Progress: Procedure completed
Role | Committee | Rapporteur | Shadows |
---|---|---|---|
Lead | JURI | LEHNE Klaus-Heiner ( PPE) | |
Committee Opinion | EMPL |
Lead committee dossier:
Legal Basis:
RoP 54
Legal Basis:
RoP 54Subjects
Events
The European Parliament adopted a resolution on deontological questions related to companies" management, and welcomes steps aiming at addressing the deontological aspects of companies’ management, which the recent financial crisis reveals are far from resolved. In this context it welcomes the Commission’s recommendation of 30 April 2009 supplementing Recommendations 2004/913/EC and 2005/162/EC as regards the regime for the remuneration of directors of listed companies, and the Commission recommendation of 30 April 2009 on remuneration policies in the financial services sector.
It points out, however, that the soft law approach is not satisfactory , and also welcomes therefore the Commission’s first legislative proposal allowing the EU legislator properly to address the relevant issues, i.e. the amendment of the Capital Requirements Directive .
Parliament maintains that the EU needs an industrial, social, and environmental model geared to the long term, consistent with the general interest – of companies, shareholders, and workers – and with a new financial architecture based on a system of prudential and deontological rules and on national and European supervisory authorities with binding powers. Remuneration policies making for sound, sustainable governance are necessary not just for deontological reasons, but also for eminently economic reasons, given that policies of this kind have a direct impact in terms of assets and the development outlook for companies themselves as well as the economy in general, and of preserving and creating higher levels of employment.
Members note that some aspects of the principles contained in the recommendations remain unclear and must be put properly into practice, such as the concept of performance criteria, which should help in creating the link between pay and performance, the notion of ‘inadequate performance’ in the case of termination payments, the termination payment and variable components of remuneration in the financial services sector. They consider further that provisions on remuneration policies for directors of banks and credit institutions have to be more than mere recommendations and must hence take the form of binding measures linked to a system of oversight, the object being to ensure that the variable component of remuneration – bonuses, stock options, and incentives – does not drive companies to adopt over-risky investment and management policies which pay no heed to the fallout for the real economy.
Parliament urges the Commission to propose sector-specific amendments to financial services legislation to ensure consistency between banking and non-banking institutions in remuneration policy. Furthermore, it calls on the Commission to bring forward legislative proposals in the field of company law to help address corporate governance issues and ensure consistency in remuneration policy for all types of companies. Members also call for the following:
the Commission to support effective implementation of measures adopted at EU level, focusing primarily on cross-border companies, and to fulfil its undertaking to submit an evaluation report on the application of both recommendations by Member States; the Commission to include in the evaluation report‘s conclusions a schedule of appropriate legislative and non-legislative activities which might be a necessary follow-up; efficient implementation of the rules on consultation and employee participation systems opted for in the context of Directive 2001/86/EC supplementing the Statute for a European Company; Member States to effectively implement measures such as the EU Shareholders’ Rights Directive to remove the obstacles to and enhance shareholders’ participation in voting, in particular with respect to cross-border voting; encouragement for more women to be assigned to management posts by means of a Commission recommendation to introduce a system for the filling of posts on company decision-making bodies, posts in other bodies and posts in general; national supervisory authorities, in assessing the independence of members of the managing bodies of undertakings more strictly, should devise more effective anti-corruption schemes, the establishment of which may not only be conducive to more ethical business management practices but may also increase the economic success of undertakings; uniform and comprehensive guidance concerning risk management, which at present seems to be addressed by various codes and standards applicable in Member States only in a fragmentary way; the Commission to promote the utilisation of best practice guidance for unlisted companies, which is designed to take account of the specificities and differences of such companies.
Parliament recalls that, during the process of economic renewal, in addition to supporting the real economy, measures for the protection of jobs, training and working conditions are of major importance and should be taken into account. Lastly, it considers it important to emphasise the general social responsibility of company boards for the sustainable, longer-term development of firms based in an EU Member State, and to expect it as a duty of such boards that they structure company directors" remuneration in a way which reflects that aim and which is transparent to the European public.
The Committee on Legal Affairs adopted the own initiative report drawn up by Klaus-Heiner LEHNE (EPP, DE) on deontological questions related to companies’ management.
It welcomes steps aiming at addressing the deontological aspects of companies’ management, which the recent financial crisis reveals are far from resolved, and in this context it welcomes the Commission’s recommendation of 30 April 2009 supplementing Recommendations 2004/913/EC and 2005/162/EC as regards the regime for the remuneration of directors of listed companies, and the Commission recommendation of 30 April 2009 on remuneration policies in the financial services sector.
It points out, however, that the soft law approach is however not satisfactory , and also welcomes therefore the Commission’s first legislative proposal allowing the EU legislator to properly address the relevant issues, i.e. the amendment of the Capital Requirements Directive .
The committee maintains that the EU needs an industrial, social, and environmental model geared to the long term, consistent with the general interest – of companies, shareholders, and workers – and with a new financial architecture based on a system of prudential and deontological rules and on national and European supervisory authorities with binding powers. Remuneration policies making for sound, sustainable governance are necessary not just for deontological reasons, but also for eminently economic reasons, given that policies of this kind have a direct impact in terms of assets and the development outlook for companies themselves as well as the economy in general, and of preserving and creating higher levels of employment.
Members note that some aspects of the principles contained in the recommendations remain unclear and must be put properly into practice, such as the concept of performance criteria, which should help in creating the link between pay and performance, the notion of ‘inadequate performance’ in the case of termination payments, the termination payment and variable components of remuneration in the financial services sector. They consider further that provisions on remuneration policies for directors of banks and credit institutions have to be more than mere recommendations and must hence take the form of binding measures linked to a system of oversight, the object being to ensure that the variable component of remuneration – bonuses, stock options, and incentives – does not drive companies to adopt over-risky investment and management policies which pay no heed to the fallout for the real economy.
The report urges the Commission to propose sector-specific amendments to financial services legislation to ensure consistency between banking and non-banking institutions in remuneration policy. Furthermore, it calls on the Commission to bring forward legislative proposals in the field of company law to help address corporate governance issues and ensure consistency in remuneration policy for all types of companies. Members also call for the following:
the Commission to support effective implementation of measures adopted at EU level, focusing primarily on cross-border companies, and to fulfil its undertaking to submit an evaluation report on the application of both recommendations by Member States; the Commission to include in the evaluation report‘s conclusions a schedule of appropriate legislative and non-legislative activities which might be a necessary follow-up; efficient implementation of the rules on consultation and employee participation systems opted for in the context of Directive 2001/86/EC supplementing the Statute for a European Company; Member States to effectively implement measures such as the EU Shareholders’ Rights Directive to remove the obstacles to and enhance shareholders’ participation in voting, in particular with respect to cross-border voting; encouragement for more women to be assigned to management posts by means of a Commission recommendation to introduce a system for the filling of posts on company decision-making bodies, posts in other bodies and posts in general; national supervisory authorities, in assessing the independence of members of the managing bodies of undertakings more strictly, should devise more effective anti-corruption schemes, the establishment of which may not only be conducive to more ethical business management practices but may also increase the economic success of undertakings; uniform and comprehensive guidance concerning risk management, which at present seems to be addressed by various codes and standards applicable in Member States only in a fragmentary way; the Commission to promote the utilisation of best practice guidance for unlisted companies, which is designed to take account of the specificities and differences of such companies.
Lastly, the committee recalls that, during the process of economic renewal, in addition to supporting the real economy, measures for the protection of jobs, training and working conditions are of major importance and should be taken into account by all stakeholders.
Documents
- Commission response to text adopted in plenary: SP(2010)4416
- Results of vote in Parliament: Results of vote in Parliament
- Decision by Parliament: T7-0165/2010
- Committee report tabled for plenary, single reading: A7-0135/2010
- Committee report tabled for plenary: A7-0135/2010
- Amendments tabled in committee: PE440.185
- Committee opinion: PE431.017
- Committee draft report: PE439.404
- Committee draft report: PE439.404
- Committee opinion: PE431.017
- Amendments tabled in committee: PE440.185
- Committee report tabled for plenary, single reading: A7-0135/2010
- Commission response to text adopted in plenary: SP(2010)4416
Activities
- Derek Roland CLARK
Plenary Speeches (1)
- Diana WALLIS
Plenary Speeches (1)
Amendments | Dossier |
93 |
2009/2177(INI)
2010/02/15
EMPL
46 amendments...
Amendment 1 #
Draft opinion Recital A A. whereas the European Union and the rest of the world are experiencing the severest economic crisis in the last 60 years, the real economy is in its worst recession of that period and difficult employment conditions are anticipated despite a relative upturn in the economy,
Amendment 10 #
Draft opinion Recital E E. whereas
Amendment 11 #
Draft opinion Paragraph 1 1. Stresses that the world needs a new social and environmental business model based on the long term which takes into account the general interest and the interest of the workers; believes that the financial sector should respond to the needs of the real economy and demonstrate
Amendment 12 #
Draft opinion Paragraph 1 1. Stresses that the European Union and the world need
Amendment 13 #
Draft opinion Paragraph 1 1. Stresses that the world needs a
Amendment 14 #
Draft opinion Paragraph 2 2. Endorses the principles set out by the Commission in its recommendations of 30 April 2009, but observes that those recommendations – particularly concerning the sensitive topic of remuneration of managers – are only being implemented in an unsatisfactory manner by the Member States; calls for the principles which the Commission introduced in its recommendations of 30 April 2009 on, first, the structure and governance of the remuneration of directors of listed companies and, second, the structure of remuneration, the process of design and operation of remuneration policy (governance), transparency of remuneration policy and supervisory review (supervision) in the financial sector to be made binding by means of an EU regulation;
Amendment 15 #
Draft opinion Paragraph 2 2. Endorses the principles set out by the Commission in its recommendations of 30 April 2009 on, first, the structure and governance of the remuneration of directors of listed companies and, second, the structure of remuneration, the process of design and operation of remuneration policy (governance), transparency of remuneration policy and supervisory review (supervision) in the financial sector
Amendment 16 #
Draft opinion Paragraph 2 a (new) 2a. Considers that the measures referred to concerning policies on the remuneration of managers of banks and credit institutions cannot merely remain recommendations but should be converted into binding measures linked to a system of supervision and penalties, with the aim of ensuring that the variable element of remuneration (bonuses, stock options and incentives) does not necessitate business investment and management policies which are excessively risky and divorced from their impact on the real economy;
Amendment 17 #
Draft opinion Paragraph 2 b (new) 2b. Stresses that policies on remuneration whose purpose is sound and sustainable business management have not only an ethical rationale but also a specifically economic rationale, as such policies directly affect the preservation of the assets and the development prospects of the undertakings themselves, and of the economy in general, the preservation of employment and the creation of additional employment – as required by correct and effective corporate social responsibility;
Amendment 18 #
Draft opinion Paragraph 3 3. Stresses the need for proportionality of remuneration within companies by linking changes in the overall remuneration and pensions of directors to those of staff and by discouraging excessive risk-taking, and, for reasons of social justice, wishes to see the salaries, bonuses and pensions of the directors of companies receiving aid from the Member States or from the European Union capped and subject to high and progressive taxation; calls, therefore, for a European plan to combat tax havens to be devised in order to flesh out the intentions announced by the G20 in London and Pittsburgh;
Amendment 19 #
Draft opinion Paragraph 3 3. Stresses the need for proportionality of remuneration within companies by linking changes in the overall remuneration and
Amendment 2 #
Draft opinion Recital A A. whereas the European Union and the rest of the world are experiencing the severest economic crisis in the last 60 years, the real economy is in its worst recession of that period and difficult employment conditions are anticipated despite a relative upturn in the economy,
Amendment 20 #
Draft opinion Paragraph 3 3. Stresses the need for proportionality of remuneration within companies by linking changes in the overall remuneration and pensions of directors to those of staff and by discouraging excessive risk-taking, and, for reasons of social justice, wishes to see the salaries, bonuses and pensions of the directors of companies receiving aid from the Member States or from the European Union capped a
Amendment 21 #
Draft opinion Paragraph 3 3. Stresses the need for proportionality of remuneration within companies by linking changes in the overall remuneration and pensions of directors to those of staff and by discouraging excessive risk-taking, and, for reasons of social justice, wishes to see the salaries, bonuses and pensions of the directors of companies receiving aid from the Member States or from the European Union capped and made subject to
Amendment 22 #
Draft opinion Paragraph 3 3. Stresses the need for proportionality of remuneration within companies by linking changes in the overall remuneration and pensions of directors to those of staff and by discouraging excessive risk-taking, and, for reasons of social justice, wishes to see the salaries, bonuses and pensions of the directors of companies receiving aid from the Member States or from the European Union capped and inappropriate salaries, bonuses and inappropriate severance pay, as a matter of absolute principle, subject to high and progressive taxation;
Amendment 23 #
Draft opinion Paragraph 3 3. Stresses the need for proportionality of remuneration within companies by linking changes in the overall remuneration and pensions of directors to those of staff and by discouraging excessive risk-taking, and, for reasons of social justice, wishes to see the salaries, bonuses and pensions of the directors of companies receiving aid from the Member States or from the European Union capped
Amendment 24 #
Draft opinion Paragraph 3 3. Stresses the need for proportionality of remuneration within companies by linking changes in the overall remuneration and pensions of directors to those of staff and by discouraging excessive risk-taking, and, for reasons of social justice, wishes to see the salaries, bonuses, golden parachutes, stock options and pensions of the directors of companies receiving aid from the Member States or from the European Union capped and subject to high and progressive taxation;
Amendment 25 #
Draft opinion Paragraph 3 a (new) 3a. Recalls the particular social responsibility of undertakings; considers that, in the light of this, a remuneration policy must form part of a multiannual framework covering a minimum of three years, in order to assess the social impact of the decisions taken and not to limit the assessment and setting of remuneration to purely economic criteria;
Amendment 26 #
Draft opinion Paragraph 3 a (new) 3a. Is convinced that, for the purpose of defining policies on the remuneration of management and by subsequently assessing these policies in relation to the management and development of the undertaking, it is necessary also to consider non-financial criteria, such as the attainment of objectives based on social and environmental responsibility, to be assessed over a sufficiently long period to be significant; stresses that the management of undertakings and policies on remuneration must respect and promote the principles enshrined in the European Treaties and directives concerning equal pay and treatment for women and men;
Amendment 27 #
Draft opinion Paragraph 3 a (new) 3a. Calls for a European reference framework to be established to harmonise practices with regard to remuneration and to prevent any distortion of competition between European financial centres;
Amendment 28 #
Draft opinion Paragraph 3 b (new) 3b. Calls for the implementation of the this reference framework to be monitored using precise indicators and a 'naming and shaming' procedure;
Amendment 29 #
Draft opinion Paragraph 4 4. Calls, in the light of cases such as that of Dell Ireland, for the European Court of Auditors to draw up a diagnostic review of the use of EU aid
Amendment 3 #
Draft opinion Recital B B. whereas profits generated in the financial sector have been disconnected
Amendment 30 #
Draft opinion Paragraph 4 Amendment 31 #
Draft opinion Paragraph 5 5. Endorses the Commission’s proposal to amend Directive 2006/49/EC1 on capital requirements to make the above-mentioned principles binding on banks and investment companies by making them subject to prudential supervision and by
Amendment 32 #
Draft opinion Paragraph 5 a (new) 5a. Reaffirms the need to penalise all forms of discrimination in undertakings, particularly in the definition of wage policies, career development and the process of recruiting senior management;
Amendment 33 #
Draft opinion Paragraph 6 6. Calls for new national supervisory authorities to be giving binding powers to ensure compliance with
Amendment 34 #
Draft opinion Paragraph 6 6. Calls for national supervisory authorities to be giving binding powers to ensure compliance with these principles, and for aid to be subject to commitments on jobs, equality of wages between men and women, training and working conditions;
Amendment 35 #
Draft opinion Paragraph 6 6. Calls for national supervisory authorities to be giving binding powers to ensure compliance with these principles, and for aid to be subject to commitments on jobs, training and working conditions and to practical steps taken in these directions;
Amendment 36 #
Draft opinion Paragraph 6 a (new) 6a. Recalls that, during the process of economic renewal, in addition to supporting the real economy, measures for the protection of jobs, training and working conditions are of major importance and should be taken into account by all stakeholders;
Amendment 37 #
Draft opinion Paragraph 7 7. Draws attention to the importance of ensuring that the regulation of financial incentives and remuneration structures in this sector does not adversely affect trade union organisations’ right to collective bargaining;
Amendment 38 #
Draft opinion Paragraph 7 7. Draws attention to the importance of ensuring that the regulation of financial incentives and remuneration structures in th
Amendment 39 #
Draft opinion Paragraph 8 8. Calls for complete transparency for employees and citizens with regard to remuneration policies for directors and a right to information, supervision and consultation for employees and their trade union organisations through works councils and group works councils; to this end, where groups comprise a number of entities, calls for these supervisory and employee consultation structures to have access to the balance sheets of all the financial companies and other holdings of the group, so that they can gain an adequate overview of the group;
Amendment 4 #
Draft opinion Recital B B. whereas profits generated in the financial sector have been disconnected from economic growth, with disproportionately high remunerations, based
Amendment 40 #
Draft opinion Paragraph 8 8. Calls for complete transparency for employees and citizens with regard to remuneration policies for directors and a right to information, supervision and consultation for employees and their trade union organisations through works councils and group works councils; considers that company councils on pay can play a useful role in terms of transparency, information and disclosure of management pay policies, with the aim of linking such policies to corporate investment decisions which protect employment and the working conditions of employees;
Amendment 41 #
Draft opinion Paragraph 8 8. Calls for complete transparency
Amendment 42 #
Draft opinion Paragraph 9 9. Calls for e
Amendment 43 #
Draft opinion Paragraph 9 a (new) 9a. Calls for encouragement for more women to be assigned to management posts by means of a Commission recommendation to introduce a compulsory quota system for the filling of posts on the decision-making bodies of undertakings, posts in other bodies and posts in general;
Amendment 44 #
Draft opinion Paragraph 9 a (new) 9a. Calls for each Member State to submit an annual report to the Commission and Parliament on the development of ethical business management practices within its territory;
Amendment 45 #
Draft opinion Paragraph 9 a (new) 9a. Proposes that the national supervisory authorities, assessing the independence of members of the managing bodies of undertakings more strictly, should devise more effective anti-corruption schemes, the establishment of which may not only be conducive to more ethical business management practices but also increase the economic success of undertakings;
Amendment 46 #
Draft opinion Paragraph 9 b (new) Amendment 5 #
Draft opinion Recital B B. whereas profits generated in the financial sector have been disconnected from economic growth, with disproportionately high remunerations, based solely on short-term shareholder profits, creating immoral risks with employees’, savers’ and investors’ money, which was diverted from its purpose of long-term investment,
Amendment 6 #
Draft opinion Recital B B. whereas profits generated in the financial sector have been disconnected from
Amendment 7 #
Draft opinion Recital B B. whereas profits generated in the financial sector have been disconnected from economic
Amendment 8 #
Draft opinion Recital D D. whereas, despite being largely responsible for the current crisis, the bonus system has been maintained
Amendment 9 #
Draft opinion Recital D D. whereas,
source: PE-438.450
2010/04/13
JURI
47 amendments...
Amendment 1 #
Motion for a resolution Citation 6 a (new) – having regard to the INI report of the Economic and Monetary Affairs Committee on remuneration of directors of listed companies and remuneration policies in the financial services sector (2010/2009 (INI)),
Amendment 10 #
Motion for a resolution Recital H H. whereas in the context of remuneration several points need to be considered, such as (i) remuneration schemes, including their structure, transparency and symmetry and the link between remuneration and incentive, (ii) the process of determining the remuneration schemes, including the definition of actors, roles and responsibilities, (iii) control over remuneration schemes, with particular attention given to shareholders, (iv) total remuneration including salaries and pensions,
Amendment 11 #
Motion for a resolution Recital H H. whereas in the context of remuneration several points need to be considered, such as (i) remuneration schemes, including their structure, transparency and symmetry and the link between remuneration and incentive, (ii) the process of determining the remuneration schemes, including the definition of actors, roles and responsibilities, (iii) control over remuneration schemes, with particular attention given to
Amendment 12 #
Motion for a resolution Recital I I. whereas some aspects of principles contained in the recommendations are
Amendment 13 #
Motion for a resolution Recital J J. whereas, given the recurring difficulties in defining the link between pay and performance, the focus should be on the effectiveness of the process in which remuneration policy is determined and on transparency, both of which should be based on sound governance defined and assessed by reference to an appropriate time-frame oriented towards the medium to long term so as to avert dangerous, unsustainable risk management policies geared to the short term (if not the very short term), with defined, separated roles and the responsibilities of those involved,
Amendment 14 #
Motion for a resolution Recital J a (new) Ja. whereas there should be benchmarking of remuneration practises within the EU to allow for transparency and effective comparison between companies; whereas a common international structure should be promoted for disclosure of the number of individuals in pay brackets from €1 million upwards inclusive of salary, bonus and pension arrangements,
Amendment 15 #
Motion for a resolution Recital J b (new) Jb. whereas there needs to be greater alignment of incentives in remuneration policy; such methods should include restrictions on variable remuneration, deferral of bonus payments, the use of malus or clawbacks, and payment of bonuses and pension arrangements in the form of non-cash instruments such as shares or subordinated debt of the company,
Amendment 16 #
Motion for a resolution Recital N N. whereas disclosure of the policy on directors" remuneration in a clear and easily understandable way should in principle benefit the process of taking decisions on remuneration policy, in particular by shareholders; such disclosure could include detailed disclosure in the annual accounts or in the remuneration report of the total remuneration and other benefits granted to individual directors; whereas in financial companies such disclosure should apply to those employees whose professional activities have a material impact on the risk profile of the company including senior management, risk-takers, control functions and any employee receiving total remuneration that takes them into the same remuneration bracket as these categories of staff,
Amendment 17 #
Motion for a resolution Recital N a (new) Na. whereas in financial companies, Member State supervisors should be able to conduct thorough and intrusive checks on senior management, risk-takers and control functions, whose professional activities have a material impact on the risk profile of credit institutions and other financial companies, before they can take up their roles in order to ensure their suitability; whereas such procedures should also apply to staff whose total remuneration, including pension provisions, takes them into the same bracket as these categories as staff; supervisors should be notified whenever a credit institution initiates any malus or clawback in order to inform such interviews,
Amendment 18 #
Motion for a resolution Recital O O. whereas the company’s objective should
Amendment 19 #
Motion for a resolution Recital O a (new) Oa. whereas it falls within the legal remit of company boards to establish criteria for management remuneration and fix the levels of such remuneration and, in many Member States, the involvement of employees’ representatives means that social considerations are taken into account here,
Amendment 2 #
Motion for a resolution Recital A A. whereas, irrespective of the type of company or the sector in which it operates, a number of questions related to companies’ management are important in the general context of the deontology of business conduct, such as the duty of care, transparency,
Amendment 20 #
Motion for a resolution Recital O a (new) (Oa) whereas, especially in the listed companies, the non-participation of the shareholders is large, the electronic vote should be encouraged in the general assemblies of the shareholders,
Amendment 21 #
Motion for a resolution Recital Q Q. whereas the aim should be to create competent boards of directors and supervisory boards capable of objective and independent judgment; whereas boards’ effectiveness and efficiency should be evaluated,
Amendment 22 #
Motion for a resolution Recital Q a (new) Qa. whereas, the acknowledged weaknesses of the current system of corporate governance, a percentage ( for ex. 1/3) of the directors ( members of the board) should be professionals, remunerated, responsible and subordinated only to the shareholders. The responsibility and subordination is to be filtered through the professional expertise,
Amendment 23 #
Motion for a resolution Recital T T. whereas recommendations issued by the Commission in respect of listed companies
Amendment 24 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 1 a (new) 1a. Calls for encouragement for more women to be assigned to management posts by means of a Commission recommendation to introduce a compulsory quota system for the filling of posts on company decision-making bodies, posts in other bodies and posts in general;
Amendment 25 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 2 2. Points out that the soft law approach is however not satisfactory; calls, therefore, for national supervisory authorities to be granted binding powers to enforce the principles of sound financial management;
Amendment 26 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 2 a (new) 2a. Maintains that the EU needs an industrial, social, and environmental model geared to the long term, consistent with the general interest – of companies, shareholders, and workers – and with a new financial architecture based on a system of prudential and deontological rules and on national and European supervisory authorities with binding powers; also believes that the financial sector should meet the needs of the real economy, help to promote sustainable growth, and display the greatest possible degree of social responsibility;
Amendment 27 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 2 b (new) 2b. Maintains that remuneration policies making for sound, sustainable governance are necessary not just for deontological reasons, but also for eminently economic reasons, given that policies of this kind have a direct impact in terms of assets and the development outlook for companies themselves as well as the economy in general, and of preserving and creating higher levels of employment;
Amendment 28 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 3 a (new) 3a. Considers that the provisions being mentioned in connection with remuneration polices for directors of banks and credit institutions have to be more than mere recommendations and must hence take the form of binding measures linked to a system of oversight and penalties, the object being to ensure that the variable component of remuneration – bonuses, stock options, and incentives – does not drive companies to adopt over-risky investment and management policies which pay no heed to the fallout for the real economy;
Amendment 29 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 3 a (new) 3a. Calls for greater account to be taken of the requirement that differences in remuneration within companies should be proportionate by linking increases in managers' pay and pensions as a whole to those of ordinary employees and discouraging excessive risk-taking; takes the view that, for reasons of social justice and economic sustainability, restrictions must be imposed on the composition, structure and level of the salaries, bonuses, golden handshakes, stock options and pensions of the managers of listed companies and companies which are partly public-owned and/or benefit from assistance from Member States or the European Union and they must be subject to high rates of progressive taxation, with a view to contributing to the funding of social protection measures and public services; calls, in that connection, for a European plan to combat tax havens to be developed in order to put into practice the proposals announced at the G20 summits in London and Pittsburgh;
Amendment 3 #
Motion for a resolution Recital A A. whereas, irrespective of the type of company or the sector in which it operates, a number of questions related to companies’ management are important in the general context of the deontology of business conduct, such as the duty of care, transparency, risk management, board practices or the exercise of shareholders’ rights; whereas the recent financial crisis showed that those questions need to be considered in the light of preserving financial stability and continuously analysed in order to help find solutions allowing companies to face current challenges,
Amendment 30 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 3 b (new) 3b. Calls for due account to be taken of the need for proportionality in remuneration within companies by linking the trend in managers’ remuneration and pensions as a whole to employees’ remuneration and pensions and company performance, discouraging excessive risk-taking; believes that, for reasons of social justice and economic sustainability, the make-up, structure, and level of the remuneration and pensions paid to managers of listed companies and companies which are partly public-owned and/or are being supported by Member States or the EU should satisfy binding criteria laid down by the proper national and European authorities and should be subject to progressive taxation in the appropriate form;
Amendment 31 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 3 b (new) 3b. Is convinced that, in the context of the definition of remuneration policies for company directors and the subsequent assessment of those policies in the light of the management and development of the company concerned, due account must also be taken of non-financial criteria, such as meeting social and environmental responsibility objectives; suggests three years as the minimum period needed to make such assessments meaningful; emphasises that corporate management and remuneration policies must comply with and foster the principles of wage parity and equal treatment of women and men established by the Treaties and by EU directives;
Amendment 32 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 3 c (new) 3c. Supports, in keeping with the Commission recommendation of 30 April 2009, the imposition of a ceiling on severance payments for company managers or even of a ban on such payments if a manager's contract has been terminated on the grounds of the company's poor performance;
Amendment 33 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 4 4. Sees the need for further European legislative action in order to solve the problem of different national remuneration rules for companies in cases where managers move from one Member State to another within a (holding) company or from one company to another company in a different Member State, or when companies make use of freedom of movement within the internal market, for example, by way of cross-
Amendment 34 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 4 a (new) 4a. Calls for the necessary steps to be taken to bring transparency to bear on the remuneration policies applied to company directors and make them comprehensible to shareholders and workers; considers it important that workers and trade unions have the right to be informed and consulted through works councils and group works councils; considers that company-level remuneration committees could play a useful role in terms of transparency, information, and bringing policies on managers’ remuneration to wider notice, thereby enabling them to be linked to investment decisions aimed at promoting operational development, employment, and better working conditions for employees;
Amendment 35 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 4 a (new) 4a. Sees the European company as a suitable platform for best practices with a view to embedding ethical principles in the way that transnational companies are directed and putting such principles into practical application;
Amendment 36 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 4 b (new) 4b. Considers it important to emphasise the general social responsibility of company boards for the sustainable, longer-term development of firms based in an EU Member State, and to expect it as a duty of such boards that they structure company directors’ remuneration in a way which reflects that aim and which is transparent to the European public;
Amendment 37 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 5 5. Urges the Commission to
Amendment 38 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 5 a (new) 5a. Endorses the principles which the Commission put forward in its recommendations of 30 April 2009 concerning, firstly, remuneration regimes and governance arrangements with regard to the remuneration of the directors and managers of listed companies, and, secondly, on remuneration regimes and the process of drafting and implementing remuneration policy (governance), the transparency of remuneration policy and prudential supervision (surveillance) in the financial sector, but emphasises that these recommendations have not been put into practice satisfactorily by the Member States; calls, therefore, for these recommendations to be incorporated into the process of revising Directive 2006/49/EC1 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 June 2006 on the capital adequacy of investment firms and credit institutions; 1 OJ L 177, 30.6.2006, p. 201.
Amendment 39 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 5 a (new) 5a. Calls on the Commission and Member States to promote a common international structure for disclosure of the number of individuals in pay brackets from €1 million upwards including the main elements of salary, bonus, long-term award and pension contribution;
Amendment 4 #
Motion for a resolution Recital A A. whereas, irrespective of the type of company or the sector in which it operates, a number of questions related to companies’ management are important in the general context of the deontology of business conduct, such as the duty of care, transparency, risk management, board of directors or supervisory board practices or the exercise of shareholders’ rights; whereas the recent financial crisis showed that those questions need to be
Amendment 40 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 5 a (new) 5a. Is convinced that for the purpose of framing policies on directors’ remuneration and subsequently assessing them from the point of view of governance and company development, non-financial criteria also need to be taken into account, one example being the extent to which a company has attained its objectives as regards social and environmental responsibility, and that the period to be covered in such cases has to be sufficiently long to allow meaningful assessment;
Amendment 41 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 5 b (new) 5b. Maintains that governance and remuneration policies have to conform to and promote the principles laid down in the Treaties and European directives regarding equal pay and equal treatment of women and men;
Amendment 42 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 5 b (new) 5b. Endorses the Commission's proposal to amend Directive 2006/49/EC in order to make the principles referred to above binding on banks and investment firms by making them subject to prudential supervision and ensuring that the total amount of the variable components of remuneration does not limit their ability to increase their capital; emphasises that strengthened European regulation should apply to the whole financial sector, including insurance companies and alternative investment funds (such as hedge funds and private equity funds);
Amendment 43 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 6 6. Invites the Commission to encourage and support effective implementation of measures adopted at EU level , focusing primarily on cross border companies, and to fulfil its commitment to submit an evaluation report on the application of both recommendations by Member States; in this context calls upon the Commission to include in the evaluation report's conclusions a schedule of appropriate legislative and non-legislative activities
Amendment 44 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 7 Amendment 45 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 9 a (new) 9a. Stresses that, in the case of economic crimes, it should be possible to bring criminal proceedings against a company’s board of directors.
Amendment 46 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 10 10.
Amendment 47 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 10 a (new) 10a. Endorses the principles introduced by the Commission in its recommendations of 30 April 2009, but observes that those recommendations – particularly concerning the sensitive topic of remuneration of managers – are only being implemented in an unsatisfactory manner by the Member States; calls for the principles which the Commission introduced in its recommendations of 30 April 2009 on, first, the structure and governance of the remuneration of directors of listed companies and, second, the structure of remuneration, the process of design and operation of remuneration policy (governance), transparency of remuneration policy and supervisory review (supervision) in the financial sector to be made binding by means of an EU regulation;
Amendment 5 #
Motion for a resolution Recital B B. whereas the crisis also showed close links between risk management and remuneration policy and the importance of the latter in the mechanisms governing the proper functioning of companies; for this reason risk management should be duly taken into account when devising remuneration policy
Amendment 6 #
Motion for a resolution Recital C C. whereas companies in all sectors share a number of classes of risk, although some types of risk are sector-specific (such as risks facing companies active in the financial sector); whereas failure of effective risk management
Amendment 7 #
Motion for a resolution Recital C C. whereas companies in all sectors share a number of classes of risk, although some types of risk are sector-specific (such as risks facing companies active in the financial sector); whereas failure of effective risk management resulting from inadequate monitoring of compliance with supervision rules was one of the most striking features of the recent financial crisis,
Amendment 8 #
Motion for a resolution Recital E E. whereas any solution should ensure that, when the risk is taken, it accords with the purpose of the business and the strategy of the company with due regard to effective risk management; effective risk management should be regarded as one of the most important elements of good corporate governance in all companies,
Amendment 9 #
Motion for a resolution Recital G G. whereas the degree of recommendation varies, depending on
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