2018/2113(INI) | [ParlTrack]

Motion for a resolution
Citation 1 a (new)

- having regard to Article 17 of the Treaty on European Union, which entrusts the European Commission with definition of the general interest of the Union and the monopoly on taking initiatives 'to that end';

Amendment 10 #

Motion for a resolution
Recital C

C. whereas, in addition to these instruments, Parliament has an array of tools for steering oversight, thanks to which it can ~~proactivel~~in theory shape the European political agenda, without however having the right of initiative as has any other parliament in the world;

Amendment 11 #

Motion for a resolution
Recital D

D. whereas the Spitzenkandidaten process has ~~substantially~~ changed the relationship between Parliament and the Commission ~~and has~~by strengtheneding the link between the two institutions, thus leading to a greater politicisation of the Commission ~~which should~~and increased subordination of Parliament, instead of resulting in ~~increased~~genuine and unconditional parliamentary scrutiny of itboth the Commission's executive functions and its legislative and judicial powers, and also of how it functions internally;

Amendment 12 #

Motion for a resolution
Recital D

D. whereas the Spitzenkandidaten process ~~has substantially changed the relationship~~reflects the interinstitutional balance between the Parliament and the Commission, therefore having substantially consolidated and ~~has~~ strengthened the link between the two institutions, thus leading to a greater politicisation of the Commission which should result in increased parliamentary scrutiny of its executive functions;

Amendment 13 #

Motion for a resolution
Recital E

E. whereas the Treaty provides for the President of the Commission isto be elected by Parliament on a proposal by the EU heads of state and government and taking into account the results of the European elections, and whereas the Treaties also provide for a procedure in the eventuality that parliament was to reject the proposed candidate;

Amendment 14 #

Motion for a resolution
Recital E

E. whereas the President of the Commission is elected by Parliament on a proposal by the EU heads of state and government ~~and~~, taking into account the results of the European elections and the consultations with the European Parliament;

Amendment 15 #

Motion for a resolution
Recital F

F. whereas all commissioners- designate are subject to a hearing before the investiture of the College of Commissioners, and whereas over its mandate Parliament can review the commitments and priorities expressed by the commissioners-designate during their appointment hearings, including an evaluation of whether their personal backgrounds qualify them for fulfilling the requirements the office demands;

Amendment 16 #

Motion for a resolution
Recital G

G. whereas the Treaties give Parliament the right in theory to vote on a motion of censure against the Commission as a whole but not to withdraw its confidence in an individual Commissioner;

Amendment 17 #

Motion for a resolution
Recital H

H. whereas despite the collective responsibility in theory of the College of Commissioners, Parliament should ensure effective political oversight of the individual work of each Commissioner;

Amendment 18 #

Motion for a resolution
Recital I

~~I. whereas the recent appointment of the new Secretary-General of the Commission has raised serious concerns over the role and political influence exercised by senior Commission officials;~~deleted

Amendment 19 #

Motion for a resolution
Recital I

I. whereas the ~~recent appointment of~~conditions under which the new Secretary-General of the Commission hwas ~~raised serious concerns over the role and~~appointed recently have confirmed the serious concerns, which have been expressed ever since the Community began, over the political role and influence ~~exercised by senior Commission~~intentionally left in the hands of senior officials;

Amendment 2 #

Motion for a resolution
Citation 2 a (new)

- having regard to the 55 new fields to which the Lisbon Treaty extended qualified majority voting;

Amendment 20 #

Motion for a resolution
Recital J

J. whereas the Commission has ~~a legal~~Treaty based obligations to report regularly to Parliament ~~as follows~~: yearly on the general activities of the Union (Article 249 TFEU); every three years on the application of the provisions on non- discrimination and citizenship of the Union (Article 25 TFEU); on the results of multilateral surveillance in economic policy (Article 121(5) TFEU); every three years on the progress made on social policy (Articles 159 and 161 TFEU); every three years on the progress made towards achieving economic, social and territorial cohesion (Article 175 TFEU); yearly on research activities in the Union (Article 190 TFEU); yearly on the fight against fraud (Article 325 TFEU); and when conducting negotiations with third countries or international organisations (Article 207 TFEU);

Amendment 21 #

Motion for a resolution
Recital J a (new)

J a. whereas, additionally, in secondary legislation the Commission is instructed to review and evaluate various Directives and Regulations and report on its findings;

Amendment 22 #

Motion for a resolution
Recital K

K. whereas with the adoption of the Framework agreement on relations between the European Parliament and the European Commission, Parliament has gained additional leverage in the shaping of the legislative agenda as proposed by the Commission every year in the Commission Work Programme (CWP), while still being the only parliament in the world that does not have the right of legislative initiative;

Amendment 23 #

Motion for a resolution
Recital M a (new)

Ma. whereas the conditions under which negotiations took place with the United Kingdom on its withdrawal from the European Union were exemplary in terms of their transparency and the involvement of Parliament;

Amendment 24 #

Motion for a resolution
Recital N

N. whereas the extent of Parliament’'s scrutiny rights varies greatly between delegated acts and implementing acts~~; whereas Parliament has~~, namely 2 500 acts per year, 500 of which are in fact legislative, produced with a lack of transparency by committees and groups of experts whose independence is questionable; whereas Parliament cannot for much longer be content with the right to veto a delegated act and/or to revoke the delegation, bugiven that in the case of implementing acts its involvement is even much less far- reaching;

Amendment 25 #

Motion for a resolution
Recital O

O. whereas the current institutional structure of the Union and the lack of precise definition of the executive in the Treaties make the concept of EU executive complex and scattered across the European, national and regional levels;deleted

Amendment 26 #

Motion for a resolution
Recital O

O. whereas the current institutional structure of the Union, the absence of any separation of powers and the lack of a precise definition of the executive in the Treaties make the concept of EU executive complex and scattered across the European, national and regional levels;

Amendment 27 #

Motion for a resolution
Recital P

P. whereas stronger cooperation between the European Parliament and national ~~and regional~~ parliaments, in line with their respective constitutional competences, is necessary to address the issue of ~~multi-layered~~parliamentary control of executive functions when it comes to the implementation of European legislation;

Amendment 28 #

Motion for a resolution
Recital P

P. whereas stronger cooperation between the European Parliament and national and regional parliaments, in line with their respective constitutional competences~~, is necessar~~ and in accordance with Article 10(2) TEU, is key to address the issue of multi-layered executive functions when it comes to the implementation of European legislation;

Amendment 29 #

Motion for a resolution
Recital P

P. whereas stronger cooperation between the European Parliament and national and regional parliaments, in line with their respective constitutional competences on the one hand and enabling them to perform together, through networking, real EU legislative, budgetary and scrutiny functions on the other, is necessary to address the issue of multi-layered executive functions when it comes to the implementation of European legislation and to strengthen their democratic legitimacy;

Amendment 3 #

Motion for a resolution
Citation 6

— having regard to its decision of 7 — February 2018 on the revision of the Framework Agreement on relations between the European Parliament and the European Commission, and especially its paragraph 1, which further reaffirms th~~e validity of~~at the Spitzenkandidaten process~~5 , _________________ 5~~ consists of a successful constitutional and political practice reflecting the interinstitutional balance provided for in the Treaties5 , _________________ 5 Texts adopted, P8_TA(2018)0030. Texts adopted, P8_TA(2018)0030.

Amendment 30 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1

1. Believes that Parliament is not making full use of all its instruments of political control over the executive, owing to a variety of reasons, some being inherent to the institutional structure of the Union and others being for example the results of the changing interinstitutional dynamics, which have made some of the instruments difficult to apply or not sufficiently effective;

Amendment 31 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 2

2. Acknowledges the fact that the strong politicisation of the Commission since the first successful implementation of the Spitzenkandidaten process has narrowed the democratic gap, by allowing European citizens a direct say in the choice of the president of the Commission; therefore strongly supports the pursuit of this practice for the 2019 European elections;deleted

Amendment 32 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 2

2. Acknowledges the ~~fact that the~~potential of stronger politicisation of the Commission ~~since the first successful implementation of the Spitzenkandidaten process has narrowed the democratic gap, by allowing~~due to the Spitzenkandidaten when all European citizens have a direct say in the choice of the president of the Commission by means of a vote on their preferential candidate; therefore strongly supports the ~~pursuit~~introduction of this practice for ~~the 2019~~future European elections;

Amendment 33 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 2

2. Acknowledges the fact that the ~~strong politicisation of the Commission since the first~~ successful implementation of the Spitzenkandidaten process has narrowed the democratic gap, by allowing European citizens a direct say in the choice of the president of the Commission; therefore strongly supports the pursuit of this practice for the 2019 European elections;

Amendment 34 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 2

Amendment 35 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 2 a (new)

2 a. Is convinced that the Spitzenkandidaten should head the lists of the European political parties in the elections to the European Parliament;

Amendment 36 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 3

3. Recalls that the stronger political link created between Parliament and the Commission as a result of the Spitzenkandidaten process should not make the Commission subject to less stringent parliamentary oversight nor exempt the European Parliament from henceforth acting as a counterbalance to the Commission ;

Amendment 37 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 4

4. Considers the threshold enshrined in the Treaties for a motion of censure to be too high to allow the effective use of this instrument, and deplores the lack of possibilities to hold individual commissioners to account;deleted

Amendment 38 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 4

4. ~~Considers the threshold enshrined in the Treaties for a motion of censure to be too high to allow the effective use of this instrument, and d~~Deplores the lack of possibilities to hold individual commissioners to account;

Amendment 39 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 4

4. ~~Considers~~Reminds that the threshold enshrined in the Treaties for a motion of censure ~~to be too high to allow~~is intended to reserve the effective use of this instrument~~, and deplores the lack of~~ for serious cases, acknowledges that, as in most parliamentary democracies, the possibility of a motion of censure works mostly as a deterrent; and recalls the lack of Treaty- based possibilities to hold individual commissioners to account;

Amendment 4 #

Motion for a resolution
Citation 9

~~— having regard to the recommendation of the European Ombudsman in joint cases 488/2018/KR and 514/2018/KR on the Commission’s appointment of a new Secretary-General,~~deleted

Amendment 40 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 5

5. Regrets the fact that the politicisation of the Commission has not been followed by a subsequent Treaty change, which would have enabled the consolidation of Commission’s role as the European executive branch through the adoption of provisions that would allow holding individual commissioners to account and would lower the threshold required for a motion of censure;deleted

Amendment 41 #

Esteban GONZÁLEZ PONS

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 5

Amendment 42 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 5

5. ~~Regrets the fac~~Points out that the politicisation of the Commission ~~has not been followed by a subsequent Treaty change, which would have enabled the consolidation of Commission’s role as the European executive branch through~~is a direct effect of the changes introduced in the Lisbon Treaty; notes that these changes did not include the adoption of provisions that would allow holding individual commissioners to account ~~and would lower the threshold required for a motion of censure~~;

Amendment 43 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 5

5. Regrets the fact that the politicisation of the Commission has not been followed by a subsequent Treaty change, which would have enabled the consolidation of the Commission’s role as the European executive ~~branch~~ through the adoption of provisions that would allow holding individual commissioners to account and ~~woul~~of measures changing its composition and lowering the threshold required for a motion of censure;

Amendment 44 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 5 a (new)

5a. Believes the aim of such a review ought to be to transform the Commission into a genuine executive whose members come from a political majority determined by the European elections and are chosen by the President of the Commission for their professional profile and no longer simply on the basis of suggestions by Member States; suggests that the number of Commissioners should be the result of political choices linked to portfolios and no longer be linked to the number of Member States;

Amendment 45 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 5 a (new)

5 a. Deeply deplores that, as stated by the Ombudsman, when appointing its Secretary-General the Commission “failed to comply with either the letter or the spirit of the relevant rules”;

Amendment 46 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 6

6. Points out that the Treaties do not separate properly powers and functions in the Union, do not set out clearly and definitively how federal and sovereign competences are to be shared out, do not ensure that the indissociable principles of conferral, subsidiarity and proportionality are respected in practice and do not provide a clear definition of the EU executive, and that the institutions responsible differ across the various policy areas, depending on whether they are considered to belong to the shared or to the exclusive competences of the Union;

Amendment 47 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 7

7. Considers it necessary to establish a genuinely bicameral legislative system involving the Council ~~and Parliament, with the Commission acting as the executiv~~, Parliament and national parliaments acting as a network, with the Commission acting as an executive body at the service of the political authorities and not the reverse;

Amendment 48 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 8

8. Points out that Parliament’s role of oversight towards the executive ~~should be mirror~~is complemented by similar competences of the national parliaments over their own executives when dealing with European affairs;

Amendment 49 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 8

8. Points out that Parliament’s role of oversight towards the executive should be mirrored by similar competences of the national parliaments over their own executives when dealing with European affairs; takes the view that such accountability is the keystone of the role of national parliamentary chambers in the European Union;

Amendment 5 #

Motion for a resolution
Citation 9

— having regard to the report on Meetings and Inspection of Documents – Joint Complaints 488/2018/KR and 514/2018/KR on the European Commission's Appointment of a new Secretary-General and to the recommendation of the European Ombudsman in joint cases 488/2018/KR and 514/2018/KR on the Commission’s appointment of a new Secretary-General,

Amendment 50 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 9

9. Considers that the exercise of control by Parliament over the executive pursuant to Article 14 TEU has been made difficult, if not sometimes impossible, by the lack of a clear catalogue of Union executive competences and ~~policies and~~ by the multi~~layered~~- level attribution of competences between European~~, national~~ and ~~reg~~national executives;

Amendment 51 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 10

10. Recalls that the Treaties do not confer any legislative functions or right of legislative initiative on the European Council; is concerned that in recent years the European Council has, against the spirit of the Treaties, taken a number of important political decisions outside of the Treaty framework, thereby de facto excluding those decisions from the oversight of Precalls that only the European Council, each representative of which remains subject to the will of its national parliament and its people expressing themselves through referenda, can say what the 'spirit of the Treaties' is, that is to say, the intention of the states signatory to it; points out that parliamentary oversight by national parliaments and ~~undermining the democratic accountability which is essential with~~the European Parliament of a number of important political decisions taken in an attempt to address successive crises was too limited as regards t~~o such European policies~~he requirements of democratic accountability;

Amendment 52 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 10

Amendment 53 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 11 a (new)

11a. Regrets the fact that in the absence of sincere cooperation by the Council, it is not possible to scrutinise the Council's budget through the institutional practice of budgetary discharge by Parliament and that this situation constitutes a serious failure to comply with obligations in the Treaty which stipulate that Parliament shall scrutinise the whole of the Union's budget;

Amendment 54 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 11 b (new)

11b. Suggests, so that budgetary control by Parliament may de facto be extended to the whole of the Union budget, starting negotiations between the Council, the Commission and Parliament to ensure Parliament has the right to have access to information on implementation of its budget by the Council, either directly or via the Commission, and that the Council answers written questions from Parliament and attends hearings and debates on the implementation of its budget; considers that should these negotiations fail, Parliament ought to grant discharge to the Commission only and should include in this overall discharge separate resolutions concerning the Union's various institutions, bodies and agencies, thereby ensuring that none of the sections of the EU budget are implemented without due transparency;

Amendment 55 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 13

13. Considers it necessary to simplify the distribution of executive competences in the European Union, in order to streamline and render more effective the political oversight of the executive body by the European Parliament; calls, therefore, for the ~~integration into Union law of the European Stability Mechanism (ESM), as well as of the relevant provisions of the Fiscal Comp~~Eurogroup to become a body that acts in line with the Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Governance (TSCG), since this would strengthen the executive capacity of the Commission in the field of economic and monetary policy and would ensure appropriate democratic oversight of those instrumentsa transparent manner, fully subject to democratic scrutiny;

Amendment 56 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 14

14. Suggests that the instruments for calling the Commission to account and those for steering scrutiny ~~should~~ be combined, and that the national parliaments be closely associated with this, in order to maximise the effectiveness of both;

Amendment 57 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 15

15. Insists that Parliament’s legislative powers and rights of oversight must be guaranteed, consolidated and strengthened, including through interinstitutional agreements and through the use of the corresponding legal basis by the Commission;deleted

Amendment 58 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 15

15. Insists that Parliament’s and the national parliaments' legislative powers and rights of oversight must be guaranteed, consolidated and strengthened, including through interinstitutional agreements and through the use of the corresponding legal basis by the Commission;

Amendment 59 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 17

17. Calls on the Commission to take more serious account of the legislative initiatives launched by Parliament under Article 225 TFEU, and wishes to see more initiatives result in legislative proposals; at the same time, commends the Commission for its positive follow-up to Parliament’s recommendations expressed in its resolution of 16 February 2017 on improving the functioning of the European Union building on the potential of the Lisbon Treaty;

Amendment 6 #

Motion for a resolution
Recital A

A. whereas the institutional framework of the Union as enshrined in the Treaties confers on Parliament~~, as a legislative body of the Union,~~ the responsibility of political oversight over the Commission;

Amendment 60 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 17

17. ~~Calls on~~Demands that the Commission ~~to take more serious account of~~consider the legislative ~~initiative~~proposals launched by Parliament under Article 225 TFEU, and ~~wishes to see more initiatives result in legislative proposal~~the reasoned opinions adopted by national parliaments, as binding political instructions; at the same time, commends the Commission for its positive follow-up to Parliament’s recommendations expressed in its resolution of 16 February 2017 on improving the functioning of the European Union building on the potential of the Lisbon Treaty;

Amendment 61 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 17

17. Calls on the Commission to take more serious account of the legislative initiatives launched by Parliament under Article 225 TFEU, calls on the next Commission President to commit to this objective and welcomes respective statements of Spitzenkandidaten in this regard; and wishes to see more initiatives result in legislative proposals; at the same time, commends the Commission for its positive follow-up to Parliament’s recommendations expressed in its resolution of 16 February 2017 on improving the functioning of the European Union building on the potential of the Lisbon Treaty;

Amendment 62 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 18

18. Proposes that, in line with common constitutional practice as existing in all parliamentary democracies, the European Parliament, as the only institution directly elected by the citizens, should be given the right of legislative initiative, without prejudice to the legislative prerogatives of the Commission;deleted

Amendment 63 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 18

Amendment 64 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 18

18. Proposes that, in line with common constitutional practice as existing in all parliamentary democracies, the European Parliament, as the only institution directly elected by the citizens, should be given the right of legislative initiative, ~~without prejudice to~~alongside the legislative prerogatives ofcurrently invested enjoyed by the Commission;

Amendment 65 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 18

18. Proposes that, in line with common constitutional practice as existing in all parliamentary democracies, the European Parliament, as the only institution directly elected by the citizens, and national parliaments in accordance with arrangements to be established, should be given the right of legislative initiative, without prejudice to the legislative prerogatives of the Commission;

Amendment 66 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 19

19. Encourages the exchange of best practices in parliamentary scrutiny among national parliaments, such as the holding of regular debates between the respective ministers and the specialised committees in national parliaments before and after Council meetings, and with Commissioners in an appropriate setting and timeframe, as well as meetings between the European Parliament and national parliaments; encourages the establishment of regular exchanges of officials of institutions and political group staff between the administrations of the European Parliament and national parliaments, the European Committee of the Regions and the Member State regions having legislative competences; calls on all national parliaments to draw inspiration from the Nordic negotiating mandate practice in which the parliamentary committee on EU affairs gives its government, well ahead of the EU legislative procedure, a proper mandate at the end of which ministers report back;

Amendment 67 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 19 a (new)

19 a. Believes that the establishment of an annual European week would allow MEPs and Commissioners, notably Vice- Presidents in charge of Clusters, to stand before all national parliamentary assemblies in order to discuss and to explain the European agenda alongside with MPs and representatives from civil society; suggests this initiative could foster the democratic accountability of the Commission pursuant to the Treaty of Lisbon;

Amendment 68 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 20

20. Calls on Parliament to reinforce its capacity for ~~assessment of the~~scrutiny of the preparation and implementation of delegated and implementing acts;

Amendment 69 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 20

20. Calls on Parliament to reinforce its capacity for assessment of the implementation of delegated ~~and implementing~~ acts;

Amendment 7 #

Motion for a resolution
Recital A a (new)

Aa. whereas this role is even more essential under the current Treaties as they have enshrined an unprecedented rise in the Union's powers, established qualified majority voting as the general rule and placed 'the general interest of the Union' in the Commission's hands, such that the Commission's monopoly on taking initiatives has expanded and been strengthened to an extraordinary extent, while being denied any truly democratic counterparty;

Amendment 70 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 20 a (new)

20 a. Welcomes the current effort of the three institutions to establish clear criteria for the delineation of the use of delegated and implementing acts; and urges that these criteria should be applied as soon as possible;

Amendment 71 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 21 a (new)

21a. Calls on the Commission to take note of reasoned opinions issued by the parliaments of the Member States which state that all or part of a draft legislative act or a judgment by the Court is not compatible with 'their national identities, inherent in their fundamental structures, political and constitutional, inclusive of regional and self-government' nor with their 'essential state functions' (Article 4(2) TEU) ; only an internal assessment by the competent legal and political bodies of the Member States may justify any such review of constitutional identity;

Amendment 72 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 21 b (new)

21b. Calls on the Commission to consider reasoned opinions from national parliaments on the principle of subsidiarity to be politically binding once the threshold laid down in the Treaties of one third of the votes allocated to Member State parliaments is reached; calls furthermore for Member State parliaments to have the right to exercise proper subsidiarity and proportionality checks on delegated acts and implementing acts, to recall them and where appropriate revise them;

Amendment 73 #

Esteban GONZÁLEZ PONS

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 22

22. Considers it necessary in a future Treaty change to amend the provisions regarding the motion of censure, in order to lower the required threshold, as well as to reinforce the procedures for holding individual commissioners accountable to Parliament throughout their term of office, which to a limited extent already exist in the Framework Agreement on relations between the European Parliament and the European Commission;deleted

Amendment 74 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 22

Amendment 75 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 22

22. Considers it necessary ~~in a future Treaty change to amend the provisions regarding the motion of censure, in order to lower the required threshold, as well as to reinforce the procedure~~to improve instruments for holding individual commissioners accountable to Parliament throughout their term of office, which to a limited extent already exist in the Framework Agreement on relations between the European Parliament and the European Commission;

Amendment 76 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 22

22. Considers it necessary in a future Treaty change to amend the provisions regarding the motion of censure, in order to ~~lower the required threshold, as well as to reinforce the~~introduce a procedures for holding individual commissioners accountable to Parliament throughout their term of office, ~~which to a~~building on the limited extent as it already exists in the Framework Agreement on relations between the European Parliament and the European Commission;

Amendment 77 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 22 a (new)

22a. Notes that the transparency and strong involvement of Parliament in the negotiations with the United Kingdom has had a positive impact on their outcome, creating a climate of trust and unity; calls on the Commission to reform its international negotiations practices by drawing inspiration from the working methods set up by the Task Force for the Preparation and Conduct of the Negotiations with the United Kingdom so that the negotiation of other international agreements, including trade agreements, may benefit from the same transparency and inclusiveness;

Amendment 78 #

Ramón JÁUREGUI ATONDO

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 23

23. Calls on the Commission and the Council ~~to swiftly proceed to an agreement~~, in accordance with the principle of fair cooperation, to establish a political dialogue on Parliament’s proposal for a regulation on the right of inquiry, in order to entrust Parliament with effective powers allowing it to exercise this basic parliamentary instrument for hcontroldling the executive ~~to account~~which is absolutely indispensable in parliamentary systems all over the world;

Amendment 79 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 24

24. Is convinced of the usefulness of parliamentary questions as an oversight tool; considers it necessary, therefore, to undertake an in-depth assessment of the quality of the answers provided by the Commission to Members’ questions, as well as on the quantity and quality of the questions asked by Members;

Amendment 8 #

Motion for a resolution
Recital A b (new)

Ab. whereas a response is needed to the grave state of EU democracy, already described by Jacques Delors almost 20 years ago: 'When all is said and done, this technocratic building project moving forward under the aegis of a kind of gentle and enlightened despotism must be transformed into a meaningful project.' (Evangelical spirit and European construction, Conference at Strasbourg Cathedral, 7 December 1999)

Amendment 80 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 26

26. Calls once again on the Commission to review its administrative procedures for the appointment of its Secretary-General, Directors-General and Directors, with the objective of fully ensuring that the best candidates are selected within a framework of maximum transparency and equal opportunities; ~~suggests that in the context of a further parliamentarisation of the institutional structure of the Union, parliamentary hearings of senior officials of the Union executive should be envisaged;~~

Amendment 81 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 26

Amendment 82 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 26

Amendment 83 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 26 a (new)

26a. Undertakes to exercise its prerogatives in order to start up a process of revising the Treaties so the Union may be equipped with a proper constitution establishing a fully functional parliamentary democracy; considers that this democracy should be based on a proper separation of powers, a bicameral parliamentary system in which the Commission would be the government upholding civic, economic, social and environmental rights;

Amendment 84 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 26 a (new)

26 a. Points out that this new procedure, consistent with the rules, for filling this post should be conducted when the new President of the Commission and the new Commissioners are appointed in 2019;

Amendment 85 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 26 b (new)

26 b. Suggests that in the context of a further parliamentarisation of the institutional structure of the Union, parliamentary hearings of senior officials of the Union executive should be envisaged;

Amendment 86 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 27

27. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council and the Commission, the national parliaments of the Member States, and the European Committee of the Regions ~~and the regional parliaments~~.

Amendment 9 #

Motion for a resolution
Recital B a (new)

Ba. whereas a number of these instruments are impracticable (motion of censure) or still only used hesitantly for political purposes (right of inquiry, budgetary discharge, questions) owing to the European Commission continuing to have the monopoly on taking initiatives and on defining what the general interest is, but also because of its mode of composition and the refusal so far by the dominant parliamentary groups to turn their institution into a counterbalance, that is, a genuine European Parliament;

source: 630.761

2018/12/04 CONT 18 amendments...

Amendment 1 #

Draft opinion
Recital A

A. whereas Parliament is mandated to ensures democratic control over the Commission, which is political in nature but includes different aspects and procedures;

Amendment 10 #

Miguel VIEGAS

Draft opinion
Paragraph 19

19. ~~Welcom~~Criticises the fact that the Commission renewed its commitment to performance and to results-based budgeting in its proposals for a new MFF and insists that the EU budget should strengthen its focus on stability, simplicity, more effective spending, low operating costs, efficient allocation of resources, the delivery of key policy priorities, European added value, results, impact, and increased accountability and transparency;

Amendment 11 #

Miguel VIEGAS

Draft opinion
Paragraph 25

25. Recalls that the current performance framework of the programmes reported in the programme statements of operational expenditure includes 716 indicators of different types measuring the performance against 61 general and 228 specific objectives, which gives an indication of the complexity of evaluations and makes clear that objective indicators do not necessarily reflect the underlying reality;

Amendment 12 #

Draft opinion
Paragraph 26

26. Welcomes the Commission’s proposal to reduce the number of spending programmes by a third and to make the rules more coherent; stresses that in order to actually achieve simplification for beneficiaries, all unnecessary rules, requirements and procedures should be eliminated, without, however, putting at risk the legality and regularity of the underlying transactions;

Amendment 13 #

Miguel VIEGAS

Draft opinion
Paragraph 27 – point a – indent 1

-– further reducing the number of objectives and indicators it uses for its various performance reports and focusing on those which best measure the performance of the Union budget and using those in~~terests of simplification, transparency and better contr~~dicators simply as tools for analysis and not as blunt decision-making tools;

Amendment 14 #

Draft opinion
Paragraph 30 – point b a (new)

b a) an assessment of all preventive and corrective measures taken against funding falling prey to corruption or conflicts of interest.

Amendment 15 #

Jean-François JALKH

Draft opinion
Paragraph 32

32. Urges the Commission, once again, to propose measures to make Union funding arrangements for implementation of the Union budget – which currently include different tools and combinations of tools, for example programmes, structural and investment funds, trust funds, strategic investment funds, guarantee funds, facilities, financial instruments, macro- financial assistance instruments, etc. – clearer, simpler, more coherent and better equipped to ensure sufficient transparency, accountability, performance and public understanding of how Union policies are funded ~~and what benefits they bring~~;

Amendment 16 #

Draft opinion
Paragraph 34

34. Recalls that the close political links between Parliament and the Commission were recently strengthened by the so-called Spitzenkandidaten system; ~~welcomes this attempt to address the democratic deficit of the EU, to strengthen its legitimacy and build trust among EU citizens;~~ recalls, however, the inherent risk related to party financing and calls on the Commission to address the shortcomings of the current political party financing model, in order to prevent fraud and ensure that the financing of electoral campaigns is fully transparent.

Amendment 17 #

Draft opinion
Paragraph 34

34. ~~Recall~~Notes that the close political links between Parliament and the Commission were recently strengthened by the so-called Spitzenkandidaten system; ~~welcom~~notes this attempt to address the democratic deficit of the EU, to strengthen its legitimacy and build trust among EU citizens; recalls, however, the inherent risk related to party financing and calls on the Commission to address the shortcomings of the current political party financing model, in particular for those election candidates who are not members of any political party, in order to prevent fraud and ensure that the financing of electoral campaigns is fair to all candidates, and fully transparent.

Amendment 18 #

Jean-François JALKH

Draft opinion
Paragraph 34

34. Recalls that the close political links between Parliament and the Commission were recently strengthened by the so-called Spitzenkandidaten system; welcomes this attempt to address the democratic deficit of the EU, t~~o strengthen its legitimacy and build trust among EU citizens; recalls, however, the inherent risk related to party financing and~~hrough parliamentary representation; calls on the Commission to address ~~the~~any shortcomings ofin the current political party financing model, in order to prevent fraud and ensure that the financing of electoral campaigns is fully transparent.

Amendment 2 #

Draft opinion
Recital C

C. whereas, despite the Commission’s commitment to performance, activity- based budgeting ~~is still~~remains - regrettably - the fundamental principle in drafting the Union’s budget;

Amendment 3 #

Draft opinion
Paragraph 1

1. Recalls that scrutiny over the EU bodies is the raison d'être of the European Parliament and that the accountability of the Commission to Parliament is an underpinning principle of the functioning of the EU and of internal democratic control;

Amendment 4 #

Draft opinion
Paragraph 3

3. Points out that the discharge procedure has proved to be a powerful tool that has had an impact on the positive evolution of the EU’s budgetary system, financial management, the shaping of the agenda and the way EU policies are defined and implemented, while contributing to increasing Parliament’s political leverage;

Amendment 5 #

Draft opinion
Paragraph 5

5. Notes that Parliament’s decision to grant, postpone or refuse the discharge is primarily, although not exclusively, based on the audit of the European Court of Auditors (ECA) that examines the reliability of the accounts and the legality and regularity of the underlying transactions; notes further that question- marks remain over the error-rate correction method employed by the same ECA (when the ECA does its audit and comes across areas that had already been audited by the Commission or relevant Member State, the corrections thus found, though they are known to have occurred exclusively in those previously audited areas, are treated as though those corrections had happened everywhere, as the subsequent error-rate correction is applied to the entire audit);

Amendment 6 #

Draft opinion
Paragraph 13

13. Welcomes, in particular, the fact that owing to its focus on financial performance, the evaluation report provided for in Article 318 TFEU should complements the compliance approach developed by the European Court of Auditors in its annual report and thus offers to the European Parliament the opportunity to assess policy achievements, with the caveat as noted above re the error-rate correction calculation method;

Amendment 7 #

Draft opinion
Paragraph 14

14. Notes that no real legal sanction is available if Parliament decides not to grant discharge to the Commission; but that not granting discharge is nevertheless a strong political signal, as it means that Parliament has not sufficient confidence in the Commission’s accountability and therefore should not be left unanswered by the Commission but should lead to definite follow-up actions aimed at improvement of the situation;

Amendment 8 #

Draft opinion
Paragraph 14

14. Notes with concern that no real legal sanction is available if Parliament decides not to grant discharge to the Commission;

Amendment 9 #