40 Amendments of Markus PIEPER related to 2014/2248(INI)
Amendment 38 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital A
Recital A
A. whereas the ‘polycrisis’es currently faced by the Union, including its financial, economic, social and migratory consequences, have all led to the rejection by a growing part of the population of the current European Union;
Amendment 49 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital B
Recital B
B. whereas progress towards a Union that can really deliver on and achieve its goals are impaired by a failure of governance owing to a continuous and systematic search for unanimity in the Council (which is still based on the so- called Luxembourg Compromise) and the lack of a credible single executive authority enjoying full democratic legitimacy and competence to take effective action across a wide spectrum of policies; whereas recent examples such as the uncontrolled migration flow, the slow clean-up of our banks after the outbreak of the financial crisis and the lack of an immediate common response to the internal and external threat of terrorism have aptly demonstrated the Union’s incapacity tocumbersomeness in responding effectively and quickly;
Amendment 79 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital D
Recital D
D. whereas, instead of fostering the Union, the system whereby Member States make progress at different speeds in accordance with their different capacities and circumstances, further reinforced in the Lisbon Treaty, which introduced new formal methods of enhanced cooperation, has increased the complexity of the Union and accentuated its ‘variable geometry’emphasised its differences; whereas more and more Member States are declining to agree on the goals and prefer ‘à la carte’piecemeal solutions, some of them even unilaterally;
Amendment 90 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital E
Recital E
E. whereas, in the field of the euro and monetary policy, the United Kingdom obtained a permanent derogation from joining (Protocol No 15), Denmark has a constitutional exemption (Protocol No 16), Sweden has ceased to follow the euro convergence criteria and the possibility of Greece leaving the single currency has been openly discussed in the European Council;
Amendment 98 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital F
Recital F
F. whereas, as regards Schengen, the free movement of people and the resulting abolition of internal border controls, all formally integrated into the Treaties, ‘opt- outs’ were given to the UK and Ireland; whereas four other Member States are also not taking part, but have the obligation to do so, while ‘opt-ins’ were accorded to three countries outside the European Union; whereas this fragmentation not only prevents the total abolition of some remaining internal borders, but also hindersposes difficulties for the establishment of a true internal market and of a fully integrated area of freedom, security and justice;
Amendment 107 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital G
Recital G
G. whereas, last but not least, this ‘variable geometry’ these differences endanger the uniform application of EU law, leads to unnexcessiveary complexity in terms of governance, jeopardises the cohesion of the Union and undermineshe EU, endanger its cohesion and solidarity among its citizens;
Amendment 131 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital I
Recital I
I. whereas, while Article 16 of the TSCG provides that within five years of the date of entry into force (before 1 January 2018) the necessary steps must have been taken to incorporate the Fiscal Compact into the legal framework of the Union, it is clear that the resilience of the euro area, including the completion of the banking union, cannot be achieved without further fiscal deepening steps together withsteps towards the establishment of a more reliable, effective and democratic form of governance; whereas this will complete the current Stability and Growth Pact, which, ever since it came into existence, even after its reform by the so- called six-pack and two-pack, has never been applied for any obvious political reasons;
Amendment 141 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital J
Recital J
J. whereas this new system of governance implies a genuine governments equipped to formulate and implement the commonjointly decided monetary, fiscal and macro- economic policies that the euro area desperately needs and must be endowed with a treasury and budget commensurate with the scale of the tasks at hand; whereas this; whereas many further considerations would requires, in addition to measures within the existing primary law, a reform of the Lisbon Treaty;
Amendment 166 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital L
Recital L
L. whereas the European Union is a constitutional system based on the rule of law; whereas the Treaties musthad to be changed to give the European Court of Justice (ECJ) jurisdiction over all aspects of EU law, in particular common foreign and security policy (Article 24(1) TEU) and monetary and economic policy (Article 126(10) TFEU);
Amendment 208 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital P
Recital P
P. whereas these changes in the Union’s primary law have become unavoidable, as regrettablyare controversial, as none of the ‘passerelle clauses’ provided for in the Lisbon Treaty with a view to facilitating the reform of the Union’s governance have been deployed, and are unlikely to be so in the present circumstances; whereas this is in sharp contrast with the attitude of the European Council in the matter of the envisaged reduction in the number of members of the European Commission, where the ‘let-out’ clause was used instantly;
Amendment 218 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital Q
Recital Q
Q. whereas clarifications are still needed as regards the European elections and on the matter of who leads the Un, amongst other reasons, the possible exit of the United Kingdom demands yet more clarification with regards to the European elections; whereas, despite the outcome of the 2014 European parliamentary elections having for the first time led directly to the nomination of the candidate for President of the Commission, a clear direct democratic link is still lacking, although the European Council has agreed to review the ‘Spitzenkandidat’ process in time for 201918; whereas, moreover, there is still confusion – not least among third parties – aboutcitizens can barely comprehend the interrelationship of the Presidents of the Commission and the European Council; __________________ 18 EUCO conclusions of 27 June 2014. EUCO conclusions of 27 June 2014.
Amendment 233 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital R
Recital R
R. whereas, finally, the urgency for reform of the Union has been dramatically increased by the United Kingdom’s decision, through a referendum, to leave the European Union has brought in a period of reflection which must urgently be used to sound out acceptance for potential solutions; whereas it is crystal clear that the negotiations to set out the arrangements for the UK’s withdrawal also need to take account of the framework for its future relationship with the Union; whereas this agreement must be negotiated in accordance with Article 218(3) TFEU and be concluded on behalf of the Union by the Council, acting by a qualified majority, after obtaining the consent of the European Parliament;
Amendment 260 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1
Paragraph 1
1. Considers that the time of crisis management by means of ad hoc and incremental decisions has passed, as it only leads to measures that are too little, too late; is convinced that it is now time to carry out a period of profound reflection on how to address the shortcomings of the governance of the European Union by undertaking, in which the short and medium term focus must be on proposed solutions which can be realised within the existing Treaties; notes that there is no support at this time for a comprehensive, in-depth reform of the Lisbon Treaty amongst the governments of the Member States;
Amendment 314 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 5
Paragraph 5
Amendment 356 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 7
Paragraph 7
7. Considers that the ‘Union method’ is the only method for legislating which ensures that all interests, especially the common European interest, are taken into account; understands by ‘Union method’ that the Commission as part of its competence as the executive initiates legislation, Parliament and the Council representing respectively the citizens and the states decide by majority voting, and the Court of Justice oversees and provides ultimate judicial control;
Amendment 387 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 9
Paragraph 9
9. Proposes that the next revision of the Treaties should rationalise the current disorderly ‘variable geometry’, i.e. ‘l’Europe à la carte’,distinctions by ending the disruptive practice of opt-outs, opt-ins and exceptions;
Amendment 404 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 10
Paragraph 10
10. Recommends that, instead of these multiple derogations, a type of ‘associate status’status which needs to be defined in more detail could be proposed to those states in the periphery that only want to participate on the sideline, i.e. in some specific Union policies; this status should be accompanied by obligations corresponding to the associated rights;
Amendment 418 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 11
Paragraph 11
11. Notes that this new type of ‘associate status’ could also be one of the possible outcomes to respect the will of the majority of the citizens of the United Kingdom to leave the EU; stresses that this wish must be respected, given that the withdrawal of the United Kingdom, as one of the larger Member States, and as the largest non- euro-area member, affects the strength and the institutional balance of the Union – a new situation that adds to the need for revision of the Treaties;
Amendment 487 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 14
Paragraph 14
14. Considers that neither the Stability and Growth Pact norand the ‘no bail-out’ clause (Article 125 TFEU) provide the intended solutions, and that they have furthermore lost credibility in their current form, as the pact has been infringed by several Member States without political or legal consequences, while Greece has been bailed out on a large scale on three occasionsform a stable framework for economic control, but is concerned, as the pact has been infringed by several Member States without political or legal consequences, and considers that, above all because of excessive deficits in several Member States, macroeconomic adjust programmes were necessary;
Amendment 494 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 15
Paragraph 15
15. Acknowledges the improvements brought by the European Semester, the six- pack and the two-pack aimed at addressing these issues, but concludes that they have not solved the problems; believes, moreover, that they have contributed to making the system overly complex, are not binding with regard to country-specific recommendations and do not cover spill- over effects between one Member State and another, or to the euro area or the EU as a wholemust be used and consistently implemented;
Amendment 524 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 16
Paragraph 16
16. Is acutely aware of the need to review the efficacy of the many recent crisis- management measures taken by the EU, and is considering whether it is necessary to codify in primary law certain decision- making procedures – such as ‘reverse qualified majority voting’ – as well as the need to entrench the legal bases of the new regulatory framework for the financial sector; agrees with the Five Presidents’ Report that the ‘open method of coordination’ as the basis for Europe’s economic strategy does not function and needs to be elevated into binding legal actsneeds to be better coordinated;
Amendment 534 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 17
Paragraph 17
17. Proposes therefore merging the deficit and debt procedures, the macroeconomic imbalance procedure and the country-specific recommendations into a single ‘convergence code’ of a legally binding nature, setting minimum and maximum standards , where only compliance with this code would allow access to EU funds for investment projects or participation in new instruments that combine economic reform with fiscal incentives such as a fiscal capacity for the euro area or a common debt instrument; the coordination of economic policies as provided for in Article 5 TFEU would therefore become a ‘shared competence’ between the Union and the Member Statea ‘convergence code’, where only compliance with this code would allow access to EU funds for investment projects or participation in new instruments that combine economic reform with fiscal incentives such as the programme to support structural reforms;
Amendment 549 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 18
Paragraph 18
Amendment 575 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 19
Paragraph 19
19. Stresses, however, that conditionality in thisany new debtincentive instrument will only be credible if complemented by an insolvency procedure for sovereigns, which will not only provide predictability to the markets in the event of an insolvent state, but also safeguard market discipline for both Member States and private creditors;
Amendment 589 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 20
Paragraph 20
20. Calls for the integration of the Fiscal Compact into the EU legal framework as well asNotes that the incorporation of the ESM and of the Single Resolution Fund into EU law, wiwould only be possible by turning away from the courresponding democratic oversight by Parliamentnt principles of economic control;
Amendment 597 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 21
Paragraph 21
Amendment 627 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 22
Paragraph 22
22. Points out that, because compliance with the new code is crucial to the functioning of the Economic and Monetary Union, stronger governmental instituobligation and implementations are required than those currently provided by the Commission and/or the Eurogroup;
Amendment 639 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 23
Paragraph 23
23. Calls , therefore, for the executive authority to be concentrated in the Commission in the role of an EU Finance Minister, by endowing the Commission with the capacity to formulate and give effect to a common EU economic policy combining macro-economic, fiscal and monetary instruments, backed up by a euro-area budget; the Finance Minister should be responsible for the operation of the ESM and other mutualised funds, and be the single external representativefor better coordination of the positions of the euro area in international organisations , especially in the financial sector;
Amendment 657 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 24
Paragraph 24
24. Considers it necessary to endow the Finance MinisterCommission with proportionate powers to intervene in the setting of national economic and fiscal policies in cases where the convergence code is not respected , and the power to use the fiscal capacity or the common bond instrument for those Member States that are compliant with the convergence code;Stability and Growth Pact is not respected,
Amendment 674 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 25
Paragraph 25
25. Considers it necessary to endow the European Central Bank with the status of lpreserve the independernce of last resort enjoying the full powers of a federal reserve bthe European Central Bank;
Amendment 681 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 26
Paragraph 26
Amendment 705 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 27
Paragraph 27
27. Calls, finally, for the banking union to be completed as soon as possible on the basis of a fast-track timelinegradually completed;
Amendment 788 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 32
Paragraph 32
32. Is of the opinion, while reiterating that more progress could and should be made under the terms of the Lisbon Treaty, including as regards use of the provisions to act by qualified majority voting, that the Vice-President / High Representative should be named EU Foreign Minister and be supported in her efforts to become the main external representative of the European Union in international fora, not least at the level of the UN; considers it essential that, owing to the broad and heavy workload, the Foreign Minister should be able to appoint political deputies; proposes a review of the functionality of the current European External Action Service;
Amendment 845 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 35
Paragraph 35
35. Proposes transforming the Commission into the principle executive authority or government of the Union with the aim of strengthening the ‘Union method’, increasing transparency and improving the efficiency and effectiveness of action taken at the level of the European Union;
Amendment 863 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 36
Paragraph 36
36. Reiterates its call for the size of the renewed Commission to be reduced substantially and for itsthe number of vice- presidents to be reduced to two: the Finance Minister and the Foreign Minister; suggests that the same reduction be applied to the Court of Auditors;
Amendment 870 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 37
Paragraph 37
Amendment 913 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 40
Paragraph 40
40. Notes that, despite the prohibition in Article 15(1) TEU, the European Council has undertaken various legislative initiatives; proposes abolishing Article 15(1) and integrating the European Council into a Council of States that could engage legitimately in the law- making process and provide direction and coherence to the other specialised Council configurations, and expressly calls for compliance with Article 15(1);
Amendment 938 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 43
Paragraph 43
43. Stresses that, following the creation of the role of EU Finance Minister, the Eurogroup should be considered as a specialised configuration of the Council with legislative and control functions but no executive tasks;
Amendment 1014 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 52
Paragraph 52
52. Believes, finally, that the current Treaty ratification procedure is too rigid to befit such a supranational polity as the European Union; proposes allowing amendments to the Treaties to come into force if not by an EU-wide referendum then after being ratified by a qualified majority of four-fifths of the Member States, having obtained the consent of Parliament; correspondingly, once this threshold has been met, Member States which still decline to ratify the amended Treaty should decide, in accordance with their own constitutional requirements, whether to start the process of secession or to opt for an associate statuvery lengthy and linked with political uncertainties;
Amendment 1037 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 54
Paragraph 54
54. Is of the opinion that the 60th anniversary of the Treaty of Rome would be an appropriate moment to modernise the European Union and to start a Convention with the purpose of making the European Union ready for the decades ahead;