECB/2014/39);

Amendment 71 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 6 a (new)

6a. Believes that prudential and anti- money laundering supervision are equally important; calls for a unified approach towards prudential and anti-money laundering supervisions;

Amendment 72 #

6b. Recalls that indicators such as ownership concentration, the share of non-resident clients, the share of non- euro deposits and loan-to-deposit ratios are likely indicators of money laundering problems2a; urges the European supervisory authorities to give special attention to these parameters; _________________ 2a PE 614.496

Amendment 73 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 6 b (new)

6b. Notes that some financial institutions directly supervised by the ECB have been actively facilitating money laundering;

Amendment 74 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 6 c (new)

6c. Expresses concern about ABLV's and Versobank's very high ownership concentration: a. In case of ABLV, the bank’s controlling interest was held by the bank’s Chief Executive Officer and the bank’s Chairman of the Council (combined they held 87% of the shares with voting rights), while the rest was held by other closely related shareholders (management and employees), but there was no free float of shares or outside shareholders; b. In case of Versobank, the main share of the bank was owned by Cyprus Popular Bank until March 2012, thereafter Ukrainian investors became the main shareholders, and more than 85% of the shares were then held by a single Ukrainian agro-industrial company;

Amendment 75 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 6 d (new)

6d. Expresses concern about the very high share of non-resident clients in Versobank and ABLV: a. In case of Versobank, at the end of 2017, 83% of the bank’s liabilities to customers were owed to non-resident clients outside of Estonia; b. In case of ABLV, at the end of June 2017, 84% of the total deposits placed at ABLV came from clients whose beneficiaries are residents in the CIS countries.

Amendment 76 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 6 e (new)

6e. Expresses concern about the large share of deposits made in non-euro currencies in Versobank and ABLV: a. In case of Versobank, more than one third of its deposits were made in US dollars; b. In case of ABLV, deposits made in USD apparently exceeded even 60% of the total deposit base at the end of 2016;

Amendment 77 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 7

7. Notes the results of the EBA’s EU- wide stress test; believes that stress tests should be interpreted in combination with other on-going supervisory monitoring activities;, and that fulfilment of prudential requirements by financial institutions with risky and often questionable business models may not necessarily prevent them from encountering other problems in the near future that can quickly lead to liquidity and solvency problems, as witnessed in the recent past.

Amendment 78 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 7

7. Notes the results of the EBA’s EU- wide stress test; believes that stress tests should be interpreted in combination with other on-going supervisory monitoring activities; calls on the SSM, EBA and ESRB to use consistent methodologies when defining the stress test in order to ensure full transparency on this procedure;

Amendment 79 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 7

7. Notes the results of the EBA’s EU- wide stress test; believes that stress tests should be interpreted in combination with other on-going supervisory monitoring activities; points, in this regard, to the need for a high level of transparency with regard to the results of the stress tests and in order to prevent possible distortions;

Amendment 8 #

Motion for a resolution
Citation 11 c (new)

– having regard to the opinion of the European Central Bank of 8 November 2017 on amendments to the Union framework for capital requirements of credit institutions and investment firms (CON/2017/46),

Amendment 80 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 7 a (new)

7a. Regrets that its concerns regarding the risks stemming from the presence of Level 3 assets, including derivatives, on the balance sheets of the major banks in the euro area, and in particular the difficulty in ascertaining their value, have not been appropriately taken into consideration in the EBA’s stress tests; notes that these risks should be reduced and that this calls for a progressive reduction of the holdings of these assets; repeats its call to the SSM to make this issue one of its supervisory priorities and to organise, jointly with the EBA, a specific quantitative stress test regarding such assets or to justify to Parliament why it has decided not to do so;

Amendment 81 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 7 a (new)

7a. Reiterates its concerns over the high level in certain jurisdictions of complex and illiquid financial instruments classified as level 2 and level 3 and the difficulty of their valuation; welcomes, in this regard, the inclusion of level 2 and level 3 instruments in the scope of 2018 stress tests; reiterates its call on the SSM to make the reduction of these complex and illiquid financial instruments, including derivatives, its main supervisory priority;

Amendment 82 #

7a. Considers that the options and national discretions set out in Union law concerning banking supervision hinder the creation of a genuine Banking Union and reduce the effectiveness of the Banking Union; considers that existing options and national discretions should be phased-out and that legislators should refrain from introducing new ones, unless they are accompanied by a sound justification and are temporary in nature;

Amendment 83 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 7 a (new)

7a. Considers that the options and national discretions set out in Union law concerning banking supervision hinder the creation of a genuine Banking Union and reduce the effectiveness of the Banking Union; considers that existing options and national discretions should be phased-out and that legislators should refrain from introducing new ones, unless they are accompanied by a sound justification and are temporary in nature;

Amendment 84 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 8

8. Highlights that sovereign debt is not risk-free; takes note of the on-going work of the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) on sovereign risk; is concerned by the fact that some financial institutions are heavily invested in their own sovereign debt; ~~calls on the Commission to assess whether to introduce risk weighting on sovereign bonds or exposure limits in the EU;~~

Amendment 85 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 8

8. Highlights that sovereign debt is not risk-free; takes note of the on-going work of the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) on sovereign risk; is concerned by the fact that some financial institutions are heavily invested in their own sovereign debt; calls on the Commission to assess whether to introduce risk weighting on sovereign bonds or exposure limits in the EU;deleted

Amendment 86 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 8

8. Highlights that sovereign debt is not risk-free; takes note of the on-going work of the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) on sovereign risk; is concerned by the fact that some financial institutions are heavily invested in their own sovereign debt; callsis also concerned by the fact that some financial institutions have overly invested in debt issued by their own sovereign; takes note of the solutions explored to address those two issues and in particular of the on-going work of the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) on sovereign risk; believes that potential changes made to the regulatory treatment of sovereign exposures should be coordinated internationally; takes note onf the Commission ~~to assess whether to introduce risk weighting on s~~proposal for an enabling framework for Sovereign bBond~~s or exposure limits in the EU~~ Backed Securities;

Amendment 87 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 8

8. Highlights that sovereign debt is not risk-free; ~~takes note of the on-going work of the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) on sovereign risk; is concerned by the fact that some financial institutions are heavily invested in~~is also concerned by the fact that some financial institutions have excessively large exposures invested in sovereign debt issued by their own sgover~~eign debt; calls on the Commission~~nments; takes note of the solutions explored to assddress ~~whether to introduce risk weighting on sovereign bonds or exposure limits in the EU~~those issues and in particular of the on-going work of the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) on sovereign risk; believes that potential changes made to the regulatory treatment of sovereign exposures should be coordinated internationally;

Amendment 88 #

8. Highlights that sovereign debt is not risk-free; takes note of the on-going work of the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) on sovereign risk; is concerned by the fact that some financial institutions are heavily invested in their own sovereign debt; calls on the Commission to assess whether to introduce risk weightingWarns against taking unilateral measures to address what is known as ‘home bias’ towards sovereign debt, as these could lead to financial instability in the euro area and create an unlevel playing field with respect to other jurisdictions; notes that the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) has practically halted its work on the prudential treatment of sovereign risk since the publication of its study in 20171 a, as it was unable to find any consensus on the issue; is concerned by the fact that the Union does not yet have a real, safe, pan-European sovereign bond; _________________ 1a 'Discussion paper - The regulatory treatment onf sovereign ~~bonds or exposure limits in the EU;~~exposures', Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, Bank for International Settlements, December 2017.

Amendment 89 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 8

8. Highlights that sovereign debt is not risk-free; takes note of the on-going work of the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) on sovereign risk; is concerned by the fact that some financial institutions are heavily invested in their own sovereign debt, constituting excessive "home bias"; calls on the Commission to ~~assess whether to~~ introduce risk weighting on sovereign bonds or exposure limits in the EU; rejects, in this respect, the Commission's ongoing work on the idea of a so-called sovereign bond-backed securities (SBBS);

Amendment 9 #

Motion for a resolution
Citation 11 d (new)

– having regard to the ESRB report on Financial Stability Implications of IFRS of 9 July 2017,

Amendment 90 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 8

8. Highlights that sovereign debt is not risk-free and should not be treated prudentially as if it was; takes note of the on-going work of the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) on sovereign risk; is concerned by the fact that some financial institutions are heavily invested in their own sovereign debt; calls on the Commission to ~~assess whether to~~submit a legislative proposal providing for the gradual introducetion of risk weight~~ing on~~s for sovereign ~~bonds~~debt or exposure limits ~~in the EU~~for government bonds;

Amendment 91 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 8

8. ~~Highlights that sovereign debt is not risk-free; t~~Takes note of the on-going work of the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) on sovereign risk; is concerned by the fact that some financial institutions are heavily invested in their own sovereign debt; calls on the Commission to assess whether to introduce risk weighting on sovereign bonds or exposure limits in the EUstresses that the EU regulatory framework on prudential treatment of sovereign debt should be consistent with international standards;

Amendment 92 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 8 a (new)

8a. Welcomes the Commission's proposal on establishing a European safe asset for the Euro area, starting with the issuance of Sovereign Bond-backed Securities (SBBS);

Amendment 93 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 10

10. ~~Welcomes~~Takes note of the Commission proposal to reinforce the role of the EBA in anti-money laundering supervision in the financial sector; ~~calls on the co-legislators adopt the proposal without undue delay~~urges the Commission however to await the implementation of the fifth Anti-Money Laundering Directive and the new EU rules regarding VAT fraud; stresses that the EBA should stay within its current mandate; urges the Commission not to tread on the role and sovereignty of the Member States and of the national anti-money laundering supervisors; calls on the Commission to incorporate concerns about money laundering within the ESFS review;

Amendment 94 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 10

10. Welcomes the Commission proposal to reinforce the role of the EBA in anti-money laundering supervision in the financial sector; calls on the co-legislators adopt the proposal without undue delay; notes, however, that the role and responsibilities of national supervisors and Financial Intelligence Units (FIUs) cannot be replaced by a single EU body; stresses the importance of cooperation between national supervisors, FIUs and EBA in order to help prevent systemic money-laundering problems at the national as well as the EU level;

Amendment 95 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 10

10. Welcomes the Commission proposal to reinforce the role of the EBA in anti-money laundering supervision in the financial sector; calls on the co-legislators adopt the proposal without undue delay; welcomes the Commission’s proposal, as announced by Jean-Claude Juncker in his State of the Union address on 12 September 2018 to the European Parliament, to strengthen the role of the EBA in the fight against money laundering in the financial sector; calls on the co-legislators to adopt this proposal without undue delay;

Amendment 96 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 10

10. Welcomes the Commission proposal to reinforce the role of the EBA in anti-money laundering supervision in the financial sector; calls on the co-legislators adopt the proposal without undue delay and urges the need for enhanced cooperation and information sharing between national supervision authorities based on common standards within the EU and subject to EU level coordination and support where national authorities are overwhelmed;

Amendment 97 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 10

10. Welcomes the Commission proposal to reinforce the role of the EBA in anti-money laundering supervision in the financial sector; calls on the co-legislators adopt the proposal without undue delay within the framework of the review of the European System for Financial Supervision;

Amendment 98 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 10 a (new)

10a. Remains concerned about recent cases of money laundering at European banks and calls for national financial supervisory authorities to be strengthened and for more effective cooperation;

Amendment 99 #