BETA

Activities of Kurt Joachim LAUK

Plenary speeches (16)

Credit Rating Agencies - Reporting and documentation requirements in the case of merger and divisions - Insurance and reinsurance (Solvency II) (recast) (debate)
2016/11/22
Dossiers: 2007/0143(COD)
Explanations of vote
2016/11/22
Dossiers: 2007/0019(COD)
Crises in the car industry (debate)
2016/11/22
EMU10: The first 10 years of Economic and Monetary Union and future challenges (debate)
2016/11/22
Dossiers: 2008/2156(INI)
Explanations of vote
2016/11/22
Dossiers: 2007/0233(COD)
Hedge funds and private equity - Transparency of institutional investors (debate)
2016/11/22
Dossiers: 2007/2239(INL)
Explanations of vote
2016/11/22
Dossiers: 2007/0099(COD)
Explanations of vote
2016/11/22
Dossiers: 2006/0163(COD)
Explanations of vote
2016/11/22
Dossiers: 2005/0282(COD)
European Central Bank Annual Report (2005) (debate)
2016/11/22
Dossiers: 2006/2206(INI)
Market access to port services
2016/11/22
Dossiers: 2004/0240(COD)
Explanations of vote
2016/11/22
2004 Annual Report – ECB; Communication strategy on the euro
2016/11/22
Explanations of vote
2016/11/22
Explanations of vote
2016/11/22
ECB 2003 annual report
2016/11/22

Reports (2)

REPORT Report on Public Finances in EMU 2006 PDF (158 KB) DOC (96 KB)
2016/11/22
Committee: ECON
Dossiers: 2007/2004(INI)
Documents: PDF(158 KB) DOC(96 KB)
REPORT on the 2004 Annual Report of the European Central Bank PDF (144 KB) DOC (62 KB)
2016/11/22
Committee: ECON
Dossiers: 2005/2048(INI)
Documents: PDF(144 KB) DOC(62 KB)

Amendments (79)

Amendment 1 #

2008/2196(INI)

Draft opinion
Paragraph 1 a (new)
1a. Draws attention to the freedom of establishment that is guaranteed for companies under Article 48 of the EC Treaty and has been interpreted by the Court of Justice of the European Communities1;
2008/10/15
Committee: ECON
Amendment 3 #

2008/2196(INI)

Draft opinion
Paragraph 2
2. Notes that the transfer of a company’s seat goes hand in hand with the transfer of supervision, and that a 14th Directive must not lead to the undermining of the rights of shareholders, creditors and workerspreserve the existing balance in the management of the company (‘corporate governance’);
2008/10/15
Committee: ECON
Amendment 4 #

2008/2196(INI)

Draft opinion
Paragraph 3
3. Proposes that reference be made to Regulation (EC) No 2157/2001 in conjunction with Directive No 2001/86/EC on the involvement ofCouncil Directive 94/45/EC on the establishment of a European Works Council or a procedure in Community- scale undertakings and Community-scale groups of undertakings for the purposes of informing and consulting employees 1and Directive 2005/56/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 October 2005 on cross- border mergers of limited liability companies2, in order to guarantee the coherence and substantive nature of employee participation procedures in the application of European company law directives; 1 2Or. de OJ L 254, 30.9.1994, p. 64. OJ L 310, 25.11.2005, p. 1.
2008/10/15
Committee: ECON
Amendment 9 #

2008/2196(INI)

Draft opinion
Paragraph 5
5. Stresses that decisions on the transfer of a company seat may be taken for reasons related to national tax incentive schemes, rather than for economic reasons; calls on the Commission to submit a proposal for a common consolidated assessment basis for corporation tax; emphasises the positive effects of tax competition with regard to economic growth, against the background of the Lisbon Strategy;
2008/10/15
Committee: ECON
Amendment 10 #

2008/2196(INI)

Draft opinion
Paragraph 8
8. Calls for transparency in the application of the new directive in the Member States and therefore proposes a reporting requirement for Member States vis-à-vis the Commission, whereby firms transferring their seat in application of the directive must be listed in a European companies register; points out that, in the interest of better law-making, excessive information (‘overkill’) must be avoided when transposing the reporting requirement into national law.
2008/10/15
Committee: ECON
Amendment 152 #

2008/0217(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 13
(13) Long -lasting relationships with the same rated entities or its related third parties could compromise the independence of senior analysts and persons approving credit ratings. Therefore those senior analysts and persons should be subject to a rotation mechanism.
2009/02/18
Committee: ECON
Amendment 189 #

2008/0217(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 25 a (new)
(25a) Once the conclusions of the high- level group are available, or this Regulation needs to be amended in order to comply with new international agreements, the Commission should, without delay, submit the legislative proposals required to enable this Regulation to be updated.
2009/02/18
Committee: ECON
Amendment 192 #

2008/0217(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 25 b (new)
(25b) Should the high-level group propose that future credit ratings be confined to issuers and no longer issued for products, that proposal should be addressed with a view to amending this Regulation and to determining whether and how it can become an international standard.
2009/02/18
Committee: ECON
Amendment 261 #

2008/0217(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 4 a (new)
Article 4a Liability The future rules governing the liability of credit rating agencies shall be comparable with those applicable to auditors.
2009/02/18
Committee: ECON
Amendment 275 #

2008/0217(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 6 – paragraph 4 – subparagraph 1
4. A credit rating agency shall ensure that senior analysts and persons approving credit ratings shall not be involved in providing the credit rating services to the same rated entity or its related third parties for a period exceeding four years. For that purpose it shall establish a rotation mechanism with regard to those senior analysts and persons.
2009/02/18
Committee: ECON
Amendment 308 #

2008/0217(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 8 – paragraph 3 – point a
(a) credit rating categories that may be attributed to structured finance instruments are clearly differentiated from rating categories that may be used to rate other types of rated entities or financial instruments. Separate rating categories shall be used for structured, complex instruments;
2009/02/18
Committee: ECON
Amendment 313 #

2008/0217(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 8 – paragraph 5 a (new)
5a. A credit rating agency shall document and disclose all the steps, information and factors which have given rise to a rating.
2009/02/18
Committee: ECON
Amendment 319 #

2008/0217(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 9 – paragraph 2 a (new)
2a. The reformed CESR or the centralised European agency shall consistently compile and publish statistics on credit rating agencies and their performance, inter alia as regards the reliability of their ratings.
2009/02/18
Committee: ECON
Amendment 344 #

2008/0217(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 18 a (new)
Article 18a Reform of the CESR It would be appropriate to carry out a reform of the CESR, either by expanding the CESR itself into an independent European agency, or by establishing a centralised European agency which issues credit ratings. With that aim in view, within 12 months following the entry into force of this Regulation the CESR shall submit a business plan detailing how such an agency should be operated. The Commission shall then put forward a corresponding proposal, taking into account, inter alia, the fact that the start- up capital for a future European agency shall be provided, on a pro rata basis, from the EU budget, by the European finance industry and by entities. The agency shall receive additional, current revenue in the form of charges for issued ratings to be paid by the client or the applicant. The agency shall operate in such a way as to cover its own costs, without generating any profit.
2009/02/18
Committee: ECON
Amendment 350 #

2008/0217(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 18 b (new)
Article 18b Non-profit-making organisation For the purposes of implementing this Regulation, a new, independent non- profit-making organisation shall be established which shall issue credit ratings. This organisation should have a start-up capital of EUR 200 million. Its start-up capital should be provided, on a pro rata basis, from the EU budget, by the European finance industry and by entities. The organisation shall receive additional, current revenue in the form of charges for issued ratings to be paid by the customer or the applicant. The organisation shall operate in such a way as to cover its costs, without generating any profit. The Commission shall put forward a corresponding proposal.
2009/02/18
Committee: ECON
Amendment 354 #

2008/0217(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 20 – paragraph 3a (new)
3a. The reformed CESR or the centralised European agency shall be granted, on a confidential basis and at its own request, access to information held by bank departments responsible for risk management.
2009/02/18
Committee: ECON
Amendment 17 #

2007/2239(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Recital D
D. whereas directives seem to be the appropriate legal instruments with which to address the different issues related to hedge funds and private equity fundsan analysis and assessment of legislation already in force in the Member States concerning hedge funds and private equity funds should precede a possible directive on the transparency thereof, and whereas such legislation should be the starting-point for harmonisation,
2008/05/08
Committee: JURI
Amendment 19 #

2007/2239(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Recital E
E. whereas it is recognised that one of the main issues is the need for transparency; whereas transparency has several facets, such as the transparency of hedge funds vis-à-vis the companies whose shares they acquire or own, as well as vis-à-visir prime brokers, institutional investors such as pension funds or banks, retail investors, and business partners, regulators and authorities; whereas one of the main; whereas the complaint made by some parties that there is a transparency deficits lies in the relationship between a hedge fund and the companies whose shares it acquires or owns is not valid,
2008/05/08
Committee: JURI
Amendment 22 #

2007/2239(INI)

Draft opinion
Paragraph 4 a (new)
4a. Suggests that voluntary guidelines offer better scope for dealing with a wide range of complexities and circumstances, at least until they have been road-tested;
2008/04/15
Committee: ECON
Amendment 28 #

2007/2239(INI)

Draft opinion
Paragraph 5 a (new)
5a. In the interests of ensuring that there is a level playing field, considers it inappropriate to discriminate between different investors;
2008/04/15
Committee: ECON
Amendment 29 #

2007/2239(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Recital F
F. whereas the primary reason for the current sub-prime crisis is not the lack of regulation of investors but the failure of rating agencies; whereas the rating agencies should therefore be made subject in principle to the same compliance rules as those applying to auditors,deleted
2008/05/08
Committee: JURI
Amendment 34 #

2007/2239(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Recital H
H. whereas numerous different businesshedge funds and private equity initiatives have established their own codes of best practice which may serve as a model for EU legislation; whereas, in addition to complying with EU legislation, companies and business associations should be encouraged to establish their own codes of best practicshould be given the chance to prove their value,
2008/05/08
Committee: JURI
Amendment 36 #

2007/2239(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Recital I
I. whereas there seems to beis probably no need for product-related legislation,
2008/05/08
Committee: JURI
Amendment 38 #

2007/2239(INI)

Draft opinion
Paragraph 6 a (new)
6a. Considers it impractical and counterproductive in terms of encouraging investment to make an artificial differentiation between categories of private investors in equities;
2008/04/15
Committee: ECON
Amendment 39 #

2007/2239(INI)

Draft opinion
Paragraph 6 b (new)
6b. Recommends that hedge funds which seek investment by retail investors should be required to commit themselves to a defined sector and to a formulaic risk profile and should be sold only through sales people who are specifically authorised as regards their technical qualifications, counselling ability and ethical probity;
2008/04/15
Committee: ECON
Amendment 42 #

2007/2239(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1
1. Requests the Commission to submit to Parliament, on the basis of Articles 44, 47(2) or 95 of the EC Treaty, depending on the subject matter, a legislative proposal or proposals on the transparency ofensure, initially, compliance with the existing legislation in the Member States, so as then, if appropriate, to submit to Parliament a legislative proposal on harmonising existing legislation concerning hedge funds and private equity fundinvestments; calls for such a proposal(s) to be drawn up in the light of interinstitutional discussions and following the detailed recommendations below;
2008/05/08
Committee: JURI
Amendment 53 #

2007/2239(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Annex – on hedge funds and private equity funds – subparagraph 1
The European Parliament asks the Commission to submit the appropriate legislative proposals by way of review the existing acquis communautaire affecting the various types of investors and counterparties, and to adapt or establish rulesto explore the possibility of differentiating between hedge funds, private equity and other investors and to adapt the rules of the Transparency Directive providing for the clear disclosure and timely communication of relevant and material information so as to facilitate high-quality decision-making and transparent communication between investors and the company management;
2008/05/08
Committee: JURI
Amendment 55 #

2007/2239(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Annex – on hedge funds and private equity funds – subparagraph 2
The new legislation should require shareholders to notify issuers of the proportion of their voting rights resulting from an acquisition or disposal of shares where that proportion reaches, exceeds or falls below the specific thresholds starting with 3% instead of 5%, as mentioned in Directive 2004/109/EC; it should also oblige hedge funds and private equity funds, if those categories of investors can be differentiated from others, to disclose and explain – vis-à-vis the companies whose shares they acquire or own, retail and institutional investors, prime brokers and supervisors – their general investment policy and associated risks;
2008/05/08
Committee: JURI
Amendment 59 #

2007/2239(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Annex – on hedge funds specifically – subparagraph 1
The European Parliament asks the Commission to establish rules that enhance the transparency of voting policies of hedge funds, on the basis that the addressees of Community rules should be the managers of such funds; such rules could also include a system of EU-wide shareholder identification for registered shares;
2008/05/08
Committee: JURI
Amendment 60 #

2007/2239(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Annex – on hedge funds specifically – subparagraph 2 – indent 1
– investigate the possibility of mitigating the undesirable effects of securities lending; market practices in securities lending and voting on borrowed shares, having regard to better regulation principles and the positive effects of securities lending which, inter alia, allows delays in securities settlement to be avoided and thus enhances the efficiency of those markets;
2008/05/08
Committee: JURI
Amendment 64 #

2007/2239(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Annex – on private equity funds specifically – subparagraph 1
The European Parliament asks the Commission, to establish rules that forbid private equity funds to “plunder” companies (so called “asset stripping”) and thus misuse their financial power in a way that merelyaking into account national legislation, to examine, assess and if necessary to improve current Community legislation so as to prevent the 'plundering' of companies, which might disadvantages the company acquired in the long term, without having any positive impact on ithe company’s future and the situationinterests of its employees, creditors and business partners;
2008/05/08
Committee: JURI
Amendment 66 #

2007/2239(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Annex – on private equity funds specifically – subparagraph 2
With a view to the above-mentioned legislative proposal(s), the Commission should examine ways of addressing the issues arising whenthe role of banks as lend huge amounts of money to private equity funds and then disclaim any responsibility whatsoever as toers to private equity funds, keeping in mind that the purpose for which that money is used orand the provenance of the money used to repay the loan will remain the responsibility of the debtor.
2008/05/08
Committee: JURI
Amendment 7 #

2007/2238(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Recital A
A. whereas there is at present insufficientnational and EU regulation concerning financial markets that directly or indirectly apply tof hedge funds and private equity,
2008/05/19
Committee: ECON
Amendment 16 #

2007/2238(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Recital E
E. whereas several global, EU and national institutions have, long before the current financial crisis, voiced their concerns in relation to hedge funds and private equity about financial stability, inadequate risk management, excessive debt (leverage) and the valuation of illiquid and complex financial instruments,deleted
2008/05/19
Committee: ECON
Amendment 22 #

2007/2238(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Recital F
F. whereas there is empirical evidence that hedge funds engage in herding in times of market turmoil, thus giving rise to financial stability concerns,deleted
2008/05/19
Committee: ECON
Amendment 31 #

2007/2238(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Recital H
H. whereas such long-term investment requires well-functioning financial markets in the EU and globally, contributing to the real economy, which can be only achieved by ensuring the presence in the European Union of a competitive and innovative financial industry,
2008/05/19
Committee: ECON
Amendment 34 #

2007/2238(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Recital I
I. whereas hedge funds and private equity in many cases provide liquidity and demand for innovative productshelp to meet pension liabilities through their returns, provide aid price discovery, provide market diversification, market efficiency, cushion volatile markets, provide absolute returns and demand for innovative products and thereby contributes positively to meeting the objectives of the Lisbon Agenda,
2008/05/19
Committee: ECON
Amendment 42 #

2007/2238(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Recital K
K. whereas enhanced appropriate levels of transparency towards the public, investors and supervisory authorities, including, in future, any new EU supervisory body, are crucial to ensure such well-functioning and stable financial markets as well as for promoting competition between market actors and products,
2008/05/19
Committee: ECON
Amendment 49 #

2007/2238(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Recital L
L. whereas excessive debt required by much of the activities of hedge funds and private equity threatens financial stability, prejudices the realisation of the long-term investment, growth and jobs agenda and is, moreover, unfairly favoured in national tax regimes,deleted
2008/05/19
Committee: ECON
Amendment 59 #

2007/2238(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Recital M
M. whereas the recent increase in private equity transactions has significantly increased the number of employees, whose jobs are ultimately controlled by equity funds, and Community employment law (in particular, Directive 2001/23/EC) was formulated when this was not so,
2008/05/19
Committee: ECON
Amendment 63 #

2007/2238(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Recital N
N. whereas in the event of extreme debt loads, private equity leveraged buy-outs affect the viability of the target companiescompanies present a higher risk profile,
2008/05/19
Committee: ECON
Amendment 69 #

2007/2238(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Recital O
O. whereas there are many conflicts of interest either arising from the business model of private equity or hedge funds or from the relationships between those vehicles and other actors in financial markets,deleted
2008/05/19
Committee: ECON
Amendment 77 #

2007/2238(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Recital P
P. whereas whilst there is no evidence that those vehicles caused the current financial crisis, they have been involved in the business of non-regulated and highly complex structured products; whereas not being adequately capitalised and thus volatile to turbulences, those vehicles enhanced the crisis,deleted
2008/05/19
Committee: ECON
Amendment 90 #

2007/2238(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Recital Q a (new)
Qa. whereas there has been a movement from a commercial bank centred, highly regulated financial system, to an enormously more complicated and highly engineered system,
2008/05/19
Committee: ECON
Amendment 91 #

2007/2238(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Recital Q b (new)
Qb. whereas financial crisis typically emerge after a self-reinforcing process of market exuberance marked by too much lending and too much borrowing, which in turn develop in response to underlying economic imbalances,
2008/05/19
Committee: ECON
Amendment 92 #

2007/2238(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Recital Q c (new)
Qc. whereas any return to heavily regulated, bank dominated, nationally insulated markets is not possible in this world of an international system with sophisticated financial techniques,
2008/05/19
Committee: ECON
Amendment 93 #

2007/2238(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Recital Q d (new)
Qd. whereas due to international markets, business and individuals regulation and supervision must take into account practices elsewhere,
2008/05/19
Committee: ECON
Amendment 94 #

2007/2238(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Recital Q e (new)
Qe. whereas the liquidity of active open markets also encouraged thin capital positions and high leverage,
2008/05/19
Committee: ECON
Amendment 95 #

2007/2238(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Recital Q f (new)
Qf. whereas the rating agencies have a strong reputation to protect; however, it appears that their approach towards rating complex packages of mortgages and loans has suffered not only from the appearance of conflicts of interests, but also from the common difficulty of much financial engineering,
2008/05/19
Committee: ECON
Amendment 96 #

2007/2238(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Recital Q g (new)
Qg. whereas the ECB has the basic responsibility to protect its value and resist chronic pressures towards inflation; granted a high degree of independence in pursuing that responsibility, the ECB should be removed from, and be seen to be removed from, decisions that seem biased to favour particular institutions or politically sensitive constituencies,
2008/05/19
Committee: ECON
Amendment 97 #

2007/2238(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Recital Q h (new)
Qh. whereas the ECB, by reason of its mandate, its prestige, its perceived competence, and most importantly because it is called upon to lend to troubled banks, is advantageously placed to exercise strong and effective oversight of the financial system,
2008/05/19
Committee: ECON
Amendment 98 #

2007/2238(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Recital Q i (new)
Qi. whereas a lack of information, asymmetric information and uncertainty are inherent in financial activities,
2008/05/19
Committee: ECON
Amendment 108 #

2007/2238(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1
1. Requests the Commission to submit to Parliament by 30 November 2008, on the basis of Article 44, Article 47(2), or Article 95 of the EC Treaty, a legislative proposal or proposals oncovering all significant financial market participants and relevant actors including hedge funds, and private equity and other relevant actors,with regard to regulatory completeness, equity requirement across the entire financial system, continued participation of the originators of securitised loans, non-cyclical accounting rules, increase transparency of rating agencies including disclosure of the conflicts of interests, derivative trading on open exchange and the alignment of compensation of actors of the financial system in times of profit as in times of loss following the detailed recommendations below;
2008/05/19
Committee: ECON
Amendment 113 #

2007/2238(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 3
3. Considers that thpossible financial implications of the requested proposal or proposals should be covered by EU budgetary allocations for (i) the establishment of any EU supervisory authority, (ii) the EU public credit rating agency, and (iii) the EU public certification body for structured products;
2008/05/19
Committee: ECON
Amendment 116 #

2007/2238(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Annex – recommendation 1
1. Recommendation 1 on Financial Stability and Better Functioning Financial Markets Measures The European Parliament considers that the legislative act to be adopted should aim to regulate: (a) Capital requirements Investment firms, insurance companies, credit institutions, conventional funds (such as UCITS and pension funds/IORPs) have to comply with capital requirements. Whatever the legal structure of hedge fund and private equity vehicles, including limited partnerships, the Commission should ensure that an appropriate capital requirement is introduced at the level of the entity that controls the investment of the fund or funds concerned (i.e. management firm), covering all funds regardless of their place of registration. (b) EU public credit rating agency The Commission should establish an EU Public Credit Rating Agency in order to foster competition and improve transparency in that sector. The Commission should also, in its revision of the Directive 2006/48/EC, introduce a provision that, where a credit assessment of an External Credit Assessment Institution (ECAI) is required for the calculation of a credit institution's risk- weighted exposure, the credit assessment of the EU Public Credit Rating Agency will also be required. (c) Liquidity The Commission should introduce risk-weighted capital adequacy requirements in respect of liquidity risk in its revision of the Directive 2006/48/EC. (d) Valuation The Commission should propose precise rules on the valuation of illiquid financial instruments in order better to protect investors and the stability of financial markets. (e) Prime brokers The capital requirement of any institution providing prime brokerage services should be increased in line with the complexity and opacity of the structure or nature of the exposures, to which their dealings with hedge funds and private equity expose them. In particular, the provisions of Directives 2006/48/EC and 2006/49/EC should be amended to achieve that result. (f) Venture capital The Commission should implement, without delay, the policy proposals set out in its communication on Removing obstacles to cross-border investments by venture capital funds, including proposing legislation to provide a harmonised EU- wide framework for venture capital and so to ensure cross-border access to such capital for the SME sector in line with the Lisbon Agenda. (g) EU supervisory authority The Commission should establish a European supervisor covering all financial services sectors: capital markets, securities, insurance and banking sectors. It should further be established whether there should be two such European supervisors: one for prudential regulation and another for conduct of business regulation.deleted
2008/05/19
Committee: ECON
Amendment 152 #

2007/2238(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Annex – recommendation 2
2. Recommendation 2 on Transparency Measures The European Parliament considers that the legislative act to be adopted should aim to regulate: (a) Registration and authorisation of management companies and funds' managers The Commission should establish an EU framework for the registration and authorisation of entities that control the investment of hedge funds or private equity (i.e. management firms), which should function on a single entry point basis: once authorised, the entities concerned should have access to undertake business throughout the EU. In order to promote a well-functioning single European financial market, the Commission should ensure that management firms disclose the following: - the name and domicile of funds they control, - the identity of managers, - corporate earnings and bonuses, - remuneration of directors, senior executives and other staff with investment responsibilities, and - relationships with prime brokers. That information should be set out in a uniform format (also to facilitate the proposal for a database below). (b) Notification (i.e. approval) of wholesale investment vehicles In order to encourage funds to be located onshore in the EU, the Commission should propose a separate directive along the lines of the EU-wide private placement regime, currently under discussion, to apply to the marketing and distribution in the EU of hedge funds and private equity funds. Such a regime should function on a single entry point basis: once authorised, it should be possible to offer those wholesale investment vehicles to professional, institutional investors throughout the EU. In order to promote a well-functioning single European financial market, the Commission should ensure the investment vehicle discloses the following: - general investment strategy and immediate information on any changes thereto, - leverage/debt exposure, - overall fees as well as breakdown of fees (including any stock options awarded to employees), - source and amount of funds raised, - past performance, - risk-management system and portfolio valuation methods, - information on the administrator of the fund, and - share of the fund contributed by the management company and its staff. That information should be set out in a uniform format (also to facilitate the database proposal below). (c) Database The Commission should, with the help of Level 3 Committees, establish an EU-wide registration/authorisation database recording the information on both management firms and investment vehicles as specified above. The supervisory authorities of all Member States should have unlimited access. Relevant categories of the database should be public. (d) Investors The Commission and supervisory authorities should ensure that investors in those vehicles receive not only sufficient but also relevant and comparable information (e.g. the simplified prospectus/fact sheet for UCITS). (e) Private equity and protection of employees The Commission should propose amendments to Directive 2001/23/EC so that the same protections afforded employees by that Directive, including the right to be informed and consulted, apply whenever control of the undertaking or business concerned is transferred by means of a private equity transaction.deleted
2008/05/19
Committee: ECON
Amendment 181 #

2007/2238(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Annex – recommendation 3
3. Recommendation 3 on Excessive Debt Measures The European Parliament considers that the legislative act to be adopted should aim to regulate: (a) Limits on leverage for private equity The Commission should amend Directive 77/91/EEC on capital to introduce rules to specify the appropriate level of debt at any given time in relation to the target company bearing in mind the legitimate rights of important stakeholders (including employees); in conjunction with such level, the Commission should request the Member States to introduce taxation consequences for private equity funds in cases of excessive debt; such taxation consequences could include eliminating or reducing the tax deductibility of interest payments on the debt concerned in line with best practices in Member States. (b) Capital depletion The Commission should amend Directive 77/91/EEC on capital to set minimum capital levels for the target company by reference to the long-term interests of the target company. The Commission should also, without delay, propose rules to harmonise requirements for directors of the target company (i.e. management and supervisory board members), to certify that capital outflow (including any fees paid) is in the best long-term interests of the target company, including its long- term growth and R&D needs. In particular, EU corporate governance requirements, such as the provisions of the Directive 1978/660/EEC, might be amended to achieve that result. (c) Limits on leverage for hedge funds The Commission should devise the upper limit in the debt of hedge funds in relation to preserving the stability of the EU financial system. (d) EU Registration for structured products The Commission should establish a public register of structured products in the EU.deleted
2008/05/19
Committee: ECON
Amendment 200 #

2007/2238(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Annex – recommendation 4
4. Recommendation 4 on Conflicts of Interest Measures The European Parliament considers that the legislative act to be adopted should aim to regulate: (a) Investment banks (prime brokers) - hedge funds and private equity The Commission should assess whether the strengthening of capital requirements for prime brokers (Recommendation 1) deals appropriately with the inherent conflicts of interest between: - the prime brokers and hedge funds, where the former's credit (lending) decisions are often contaminated by the prospect of earning fees from latter (via trading services), and - investment banks and private equity, where the former's credit (lending) decisions are often contaminated by the prospect of earning fees from latter (via deal related services). (b) The Commission should also introduce rules to ensure effective Chinese walls between services that investment firms provide for their clients (such as prime brokerage) and all their other business units (including asset management services, proprietary trading etc). - Private equity The Commission should formulate rules by which to deal with the conflicts of interest between the private equity partners and the management of the target company (and any others who stand to gain from the deal). Those rules should include a requirement of public disclosure of any fees or other incentives received by directors (i.e. management board and supervisory board members) or employees of the target company. - Credit Rating Agencies (CRAs) The Commission should formulate rules by which to deal with the conflicts of interest inherent in their current business models, and arising from the interplay among actors in today's financial markets. - Market access and concentration: the Directorate General for Competition of the Commission should launch an inquiry into market concentration in the following financial services industry sectors: hedge funds, private equity, investment banks (with focus on prime brokerage services) and CRAs.deleted
2008/05/19
Committee: ECON
Amendment 211 #

2007/2238(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Annex – recommendation 4 a (new)
The European Parliament considers that the legislative act to be adopted should aim to regulate: a) Regulatory completeness: Regulatory coverage must be complete. All leveraged financial institutions above a certain size must be inside a harmonised EU-net; the Member States and the Commission should ensure the consistent implementation and application of the body of Community legislation concerning financial markets, that directly or indirectly applies to hedge funds and private equity; b) Capital Requirements: Capital requirements must be the same across the entire financial system, against any given class of risks. But there must also be greater attention to liquidity. c) Continued participation: Originators should be required to hold portions of securitised loans on their balance sheets. d) Non-cyclical accounting: It is necessary to differentiate between target levels of capital and a lower minimum level; institutions that have minimum capital in bad times would only be required to aim for the higher target level over an extended period. e) Transparency: Rating agencies should be required to eliminate/ mitigate the lack of information, asymmetric information and uncertainty and disclose the conflicts of interest under which they operate without destroying the transaction oriented financial system. f) Derivate Trading: The European Commission should evaluate the possibility to insist that all derivatives be traded on open exchange. g) Incentives and compensation: The European Parliament asks the Commission to require the relevant corporate governance boards to ensure that rewards for trading and transaction origination are commensurate in times of profit the same way as in times of loss.
2008/05/19
Committee: ECON
Amendment 17 #

2007/0297(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 10 a (new)
(10a) In its opinions on the Commission communications of 7 February 2007 the European Parliament pointed out that the development of new types of cars takes five to seven years and therefore now calls on the Commission not to set definitively binding CO2 emissions targets before 2015.
2008/06/18
Committee: ENVI
Amendment 23 #

2007/0297(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 12
(12) In order to maintain the diversity of the car market and its ability to cater for different consumer needs, CO2 targets for passenger cars should be defined as a function of the utility of the cars on a linear basis. To describe this utility, mass is the most appropriate parameter because it provides a satisfactory correlation with present emissions and would therefore result in more realistic and competitively neutral targets and because data on mass is readily available. Data on the alternative utility parameter of footprint (track width times wheelbase) should, however, be collected in order to facilitate longer-term evaluations of the utility-based approach. In the establishment of the targets, the projected evolution of new cars' mass until 20125 should be taken into account, and potential incentives to increase vehicle mass just in order to benefit from a consequential increase of the CO2 reduction target should be avoided. Therefore, the possible future autonomous mass increase evolution of vehicles produced by the manufacturers and sold on the EU market should be taken into account when defining the targets for 20125. Finally, differentiation of targets should encourage emissions reductions to be made in all categories of cars while recognising that larger emission reductions can be made for heavier cars.
2008/06/18
Committee: ENVI
Amendment 45 #

2007/0297(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 22
(22) Manufacturers' compliance with the targets under this Regulation should be assessed at the Community level. Manufacturers whose average specific emissions of CO2 exceed those permitted under this Regulation should pay an excess emissions premium in respect of each calendar year from 20125 onwards. The premium should be modulated as a function of the extent to which manufacturers fail to comply with their target. It should increase over time. In order to provide a sufficient incentive to take measures to reduce specific emissions of CO2 from passenger cars, the premium should reflect technological costs. The amounts of the excess emissions premium should be considered as revenue for the budget of the European Union.
2008/06/18
Committee: ENVI
Amendment 54 #

2007/0297(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 10a (new)
(10a) In its resolution1 on the Commission communications of 7 February 2007, Parliament points out that the development of new types of passenger cars takes between five and seven years, and therefore requests the Commission not to set any final mandatory targets for CO2 emissions for any date before 2015. 1 European Parliament resolution of 15 January 2008 on CARS 21: A Competitive Automotive Regulatory Framework (P6_TA(2008)0007).
2008/06/17
Committee: ITRE
Amendment 57 #

2007/0297(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 1
1. This Regulation establishes CO2 emission performance requirements for new passenger cars in order to ensure proper functioning of the internal market and achieve the EU's overall objective that the average new car fleet should achieve CO2 emissions of 120 g CO2/km. 2. The target of 120 g/km must be achieved in 2012 by 25%, in 2013 by 50%, in 2014 by 75% and in 2015 by 100% of the new car fleet. 3. The Regulation sets the average CO2 emissions for new passenger cars at 130 g CO2/km by means of improvement in vehicle motor technology as measured in accordance with Regulation (EC) No 715/2007 and its implementing measures. T4. As part of the Community's integrated approach, this Regulation will be complemented by all additional measures corresponding to 10 g/km as part of the Community's integrated approachwhich can contribute to reducing CO2 emissions. These measures shall correspond to at least 10 g CO2/km.
2008/06/18
Committee: ENVI
Amendment 61 #

2007/0297(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 12
(12) In order to maintain the diversity of the car market and its ability to cater for different consumer needs, CO2 targets for passenger cars should be defined as a function of the utility of the cars on a linear basis. To describe this utility, mass is the most appropriate parameter because it provides a satisfactory correlation with present emissions and would therefore result in more realistic and competitively neutral targets and because data on mass is readily available. Data on the alternative utility parameter of footprint (track width times wheelbase) should, however, be collected in order to facilitate longer-term evaluations of the utility-based approach. In the establishment of the targets, the projected evolution of new cars' mass until 20125 should be taken into account, and potential incentives to increase vehicle mass just in order to benefit from a consequential increase of the CO2 reduction target should be avoided. Therefore, the possible future autonomous mass increase evolution of vehicles produced by the manufacturers and sold on the EU market should be taken into account when defining the targets for 20125. Finally, differentiation of targets should encourage emissions reductions to be made in all categories of cars while recognising that larger emission reductions can be made for heavier cars.
2008/06/17
Committee: ITRE
Amendment 78 #

2007/0297(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 22
(22) Manufacturers' compliance with the targets under this Regulation should be assessed at the Community level. Manufacturers whose average specific emissions of CO2 exceed those permitted under this Regulation should pay an excess emissions premium in respect of each calendar year from 20125 onwards. The premium should be modulated as a function of the extent to which manufacturers fail to comply with their target. It should increase over time. In order to provide a sufficient incentive to take measures to reduce specific emissions of CO2 from passenger cars, the premium should reflect technological costs. The amounts of the excess emissions premium should be considered as revenue for the budget of the European Union. .
2008/06/17
Committee: ITRE
Amendment 84 #

2007/0297(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 1
1. This Regulation establishes CO2 emission performance requirements for new passenger cars in order to ensure proper functioning of the internal market and achieve the EU's overall objective that the average new car fleet should achieve CO2 emissions of 120 g CO2/km. 2. The target figure of 120 g/km must be achieved in 2012 by 25%, in 2013 by 50%, in 2014 by 75% and in 2015 by 100% of the new car fleet. 3. The Regulation sets the average CO2 emissions for new passenger cars at 130 g CO2/km by means of improvement in vehicle motor technology as measured in accordance with Regulation (EC) No 715/2007 and its implementing measures. 4. This Regulation will be complemented, as part of the Community's integrated approach, by any additional measures corresponding to 10 g/km as part of the Community's integrated approach. which contribute to the reduction of CO2 emissions. Such measures shall correspond to at least 10 g CO2/km.
2008/06/17
Committee: ITRE
Amendment 110 #

2007/0297(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 4
For the calendar year commencing 1 January 20125 and each subsequent calendar year, each manufacturer of passenger cars shall ensure that its average specific emissions of CO2 do not exceed its specific emissions target determined in accordance with Annex I or, where a manufacturer is granted a derogation under Article 9, in accordance with that derogation.
2008/06/18
Committee: ENVI
Amendment 121 #

2007/0297(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 4
For the calendar year commencing 1 January 20125 and each subsequent calendar year, each manufacturer of passenger cars shall ensure that its average specific emissions of CO2 do not exceed its specific emissions target determined in accordance with Annex I or, where a manufacturer is granted a derogation under Article 9, in accordance with that derogation.
2008/06/17
Committee: ITRE
Amendment 141 #

2007/0297(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 7 – paragraph 1
1. In respect of each calendar year from 20125 onwards for which a manufacturer's average specific emissions of CO2 exceed its specific emissions target in that year, the Commission shall impose an excess emissions premium on the manufacturer or, in the case of a pool, the pool manager.
2008/06/17
Committee: ITRE
Amendment 152 #

2007/0297(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 7 – paragraph 3
3. The excess emissions premium shall be: (a) in relation to excess emissions in the calendar year 2012, 2the CO2 price as traded on the exchange, but not more than 10 euros; (b) in relation to excess emissions in the calendar year 2013, 35the CO2 price as traded on the exchange, but not more than 20 euros; (c) in relation to excess emissions in the calendar year 2014, 6the CO2 price as traded on the exchange, but not more than 30 euros; and (d) in relation to excess emissions in the calendar year 2015 and subsequent calendar years, 95the CO2 price as traded on the exchange, but not more than 40 euros.
2008/06/17
Committee: ITRE
Amendment 156 #

2007/0297(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 7a (new)
Article 7a Bonus system 1. If in 2012 the target is achieved by more than 25%, in 2013 by more than 50% and in 2014 by more than 75% of the whole fleet, the manufacturer shall receive bonus points. 2. Bonus points shall be calculated in the same way as the excess emissions premiums provided for in Article 7, in which connection one bonus point shall correspond to one euro. 3. Bonus points obtained as from 2012 shall be offset against possible future excess emissions premiums imposed pursuant to Article 7. 4. The Commission shall lay down the method for determining and offsetting bonus points.
2008/06/17
Committee: ITRE
Amendment 157 #

2007/0297(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 7 – paragraph 1
In respect of each calendar year from 20125 onwards for which a manufacturer's average specific emissions of CO2 exceed its specific emissions target in that year, the Commission shall impose an excess emissions premium on the manufacturer or, in the case of a pool, the pool manager.
2008/06/18
Committee: ENVI
Amendment 158 #

2007/0297(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 8 – paragraph 2
2. From the 31 October 20136, the list published under paragraph 1 shall also indicate whether or not the manufacturer has complied with the requirements of Article 4 in respect of the preceding calendar year.
2008/06/17
Committee: ITRE
Amendment 177 #

2007/0297(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 7 – paragraph 3
3. The excess emissions premium shall be: (a) in relation to excess emissions in the calendar year 2012, 2the CO2 price as traded on the exchange, but not more than 10 euros; (b) in relation to excess emissions in the calendar year 2013, 35the CO2 price as traded on the exchange, but not more than 20 euros; (c) in relation to excess emissions in the calendar year 2014, 6the CO2 price as traded on the exchange, but not more than 30 euros; and (d) in relation to excess emissions in the calendar year 2015 and subsequent calendar years, 95the CO2 price as traded on the exchange, but not more than 40 euros.
2008/06/18
Committee: ENVI
Amendment 183 #

2007/0297(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 7 a (new)
Article 7a Bonus system 1. If in 2012 the target is achieved by more than 25%, in 2013 by more than 50% and in 2014 by more than 75% of the whole fleet, the manufacturer shall receive bonus points. 2. Bonus points shall be calculated in the same way as the excess emissions premiums provided for in Article 7, in which connection one bonus point shall correspond to one euro. 3. Bonus points obtained as from 2012 shall be offset against possible future penalties imposed pursuant to Article 7. 4. The Commission shall lay down the method for determining and offsetting bonus points.
2008/06/18
Committee: ENVI
Amendment 187 #

2007/0297(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 8 – paragraph 2
2. From the 31 October 20136, the list published under paragraph 1 shall also indicate whether or not the manufacturer has complied with the requirements of Article 4 in respect of the preceding calendar year.
2008/06/18
Committee: ENVI
Amendment 187 #

2007/0297(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Annex I – paragraph 1
1. For each new passenger car, the permitted specific emissions of CO2, measured in grams per kilometre shall be determined in accordance with the following formula: Permitted specific emissions of CO2 = 130 + a × (M – M0) Where: : M = mass of the vehicle in kilograms (kg) M0 = 1289.0 × f f = (1 + AMI)6 Autonomous mass increase (AMI) = 0 % % a = 0.0457609
2008/06/17
Committee: ITRE
Amendment 245 #

2007/0297(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Annex I – paragraph 1 – last line
a = 0.0457 a = 0.0609
2008/06/18
Committee: ENVI