Awaiting committee decision
2016/2063(INI) European Central Bank annual report for 2015
Lead committee dossier: ECON/8/05938
Legal Basis RoP 052
| Role | Committee | Rapporteur | Shadows |
|---|---|---|---|
| Lead | ECON | TREMOSA I BALCELLS Ramon (ALDE) | MANN Thomas (EPP), FERNÁNDEZ Jonás (S&D), LUCKE Bernd (ECR), DE MASI Fabio (GUE/NGL), URTASUN Ernest (Verts/ALE), VALLI Marco (EFD), ANNEMANS Gerolf (ENF) |
| Opinion | EMPL |
Legal Basis RoP 052
Activites
-
2016/11/21
Indicative plenary sitting date, 1st reading/single reading
-
2016/10/11
Vote scheduled in committee, 1st reading/single reading
-
2016/04/28
Committee referral announced in Parliament, 1st reading/single reading
Documents
| Amendments | Dossier |
| 269 |
2016/2063(INI)
2016/07/27
ECON
269 amendments...
Amendment 1 #
Motion for a resolution Citation 2 a (new) - having regard to Article 127(2) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,
Amendment 10 #
Motion for a resolution Recital B B. whereas
Amendment 100 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 3 3. Believes that the APP would have an even higher impact on the European economy if it had a higher share of EIB bond buying, particularly related to
Amendment 101 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 3 3. Believes that the APP would have an even higher impact on the European economy if it had a higher share of EIB bond buying, particularly related to the TEN-T and TEN-E (projects with proven added European value in social and economic terms), and SME securitised loans, or if the ECB were able to buy Member States’ public debt directly linked to investment and research expenditure on the secondary markets; believes that in order to choose the eligibility of public debt assets for the APP, the Eurosystem should assign a complementary credit rating in addition to those assigned by private agencies; warns that the outright purchases of bonds issues by non-bank corporations within the Corporate Sector Purchase Programme (CSPP) constitute a market distortion which is justifiable in the present circumstances but must be temporary;
Amendment 102 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 3 a (new) 3a. Urges the ECB together with other relevant Union bodies and in the light of the requirement under TFEU 127.1 that the ESCB shall support the general economic policies in the Union to consider the possibility of using its APP strategically, by encouraging in coordination with the EIB the development of safe and simple marketable asset classes, suitable for the Program, that are linked to the achievement of key EU targets particularly the transition to a sustainable and fair economy and to consider drawing up a range of green and social projects for which credit created through quantitative easing could be used as direct financing;
Amendment 103 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 3 a (new) 3a. Calls on the European Central Bank to step up direct involvement in operations to purchase government bonds in the secondary markets, so as not to be constrained by the breakdown derived from its capital subscription key;
Amendment 104 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 3 a (new) 3a. Underlines the risks arising from the ECB's corporate bond purchases, particularly in terms of vested interests and moral hazard;
Amendment 105 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 3 b (new) 3b. Is of the opinion that any asset backed security related purchase by the eurosystem as part of its unconventional policy toolbox should be strictly limited to the most senior tranches of the most simple and transparent products and that purchases of mezzanine tranches should be avoided while originators should retain at least retain 20% of original risks;
Amendment 106 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 3 b (new) 3b. Calls on the European Central Bank to consider including other types of assets than government and corporate bonds in its programme of purchases on secondary markets;
Amendment 107 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 3 c (new) 3c. Urges the European Central Bank to take further measures, such as increasing the amount of debt securities to be acquired in its purchase programme in secondary markets;
Amendment 108 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 3 d (new) 3d. Takes the view that the European Central Bank has distinguished itself as the most effective European institution in combating the crisis, at least until March of 2016;
Amendment 109 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 3 e (new) 3e. Draws the conclusion that the programme to purchase public and private debt securities in secondary markets would be more effective if there were a risk-free asset in the European Union, which could be established by the Commission issuing EU bonds;
Amendment 11 #
Motion for a resolution Recital B B. whereas, according to the same forecast, unemployment in the euro area is expected to record a
Amendment 110 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 4 4.
Amendment 111 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 4 4.
Amendment 112 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 4 4. A
Amendment 113 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 4 4. Agrees with ECB President Mario Draghi that the single monetary policy cannot stimulate aggregate demand unless it is complemented by sound fiscal policies and ambitious structural reform programmes at Member State level;
Amendment 114 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 4 4. Agrees with ECB President Mario Draghi that
Amendment 115 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 4 4. Agrees with ECB President Mario Draghi that the single monetary policy cannot stimulate aggregate demand unless it is complemented by
Amendment 116 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 4 4.
Amendment 117 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 4 4. Agrees with ECB President Mario Draghi that the single monetary policy cannot stimulate aggregate demand unless it is complemented by s
Amendment 118 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 4 4. Agrees with ECB President Mario Draghi that the single monetary policy cannot stimulate aggregate demand unless it is complemented by sound fiscal policies and ambitious structural reform programmes at Member State level; recalls that the main
Amendment 119 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 4 a (new) 4a. Agrees that a well-functioning, diversified and integrated capital market would support the transmission of the single monetary policy. Calls in that context for a swift completion of the banking union and full MS compliance with its related legislation as well as the building of a financial union as it is a decisive step to improve the effectiveness of the single monetary policy and to mitigate the risks arising from a shock in the financial sector;
Amendment 12 #
Motion for a resolution Recital B B. whereas, according to the same forecast, unemployment in the euro area is expected to record a slow decrease, from 10.9 % at the end of 2015 to 9.9 % at the end of 2017; whereas Brexit could have an adverse impact on employment levels in the euro area; whereas disparities between the unemployment rates of the Member States continued to widen in 2015, with figures ranging from 4.6 % in Germany to 24.9 % in Greece;
Amendment 120 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 4 a (new) 4a. Draws attention in this respect to the conclusions of recent studies1a that showed that the neutral interest rates have fallen all over the world over the last decades as a result of lower growth expectations and higher preference for savings; points out that this situation is likely to result in monetary policy being more constrained and less effective as it runs more often the risk of hitting the zero lower bound; __________________ 1a"Secular drivers of the global real interest rate", Bank of England Staff Working Paper No. 571, December 2015
Amendment 121 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 4 a (new) 4a. Considers it necessary for the Member States to take back their tax and monetary autonomy in order to pursue the requisite expansive economic policies and make public investments in support of economic growth;
Amendment 122 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 4 b (new) 4b. Considers of crucial importance to solve the issue of non-performing loans for the national banking sectors which are the most affected in order to restore a smooth transmission of monetary policy for the whole euro area;
Amendment 123 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 5 Amendment 124 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 5 Amendment 125 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 5 5. Underlines that
Amendment 126 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 5 5. Underlines that structural reforms in the economy and the labour market should
Amendment 127 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 5 5. Underlines that structural reforms in the economy and the labour market should also fully take into account
Amendment 128 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 5 5. Underlines that structural reforms in the economy
Amendment 129 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 5 5. Underlines that structural reforms in the economy and the labour market should also fully take into account the demographic trends in Europe, in order to create incentives for a more balanced demographic structure that would make it easier to maintain an inflation target of around 2 %; urges the ECB to contribute to creating conditions incentivising Member States to implement ambitious structural reforms to enhance flexibility and competition in product and labour markets;
Amendment 13 #
Motion for a resolution Recital C C. whereas,
Amendment 130 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 5 5. Underlines that structural reforms in the economy and the labour market should also fully take into account the demographic trends in Europe, in order to create incentives for a more balanced demographic structure that would make it easier to maintain an inflation target of around 2 %; stresses that structural reform should go hand in hand with investment in the real economy;
Amendment 131 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 5 5. Underlines that structural reforms in the economy and the labour market should also fully take into account the demographic trends in Europe, in order to create incentives for a more balanced demographic structure that would make it easier to maintain an inflation target of around 2 %; points up the risk of negative investment expectations where demographic trends are unfavourable;
Amendment 132 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 5 5. Underlines that structural reforms in the economy and the labour market, whilst also considering social aspects, should
Amendment 133 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 5 5. Underlines that structural and socially balanced reforms in the economy and the labour market should also fully take into account the demographic trends in Europe, in order to create incentives for a more balanced demographic structure that would make it easier to maintain an inflation target of around 2 %;
Amendment 134 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 6 6. Notes
Amendment 135 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 6 6. Notes, however, that even though
Amendment 136 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 6 6. Notes, however, that even though the
Amendment 137 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 6 6. Notes, however, that even though the impact of unconventional measures has been significant, inflation is not expected to converge to the 2 % medium-term
Amendment 138 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 6 6. Notes, however, that even though the impact of unconventional measures has been significant, as regards in particular funding conditions for banks in the periphery inflation is not expected by the ECB to converge to the 2 % medium-term objective
Amendment 139 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 6 6. Notes, however, that even though the impact of unconventional measures has been significant, inflation is not expected to converge to the 2 % medium-term objective at the 2017 horizon; notes that the current recovery in bank and market lending has not wholly produced the expected effect on the existing investment gap in the euro area so far, even as the rules made necessary by Banking Union have enforced stricter financial criteria on banks; Asks therefore for improved fiscal policies, that are both sustainable and growth-inducing, while promoting structural reforms that directly facilitate investment and growth;
Amendment 14 #
Motion for a resolution Recital C C. whereas, again according to the same forecast, the government deficit in the euro area will gradually decline from 2.1 % in 2015 to 1.9 % in 2016 and 1.6 % in 2017 and the debt-to-GDP ratio is also forecast to decline for the first time since the beginning of the crisis, even though there are still four countries involved in the Commission’s excessive deficit procedure
Amendment 140 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 6 6. Notes, however, that even though the impact of unconventional measures has been significant, inflation is not expected to converge to the 2 % medium-term objective at the 2017 horizon; notes that the current recovery in bank and market lending has not wholly produced the expected effect on the existing investment gap in the euro area so far; considers that it is necessary for a restart of investment activity that there have to be readjustments to all malinvestments created during the preceding boom period;
Amendment 141 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 6 6. Notes, however, that even though the impact, risks and spillover effects of unconventional measures ha
Amendment 142 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 6 a (new) 6a. Draws attention to the fact that, in spite of the high level of liquidity provided by the ECB and other central banks, there seems to be a decrease in the availability of international assets, that is, high quality assets that are internationally accepted as means of payments, due to the downgrading of some sovereign issuers and to other sources of international assets not being elastic enough to offset these downgrades; is worried that this might result in constraints on trade flows; calls on the ECB to investigate this matter and study, in cooperation with other central banks and the IMF the seriousness of the issue and possible remedies;
Amendment 143 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 6 a (new) 6a. Points out that, while the effects on the real economy have been very limited, banks have been able to access funding at virtually no or very low cost which has directly subsidised their balance sheets; deplores the fact that the size of this subsidy, despite representing a clear fiscal spill-over effect of monetary, is not monitored and published and that it is free from strict conditionality in terms of whether or how it is invested; insists that any extraordinary measures of this kind should be accompanied by measures to mitigate distortions to markets and the economy;
Amendment 144 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 7 7. Deplores the existing
Amendment 145 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 7 7.
Amendment 146 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 7 7. Deplores the existing, albeit gradually decreasing, gaps between the financing rates granted to SMEs and those granted to bigger companies, between lending rates on small and large loans, and between credit conditions for SMEs located in different euro area countries, but recognises the limits of what monetary policy can achieve in this respect; stresses that the lack of trust and transparency in the banking system as well as the persistent need for balance sheet adjustments affect the availability of credit for SMEs in some Member States and dampens economic activity;
Amendment 147 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 7 7. Deplores the existing, albeit gradually decreasing, gaps between the financing rates granted to SMEs and those granted to bigger companies, between lending rates on small and large loans, and between credit conditions for SMEs located in different euro area countries, but recognises the limits of what monetary policy can achieve in this respect; points up the risk, moreover, of possible further distortions of competition as a result of ECB corporate bond buying on the capital market, in which SMEs do not participate;
Amendment 148 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 7 a (new) 7a. Points out that the below-target level of inflation expected over the coming years will have an impact on a number of Member States' debt reduction programmes;
Amendment 149 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 8 8. Underlines that
Amendment 15 #
Motion for a resolution Recital C C. whereas, again according to the same forecast, the government deficit in the euro area is expected to gradually decline from 2.1 % in 2015 to 1.9 % in 2016 and 1.6 % in 2017 and the debt-to- GDP ratio is also forecast to decline for the first time since the beginning of the crisis, even though there are still four euro area countries involved in the Commission’s excessive deficit procedure: France, Spain, Greece and Portugal; whereas Cyprus, Ireland and Slovenia have implemented macroeconomic adjustment programmes which have enabled them to reduce their respective deficits to less than the threshold of 3 % of GDP;
Amendment 150 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 8 8.
Amendment 151 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 8 8. Underlines that a prolonged period of ultra-low (negative) interest rate
Amendment 152 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 8 8. Underlines that a prolonged period of ultra-low (negative) interest rate policy creates
Amendment 153 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 8 8. Underlines that a necessarily prolonged period of ultra-low (negative) interest rate policy could create
Amendment 154 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 8 8. Underlines that a prolonged period of
Amendment 155 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 8 8. Underlines that a prolonged period of ultra-low (negative) interest rate policy creates potential risks for financial stability and ultimately the whole economy, in particular for private savings and pension and insurance funds; warns that a decline in the profitability of banks will dampen their willingness to develop lending activity; points particularly to the negative effect of such an interest rate policy on local and regional banks and savings banks with little funding from financial markets, and to risks in the insurance sector;
Amendment 156 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 8 8. Underlines that a prolonged period of ultra-low (negative) interest rate policy creates potential risks for financial stability and ultimately the whole economy and emphasises the need for proper, prudent and timely management of the winding down; warns that a decline in the profitability of banks will dampen their willingness to develop lending activity; points particularly to the effect of such an interest rate policy on local and regional banks and savings banks with little funding from financial markets, and to risks in the insurance sector;
Amendment 157 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 9 Amendment 158 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 9 9. Understands the reason why negative rates have been implemented, but remains very concerned about the potential consequences of negative interest rate policy for individual savers and the financial equilibrium of pension s
Amendment 159 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 9 9.
Amendment 16 #
Motion for a resolution Recital C C. whereas, again according to the same forecast, the government deficit in the euro area
Amendment 160 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 9 9.
Amendment 161 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 9 9. Understands the reason why negative rates have been implemented, but remains concerned about the potential consequences of negative interest rate policy for individual savers and the financial equilibrium of pension schemes; believes that
Amendment 162 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 9 9.
Amendment 163 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 9 9. Understands the reason why negative rates have been implemented, but
Amendment 164 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 9 9. Understands the reason why negative rates have been implemented
Amendment 165 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 9 9. Understands the reason why negative policy rates have been implemented by the ECB, but remains concerned about the potential consequences of negative interest rate
Amendment 166 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 9 a (new) 9a. Notes, furthermore, that, due to the downward rigidity of deposit rates, the benefits of pushing the rates on deposits at the ECB further into negative territory would be limited unless a fully tiered system is introduced; calls therefore on the ECB to study whether such a system would constitute an improvement to the current policy and, if it would, how best to design it;
Amendment 167 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 9 a (new) 9a. Is concerned in particular that, in the absence of Union and Member State actions to stimulate demand, continued application of unconventional monetary policy actions will further exacerbate the problems posed by sustained low interest rates and excess liquidity chasing yield leading to actual and potential distortions and instabilities in financial markets;
Amendment 168 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 9 a (new) 9a. Underlines that negative rates are no substitute for policies boosting aggregate demand, particularly through stabilizing income distribution via wage growth in line with trend productivity and the ECB's inflation target;
Amendment 169 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 9 b (new) 9b. Remains concerned by the still significant levels of non-marketable assets and asset-backed securities put forward as collateral to the eurosystem in the framework of its refinancing operations; reiterates its request to the ECB to provide information on which central banks have accepted such securities as well as to disclose valuation methods regarding such assets; underlines that such disclosure would be beneficial for the purpose of parliamentary scrutiny of supervisory tasks conferred to the ECB;
Amendment 17 #
Motion for a resolution Recital D Amendment 170 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 9 b (new) 9b. Agrees with ECB President Mario Draghi that negative rates are a symptom of an underlying problem caused by a global excess of savings and a lack of appetite for investment; underlines in this context that the euro area's and particularly Germany's current account surplus of €257 billion in 2015 strongly contribute to this problem globally;
Amendment 171 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 10 10. Asks the ECB to study how the transmission of monetary policy differs in those Member States with centralised and concentrated banking sectors and those with a more diverse network of local and regional banks
Amendment 172 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 10 10. Asks the ECB to study how the transmission of monetary policy differs in those Member States with centralised and concentrated banking sectors and those with a more diverse network of local and regional banks; calls, moreover, on the ECB to make its findings public;
Amendment 173 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 10 10. Asks the ECB to study how the transmission of monetary policy differs in those Member States with centralised and concentrated banking sectors and those with a more diverse network of local and regional banks and bigger reliance on capital markets;
Amendment 174 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 11 11. Calls on the ECB to
Amendment 175 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 11 11. Calls on the ECB to carefully assess the risks of a future resurgence of housing bubbles owing to
Amendment 176 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 11 11. Calls on the ECB to carefully assess the risks of a future resurgence of housing bubbles owing to its
Amendment 177 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 11 11. Calls on the ECB to carefully assess the risks of a future resurgence of housing bubbles owing to its ultra-low (negative) interest rate policy, especially in the light of much increased lending volumes and disproportionately high prices in the property sector, particularly in big cities, and to design specific macroprudential recommendations in this regard, not least to dispel fears of a negative impact as a result of socioeconomic structural change;
Amendment 178 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 11 11. Calls on the ECB to carefully assess the risks of a future resurgence of asset and housing bubbles owing to its ultra-low (negative) interest rate policy, particularly in big cities, and to design specific macroprudential recommendations in this regard;
Amendment 179 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 11 a (new) 11a. Asks the Commission to come forward with proposals to improve macroprudential oversight and the policy tools available for mitigating the risks in shadow banking, in the light of the warning by the ECB that, given the steady expansion over the last decade to 22 trillion euro in assets of non-bank credit intermediation, further initiatives are needed to monitor and assess vulnerabilities in the growing shadow banking sector;
Amendment 18 #
Motion for a resolution Recital D D. whereas, according to the same forecast, the euro area
Amendment 180 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 11 b (new) 11b. Supports the ECB's assessment that the current CRR/CRD IV package lacks certain measures which could also effectively address specific types of systemic risk - such as (i) various asset- side measures including the application of limits to loan-to-value, loan-to income or debt service-to-income ratios, and (ii) the introduction of various exposure limits falling outside the current definition of large exposures; urges the Commission to examine the need for legislative proposals in this regard; notes that some of these measures could already be integrated in the context of the ongoing legislative work around the EDIS proposal;
Amendment 181 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 11 c (new) 11c. Points out, that as indicated by the ECBs role in relation to liquidity provision to Greece in June 2015 and the leaked discussions of the ECB Council of Governors on the solvency of Cypriot banks, the concept of 'insolvency' underpinning the provision of central bank liquidity to institutions in the Euro area lacks a sufficient level of clarity and legal certainty as the ECB has in the previous years alternatively referred to a static concept (whether a bank complies with minimum capital requirements at a certain point in time) or to a dynamic concept of solvency based on forward looking scenarios of stress tests for justifying the continuation or the limitation of ELA provision; underlines that such a lack of clarity needs to be addressed so as to guarantee legal certainty and foster financial stability;
Amendment 182 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 11 d (new) 11d. Warns that prolonged non- conventional monetary policy actions can have significant distributional effects between the wealthy and poor, young and old, and also between regions with different financial structures; urges and suggests the ECB to monitor comprehensively in its next annual report the side effects of its monetary policy measures and its impact on inequality;
Amendment 183 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 11 e (new) 11e. Underlines the still urgent need for a deep structural reform of the euro area banking system as 'too-big and interconnected to fail' institutions still enjoy unjustifiable public subsidies and represent a fundamental treat to the stability and efficient allocation of capital in the EU and international economies; emphasizes that an institution that is 'too- big to fail' must be considered 'too dangerous to exist' and should therefore be downsized, simplified into manageable entities with defined economic functions and put to the service of the real economy;
Amendment 184 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 12 Amendment 185 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 12 12. Recognises the existence of distributional consequences of the ECB policies, which
Amendment 186 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 12 12. Recognises the existence of distributional consequences of the ECB policies, which
Amendment 187 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 12 12. Recognises the existence of distributional consequences of the ECB policies, e.g. the Cantillon Effect, which can be perceived as increasing inequalities
Amendment 188 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 12 12.
Amendment 189 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 12 12.
Amendment 19 #
Motion for a resolution Recital D D. whereas, according to the same forecast, the euro area will continue to
Amendment 190 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 12 12. Recognises the existence of distributional consequences of the ECB policies,
Amendment 191 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 12 a (new) 12a. Points out that under normal circumstances monetary policy is in principle supposed to involve unbiased and unsystematic distributional effects in the short to medium term while fostering price stability in the longer term; notes however that under the current non- conventional policy regime, distributional consequences arise in the short-term while the long-term effects of such unconventional policies are as yet unknown and subject to controversy within the academic and policy making spheres;
Amendment 192 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 12 a (new) 12a. Stresses that greater flexibility in the Stability and Growth Pact rules could allow a better response to be made to the weak recovery and money to be found for the necessary structural reforms;
Amendment 193 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 13 13. Notes that the ECB
Amendment 194 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 13 13. Notes that the ECB
Amendment 195 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 13 13. Notes that the ECB’s APP has lowered bond yields in most Member States to unprecedented levels; warns against the risk of too-high valuations on the bond markets, which would be difficult to handle if interest rates start to rise again, particularly for the countries involved in the excessive deficit procedure or with high levels of debt; insists that the APP has to be ended;
Amendment 196 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 13 a (new) 13a. Stresses the prerequisites defined by the Court of Justice that have to be met by any purchase of government bonds of Member States of the Euro zone on the secondary market by the European System of Central Banks ("ESCB"): purchases are not announced, the volume of the purchases is limited from the outset, there is a minimum period between the issue of the government bonds and their purchase by the ESCB that is defined from the outset and prevents the issuing conditions from being distorted, the ESCB purchases only government bonds of Member States that have bond market access enabling the funding of such bonds, purchased bonds are only in exceptional cases held until maturity and purchases are restricted or ceased and purchased bonds are remarketed should continuing the intervention become unnecessary;
Amendment 197 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 14 Amendment 198 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 14 Amendment 199 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 14 Amendment 20 #
Motion for a resolution Recital D D. whereas, according to the same forecast, the euro area will continue to exhibit an external surplus, of around 3 % of GDP, pushed mainly by those euro area economies that are in less need of structural reforms;
Amendment 200 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 14 14.
Amendment 201 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 14 14. Deplores the fact that some Member States
Amendment 202 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 14 14. Deplores the fact that some Member States are not using the ultra-low (negative) interest rate policy
Amendment 203 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 14 14. Deplores the fact that some Member States are using the ultra-low (negative) interest rate policy as a pretext to defer the necessary consolidation of their primary public deficits, particularly at central government level; asks therefore to provide counter-incentives by establishing a mechanism for sovereign debt restructuring within the euro zone;
Amendment 204 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 14 14. Deplores the fact that some Member States are using the ultra-low (negative) interest rate policy as a pretext to defer the necessary consolidation of their primary public deficits, particularly at central government level, and points in this connection to the Stability and Growth Pact commitments;
Amendment 205 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 14 14. Deplores the fact that some Member States are using the ultra-low (negative) interest rate policy as a pretext to defer the necessary consolidation of their primary public deficits and necessary structural reforms, particularly at central government level;
Amendment 206 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 14 a (new) 14a. Insists that the euro area cannot be seen as a single macroeconomic entity; insists further that the euro area can only survive if its members can exit the euro area both voluntarily and, in the case of grave misconduct, as last resort, involuntarily; recommends that the voluntary exit mechanism should be rooted in democratic decision-making at the level of the Member States; considers that economic integration does neither presuppose a single currency nor coordination of economic or fiscal policy- making between Member States; considers that Member States should therefore no longer be required to enter the third stage of the EMU and adopt the euro as their currency once they meet the convergence criteria; regards the idea that the EMU has to be completed as misguided;
Amendment 207 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 14 a (new) 14a. Notes that bank supervision and SREP application in SSM Member States are uneven and failing in the periphery where they matter most, since weak public governance has impacted local regulatory governance and development of competencies, which in turn has affected banks' and, thus financial firms' corporate governance and internal controls;
Amendment 208 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 14 a (new) 14a. Calls on the European Central Bank to consider taking legislative initiative, in accordance with Article 129(3) of the TFEU, in the reform, by ordinary legislative procedure, of Article 33(1)(a) of the ECB Statute, which could allow to make the profits it generates annually into an own resource of the Union;
Amendment 209 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 14 a (new) 14a. Is concerned about the current 'liquidity trap' the European economy seems to have fallen into, with interest rates at the Zero Lower Bound (ZLB), weak demand forecasts, limited investment and spending by households and businesses, in particular in surplus countries;
Amendment 21 #
Motion for a resolution Recital D a (new) Da. whereas the forecasts the Commission makes each year are unreliable in that they are – consistently – subject to being revised downwards as they are too unrealistic;
Amendment 210 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 14 a (new) 14a. Underlines that the unavoidable process of exiting of unconventional monetary policy will be a very complex issue that this process will have to be carefully planned in order to avoid negative shocks on the capital markets;
Amendment 211 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 14 b (new) 14b. Stresses that a wide range of bank activities are left unsupervised and, in the absence of a conduct authority, misconduct risk reigns supreme and tail risk remain intact, as the behaviour of M3 components for over a decade clearly attests; underlines that the operational risk in such economic environment is dominant and highly correlated with both market and credit risk and in fact, a significant materialization component of the latter is a manifestation of the first;
Amendment 212 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 14 b (new) 14b. Urges the central banks of the Euro Area Member States to pool their equities at the Bank for International Settlements within the European Central Bank;
Amendment 213 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 14 c (new) 14c. Notes that confidence and trust to the banking system is affected and non- performing loans resolution, lending capacity, as well as economic recovery is hampered; points to the implications for the staffing and expertise needs of Joint Supervisory Teams, and to side effects for the completion of the third pillar of the EBU (EDIS) and CMU related simple securitization process;
Amendment 214 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 14 c (new) 14c. Calls on the ECB to explore all policy options compatible with its Statute in order to ensure the effectiveness of the transmission of the monetary policy, including the extension of the TLTRO program to households through zero- coupon perpetual loans;
Amendment 215 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 14 d (new) 14d. Underscores that regulatory treatment of sovereign debt exposures must be completed in order to take advantage in the implementation transition period of ECB's APP;
Amendment 216 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 15 15. Welcomes the publication of the minutes of the Council meeting and the decision to disclose the agreements on net financial assets (ANFA) between the ECB and the national central banks; encourages the ECB to pursue its transparency effort;
Amendment 217 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 15 15. Welcomes the publication of the minutes of the Council meeting and the decision to disclose the agreements on net financial assets (ANFA) between the ECB and the national central banks; encourages the ECB to pursue its transparency effort; hopes that in the near future the minutes will incorporate information on who made each statement; recognises that much can still be done in terms of transparency; points out that the monetary dialogue is an important opportunity to ensure the transparency of monetary policy, vis-à-vis Parliament and the wider public and therefore calls on the representatives of the ECB to give precise and detailed replies to questions by MEPs; calls on ECB officials also to provide additional information in writing where answers given during the discussions are not fully satisfactory and/or comprehensive;
Amendment 218 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 15 15. Welcomes the publication of the minutes of the Council meeting and the decision to disclose the agreements on net financial assets (ANFA) between the ECB and the national central banks; encourages the ECB to pursue its transparency effort; hopes that in the near future the minutes will incorporate information on who made each statement; insists that the competences granted to National Central Banks (NCB) under ANFA should not be misapplied for concealed illegal monetary financing;
Amendment 219 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 15 a (new) 15a. Reminds the ECB that labour recruitment policy has to comply with best practice, avoiding situations where some workers have no rights after long periods in employment;
Amendment 22 #
Motion for a resolution Recital E E. whereas, according to the ECB projection of March 2016, the average inflation rate in the euro area, after being nil in 2015, will remain close to this level in 2016 (0.2 %) and reach 1.2 % in 2017 and 1.6 % in 2018; whereas in June 2016 the ECB's economists lowered their forecasts for core inflation growth;
Amendment 220 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 16 Amendment 221 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 16 Amendment 222 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 16 16. Recalls that
Amendment 223 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 16 16. Recalls that the independence of the ECB for the conduct of monetary policy, as enshrined in the Treaties, is crucial to the objective of safeguarding price stability;
Amendment 224 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 16 16. Recalls that the independence of the ECB
Amendment 225 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 16 16. Recalls that the independence of the ECB for the conduct of monetary policy, as enshrined in the Treaties, is
Amendment 226 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 16 16. Recalls that the independence of the ECB for the conduct of monetary policy, as enshrined in the Treaties, is crucial to the objective of safeguarding price stability; asks all governments to avoid statements requesti
Amendment 227 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 16 16. Recalls that the independence of the ECB for the conduct of monetary policy, as enshrined in the Treaties, is crucial to the objective of safeguarding price stability; asks all governments to avoid statements questioning the role played by the institution within its mandate; reiterates that the above does not prevent the European Parliament from expressing its views on the monetary policy options it deems to be most appropriate;
Amendment 228 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 16 16. Recalls that the independence of the ECB for the conduct of monetary policy, as enshrined in the Treaties, is crucial to the objective of safeguarding price stability; asks all governments to avoid statements questioning the role played by the institution within its mandate; notes, however, that conferring the task of bank supervision on the ECB is a burden on its independence;
Amendment 229 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 16 16. Recalls that the independence of the ECB for the conduct of monetary policy, as enshrined in the Treaties, and of national central banks, under Article 130 TFEU, is crucial to the objective of safeguarding price stability; asks all governments to avoid statements questioning the role played by the institution within its mandate;
Amendment 23 #
Motion for a resolution Recital E E. whereas, according to the ECB projection of March 2016, the average inflation rate in the euro area, after being nil in 2015, will remain close to this level in 2016 (0.2 %) and reach 1.2 % in 2017; whereas the low inflation rates seen in recent years can primarily be attributed to low energy prices;
Amendment 230 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 16 a (new) 16a. Stresses that the ECB's supervisory role (SSM), its responsibility for systemic stability (ESRB) and its monetary policy function should not be confused and should not generate any conflict of interest in its execution of its principal functions; further stresses the importance of exploring future institutional independence of these three functions with a democratically accountable mechanism for resolving conflicts between them;
Amendment 231 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 16 a (new) 16a. Deplores the role played by the ECB in the SSM as the European systemic bank watchdog body, given that this could lead to possible conflicts of interest; takes the view that the optimal solution would have been to entrust supervision to a separate body, independent of the ECB, when the SSM was established;
Amendment 232 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 16 a (new) 16a. Notes that the current system by which the ECB is relying on the employment of temporary agents, placed within a system of repetitive temporary contracts, is reportedly creating instability in the working environment and undermining professional cohesion at the ECB;
Amendment 233 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 16 a (new) 16a. Notes that, according to the ECJ judgment of 16 June 2015 in Case C- 62/14, when the ECB purchases government bonds on secondary markets it is exposed to a significant risk of losses as well as to the risk of a debt cut;
Amendment 234 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 16 a (new) 16a. Calls on the ECB to pay particular attention to the proportionality principle in connection with the banking supervisory tasks conferred on it;
Amendment 235 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 16 a (new) 16a. Deplores the role played by the ECB during the negotiations with the Greek government for the Third Economic Adjustment Programme for Greece;
Amendment 236 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 16 a (new) 16a. Asks the European Central Bank to specifically identify and measure the effects of the central bank's actions throughout the economy;
Amendment 237 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 16 b (new) 16b. Is of the opinion that the ECB's governance council decisions on 4 February 2015 to lift the waiver affecting marketable debt instruments issued or fully guaranteed by the Hellenic Republic, and on 28 June 2015 to freeze the level of emergency liquidity assistance to Greek banks directly led to the introduction of capital controls in Greece; considers these decisions to be in violation of the ECB's mandate to promote the smooth operation of payment systems;
Amendment 238 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 16 b (new) 16b. Urges those euro area Member States which are subject to a macroeconomic adjustment programme to act pursuant to Article 7(9) of Regulation No 472/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 May 2013 to carry out a comprehensive audit of their public finances in order, inter alia, to assess the reasons that led to the build-up of excessive levels of debt, as well as to track any possible irregularities;
Amendment 239 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 16 b (new) 16b. Regrets that the ECB has gone too far in interpreting its mandate as regards its role in the Troika; urges the ECB to take a step backwards and to reinforce its independence from political decisions; stresses the ECB’s independence in the field of monetary policy and the need to avoid any conflict of interest in the execution of its functions;
Amendment 24 #
Motion for a resolution Recital E E. whereas, according to the ECB projection of March 2016, the average inflation rate in the euro area, after being nil in 2015, will remain close to this level in 2016 (0.2 %) and reach 1.2 % in 2017; whereas the inflation rate in the euro area has been below the ECB's target rate since early 2013;
Amendment 240 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 16 b (new) 16b. Point out that one source of such potential conflicts of interest arises with the fact that recent stress tests to which design the SSM as the supervisory arm of the ECB participates fail to integrate adverse scenarios of persistently low interest and inflation rates, scenarios which in practice challenges the future effectiveness of monetary policy measures;
Amendment 241 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 16 b (new) 16b. Asks the European Central Bank to better explain to the public where and how its actions affect the economies of the member states, particularly in view of recent unorthodox monetary policy measures;
Amendment 242 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 16 b (new) 16b. Points to the apportionment of responsibilities between the ECB and the European Banking Authority (EBA); stresses that the ECB should not become the de facto standard-setter for non-SSM banks;
Amendment 243 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 16 c (new) 16c. Notes that on 18 May 2016 the ECB Governing Council adopted the Regulation on the collection of granular credit and credit risk data (AnaCredit); calls on the ECB and national central banks to leave as much leeway as possible when implementing AnaCredit;
Amendment 244 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 16 c (new) 16c. Strongly deplores the Capital Markets Union project because further financialisation would make the economic system more fragile, interconnected and exposed to systemic risks and to fresh crises, to the detriment of the real economy;
Amendment 245 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 16 c (new) 16c. Insists that, fiscal and prudential policy need to be clearly under the responsibility of independent and democratically accountable bodies and that conflicts between them must be resolved in the framework of a democratically accountable mechanism;
Amendment 246 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 16 c (new) 16c. Notes that the ECB's policy to address financial stability risks solely with macro prudential tools is in contradiction with the BIS' view that macro prudential policy is a complement and not a substitute to monetary policy;
Amendment 247 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 16 c (new) 16c. Considers that the existing flexibility within the Stability and Growth Pact rules could be used to better address the weak recovery in some Member States;
Amendment 248 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 16 d (new) 16d. Rejects the Banking Union project and its completion. The steps taken so far have been testament to the umpteenth failure on the part of the EU institutions. Supervision has turned out to be imprecise and punitive for some Member States, given that the first assessment exercise (AQR and stress tests) did not take due account of the derivatives held by some banking groups and adopted national methods of assessment; resolution – which, moreover, is incomplete given that the SRF has not yet been set up – has turned out even to be punitive in respect of consumers, as shown by the first applications of the bail- in mechanism; ultimately, EDIS risks being a further failure unless it is backed up by a public ECB guarantee;
Amendment 249 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 16 d (new) 16d. Recalls that Article 127 TFEU states that the ECB, without prejudice to its primary objective of maintaining price stability, shall support the general economic policies in the Union, and that this is further specified in Article 282 TFEU;
Amendment 25 #
Motion for a resolution Recital E E.
Amendment 250 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 16 d (new) 16d. Calls on the ECB not to begin work on any further stages in connection with AnaCredit until after a public consultation exercise, with full involvement of the European Parliament and particular account being taken of the proportionality principle;
Amendment 251 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 16 d (new) 16d. Points out that, ultimately, a democratically accountable system of checks and balances and coordination between monetary, fiscal and prudential objectives with clear and independent mandates should be achieved through a Treaty change;
Amendment 252 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 16 e (new) 16e. Calls in that respect for a revision of the ECB treaty mandate with a view to strengthening its democratic accountability and its strict separation with the EMU Single Supervisory Mechanism; underlines that the fundamental principle of 'no taxation or provision of public subsidies without representation' should be enshrined in such mandate and therefore a permanent scrutiny mechanism will be established so as to ensure a strict separation between fiscal and monetary policy and hence for preventing and correcting the provision of implicit subsidies by the monetary authority and for ensuring that in the medium term the monetary policy does not entail distributive effects;
Amendment 253 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 16 e (new) 16e. Considers it necessary to implement Bank Structural Reform as soon as possible, with a clear and compulsory separation between retail and investment activities to reduce interdependencies and risks in the banking sector and to increase its resilience; deplores the lack of interest shown by the European institutions in proceeding with such reform; considers it necessary, moreover, to draw up a serious set of rules concerning shadow banking;
Amendment 254 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 16 e (new) 16e. Draws attention to Article 123 TFEU, Article 21 of the Statute of the European System of Central Banks, and Article 7 of Council Regulation (EC) No 3603/1993 of 13 December 1993;
Amendment 255 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 16 f (new) 16f. Underlines that the current ELA legal framework has often been justified on grounds that the provision of emergency liquidity assistance needed to remain within the remit of National Central Banks as the supervision of these banks used to be circumscribed within the Member States' competent authorities perimeter; is of the opinion that as banking supervision of at least significant institutions has been Europeanised such development points towards the need to reform and update the ELA legal framework to adapt it to the new institutional setting; welcomes in that respect recent remarks from President Draghi hinting that such reforms would be required and are to be discussed; suggests the ECB develop further policy options for such reform in its next annual report;
Amendment 256 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 16 f (new) 16f. Notes that austerity policies in a number of Member States have contributed to stagnation and recession, with damaging effects on euro area members’ public accounts, levels of unemployment and social cohesion;
Amendment 257 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 16 g (new) 16g. Notes with concern that TARGET 2 imbalances are raising again in the euro area despite a narrowing in trade imbalances pointing out to continued capital outflows from the euro area periphery;
Amendment 258 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 16 g (new) 16g. Recalls that the monetary dialogue is important to ensure the transparency of monetary policy, vis-à-vis Parliament and the wider public;
Amendment 259 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 16 h (new) 16h. Asks the ECB to prepare in the framework of its next annual report a research on the pro and the cons and the legal feasibility of different options as regards of channelling newly created money towards sustainable investment, including options related to the concept of helicopter money, while respecting the provisions of the Treaty;
Amendment 26 #
Motion for a resolution Recital E a (new) Ea. whereas the normalization of the monetary policy of the FED in the USA is expected to impact in both positive and negative ways the macroeconomic conditions of the euro area as well as in the competitive position of the EU products and services in the international economy; whereas the coordination of the ECB and FED monetary policies has a potential stabilizing effect;
Amendment 260 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 16 h (new) 16h. Stresses that the ECB’s supervisory role and its monetary policy function must not be confused and should not generate any conflict of interest in its execution of its principal functions;
Amendment 261 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 16 i (new) 16i. Deplores the fact that the ECB has exceeded even a broad interpretation of its Treaty-based mandate, inter alia in its role in the troika and quadriga; urges the ECB to take a step backwards and reinforce its independence from political decisions, abiding by the ECJ judgment in Case C-62/14 of 16 June 2015, especially its paragraph 102, as well as the opinion expressed by Advocate-General Cruz Villalón in the same case, especially its paragraphs 227 and 263;
Amendment 262 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 16 i (new) 16i. Recalls its request to improve the gender balance within the institution; welcomes the gender-quota system that has been recently introduced with that purpose;
Amendment 263 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 16 j (new) 16j. Believes that the on-going crisis has highlighted the need diversify the theoretical background underlying the policy framework within central banks; requests the ECB to develop in its next annual report on what has been the impact of the crisis as regards the evolution of its theoretical framework;
Amendment 264 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 16 j (new) 16j. Recalls Parliament’s resolution on the 2013 Annual Report of the ECB, especially its paragraph 9;
Amendment 265 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 16 k (new) 16k. Notes with concern the participation of ECB Board and Council of governors Members in instances and informal fora involving secretive discussions with the participation of prominent senior representatives of the private sector such as the 'group of thirty' where discussions are not in the public domain; is of the opinion that rules related to such involvement as well as regarding revolving door practices for all public institutions including the ECB should be significantly strengthen as potential conflicts of interest undermine the necessary trust, transparency and accountability of these institutions;
Amendment 266 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 16 k (new) 16k. Underlines the need for democratic accountability in view of the new responsibilities conferred on the ECB regarding supervisory tasks, as well as its involvement in the troika and quadriga programmes, while also stressing the ECB’s independence in the field of monetary policy and the need to avoid any conflict of interest in the execution of its functions;
Amendment 267 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 16 l (new) 16l. Calls for a thorough assessment of the troika’s modus operandi and of the ECB’s involvement in the troika and quadriga frameworks, with a view to clarifying and redefining the scope of responsibilities and ensuring greater democratic accountability in the adoption and implementation of bailout programmes; invites the Council to reconsider the involvement of the ECB and IMF in the troika;
Amendment 268 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 16 m (new) 16m. Recalls the report of Parliament of 28 February 2014 on the inquiry into the role and operations of the troika, which calls on the next Parliament to build on the work of this report, develop its key findings and investigate further;
Amendment 269 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 16 n (new) 16n. Believes that the current structure of the Banking Union should be complemented in the future with a single mechanism to guarantee bank deposits, aimed at avoiding capital flight in the event of a future banking crisis;
Amendment 27 #
Motion for a resolution Recital E a (new) Ea. whereas the measuring of inflation used by the ECB is constricted to consumer prices and ignores the development of asset prices;
Amendment 28 #
Motion for a resolution Recital E b (new) Eb. whereas the inflation target set by the ECB has no legal base in the Treaties and, moreover, should be revised by taking into account the development of asset prices;
Amendment 29 #
Motion for a resolution Recital F F. whereas the
Amendment 3 #
Motion for a resolution Citation 3 - having regard to the Statute of the European System of Central Banks and of the European Central Bank, in particular Article 15 and 21 thereof,
Amendment 30 #
Motion for a resolution Recital F F. whereas
Amendment 31 #
Motion for a resolution Recital F F. whereas the inflation target is getting harder to reach owing
Amendment 32 #
Motion for a resolution Recital F F. whereas the inflation target is getting harder to reach owing to
Amendment 33 #
Motion for a resolution Recital F F. whereas the inflation target is getting harder
Amendment 34 #
Motion for a resolution Recital F F. whereas
Amendment 35 #
Motion for a resolution Recital F F. whereas the inflation target is getting harder to reach owing to the fact that the ECB's policies have reached their limits, the consolidation of demographic trends, and the full impact of trade globalisation on a high-unemployment European society;
Amendment 36 #
Motion for a resolution Recital F F. whereas the inflation target is getting harder to reach owing to consolidation of demographic trends, continuing low energy prices and the full impact of trade globalisation on a high- unemployment European society;
Amendment 37 #
Motion for a resolution Recital F a (new) Fa. whereas the fall in real interest rates has not resulted in any slacking of the conditions governing access to credit for households and businesses, in any GDP or jobs growth or in a slackening of the Fiscal Compact rules in order to facilitate public investment in the real economy;
Amendment 38 #
Motion for a resolution Recital G G. whereas in 2015 the ECB launched an expanded Asset Purchase Programme (APP) as an unprecedented unconventional monetary instrument amounting to EUR 1.1 trillion and initially scheduled to run until September 2016;
Amendment 39 #
Motion for a resolution Recital G G. whereas in March 2015 the ECB launched an expanded Asset Purchase Programme (APP) amounting to EUR 1.1 trillion and initially scheduled to run until September 2016;
Amendment 4 #
Motion for a resolution Recital A A. whereas
Amendment 40 #
Motion for a resolution Recital G a (new) Ga. whereas the effect of the quantitative easing (QE) program of the ECB has achieved only limited success as it is indicated by the expected inflation rate in the Eurozone, which remains far below from the stated target of "close to but below 2%";
Amendment 41 #
Motion for a resolution Recital H H. whereas this
Amendment 42 #
Motion for a resolution Recital H H. whereas this programme has since been upgraded, with the asset purchase scheduled to run until March 2017 for a total amount which should be close to EUR 1.7 trillion, and the list of eligible assets has been enlarged to include
Amendment 43 #
Motion for a resolution Recital H H. whereas this programme has since been upgraded, with the asset purchase scheduled to run until March 2017 for a total amount which should be
Amendment 44 #
Motion for a resolution Recital H H. whereas this programme has since been upgraded, with the asset purchase scheduled to run until March 2017 for a total amount which should be close to EUR 1.7 trillion, and the list of eligible assets has been enlarged to include corporate bonds; whereas the ECB has thus loaded its balance sheet with a massive level of risk;
Amendment 45 #
Motion for a resolution Recital I I. whereas the ECB has bought
Amendment 46 #
Motion for a resolution Recital I I. whereas the ECB has bought
Amendment 47 #
Motion for a resolution Recital I a (new) Ia. whereas there is increased risk that the ECB's APP fuel asset price bubbles that may pose a threat to financial stability;
Amendment 48 #
Motion for a resolution Recital I b (new) Ib. whereas overreliance on monetary policy for economic stimulus via asset purchases contributes to inequality as asset ownership is reserved to wealthier households;
Amendment 49 #
Motion for a resolution Recital J J. whereas the ECB further eased its monetary stance by lowering its key intervention rates to unprecedented levels, with the main refinancing operations (MRO) and the deposit facility
Amendment 5 #
Motion for a resolution Recital A A. whereas, according to the Commission’s latest spring forecast issued in May 2016, euro area real growth is expected to be modest – 1.6 % in 2016 and 1.8 % in 2017, following 1.7 % in 2015; whereas, against the backdrop of the United Kingdom's likely exit from the European Union, the ECB is warning of a decline in euro area growth of up to half a percentage point over the next three years;
Amendment 50 #
Motion for a resolution Recital J J. whereas the ECB further eased its monetary stance by lowering its key intervention rates to unprecedented levels, with the main refinancing operations (MRO) and the facility deposit down to 0% and – 0.40 % respectively
Amendment 51 #
Motion for a resolution Recital J a (new) Ja. whereas, according to the ECB, the establishment of the Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM) aimed at consistent application of microprudential supervision and enforcement across the euro area to ensure a level-playing field for bank operations and impose a common assessment methodology (SREP);
Amendment 52 #
Motion for a resolution Recital J a (new) Ja. whereas the ECB's monetary policy efforts are still failing to leave a tangible impact on the investment side of the EU economy; Notes that this lack of impact is especially having an adverse effect in the peripheral regions on the Union;
Amendment 53 #
Motion for a resolution Recital J a (new) Ja. whereas the ECB is offering banks incentives to grant loans and, with that aim in view, is carrying out a further series of targeted longer-term refinancing operations (TLTRO-II);
Amendment 54 #
Motion for a resolution Recital J a (new) Ja. whereas in a monetary union monetary policy cannot be tailored to developments in particular countries;
Amendment 55 #
Motion for a resolution Recital J b (new) Jb. whereas public and corporate governance risk events in relation to the macroeconomic adjustment programmes of certain Member States in 2015, which impinged on financial volatility and financing conditions, highlighted the existence of tail risks and the fragility of the euro area, and thus the need to complete the Banking Union;
Amendment 56 #
Motion for a resolution Recital J c (new) Jc. whereas, contrary to the market and credit risk, which are comparatively better addressed, the problem of operational risk in banking activities is essential for both systemic stability and the consumer protection, but unfortunately is not well addressed by the current regulatory framework;
Amendment 57 #
Motion for a resolution Recital J b (new) Jb. whereas the ECB's president has continued to stress the urgency of much- needed structural reforms in the Eurozone;
Amendment 58 #
Motion for a resolution Recital J d (new) Jd. whereas the ECB is supportive of the Simple, Transparent and Standardized Securitization framework and the resultant reduced capital requirements that will revitalize both securitization markets and the financing of the real sector economy;
Amendment 59 #
Motion for a resolution Recital J c (new) Jc. whereas Article 123 TFEU and Article 21 of Statute of the European System of Central Banks and of the European Central Bank prohibit the monetary financing of governments;
Amendment 6 #
Motion for a resolution Recital A A. whereas, according to the Commission
Amendment 60 #
Motion for a resolution Recital J e (new) Je. whereas the ECB contributed to a regulatory initiative to weaken the sovereign-bank nexus by supporting sovereign debt risk weights and limits on sovereign exposures consistent with prudential regulation;
Amendment 61 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 1 1. Stresses that the euro area continues to suffer from a high level of unemployment and excessive low inflation and that, in addition, the euro area is facing
Amendment 62 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 1 1. Stresses that the
Amendment 63 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 1 1. Stresses that the euro area continues to suffer from a high level of unemployment and excessive low inflation as well as still large macroeconomic imbalances such as excessive current account imbalances and that, in addition, the euro area is facing a very low level of productivity growth, which
Amendment 64 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 1 1. Stresses that the euro area continues to suffer from a high level of unemployment and excessive low inflation and that, in addition, the euro area is facing a very low level of productivity growth, which is the result of the lack of
Amendment 65 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 1 1. Stresses that the euro area continues to suffer from a high, but slowly falling, level of unemployment and excessive low inflation and that, in addition, the euro area is facing a very low level of productivity growth, which is the result of the lack of investment since the beginning of the crisis; notes that the level of investment is still some 10 percentage points below what it was before the crisis; notes that the high level of public debt and the huge number of non-
Amendment 66 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 1 1. Stresses that the euro area continues to suffer from a high level of unemployment and excessive low inflation and that, in addition, the euro area is facing
Amendment 67 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 1 1. Stresses that the euro area continues to suffer from a high level of unemployment and excessive low inflation and that, in addition, the euro area is facing a very low level of productivity growth, which is the result of the lack of investment and a failure to carry out structural reforms since the beginning of the crisis; notes that the high level of public debt and the huge number of non- performing loans in the banking sector in some Member States are still fragmenting the euro area financial market, thus
Amendment 68 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 1 1. Stresses that the euro area continues to suffer from a high level of unemployment and excessive low inflation and that, in addition, the euro area is facing a very low level of productivity growth, which is the result of the lack of investment since the beginning of the crisis; acknowledges in this regard that some problems of the weaker euro area economies are due to the impossibility of a nominal depreciation in the Eurosystem; notes that the high level of public debt and the huge number of non-
Amendment 69 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 1 1. Stresses that the euro area continues to suffer from a high level of
Amendment 7 #
Motion for a resolution Recital A A. whereas, according to the Commission’s latest spring forecast, euro area real growth is repeatedly expected to be modest – 1.6 % in 2016 and 1.8 % in 2017, following 1.7 % in 2015;
Amendment 70 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 1 1. Stresses that the euro area continues to suffer from a high level of unemployment and excessive low inflation and that, in addition, the euro area is facing a very low level of productivity growth, which is the result of the lack of investment and lack of structural reforms since the beginning of the crisis; notes that the high level of public debt and the huge number of non-
Amendment 71 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 1 1. Stresses that the euro area continues to suffer from a high level of unemployment and excessive low inflation and that, in addition, the euro area is facing a very low level of productivity growth, which is the result of the lack of investment since the beginning of the crisis; notes that the high level of public debt and particularly the huge number of non-
Amendment 72 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 1 a (new) 1a. Calls for debt and deficit calculations not to factor in public investment carried out by Member States’ public operators, particularly in view of the impact of the new ESA 2010 system of accounts, which is preventing Member States from putting up co-financing for projects eligible for structural funding (in particular under the European Regional Development Fund, the European Social Fund and the Youth Employment Initiative) and thus from using this important source of funding to help find a way out of the economic crisis and kick- start growth and employment;
Amendment 73 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 1 a (new) 1a. Denounces the fact that this has arisen from the adoption of the single currency, which has imposed a system of fixed exchange rates across 19 Member States in a currency area with too many differences; also deplores the fact that the euro has generated and continues to generate balance of payment imbalances with excessive surpluses on the part of countries which continually go unpunished by the Commission;
Amendment 74 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 1 a (new) 1a. Underlines that a frontloaded fiscal consolidation in the euro area as a whole during a period of large output gap since 2010 has had a severe impact on aggregate demand and has generated long lasting negative hysteresis effects which have undermined the effectiveness of the monetary transmission mechanism despite the unprecedented policy measures implemented by the ECB;
Amendment 75 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 1 a (new) 1a. Underlines the federal nature of the European Central Bank, which rules out national vetoes, that enabled it to act decisively in addressing the crisis;
Amendment 76 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 1 b (new) 1b. Considers the EMU to have shown itself vulnerable during the global economic and financial crisis, which exacerbated the unsustainable imbalances generated by the introduction of the single currency, and the wholesale public interventions to rescue the financial sector led to a sovereign debt crisis in which government borrowing costs increased dramatically in some Member States, and believes that the EMU suffers from structural deficiencies by virtue of the fact that it is not an optimal currency area, which over the years has generated unsustainable macroeconomic imbalances, especially for many periphery countries;
Amendment 77 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 1 c (new) 1c. Denounces the fact that the introduction of the single currency has exacerbated the increase in structural divergence and made it more difficult to respond to crises; stresses that the introduction of the euro as a common currency has eliminated the option of intervening in response to asymmetric shocks such as exchange rate fluctuations, shifting the adjustment burden to the weaker euro area economies; urges that an opt-out procedure be introduced for states which might democratically express the need to withdraw from the euro area, as optimal economic and monetary integration has stalled for many years now owing to thorny political disagreements and the economic and social crisis in the peripheral countries is strongly intensifying; considers also that a controlled dissolution plan should be organised for the whole common currency area, so as not to be taken unaware by an uncontrolled dissolution, while at the same time promoting positive cooperation between European states in a manner respecting their respective national constitutions;
Amendment 78 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 2 Amendment 79 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 2 2. Acknowledges that, confronted with this very complex environment and the risks of a prolonged period of low inflation, the ECB was within the terms of its mandate in adopting extraordinary measures to lift inflation back up to the medium-term objective of 2 %; notes th
Amendment 8 #
Motion for a resolution Recital A a (new) Aa. whereas Article 127(5) of the TFEU requires the European System of Central Banks to help maintain financial stability;
Amendment 80 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 2 2. Acknowledges that,
Amendment 81 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 2 2.
Amendment 82 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 2 2. Acknowledges that, confronted with this very complex environment and the risks of a prolonged period of low inflation, the ECB was within the terms of its mandate in adopting extraordinary measures to lift inflation back up to the medium-term objective of 2 % as recently underlined by the European Court of Justice; notes that, since the launching of the APP in March 2015,
Amendment 83 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 2 2. Acknowledges that, confronted with this very complex environment and the risks of a prolonged period of low inflation, the ECB
Amendment 84 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 2 2. Acknowledges that, confronted with this very complex environment and the risks of a prolonged period of low inflation, the ECB was within the terms of its mandate in adopting extraordinary measures to lift inflation back up to the medium-term objective of 2 %; notes that, since the launching of the APP in March 2015, and owing to targeted long-term refinancing operation (TLTRO) programmes targeted at the real economy, financial conditions have improved, which has promoted a recovery in lending to firms and households in the euro area; notes that improvements have not affected Member States equally and that credit demand especially in southern Member States remains weak, due to the depressed economic situation;
Amendment 85 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 2 2. Acknowledges that, confronted with this very complex environment and the risks of a prolonged period of low inflation, the ECB was within the terms of its mandate in adopting extraordinary measures to lift inflation back up to the medium-term objective of 2 %; notes that, since the launching of the APP in March 2015, and owing to targeted long-term refinancing operation (TLTRO) programmes targeted at the real economy, financial conditions have improved and the spreads of euro area peripheral governments' bonds against these of German bonds has narrowed, which has promoted a recovery in lending to firms and households in the euro area and eased the financing conditions for governments;
Amendment 86 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 2 2. Acknowledges that, confronted with this very complex environment and the risks of a prolonged period of low
Amendment 87 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 2 a (new) 2a. Denounces the fact that the monetary policy measures launched by the ECB after the crisis (such as LTRO, TLTRO, ABSPP and QE) have not had the stated effects because the huge liquidity injected into the markets has remained locked in the financial system and has been used by the banks for speculative purposes rather than for financing and supporting the real economy; is concerned that the ABS market is becoming more risky and less transparent; deplores the fact that the ECB itself is responsible for greater systemic risk, an increase in inequalities and a growing risk of speculative bubbles;
Amendment 88 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 2 a (new) 2a. Emphasizes that the ECB started in June 2016 a new series of four targeted longer-term refinancing operations (TLTRO II); point out the incentive structure of the programme has changed in comparison with the original TLTRO as several banks will be able to borrow at negative rates even if they do not increase their net lending to the real economy;
Amendment 89 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 2 a (new) 2a. Draws the conclusion that the European Central Bank has complied with the provisions of Articles 127(5) and 127(2) of the TFEU in implementing its March 2015 programme to purchase public and private debt securities in secondary markets;
Amendment 9 #
Motion for a resolution Recital A b (new) Ab. whereas Article 127(2) of the TFEU requires the European System of Central Banks to 'to promote the smooth operation of payment systems';
Amendment 90 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 2 b (new) 2b. Is concerned by the fact that by offering liquidity at negative rates, but eliminating the requirements for banks to return the funds when they do not achieve their lending benchmark, the ECB is therefore weakening the link between the provision of central bank liquidity and lending to the real economy that was at the centre of the TLTRO concept;
Amendment 91 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 2 b (new) 2b. Welcomes the European Central Bank's categorical pledge to 'do whatever it takes' to defend the euro made in August 2012, which has been instrumental in ensuring the financial stability of the Eurozone;
Amendment 92 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 3 Amendment 93 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 3 Amendment 94 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 3 3. Believes that the APP
Amendment 95 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 3 3. Believes that the APP would have an even higher impact on the European economy if it had a higher share of EIB bond buying, particularly related to
Amendment 96 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 3 3. Believes that the APP would have an even
Amendment 97 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 3 3. Believes that the APP would have an even higher impact on the European economy if it
Amendment 98 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 3 3. Believes that the APP would have an even higher impact on the European economy if it had a higher share of EIB bond buying
Amendment 99 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 3 3. Believes that the APP would have an even higher impact on the European economy if the amount involved were higher, close to two trillion euro, it had a higher share of EIB bond buying, particularly related to the TEN-T and TEN- E (projects with proven added European value in social and economic terms), and SME securitised loans
source: 587.445
|
History
(these mark the time of scraping, not the official date of the change)
2016-11-26Show (7) Changes | Timetravel
| activities/1/committees |
|
| activities/1/type |
Old
Vote scheduled in committee, 1st reading/single readingNew
Vote in committee, 1st reading/single reading |
| activities/2 |
|
| activities/3/docs |
|
| activities/3/type |
Old
Indicative plenary sitting date, 1st reading/single readingNew
Debate in Parliament |
| activities/4 |
|
| procedure/stage_reached |
Old
Awaiting committee decisionNew
Procedure completed |
2016-06-30Show (1) Changes | Timetravel
| activities/1/date |
Old
2016-10-10T00:00:00New
2016-10-11T00:00:00 |
2016-05-11Show (1) Changes | Timetravel
| activities/2 |
|
2016-05-04Show (2) Changes | Timetravel
| activities/0/committees/0/shadows/6 |
|
| committees/0/shadows/6 |
|
2016-05-03Show (5) Changes
| activities |
|
| committees |
|
| links |
|
| other |
|
| procedure |
|