BETA

Activities of Daniel HANNAN

Plenary speeches (14)

P9_CRE-PROV(2020)01-16(4-143-0000)

2016/11/22
Dossiers: 2019/2135(INI)

P9_CRE-PROV(2020)01-15(3-222-0000)

2016/11/22
Dossiers: 2019/2956(RSP)

P9_CRE-PROV(2020)01-15(3-271-0000)

2016/11/22
Dossiers: 2020/2505(RSP)

P9_CRE-PROV(2019)12-19(4-115-0000)

2016/11/22
Dossiers: 2019/2989(RSP)

P9_CRE-PROV(2019)12-18(3-204-0000)

2016/11/22
Dossiers: 2019/2933(RSP)

P9_CRE-PROV(2019)12-17(2-114-0000)

2016/11/22
Dossiers: 2019/0192(COD)

P9_CRE-PROV(2019)11-28(4-155-0000)

2016/11/22

P9_CRE-PROV(2019)11-26(2-160-0000)

2016/11/22
Dossiers: 2019/2876(RSP)

P9_CRE-PROV(2019)11-14(2-144-0000)

2016/11/22
Dossiers: 2019/2891(RSP)

P9_CRE-REV(2019)10-22(2-052-0000)

2016/11/22

P9_CRE-REV(2019)10-22(2-054-0000)

2016/11/22

P9_CRE-PROV(2019)09-19(4-153-0000)

2016/11/22
Dossiers: 2019/2800(RSP)

P9_CRE-PROV(2019)09-19(4-164-0000)

2016/11/22
Dossiers: 2019/2819(RSP)

P9_CRE-REV(2019)09-18(3-196-0000)

2016/11/22
Dossiers: 2019/2817(RSP)

Amendments (49)

2016/2114(REG)

Parliament's Rules of Procedure
Rule 136

1. three political groups may submit a written declaration of not more than 200 words relating exclusively to a matter falling within the competence of the European Union. The contents of such a declaration may not go beyond the form of a declaration. In particular, it may not call for any legislative action, contain any decision on matters for which specific procedures and competences are laid down in these Rules of Procedure or deal with the subject of ongoing proceedings in Parliament. 2. further shall be subject to a reasoned decision by the President pursuant to paragraph 1 in any given case. Written declarations shall be published in the official languages on Parliament's website and distributed electronically to all Members. They shall be entered, with the names of the signatories, in an electronic register. This register shall be public and shall be accessible through Parliament's website. Hard copies of written declarations with signatures will be also kept by the President. 3. The signature of any Member may be added to a declaration entered in the electronic register. It may be withdrawn at any time before the end of a period of three months from the entry of the declaration in the register. In the event of such a withdrawal the Member concerned shall not be permitted to add his or her signature again to the declaration. 4. three months from its being entered in the register, a declaration is signed by a majority of Parliament's component Members, the President shall notify Parliament accordingly. Without binding Parliament, the declaration shall be published inRule 136 deleted Written declarations At least 10 Members from at least The authorisation to proceed Where, at the end of a period of The procedure shall be closed by Where the minutes with the names of its signatories. 5. the forwarding to the addressees, at the end of the part-session, of the declaration, together with the names of the signatories. 6. adopted declaration has been addressed do not inform Parliament about the intended follow-up within three months from its receipt, the matter shall, at the request of one of the authors of the declaration, be placed on the agenda of a subsequent meeting of the committee responsible. 7. remained in the register for over three months and is not signed by at least one half of the component Members of Parliament shall lapse, without any possibility of that three-month period being extended.stitutions to which the A written declaration that has

2016/09/27
Committee: AFCO

2015/0270(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 10

Regulation No 806/2014
Article 41i – paragraph 1 – Introductory part

1. A participating DGS shall not be covered by EDIS ~~in the reinsurance, co- insurance or full insurance phase~~, if the Commission, acting on its own initiative or upon a request of the Board or a participating Member State, decides and informs the Board, the DGS, the designated authority of the participating Member State within the meaning of point 18 of Article 2 of Directive 2014/49/EU, and the national competent authority or authorities accordingly, that at least one of the following disqualifying conditions is met:

2016/12/09
Committee: AFCO

2015/0270(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 10

Regulation No 806/2014
Article 41i – paragraph 1 – paragraph a

(a) the participating DGS has failed to comply with the obligations under this Regulation or under Articles 4, 5, 6, 7, 8 or 10 of Directive 2014/49/EU;

2016/12/09
Committee: AFCO

2015/0270(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 10

Regulation No 806/2014
Article 41i – paragraph 1 a (new)

1a. The Board shall monitor compliance with the conditions set out in either point (a) or point (b) of paragraph 1 on a continuous basis. If the Board identifies instances of compliance with either of these points, it shall immediately inform the Commission thereof.

2016/12/09
Committee: AFCO

2015/0270(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 10

Regulation No 806/2014
Article 41i – paragraph 1 b (new)

1b. If the Commission considers that at least one of the disqualifying conditions is met, it shall deliver a letter of formal notice to the DGS and to the designated authority of the participating Member State within the meaning of point 18 of Article 2 of Directive 2014/49/EU, as well as to the national competent authority or authorities. It shall also inform the Member State or Member States concerned. That letter shall set out the Commission's reasons for considering disqualifying the participating DGS from coverage by EDIS. Within two months of receipt of such formal notice, the designated authority, in close cooperation with the DGS concerned and the national competent authority, shall: (a) take prompt corrective action to address the shortcomings identified and to ensure that the disqualifying conditions are no longer met; (b) submit to the Commission a reply in which they set out in detail the corrective action they have taken.

2016/12/09
Committee: AFCO

2015/0270(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 10

Regulation No 806/2014
Article 41i – paragraph 1 c (new)

1c. The Commission shall decide to disqualify the participating DGS from coverage by EDIS in accordance with paragraph 1, where it, having assessed the corrective action taken and consulted with the Board, considers that the DGS or the designated national authority remains non-compliant.

2016/12/09
Committee: AFCO

2015/0270(COD)

2. When funding has already been obtained by a participating DGS and at least one of the disqualifying conditions referred to in paragraph 1 is met in relation to a payout event or a use in resolution, the Commission ~~may~~shall order full ~~or partial~~ repayment of the funding to the DIF.

2016/12/09
Committee: AFCO

2015/0270(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 10

Regulation No 806/2014
Article 41j – paragraph 2

2. The Commission, after consulting the Board, may approve a derogation from the requirements set out in paragraph 1 ~~for duly justified reasons linked to the business cycle in the respective Member State, the impact pro-cyclical contributions may have, or to a payout event which occurred at national level~~only where, at national level, a participating DGS has encountered a payout event or has been used in resolution in accordance with Article 109 of Directive 2014/59/EU or Article 79 of this Regulation. Th~~ose~~is derogation~~s must be tempor~~ should last no longer than 5 yearys and may be subject to the fulfilment of certain conditions.

2016/12/09
Committee: AFCO

2014/2257(INI)

Draft opinion
Paragraph 9

9. Invites the Commission to examine proposals relating to the creation of a European identity card, which should also meet the requirements of the regulation on the citizens’ initiative for gathering signatures;deleted

2015/05/18
Committee: PETI

2014/2257(INI)

Draft opinion
Point 10

~~10. Calls on the Commission to come forward with proposals concerning the establishment of a complete electoral list of its citizens;~~deleted

2015/05/18
Committee: PETI

2010/2201(INI)

Daniel HANNAN, Geoffrey VAN ORDEN

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 3

3. Notes that the European political parties, as they stand, are ~~not in a position to fully play this role because they are merely the~~ umbrella organisations of national parties ~~and not~~ directly in touch with the electorate in the Member States;

2011/03/03
Committee: AFCO

2010/2201(INI)

Daniel HANNAN, Geoffrey VAN ORDEN

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 7

~~7. Notes that a European political party should be represented by at least one Member in the European Parliament;~~deleted

2011/03/03
Committee: AFCO

2010/2201(INI)

Daniel HANNAN, Geoffrey VAN ORDEN

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 8

8. Points out that political parties have rights and responsibilities and should therefore have organisational uniformity; considers that this organisational convergence can be achieved only by establishing a common political, legal and fiscal status for the European political parties;deleted

2011/03/03
Committee: AFCO

2010/2201(INI)

Daniel HANNAN, Geoffrey VAN ORDEN

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 10

10. Notes that creating a clearer and less burdensome fiscal regime for the ~~staff of~~ European political parties will enhance their efficiency;

2011/03/03
Committee: AFCO

2010/2201(INI)

Daniel HANNAN, Geoffrey VAN ORDEN

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 11

11. Takes the view that the European political parties should interact ~~and compete~~ in a three- level approach: regionally, nationally and internationally; considers that in a period of crisis, it is of the utmost importance for political parties to be efficient and productive at ~~both~~ EU and Member State level and beyond;

2011/03/03
Committee: AFCO

2010/2201(INI)

Daniel HANNAN, Geoffrey VAN ORDEN

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 12

12. Stresses that interaction of the European political parties involves the adoption of a transnational party list; points out that without legal status there can be no prospect of adopting a transnational list of candidates for Parliament;deleted

2011/03/03
Committee: AFCO

2010/2201(INI)

Daniel HANNAN, Geoffrey VAN ORDEN

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 13

13. Underlines the importance, for some, of forming cross-country synergies among candidates standing on genuinely European issues and policy platforms;

2011/03/03
Committee: AFCO

2010/2201(INI)

Daniel HANNAN, Geoffrey VAN ORDEN

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 14

14. Is of the opinion that the creation of an additional constituency for elections to the European Parliament, formed of the whole territory of the European Union, and the setting up of transnational lists with candidates drawn from several Member States campaigning throughout the EU, would present a unique and ‘tailor-made’ would present an opportunity for the European political parties to be in the European public eye ~~and get closer to European citizens~~;

2011/03/03
Committee: AFCO

2010/2201(INI)

Daniel HANNAN, Geoffrey VAN ORDEN

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 15

~~15. Considers that this would be a first step towards changing the character of the European elections, moving away from their image as ‘synchronised national elections’;~~deleted

2011/03/03
Committee: AFCO

2010/2201(INI)

Daniel HANNAN, Geoffrey VAN ORDEN

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 18

18. Recalls a demand made long ago, namely to give the European political parties and foundations a legal statute, enabling them to acquire legal personality under EU law rather than the law of the State where they are established or recognised; considers that such a statute could at the same time lay down minimum requirements as to their functioning and structure; invites the Committee on Constitutional Affairs to draw up a legislative proposal with this aim, to be submitted to the Commission in accordance with Article 225 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union;deleted

2011/03/03
Committee: AFCO

2009/0064(COD)

Proposal for a directive
Recital 12

(12) It is necessary to ensure that AIFM operate subject to robust governance controls. AIFM should be managed and organised so as to minimise conflicts of interest. Recent developments underline the crucial need to separate asset safe- keeping and management functions, and segregate investor assets from those of the manager. To this end, the AIFM has to ~~appoint a depositary and entrust it with the booking of~~ensure that a separate depositary is appointed to provide depository functions with respect to AIF. The depositary will be responsible for ensuring that investor money is booked correctly in segregated accounts, for the safe-keeping of financial instruments, including the holding in custody of financial instruments that can be kept, and the verification of whether the AIF or the AIFM on behalf of the AIF has obtained ownership of all other assets. When ensuring that investor money ~~on a~~is booked in segregated accounts, ~~the safe-keeping of financial instruments and the verification of whether the AIF or the AIFM on behalf of the AIF has obtained ownership of all other assets.~~ including where this is done by a person other than the depositary, the depositary should at least ensure that appropriate and rigorous processes for segregation are in place and routinely observed. The holding of assets could be delegated to a third party, which in its turn could delegate this function. The depositary and third parties may maintain a common segregated account for multiple AIF. A depositary should act honestly, fairly, professionally, independently and in the interests of the AIF or, where the AIF is not an undertaking, the investors of the AIF. These requirements should however be seen in the context of the whole relationship between the depositary and the AIF. They should not, for example, prevent a depositary from doing business in its own name but on behalf of the AIF where that is required by the very nature of the transaction and where the AIF is in agreement. A depositary may in some cases act as a finance provider or otherwise as a counterparty to the AIF, and may under these circumstances use assets of the AIF as collateral or in other ways provide services to the AIF which could cause the depositary to incur credit risk to the AIF. Acts that a depositary may undertake as a consequence of such arrangements with an AIF should not be deemed contrary to the interests of the AIF or, where the AIF is not an undertaking, the investors of the AIF. Where an AIF transfers full ownership of financial instruments or funds to a depositary for the purpose of securing or otherwise covering present or future, actual or contingent or prospective obligations, such financial instruments or funds should likewise no longer be regarded as belonging to the AIF. The requirement for the depositary to act honestly, fairly, professionally, independently and in the interests of the AIF or, where the AIF is not an undertaking, the investors of the AIF, includes a requirement to consider the appropriateness of any such transfer arrangements, including the extent to which the relevant financial instruments or funds are transferred in an amount which corresponds to the obligations in respect of which the transfer is made. The duties of the AIFM to act honestly, with due skill, care and diligence, fairly and in the best interests of the AIF it manages also include this requirement.

2010/03/01
Committee: JURI

2009/0064(COD)

Proposal for a directive
Recital 20

(20) It is appropriate to allow the AIFM to delegate ~~administrative task~~the performance of their functions to an entityies established in a third countr~~y provided that necessary safeguards are in plac~~ies and to appoint an independent valuator established in a third country, in accordance with this Directive. Similarly, a depositary may delegate its depositary tasks in respect of AIF ~~domiciled in a third country~~ to a depositary domiciled in ~~that~~a third country, provided that the legislation of that third country ensures a level of protection of investor interests which is equivalent to that in the Community. Under certain conditions, it should also be possible for the AIFM to appoint an independent valuator established in a third country in accordance with this Directive.

2010/03/01
Committee: JURI

2009/0064(COD)

Proposal for a directive
Recital 27

(27) In particular the Commission should be empowered to adopt the measures necessary for the implementation of this Directive. In this respect, the Commission should be able to adopt measures determining the procedures under which AIFM managing portfolios of AIF whose assets under management do not exceed the threshold set out in this Directive may exercise their right to be treated as AIFM covered by this Directive. These measures are also designed to specify the criteria to be used by competent authorities to assess whether AIFM comply with their obligations as regards their conduct of business, the type of conflicts of interests AIFM have to identify, as well as the reasonable steps AIFM are expected to take in terms of internal and organizational procedures in order to identify, prevent, manage and disclose conflicts of interest. They are designed to specify the risk management requirements to be employed by AIFM as a function of the risks which the AIFM incurs on behalf of the AIF that it manages as well as any arrangements needed to enable AIFM to manage the particular risks associated with short selling transactions, including any relevant restrictions that might be needed to protect the AIF from undue risk exposures. They are designed to specify the liquidity management requirements of this Directive and in particular the minimum liquidity requirements for AIF. They are designed to specify the requirements that originators of securitisation instruments have to meet in order for an AIFM to be allowed to invest in such instruments issued after 1 January 2011. They are as well designed to specify the requirements that AIFM have to comply with when investing in such securitisation instruments. They are designed to specify the criteria under which a valuator can be considered independent in the meaning of this Directive. They are designed to specify the conditions under which the delegation of AIFM functions should be approved and the conditions under which the manager could no longer be considered to be the manager of the AIF in case of excessive delegation. They are designed to specify the content and format of the annual report that AIFM have to make available for each AIF they manage and to specify the disclosure obligations of AIFM to investors and reporting requirements to competent authorities as well as their frequency. They are designed to specify the disclosure requirements imposed on AIFM as regards leverage and the frequency of reporting to competent authorities and of disclosure to investors. They are designed to setting limits to the level of leverage AIFM can employ when managing AIF They are designed to determine the detailed content and the way AIFM acquiring controlling influence in issuers and non-listed companies should fulfil their information obligation towards issuers and non-listed companies and their respective shareholders and representatives of employees, including the information to be provided in the annual reports of the AIF they manage. They are designed to specify the types of restrictions or conditions that can be imposed on the marketing of AIF to professional investor in the home Member State of the AIFM. They are designed to specify general criteria for assessing equivalence of valuation standards of third countries where the valuator is established in a third country, the equivalence of legislation of third countries regarding depositaries and, for the purpose of the authorisation of AIFM established in third countries, the equivalence of prudential regulation and ongoing supervision. They are designed to specify general criteria for assessing whether third countries grant Community AIFM effective market access comparable to that granted by the Community to AIFM from third countries. They are designed to specify the modalities, content and frequency of exchange of information regarding AIFM between the competent authorities of the home Member State of the AIFM and other competent authorities where the AIFM individually or collectively with other AIFM may have an impact on the stability of systemically relevant financial institutions and the orderly functioning of markets. They are designed to specify the procedures for on- the-spot verifications and investigations.deleted

2010/03/01
Committee: JURI

2009/0064(COD)

Proposal for a directive
Recital 28

(28) Since those measures are of general scope and are designed to amend non- essential elements of this Directive, by supplementing it with new non-essential elements, they must be adopted in accordance with the regulatory procedure with scrutiny provided for in Article 5a of Decision 1999/468/EC. Measures not falling under the above category should be subject to the regulatory procedure provided in Article 5 of that Decision. Those measures are designed to state that the fund valuation standards of a specific third country are equivalent to those applicable in the Community where the valuator is established in a third country. They are designed to state that the legislation on depositaries of a specific third country is equivalent to this Directive. They are designed to state that the legislation on prudential regulation and on-going supervision of AIFM in a specific third country is equivalent to this Directive. They are designed to state whether a specific third country grants Community AIFM effective market access comparable to that granted by the Community to AIFM from that third country. They are designed to specify standard models for notification and attestations and to specify the procedure for the exchange of information between competent authorities.deleted

2010/03/01
Committee: JURI

2009/0064(COD)

Proposal for a directive
Article 10 – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 1 a (new)

The AIFM shall set up and implement sound remuneration policies and practices that are consistent with effective risk management and long-term value creation.

2010/03/01
Committee: JURI

2009/0064(COD)

Proposal for a directive
Article 10 – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 1 b (new)

The AIFM shall inform Member States’ competent authorities about the characteristics of its remuneration policies and practices.

2010/03/01
Committee: JURI

2009/0064(COD)

Proposal for a directive
Article 10 – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 1 c (new)

Member States’ competent authorities may react and take appropriate corrective measures to offset risks that may result in the failure of an AIFM to implement sound remuneration policies and practices.

2010/03/01
Committee: JURI

2009/0064(COD)

Proposal for a directive
Article 17 – paragraph 1 – introductory wording

For each AIF established in the Community which it manages, the AIFM shall ensure that a depositary is appointed to fulfil, where relevant, the following ~~task~~depositary functions:

2010/03/01
Committee: JURI

2009/0064(COD)

Proposal for a directive
Article 17 – paragraph 1 – point a

(a) ~~receive~~ensure that all payments made by or on behalf of investors wupon then subscri~~bing~~ption of units or shares of an AIF managed by the AIFM and ~~book them~~all payments received by or for the benefit of investors upon the repurchase of shares or units of such an AIF have been correctly booked on behalf of the AIFM in a segregated accounts, including where those payments are made or received by a person other than the depositary;

2010/03/01
Committee: JURI

2009/0064(COD)

Proposal for a directive
Article 17 – paragraph 1 – point b

(b) safe-keep any financial instruments which belong to the AIF, namely: (i) hold in custody all financial instruments that can be kept and make adequate arrangements so as to safeguard the AIF's ownership rights, especially in the event of the depositary's insolvency, including arrangements to ensure that those financial instruments are registered in the depositary's books within segregated accounts or a common segregated account for multiple AIF, so that in the event of the depositary's default they can be clearly identified as separate from the assets of the depositary; (ii) maintain the records necessary to verify the ownership of financial instruments that cannot be kept on the basis of the information provided by the AIFM and external evidence of transactions made, and arrange for records to be kept of services and transactions undertaken by it which shall be sufficient to enable the competent authority of the AIFM’s home Member State to monitor the AIFM’s compliance with its obligations under this subparagraph;

2010/03/01
Committee: JURI

2009/0064(COD)

Proposal for a directive
Article 17 – paragraph 1 – point c

(c) verify whether the AIF or the AIFM on behalf of the AIF h~~as obtained the ownership of~~olds an ownership interest in all other assets the AIF invests in, based on internal and external evidence of ownership.

2010/03/01
Committee: JURI

2009/0064(COD)

Proposal for a directive
Article 17 – paragraph 1 a (new)

1a. In addition to the tasks referred to in paragraph 1, the depositary shall, where relevant, ensure that: (a) the sale, issue, re-purchase, redemption and cancellation of shares or units of the AIF are carried out in accordance with the applicable national law and the AIF rules or instruments of incorporation; (b) the value of the shares or units of the AIF is calculated in accordance with the applicable national law and the AIF rules or instruments of incorporation; (c) in transactions involving the AIF’s assets any consideration is remitted to it within the usual time limits; (d) no AIFM instructions to the depositary which conflict with the applicable national law or the AIF rules or instruments of incorporation are carried out; (e) an AIF’s income is applied in accordance with the applicable national law and the AIF rules.

2010/03/01
Committee: JURI

2009/0064(COD)

Proposal for a directive
Article 17 – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 2

~~The depositary shall act~~In the context of their respective roles, the AIFM and the depositary shall act honestly, fairly, professionally, independently and ~~solely~~ in the interest of ~~AIF investors.~~ the AIF or, where the AIF is not an undertaking, the investors of the AIF.

2010/03/01
Committee: JURI

2009/0064(COD)

Proposal for a directive
Article 17 – paragraph 3

3. The depositary shall be either: (a) a credit institution having its registered office in the Community and be authorised in accordance with Directive 2006/48/EC of the European Parliament and Council of 14 June 2006 relating to the taking up and pursuit of the business of credit institutions (recast); or (b) an investment firm authorised in accordance with Directive 2004/39/EC and which provides the ancillary service of safe-keeping and administration of financial instruments for the account of clients in accordance with Section B(1) of Annex I to that Directive, having its registered office in the Community; or (c) a person subject to prudential regulation and ongoing supervision and which can furnish sufficient financial and professional guarantees to be able to effectively perform the relevant depositary functions and meet the commitments inherent in those functions. In addition to the provisions laid down in points (a), (b) and (c) of the first subparagraph, for AIF which exclusively or predominantly hold immovable property and/or transferable securities as defined by point 18(a) of Article 4(1) of Directive 2004/39/EC and whose investment strategy mainly involves holding such immovable property and transferable securities for the medium or long term, the depositary may be a person which carries out depositary functions as part of professional or business activities in respect of which it is subject to mandatory professional registration recognised by law or to legal or regulatory provisions or rules of professional conduct and which can furnish sufficient financial and professional guarantees to be able to effectively perform the relevant depositary functions and meet the commitments inherent in those functions. Member States shall determine which of the categories of institutions referred to this paragraph are eligible to be depositaries.

2010/03/01
Committee: JURI

2009/0064(COD)

Proposal for a directive
Article 17 – paragraph 4

4. DThe depositar~~ies may delegate their tasks to other depositaries~~y may delegate to third parties the tasks referred to in this Article. The third party may in turn sub-delegate those tasks. The depositary shall exercise all due skill, care and diligence in the selection, appointment and periodic review of any third party as referred to in this paragraph. In the case of loss of financial instruments held by a sub-custodian, the depositary may, on a contractual basis, discharge itself of its liability under paragraph 5 if it can prove that it has fulfilled its obligations pursuant to this Directive. The depositary must take the necessary steps to ensure that financial instruments which it holds with a sub-custodian are identifiable separately from financial instruments belonging to the depositary and from financial instruments belonging to that sub-custodian, by means of differently titled accounts on the books of the depositary or sub-custodian or other measures that achieve the same level of protection. Financial instruments held by a sub-custodian may be registered in its books in one or more segregated accounts for multiple AIF.

2010/03/01
Committee: JURI

2009/0064(COD)

Proposal for a directive
Article 17 – paragraph 5 – subparagraph 1

The depositary shall be liable to the AIFM ~~and the investors of the AIF~~ for any losses suffered by them as a result of its unjustifiable failure to perform its obligations pursuant to this Directive or its improper performance of them.

2010/03/01
Committee: JURI

2009/0064(COD)

Proposal for a directive
Article 17 – paragraph 5 – subparagraph 3

Liability to AIF investors may be invoked either directly or indirectly through the AIFM, depending on the legal nature of the relationship between the depositary, the AIFM and the investors. The depositary's liability shall not be affected by any delegation referred to in paragraph 4 except as provided for in that paragraph.

2010/03/01
Committee: JURI

2009/0064(COD)

Proposal for a directive
Article 17 – paragraph 5 a (new)

5a. The Commission shall adopt implementing measures further specifying: (a) the modalities for the safe-keeping, safeguarding, segregation and use of fund assets and record-keeping; and (b) the supervisory duties of depositaries, including the due diligence duties of depositaries and duties relating to the operation of joint sub-custody accounts; This Directive does not prevent a Member State from imposing requirements on a depositary established in that Member State in respect of its performance of the safe-keeping function.

2010/03/01
Committee: JURI

2009/0064(COD)

Proposal for a directive
Article 18 – paragraph 2

2. In no case shall the AIFM's liability be affected by the fact that the AIFM has delegated functions to a third party, nor shall the AIFM delegate its functions to the extent that, in essence, it can no longer be considered to be the manager of the AIF and to the extent that it becomes a 'letter- box' entity.

2010/03/01
Committee: JURI

2009/0064(COD)

Proposal for a directive
Article 19 – paragraph 2 – point c a (new)

(ca) the amounts of remuneration, split into fixed and variable remuneration, paid by a systemically important AIFM (and, where relevant, by any AIF managed by such an AIFM) to senior executives and other employees having a material impact on the firm’s risk exposure.

2010/03/01
Committee: JURI

2009/0064(COD)

Proposal for a directive
Article 20 – paragraph 1 – point a

(a) a description of the investment strategy and objectives of the AIF, ~~all the~~the types of assets which the AIF can invest in and of the techniques it may employ and of ~~all~~the associated risks, any applicable investment restrictions, the circumstances in which the AIF may use leverage, the types and sources of leverage permitted and the associated risks and of any restrictions toin the use of leverage;

2010/03/01
Committee: JURI

2009/0064(COD)

Proposal for a directive
Article 20 – paragraph 1 – point c

(c) a description of the legal implications of the contractual relationship entered into for the purpose of investment, including information on jurisdiction, applicable law and on the existence, or not, of any legal instruments providing for the recognition and enforcement of judgments on the territory where the fund is domiciled;deleted

2010/03/01
Committee: JURI

2009/0064(COD)

Proposal for a directive
Article 20 – paragraph 1 – point h

(h) a description of all fees, charges and expenses and of the maximum amounts or rates thereof which are directly or indirectly borne by investors;

2010/03/01
Committee: JURI

2009/0064(COD)

Proposal for a directive
Article 20 – paragraph 1 – point i

(i) whenever an investor obtains a preferential treatment or the right to obtain preferential treatment, ~~the identity of the investor and~~ a description of that preferential treatment;

2010/03/01
Committee: JURI

2009/0064(COD)

Proposal for a directive
Article 21 – paragraph 4 a (new)

4a. AIFM managing one or more AIF employing leverage on a systemically significant basis shall make available to the competent authorities of its home Member State information about the overall level of leverage employed by each AIF it manages, a breakdown between leverage arising from borrowing of cash or securities and leverage embedded in financial derivatives and, where known, the extent to which their assets have been reused under leveraging arrangements. That information shall include the identity of the five largest sources of borrowed cash or securities for each of the AIF managed by the AIFM, and the amounts of leverage received from each of those entities for each of the AIF managed by the AIFM.

2010/03/01
Committee: JURI

2009/0064(COD)

Proposal for a directive
Article 21 – paragraph 4 b (new)

4b. Member States shall ensure that the competent authorities of the home Member State of an AIFM have access to information on the use of short selling on account of AIF managed by the AIFM for the purposes of identifying the extent to which the use of short selling contributes to the build-up of systemic risk in the financial system or risks of disorderly markets. The competent authorities of the home Member State shall also ensure that such information, aggregated in respect of all AIFM that they supervise, is made available to other competent authorities, the Committee of European Securities Regulators (CESR) established by Commission Decision 2009/77/EC of 23 January 2009 1 and the European Systemic Risk Board (ESRB) established by Regulation…/…/EC through the procedures set out in Article 46 on supervisory cooperation. ________________ 1 OJ L 25, 29.1.2009, p. 18.

2010/03/01
Committee: JURI

2009/0064(COD)

Proposal for a directive
Article 23

AIFM managing one or more AIF employing high levels of leverage on a systematic basis shall for each such AIF: (a) disclose to investors the maximum level of leverage which the AIFM may employ on behalf of the AIF as well as any right of re-use of collateral or any guarantee granted under the leveraging arrangement; (b) quarterly disclose to investors the total amount of leverage employed by each AIF in the preceding quarter.rticle 23 deleted Disclosure to investors

2010/03/01
Committee: JURI

2009/0064(COD)

Proposal for a directive
Article 38

Delegation of the depositary tasks in respect of AIF domiciled in third 1. By way of derogation from Article 17(4), in respect of AIF domiciled in a third country Member States shall allow the depositary of that AIF appointed in accordance with Article 17 to delegate the performance of one or more of its functions to a sub-depositary domiciled in the same third country provided that the legislation of that third country is equivalent to the provisions of this Directive and is effectively enforced. The following conditions shall also be met: (a) the third country is the subject of a decision taken pursuant to paragraph 4 stating sub-depositaries domiciled in that country are subject to effective prudential regulation and supervision which is equivalent to the provisions laid down in Community law; (b) co-operation between the home Member State and the relevant authorities of the third country is sufficiently ensured; (c) the third country is the subject of a decision taken pursuant to paragraph 4 stating that the standards to prevent money laundering and terrorist financing are equivalent to those laid down in Community law. 2. The depositary's liability towards investors shall not be affected by the fact that it has delegated to a third country depositary the performance of all or a part of its tasks. 3. The Commission shall adopt implementing measures specifying the criteria for assessing the equivalence of the prudential regulation, supervision and standards of third countries as referred to in paragraph 1. Those measures, designed to amend non- essential elements of this Directive by supplementing it, shall be adopted in accordance with the regulatory procedure with scrutiny referred to in Article 49(3). 4. On the basis of the criteria referred to in paragraph 3, the Commission shall, in accordance with the procedure referred to in Article 49(2), adopt implementing measures, stating that prudential regulation, supervision and standards of a third country are equivalent to this Directive.Article 38 deleted countries

2010/03/01
Committee: JURI

2007/2272(REG)

Ashley MOTE, Jim ALLISTER, Roger HELMER, Robert KILROY-SILK, Jens-Peter BONDE, Daniel HANNAN

Parliament's Rules of Procedure
Rule 110 – paragraph 4 – subparagraph 2

Other questions (non-priority questions) shall be answered within six weeks of being forwarded to the institution concerned. There shall be no limit to the number of non-priority questions that can be submitted by a Member.

2008/03/13
Committee: AFCO