2014/2248(INI) | [ParlTrack]

Draft opinion
Paragraph 1 – point 1 (new)

(1) proposes the principle of a forced reduction in the EU budget of 3% each year;

Amendment 11 #

Draft opinion
Paragraph 1 – point 2 (new)

(2) proposes the principle of a reduction in the EU wage bill of 3% per year;

Amendment 12 #

Draft opinion
Paragraph 1 – point 3 (new)

(3) proposes the principle of a reduction in operating expenditure of 4% per year;

Amendment 13 #

Draft opinion
Paragraph 1 – point 4 (new)

(4) proposes the principle of an annual assessment of the various departments within each EU body, so as to make it possible to cut the wage bill of departments to which too many resources are allocated;

Amendment 14 #

Draft opinion
Paragraph 1 – point 5 (new)

(5) takes the view that the various reforms to the EU’s economic and budgetary framework have given rise to complications that mean that the system is not viable;

Amendment 15 #

Draft opinion
Paragraph 1 – point 6 (new)

(6) takes the view, in particular, that the European Semester, the six-pack and the two-pack have proven to be useless;

Amendment 16 #

Draft opinion
Paragraph 1 – point 7 (new)

(7) considers, furthermore, that the European Semester, the six-pack and the two-pack are anti-democratic instruments;

Amendment 17 #

Draft opinion
Paragraph 1 – point 8 (new)

(8) therefore calls for them to be scrapped;

Amendment 18 #

Draft opinion
Paragraph 1 – point 9 (new)

(9) takes the view that the proposal made in Mr Verhofstadt’s report to merge the deficit and debt procedures, the macroeconomic imbalance procedure and the country-specific recommendations into a single ‘convergence code’ of a legally binding nature is clear example of the doctrine according to which ‘if Communism didn’t work it’s because we needed more of it’;

Amendment 19 #

Draft opinion
Paragraph 1 – point 10 (new)

(10) therefore demands that this ridiculous idea be scrapped;

Amendment 2 #

Isabelle THOMAS

Draft opinion
Paragraph 1

1. Believes that for the Union to meet the objectives of the Europe 2020 strategy and to address current and new challenges effectively, it needs to be granted a budget that is commensurate with the mission it is called on to accomplish; considers that the current level of the EU budget, which corresponds to 1 % of the EU-28 GDP, is not sufficient to achieve these goals; considers, therefore, as Parliament pointed out in its resolution of 6 July 2016 entitled ‘Preparation of the post-electoral revision of the MFF 2014-2020: Parliament’s input ahead of the Commission’s proposal’, an ambitious review/revision of the current multiannual financial framework is absolutely indispensable;

Amendment 20 #

Draft opinion
Paragraph 1 – point 11 (new)

(11) takes the view that the proposal to appoint a ‘European finance minister’ is a dangerous one;

Amendment 21 #

Draft opinion
Paragraph 1 – point 12 (new)

(12) takes the view, furthermore, that the proposal is not politically acceptable for the public;

Amendment 22 #

Draft opinion
Paragraph 1 – point 13 (new)

(13) takes the view, therefore, that it is anti-democratic and belongs in the realm of technocratic fantasy;

Amendment 23 #

Draft opinion
Paragraph 1 – point 14 (new)

(14) points out that the Nation is the only legitimate framework for the exercise of democracy;

Amendment 24 #

Draft opinion
Paragraph 1 a (new)

1a. Takes the view that the EU largely functions by means of fraud, corruption and wastefulness, and that lavish spending is rife;

Amendment 25 #

Draft opinion
Paragraph 1 b (new)

1b. Takes the view that the EU has provided sufficient evidence of the harm it does for the conclusion to be drawn that it should be scrapped;

Amendment 26 #

Draft opinion
Paragraph 2

2. Is convinced that the EU budget needs to be ~~endowed with a system of genuine own resources~~cut as much as possible, with simplicity, fairness and transparency as guiding principles; considers that such a system should reduce the share of GNI contributions to the EU budget with a view to abandoning the ‘juste retour’ approach of Member States; insists, in this context, on the phasing-out of all forms of rebates;

Amendment 27 #

Draft opinion
Paragraph 2

2. Is convinced that the EU budget ~~needs to~~should under no circumstances be endowed with a system of genuine own resources, with simplicity, fairness and transparency as guiding principles; considers that such a system should reduce the share of GNI contributions to the EU budget with a view to abandoning the ‘juste retour’ approach of Member States; insists, in this context, on the phasing-out of all forms of rebates; considers that the GNI contributions should be cut; insists, in this context, on gradual but drastic reduction of the EU budget;

Amendment 28 #

Daniele VIOTTI

Draft opinion
Paragraph 2

2. Is convinced that the EU budget needs to be endowed with a system of genuine own resources, with simplicity, fairness and transparency as guiding principles; considers of primary importance the work of the High Level Group on Own Resources and expects from it timely, effective and ambitious proposals; considers that such a system should reduce the share of GNI contributions to the EU budget with a view to abandoning the ‘juste retour’ approach of Member States; insists, in this context, on the phasing-out of all forms of rebates;

Amendment 29 #

Inese VAIDERE

Draft opinion
Paragraph 2

2. Is convinced that the EU budget needs to be endowed with a system of genuine own resources, with simplicity, fairness and transparency as guiding principles; considers that such a system should reduce the share of GNI contributions to the EU budget with a view to abandoning the ‘juste retour’ approach of Member States; insists, in this context, on the phasing-out of all forms of rebates; while stresses that the main focus should be on the expenditure to ensure that all expenditure is covered by revenue;

Amendment 3 #

Draft opinion
Paragraph 1

1. Believes that for the Union to meet the objectives of the Europe 2020 strategy and to address current and new challenges effectively, it needs to be granted a budget that is commensurate with the mission it is called on to accomplish; considers that the current level of the EU budget, which corresponds to 1 % of the EU-28 GDP, is not sufficient to achieve these goals; considers that this reform - together with assignment to Parliament of full powers of legislative initiative - is essential for the substantial enhancement of the democratic effectiveness of the EU;

Amendment 30 #

Draft opinion
Paragraph 2

2. Is convinced that the EU budget needs to be endowed with a system of genuine own resources, with simplicity, fairness and transparency as guiding principles; considers that such a system should reduce the share of GNIRejects therefore the measures proposed or advocated in the draft report to address the crisis in the EU as a further coentr~~ibutions to the EU budget with a view to abandoning the ‘juste reto~~alisation of the EU with an independent EU government, an EU Finance Minister, an independent eur’o a~~pproach of Member States; insists, in this context, on the phasing-out of all forms of rebat~~rea budget (a ‘fiscal capacity for the euro area’), a Banking Union and a redemption fund for euro area countries;

Amendment 31 #

Draft opinion
Paragraph 2

2. Is convinced that the EU budget needs to be endowed with a system of genuine own resources, with simplicity, fairness and transparency as guiding principles; considers that such a system should reduce the share of GNI contributions to the EU budget with a view to abandoning the ‘juste retour’ approach of Member States; ~~insists, in this context, on the phasing-out of all forms of rebates;~~

Amendment 32 #

Charles GOERENS

Draft opinion
Paragraph 3

Amendment 33 #

Draft opinion
Paragraph 3

3. Underlines the need for the EU budget to be simple, clear and easily understood by EU citizens, and to be based on a structure that allows it to be compared and coordinated with national budgets; considers that these should be underpinning principles for both the expenditure and revenue sides of the EU budget; believes it important — in the spirit of the Lisbon Treaty — to involve national parliaments in strategic EU budget discussions through joint meetings with their respective parliamentary committees on presentation of the budget by the Commission;

Amendment 34 #

Draft opinion
Paragraph 3

3. Underlines the need for the EU budget to be simple, clear and easily understood by EU citizens~~, and to be based on a structure that allows it to be compared and coordinated with national budgets~~; considers that these should be underpinning principles for both the expenditure and revenue sides of the EU budget;

Amendment 35 #

Draft opinion
Paragraph 3

3. Underlines the need for the EU budget to be simple, clear and easily understood by EU citizens, and to be based on a structure that allows it to be compared and coordinated with national budgets; ~~considers that these should be underpinning principles for both the expenditure and revenue sides of~~emphasises, in particular, that the Member States should themselves designate the GNI contributions in the EUir budgets;

Amendment 36 #

Draft opinion
Paragraph 3

3. Underlines the need for the EU budget to be simple, clear and easily understood by EU citizens, and to be based on a structure that allows it to be compared ~~and coordinated~~ with national budgets; considers that these should be underpinning principles for both the expenditure and revenue sides of the EU budget;

Amendment 37 #

Draft opinion
Paragraph 3 a (new)

3a. Stresses that the current challenges of the EU can be dealt with well enough with the present ceiling of the EU budget, provided that the corresponding appropriations are used in an efficient and targeted way in accordance with the requirements of professional project management, such as programme and project relevance, measurability of objectives, sustainability and good cost-benefit ratio;

Amendment 38 #

Victor NEGRESCU

Draft opinion
Paragraph 3 a (new)

3a. Calls for an information campaign to ensure that citizens across Europe are better informed with regard to the EU Budget, thus they will be aware of how the money is being spent and also aware of the budget changes that might have an impact on them;

Amendment 39 #

Draft opinion
Paragraph 3 a (new)

3a. Recalls the numerous pronouncements in favour of a single seat for the European Parliament, given the symbolic value of such a move and the actual savings it would achieve;

Amendment 4 #

Draft opinion
Paragraph 1

1. ~~Believ~~Notes that for the Union to meet the objectives of the Europe 2020 strategy and to address current and new challenges effectively, it needs to be granted a budget that is commensurate with the mission it is called on to accomplish; considers that the current level of the EU budget, which corresponds to 1 % of the EU-28 GDP, is not sufficient to achieve these goalthe EU’s current problems cannot be resolved either with a greater degree of centralisation and harmonisation of European structures or with yet more European taxpayers’ money, but only by a return to a United Europe of sovereign nation States whose political acts are guided by the European ideal of peace, the quest for freedom and prosperity and the obligation to provide for social security and governed in principle by the will of the citizen, as this will ensure the lasting competitiveness of the Member States;

Amendment 40 #

Victor NEGRESCU

Draft opinion
Paragraph 3 b (new)

3b. Calls for the further development and simplification of the Financial Transparency System so that people can gain easy access to information regarding the EU budget;

Amendment 41 #

Draft opinion
Paragraph 4

4. Considers that the multiannual financial framework should allow for maximum flexibility in order to respond to crises and evolving political priorities; ~~stresses, in this context, the need to make available in the budget all extraordinary revenue resulting from decommitments under the EU budget or competition fines;~~

Amendment 42 #

Daniele VIOTTI

Draft opinion
Paragraph 4

4. Considers that the multiannual financial framework should allow for maximum flexibility in order to respond to crises and evolving political priorities;, underlines therefore the importance of the 2014-2020 MFF mid - term revision and stresses, in this context, the need to make available in the budget all extraordinary revenue resulting from decommitments under the EU budget or competition fines;

Amendment 43 #

Inese VAIDERE

Draft opinion
Paragraph 4

4. Considers that the multiannual financial framework should allow for maximum flexibility in order to respond to crises and evolving political priorities; while stresses~~, in this context, the need to make available~~ the importance of ensuring the b~~udget all extraordinary revenue resulting from decommitment~~alance between the principle of long- term priorities uand~~er the EU budget or competition fin~~ new challenges;

Amendment 44 #

Draft opinion
Paragraph 4

4. Considers that the multiannual financial framework should not allow for ~~maximum~~any flexibility sin ~~order to~~ce the respondse to crises can~~d evolving political priorities~~ be triggered within the funds established for this purpose; stresses, in this context, the need ~~to make available in the budge~~ensure that all extraordinary revenue resulting from decommitments under the EU budget or competition fines flows back to the Member States;

Amendment 45 #

Draft opinion
Paragraph 4

4. Considers that ~~the multiannual financial framework should~~it is the national budgets that allow for maximum flexibility in order to respond as effectively as possible to crises and evolving political priorities; stresses, in this context, th~~e need to make available in the budget all extraordinary revenue resulting from decommitments under the EU budget or competition fine~~at the restrictions imposed on certain States have had a detrimental effect, especially as regards the management of the migration crisis;

Amendment 46 #

José Manuel FERNANDES

Draft opinion
Paragraph 4 a (new)

4a. Notes that the EU budget is often called to finance extraordinary needs or new political priorities that were not anticipated at the time of adoption of the multiannual financial framework; stresses, however, that EU commitments should be fully respected and that any new initiatives and needs should not be financed to the detriment of existing EU programmes and policies; considers that the MFF special instruments should be mobilised, as appropriate, for this purpose, and be counted over and above the MFF ceilings, both in commitment and payment appropriations;

Amendment 47 #

Draft opinion
Paragraph 5

5. Underlines the need to safeguard the principle of unity of the budget, and is concerned about the recent shift from the Community method to intergovernmental decision-making as observed in the setting-up of ad hoc satellite instruments outside the EU budget such as the Trust Funds; stresses the need to ensure parliamentary oversight over all EU expenditure.deleted

Amendment 48 #

Draft opinion
Paragraph 5

5. ~~Underlines the need to safeguard the principle of unity of the budget, and is concern~~Calls for the Community method to be phased about the recent shift from the Community method to intergovernmental decision-making as observed in the setting-up of ad hoc satellite instruments outside the EU budget such as the Trust Funds; stresses the need to ensure parliamentary oversight over all EU expenditure.and replaced by intergovernmental decision-making;

Amendment 49 #

Draft opinion
Paragraph 5

5. ~~Underlines the need to safeguard the principle of unity of the budget, and is concerned about~~Notes the recent shift from the Community method to intergovernmental decision-making as observed in the setting- up of ad hoc satellite instruments outside the EU budget such as the Trust Funds; stresses the need to ensure parliamentary oversight over all EU expenditure.

Amendment 5 #

Draft opinion
Paragraph 1

1. Believes that for the ~~Union~~Member States to meet the objectives of the Europe 2020 strategy and to address current and new challenges effectively, it needs to be granted a budget that is commensurate with the mission ~~it is~~they are called on to accomplish; ~~considers that the current level of the EU budget, which corresponds to 1 % of the EU-28 GDP, is not sufficient to achieve these goals;~~

Amendment 50 #

Marco ZANNI, Marco VALLI

Draft opinion
Paragraph 5

5. Underlines the need to safeguard the principle of unity of the budget, and is concerned a~~bout the recent shift from the Community method to intergovernmental decision-making as observed in~~t the setting-up of ad hoc satellite instruments outside the EU budget such as the Trust Funds; stresses the need to ensure effective parliamentary oversight over all EU expenditure.

Amendment 51 #

Daniele VIOTTI

Draft opinion
Paragraph 5

5. Underlines the need to safeguard the principle of unity of the budget, and is concerned about the recent shift from the Community method to intergovernmental decision-making as observed in the setting- up of ad hoc satellite instruments outside the EU budget such as the Trust Funds; stresses the need to ensure ~~parliamentary~~democratic oversight over all EU expenditure.

Amendment 52 #

José Manuel FERNANDES

Draft opinion
Paragraph 5 a (new)

5a. Stresses the need to apply the ordinary legislative procedure for the adoption of the MFF Regulation, in order to align it with the decision-making procedure of virtually all EU multiannual programmes, including their respective financial allocations, as well as the EU budget; believes that the consent procedure deprives the European Parliament of the decision-making power that it exercises over the adoption of the annual budgets, while the unanimity rule in the Council means that the agreement represents the lowest common denominator, based on the need to avoid the veto of a single Member State;

Amendment 53 #

Draft opinion
Paragraph 5 a (new)

5a. Takes the view that the 60th anniversary of the Treaties of Rome at the beginning of 2017 is the ideal occasion on which to relaunch a debate at the highest institutional level, focusing in particular on ways of increasing funding and enhancing growth mechanisms;

Amendment 6 #

Draft opinion
Paragraph 1

1. Believes that ~~for~~ the Union cannoto meet the objectives of the Europe 2020 strategy ~~and t~~or address current and new challenges effectively, ~~it needs to be granted a budget that is commensurate with the mission it is called on to accomplish;~~ considers that the current level of the EU budget, which corresponds to 1 % of the EU-28 GDP, is ~~not sufficient to achieve these goals~~excessive;

Amendment 7 #

Draft opinion
Paragraph 1

1. Believes that for the Union to meet the objectives of the Europe 2020 strategy and to address current and new challenges effectively, it needs to be granted a budget that is commensurate with the mission it is called on to accomplish; considers that the number of tasks transferred to the Union is excessive; considers that the current level of the EU budget, which corresponds to 1 % of the EU-28 GDP, is ~~not sufficient~~much too ~~achieve these goals~~high and must be reduced;

Amendment 8 #

Marco ZANNI, Marco VALLI

Draft opinion
Paragraph 1

1. Believes that for the Union to ~~meet the objectives of the Europe 2020 strategy and to~~ address current and new challenges effectively, it needs to ~~be granted a budget that is commensurate with the mission i~~focus on a number of priorities with clear added value for European citizens, in line with the resources at its ~~called on to accomplish~~disposal; considers that the current level of the EU budget, which corresponds to 1 % of the EU-28 GDP, ~~is not sufficient~~must be used as effectively as possible to achieve these goals;

Amendment 9 #

Victor NEGRESCU

Draft opinion
Paragraph 1

1. Believes that for the Union to meet the objectives of the Europe 2020 strategy and to address current and new challenges effectively, it needs to be granted a budget that is ~~commensur~~proportionate with the mission it is called on to accomplish; considers that the current level of the EU budget, which corresponds to 1 % of the EU-28 GDP, is not sufficient to achieve these goals;

source: 589.140

2016/09/13 CONT 31 amendments...

Amendment 1 #

Draft opinion
Recital B

B. whereas all EU institutions without exception ought to be transparent and fully accountable to the citizens of the EU as regards the funds entrusted to them as EU institutions;

Amendment 10 #

Draft opinion
Paragraph 5

5. Points out that effective supervision of the institutions’ and bodies’ implementation of the EU budget requires more effective cooperation with Parliament, as well as an annual follow-up document from all the institutions on the discharge recommendations of Parliament; regrets that the Council has not adhered to this procedure and considers this long-standing state of affairs to be unjustifiable and to undermine the reputation of the whole Union;

Amendment 11 #

Draft opinion
Paragraph 5

5. Points out that effective supervision of the institutions’ and bodies’ implementation of the EU budget requires cooperation with Parliament and full transparency regarding the use of funding, as well as an annual follow-up document from all the institutions on the discharge recommendations of Parliament; regrets that the Council has not adhered to this procedure;

Amendment 12 #

Draft opinion
Paragraph 5

5. Points out that effective supervision of the institutions’ and bodies’ implementation of the EU budget requires bona fide cooperation with Parliament, as well as an annual follow-up document from all the institutions on the discharge recommendations of Parliament; regrets that the Council hais not adhereding to this procedure;

Amendment 13 #

Draft opinion
Paragraph 6

6. Notes that the procedure of giving discharge separately to the individual EU institutions and bodies is a long-standing practice developed to guarantee transparency and democratic accountability towards EU taxpayers and is a means of verifying the relevance and transparency of the use of EU funding; underlines that this effectively guarantees Parliament’s right and duty to scrutinise the whole of the EU budget; recalls the Commission’s view, expressed in January 2014, that all institutions are fully part of the follow-up process to the observations made by Parliament in the discharge exercise and should cooperate to ensure the smooth functioning of the discharge procedure;

Amendment 14 #

Draft opinion
Paragraph 6

6. Notes that the procedure of giving discharge separately to the individual EU institutions and bodies is a long-standing practice developed to guarantee transparency and democratic accountability towards EU taxpayers; underlines that this effectively guarantees Parliament’s right and duty to scrutinise the whole of the EU budget; recalls the Commission’s view, expressed in January 2014, that all institutions without exception are fully part of the follow-up process to the observations made by Parliament in the discharge exercise and should unfailingly cooperate to ensure the smooth functioning of the discharge procedure;

Amendment 15 #

Draft opinion
Paragraph 7

7. In order to enable Parliament to take an informed decision on granting discharge, requires the institutions to provide Parliament with their annual activity reports and to give Parliament sufficient information in answers to to its questions during the discharge process;

Amendment 16 #

Draft opinion
Paragraph 7

7. In order to enable Parliament to take an informed decision on granting discharge, requires the institutions to provide Parliament directly with their annual activity reports and to give Parliament sufficient answers to its questions during the discharge process;

Amendment 17 #

Draft opinion
Paragraph 7

7. In order to enable Parliament to take an informed decision on granting discharge, requires the institutions to provide Parliament with their annual activity reports and to give Parliament ~~sufficient~~full answers to its questions during the discharge process;

Amendment 18 #

Draft opinion
Paragraph 8 a (new)

8a. Stresses that all Member States should be obliged to provide an annual declaration to account for its use of EU funds;

Amendment 19 #

Derek VAUGHAN

Draft opinion
Paragraph 9

9. Requests that the Financial Regulation be updated in order to clarify the objectives of the discharge procedure and ~~to clearly define the sanctions to be imposed for not respecting this procedure~~provide measures to ensure the discharge process is respected, including possible enforcement measures to ensure appropriate follow-up, such as the use of sanctions; highlights that this should be done in order to hold the EU institutions accountable with the aim of protecting the financial interests of EU citizens; stresses that there should be no exceptions;

Amendment 2 #

Draft opinion
Paragraph 1

1. Considers that Parliament’s powers of oversight and monitoring of EU budget implementation are key to ensuring an effective holding to account~~ability~~ of the institutions for the efficient use of EU funding and should therefore be reinforced;

Amendment 20 #

Draft opinion
Paragraph 9

9. Requests that the Financial Regulation be updated in order to clarify the objectives of the discharge procedure and to clearly define the sanctions to be imposed for not respecting this procedure and in the event of discharge not being granted; highlights that this should be done in order to hold the EU institutions accountable with the aim of protecting the financial interests of EU citizens; stresses that there ~~should~~will be no exceptions;

Amendment 21 #

Draft opinion
Paragraph 9

9. Requests that the Financial Regulation be updated in order to ~~clarify the objectives of the discharge procedure and to~~ clearly define the sanctions to be imposed for not respecting this procedure; ~~highlight~~stresses that this should be done in order to hold the EU institutions accountable with the aim of protecting the financial interests of EU citizens; stresses that there should be no exceptions;

Amendment 22 #

Ingeborg GRÄSSLE

Draft opinion
Paragraph 9

9. Requests that the Financial Regulation be ~~updat~~amended in order to clarify the objectives of the discharge procedure and to clearly define the sanctions to be imposed for not respecting this procedure; highlights that this should be done in order to hold the EU institutions accountable with the aim of protecting the financial interests of EU citizens; stresses that there should be no exceptions;

Amendment 23 #

Draft opinion
Paragraph 10

10. Acknowledges the crucial role of the Court of Auditors in ensuring better and smarter spending of the EU budget, in detecting cases of fraud, corruption and the unlawful use of EU funds, and in giving a professional opinion on how to better manage EU funding; recalls the importance of the Court’s role as a European public auditing authority;

Amendment 24 #

Draft opinion
Paragraph 10

10. Acknowledges the crucial role of the Court of Auditors in ensuring better, fairer and smarter spending of the EU budget; recalls the importance of the Court’s role as European public auditing authority;

Amendment 25 #

Draft opinion
Paragraph 10 a (new)

10a. Considers that in view of the important role played by the European Court of Auditors in auditing the collection and utilisation of EU funds, it is absolutely essential that the institutions take full account of its recommendations;

Amendment 26 #

Draft opinion
Paragraph 11

11. Notes that the Court’s composition and its appointment procedure are laid down in Articles 285 and 286 TFEU; considers that Parliament and the Council should be on an equal footing when appointing Members of the Court of Auditors, in order to ensure democratic legitimacy, transparency and the complete independence of those Members; calls for the Council to respect in full the decisions taken by Parliament subsequent to hearings of candidates nominated as Members of the Court of Auditors;

Amendment 27 #

Draft opinion
Paragraph 11

11. Notes that the Court’s composition and its appointment procedure are laid down in Articles 285 and 286 TFEU; considers that Parliament and the Council should be on an equal footing when appointing Members of the Court of Auditors, in order to ensure democratic legitimacy, transparency and the complete independence of those Members; calls for the Council to ~~respec~~accept the decisions taken by Parliament subsequent to hearings of candidates nominated as Members of the Court of Auditors;

Amendment 28 #

Draft opinion
Paragraph 12

12. ~~Deplores the fact~~Notes that certain appointment procedures have resulted in conflicts between Parliament and the Council on candidates; stresses that it is, as stipulated in the Treaty, Parliament’s duty to evaluate the nominees; emphasises that these conflicts might harm the good working relations of the Court with the aforementioned institutions and could possibly have serious negative consequences for the credibility, and hence the effectiveness, of the Court; is of the opinion that the Council should, in the spirit of good cooperation among the EU institutions, respect the decisions taken by Parliament subsequent to the hearings.

Amendment 29 #

Draft opinion
Paragraph 12

12. Deplores the fact that certain appointment procedures have resulted in conflicts between Parliament and the Council on candidates; stresses that it is, as stipulated in the Treaty, Parliament’s duty to evaluate the nominees; emphasises that these conflicts might harm the good working relations of the Court with the aforementioned institutions and could possibly have serious negative consequences for the credibility, and hence the effectiveness, of the Court; is of the opinion that the Council should, in the spirit of good cooperation among the EU institutions, ~~respec~~accept the decisions taken by Parliament subsequent to the hearings.

Amendment 3 #

Draft opinion
Paragraph 1

1. Considers that Parliament’s powers of oversight and monitoring of EU budget implementation are key to ensuring effective accountability of the institutions and should therefore be reinforced and extended immediately;

Amendment 30 #

Draft opinion
Paragraph 12 a (new)

12a. Recalls the numerous pronouncements in favour of a single seat for the European Parliament, given the symbolic value of such a move and the actual savings this would represent;

Amendment 31 #

Draft opinion
Paragraph 12 b (new)

12b. Takes the view that the 60th anniversary of the Treaties of Rome at the beginning of 2017 is the ideal occasion on which to relaunch a debate at the highest institutional level, focusing in particular on the more efficient use of funding and of democratic EU budget control mechanisms;

Amendment 4 #

Draft opinion
Paragraph 1 a (new)

1a. Emphasizes that any change of competences of one or more EU institutions, should go hand in hand with measures safeguarding the democratic and financial accountability of these institutions, and should, in particular, be accompanied by measures ensuring full budgetary control by the Parliament, whenever the financial interests of the Union are affected;

Amendment 5 #

Draft opinion
Paragraph 2

2. Notes the fact that the list of institutions defined in Article 13 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) differs from that stated in Article 2 of the Financial Regulation; considers that having different meanings for the same concept enshrined in EU legislation is misleading; and urges the Commission and Council to correct this anomaly;

Amendment 6 #

Ingeborg GRÄSSLE

Draft opinion
Paragraph 2

2. Notes the fact that the list of institutions defined in Article 13 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) differs from that stated in Article 2 of the Financial Regulation; considers that ~~having different meanings for the same concept enshrined in EU legislation is misleading~~the Financial Regulation already reflects current practice;

Amendment 7 #

Draft opinion
Paragraph 3

3. Finds that there are a few instances where the letter of the TFEU diverges from the practice and the spirit of the Treaty; is of the opinion that these incoherencies need to be corrected in line with the principles of democracy and transparency;

Amendment 8 #

Draft opinion
Paragraph 3 a (new)

3a. Deplores the current level of unused appropriations (RAL), which is a de facto breach of the spirit of Article 310 TFEU, while recognising the endemic nature of this problem;

Amendment 9 #

Draft opinion
Paragraph 4

4. Recalls that each of the institutions, as defined in Article 2(b) of the Financial Regulation, has the autonomy to implement its own section of the budget pursuant to Article 55 of the Financial Regulation; points out that such autonomy also entails a substantial level of responsibility regarding use of the funding allocated;

source: 589.243

2016/11/09 AFCO 688 amendments...

Amendment 1000 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 50

Amendment 1001 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 50

Amendment 1002 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 50

50. Proposes in this regard that the decision-making procedures for both own resources and the MFF should be shifted ~~from unanimity to qualified majority voting, thereby inducing real co-decision between the Council and Parliament on all budgetary matters~~back to unanimity; repeats its call, furthermore, to make the MFF coterminous with the mandates of Parliament and the European executive, and insists that the finances of all Union agencies should become an integral part of the EU budget;

Amendment 1003 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 50

50. Proposes in this regard that the decision-making procedures for both own resources and the MFF should ~~be shifted from unanimity to qualified majority voting, thereby inducing real co-decision between the Council and Parliament on all budgetary matters~~continue to be carried out on the basis of unanimity; repeats its call~~, furthermore,~~ to make the MFF coterminous with the mandates of Parliament and the European executive, and insists that the finances of all Union agencies should become an integral part of the EU budget;

Amendment 1004 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 50

50. Proposes in this regard that the decision-making procedures for both own resources and the MFF should be shifted from unanimity to qualified majority voting, thereby inducing real co-decision between the Council and Parliament on all budgetary matterso introduce co-decision between the Council and Parliament for own resources and the MFF and proposes that the decision- making procedure for the MFF should be shifted from unanimity to qualified majority voting in Council; repeats its call, furthermore, to make the MFF coterminous with the mandates of Parliament and the European executive, and insists that the finances of all Union agencies should become an integral part of the EU budget;

Amendment 1005 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 50 a (new)

50a. Calls for the introduction of a legal basis in order to establish Union agencies which may carry out specific executive and implementing functions conferred upon them by the European parliament and the Council in accordance with the ordinary legislative procedure;

Amendment 1006 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 50 a (new)

50a. Calls for abolishing the unanimity requirement in areas relating to respect for and protection and promotion of fundamental rights, such as equality and non-discrimination;

Amendment 1007 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 50 b (new)

50b. Calls on the next Convention to allow for the possibility for the Union to budget for a deficit which shall not exceed reference values to be specified in the Treaties, together with the establishment of proper mechanisms ensuring the avoidance of an excessive deficit at European level;

Amendment 1008 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 50 c (new)

50c. Calls for the establishment of a legal base which empowers the Union to raise own taxes as a proper own resource for the benefit of the Union budget;

Amendment 1009 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 52

Amendment 1010 #

Cristian Dan PREDA

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 52

Amendment 1011 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 52

Amendment 1012 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 52

Amendment 1013 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 52

52. Believes, finally, that the current Treaty ratification procedure is too rigid to befit such a supranational polity as the European Union; proposes allowing amendments to the Treaties to come into force if not by an EU-wide referendum then after being ratified by a qualified majority of four-fifths of the Member States, having obtained the consent of Parliament; correspondingly, once this threshold has been met, Member States which still decline to ratify the amended Treaty should decide, in accordance with their own constitutional requirements, whether to start the process of secession or to opt for an associate statuvery lengthy and linked with political uncertainties;

Amendment 1014 #

Kazimierz Michał UJAZDOWSKI, Ulrike TREBESIUS

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 52

Amendment 1015 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 52

52. Believes, finally, that the current Treaty ratification procedure is too rigid to befit such a supranational polity as the European Union; proposes allowing amendments to the Treaties to come into force if not by an EU-wide referendum then after being ratified by a qualified majority of four-fifths of the Member States, having obtained the consent of Parliament; correspondingly, once this threshold has been met, Member States which still decline to ratify the amended Treaty should decide, in accordance with their own constitutional requirements, whether to start the process of secession or to that respect for the Treaties, legitimacy and continuity of the Union require strict compliance with the Treaties revision procedure, as set oput ~~for an associate status~~in Article 48 TEU;

Amendment 1016 #

Morten MESSERSCHMIDT, Ulrike TREBESIUS

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 52

52. Believes, finally, that the current Treaty ratification procedure is too rigid to befit such a supranational polity as the European Union; proposes allowing amendments to the Treaties to come into force if not by an EU-wide referendum then after being ratified by a qualified majority of four-fifths of the Member States, having obtained the consent of Parliament; correspondingly, once this threshold has been met,Proposes allowing amendments to the Treaties to come into force by referendum at each state; notes that Member States which ~~still~~ decline to ratify the amended Treaty should decide, in accordance with their own constitutional requirements, whether to start the process of secession or to opt for an associate status;

Amendment 1017 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 52

52. Believes, finally, that the current Treaty ratification procedure is too rigid to befit such a supranational polity as the European Union; proposes allowing amendments to the Treaties to come into force if not by an EU-wide referendum then after being ratified by a qualified majority of four-fifths of the Member States, having obtained the consent of Parliament; correspondingly, once this threshold has been met, Member States which still decline to ratify the amended Treaty should decide, in accordance with their own constitutional requirements, whether to start the process of secession or to opt for an associate status that respect for the Treaties, its signatory Members’ legitimacy, State of Law, democratic will expressed through every referenda organized in Europe for more than 10 years, and viability of the Union itself require strict compliance with procedures for revision of the Treaties provided in Article 48-1 to 5 TEU;

Amendment 1018 #

Paulo RANGEL, Constance LE GRIP

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 52

Amendment 1019 #

Jo LEINEN, Sylvia-Yvonne KAUFMANN, Ramón JÁUREGUI ATONDO, Mercedes BRESSO

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 52

52. Believes~~, finally,~~ that the ~~current~~ Treaty ratification procedure ~~is too rigid to befit such a supranational polity as the European Union; proposes~~could be amended allowing ~~amendment~~changes to the Treaties to come into force ~~if not~~ by an EU-wide referendum then after being ratified by a qualified majority of four-fifths of the Member States, having obtained the consent of Parliament; correspondingly, once this threshold has been met, Member States which still decline to ratify the amended Treaty should decide, in accordance with their own constitutional requirements, whether to start the process of secession or to opt for an associate statuswith a double majority, i.e. a majority of the European electorate and a positive public vote within a majority of the Member States or after being ratified by a qualified majority of four-fifths of the Member States, having obtained the consent of Parliament;

Amendment 1020 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 52

52. Believes, ~~finally,~~ that the current Treaty ratification procedure ~~is too rigid to befit such a supranational polity as the European Un~~while rigid, is the best way for Treaty ratification; proposes allowing amendments to the Treaties to come into force if not by an EU-wide referendum ~~then after being ratified by a qualified majority of four-fifths of the~~s; believes that if Member States, having obtained the consent of Parliament; correspondingly, once this threshold has been met, Member States which still decline to ratify the amended Treaty should decide, in accordance with their own constitutional requithrough the democratic will of its people choose not to ratify a Treaty, then that decision must be respected as that Treaty will have failed in one of its main responsibilities, to repremsent~~s, whether to start the process of secession or to opt for an associate status~~ the views of the citizens of Europe;

Amendment 1021 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 52

52. Believes, finally, that the current Treaty ratification procedure is too rigid to befit such a supranational polity as the European Union; proposes allowing amendments to the Treaties to come into force if not by an EU-wide referendum then after being ratified by a qualified majority of four-fifths of the Member States, having obtained the consent of Parliament; correspondingly, once this threshold has been met, Member States which still decline to ratify the amended Treaty should decide, in accordance with their own constitutional requirements, whether to start the process of secession or to opt for an associate status; considers that the unanimity rule shall not be applied to the membership of new Member States.

Amendment 1022 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 52

52. Believes, finally, that the current Treaty ratification procedure is too rigid to befit such a supranational polity as the European Union; proposes allowing amendments to the Treaties to come into force if not by an EU-wide referendum then after being ratified by a qualified majority of four-fifths of the Member States, having obtained the consent of Parliament; notes that, once this threshold has been met, Member States which ~~still decline~~for governmental or popular reasons, decide not to ratify the amended Treaty should decide, in accordance with their own constitutional requirements, whether to start the process of secession or to opt for an associate status;

Amendment 1024 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 52

52. Believes, finally, that the current Treaty ratification procedure is t~~oo rigid to befit such a supranational polity as the European Union;~~he most democratic, but proposes allowing amendments to the Treaties to come into force if not by an EU-wide referendum then after being ratified by a qualified majority of four-fifths of the Member States, having obtained the consent of Parliament; correspondingly, once this threshold has been met, Member States which still decline to ratify the amended Treaty should decide, in accordance with their own constitutional requirements, whether to start the process of secession or to opt for an associate status;

Amendment 1025 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 52 a (new)

52a. Underlines that European policy and decision-making pertaining to it should be transparent and open to the scrutiny of anyone; stresses that public access to policy papers should not be subject to the arbitrary decisions of European institutions;

Amendment 1026 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 52 a (new)

52a. Believes that European citizens and enterprises inside current Member States that show a democratic will to keep being part of the EU shall be protected.

Amendment 1027 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 52 b (new)

52b. Notes that large companies currently have a disproportionately strong influence on European legislation; stresses that the influence of lobbyists should be transparent and that all interests, including those of for instance SMEs, the environment, trade unions and consumers, should be taken into equal account;

Amendment 1028 #

Kazimierz Michał UJAZDOWSKI, Ulrike TREBESIUS

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 52 b (new)

52b. Believes that a time of rising euroskepticism and anti-European populism, pro-European movements inside Member States are welcome, even if they challenge their national status-quo.

Amendment 1029 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 53

53. ~~Commits itself to playing a leading part in these important constitutional developments, and is determined to make its own proposals for~~Requests the Council and the European Commission to hold an interinstitutional debate that will initiate a process for enhancing the Union within the applicable Treaty frame~~ndment in a timely fashion~~work and evaluate the execution of tasks and competences in the context of Union legitimacy, efficiency and accountability;

Amendment 1030 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 53

53. Commits itself to playing a ~~leading~~constitutional part in these important constitutional developments, and is determined to make its own proposals for Treaty amendment in a timely fashion;

Amendment 1031 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 53 a (new)

53a. Underlines that primary law of the EU should be strictly limited to institutional provisions and should not deal with the content of policies; therefore parts three and five TFEU should no longer be integrated into the Treaties but rather be governed by framework laws;

Amendment 1032 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 53 b (new)

53b. Insists that the future Convention should have the greatest possible democratic legitimacy by also involving social partners, civil society and other stakeholders; reach its decisions in plenum according to full democratic rules; have adequate time for serious and thorough deliberation; operate with full transparency and have all its meetings open to the public;

Amendment 1033 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 54

54. Is of the opinion that the 60th anniversary of the Treaty of Rome would be an appropriate moment to modernise the European Union and to start a Convention with the purpose of making the European Union ~~ready for the decades ahead~~fit for purpose, currently and for the decades ahead; also sees this as an incredibly important time for the EU to address the many short fallings and irresponsible decisions which have created a never before seen disunity, mistrust, and bullying within the Union sees this as an opportunity to a social and caring Europe; hopes that this will also lead to a rejection of neoliberalism which has insidiously crept into the whole European project as well as EU institutions; further hopes that this ‘modernisation’ of the European Union will lead to an end to austerity and the repression of European citizens and democratically elected governments in the Member States;

Amendment 1034 #

Jo LEINEN, Mercedes BRESSO, Sylvia-Yvonne KAUFMANN, Ramón JÁUREGUI ATONDO, Pedro SILVA PEREIRA

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 54

54. Is of the opinion that the 60th anniversary of the Treaty of Rome would be an appropriate moment to ~~modernise~~rebuild the European Union and to start a Convention ~~with the purpose of making the European Union ready for the decades ahead;~~ in order to try to reconnect the European Union with its citizens and to draw a line under the current and persistent slide towards disaggregation, division and insignificance;

Amendment 1035 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 54

54. Is of the opinion that the 60th anniversary of the Treaty of Rome would be an appropriate moment to ~~modernise~~start an in- depth reflection on the future of the European Union ~~and to start~~leading to a Convention with the purpose of making the European Union ready for the decades ahead;

Amendment 1036 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 54

54. Is of the opinion that the 60th anniversary of the Treaty of Rome would be an appropriate moment to modernise the European Union ~~and to start a Convention~~ with the purpose of making the European Union ready for the decades ahead;

Amendment 1037 #

Paulo RANGEL, Cristian Dan PREDA, Constance LE GRIP

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 54

Amendment 1038 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 54

54. Is of the opinion that the upcoming 60th anniversary of the Treaty of Rome would be an appropriate moment to ~~modernise the European Un~~launch the reflection ~~and~~on to ~~start a Convention with~~the future of Europe and agree on a vision for the pcur~~pose of making the European Union ready for the decades ahead~~rent and future generations of European citizens;

Amendment 1039 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 54

54. Is of the opinion that the 60th anniversary of the Treaty of Rome would be an appropriate moment to ~~modernise the European Union and to start a Convention with the purpose of making the European Union ready for the~~return to that which was working, the EEC community- based treaty to which the likes of Ireland signed up four decades a~~head;~~go.

Amendment 339 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 6

6. Notes that the fracturing process of ‘variable geometry’ has found its way into the European decision-making process every time the European Council decides to apply intergovernmental methods and to bypass the ‘Union method’ as defined in the Treaties; this not only leads to less effective policy- making but also contributes to a growing lack of transparency, democratic accountability and control;Proposes a fundamental review of the Treaty so that decisions and accountability take place as close to the citizens as possible in harmony with the principle of subsidiarity.

Amendment 340 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 6

6. ~~Not~~Deplores that the fracturing process of ‘variable geometry’ has found its way into the European decision-making process every time the European Council decides to apply intergovernmental methods and to bypass the ‘Union method’ as defined in ~~the Treaties~~article 294 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union; this not only leads to less cohesive effective policy-making but also contributes to a growing lack of transparency, democratic accountability and control; and of well- reflected solidarity-based choices in the economic and political spheres;

Amendment 341 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 6

6. Notes that the fracturing process of ‘variable geometry’ has found its way into the European decision-making process every time the European Council decides to apply intergovernmental methods and to bypass the ‘Union method’ as defined in the Treaties; ~~this not only leads to less effective policy-making but also contributes to a growing lack of transparency, democratic accountability and control;~~

Amendment 342 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 6

6. Notes that the ~~fracturing~~ process of ‘variable geometry’ ~~has found its way into~~is sometimes present during the European decision-making process ~~every time~~, often when the European Council decides to apply intergovernmental methods and to bypass the ‘Union method’ as defined in the Treaties; ~~this not only leads to less effective policy-making but also contributes to a growing lack of transparency, democratic accountability and control;~~

Amendment 343 #

Jo LEINEN, Enrique GUERRERO SALOM, Sylvia-Yvonne KAUFMANN, Mercedes BRESSO, Ramón JÁUREGUI ATONDO, Pedro SILVA PEREIRA

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 6

6. Notes that the ~~fracturing~~ process of ‘variable geometry’, which has found its way into the European decision-making process every time the European Council decides to apply intergovernmental methods and to bypass the ‘Union method’ as defined in the Treaties; this not only leads to less effective policy-making but also contributes to a growing lack of transparency, democratic accountability and control, complies with the ‘United in Diversity’ principle, because only intergovernmental methods do justice to the diversity of the Member States and make it possible for them to co-exist as good neighbours;

Amendment 344 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 6

6. Notes ~~that the fracturing process of ‘variable geometry’ has found its way into the European decision-making process~~ every time the European Council decides to apply intergovernmental methods and to bypass the ‘Union method’ (‘Community method’) as defined in the Treaties; this not only leads to less effective policy- making but also contributes to a growing lack of transparency, democratic accountability and control;

Amendment 345 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 6

6. Notes that the f~~racturing~~lexible process of ‘variable geometry’ has found its way into the European decision-making process every time the European Council decides to apply intergovernmental methods and to bypass the ‘Union method’ as lbeit undefined in the Treaties~~; this not only leads to less effective policy-making but also contributes to a growing lack of transparency, democratic accountability and control~~ and accepts this as a viable method of European governance;

Amendment 346 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 6 a (new)

6a. Believes that the Treaty amendment shall strengthen the yellow card so that it can function in practice; the limit for how many parliaments need to protest needs to be lowered; believes that the influence of national parliaments in the EU’s legislation process must increase; the national parliaments should receive more influence over how the member countries act in the Council and have the same rights as the European Parliament to add proposals; believes that it should be easier to review bad decisions by extended use of ‘sunset paragraphs’ which entail that EU legislation must be reaffirmed or renegotiated after a number of years;

Amendment 347 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 6 a (new)

6a. States that good cooperation between Member States is of great importance and that it must remain possible for Member States to seek closer cooperation in lesser matters where cooperation with all Member States is not a political possibility;

Amendment 348 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 6 a (new)

6a. Notes that rule-of-law structures, economic prosperity and a stable, performance-focused social system fall within the national responsibility of the Member States;

Amendment 349 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 6 b (new)

6b. Notes that policy in the Union is characterised by a creeping loss of democracy and that the Union has become an undemocratic construct, whose policy is shaped by bureaucracies without democratic controls; calls, therefore, for major reforms to the Union, so that the Member States can become the leading lights of freedom and democracy in the world once again;

Amendment 350 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 7

7. Considers that the ‘Union method’ ~~is the only method for legislating which ensures that all interests, especially the common European~~for legislating serves European interests, also notes that the process of ‘variable geometry’ serves the common Member States interests, a~~re taken into account~~nd that both are important in the decision making process of the EU; understands by ‘Union method’ that the Commission as the executive initiates legislation, Parliament and the Council representing respectively the citizens and the states decide by majority voting, and the Court of Justice oversees and provides ultimate judicial control; understands ‘variable geometry’ is the practice where different parts of the European Union integrate at different levels and pace depending on the political situation of each individual country; further understands this to be necessary as the Union is not a homogeneous state, but a Union of sovereign nations that share a common European identity, culture, and history, but are also are united in their diversity;

Amendment 351 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 7

7. Considers that the ‘Union method’ is the only method for legislating which ensures that all interests, especially the common European interest, are taken into account; understands by ‘Union method’ that the Commission as the executive initiates legislation, Parliament and the Council representing respectively the citizens and the states decide by majority voting, and the Court of Justice oversees and provides ultimate judicial control; would like to see the European Parliament, in its capacity as the only body elected directly by citizens, granted the power of initiative, with a view to reforming this method as part of a wider revision of the Treaties along the lines of national systems for legislative assemblies;

Amendment 352 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 7

7. ~~Considers that the ‘Union method’ is the only method for legislating which ensures that all interests, especially the common European interest, are taken into account; u~~Understands by ‘Union method’ that the Commission as the executive initiates legislation, Parliament and the Council representing respectively the citizens and the states decide by majority voting, and the Court of Justice oversees and provides ultimate judicial control;

Amendment 353 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 7

7. Considers that the ‘Union method’ is the only method for legislating which ensures that all interests, especially the common European interest, are taken into account; understands by ‘Union method’ that the Commission as the executive initiates legislation, Parliament and the Council representing respectively the citizens and the states decide by majority voting, and the Court of Justice oversees and provides ultimate judicial control; recognizes that a fast-track procedure should be put in place to ensure that even in cases of urgency the ‘Union method’ is respected;

Amendment 354 #

Paulo RANGEL

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 7

7. Considers that the ‘Union method’ is the only method for legislating which ensures that all interests, especially the common European interest, are taken into account; understands by ‘Union method’ thate legislative procedure in which the Commission as the executive initiates legislation, the Parliament and the Council representing respectively the citizens and the states decide by majority voting, while unanimity obligations become the absolute exceptions, and the Court of Justice oversees and provides ultimate judicial control;

Amendment 355 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 7

7. Considers that the ‘current Union method’ is ~~the only method for legislating which ensures that all interests, especially the common European interest, are taken into account~~outmoded and deeply undemocratic; understands by ‘Union method’ that the Commission as the executive initiates legislation, Parliament and the Council representing respectively the citizens and the states decide by majority voting, and the Court of Justice oversees and provides ultimate judicial control;

Amendment 356 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 7

Amendment 357 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 7

7. Considers that the ‘Union method’ is the ~~only~~ method for legislating which ensures that all interests, especially the common European interest, are formally taken into account; understands by ‘Union method’ that the Commission as the executive initiates legislation, Parliament and the Council representing respectively the citizens and the sMember States decide in co-decision by majority voting, and the Court of Justice oversees and provides ultimate judicial control;

Amendment 358 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 7

7. Considers that the ‘Union method’ is not the only method for legislating which ensures that all interests, especially the common European interest, are taken into account; understands by ‘Union method’ that the Commission as the executive initiates legislation, Parliament and the Council representing respectively the citizens and the states decide by majority voting, and the Court of Justice oversees and provides ultimate judicial control;

Amendment 359 #

Jo LEINEN, Mercedes BRESSO, Enrique GUERRERO SALOM, Ramón JÁUREGUI ATONDO, Pedro SILVA PEREIRA

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 7

Amendment 360 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 7

7. Considers that the ‘Union method’ is the only democratic method for legislating which ensures that ~~all interests, especially~~ the common European interest~~, are taken into account~~ prevails; understands by ‘Union method’ that the Commission as the executive initiates legislation, Parliament and the Council representing respectively the citizens and the states decide by majority voting, and the Court of Justice oversees and provides ultimate judicial control;

Amendment 361 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 7

Amendment 362 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 7 a (new)

7a. Considers for these purposes that the European Commission should apply the provisions which scrap the format of one commissioner per Member State and adopt an organigram which favours effectiveness and efficiency and streamlines the working areas of the community portfolio holders. The provisions laid down in the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union may be used as a basis in that regard;

Amendment 363 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 7 a (new)

7a. Underlines the fundamental importance of complying with European law by Member States, and considers that its correct implementation must be more thoroughly enforced and surveilled by the Commission and the European Parliament;

Amendment 364 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 7 a (new)

7a. Calls for a flexible network in which every Member State can participate as much as possible;

Amendment 365 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 8

Amendment 366 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 8

8. Considers it essential in these circumstances to reaffirm the mission of an ‘ever-closer union among the peoples of Europe’ (Article 1 TEU) in order to mitigate any tendency towards disintegration and to clarify once more the moral, political and historical purpose, as well as the constitutional nature, of the European Union; not least by seeking inputs from all the diverse voices to be found in Europe an ~~Union~~d taking these fully into account in order to enhance the legitimacy of the European project;

Amendment 367 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 8

8. ~~Considers it essential in these circumstances to reaffirm the mission of an ‘ever-closer union among the peoples of Europe’ (Article 1 TEU)~~Reaffirms the mission of a union among the peoples of Europe that celebrates and respects similarities as well as unique individualities, one that respects Member States and the wishes of their citizens, one that pursues a social and caring Europe, only through this can we work more harmoniously in order to mitigate any tendency towards disintegration and to clarify once more the moral, political and historical purpose, as well as the constitutional nature, of the European Union;

Amendment 368 #

Helmut SCHOLZ

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 8

8. Considers it essential in these circumstances not only to reaffirm the mission of an ‘ever-closer union among the peoples of Europe’ (Article 1 TEU) in order to mitigate any tendency towards disintegration ~~and~~, but also to clarify ~~once more the moral, poli~~the substantical ~~and historical purpose, as well as the constitutional nature, of the European Union~~meaning of such formula, whose purpose should be that of providing the European Union of a constitution framework underwritten by its peoples and not only by the heads of State and Government of the Member States;

Amendment 369 #

Barbara SPINELLI

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 8

8. Considers it essential in these circumstances not only to reaffirm the mission of an ‘ever-closer union among the peoples of Europe’ (Article 1 TEU) in order to mitigate any tendency towards disintegration ~~and~~, but also to clarify ~~once more the moral, poli~~the substantical ~~and historical purpose, as well as the constitutional nature, of the European Union~~meaning of such formula, whose purpose should be that of providing the European Union of a real constitution underwritten by its peoples and not only by the heads of State and Government of the Member States;

Amendment 370 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 8

8. Considers it essential ~~in these circumstances to reaffirm the mission~~to reaffirm that the peoples of Europe have a right to steer their own future and that the wording of an ‘ever- closer union among the peoples of Europe’ (Article 1 TEU) in order to mitigate any tendency towards disintegration and to clarify once more the moral, political and historical purpose, as well as the constitutional nature, of the European Union’ (Article 1 TEU) does not intend to limit the freedom of choice and political rights of the citizens;

Amendment 371 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 8

8. ~~Considers it essential in these circumstances to reaffirm the mission of an ‘ever-closer union among the peoples of Europe’ (Article 1 TEU) i~~In order to mitigate any tendency towards disintegration and ~~to clarify once more~~with a view to redefining the moral, political and historical purpose of the European Union, as well as ~~the~~its constitutional nature, ~~of the European Union~~considers that the method of decision- making within the European Union must change radically;

Amendment 372 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 8

8. Considers it essential in these circumstances to ~~reaffirm~~consider and reassess the mission of an ‘ever-closer union among the peoples of Europe’ (Article 1 TEU) in order to m~~itigate any tendency towards disintegration and to clarify once more the moral, political and historical purpose, as well as the constitutional nature, of the European Union~~ake it possible for the Member States to guarantee the freedom and safety of their citizens, support their citizens’ well-being and contribute to a peaceful and prosperous Europe;

Amendment 373 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 8 a (new)

8a. Stresses that all the meaning of the founding expression “Peoples of Europe” should be revived and that a discussion should be held on the influence that territorial tensions in the Member States exert with regard to the shift in mood towards disintegration. It is not easy that those who have not managed to integrate their own minorities into society in their own country may bring stability to the European project;

Amendment 374 #

Jo LEINEN, Mercedes BRESSO, Ramón JÁUREGUI ATONDO, Pedro SILVA PEREIRA

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 8 a (new)

8a. Stresses that changes to treaties or proposals for enlargement of the European Union not only require approval from national parliaments, but, depending on national arrangements, sometimes need to be put to citizens via a referendum;

Amendment 375 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 8 a (new)

8a. Suggests to render the requirements for establishing enhanced and structured cooperation less restrictive, inter alia by lowering the minimum number of participating Member States;

Amendment 376 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 8 b (new)

8b. For those purposes, and in line with the contents of the ‘Strasbourg Manifesto’, signed by many MEPs who represent the traditional national minorities to which more than 70 million Europeans, calls on the EU institutions to play a more active role in the resolution of such political tension when the disputes take the Member States to a point of no return. An arbitration system to resolve such political conflicts without taking them to court should be included in the reforms to the Union. The basis for the arbitration should be built on frameworks applied at international level in situations of this type and should encourage the principle that the parties to the dispute may neither hinder the debate or the free expression of that debate nor unilaterally impose a position or solution, in accordance with the principles of Canada’s ‘Clarity Act’;

Amendment 377 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 9

Amendment 378 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 9

Amendment 379 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 9

Amendment 380 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 9

Amendment 381 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 9

9. Proposes that the next revision of the Treaties should rationalise the current disorderly ‘variable geometry’, i.e. ‘l’Europe à la carte’, by ending the disruptive practice of opt-outs, opt-ins and exceptions; or, if this is not possible, that it should at least grant all Member States the same powers and rights with a view to making them fully equal to one another;

Amendment 382 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 9

9. Proposes that the next revision of the Treaties should ~~rationalise~~strengthen the current ~~disorderly~~ ‘variable geometry’~~, i.e. ‘l’Europe à la carte’, by ending the disruptive practice of opt-outs, opt-ins and except~~ with the aim of improving the Unions;

Amendment 383 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 9

9. Proposes that the next revision of the Treaties should rationalise across the board the current ~~disorderly~~ ‘variable geometry’, ~~i.e. ‘l’Europe à la carte’, by ending the disruptive practice of~~and opt-outs, opt-ins and exceptions;

Amendment 384 #

Jo LEINEN, Enrique GUERRERO SALOM, Mercedes BRESSO, Sylvia-Yvonne KAUFMANN, Ramón JÁUREGUI ATONDO

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 9

9. Proposes that the next revision of the Treaties should ~~rationalise the current disorderly ‘variable geometry’, i.e. ‘l’Europe à la carte’, by ending~~assess if these treaties are still fit for purpose in these testing times and if there are short fallings that dialogue needs to be started on those dis~~ruptive practice of opt-outs, opt-ins and exceptions~~sues and how we, as a Union of equals, can address them;

Amendment 385 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 9

9. Proposes that the next revision of the Treaties should ~~rationalise the current disorderly ‘variable geometry’, i.e. ‘l’Europe à la carte’, by ending the disruptive practice of opt-outs, opt-ins and exceptions~~put an end to opt-outs by individual Member States on the level of EU primary law;

Amendment 386 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 9

9. Proposes that the next revision of the Treaties should rationalise the current disorderly ‘variable geometry’, i.e. ‘l’Europe à la carte’~~, by ending the disruptive practice of opt-outs, opt-ins and exceptions~~;

Amendment 387 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 9

9. Proposes that the next revision of the Treaties should rationalise the current disorderly ~~‘variable geometry’, i.e. ‘l’Europe à la carte’,~~distinctions by ending the ~~disruptive~~ practice of opt-outs, opt-ins and exceptions;

Amendment 388 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 9

9. Proposes that the next revision of the Treaties should rationalise the current disorderly ‘variable geometry’ ~~, i.e. ‘l’Europe à la carte’,~~ by ending the ~~disruptive~~ practice of opt-outs, opt-ins and exceptions;

Amendment 389 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 9

9. Proposes that the next revision of the Treaties should rationalise the current disorderly ‘variable geometry’, i.e. ‘l’Europe à la carte’, by ~~end~~reconsidering the disruptive practice of opt-outs, opt-ins and exceptions;

Amendment 390 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 9

9. Proposes that the next revision of the Treaties should r~~ational~~eorganise the current disorderly ‘variable geometry’, i.e. ‘l’Europe à la carte’, by ending the disruptive practice of opt-outs, opt-ins and exceptions;

Amendment 391 #

Pervenche BERÈS

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 9

9. Proposes that the next revision of the Treaties should rationalise the current disorderly ‘variable geometry~~’, i.e. ‘l’Europe à la carte’~~, by ending the disruptive practice of opt-outs, opt-ins and exceptions;

Amendment 392 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 9 a (new)

9a. Considers that the scope of the future institutions, policies and instruments of the EMU as defined in the new Treaty should be applicable to all Member States, except where specific derogations or transitional periods for some Member States are deemed necessary or justified, and on an exceptional and temporary basis;

Amendment 393 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 9 a (new)

9a. Stresses that Member States themselves must look at public services such as social housing, care, water, electricity, public transport, Internet and education and all other core functions that citizens consider to be of general interest;

Amendment 394 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 9 b (new)

9b. Considers it essential in order to counter social dumping that Member States be able to regulate their own labour market, even if this means a temporary suspension of the free movement of workers in states of emergency; stresses that Member States themselves must see to controls in the work place to combat illegal and exploitative labour practices;

Amendment 395 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 9 b (new)

9b. Takes the view that the new treaty should provide for adequate mechanisms, under the responsibility of the Commission, in order to: ensure the consistency of all European policies, preserve the integrity of the single market and prevent discrimination against those Member States which are not yet euro area members;

Amendment 396 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 10

Amendment 397 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 10

Amendment 398 #

Jo LEINEN, Sylvia-Yvonne KAUFMANN, Enrique GUERRERO SALOM, Ramón JÁUREGUI ATONDO, Pedro SILVA PEREIRA

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 10

Amendment 399 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 10

Amendment 400 #

Mercedes BRESSO, Pervenche BERÈS

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 10

10. Recommends that, instead of these multiple derogations, a type of ‘associate status’ could be proposed to those states in the periphery that only want to participate on the sideline, i.e. in some specific Union policies; this status should be accompanied by obligations corresponding to the associated rights; which should incorporate obligations in areas such as financing the EU institutions, fiscal discipline and coordination commitments, adherence to the rules on the functioning of the single market and competence, along with accelerated mechanisms for the full integration of interested states from the status of Associate State;

Amendment 401 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 10

10. Recommends that, instead of ~~these multiple derogation~~individual opt-outs, a new type of ~~‘associate status’~~membership could be proposed to ~~those~~ states ~~in the periphery~~ that only want to participate ~~on the sideline, i.e.~~ in some specific Union policies; this ~~statu~~kind of membership with a limited involvement in the decision-making process should be accompanied by obligations corresponding to the associated rights, as for example a contribution to the EU budget and the respect of the Union’s fundamental values and the four freedoms;

Amendment 402 #

Paulo RANGEL, Cristian Dan PREDA, Viviane REDING, Constance LE GRIP, Alain LAMASSOURE

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 10

10. Recommends that, instead of these multiple derogations, a ~~type of ‘associate~~n instrument or even a status~~’ c~~ should be ~~proposed to those states in the periphery that only want to participate on the sideline, i.e. in some specific Union policies; this statu~~developed in order to set up a ring of partners around the EU for countries swho~~uld be accompanied by obligations corresponding to the associated rights~~ cannot yet or will not join the Union;

Amendment 403 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 10

10. Recommends that, instead of these multiple derogations, a type of ‘associate status’ could be proposed to those states ~~in the periphery~~ that only want to participate on the sideline, i.e. in some specific Union policies; this status should be accompanied by obligations corresponding to the associated rights, first of all the adherence to the rule of law and free movement of people;

Amendment 404 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 10

10. Recommends that, instead of these multiple derogations, a type of ~~‘associate status’~~status which needs to be defined in more detail could be proposed to those states in the periphery that only want to participate on the sideline, i.e. in some specific Union policies; ~~this status should be accompanied by obligations corresponding to the associated rights;~~

Amendment 405 #

Paulo RANGEL, Constance LE GRIP, Alain LAMASSOURE

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 10

10. Recommends that ~~, instead of the multiple derogations currently in effect,~~ a type of ‘associate status’ could be proposed to those states in the periphery that only want to participate on the sideline, i.e. in some specific Union policies; this status should be accompanied by obligations corresponding to the associated rights;

Amendment 406 #

Andrey KOVATCHEV

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 10

10. Recommends that, instead of these multiple derogations, a type of ‘associate status’ could be proposed to those states ~~in the periphery,~~ that only want to participate on the sideline, i.e. in some specific Union policies; this status should be accompanied by obligations corresponding to the associated rights;

Amendment 407 #

Viviane REDING

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 10 a (new)

10a. Believes that the best set-up for a future-proof European Union would consist of open concentric circles with an inner circle of Member States sharing all Union policies, a second circle of Member States sharing not all Union policies, surrounded by a ring of friends with whom the Member States may share anything but institutions;

Amendment 408 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 10 a (new)

10a. Considers that the possibility of differentiated integration should be left open for all Member States, if they are able and willing to advance with the Union’s common objectives; notes, however, that such differentiated integration should only vary in its timescale, so as to ensure a clear and uniform implementation of the Treaties;

Amendment 409 #

Paulo RANGEL, Cristian Dan PREDA, Viviane REDING, Constance LE GRIP, Alain LAMASSOURE

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 10 b (new)

10b. The single institutional framework should be preserved and any form of flexibility should aim to achieve the Union’s common objectives, without undermining the principle of equality of all citizens and Member States;

Amendment 410 #

Jo LEINEN, Enrique GUERRERO SALOM, Sylvia-Yvonne KAUFMANN, Ramón JÁUREGUI ATONDO, Pedro SILVA PEREIRA

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 11

Amendment 411 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 11

Amendment 412 #

Kazimierz Michał UJAZDOWSKI

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 11

11. ~~Not~~Believes that this new type of ‘associate status’ could also be one of the possible outcomes to respect the will of the majority of the citizens of the United Kingdom to leave the EU; stresses that this wish must be respected, given that the withdrawal of the United Kingdom, as one of the larger Member States, and as the largest non-euro-area member, affects the strength and the institutional balance of the Union – a new situation that adds to the need for revision of the Treae European Parliament should respect the will of the majority of the citizens of Great Britain to leave the EU and that they should be given a fair agreement which benefits both parties;

Amendment 413 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 11

11. Notes that this new type of ‘associate status’ could ~~also be one of the possible outcomes to respect the will of the majority of the citizens of the United Kingdom to leave the EU; stresses that this wish must be respected, given that the withdrawal of~~be a good basis for a mutually beneficial cooperation between the United Kingdom, as one of the larger Member States, and as the largest non-euro-area member, affects the strength and the institutional balance of the Union – a new situation that adds to the need for revision of the Treatiesnd the EU that would promote Europe’s security;

Amendment 414 #

Paulo RANGEL, Cristian Dan PREDA, Viviane REDING, Constance LE GRIP, Alain LAMASSOURE

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 11

11. Notes that thise new ~~type of ‘associate~~instrument or status’ could also be one of the possible outcomes to respect the will of the majority of the citizens of the United Kingdom to leave the EU; stresses that this wish must be respected, given that the withdrawal of the United Kingdom, as one of the larger Member States, and as the largest non-euro-area member, affects the strength and the institutional balance of the Union – a new situation that adds to the need for revision of the Treaties;

Amendment 415 #

Mercedes BRESSO

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 11

11. Notes that this new type of ~~‘associate status’~~membership could also be one of the possible outcomes to respect the will of ~~the~~a narrow majority of the citizens of the United Kingdom to leave the EU; stresses that this wish must be respected, given that the withdrawal of the United Kingdom, as one of the larger Member States, and as the largest non-euro-area member, affects the strength and the institutional balance of the Union – a new situation that adds to the need for revision of the Treaties;

Amendment 416 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 11

Amendment 417 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 11

11. Notes that this new type of ‘associate status’ could also be one of the possible outcomes to respect the will of the majority of the citizens of the United Kingdom to leave the EU; stresses that this wish must be respected, given that the withdrawal of the United Kingdom, as one of the larger Member States, and as the largest non-euro-area member, affects the strength and the institutional balance of the Union – a new situation that adds to the need for revision of the Treatiese vote of the United Kingdom to leave the EU does not represent all regions who voted; the majority decision to leave the EU must be respected, as must the wishes of the people in certain regions who voted to remain in the EU, stresses that the vote of the people in the north of Ireland and Scotland must be respected under the principle of consent;

Amendment 418 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 11

11. Notes that this new type of ~~‘associate~~ status’ could also be one of the possible outcomes to respect the will of the majority of the citizens of the United Kingdom to leave the EU; stresses that ~~this wish must be respected, given that~~ the withdrawal of the United Kingdom, as one of the larger Member States, and as the largest non- euro-area member, affects the strength and the institutional balance of the Union ~~– a new situation that adds to the need for revision of the Treaties~~;

Amendment 419 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 11

Amendment 420 #

Richard CORBETT

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 11

11. Notes that this new type of ‘associate status’ could also be one of the possible outcomes to respect the will of the majority of the ~~citizens of the United Kingdom to leave the EU; stresses that this wish must be respected, given~~those who voted in the recent referendum in the United Kingdom to leave the EU; while taking account of the 48.1% who wished to remain in it; notes that the withdrawal of the United Kingdom, as one of the larger Member States, and as the largest non-euro-area member, affects the strength and the institutional balance of the Union – a new situation that adds to the need for revision of the Treaties;

Amendment 421 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 11

11. ~~Notes that this new type of ‘associate status’ could also be one of the possible outcomes to respec~~Stresses that the will of the majority of the citizens of the United Kingdom to leave the EU~~; stresses that this wish~~ must be respected, given that the withdrawal of the United Kingdom, as one of the larger Member States, and as the largest non- euro-area member, affects the strength and the institutional balance of the Union – a new situation that adds to the need for revision of the Treaties, and the subsequent dissolution of the Union;

Amendment 422 #

Barbara SPINELLI

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 11

11. Notes that this new type of ‘associate status’ could ~~also~~ be one of the possible outcomes to respect the will of the majority of the citizens of the United Kingdom to leave the EU; stresses that this wish must be respected, given that the withdrawal of the United Kingdom, as one of the larger Member States, and as the largest non-euro-area member, affects the strength and the institutional balance of the Union – a new situation that adds to the need for revision of the Treaties;

Amendment 423 #

Pervenche BERÈS

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 11

11. Notes that this ~~new type of~~ ‘associate status’ could also be one of the possible outcomes to respect the will of the majority of the citizens of the United Kingdom to leave the EU; stresses that this wish must be respected, given that the withdrawal of the United Kingdom, as one of the larger Member States, and as the largest non- euro-area member, affects the strength and the institutional balance of the Union – a new situation that adds to the need for revision of the Treaties;

Amendment 424 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 11 a (new)

11a. Stresses the need to follow closely political and institutional developments in countries such as Scotland which have clearly expressed their wish to remain in the Union. Considers that on the basis that it had already expressed that wish in a legal and democratic referendum, an accelerated integration mechanism for that country should be established, and the mechanism should start with the automatic acquisition of Associate State, to which the veto principle normally used for ordinary candidates seeking to join the Union should not apply;

Amendment 425 #

Barbara SPINELLI

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 11 a (new)

11a. Notes and respects the fact that the people of the Northern Ireland and Scotland voted overwhelmingly to remain in the EU; believes that an accommodation should be found whereby Northern Ireland maintains its membership of the European Union; calls on the EU to continue to proactively support the peace process in Ireland and to provide for its continuation in any negotiations on British withdrawal; stresses that an accommodation should also be found as far as Scotland is concerned if its citizens express a desire in this direction;

Amendment 426 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 11 a (new)

11a. Believes that the EU should work towards helping Scotland, Northern Ireland and Gibraltar to remain inside (or as attached as possible to) the EU in respect of their democratic will, both in case they maintain their current national status or they democratically choose to change it;

Amendment 427 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 11 a (new)

11a. Notes that the appointment of Guy Verhofstadt MEP as ‘the European Parliament’s representative for the Brexit negotiations’ is the result of non- transparent backroom diplomacy within Parliament and was not decided in plenary;

Amendment 428 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 12

12. Underlines the fact that, until the Treaties cease to apply to the United Kingdom, it will continue to participate in all decision-making of the Union throughout its institutions, with the exception of the negotiations and the agreement concerning its own withdrawal; considers that intermediate arrangements will need to be made concerning the UK’s participation in European decision- making, as it will be politically difficult to allow a Member State in the process of leaving to influence decisions affecting the Union of which it will soon cease to be a member;

Amendment 429 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 12

Amendment 430 #

Morten MESSERSCHMIDT, Ashley FOX, Ulrike TREBESIUS

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 12

Amendment 431 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 12

Amendment 432 #

Kazimierz Michał UJAZDOWSKI

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 12

Amendment 433 #

Pervenche BERÈS

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 12

12. Underlines the fact that, until the Treaties cease to apply to the United Kingdom, it will continue to participate in all decision-making ~~of the Union throughout its~~in the EU institutions, with the exception of the negotiations and the agreement concerning its own withdrawal; considers that for the time of the withdrawal negotiations, intermediate arrangements will need to be made, concerning the UK’s participation in European decision-making, as it will be politically difficult to allow a Member State in the process of leaving to influence decisions affecting the Union of which it will soon cease to be a member; proposes that before a formal decision is made, an informal consultation takes place to give visibility to what would be the decision without the participation of UK;

Amendment 434 #

Jo LEINEN, Enrique GUERRERO SALOM, Sylvia-Yvonne KAUFMANN, Mercedes BRESSO, Ramón JÁUREGUI ATONDO, Pedro SILVA PEREIRA

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 12

12. Underlines the fact that, until the Treaties cease to apply to the United Kingdom, it will continue to participate in all decision-making of the Union throughout its institutions, with the exception of the negotiations and the agreement concerning its own withdrawal; considers that intermediate arrangements will need to be made concerning the UK’s participation in European decision-making, as it will be politically difficult to allow a Member State in the process of leaving to influence decisions affecting the Union of which it will soon cease to be a member; recalls the principle of sincere cooperation as laid out in the Treaties (article 4(3) TEU);

Amendment 435 #

Jérôme LAVRILLEUX, Arnaud DANJEAN, Marc JOULAUD, Franck PROUST, Michel DANTIN, Brice HORTEFEUX, Philippe JUVIN, Françoise GROSSETÊTE, Angélique DELAHAYE, Maurice PONGA, Michèle ALLIOT-MARIE, Tokia SAÏFI, Anne SANDER, Renaud MUSELIER

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 12

12. Underlines the fact that, until the Treaties cease to apply to the United Kingdom, it will continue to participate in all decision-making of the Union throughout its institutions, with the exception of the negotiations and the agreement concerning its own withdrawal; considers that intermediate arrangements will need to be made concerning the UK’s participation in European decision-making, as it will be politically difficult to allow a Member State in the process of leaving to influence decisions ~~affecting~~– particularly European Parliament votes – affecting the future of the Union of which it will soon cease to be a member;

Amendment 436 #

Jérôme LAVRILLEUX

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 12

12. Underlines the fact that, until the Treaties cease to apply to the United Kingdom, it will continue to participate in all decision-making of the Union throughout its institutions, with the exception of the negotiations and the agreement concerning its own withdrawal; considers that intermediate arrangements will need to be made concerning the UK’s participation in European decision-making, as it will be politically difficult to allow a Member State in the process of leaving to influence decisions ~~affecting~~– particularly European Parliament votes – affecting the future of the Union of which it will soon cease to be a member;

Amendment 437 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 12

12. Underlines the fact that, until the Treaties cease to apply to the United Kingdom, it will continue to participate in all decision-making ~~of the Union throughout its~~in the EU institutions, with the exception of the negotiations and the agreement concerning its own withdrawal; considers that for the time of the withdrawal negotiations, intermediate arrangements ~~will need to be made~~should be considered concerning the UK’s participation in European decision-making, as it will be politically difficult to allow a Member State in the process of leaving to influence decisions affecting the Union of which it will soon cease to be a member;

Amendment 438 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 12

12. Underlines the fact that, until the Treaties cease to apply to the United Kingdom, it will continue to participate, in so far as it wishes to, in all decision- making of the Union throughout its institutions, with the exception of the negotiations and the agreement concerning its own withdrawal; considers that intermediate arrangements will need to be made concerning the UK’s participation in European decision-making, as it will be politically difficult to allow a Member State in the process of leaving to influence decisions affecting the Union of which it will soon cease to be a member;

Amendment 439 #

Richard CORBETT

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 12

12. Underlines the fact that, until the Treaties cease to apply to the United Kingdom, it will continue to participate in all decision-making of the Union throughout its institutions, with the exception of the negotiations and the agreement concerning its own withdrawal; considers that intermediate arrangements ~~will~~may need to be made concerning the UK’s participation in ~~European~~Council decision- making, as it will be politically difficult to allow a Member State in the process of leaving to influence decisions affecting the Union of which it will soon cease to be a member;

Amendment 440 #

Jérôme LAVRILLEUX, Françoise GROSSETÊTE

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 12

12. Underlines the fact that, until the Treaties cease to apply to the United Kingdom, it will continue to participate in all decision-making of the Union throughout its institutions, with the exception of the negotiations and the agreement concerning its own withdrawal; considers that intermediate arrangements ~~will need to be made~~could be foreseen concerning the UK’s participation in European decision-making, as it will be politically difficult to allow a Member State in the process of leaving to influence decisions affecting the Union of which it will soon cease to be a member;

Amendment 441 #

Jérôme LAVRILLEUX

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 12 – point 1 (new)

(1) Calls for the establishment of an ‘observer’ status applicable to all United Kingdom representatives, whether elected or unelected, at the EU institutions; the status would enable the representatives to participate in debates until the United Kingdom leaves the European Union without taking part in decisions, including votes in the European Parliament and the Council of the European Union; proposes that the European Parliament’s Committee on Constitutional Affairs is given a mandate to set out the arrangements for this ‘observer’ status on behalf of all the institutions;

Amendment 442 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 12 – point 2 (new)

(2) Calls for the headquarters of the European Medicines Agency, currently in London, to be moved to another Member State;

Amendment 443 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 12 a (new)

12a. Recalls that the construction of the European Union has been rooted on four freedoms namely the free movement of goods, the free movement of services and freedom of establishment, the free movement of persons (and citizenship), including free movement of workers and the free movement of capital; therefore, points out that the both the negotiations and the final agreement concerning the withdrawal of the UK from the Union as well as the future framework for the future relationships should respect their substantial indivisibility;

Amendment 444 #

Sylvia-Yvonne KAUFMANN

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 12 a (new)

12a. Expects, therefore, that when it triggers Article 50 TEU, the United Kingdom will clarify how it intends to act in the Council during deliberations and decision-making on ongoing legislative procedures, so as not to hinder the progress of the EU 27;

Amendment 445 #

Constance LE GRIP

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 12 a (new)

12a. Given the choice made by the citizens of the United Kingdom to leave the European Union; calls for the headquarters of the European Banking Authority and the European Medicines Agency, both currently in London, to be moved to another Member State;

Amendment 446 #

Francisco de Paula GAMBUS MILLET

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 12 a (new)

12 a. Recognises the unique circumstances of the island of Ireland in the Brexit process and the potential threats to the Irish Peace Process; the EU must work with the Irish Government and the Northern Executive to avoid these threats by any means possible;

Amendment 447 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 12 a (new)

12a. Rejects in any event a hypothetical negotiation in which the United Kingdom remains in the European Union under conditions different to those in place before Brexit;

Amendment 448 #

Jérôme LAVRILLEUX, Marc JOULAUD, Brice HORTEFEUX, Philippe JUVIN, Franck PROUST, Françoise GROSSETÊTE, Michel DANTIN, Michèle ALLIOT-MARIE, Tokia SAÏFI, Anne SANDER, Maurice PONGA, Angélique DELAHAYE, Elisabeth MORIN-CHARTIER, Renaud MUSELIER

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 12 a (new)

12a. Calls for the headquarters of the European Medicines Agency, currently in London, to be moved to another Member State;

Amendment 449 #

Jérôme LAVRILLEUX, Marc JOULAUD, Philippe JUVIN, Franck PROUST, Michel DANTIN, Maurice PONGA, Michèle ALLIOT-MARIE, Tokia SAÏFI, Anne SANDER, Constance LE GRIP, Renaud MUSELIER

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 12 b (new)

12b. Calls for the establishment of an ‘observer’ status applicable to all United Kingdom representatives, whether elected or unelected, at the EU institutions; the status would enable the representatives to participate in debates until the United Kingdom leaves the European Union without taking part in decisions, including votes in the European Parliament and the Council of the European Union; proposes that the European Parliament’s Committee on Constitutional Affairs is given a mandate to set out the arrangements for this ‘observer’ status on behalf of all the institutions;

Amendment 450 #

Constance LE GRIP

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 12 b (new)

12b. Calls for ‘observer member’ status to be applied to British Members of the European Parliament once the British Government has invoked Article 50 of the TFEU and the British Parliament has voted in favour of repealing the European Communities Act; the status will enable them to participate in Parliamentary debates without taking part in votes; proposes that the Committee on Constitutional Affairs be tasked with preparing and setting out the arrangements for this ‘observer member’ status;

Amendment 451 #

Jo LEINEN, Enrique GUERRERO SALOM, Mercedes BRESSO, Sylvia-Yvonne KAUFMANN, Ramón JÁUREGUI ATONDO, Pedro SILVA PEREIRA, Pervenche BERÈS

Motion for a resolution
Subheading 3

New Economic Governance and establishment of a Social Europe

Amendment 452 #

Jo LEINEN, Enrique GUERRERO SALOM, Mercedes BRESSO, Ramón JÁUREGUI ATONDO, Pedro SILVA PEREIRA, Pervenche BERÈS

Motion for a resolution
Subheading 3

New Economic Policy and Governance

Amendment 453 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 12 a (new)

12a. Recalls as stated in its resolution of XXXX on a budgetary capacity for the eurozone that the various crises require the euro area to make, as soon as possible, a qualitative leap of integration to deliver on its promise of stability, convergence, growth and jobs;

Amendment 454 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 13

13. Is greatly concerned by the lack of economic reform and convergence in the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) as well as the loss of competitiveness of the economies of many of its Member States, highlighting that the main cause of these problems is a lack of redistribution between Member States, which is essential for correcting imbalances and inequalities, supporting harmonious development and building an economic as opposed to merely monetary Union;

Amendment 455 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 13

13. Is greatly concerned by the l~~ack of economic reform and convergence in~~oss of competitiveness of the economies of many of its Member States; acknowledges that a loss of competiveness of the Eeconomi~~c and Monetary Union (EMU) as well as the~~es of many of its Member States is a direct result of the austerity agenda that has emanated directly from Brussels; further acknowledges that poorly thought out trade agreements and a policy of deindustrialisation are also responsible for a loss of competitiveness of the economies of ~~many of its~~some Member States;

Amendment 456 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 13

13. Is greatly concerned by the lack of economic reform and convergence in the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) as well as the loss of competitiveness of the economies of many of its Member States; is of the opinion that human investment must be given equal priority with investment in infrastructure, innovation and all the other areas seen as crucial to Europe’s global competitiveness;

Amendment 457 #

Jo LEINEN, Mercedes BRESSO, Ramón JÁUREGUI ATONDO, Pedro SILVA PEREIRA, Pervenche BERÈS

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 13

13. Is greatly concerned by the l~~ack of economic reform and convergence in the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) as well as the loss of competitiveness of the economies of many of its Member States~~oss of competitiveness of the economies of many of its Member States, much of it caused by the strait-jacket that membership of the Eurozone imposed, the absence of any tools to deal with a monetary crisis in individual states, a reflection of the poor design of the euro itself;

Amendment 458 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 13

13. Is greatly concerned by ~~the lack of economic reform and con~~growing economic and social divergences in the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) ~~as well as the loss~~, notably due to the absence of a com~~petitiveness of the economies~~mon fiscal and economic policy, aggravated by the lack of a proper aggregate fiscal stance for the euro area and the absence of man~~y of its Member St~~ industrial stratesgy;

Amendment 459 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 13

13. Is greatly concerned by the ~~lack of economic reform and convergence in~~inadequacy and flaws of the Eeconomic and ~~Monetary Union (EMU) as well as the loss of competitiveness of the economies of man~~social policy of the Union as well as the loss of cohesion and solidarity of ~~its~~the Member States;

Amendment 460 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 13

13. Is greatly concerned by the lack of economic reform ~~and convergence~~ in the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) as well as the ~~loss of competitiveness~~rapid collapse of the economies of many of its Member States;

Amendment 461 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 13

13. Is greatly concerned by the lack of eco~~nomic reform~~mmon fiscal and econ~~vergence~~omic policies in the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) as well as the ~~loss of competitiveness of the economies of many of~~exacerbation of disparities between its Member States;

Amendment 462 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 13

13. Is greatly concerned by the lack of economic reform ~~and convergence~~ in the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) as well as the loss of competitiveness of the economies of many of its Member States;

Amendment 463 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 13 a (new)

13a. Is convinced that the Union needs a legal shift on its economic policy based on the full application of Article 3 TEU and the principles provided for, in particular, in articles 9 to 12 TFEU; asks therefore for a real New Deal for Europe, consisting in common investments in a new environmentally sustainable growth and employment plan, financed by the European Bank of Investments and by own resources deriving from an EU wide coordinated wealth levy, a Financial Transaction Tax (FTT) and a carbon tax, directly collected by the Union;

Amendment 464 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 13 a (new)

13a. Reaffirms that constitutional elements of the Union, notably the integrity of the Single Market and the fact that this cannot be separated from the four fundamental freedoms of the Union (free movement of capital, people, goods and services) are essential, indivisible pillars of the Union, as is the existence of a state of law, guaranteed by the European Court of Justice; reaffirms this constitutional unity cannot be undone during the negotiations of the exit of the United Kingdom from the Union;

Amendment 465 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 13 a (new)

13a. Deplores the fact that the structural weakness of the EU institutions and the state-oriented logic too often applied to its operational programmes renders less effective its policies which support innovation, the production economy and reindustrialisation. Stresses that the cross-border, cooperative, synergistic and flexible logic that drives cohesion policies such as intelligent specialisation should be bolstered and that this format should be replicated in employment policies;

Amendment 466 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 13a (new)

13a. Strongly deplores the use of austerity policies, which have led to an increase in levels of unemployment and absolute poverty and an explosion in socio-economic discrepancies, and therefore observes the need to strive to remove the constraints and restrictions on public investments imposed on the Member States to boost employment and social and territorial cohesion, paying close attention to the needs and specificities of the different economic contexts;

Amendment 467 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 13 a (new)

13a. Stresses the necessity for a European Union where human considerations rather than the interests of multinationals and financial institutions are central;

Amendment 468 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 13 a (new)

13a. Considers that common fiscal and economic policy should become a shared competence between the Union and the Member States;

Amendment 469 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 13 b (new)

13b. Recalls that social rights are fundamental rights, as recognised by international treaties, the ECHR, the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights and the European Social Charter; in this respect, calls on the Commission to swiftly present a proposal for a concrete European Social Pillar aimed at improving living and working conditions, quality employment, fair wages, equal treatment, social dialogue, quality public services and effective social protection, in line with the relevant ILO Conventions, while respecting the prerogative of the Member States to introduce or retain more favourable provisions in this field; moreover, asks the Commission to take into consideration the idea of introducing, in that proposal, provisions establishing a fair and just minimum wage, minimum pensions and a minimum income, in line with the European Parliament resolution of 20 October 2010 on the role of minimum income in combating poverty and promoting an inclusive society in Europe and article 34(3) of the Charter of fundamental rights of the European Union, while respecting the right to collective bargain, as enshrined in article 28 of the EU Charter;

Amendment 470 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 13 b (new)

13b. Calls for the amendment of Article 136 TFEU in order to open its scope to voluntary participation by non-euro Member States, providing for full voting rights in line with the enhanced cooperation procedure, and calls for the dropping of the restrictions under Article 136 TFEU and for the upgrading of this article into a general clause for the adoption by codecision of legal acts concerning the coordination and setting of legally-binding minimum standards with regard to economic, employment and social policy;

Amendment 471 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 13

13b. states that national parliaments should determine the size and content of national budgets without being dictated by the European Union;

Amendment 472 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 13 c (new)

13c. Calls on the Commission to start negotiations with the Council of Europe in order to launch the process for the accession of the EU to the European Social Charter; in the meantime, asks the Commission to use the Charter as guiding standard for the impact assessments carried out on the basis of article 12 of the Interinstitutional Agreement on Better Law-Making and for drafting the explanatory memoranda foreseen in article 25 of the same, having regard to the fifth recital of the Preamble to the Treaties;

Amendment 473 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 13 c (new)

13c. Considers that art. 119 TFEU should state that the member States and the Union shall conduct their economic policy in accordance with the principle of a social market economy;

Amendment 474 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 14

14. Considers that neither the Stability and Growth Pact nor the ‘no bail-out’ clause (Article 125 TFEU) provide the intended solutions, and that they have furthermore lost credibility in their current form, as the pact has been infringed by several Member States without political or legal consequences, while Greece has been bailed out on a large scale on three occasions; believes that EU must reject the attempts to come back to protectionist national politics, and should continue to be an open economy in the future; warns that this cannot be obtained as a consequence of the dismantling of the social model;

Amendment 475 #

Jo LEINEN, Mercedes BRESSO, Ramón JÁUREGUI ATONDO, Pedro SILVA PEREIRA

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 14

14. Considers that ~~neither~~strict adherence to the Stability and Growth Pact ~~nor~~and the ‘no bail-out’ clause (Article 125 TFEU) provide the intended solutions, and that they have furthermore lost credibility in their current form, as the pact has been infringed by several Member States without political or legal consequences, while Greece has been bailed out on a large scale on three occasionsshould be reestabilshed;

Amendment 476 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 14

14. Considers that in their current form neither the Stability and Growth Pact nor the ‘no bail-out’ clause (Article 125 TFEU) provide the intended solutions, and that they have furthermore lost credibility in their current form, as the pact has been infringed by several Member States without political or legal consequences, while Greece has been bailed out on a large scale on three occasions;

Amendment 477 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 14

14. Considers that neither the Stability and Growth Pact nor the ‘no bail-out’ clause (Article 125 TFEU) provide the intended solutions, and that they have furthermore lost credibility in their current form~~, as the pact has been infringed by several Member States without political or legal consequences, while Greece has been bailed out on a large scale on three occasions~~;

Amendment 478 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 14

14. Considers that neither the Stability and Growth Pact nor the ‘no bail-out’ clause (Article 125 TFEU) provide the intended solutions, and that they have furthermore lost credibility in their current form, as the ~~pact has been infringed b~~y were administered in a draconian manner which only serve~~ral Member States without political or legal consequences, while Greece has been bailed out on a large scale~~d the interests of the economies of some of the larger Member States and not the Member States who needed assistance; considers it shameful that some member States conspired to foist 42% of the total cost onf th~~ree occasions~~e European banking crisis upon Ireland;

Amendment 479 #

Paulo RANGEL, Cristian Dan PREDA, Constance LE GRIP

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 14

14. Considers that neither the Stability and Growth Pact nor the ‘no bail-out’ clause (Article 125 TFEU) and the "bail- in" rules of the European Central Bank provide the intended solutions, and that they have ~~furthermore~~ lost credibility in their current form~~, as the pact has been infringed by several Member States without political or legal consequences, while Greece has been bailed out on a large scale on three occasions~~;

Amendment 480 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 14

14. Considers that ~~neither~~the framework for economic governance provided by the Stability and Growth Pact ~~nor~~and the ‘no bail- out’ clause (Article 125 TFEU) provide the intended solutions, and that they have furthermore lost credibility in their current form, as the pact has been infringed by several Member States without political or legal consequences, while Greece has been bailed out on a large scale on three occashould be developed in order to ensure a truthful and comprehensive implementation of their provisions;

Amendment 481 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 14

14. Considers that neither the Stability and Growth Pact nor the ‘no bail-out’ clause (Article 125 TFEU) provide the intended solutions, and that they have furthermore lost credibility in their current form, as the pact has been infringed by several Member States without political or legal consequences, while Greece has been bailed out on a large scale on three occasions, as a result of the institutional inability of the EU to adopt realistic solutions;

Amendment 482 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 14

14. Considers that ~~neither~~ the Stability and Growth Pact ~~nor~~and the ‘no bail-out’ clause (Article 125 TFEU) provide the intended solutions, and that they have furthermore lost credibility in their current form, as the pact has been infringed by several Member States without political or legal consequences, while Greece has been bailed out on a large scale on three occasionhave the ability to provide a strong framework for economic governance if implemented; considers that the pact has been infringed by several Member States without political or legal consequences and that excessive sovereign debt in particular have made macroeconomic adjustment programmes necessary in several Member States;

Amendment 483 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 14

14. Considers that neither the Stability and Growth Pact nor the ‘no bail-out’ clause (Article 125 TFEU) provide the intended solutions, and that they have furthermore lost credibility in their current form, as the pact has been infringed by several Member States without political or legal consequences, while Greece ~~has~~’s creditors, especially its foreign bankers, have been bailed out on a large scale on three occasions;

Amendment 484 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 14

14. Considers that ~~neither~~ the Stability and Growth Pact ~~nor the ‘no bail-out’ clause (Article 125 TFEU) provide the intended solutions, and that they have fur~~has widely demonstrated itself to be grounded in an economic development model that is inadequately equipped for pursuing the European common interest and that it is thermefore ~~lost credibility~~ not an effective tool for resolving the~~ir current form, as the pact has been infringed by several Member States without political or legal consequences, while Greece has been bailed out on a large scale on three occasion~~ enduring economic crisis, having increased the problems faced in effectively combating unemployment and intensified the impoverishment of those States most affected by the crisis;

Amendment 485 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 14

14. Considers that neither the Stability and Growth Pact nor the ‘no bail-out’ clause (Article 125 TFEU) provide the intended solutions, and that they have furthermore lost credibility in their current form, as the pact has been infringed by several Member States, including Germany, without political or legal consequences, while Greece has been bailed out on a large scale on three occasions;

Amendment 486 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 14

14. Considers that ~~neither~~ the Stability and Growth Pact ~~nor~~and the ‘no bail-out’ clause (Article 125 TFEU) provide the intended solutions, and that they have furthermore lost credibility in their current form, as the pact has been infringed by several Member States without political or legal consequences, while Greece has been bailed out on a large scale on three occasionsform a stable framework for economic control, but is concerned, as the pact has been infringed by several Member States without political or legal consequences, and considers that, above all because of excessive deficits in several Member States, macroeconomic adjust programmes were necessary;

Amendment 487 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 14

14. Considers that ~~neither~~ the Stability and Growth Pact ~~nor~~and the ‘no bail-out’ clause (Article 125 TFEU) provide the intended solutions, and that they have furthermore lost credibility in their current form, as the pact has been infringed by several Member States without political or legal consequences, while Greece has been bailed out on a large scale on three occasionsform a stable framework for economic control, but is concerned, as the pact has been infringed by several Member States without political or legal consequences, and considers that, above all because of excessive deficits in several Member States, macroeconomic adjust programmes were necessary;

Amendment 488 #

Dariusz ROSATI

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 14

14. Considers that ~~neither~~ the Stability and Growth Pact ~~nor~~and the ‘no bail-out’ clause (Article 125 TFEU) provide the intended solutions, and that they have furthermore lost credibility in their current form, as the pact has been infringed by several Member States without political or legal consequences, while Greece has been bailed out on a large scale on three occasiona strong framework for economic governance, but is greatly concerned that the pact has been infringed by several Member States without political or legal consequences, and that excessive sovereign debt in particular have made macroeconomic adjustment programmes necessary in several Member States;

Amendment 489 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 14

Amendment 490 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 14

14. Considers that ~~neither~~ the Stability and Growth Pact ~~nor~~and the ‘no bail-out’ clause (Article 125 TFEU) provide ~~the intended solutions, and that they have furthermore lost credibility in their current form, as~~a strong framework for economic governance, but is greatly concerned that the pPact has been infringed by several Member States without political or legal consequences, ~~while Greece has been bailed out on a large scale on three occasion~~and that excessive sovereign debt levels have made macroeconomic adjustment programs necessary in several Member States;

Amendment 491 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 14

14. ~~Considers that neither~~Regrets that the Stability and Growth Pact ~~nor the~~and ‘no bail-out’ clause (Article 125 TFEU) ~~provide the intended solutions, and that they have furthermore lost credibility in their current form, as~~have been persistently infringed and have thus lost credibility; the pact has been infringed by several Member States without political or legal consequences, while Greece has, in breach of the ‘no-bail-out clause’, been bailed out on a large scale on three occasions;

Amendment 492 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 15

Amendment 493 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 15

15. Acknowledges the improvements brought by the European Semester, the six- pack and the two-pack aimed at addressing these issues, but concludes that they have not solved the problems; believes, moreover, that they have contributed to making the system overly complex, a~~re not binding with regard to c~~nd do not cover spill-over effects between one Member State and another, or to the euro area or the EU as a whole; regrets that Country-s Specific rRecommendations andre not binding and that the current system does not ~~cover spill- over effects between one Member State and another, or to the euro area or the EU~~sufficiently ensure their national ownership; is interested in this regard in the potential offered by the Advisory European Fiscal Board and its future mission of advising the Commission on a fiscal stance that would be appropriate for the euro area as a whole;

Amendment 494 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 15

Amendment 495 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 15

Amendment 496 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 15

15. Acknowledges th~~e improvements brought by~~at the European Semester, the six- pack and the two-pack aimed at addressing these issues~~, but concludes that they have not solved the problems; believes, moreover, that they have contributed to making the system overly complex, are not binding with regard to~~ have brought no improvements, as they have been replaced by ineffective political countr~~y-specific recommendations and do not cover spill- over effects between one Member State and another, or to the euro area or the EU as a whole~~ol mechanisms through numerous weakened market control interventions;

Amendment 497 #

Dariusz ROSATI

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 15

Amendment 498 #

Paulo RANGEL

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 15

Amendment 499 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 15

Amendment 500 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 15

Amendment 501 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 15

15. Acknowledges the ~~improvements brought by the European Semester, the six-pack and the two-pack aimed at addr~~European Semester has put many Member Statess in~~g these issues, but concludes that they have not~~ a fiscal ‘straight jacket’, and instead of solveding the problems~~; believes, moreover, that they hav~~ it has in fact damaged the econtributed to making the system overly complex, are not binding with regard to country-specific recommendations and do not cover spill-over effects between one Member State and another, or to the euro area or the EU as a wholeomies of many Member States and hindered their ability to leverage through debt in a manner which is necessary to thereafter achieve growth;

Amendment 502 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 15

15. Acknowledges the improvements brought by the European Semester, the six- pack and the two-pack aimed at addressing these issues, but concludes that they have not solved the problems, in part due to the fact that the rules have not been fully respected nor the tools available in them activated; believes, moreover, that they have contributed to making the system overly complex, are not binding with regard to country-specific recommendations and do not cover spill- over effects between one Member State and another, or to the euro area or the EU as a whole;

Amendment 503 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 15

Amendment 504 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 15

15. ~~Acknowledges the improvement~~Notes the changes brought by the European Semester, the six- pack and the two-pack aimed at addressing these issues, but concludes that they have not solved the problems~~; believes, moreover, that they have contributed to making the system overly complex, are not bi~~ since they include pro-cyclical and in~~g with regard to country-specific recommendations and do not cover spill- over effects between one Member State and another, or to the euro area or the EU as a whole~~flexible rules on debt and deficit, which can be hardly achieved without aggravating an economic and social recovery;

Amendment 505 #

Jo LEINEN, Mercedes BRESSO, Ramón JÁUREGUI ATONDO, Pedro SILVA PEREIRA, Pervenche BERÈS

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 15

15. ~~Acknowledges the improvement~~Believes that the changes brought by the European Semester, the six- pack and the two-pack ~~aimed at addressing these issues, but concludes that they have not solved the problems; believes, moreover, that they~~ have contributed to making the system overly complex, are not binding with regard to country-specific recommendations and do not cover spill- over effects between one Member State and another, or to the euro area or the EU as a whole and are not solving any problems;

Amendment 506 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 15

15. ~~Acknowledges the improvements brought by~~Takes note of the European Semester, the six- pack and the two-pack aimed at addressing these issues, but concludes that they have not solved the problems; believes, moreover, that they have ~~contributed to making~~rendered the system overly complex~~, are not binding with regard to country- specific recommendations~~ and do not cover spill-over effects between one Member State and another, or to the euro area or the EU as a whole;

Amendment 507 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 15

15. Acknowledges th~~e improvements brought by~~at the European Semester, the six- pack and the two-pack ~~aimed at addressing these issues, but concludes that they have not solv~~have not solved but aggravated the problems; believes, moreover, that they have contributed to making the system not only overly complex, ~~are not binding with regard to country-specific recommendations and do not cover spill-over effects between one Member State and another, or to the euro area or the EU as a whole~~but essentially unjust and ineffective, increasing the disgregation of the EU and the widespread mistrust of the EU citizens; believes, furthermore, that the current "convergence instruments" - in particular the European Semester - should be reformed to include binding social targets;

Amendment 508 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 15 a (new)

15a. Deplores the emphasis put, in the 5 Presidents Report, on "flexible" economies capable to quickly adjust to shocks and on a "new convergence process", facilitated by the creation of national Competitiveness Boards; believes that such measures are based on the assumption that (downward) wage flexibility is the main ‘shock absorber’ and a key tool for assuring the cost competitiveness of national economies. The Competitiveness Boards may in fact institutionalise the pressure towards wage and cost reductions in the pursuit of greater cost competitiveness, especially in less technologically advanced countries; considers that the proposals contained in the "Five presidents’ report" claim to promote greater prosperity and solidarity in Europe while in fact further reinforcing the technocratic character of EU governance;

Amendment 509 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 15 a (new)

15a. Believes that regarding the country-specific recommendations, they should be tailor-made taking into account the different institutional set up of Member States; if needed, concrete recommendations should be done for concrete regions in order to avoid generalization;

Amendment 510 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 15 b (new)

15b. Underlines the astounding economic success of fiscal federalism in some regions of Spain at reducing unemployment and having a higher control of its budgetary deficit, and considers them a role model to reproduce in other parts of the Union;

Amendment 511 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 16

16. Is acutely aware of the need to review the efficacy of the many recent crisis-management measures taken by the EU, and to codify in primary law certain decision-making procedures – such as ‘reverse qualified majority voting’ – as well as the need to entrench the legal bases of the new regulatory framework for the financial sector; agrees with the Five Presidents’ Report that the ‘open method of coordination’ as the basis for Europe’s economic strategy does not function and needs to be elevated into binding legal acts;deleted

Amendment 512 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 16

Amendment 513 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 16

Amendment 514 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 16

Amendment 515 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 16

16. Is acutely aware of the need to review ~~the efficacy of the~~ many recent crisis-management measures taken by the EU, a~~nd to codify in primary law certain decision-making procedu~~s well as the need to change course to the regulatory framework for the financial sector; at the same time, regrets – such as ‘reverse qualified majority voting’ – as well as the need to entrench the legal bases of the new regulatory framework for the financial sector; agrees with the Five Presidents’ Report that the ‘that the measures imposed by the Troika led to a substantial increase of social and economic inequalities to the detriment of the citizens of the countries in which those have been applied; in this regard, reminds that the Court of justice, in its recent judgment Ledra Advertising Ltd and Others v. European ~~method of coordination’ as the basis for Europe’s economic strategy does not function and ne~~Commission and European Central Bank (ECB) (joined cases C-8/15 P to C-10/15 P), has stated that whilst the Member States do not implement EU law in the context of the ESM Treaty, on the other hand the Charter is addresseds to ~~be elevated into binding legal acts~~the EU institutions, including when they act outside the EU legal framework;

Amendment 516 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 16

16. Is acutely aware of the need to review the efficacy of the many recent crisis-management measures taken by the EU, and to codify in primary law certain decision-making procedures – such as ‘reverse qualified majority voting’ – as well as the need to entrench the legal bases of the new regulatory framework for the financial sector; agrees with the Five Presidents’ Report that the ‘open method of coordination’ as the basis for Europe’s economic strategy does not function ~~and needs to be elevated into binding legal acts~~;

Amendment 517 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 16

16. Is ~~acutely~~ aware of the ~~need to review the efficacy of the~~ many recent crisis- management measures taken by the EU, and considers to codify in primary law certain decision-making procedures – such as ‘reverse qualified majority voting’ – as well as the need to entrench the legal bases of the new regulatory framework for the financial sector; agrees with the Five Presidents’ Report that the ‘open method of coordination’ as the basis for Europe’s economic strategy does not function and needs to be elevated into binding legal acts; highlights that Europe’s economic strategy needs to be better coordinated;

Amendment 518 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 16

16. Is acutely aware of the need to review the efficacy of the many recent crisis-management measures taken by the EU, and to codify in primary law certain decision-making procedures – such as ‘reverse qualified majority voting’ – as well as the need to entrench the legal bases of the new regulatory framework for the financial sector; ~~agrees with the Five Presidents’ Report that the ‘open method of coordination’ as the basis for Europe’s economic strategy does not function and needs to be elevated into binding legal acts;~~

Amendment 519 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 16

Amendment 520 #

Jo LEINEN, Mercedes BRESSO, Pedro SILVA PEREIRA, Pervenche BERÈS

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 16

Amendment 521 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 16

16. Is acutely aware of the need to review the efficacy of the many recent crisis-management measures taken by the EU, and to codify in primary law certain decision-making procedures ~~– such as ‘reverse qualified majority voting’ –~~ as well as the need to entrench the legal bases of the new regulatory framework for the financial sector; agrees with the Five Presidents’ Report that the ‘open method of coordination’ as the basis for Europe’s economic strategy does not function ~~and needs to be elevated into binding legal acts~~;

Amendment 522 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 16

16. Is acutely aware of the need to review the efficacy of the many recent crisis-management measures taken by the EU, and to codify in primary law certain decision-making procedures – such as ‘reverse qualified majority voting’ – as well as the need to entrench the legal bases of the new regulatory framework for the financial sector; agrees with the Five Presidents’ Report that the ~~‘open method of coordination’ as the basis for Europe’s economic strategy does not function and needs to be elevated into binding legal acts~~Europe’s economic strategy needs to be better coordinated;

Amendment 523 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 16

16. Is ~~acutely~~ aware of the ~~need to review the efficacy of the~~ many recent crisis- management measures taken by the EU, and is considering whether it is necessary to codify in primary law certain decision- making procedures – such as ‘reverse qualified majority voting’ – as well as the need to entrench the legal bases of the new regulatory framework for the financial sector; agrees with the Five Presidents’ Report that the ‘open method of coordination’ as the basis for Europe’s economic strategy ~~does not function and needs to be elevated into binding legal acts~~needs to be better coordinated;

Amendment 524 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 16

Amendment 525 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 17

Amendment 526 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 17

Amendment 527 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 17

Amendment 528 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 17

Amendment 529 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 17

Amendment 530 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 17

Amendment 531 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 17

Amendment 532 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 17

17. Proposes therefore merging the deficit and debt procedures, the macroeconomic imbalance procedure and the country-specific recommendations into a single ‘convergence code’ of a legally binding nature, setting minimum and maximum standards, where only compliance with this code would allow access to EU funds for investment projects or participation in new instruments that combine economic reform with fiscal incentives such as a fiscal capacity for the euro area or a common debt instrument; the coordination of economic policies as provided for in Article 5 TFEU would therefore become a ‘shared competence’ between the Union and the Member StatThe coordination of economic policies as provided for in Article 5 TFEU should not remove the sovereign rights of EU Member States to independently determine their economic policies;

Amendment 533 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 17

17. Proposes therefore merging the deficit and debt procedures, the macroeconomic imbalance procedure and the country-specific recommendations into a single ‘convergence code’ of a legally binding nature, setting minimum and maximum standards , where only compliance with this code would allow access to EU funds for investment projects or participation in new instruments that combine economic reform with fiscal incentives such as a fiscal capacity for the euro area or a common debt instrument; the coordination of economic policies as provided for in Article 5 TFEU would therefore become a ‘shared competence’ between the Union and the Member Statea ‘convergence code’, where only compliance with this code would allow access to EU funds for investment projects or participation in new instruments that combine economic reform with fiscal incentives such as the programme to support structural reforms;

Amendment 534 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 17

17. Proposes therefore merging the deficit and debt procedures, the macroeconomic imbalance procedure and the country-specific recommendations into a single ‘convergence code’ of a legally binding nature, setting minimum and maximum standards , where only compliance with this code would allow access to EU funds for investment projects or participation in new instruments that combine economic reform with fiscal incentives such as a fiscal capacity for the euro area or a common debt instrument; the coordination of economic policies as provided for in Article 5 TFEU would therefore become a ‘shared competence’ between the Union and the Member Statea ‘convergence code’, where only compliance with this code would allow access to EU funds for investment projects or participation in new instruments that combine economic reform with fiscal incentives such as the programme to support structural reforms;

Amendment 535 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 17

17. Proposes therefore ~~merging the deficit and debt procedures, the macroeconomic imbalance procedure and the country-specific recommendations into a single~~a ‘convergence code’ of a legally binding nature,; s~~etting minimum and maximum standards, where only~~uggests that compliance with this code would allow access to EU funds for investment projects or participation in new instruments that combine economic reform with fiscal incentives such as a fiscal capacity for the euro area or a common debt instrument; the coordination of economic policies as provided for in Article 5 TFEU would therefore become a ‘shared competence’ between the Union and the Member Statesthe Structural Reform Support Programme;

Amendment 536 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 17

17. Proposes therefore merging the deficit and debt procedures, the macroeconomic imbalance procedure and the country-specific recommendations into a single ‘convergence code’ of a legally binding nature, setting minimum and maximum standardsa ‘convergence code’ with the aim to strengthen the competitiveness of the Member States and the EU, where only compliance with this code would allow access to EU funds for investment projects or participation in new instruments that combine economic reform with ~~fiscal~~ incentives such as a fiscal capacity for the euro area or a common debt instrument; the coordination of economic policies as provided for in Article 5 TFEU would therefore become a ‘shared competence’ between the Union and the Member Statesthe Structural Reform Support Programme;

Amendment 537 #

Jo LEINEN, Enrique GUERRERO SALOM, Sylvia-Yvonne KAUFMANN, Mercedes BRESSO, Ramón JÁUREGUI ATONDO, Pedro SILVA PEREIRA, Pervenche BERÈS

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 17

17. Proposes therefore merging the deficit and debt procedures, the macroeconomic imbalance procedure and the country-specific recommendations into a single ‘convergence code’ of a legally binding nature, setting minimum and maximum standards, where only compliance with this code would allow access to EU funds for investment projects or participation in new instruments that combine economic reform with fiscal incentives such as a fiscal capacity for the euro area or a common debt instrument; the coordination of economic policies as provided for in Article 5 TFEU would therefore become a ‘shared competence’ between the Union and the Member StatesBelieves that, as parliamentary input on economic policy guidelines is an important aspect of any democratic system, increased legitimacy at the European level can be ensured by the adoption of Convergence Guidelines which contain targeted priorities for the coming years, subject to a codecision procedure that should be introduced in the next Treaty change;

Amendment 538 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 17

17. ~~Proposes therefore merging the deficit and debt procedures, the macroeconomic imbalance procedure and the country-specific recommendations into a single~~Reiterates its call for the adoption of a ‘convergence code’ of, as a legally binding nature, setting minimum and maximum standards, where only compliance with this code would allow access to EU funds for investment projects or participation in new instruments that combine economic reform with fiscal incentiv act by ordinary legislative procedure, to streamline the existing coordination of economic policies into a more effective convergence of economic policies; such as a fiscal capacity for the euro area or a common debt instrument; the coordination of economic policies as provided for in Article 5 TFEU would therefore become a ‘shared competence’ between the Union and the Member Statggests that the code should be focusing for the first period on convergence criteria regarding taxation, labour market, including among others minimum wages, investment, social cohesion and public administrative and good governance capacities;

Amendment 539 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 17

17. Proposes therefore merging the deficit and debt procedures, the macroeconomic imbalance procedure and the country-specific recommendations into a single ‘convergence code’ of a legally binding nature, setting minimum and maximum standards, where onlyThe coordination of economic policies should never have become a ‘shared competence’ between the Union and the Member States, it should have remained the comp~~lia~~etence ~~with this code would allow access to EU funds for investment projects or participation in new instruments that combine economic reform with fiscal incentiv~~of democratically elected government in Member States; taxation rates, including income and corporate tax rates, s~~uch as a fiscal capacity for the euro area or a common debt instrument; the coordination of economic policies as provide~~hould always remain the competence of democratically elected governments in Member States; the Union and Member States should fwor ~~in Article 5 TFEU would therefore become a ‘sha~~k together to ensured com~~petence’ between the Union and the Member States~~bating against tax avoidance and tax evasion;

Amendment 540 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 17

Amendment 541 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 17 a (new)

17a. Calls for the deduction of net public investment from public debt in an effort to implement the "golden rule for public investment" in order to allow for an optimal intergenerational allocation of public investment; believes that the definition of what qualifies as investment should be assessed; considers that in order to limit short term public debt a corresponding threshold for net investment could be implemented; considers that implementation of the rule could be done through annexing an "investment protocol" to the Treaties under the simplified revision procedure of Art. 48 TEU;

Amendment 542 #

Ramón JÁUREGUI ATONDO, Jonás FERNÁNDEZ, Sergio GUTIÉRREZ PRIETO

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 17 a (new)

17a. Considers that among the criteria included in the convergence code should be an assessment on the extent to which the master plans for infrastructures with added European value proposed for the TEN-T will incorporate an effective tool to stimulate and speed up the construction of the trans-European transport networks. To ensure that the above is the case, deviations from investment plans access to Union funds should be restricted;

Amendment 543 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 17 a (new)

17a. Considers that the proposed ‘convergence code’ needs to be compatible with the European Pillar of Social Rights which should include the establishment of a European framework on minimum wages, a guaranteed level of social protection across the Union and a European Unemployment Insurance;

Amendment 544 #

Pedro SILVA PEREIRA

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 17 a (new)

17a. Believes the ‘convergence code’ should aim, first and foremost, at territorial and social cohesion, with a view to obtaining a level playing field and eliminating the root causes of divergence between Member States and between regions;

Amendment 545 #

Jo LEINEN, Enrique GUERRERO SALOM, Mercedes BRESSO, Ramón JÁUREGUI ATONDO, Pervenche BERÈS

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 17 a (new)

17a. Proposes that compliance with this code would allow access new instruments that combine economic reform with fiscal incentives such as a budgetary capacity for the euro area or a common debt instrument;

Amendment 546 #

Jo LEINEN, Sylvia-Yvonne KAUFMANN, Mercedes BRESSO, Enrique GUERRERO SALOM, Ramón JÁUREGUI ATONDO

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 17 b (new)

17b. Suggests that the coordination of economic policies as provided for in Article 5 TFEU should become a ‘shared competence’ between the Union and the Member States;

Amendment 547 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 18

Amendment 548 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 18

Amendment 549 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 18

Amendment 550 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 18

Amendment 551 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 18

Amendment 552 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 18

Amendment 553 #

Jo LEINEN, Mercedes BRESSO, Ramón JÁUREGUI ATONDO, Pedro SILVA PEREIRA, Pervenche BERÈS

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 18

Amendment 554 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 18

18. Believes that, in order to reduce the still excessively high debt burden of Member States, ~~such~~ a common debt instrument needs to be established, inspired by the proposal by the German Council of Economic Experts of 9 November 2011, whereby euro-area members would undertake joint and several liability for a sinking fund, with strong individual commitments on structural reforms to reduce the debt-to- GDP ratio to the required maximum of 60 %; insists that euro-area members would only be able to participate when they are in compliance with the convergence code, as this will prevent moral hazard;

Amendment 555 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 18

18. Believes that~~, in order to reduce the still excessively high debt burden of Member States, such~~ a common debt instrument needs to be established, inspired by the proposal by the German Council of Economic Experts of 9 November 2011, whereby euro-area members would undertake joint and several liability for a sinking fund, with strong individual commitments ~~on structural reforms~~ to reduce the debt-to-GDP ratio ~~to the required maximum of 60 %; insists that euro-area members would only be able to participate when they are in compliance with the convergence code, as this will prevent moral hazard~~;

Amendment 556 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 18

18. Believes that, in order to reduce the still excessively high debt burden of Member States, ~~such~~ a common debt instrument needs to be established, inspired by the proposal by the German Council of Economic Experts of 9 November 2011, whereby euro-area members would undertake joint and several liability for a sinking fund, with strong individual commitments on structural reforms to reduce the debt-to-GDP ratio to the required maximum of 60 %; insists that euro-area members would only be able to participate when they are in compliance with the convergence code, as this will prevent moral hazard;

Amendment 557 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 18

18. Believes that, in order to reduce the still excessively high debt burden of Member States, such a common debt instrument needs to be established, inspired by the proposal by the German Council of Economic Experts of 9 November 2011, whereby euro-area members would undertake joint and several liability for a sinking fund, with strong individual commitments on structural reforms to reduce the debt-to- GDP ratio to the required maximum of 60 %; insists that euro-area members would only be able to participate when they are in compliance with the convergence code, as this will prevent moral hazardtructural reforms that increase the competitiveness of Member States and the Eurozone as a whole are necessary. Points to the Commission communication on flexibility in the SGP, allowing Member States to conduct anticyclical fiscal policies in times of economic downturn;

Amendment 558 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 18

18. Believes that, in order to reduce the still excessively high debt burden of Member States, such a common debt instrument needs to be established, inspired by the proposal by the German Council of Economic Experts of 9 November 2011, whereby euro-area members would undertake joint and several liability for a sinking fund, with strong individual commitments on structural reforms to reduce the debt-to-GDP ratio to the required maximum of 60 %a common debt instrument needs to be established whereby euro-area members would undertake joint and several liability for an investment fund; insists that euro-area members wshould ~~only be able to participate when they are in compliance~~participate to the instrument on the basis of the principle of cooperation and within the con~~vergence code, as this will prevent moral hazard~~text of common policies of investments, adopted with the purpose of overcoming the imbalances in the Eurozone;

Amendment 559 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 18

Amendment 560 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 18

18. Believes that, in order to reduce the still excessively high debt burden of Member States, such a common debt instrument needs to be established, ~~inspired by the proposal by the German Council of Economic Experts of 9 November 2011,~~ whereby euro-area members would undertake joint and several liability for a sinking fund, ~~with strong individual commitments on structural reforms~~ to reduce the debt-to-GDP ratio to the required maximum of 60 %; ~~insists that euro-area members would only be able to participate when they are in compliance with the convergence cod~~at the same time, calls on all the relevant national authorities in accordance with Article 7(9) of Regulation No 472/2013 to carry out a debt audit; believes that this audit should define the amounts of odious debt for each Member State, asnd th~~is will prevent moral hazard~~at these should be immediately cancelled from the obligations of those States;

Amendment 561 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 18 a (new)

18a. Stresses that in the current economic environment of subdued demand, the monetary policy must be complemented by expansionary fiscal policies as well as by strengthening unions collective bargaining power in order to ensure wage growth in line with countries average productivity growth and the ECBs inflation target; deems it necessary, in this context, to revise the objectives of the ECB;

Amendment 562 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 18 a (new)

18a. Considers it necessary to open the debate at EU level concerning the subject of German war reparations where these are being demanded by Greece and the other EU Member States and considers that the satisfaction of these is not only an economic obligation incumbent on Germany but also an opportunity to stabilise the European economy and at the same time to restore justice;

Amendment 563 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 18 a (new)

18a. Notes that if Member States are able to obtain budget surpluses in economic upturn, a shock absorbing mechanism of over 3% of GDP would be available to Member States to implement countercyclical fiscal policies in times of economic downturn without breaking the rules set out in the Stability and Growth Pact;

Amendment 564 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 18 b (new)

18b. Calls for better use of the existing structural funds in the direction of fostering cohesion;

Amendment 565 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 19

19. Stresses, however, that conditionality in this new debt instrument will only be credible if complemented by an insolvency procedure for sovereigns, which will not only provide predictability to the markets in the event of an insolvent state, but also safeguard market discipline for both Member States and private creditors;deleted

Amendment 566 #

Jo LEINEN, Mercedes BRESSO, Ramón JÁUREGUI ATONDO, Pedro SILVA PEREIRA, Pervenche BERÈS

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 19

Amendment 567 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 19

Amendment 568 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 19

Amendment 569 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 19

Amendment 570 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 19

Amendment 571 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 19

Amendment 572 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 19

Amendment 573 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 19

19. Stresses~~, however, that conditionality in this new debt instrument will only be credible if complemented by an insolvency procedure for sovereigns, which~~ the need to establish a regulatory framework of reference for the insolvency procedure for sovereigns whose foreign debt is unlawful, unbalanced or unsustainable, based on a mechanism for restructuring the sovereign debt aimed at significantly reducing the foreign debt to bring it back down to sustainable levels; Stresses that this will not only provide predictability to the markets in the event of an insolvent state, but also safeguard market discipline for both Member States and private creditors;

Amendment 574 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 19

Amendment 575 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 19

19. Stresses, however, that conditionality in ~~this~~any new ~~debt~~incentive instrument will only be credible if complemented by an insolvency procedure for sovereigns, which will not only provide predictability to the markets in the event of an insolvent state, but also safeguard market discipline for both Member States and private creditors;

Amendment 576 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 19

19. Stresses ~~, however,~~ that conditionality in ~~this~~any new ~~debt~~incentive instrument will only be credible if complemented by an insolvency procedure for sovereigns, which will not only provide predictability to the markets in the event of an insolvent state, but also safeguard market discipline for both Member States and private creditors;

Amendment 577 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 19

19. Stresses, however, that conditionality ~~in this new debt instrument~~ will only be credible if complemented by an insolvency procedure for sovereigns, which will not only provide predictability to the markets in the event of an insolvent state, but also safeguard market discipline for both Member States and private creditors;

Amendment 578 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 20

20. Calls for the integration of the Fiscal Compact into the EU legal framework as well as the incorporation of the ESM and the Single Resolution Fund into EU law, with corresponding democratic oversight by Parliament;deleted

Amendment 579 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 20

Amendment 580 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 20

Amendment 581 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 20

Amendment 582 #

Jo LEINEN, Mercedes BRESSO, Ramón JÁUREGUI ATONDO, Pedro SILVA PEREIRA, Pervenche BERÈS

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 20

Amendment 583 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 20

20. Calls for the ~~integration of the Fiscal Compact~~evaluation and, if necessary, review of the Fiscal Compact and its subsequent integration into the EU legal framework ~~as well as~~; calls likewise for the incorporation of the ESM and the Single Resolution Fund into EU law, with corresponding democratic oversight by Parliament and further development of the inter-parliamentary conference foreseen in Article 13, to allow a substantial and timely discussions between the EP and the national parliaments where needed;

Amendment 584 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 20

20. Calls for the ~~integration of the~~ Fiscal Compact into ~~the EU legal framework as well as the incorporation of the ESM and the Single Resolution Fund into EU law, with corresponding democratic oversight by Parliament~~be abolished;

Amendment 585 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 20

Amendment 586 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 20

20. Calls for the integration of the Fiscal Compact into the EU legal framework as well as the incorporation of the ESM and the Single Resolution Fund into EU law, on the basis of a comprehensive assessment of its implementation and with corresponding democratic oversight by Parliament;

Amendment 587 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 20

20. Calls for the ~~integration~~replacement of the Fiscal Compact ~~into the EU legal framework as well as the incorporation of the ESM and the Single Resolution Fund into EU law, with corresponding democratic oversight by Parliament~~and the introduction of a really symmetric mechanism for macroeconomic policy coordination that addresses surpluses as well as deficits and does not place the burden of adjustment on deficit countries alone;

Amendment 588 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 20

20. Calls for the integration of the Fiscal Compact into the EU legal framework a~~s well as~~nd notes that the incorporation of the ESM ~~and the Single Resolution Fund into EU law, wi~~into EU law would not be possible without a fundamental departure from the courre~~sponding democrat~~ntly underlying principles of economic gover~~sight by Parliament~~nance;

Amendment 589 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 20

20. ~~Calls for the integration of the Fiscal Compact into the EU legal framework as well as~~Notes that the incorporation of the ESM and of the Single Resolution Fund ~~into EU law, wi~~would only be possible by turning away from the courre~~sponding democratic oversight by Parliament~~nt principles of economic control;

Amendment 590 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 20

20. Calls for the integration of the Fiscal Compact into the EU legal framework a~~s well as~~nd notes that the incorporation of the ESM and the Single Resolution Fund ~~into EU law, wi~~would only be possible by turning away from the courre~~sponding democratic oversight by Parliament~~nt principles of economic control;

Amendment 591 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 20

20. Calls for the integration of the Fiscal Compact into the EU legal framework a~~s well as the incorporation of~~nd notes that the ECJ ruled in the Pringle case that the ESM can~~d th~~not be Sin~~gle Resolution Fund into EU law, with corresponding democratic oversight by Parliament~~corporated into the Community framework without a complete treaty change;

Amendment 592 #

Sylvie GOULARD

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 20 a (new)

20a. In order to ensure that control and accountability is undertaken by those contributing to these instruments believes that the creation of a Euro Area Parliament within the European Parliament will be needed; within the Euro Area Parliament considers it essential to differentiate between discussion concerning policies for the euro area and related decision making; modalities must be found to allow all Member State who are committed to joining the euro area to participate in discussions concerning the euro area, if they so wish, however only Member States who are members of the euro area and contribute to rescue funds etc. should be able to vote on these decisions;

Amendment 593 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 20 a (new)

20a. Highlights that the role of the ESM will evolve in the future, from this of a crisis management agency into, most likely, this of a debt management agency and backstop for the Single Resolution Fund; stresses that this warrants a comprehensive review of its architecture, in particular as regards its institutional arrangements such as voting procedures as well as the design of the Direct Recapitalisation Instrument;

Amendment 594 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 20 b (new)

20b. Believes that any future attempts to reintroduce a double-majority for euro- area/non-euro-area Member States in the field of financial legislation must be refused as it would violate article 3 TEU;

Amendment 595 #