2022/2143(INI) | [ParlTrack]

Motion for a resolution
Recital J

J. whereas, in accordance with Article 258 TFEU, the Commission has the possibility of opening an infringement procedure, before the CJEU, against a Member State that has failed to fulfil ~~the~~its obligations under the Treaties, and whereas, in the light of the case-law of the CJEU and Declaration No 17 on primacy annexed to the Treaty of Lisbon, that procedure could also be applied in the event of a breach of obligations resulting from the principle of primacy of EU law;

Amendment 101 #

Motion for a resolution
Recital J

J. whereas, in accordance with Article 258 TFEU, the Commission has the possibility of opening an infringement procedure before the CJEU against a Member State that has failed to fulfil the obligations resulting from the principle of primacy; whereas pursuant to Rule 149(4) of its Rules of Procedure the European Parliament can submit observations or intervene in support of the European Commission in such infringement proceedings under Article 258 TFEU;

Amendment 102 #

Motion for a resolution
Recital J a (new)

Ja. whereas, in accordance with Article 7 TEU, on a proposal by one third of the Member States or by the Commission, the European Council may determine the existence of a serious and persistent breach by a Member State of the values referred to in Article 2 TEU, following which the Council may decide to suspend certain of the rights deriving from the application of the Treaties to the Member State in question;

Amendment 103 #

Victor NEGRESCU

Motion for a resolution
Recital J a (new)

Ja. whereas the principle of primacy of EU law is not just a legal doctrine but also a reflection of the political and economic integration that the EU represents;

Amendment 104 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1

1. Reiterates that, by their accession to the EU, the Member States have ~~adhered to a certain number of core values and principles, which they share and have undertaken to respect at all times; recalls that these include the principle of primacy~~undertaken to respect the provisions of the Treaties at all times; recalls that the principle of primacy of EU law over the national laws of the Member States ranking below the Constitution in not enshrined in the Treaties and emanates solely from the case-law of the CJEU, which has been contested by academics, the scientific community and a number of national courts and tribunals, including at the constitutional level;

Amendment 105 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1

1. Reiterates that, by their accession to the EU, the Member States have adhered to a certain number of core values and principles, which they share and have undertaken to respect at all times; ~~recalls that these include the principle of primacy;~~

Amendment 106 #

1. Reiterates that, by their accession to the EU, the Member States have adhered to a certain number of core values and principles, which they share and have undertaken to respect at all times; ~~recalls that these include the principle of primacy;~~

Amendment 107 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1

1. Reiterates that, by their accession to the EU, the Member States have adhered to a certain number of core values and principles, which they share and have undertaken to respect at all times; ~~recalls that these include the principle of primacy;~~

Amendment 108 #

Sophia IN 'T VELD, Alin MITUȚA, Charles GOERENS, Max ORVILLE, Sandro GOZI

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1

1. Reiterates that, by their accession to the EU, the Member States have adhered to ~~a certain number of~~the EU acquis and all the core EU values and principles that underpin it, which they share and have undertaken to respect at all times; recalls that these include the principle of primacy;

Amendment 109 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1

1. Reiterates that, by their accession to the EU, the Member States have adhered to a certain number of core values and principles, which they share and have undertaken to respect at all times during their membership of the EU; recalls that these include, inter alia, the principle of primacy of EU law;

Amendment 11 #

Motion for a resolution
Citation 4

~~— having regard to its resolution of 21 October 2021 on the rule of law crisis in Poland and the primacy of EU law2, _________________ 2 OJ C 184, 5.5.2022, p. 154.~~deleted

Amendment 110 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1

1. Reiterates that, by their accession to the EU, the Member States have adhered to the entire body of EU law, including the acquis communautaire and the Court’s case law, to a certain number of core values and principles, which they share and have undertaken to respect at all times; recalls that these include the principle of primacy;

Amendment 111 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1

1. Reiterates that, by their accession to the EU, the Member States have adhered to a certain number of core values and principles, which they share and have undertaken to respect at all times; recalls that these include the principle of primacy which may not, however, impinge upon the sovereignty of the constitutional order of the Member States or the direct expression of the will of the people of a Member State in a referendum;

Amendment 112 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1

1. Reiterates that, by their accession to the EU, the Member States have adhered to a certain number of core values and principles, which they share and have undertaken to respect at all times; recalls that these include the principle of primacy, which is crucial for ensuring the consistent application of EU law throughout the Union and guaranteeing the equal protection for EU citizens;

Amendment 113 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1

1. Reiterates that, by their accession to the EU, the Member States have adhered to a certain number of core values and principles, which they share and have undertaken to respect at all times; recalls that these include the principle of primacy, which constitutes a necessary condition for safeguarding and strengthening the unity and consistency of Union law in all Member States;

Amendment 114 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1 a (new)

1a. Rejects the intention to impose on the constitutions of Member States the principle of primacy of EU law and the neoliberal, militaristic and federalist policies laid down in its Treaties, concentrating power – in line with the interests of large economic and financial groups – in the hands of institutions dominated by the major powers, responsible for eroding rights, worsening social inequalities, increasing imbalances between countries and imposing unequal relationships of dominance and dependence;

Amendment 115 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1 a (new)

1a. Warns that the Constitutions of the Member States are, in any case and unless expressly provided for in the national constitution itself, hierarchically superior to EU law, including the Treaties, since it is the constitutions that in every instance authorise, enable, permit or empower each Member State to join the European Union, in the manner laid down in national law;

Amendment 116 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1 a (new)

1a. Stresses that each Member State has its own national constitutional traditions which are in line with these values and which must always be treated with respect, objectivity and in accordance with the principle of equality;

Amendment 117 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1 a (new)

1a. Recalls that the principle of primacy does not appear in the texts of the EU Treaties but has been developed by case law, which is a very uncommon, often totally alien practice in most continental statute law legal traditions;

Amendment 118 #

Victor NEGRESCU

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1 a (new)

1a. Stresses the need to ensure that the common policies and objectives of the EU are effectively implemented across all Member States, ensuring a level playing field and promoting mutual trust among Member States;

Amendment 119 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1 b (new)

1b. Stresses that the erosion of social rights and achievements being encouraged by the European Union has gone hand-in-hand with instruments and mechanisms – such as the 'Economic and Monetary Union', the 'Fiscal Compact', 'Economic Governance', the 'European Semester' or the 'Banking Union’ – which seek to monitor and circumscribe Member State policies and are an obstacle to the full exercise of the sovereign powers of Member States that are fundamental to their development, instruments and mechanisms that the attempted imposition of the so-called principle of primacy of EU law seeks to bolster;

Amendment 12 #

Motion for a resolution
Citation 5

~~– having regard to its resolution of 19 May 2022 on the Commission’s 2021 Rule of Law Report3 , _________________ 3 OJ C 479, 16.12.2022, p. 18.~~deleted

Amendment 120 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1 b (new)

1b. Recalls that there are Member States where, in accordance with customary law, case-law is not a source of law, and therefore the alleged primacy of EU law as asserted in the doctrine of the CJEU cannot be seriously claimed, and that there are also countries where laws expressly state that Community rules may not derogate in whole or in part from the Constitution;

Amendment 121 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1 b (new)

1b. Recalls that the principle of primacy asserts a hierarchy between EU and national law, which is not expressly mentioned in the texts of the EU Treaties and does not have a basis in general public international law;

Amendment 122 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1 c (new)

1c. Considers that, in order to uphold democracy – in particular by bringing decision-making processes closer to the grass roots in the Member States – it is not necessary to centralise power in the hands of European Union supranational institutions, dominated as they are by the major powers, but to respect and sustain national sovereignty and independence and cooperation on the basis of equal rights;

Amendment 123 #

Domènec RUIZ DEVESA, Cyrus ENGERER

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1 d (new)

1d. Considers that the path of blackmail and interference that the so- called primacy of EU law seeks to impose on the constitutions of Member States will not only fail to help solve problems but will exacerbate tensions and conflicts and at the same time hamper states' development and undermine the people's interests and aspirations and their participation in democratic processes;

Amendment 124 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 2

2. Recalls in this regard that, in accordance with consistent case-law and on the basis of Article 4(2) TEU, although the Member States have a certain degree of discretion in implementing the principles of EU law, their obligations as to the result to be achieved do not vary from one Member State to another and the executive force of EU law may not vary from one Member State to another; emphasises that the same logic applies within the Member States, as compliance with EU law and its principles may not vary over time as a result of national legal, political or social changes;deleted

Amendment 125 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 2

2. Recalls ~~in this regard that, in accordance with consistent case-law and~~that, on the basis of Article 4(2) TEU, ~~although~~ the Member States have a certain degree of discretion in implementing the principles of EU law, their obligations as to the result to be achieved do not vary from one Member State to another and the executive force of EU law may not vary from one Member State to another; emphasises that the same logic applies within the Member States, as compliance with EU law and its principles may not vary over time as a result of national legal, political or social changes;

Amendment 126 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 2

2. Recalls in this regard that, in accordance with consistent case-law and on the basis of Article 4(2) TEU, ~~although~~ the Member States have a certain degree of discretion in implementing the principles of EU law, their obligations as to the result to be achieved do not vary from one Member State to another and the executive force of EU law may not vary from one Member State to another; emphasises that the same logic applies within the Member States, as compliance with EU law and its principles may not vary over time as a result of national legal, political or social changes;

Amendment 127 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 2

2. Recalls in this regard that, in accordance with consistent case-law and on the basis of Article 4(2) TEU, although the Member States have a certain degree of discretion in implementing the principles of EU law, their obligations as to the result to be achieved do not vary from one Member State to another and the executive force of EU law may not vary from one Member State to another; emphasises that the same logic applies within the Member States, as compliance with EU law and its principles may not vary over time asthe principle of primacy precludes autochthonous national legislation in areas of exclusive EU competence, applies to areas of shared EU/national competence but does not extend to areas of subordinate or complementary EU competence nor to a re~~sult of national legal, political or social changes~~as of ongoing national competence;

Amendment 128 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 2

2. Recalls in this regard that, in accordance with consistent case-law and on the basis of Article 4(2) TEU, although the Member States have a certain degree of discretion in implementing the principles of EU law, their obligations as to the result to be achieved do not vary from one Member State to another and the executive force of EU law may not vary from one Member State to another; emphasises that the same logic applies within the Member States, as compliance with EU law and its principles may not vary over time as a result of national legal, political or social changes;

Amendment 129 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 2

2. Recalls in this regard that, in accordance with the consistent case-law of the CJEU, and on the basis of Article 4(2) TEU, although the Member States have a certain degree of discretion in implementing the principles of EU law, their obligations as to the result to be achieved do not vary from one Member State to another, and the executive force of EU law may not vary from one Member State to another, since this would endanger the objectives of the EU Treaties and would be tantamount to discriminating between the citizens of the Member States; emphasises that the same logic applies within the Member States, as compliance with EU law and its principles may not vary over time as a result of national legal, economic, political or social changes;

Amendment 13 #

Motion for a resolution
Citation 5

~~— having regard to its resolution of 19 May 2022 on the Commission’s 2021 Rule of Law Report3, _________________ 3 OJ C 479, 16.12.2022, p. 18.~~deleted

Amendment 130 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 2

2. Recalls in this regard that, in accordance with consistent case-law and on the basis of Article 4(2) TEU, ~~although th~~while Member States have a certain degree of discretion in implementing the principles of EU law, their obligations as to the result to be achieved do not vary from one Member State to another and the executive force of EU law may not vary from one Member State to another; emphasises that the same logic applies within the Member States, as compliance with EU law and its principles may not vary over time as a result of national legal, political or social changes;

Amendment 131 #

2. Recalls in this regard that, in accordance with consistent case-law and on the basis of Article 4(2) TEU, although the Member States have a certain degree of discretion in implementing the principles of EU law, their obligations as to the result to be achieved do not vary from one Member State to another and the executive force of EU law may not vary from one Member State to another; emphasises that the same logic applies within the Member States, as compliance with EU law ~~and its principles~~ may not vary over time as a result of national legalislative, regulatory, political or social changes;

Amendment 132 #

Sophia IN 'T VELD, Alin MITUȚA, Charles GOERENS, Max ORVILLE, Sandro GOZI

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 2

2. Recalls in this regard that, in accordance with consistent case-law and on the basis of Article 4(2) TEU, although the Member States have a certain degree of discretion in implementing the principles of EU law, their obligations ~~as to the result to be achieved~~ do not vary from one Member State to another and the executive force of EU law may not vary from one Member State to another; emphasises that the same logic applies within the Member States, as compliance with EU law and its principles may not vary over time as a result of national legal, political or social changes;

Amendment 133 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 2

2. Recalls in this regard that, in accordance with consistent case-law and on the basis of Article 4(23) TEU, although the Member States have a certain degree of discretion in implementing the principles of EU law, their obligations as to the result to be achieved do not vary from one Member State to another and the executive force of EU law may not vary from one Member State to another; emphasises that the same logic applies within the Member States, as compliance with EU law and its principles may not vary over time as a result of national legal, political or social changes;

Amendment 134 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 2 a (new)

2a. Stresses that if the primacy of EU law means that its executive force may not vary from one Member State to another and that compliance with its letter and spirit cannot vary over time in the wake of national legal, political or social changes, this amounts to a fundamental change in the very institutional nature of European integration; points out that that such a substantial modification would require an explicit revision to this effect both of the Treaties and of the national ratification processes;

Amendment 135 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 2 a (new)

2a. Recalls that the constitutional identity of the Member States is recognised under Article 4(2) TEU;

Amendment 136 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 2 b (new)

2b. Stresses that if a principle of case- law were to be asserted in a manner overruling choices expressed by a majority, for example in elections held in the Member States, this would pose a major democratic problem, especially as this principle applies even to constitutions, and it is conceivable that it could even run contrary to a referendum decision;

Amendment 137 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 3

3. Recalls that it is up to the CJEU, given its exclusive competence to provide the definitive interpretation of EU law, to define the scope of the principle of primacy; notes that such a definition cannot, therefore, be left to national courts on the basis of their interpretation of EU law or provisions of national law;deleted

Amendment 138 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 3

3. Recalls that it is up to the CJEU, given its exclusive competence to provide the definitive interpretation of EU law, to define the scope of the principle of primacy; notes that such a definition cannot, therefore, be left to national courts on the basis of their interpretation of EU law or provisions of national lawMember States to define the scope of the principle of primacy when the rule or principle of EU law interferes with the Member States' fundamental interests;

Amendment 139 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 3

3. Recalls that it is up to the CJEU, given its exclusive competence to provide the definitive interpretation of EU law, to define the scope of the principle of primacy; notes that such a definition cannot, therefore, be left to national courts on the basis of their interpretation of EU law or provisions of national lawthe Union cannot unilaterally impose the application of the principle of primacy of EU law over national constitutions, and that respect for the sovereignty of the Member States is a fundamental pillar of the European project;

Amendment 14 #

Motion for a resolution
Citation 6

— having regard to the study of July 2022 entitled ‘The primacy of European Union law’, commissioned by its Committee on Legal Affairs and published by its Directorate-General for Internal Policies of the Union4, _________________ 4 Study – ‘The primacy of European Union law’, European Parliament, Directorate-General for Internal Policies of the Union, Policy Department C – Citizens’ Rights and Constitutional Affairs, July 2022.deleted

Amendment 140 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 3

3. Recalls that while it is up to the CJEU, given its exclusive competence to provide the definitive interpretation of EU law, to define the scope of the principle of primacy; notes that such a definition cannot, therefore, be left to national courts on the basis of their interpretation of EU law or provisions of national to define the scope of the principle of primacy, that is not the case for the principle of primacy, which it has defined itself without it being mentioned in primary law;

Amendment 141 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 3

3. Recalls that it is up to the CJEU, given its exclusive competence to provide the definitive interpretation of EU law, to ~~define the scope of the principle of primacy; notes that such a definition cannot, therefore, be left to national courts on the basis of their interpretation of EU law or provisions of national law~~specify its impact on the Member States' legislative and regulatory systems;

Amendment 142 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 3

3. Recalls that it is up to the CJEU, given its exclusive competence to provide the definitive interpretation of EU law, to define the scope of the principle of primacy; ~~notes that such a definition cannot, therefore, be left to~~underlines that the application of Articles 4(2) and 5 TEU requires an active dialogue between the national courts onand the ~~basis of their interpretation of EU law~~CJEU; notes that the definition of the principle orf pr~~ovisions of national law~~imacy cannot, therefore, be left to the CJEU or national courts alone;

Amendment 143 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 3

3. Recalls that it is up to the CJEU, given its exclusive competence to provide the definitive interpretation of EU law, to ~~defin~~be the ~~scope~~guardian of the principle of primacy; notes that ~~such a definition cannot, therefore, be left to national courts~~, therefore, national courts cannot apply the principle of primacy on the basis of ~~their~~a differing interpretation of EU law or provisions of national law;

Amendment 144 #

3. Recalls that it is up to the CJEU, given its exclusive competence to provide the definitive interpretation of EU law, to define the scope of EU rules for which the principle of primacy demands to take precedence over conflicting national rules; notes that such a definition cannot, therefore, be left to national courts on the basis of their interpretation of EU law or provisions of national law; acknowledges that the protection of core values and principles such as the effective protection of human rights, of democracy and of the rule of law is a joint task for the EU legal order and the national legal orders and for the courts tasked with the interpretation of these legal orders;

Amendment 145 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 3

3. Recalls that it is up to the CJEU, given its exclusive competence to provide the definitive interpretation of EU law, to define the scope of the principle of primacy; notes that such a definition cannot, therefore, be left to national courts on the basis of their interpretation of EU law or provisions of national law; underlines however that Member States as 'masters of the treaties' retain the right to assess whether the EU institutions, including the CJEU, in adopting a particular act or judgement have acted within the framework of the powers conferred on them and whether they have exercised their powers in accordance with the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality and if this framework is exceeded, then acts (judgements) adopted outside of it are not covered by the principle of primacy of EU law;

Amendment 146 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 3 a (new)

3a. Recalls that there have only been very few instances of conflicts between EU and national constitutional law, which have resulted in national constitutional courts asserting their jurisdiction of the last resort: in the PSPP case where the German Constitutional Court eventually submitted like a lamb once the ECB, the German government and the German parliament all ignored the constitutional limits on the ECB’s bond-buying programmes;

Amendment 147 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 3 a (new)

3a. Stresses that the development of the case-law of the CJEU since the Costa v. E.N.E.L. judgment of 15 July 1964 has meant that the constitutional courts of several Member States have questioned the abusive application of this principle, on the grounds that the Union is exceeding the powers assigned to it by the Member States, and that it is damaging their national constitutional identity;

Amendment 148 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 3 a (new)

3a. Recalls that the principle of primacy of EU law or that of the precedence of international law over domestic law are present in the constitutional order of several Member States, though not all;

Amendment 149 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 4

4. Emphasises that the vast majority of the courts of the Member States comply with the principle of the primacy of EU law; notes that, since the Costa v E.N.E.L. judgment of 15 July 1964, there has only been a very small number of cases in which a national court has refused to draw the consequences of a preliminary ruling, compared to the large overall number of preliminary references; highlights that even in one of the most prominent such cases, namely the judgment of 5 May 2020 concerning the European Central Bank’s public sector purchase programme, the German Federal Constitutional Court nevertheless stressed its respect for the principle of primacy;deleted

Amendment 15 #

Motion for a resolution
Citation 7

— having regard to the study of 27 April 2021 entitled ‘Primacy’s Twilight? On the Legal Consequences of the Ruling of the Federal Constitutional Court of 5 May 2020 for the Primacy of EU Law’, commissioned by its Committee on Constitutional Affairs and published by its Directorate-General for Internal Policies of the Union5, _________________ 5 Study – ‘Primacy’s Twilight? On the Legal Consequences of the Ruling of the Federal Constitutional Court of 5 May 2020 for the Primacy of EU Law’, European Parliament, Directorate- General for Internal Policies of the Union, Policy Department C – Citizens’ Rights and Constitutional Affairs, 27 April 2021.deleted

Amendment 150 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 4

4. Emphasises that the vast majority of the courts of the Member States comply with the principle of the primacy of EU law; notes that, since the Costa v E.N.E.L. judgment of 15 July 1964, there has only been a very small number of cases in which a national court has refused to draw the consequences of a preliminary ruling, compared to the large overall number of preliminary references; highlights that even in one of the most prominent such cases, namely the judgment of 5 May 2020 concerning the European Central Bank’s public sector purchase programme, the German Federal Constitutional Court nevertheless stressed its respect for the principle of primacy;deleted

Amendment 151 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 4

4. Emphasises that the vast majority of the courts of the Member States comply with the principle of the primacy of EU law; notes that, since the Costa v E.N.E.L. judgment of 15 July 1964, there has only been a very small number of cases in which a national court has refused to draw the consequences of a preliminary ruling, compared to the large overall number of preliminary references; highlights that even in one of the most prominent such cases, namely the judgment of 5 May 2020 concern where they take the view that the law has been laid down in accordance with the EU's Treaty-recognised competences and does not infringe the ~~European Central Bank’s public sector purchase programme, the German Federal Constitutional Court nevertheless stressed its respect for the principle of primac~~ir constitutional identity;

Amendment 152 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 4

4. Emphasises that the vast majority of the courts of the Member States comply with the principle of the primacy of EU law; notes that, since the Costa v E.N.E.L. judgment of 15 July 1964, there has only been a very small number of cases in which a national court has refused to draw the consequences of a preliminary ruling, compared to the large overall number of preliminary references; highlights that even in one of the most prominent such cases, namely the judgment of 5 May 2020 concerning the European Central Bank’s public sector purchase programme, the German Federal Constitutional Court nevertheless stressed its respect for the principle of primacyin some cases among the large overall number of preliminary references, a national court has refused to draw the consequences of a preliminary ruling; highlights that in its judgment of 5 May 2020 concerning the European Central Bank’s public sector purchase programme, the German Federal Constitutional Court recognised the right to declare EU institutions' acts inapplicable in Germany when they would go beyond the competences conferred upon the EU in the Treaties, as it would lead to changes to the Treaties, which only the States can amend;

Amendment 153 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 4

4. Emphasises that the vast majority of the courts of the Member States comply with the principle of the primacy of EU law; notes that, since the Costa v E.N.E.L. judgment of 15 July 1964, there has only been a very small number of cases in which a national court has refused to draw the consequences of a preliminary ruling, compared to the large overall number of preliminary references; highlights that even in one of the most prominent such cases, namely the judgment of 5 May 2020 concerning the European Central Bank’s public sector purchase programme, the German Federal Constitutional Court nevertheless stressed its respect for the principle of primacy;

Amendment 154 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 4

4. Emphasises that the vast majority of the courts of the Member States comply with the principle of the primacy of EU law; notes that, since the Costa v E.N.E.L. judgment of 15 July 1964, there has only been a very small number of cases in which a national court has refused to draw the consequences of a preliminary ruling, compared to the large overall number of preliminary references; highlights that even in one of the most prominent such cases, namely the judgment of 5 May 2020 concerning the European Central Bank’s public sector purchase programme, the German Federal Constitutional Court nevertheless stressed its respect for the principle of primacy of EU law;

Amendment 155 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 4

4. Emphasises that the vast majority of the courts of the Member States ~~comply~~has not yet dealt with the principle of the primacy of EU law; notes that, since the Costa v E.N.E.L. judgment of 15 July 1964, there has only been a very small number of cases in which a national court has refused to draw the consequences of a preliminary ruling, compared to the large overall number of preliminary references; highlights that even in one of the most prominent such cases, namely the judgment of 5 May 2020 concerning the European Central Bank’s public sector purchase programme, the German Federal Constitutional Court nevertheless stressed its respect for the principle of primacy;

Amendment 156 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 4

4. Emphasises that the vast majority of the courts of the Member States ~~comply with~~applies the principle of the primacy of EU law; notes that, since the Costa v E.N.E.L. judgment of 15 July 1964, there has only been a very small number of cases in which a national court has refused to draw the consequences of a preliminary ruling, compared to the large overall number of preliminary references; highlights that even in one of the most prominent such cases, namely the judgment of 5 May 2020 concerning the European Central Bank’s public sector purchase programme, the German Federal Constitutional Court nevertheless stressed its respect for the principle of primacy;

Amendment 157 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 4 a (new)

4a. Underlines that a constructive dialogue between national constitutional courts and the CJEU is beneficial to the development of EU law as it can serve as a way of solving tensions between the European and national legal orders regarding the division of competences; stresses that such dialogue should be constructive and does not legitimise any disrespect for the decisions of the CJEU;

Amendment 158 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 5

5. Points, however, to the negative consequences of any decision of a national constitutional court that challenges the principle of primacy; stresses that, if every national constitutional court could decide on the limits of the primacy of EU law, the effectiveness and uniformity of EU law would be seriously jeopardised; underlines that challenging CJEU judgments on the basis of national constitutional reservations concerning respect for EU competences or the national constitutional identity genuinely undermines the CJEU’s authority;deleted

Amendment 159 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 5

5. Points, however, to the negative consequences of any decision of a national constitutional court that challenges the principle of primacy; stresses that, if every national constitutional court could decide on the limits of the primacy of EU law, the effectiveness and uniformity of EU law would be seriously jeopardised; underlines that challenging CJEU judgments on the basis of national constitutional reservations concerning respect for EU competences or the national constitutional identity genuinely undermines the CJEU’s authority;deleted

Amendment 16 #

Motion for a resolution
Recital A

A. whereas, in accordance with Article 2 TEU, the EU is founded on values~~, including the rule of law, that are common to the Member States; whereas respect for such values is a prerequisite for accession to the Union~~ shared by the Member States;

Amendment 160 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 5

5. Points, however, to the negative consequences of any decision of a national constitutional court that challenges the principle of primacy; stresses that, if every national constitutional court could decide on the limits of the primacy of EU law, the effectiveness and uniformity of EU law would be seriously jeopardised; underlines that challenging CJEU judgments on the basis of national constitutional reservations concerning respect for EU competences or the national constitutional identity genuinely undermines the CJEU’s authority;deleted

Amendment 161 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 5

5. ~~Points, however, to the negative consequences of any decision~~Stresses that a number of a national constitutional court ~~that challenges the principle of primacy; stresses that, if every national constitutional court could decide on the~~s have sought to limit~~s of~~ the primacy of EU law, the effectiveness and uniformity of EU law would be seriously jeopardised; underlines that challenging CJEU judgments on the basis of national constitutional reservations concerning respect for EU competences or the national constitutional identity genuinely undermines the CJEU’s authoritynciple of primacy of EU law by putting principles inherent in their constitutional identity to the fore;

Amendment 162 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 5

5. Points, however, to the negative consequences of any decision of a national constitutional court that challenges the principle of primacy; stresses that, if every national constitutional court could decide on the limits of the primacy of EU law, the effectiveness and uniformity of EU law would be seriously jeopardised; underlines that challenging CJEU judgments on the basis of national constitutional reservations concerning respect for EU competences or the national constitutional identity genuinely undermines the CJEU’s authorityStresses that every national constitutional court must be able to decide on the limits of the primacy of EU law with a view to safeguarding the Member State's fundamental interests;

Amendment 163 #

Sophia IN 'T VELD, Alin MITUȚA, Charles GOERENS, Max ORVILLE, Sandro GOZI

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 5

5. Points, however, to the negative consequences of any decision of a national constitutional court that challenges the principle of primacy; stresses that, if every national constitutional court could decide on the limits of the primacy of EU law, the effectiveness and uniformity of EU law would ~~be seriously jeopardised~~cease to exist, and thereby the guarantee for equal treatment of citizens and businesses across the Union; underlines that challenging CJEU judgments on the basis of national constitutional reservations concerning respect for EU competences or the national constitutional identity genuinely undermines the CJEU’s authority, as well as the legitimacy and proper functioning of the EU;

Amendment 164 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 5

5. Points, however, to the negative consequences of any decision of a national constitutional court that challenges, or fails to apply, the principle of primacy of EU law; stresses that, if every national constitutional court could decide on the limits of the primacy of EU law, or on exceptions to the applicability of that principle, the effectiveness and uniformity of EU law would be seriously jeopardised, the implementation of EU policies would become unachievable and the uniform and non-discriminatory protection of persons by EU laws, throughout all EU Member States, would be weakened; underlines that challenging CJEU judgments on the basis of national constitutional reservations concerning respect for EU competences or the national constitutional identity could genuinely undermines the CJEU’s authority;

Amendment 165 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 5

5. Points, however, to the negative consequences of ~~any~~ decisions of a national constitutional court that challenges the principle of primacy itself; stresses that, if every national constitutional court could decide on the limits of the primacy of EU law, the effectiveness and uniformity of EU law would be seriously jeopardised; underlines that challenging CJEU judgments on the basis of national constitutional reservations concerning respect for EU competences or the national constitutional identity without referring preliminary questions on the interpretation of these judgments to the CJEU genuinely undermines the CJEU’s authority;

Amendment 166 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 5

5. Points, however, to the negative consequences of any decision of a national constitutional court that challenges the principle of primacy; stresses that, if every national constitutional court could decide on the limits of the primacy of EU law, the effectiveness and uniformity of EU law would be seriously jeopardised; underlines that challenging CJEU judgments on the basis of national constitutional reservations concerning respect for EU competences or the national constitutional identity ~~genuinely~~might undermines the ~~CJEU’s~~ authority of EU law;

Amendment 167 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 5

5. Points, however, to the negative consequences of any decision of a national constitutional or supreme court that challenges the principle of primacy; stresses that, if every national constitutional or supreme court could decide on the limits of the primacy of EU law, the effectiveness and uniformity of EU law would be seriously jeopardised; underlines that challenging CJEU judgments on the basis of national constitutional reservations concerning respect for EU competences or the national constitutional identity genuinely undermines the CJEU’s authority;

Amendment 168 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 5

5. Points, however, to the negative consequences of any decision of a national constitutional court that challenges the principle of primacy; stresses that, if every national constitutional court could decide on the limits of the primacy of EU law, the effectiveness and uniformity of EU law would be seriously jeopardised; underlines that challenging CJEU judgments on the basis of national constitutional reservations concerning respect for EU competences or the national constitutional identity genuinely undermines the CJEU’s authority; points out in this regard that the CJEU should refrain from acting outside of its scope of competences;

Amendment 169 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 6

6. Believes that the case-law of any national constitutional court challenging the principle of primacy has an important influence on the doctrines of the constitutional courts of the other Member States with regard to the scope of the primacy of EU law; points, therefore, to the risk that this could pose to the effectiveness and uniformity of EU law;deleted

Amendment 17 #

Motion for a resolution
Recital A

A. whereas, in accordance with Article 2 TEU, the EU is founded on the values~~, including the rule of law, that are common to the Member States; whereas respect for such values is a prerequisite for accession to the Union~~ of respect for human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, the rule of law and respect for human rights, including the rights of persons belonging to minorities, that are common to the Member States; whereas respect for such values is a prerequisite for accession to the Union; whereas respect for the rule of law entails compliance with EU primary and secondary law, and with the core principle of the primacy of EU law;

Amendment 170 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 6

6. Believes that the case-law of any national constitutional court ~~challenging~~on the principle of primacy ~~has an important influence on the doctrines of~~may be a point of consideration for the constitutional courts of the other Member States with regard to the scope of the primacy of EU law; points, therefore, to the ~~risk that this could pose to the effectiveness and uniformity of EU law~~significance of a dialogue between national constitutional judges, particularly with regard to the EU's adherence to the competences conferred upon it in the Treaties;

Amendment 171 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 6

6. ~~Believ~~Acknowledges that the case-law of any national constitutional court challenging the principle of primacy ~~has an important influence~~may have an impact on the doctrines of the constitutional courts of the other Member States with regard to the scope of the primacy of EU law; ~~points, therefore, to the risk that this could pose to the effectiveness and uniformity of EU law;~~

Amendment 172 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 6

6. Believes that the case-law of any national constitutional court challenging the principle of primacy has an important influence on the doctrines of the constitutional courts of the other Member States with regard to the scope of the primacy of EU law; ~~points, therefore, to the risk that this could pose to the effectiveness and uniformity of EU law;~~

Amendment 173 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 6

6. Believes that the case-law of any national constitutional court ~~challenging the principle of primacy has an important~~may influence on the doctrines of the constitutional courts of the other Member States with regard to the scope of the primacy of EU law; points, therefore, to the risk that this could pose to the effectiveness and uniformity of EU law;

Amendment 174 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 6

6. Believes that the case-law of any national constitutional court challenging the principle of primacy ~~has an import~~can have ant influence on the doctrines of the constitutional courts of the other Member States with regard to the scope of the primacy of EU law; points, therefore, to the risk that this could pose to the effectiveness and uniformity of EU law;

Amendment 175 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 6

6. Believes that the case-law of any national constitutional or supreme court challenging the principle of primacy has an important influence on the doctrines of the constitutional or supreme courts of the other Member States with regard to the scope of the primacy of EU law; points, therefore, to the risk that this could pose to the effectiveness and uniformity of EU law;

Amendment 176 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 6 a (new)

6a. Recalls the diversity among the legal traditions specific to each Member State; notes that the CJEU case-law has developed on the basis of the different Member States’ legal traditions; believes that such differences are one of the contributing factors to national constitutional courts challenging the rulings of the CJEU; emphasises that the CJEU constructs general principles based on common constitutional traditions of Member States’ legal orders;

Amendment 177 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 6 b (new)

6b. Reiterates that in practical terms the approach of the CJEU to Article 4(2) TEU on respect for national identities of Member States, is informed by the analysis of common European values (Article 2 TEU); points out therefore, that references to Article 4(2) TEU by national constitutional courts should never be used to compromise common European values;

Amendment 178 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 7

7. Is of the opinion that the preliminary reference procedure constitutes a way to engage in a constructive judicial dialogue; emphasises that, since it ensures the uniform interpretation of EU law, it is a prerequisite for the consistency and autonomy of the EU’s legal order; recalls that, in certain cases, the CJEU has shown a willingness to change its reasoning in a second preliminary ruling requested by the same national constitutional court that had initiated the first preliminary reference, which demonstrates that this procedure provides for an effective dialogue between courtsnotes that a dialogue of that kind is incompatible with a general and strict principle of primacy that involves a uniform interpretation and for which there is, therefore, no room for discussion;

Amendment 179 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 7

7. Is of the opinion that the preliminary reference procedure ~~constitutes a way to engage in a constructive judicial dialogue~~plays a crucial role in fostering a free and constructive judicial dialogue and is a key instrument to solve conflicts between national courts of last instance and the CJEU; emphasises that, since it ensures the uniform interpretation of EU law, it is a prerequisite for the consistency and autonomy of the EU’s legal order; recalls that, in certain cases, the CJEU has shown a willingness to change its reasoning in a second preliminary ruling requested by the same national constitutional court that had initiated the first preliminary reference, which demonstrates that this procedure provides for an effective dialogue between courts; emphasises that the current reform of the preliminary ruling procedure amending Protocol No 3 of the Court of Justice of the European Union needs to take into account its potential impact on the mechanism of judicial dialogue between courts within the framework of the preliminary ruling procedure;

Amendment 18 #

Motion for a resolution
Recital A

A. whereas, in accordance with Article 2 TEU, the EU is founded on the values~~, including the rule of law~~ of respect for human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, the rule of law and respect for human rights, including the rights of persons belonging to minorities, that are common to the Member States; whereas respect for such values is a prerequisite for accession to the Union;

Amendment 180 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 7

7. Is of the opinion that the preliminary reference procedure constitutes a way to engage in a constructive judicial dialogue; emphasises that, since it ensures the uniform interpretation of EU law, it is a prerequisite for the consistency and autonomy of the EU’s legal order; recalls that~~, in certain cases,~~ the CJEU has already shown a willingness to change its reasoning in a second preliminary ruling requested by the same national constitutional court that had initiated the first preliminary reference, which demonstrates that this procedure provides for an effective dialogue between courts;

Amendment 181 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 7

7. Is of the opinion that the preliminary reference procedure constitutes a way to engage in a constructive judicial dialogue; emphasises that, since it ensures the uniform interpretation of EU law, it is a prerequisite for the consistency and autonomy of the EU’s legal order; recalls that, in certain cases, the CJEU has shown a willingness to change its reasoning in a second preliminary ruling requested by the same national constitutional court that had initiated the first preliminary reference, which demonstrates that this procedure provides for an effective dialogue between courts; considers that the escalation of conflicts by national constitutional or supreme courts might testify to a lack of investment in dialogue with the CJEU in the course of the proceedings;

Amendment 182 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 7

7. Is of the opinion that the preliminary reference procedure constitutes a way to engage in a constructive judicial dialogue with the CJEU; emphasises that, since it ensures the uniform interpretation of EU law, it is a prerequisite for the consistency and autonomy of the EU’s legal order; recalls that, in certain cases, the CJEU has shown a willingness to change its reasoning in a second preliminary ruling requested by the same national constitutional court that had initiated the first preliminary reference, which demonstrates that this procedure provides for an effective dialogue between courts;

Amendment 183 #

Sophia IN 'T VELD, Alin MITUȚA, Charles GOERENS, Max ORVILLE, Sandro GOZI

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 7 a (new)

7a. Welcomes the changes proposed by the Court in the pending draft regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Protocol No 3 on the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Union; believes that a more balanced distribution of labour between the Court of Justice and the General Court should give way for a more intense judicial dialogue between EU and Member States’ courts and tribunals, enabling them to resolve persisting tensions surrounding the principle of the primacy of EU law; encourages the EU and national courts and tribunals to also intensify their judicial dialogue through informal channels;

Amendment 184 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 7 a (new)

7a. Welcomes all existing informal mechanisms allowing to strengthen judicial dialogue between national constitutional and supreme courts and the CJEU, such as the Meeting of judges gathering the President of the CJEU and the Presidents of the constitutional and supreme courts, and the Judicial Network of the European Union platform created at their initiative in 2017;

Amendment 185 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 7 a (new)

7a. Emphasises that transparency of decision-making as a democratic principle also applies to the judiciary and fosters public trust into the judicial process; believes that public access to court documents, files and records contributes to transparency and accountability of the judiciary in the Member States and the Union;

Amendment 186 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 7 a (new)

7a. This constructive judicial dialogue may be resorted to in cases where there is a conflict between a provision of EU law and a national constitution, however, in the event of failure to reach an agreement, national constitutions must take precedence;

Amendment 187 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 8

8. Reiterates its call on the Commission to closely monitor the rulings of national courts with regard to the primacy of EU law over national legislation and to provide full information to Parliament on any possible conflict and any action taken in response;deleted

Amendment 188 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 8

8. ~~Reiterates its c~~Calls on the Commission to ~~closely monitor~~respect the rulings of national courts with regard to ~~the primacy of EU law over national legislation and to provide full information to Parliament on any possible conflict and any action taken in response~~conflicts between EU legislation and national constitutions;

Amendment 189 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 8

8. ~~Reiterates its c~~Calls on the Commission to closely ~~monitor~~study the rulings of national courts with regard to the primacy of EU law over national legislation and to ~~provide full information to Parliament on any possible conflict and any action taken in resp~~take them into consideration in its own interpretation of EU law; calls on the Commission to send the Council and Parliament a detailed summary of those decisionse;

Amendment 19 #

Motion for a resolution
Recital A

A. whereas, in accordance with Article 2 TEU, the EU is founded on values, including the rule of law, that are common to the Member States; whereas respect for such values is a prerequisite for accession to the Union and an obligation for the EU Member States;

Amendment 190 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 8

8. Reiterates its ~~call on~~recommendation to the Commission to closely monitor the rulings of national courts with regard to application of the principle of the primacy of EU law over national legislation and to provide full information to Parliament on any ~~possible conflict and any~~conflict relating to non-observance of the principle of the primacy of EU law and on the action taken in response to this;

Amendment 191 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 8

8. ~~Reiterates its call on~~Notes that the Commission ~~to closely~~ monitors the rulings of national courts with regard to the primacy of EU law over national legislation ~~and~~; calls on the Commission to provide full information to Parliament on any possible conflict and any action taken in response;

Amendment 192 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 8

8. Reiterates ~~its call~~the duty onf the Commission as the guardian of the Treaties to closely monitor the rulings of national courts with regard to the primacy of EU law over national legislation and to provide full information to Parliament on any possible conflict and any action taken in response;

Amendment 193 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 8

8. Reiterates its call on the Commission to closely monitor the rulings of national courts with regard to the primacy of EU law over national legislation and to provide full information to Parliament on any possible conflict and any action taken in response; to this end, calls on the Commission to include this monitoring exercise on primacy in its annual Rule of Law report;

Amendment 194 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 8

8. Reiterates its call on the Commission to closely monitor the rulings of national courts with regard to the primacy of EU law over national legislation and to provide full information to Parliament on any possible conflict and any action taken in response; calls on the Commission to include the subsequent results of such monitoring in its annual Rule of Law report;

Amendment 195 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 8 a (new)

8a. Encourages constitutional and supreme courts to consistently engage in a judicial dialogue with the CJEU in order to avoid such rulings; underlines that procedures before the Court of Justice, such as references for preliminary rulings, already provide the opportunity for such dialogue; to this regard, invites national constitutional and supreme courts to proactively use references for preliminary rulings; considers nevertheless that other mechanisms could be envisaged to further enhance judicial dialogue, such as the establishment of a voluntary non-binding conciliation dialogue of judges where relevant references for preliminary rulings have been made; considers that such a mechanism would help prevent in particular ultra vires cases similar to the German Federal Constitutional Court’s judgment of 5 May 2020 or the Polish Constitutional Tribunal’s decision of 7 October 2021;

Amendment 196 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 8 a (new)

8a. Notes that the proper implementation of EU law and CJEU case law is a priority for the respect of the principle of primacy of EU law; therefore, calls on the Commission, in its role as the guardian of the Treaties, to issue a yearly account, modelled on the Rule of Law annual report, in which the state of play on the implementation of Union law and jurisprudence is determined by analysing and assessing the application of CJEU judgements in the Member States and the upholding of the EU Treaties and their application in the different Member States; calls on the Commission also to initiate the appropriate proceedings against the Member States who fail to implement primary Union law or CJEU case-law relating to EU competences in domestic law and courts;

Amendment 197 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 8 a (new)

8a. Encourages national courts to effectively and consistently use the existing mechanisms to engage in a judicial dialogue with the CJEU; underlines the role that references for preliminary rulings can play in that regard; points out that the existence of informal mechanisms allows to foster existing judicial dialogues, such as the European Judicial Network, which are important for shaping the relationships between national and respective EU structures;

Amendment 198 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 8 a (new)

8a. Calls on the Union to respect national constitutional identities and to confine itself to acting within the scope of the competences assigned to it by the Member States, exercising its functions with full respect for national sovereignty;

Amendment 199 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 8 a (new)

8a. Considers it vital to respect national sovereignty and democracy and the right of peoples to determine their destiny, including by bolstering national parliaments' decision-making capacity regarding European Union policies;

Amendment 2 #

Motion for a resolution
Citation 1

—– having regard to Articles 1, 2, 43(6), 4, 5, 13(2) and 19 of the Treaty on European Union (TEU),

Amendment 20 #

Motion for a resolution
Recital A a (new)

Aa. whereas, in accordance with Article 5(2) of the Treaty on European Union and under the principle of conferral, the Union shall act only within the limits of the competences conferred upon it by the Member States in the Treaties to attain the objectives set out therein and whereas competences not conferred upon the Union in the Treaties shall remain in the hands of the Member States;

Amendment 200 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 8 a (new)

8a. Calls on the CJEU to refrain from issuing ultra vires judgments and to respect the power of the constitutional courts in the Member States to examine whether such a limit has been exceeded by the CJEU;

Amendment 201 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 8 b (new)

8b. Considers it necessary for the EU Treaties, policies and rules to be reversible – starting with the repeal of the Fiscal Compact and the Treaty of Lisbon – with a view to the progressive adjustment of the status of each country according to the will of its people and its actual situation, while safeguarding its specificities and permitting the necessary exception clauses;

Amendment 202 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 8 b (new)

8b. Calls for establishing a separate subsidiarity chamber in the CJEU, composed of presidents of national constitutional courts, to monitor EU legislation;

Amendment 203 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 8 c (new)

8c. Calls for cooperation among sovereign states with equal rights by rejecting the imposition of power relations in EU institutions that keep the major powers in a dominant position in decision-making processes;

Amendment 204 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 8 d (new)

8d. Upholds the principle of equality among states – one country, one vote – and the right to veto on all matters deemed to be of vital interest for upholding each Member State's right to development, sovereignty and independence;

Amendment 205 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 9

9. Encourages the Commission to initiate infringement procedures under Article 258 TFEU in response to judgments of national constitutional courts that challenge the principle of primacy; underlines that such procedures provide the opportunity for supreme courts to engage in a judicial dialogue; stresses also the need to make clear to other national constitutional courts that there are consequences for failing to respect the principle of primacy;deleted

Amendment 206 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 9

9. Encourages the Commission to initiate infringement procedures under Article 258 TFEU in response to judgments of national constitutional courts that challenge the principle of primacy; underlines that such procedures provide the opportunity for supreme courts to engage in a judicial dialogue; stresses also the need to make clear to other national constitutional courts that there are consequences for failing to respect the principle of primacy;deleted

Amendment 207 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 9

9. Encourages the Commission to initiate infringement procedures under Article 258 TFEU in response to judgments of national constitutional courts that challenge the principle of primacy; underlines that such procedures provide the opportunity for supreme courts to engage in a judicial dialogue; stresses also the need to make clear to other national constitutional courts that there are consequences for failing to respect the principle of primacy;deleted

Amendment 208 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 9

9. ~~Encourage~~Reminds the Commission to initiate infringement procedures under Article 258 TFEU in response to judgments of national constitutional courts that challenge the principle of primacy; underlines that such procedures provide the opportunity for supreme courts to engage in a judicial dialogue; stresses also the need to make clear to other national chat while Article 258 TFEU enables it to initiate infringement procedures against a Member State that may have failed to fulfil an obligation under the Treaties, that article does not apply in the case of a Member State whose Constitutional cCourt~~s that there are consequences for failing to respect the principle of primacy~~ may have called into question the principle of primacy in case-law, which is not enshrined in the Treaties;

Amendment 209 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 9

9. Encourages the Commission to initiate infringement procedures under Article 258 TFEU in response to judgments of national constitutional courts that challenge the principle of primacy; underlines that such procedures provide the opportunity for supreme courts to engage in a judicial dialogue; stresses also the need to make clear to other national constitutional courts that there are consequences for failing to respect the principle of primacyConsiders that it might be extremely useful for the cause of the ‘ever close union’ if judges of Supreme Courts engaged on a regular basis in an open and transparent dialogue by using possible means, such as conferences, networks or exchange visits; suggests that in the interests of democratic accountability and transparency, however, such meetings should neither be informal nor be tarnished by secrecy, and a full transcript should be published of any encounter or any meeting or any conversation in writing or otherwise between national and EU judges;

Amendment 21 #

Motion for a resolution
Recital A a (new)

Aa. whereas the attempt to impose the primacy of EU law over the law of each Member State by way of the Draft Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe was clearly rejected by the peoples of a number of countries in referendums;

Amendment 210 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 9

9. Encourages the Commission to initiate infringement procedures under Article 258 TFEU in response to judgments of national constitutional courts that challenge the principle of primacy; underlines that such procedures provide the opportunity for supreme courts to engage in a judicial dialogue; stresses also the need to make clear to other national constitutional courts that there are consequences for failing to respect the principle of primacyif it takes the view, when a conflict of norms arises, that they have not favoured EU law over national legislative and regulatory law; underlines that such procedures provide the opportunity for supreme courts to engage in a judicial dialogue;

Amendment 211 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 9

9. ~~Encourage~~Stresses however the need to make clear to national constitutional and supreme courts that there are consequences for failing to respect the principle of primacy; requests the Commission to initiate infringement procedures under Article 258 TFEU in response to judgments of national constitutional and supreme courts that challenge the principle of primacy; ~~underlines that such procedures~~ in this regard, further suggests to improvide the opportunity for supreme courts to engage in a judicial dialogue; stresses also the need to make clear to other national constitutional courts that there are consequences for failing to respect the principle of primacyeffectiveness of infringement procedures in order to be more dissuasive through the next revision of the Treaties;

Amendment 212 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 9

9. Encourages the Commission to initiate infringement procedures under Article 258 TFEU in response to judgments of national constitutional courts that challenge the principle of primacy as the measure of the last resort when other forms of dialogue fail; underlines that such procedures might provide the opportunity for ~~supreme~~national highest courts to engage in a judicial dialogue; ~~stresses also the need to make clear to other national constitutional courts that there are consequences for failing to respect the principle of primacy;~~

Amendment 213 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 9

9. Encourages the Commission to initiate infringement procedures under Article 258 TFEU in response to judgments of national constitutional courts that prove to have challenged the principle of primacy of EU law; underlines that such procedures provide the opportunity for supreme courts to engage in a judicial dialogue; ~~stresses also the need to make clear to other national constitutional courts that there are consequences for failing to respect the principle of primacy;~~

Amendment 214 #

Sophia IN 'T VELD, Alin MITUȚA, Charles GOERENS, Max ORVILLE, Sandro GOZI

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 9

9. ~~Encourages~~Calls on the Commission to initiate infringement procedures under Article 258 TFEU in response to judgments of national constitutional courts that challenge the principle of primacy; underlines that such procedures provide the opportunity for supreme courts to engage in a judicial dialogue; stresses also the need to make clear to other national constitutional courts that there are consequences for failing to respect the principle of primacy; reiterates that challenges to the principle of primacy of EU law are sometimes part of a systemic undermining of the Rule of Law by a Member State government, which merit further action by the EU institutions, including activating and advancing Article 7 proceedings and the EU Rule of Law budget conditionality Regulation;

Amendment 215 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 9

9. Encourages the Commission to initiate infringement procedures under Article 258 TFEU in response to judgments of national constitutional courts that challenge the principle of primacy; underlines that such procedures provide the opportunity for supreme courts to engage in a judicial dialogue; stresses also the need to make clear to other national constitutional courts that there are consequences for failing to respect the principle of primacy; further suggests to improve the effectiveness of infringement procedures;

Amendment 216 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 9

9. Encourages the Commission to initiate infringement procedures under Article 258 TFEU in response to judgments of national constitutional courts that challenge the principle of primacy; underlines that such procedures provide the opportunity for supreme courts to engage in a judicial dialogue; stresses also the need to make clear to other national constitutional courts and their governments that there are consequences for failing to respect the principle of primacy;

Amendment 217 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 9

9. Encourages the Commission to initiate infringement procedures under Article 258 TFEU where appropriate, in response to judgments of national constitutional courts that challenge the principle of primacy; underlines that such procedures provide the opportunity for supreme courts to engage in a judicial dialogue; stresses also the need to make clear to other national constitutional courts that there are consequences for failing to respect the principle of primacy;

Amendment 218 #

Victor NEGRESCU

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 9 a (new)

9a. Encourages academic institutions and legal bodies within the EU to incorporate comprehensive modules on the principle of primacy in their curricula, fostering a deeper understanding and appreciation of this foundational principle among future legal practitioners and policymakers;

Amendment 219 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 10

10. Acknowledges that infringement procedures against judicial decisions are often criticised for potentially jeopardising the independence of the judiciary; points out, however, that judicial independence is aimed at shielding courts from exposure to political pressure, but not from accountability for not complying with the applicable law;deleted

Amendment 22 #

Motion for a resolution
Recital A b (new)

Ab. whereas allowing an external political/legal power to take precedence over a state's constitutional order endangers the sovereignty of a people and, therefore, democracy;

Amendment 220 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 10

10. Acknowledges that infringement procedures against judicial decisions are often criticised for potentially jeopardising the independence of the judiciary; points out, however, that judicial independence is aimed at shielding courts from exposure to political pressure, but not from accountability for not complying with the applicable law;deleted

Amendment 221 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 10

10. Acknowledges that infringement procedures against judicial decisions are often criticised for potentially jeopardising the independence of the judiciary; points out, however, that judicial independence is aimed at shielding courts from exposure to political pressure, but not from accountability for not complying with the applicable law;deleted

Amendment 222 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 10

10. Acknowledges that infringement procedures against judicial decisions are ~~often~~legitimately criticised for ~~potentially~~ jeopardising the independence of the judiciary~~; points out, however, that judicial independence is aimed at shielding courts from exposure to political pressure, but not from accountability for not complying with the applicable law~~, including constitutional courts;

Amendment 223 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 10

10. Acknowledges that infringement procedures against judicial decisions are often criticised for potentially jeopardising the independence of the judiciary; points out, however, that judicial independence is aimed at shielding courts from exposure to political pressure~~, but not from accountability for not complying with the applicable law~~;

Amendment 224 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 10 a (new)

10a. Strongly recommends that alongside the judicial means of preliminary reference, the CJEU and national constitutional courts are to engage in regular informal dialogue; encourages therefore the establishment of a forum within the CJEU, in which these judicial authorities can be brought together supported by the Commission, in the spirit of mutual cooperation with the aim of encouraging harmonisation of the interpretation of EU law across all judicial systems; encourages the individual Member States and the Commission to support these efforts; stresses that legal scholars in the field of national constitutional law should also be encouraged to familiarise themselves with EU case-law;

Amendment 225 #

Sophia IN 'T VELD, Alin MITUȚA, Charles GOERENS, Max ORVILLE, Sandro GOZI

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 10 a (new)

10a. Notes that the general application and implementation of EU law is the very precondition for its primacy; calls on the Commission to step up its efforts to enforce EU law, in particular by increasing infringement actions where Member States are failing to implement EU law;

Amendment 226 #

Sophia IN 'T VELD, Alin MITUȚA, Charles GOERENS, Max ORVILLE, Sandro GOZI

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 10 b (new)

10b. Notes that in some cases, Member State authorities are not implementing CJEU judgments, without this being followed by further enforcement action by the Commission, meaning that individuals and businesses have a judgement by the highest EU court ignored by their national authorities without any further available remedy; calls on the Commission to produce an implementation scoreboard for each CJEU judgement and, should implementation fail, initiate infringement procedures against the Member State;

Amendment 227 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 10 b (new)

10b. Emphasises that the executive and legislative bodies of Member States also bear a responsibility to ensure that their respective Member State upholds the provisions of the Treaties; stresses in this regard that executive and legislative bodies should take action to amend or withdraw legal acts that have been found to be in breach of EU law;

Amendment 228 #

10c. Emphasises that the key to fruitful dialogue and proper implementation of the principle of primacy of EU law is adequate capacity building; calls, therefore, for a European Union programme offering thorough training addressed at the Member States' domestic judicial systems, including judges, magistrates, lawyers, prosecutors, those working in the public sector and also at policy makers, both at national and also at EU level in order to encourage a better understanding of the primacy of Union law itself, the EU legal order in general and also the ramifications of the incorrect implementation of Union law and CJEU case-law;

Amendment 229 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 10 d (new)

10d. Notes that some cases of national constitutional courts disagreeing with the decisions of the CJEU relate to the protection of fundamental rights, specifically when national courts interpret the fundamental rights granted by EU law to be less protective than the fundamental rights granted by the national constitution; notes that the accession of the European Union to the European Convention on Human Rights would contribute to resolving conflicts concerning the protection of fundamental rights by allowing the European Court of Human Rights to review Union acts for their compliance with the European Convention on Human Rights; calls on the Commission and Member States to ensure a swift conclusion of the accession process;

Amendment 23 #

Motion for a resolution
Recital B

B. whereas, as a legal community and within the limits of its competencies, the EU is dependent on the effective and uniform application of its law; whereas such effectiveness and uniformity can only be ensured if EU law takes precedence over national law; whereas the principle of primacy therefore constitutes a cornerstone of the EU’s legal order, which is essential for the EU’s functioning;

Amendment 230 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 10 e (new)

10e. Notes that some cases of conflict can be linked with the deteriorating situation of the rule of law in the Member State in question; considers such cases to be a threat to the legal order in the Member State concerned and to the sincere cooperation among Member States as well as a failure of that Member State to live up to its Treaty obligations; welcomes the CJEU’s case-law in the fields of rule of law and judicial independence; reiterates its call on the Commission to make full use of its powers to address the existing and potential breaches of the values enshrined in Article 2 TEU; stresses Parliament’s determination to initiate the procedure referred to in Article 7 TEU in cases of a clear risk of a serious breach by a Member State of the European values referred to in Article 2 TEU and reiterates its call on the Council to make concrete and credible efforts to advance all ongoing Article 7 proceedings;

Amendment 231 #

10f. Notes the current process of accession to the EU of a number of candidate countries; recommends that in the application of the above recommendations and others towards a more harmonised approach to the principle of primacy of EU law, candidate countries are to be included in the broader discussion; proposes the accession process to include capacity building on the EU’s legal order and application of Union law; further proposes the establishment of a regular structured dialogue between the CJEU and the national courts of candidate countries;

Amendment 232 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 11

~~11. Reiterates that, although it is not enshrined in the Treaties, the principle of the primacy of EU law applies to, and its effects are binding on, all bodies of the Member States at all times;~~deleted

Amendment 233 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 11

11. Reiterates that~~, although it is not enshrined in the Treaties, the principle of the primacy of EU law applies to, and its effects are binding on, all bodies of the Member States at all tim~~ the principle of the primacy of EU law is not enshrined by the Treaties;.

Amendment 234 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 11

11. Reiterates that, a~~lthough~~s it is not enshrined in the Treaties, the principle of the primacy of EU law ~~applies to, and its effects are binding on, all bodies of the~~may not apply in any binding manner to any Member State~~s at all tim~~ bodies;

Amendment 235 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 11

11. Reiterates that~~, although it is not enshrined in the Treaties, the principle of the primacy of EU law applies to, and its effects are binding on, all bodies of the Member States at all tim~~ the principle of the primacy of EU law is not enshrined by the Treaties;.

Amendment 236 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 11

11. Reiterates that~~, although it is not enshrined in the Treaties, the principle of the primacy of EU law applies to, and its effects are binding on, all bodies of the Member States at all tim~~ the principle of the primacy of EU law is not enshrined in the Treaties;

Amendment 237 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 11

11. Reiterates that, although it is not enshrined in the Treaties, the principle of the primacy of EU law applies to, and its effects are binding on, all bodies of the Member States ~~at all tim~~in accordance with the constitutional arrangements of the Member States;

Amendment 238 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 11

11. Reiterates that, although ~~it is not enshrined in~~the principle of primacy of EU law is enshrined in a Declaration annexed to the Treaties, the principle of the primacy of EU law applies to, and its effects are binding on, all bodies of the Member States at all times;

Amendment 239 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 11

11. Reiterates that, although it is not explicitly enshrined in the Treaties, the principle of the primacy of EU law applies to, and its effects are binding on, all bodies of the Member States at all times;

Amendment 24 #

Motion for a resolution
Recital B

B. whereas, as a legal community and not a state, the EU is dependent on the effective and uniform application of its law;, wh~~ereas such effectiveness and uniformit~~ich should comply can ~~only be ensured if EU law takes precedence over national law; whereas the principle of primacy therefore constitutes a cornerstone of the EU’s leg~~d be consistent with the constitutional order~~, which~~ of its ~~essential for the EU’s functioning~~Member States;

Amendment 240 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 12

12. Recommends nevertheless that, in the event of a revision of the Treaties, the principle of primacy be codified; recalls that the precedence of EU law was explicitly laid down in the Constitutional Treaty; regrets the fact that this primacy clause was not included in the Treaty of Lisbon;deleted

Amendment 241 #

12. Recommends nevertheless that, in the event of a revision of the Treaties, the principle of primacy be codified; recalls that the precedence of EU law was explicitly laid down in the Constitutional Treaty; regrets the fact that this primacy clause was not included in the Treaty of Lisbon;deleted

Amendment 242 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 12

12. Recommends nevertheless that, in the event of a revision of the Treaties, the principle of primacy be codified; recalls that the precedence of EU law was explicitly laid down in the Constitutional Treaty; regrets the fact that this primacy clause was not included in the Treaty of Lisbon;deleted

Amendment 243 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 12

12. Recommends nevertheless that, in the event of a revision of the Treaties, the principle of primacy be codified; recalls that the precedence of EU law was explicitly laid down in the Constitutional Treaty; regrets the fact that this primacy clause was not included in the Treaty of Lisbon;deleted

Amendment 244 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 12

12. Recommends nevertheless that, in the event of a revision of the Treaties, the principle of primacy be codified; recalls that the precedence of EU law was explicitly laid down in the Constitutional Treaty; regrets the fact that this primacy clause was not included in the Treaty of Lisbon;deleted

Amendment 245 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 12

12. Recommends nevertheless that, in the event of a revision of the Treaties, the principle of primacy be codified; recalls that the precedence of EU law was explicitly laid down in the Constitutional Treaty; regretalls the fact that this primacy clause was not included in the Treaty of Lisbon;

Amendment 246 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 12

12. ~~Recommends nevertheless~~Points out that, in the event of a revision of the Treaties, the principle of primacy be codified; recalls that the precedence of EU law was explicitly laid down in the Constitutional Treaty; regrets the fact that this primacy clause was not included in the Treaty of Lisbondebate on whether to codify the principle of primacy of EU law, doubts have been raised as to the effectiveness of such codification, as it is felt that this would not resolve one of the key issues underlying the challenge to the principle of primacy, with reference to national and/or European competences;

Amendment 247 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 12

12. ~~Recommends nevertheless that, in the event of a revision of the Treaties, the principle of primacy be codified~~Takes the view that established case-law and the current legal provisions are enough to apply EU law with due regard for the Member States' constitutions; recalls that while the precedence of EU law was ~~explicitly~~ laid down in the Cdraft constitutional ~~Treaty; regrets the fact that this primacy clause was not included in the Treaty of Lisbon~~treaty, that treaty was rejected in referendums in a number of Member States in 2005;

Amendment 248 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 12

12. Recommends nevertheless that, in the event of a revision of the Treaties, the principle of primacy be codified; recalls that the precedence of EU law was explicitly laid down in the Constitutional Treaty; regrets the factalls that the precedence of EU law was explicitly laid down in the Constitutional Treaty but that the Constitutional Treaty was democratically rejected in two national referendums; stresses that this primacy clause was then deliberately not included in the Treaty of Lisbon, stripping it of all binding legal force;

Amendment 249 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 12

12. Recommends nevertheless that, ~~in the event of~~when a revision of the Treaties will occur, the principle of primacy be codified in the Treaties themselves; recalls that the precedence of EU law was explicitly laid down in the Constitutional Treaty; regrets the fact that this primacy clause was not included in the Treaty of Lisbon;

Amendment 25 #

Motion for a resolution
Recital B

B. whereas, as a legal community, the EU is dependent on the effective and ~~uniform~~homogeneous application of its law; whereas such effectiveness and ~~uniform~~homogeneity can only be ensured if EU law takes precedence over national law; w~~hereas the principle of primacy therefore constitutes a cornerstone~~ithin the areas of competence conferred ofn the ~~EU’s legal order, which is essential for the EU’s functioning~~Union by the Treaties;

Amendment 250 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 12

12. Recommends nevertheless that, in the event of a revision of the Treaties, the principle of primacy be codified; recalls that the precedence of EU law was explicitly laid down in the Constitutional Treaty~~; regrets the fact that this primacy clause~~ but was not included in the Treaty of Lisbon;

Amendment 251 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 12

12. Recommends nevertheless that, in the event of a revision of the Treaties, the principle of primacy be codified; recalls that the precedence of EU law was explicitly laid down in the Constitutional Treaty; regrets the fact that this primacy clause was not included in the Treaty of Lisbon; underlines the legal effect of Declaration No 17 annexed to the Treaty of Lisbon, concerning primacy and its interpretation by the signatory states;

Amendment 252 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 12 a (new)

12a. Calls, in an intergovernmental EU founded on subject-matter jurisdiction, for the primacy of national constitutional orders to be reasserted; to that end and to provide more legal clarity, as part of any future Treaty reform, Declaration 17 to the TFEU should be repealed and it should be established in primary law that the primacy of EU law is limited to only legislative competence areas explicitly conferred upon the EU in the Treaties, and it should remain subject, on the one hand, to the 'constitutional identity' of the Member States and, on the other hand, to effective control of compliance with that condition, both judicial, by the national constitutional courts, and political and democratic, by the Member States' parliaments;

Amendment 253 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 13

13. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council and the Commission, the CJEU and constitutional courts of the Member States.

Amendment 254 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 13

13. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council, the Member States' constitutional courts, and the Commission.

Amendment 26 #

Motion for a resolution
Recital B

B. whereas, as a legal community~~, the EU is dependent~~ uniting countries that have previously amended their constitutions so that certain elements of their national sovereignty are exercised at EU level, the proper functioning of the EU depends on the effective and uniform application of its law; whereas such effectiveness and uniformity can only be ensured if EU law takes precedence over national l~~aw; whereas the principle of primacy therefore constitutes a cornerstone of the EU’s legal order, which is essential for the EU’s functioning~~egislative and regulatory law;

Amendment 27 #

Motion for a resolution
Recital B

B. whereas, as a legal community, the EU is dependent on the effective and uniform application of its law; whereas such effectiveness and uniformity can ~~only~~ be ensured if EU law takes precedence over national law in areas where EU law is applicable; whereas the principle of primacy therefore constitutes a cornerstone of the EU’s legal order, which is essential for the EU’s functioning;

Amendment 28 #

Motion for a resolution
Recital B

B. whereas, as a ~~legal~~ community of law (‘Rechtsgemeinschaft’), the EU is dependent on the effective and uniform application of its law; whereas such effectiveness and uniformity can only be ensured if EU law takes precedence over diverging national law; whereas the principle of primacy therefore constitutes a cornerstone of the EU’s legal order, which is essential for the EU’s functioning;

Amendment 29 #

Sophia IN 'T VELD, Alin MITUȚA, Charles GOERENS, Max ORVILLE, Sandro GOZI

Motion for a resolution
Recital B

B. whereas, as a legal community, the EU is dependent on the effective and uniform application and enforcement of its law; whereas such effectiveness and uniformity can only be ensured if EU law takes precedence over national law; whereas the principle of primacy therefore constitutes a cornerstone of the EU’s legal order, which is essential for the EU’s functioning; whereas, in the same spirit, the principle is a centre piece in the creation of an “ever closer union among the peoples of Europe”, as foreseen by the Treaties;

Amendment 3 #

Motion for a resolution
Citation 1 a (new)

— having regard to the constitutions of the Member States,

Amendment 30 #

Motion for a resolution
Recital B

B. whereas, as a legal community, the EU is dependent on the effective and uniform application of its law by the Member States’ and the Union’s courts; whereas such effectiveness and uniformity can only be ensured if EU law takes precedence over national law; whereas the principle of primacy therefore constitutes a cornerstone of the EU’s legal order, which is essential for the EU’s functioning;

Amendment 31 #

Motion for a resolution
Recital B a (new)

Ba. whereas, according to the case-law of the CJEU, the rationale for the principle of primacy centres in essence on the need for the effective and uniform application of EU law as a form of protection for all persons throughout the EU, underpinning citizens’ equality under the law;

Amendment 32 #

Motion for a resolution
Recital B a (new)

Ba. whereas the principle of primacy of EU law is not entrenched in the Treaties and has therefore not been accepted explicitly by the Member States;

Amendment 33 #

Motion for a resolution
Recital B a (new)

Ba. whereas the primacy of EU law is intrinsically linked to the principle of equality before the law, as it guarantees equal protection of the rights conferred by EU law to all EU citizens;

Amendment 34 #

Motion for a resolution
Recital B b (new)

Bb. whereas the concept of primacy does not relate to the fact there is a hierarchy between EU and national law; whereas, however, in the event of a conflict, Member States have the obligation not to apply national law that is contrary to EU law;

Amendment 35 #

Motion for a resolution
Recital B c (new)

Bc. whereas, according to the case-law of the CJEU, if the conditions for direct applicability are met, national authorities are obliged to apply the provision of EU law, while if they are not then national authorities are obliged to interpret national law in conformity with EU law;

Amendment 36 #

Motion for a resolution
Recital B d (new)

Bd. whereas the implementation of EU policies would become unachievable if Member States were not to respect the principle of primacy of EU law;

Amendment 37 #

Motion for a resolution
Recital C

C. whereas the principle of primacy is not enshrined in the Treaties, but has developed over decades through the case- law of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU); whereas, ever since its landmark Costa v E.N.E.L. judgment of 15 July 1964 in Case C-6/646, the CJEU has reaffirmed that EU law takes precedence over the law of the Member States, regardless of the rank of the national legislation or the time of its adoption; whereas the principle of primacy therefore applies to any provision of domestic law, including provisions of a constitutional nature, in accordance with the well-established case-law of the CJEU; _________________ 6 Judgment of the Court of Justice of 15 July 1964, Costa v E.N.E.L., C-6/64, ECLI:EU:C:1964:66.;

Amendment 38 #

Motion for a resolution
Recital C

C. whereas the principle of primacy is not enshrined in the Treaties, but has developed over decades through the case- law of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU); whereas, ever since its landmark Costa v E.N.E.L. judgment of 15 July 1964 in Case C-6/646, the CJEU has reaffirmed that EU law takes precedence over the law of the Member States, regardless of the rank of the national legislation or the time of its adoption; whereas the principle of primacy therefore applies to any provision of domestic law, including provisions of a constitutional nature, in accordance with the well-established case-law of the CJEU; _________________ 6 Judgment of the Court of Justice of 15 July 1964, Costa v E.N.E.L., C-6/64, ECLI:EU:C:1964:66.;

Amendment 39 #

Motion for a resolution
Recital C

C. whereas in the ~~principle of primacy is not enshrined in the Treaties, but has developed over decades through the case- law of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU); whereas, ever since its landmark~~ Costa v E.N.E.L. judgment of 15 July 1964 in Case C- 6/646, the CJEU ~~has re~~affirmed th~~at EU law takes precedence over the~~e primacy of EU law ofn the ~~Member States, regardless of the rank of the national legislation or the time of~~grounds that EU law must be applied in a uniform manner and its ~~adoption; whereas the principle of primacy therefore applies to any provision of domestic law, including provisions of a constitutional nature, in accordanc~~directly effective in all of the Member States, but left national constitutions outside wit~~h the well-established case-law of the CJEU~~s scope of application; _________________ 6 Judgment of the Court of Justice of 15 July 1964, Costa v E.N.E.L., C-6/64, ECLI:EU:C:1964:66.

Amendment 4 #

Motion for a resolution
Citation 2

~~— having regard to Articles 258, 267 and 344 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU),~~deleted

Amendment 40 #

Motion for a resolution
Recital C

C. whereas the so-called principle of primacy of EU law is not enshrined in the Treaties, buwhich is a fact tha~~s developed over decades through the~~t cannot be obscured or modified by any case- law of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU); ~~whereas, ever since its landmark~~that includes the Costa v E.N.E.L. judgment of 15 July 1964 in Case C-6/646, in which the CJEU has reaffirmed that EU law takes precedence over the law of the Member States, regardless of the rank of the national legislation or the time of its adoption; whereas the principle of primacy therefore applies to any provision of domestic law, including provisions of a constitutional nature, in accordance with the well-established case-law of the CJEU; _________________ 6 Judgment of the Court of Justice of 15 July 1964, Costa v E.N.E.L., C-6/64, ECLI:EU:C:1964:66.

Amendment 41 #

Motion for a resolution
Recital C

C. whereas the principle of primacy is not enshrined in the Treaties~~, but has developed over decades through~~ and therefore has no legal value under primary law, but has developed as a result of the interpretation thereof in the case- law of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU); whereas, ever since its ~~landmark~~ Costa v E.N.E.L. judgment of 15 July 1964 in Case C-6/646, the CJEU has reaffirmed that EU law takes precedence over the law of the Member States, regardless of the rank of the national legislation or the time of its adoption; whereas ~~the principle of primacy therefore~~, under this interpretation, primacy applies to any provision of domestic law, including provisions of a constitutional nature, in accordance with the well- established case- law of the CJEU; _________________ 6 Judgment of the Court of Justice of 15 July 1964, Costa v E.N.E.L., C-6/64, ECLI:EU:C:1964:66.

Amendment 42 #

Sophia IN 'T VELD, Alin MITUȚA, Charles GOERENS, Max ORVILLE, Sandro GOZI

Motion for a resolution
Recital C

C. whereas the principle of primacy is not explicitly enshrined in the Treaties, but has developed over decades through the case- law of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU); whereas, ever since its landmark Costa v E.N.E.L. judgment of 15 July 1964 in Case C-6/646 , the CJEU has on countless occassions reaffirmed that EU law takes precedence over the law of the Member States, regardless of the rank of the national legislation or the time of its adoption; whereas the principle of primacy therefore applies to any provision of domestic law, including provisions of a constitutional nature, in accordance with the well- established case-law of the CJEU; whereas, by virtue of the same jurisprudence, the principle also applies to international agreements concluded by Member States where those agreements are covered by the sphere of competence of the EU; _________________ 6 Judgment of the Court of Justice of 15 July 1964, Costa v E.N.E.L., C-6/64, ECLI:EU:C:1964:66.

Amendment 43 #

Motion for a resolution
Recital C

C. whereas the principle of primacy is not explicitly enshrined in the Treaties, but has developed over decades through the case- law of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU); whereas, ever since its landmark Costa v E.N.E.L. judgment of 15 July 1964 in Case C-6/646 , the CJEU has reaffirmed that EU law takes precedence over the law of the Member States, regardless of the rank of the national legislation or the time of its adoption; whereas the principle of primacy therefore applies to any provision of domestic law, including provisions of a constitutional nature, in accordance with the well- established case-law of the CJEU; _________________ 6 Judgment of the Court of Justice of 15 July 1964, Costa v E.N.E.L., C-6/64, ECLI:EU:C:1964:66.

Amendment 44 #

Motion for a resolution
Recital C a (new)

Ca. whereas, according to Article 4(3) subparagraph 2 TEU, Member States must take any appropriate measure, general or particular, to ensure fulfilment of the obligations arising out of the Treaties or resulting from the acts of the institutions of the Union;

Amendment 45 #

Motion for a resolution
Recital C a (new)

Ca. whereas, despite the attempts of the Court of Justice of the European Union to develop this principle, the primacy of EU law over national constitutional law is an abuse of the sovereignty of the Member States;

Amendment 46 #

Motion for a resolution
Recital D

D. whereas, in Declaration No 17 concerning primacy, annexed to the Treaty of Lisbon, the Conference recalls that, in accordance with the well-settled case-law of the CJEU, the Treaties and the law adopted by the Union on the basis of the Treaties have primacy over the law of the Member States, under the conditions laid down by the said case-law;deleted

Amendment 47 #

Motion for a resolution
Recital D

D. whereas~~, in~~ Declaration No 17 concerning primacy, annexed to the Treaty of Lisbon, the Conference recalls that, in accordance with the well-settled case-law of the CJEU, the Treaties and the law adopted by the Union on the basis of the Treaties have primacy over the law of the Member States, under the conditions laid down by the said case-lawFinal Act of the Intergovernmental Conference which adopted the Treaty of Lisbon, has no binding legal value;

Amendment 48 #

Motion for a resolution
Recital D

D. whereas, in Declaration No 17 concerning primacy, annexed to the Treaty of Lisbon, the Conference recalls that, in accordance with the well-settled case-law of the CJEU, the Treaties and the law adopted by the Union on the basis of the Treaties have primacy over the law the reason why the so- called principle of the primacy of EU law has never been enshrined in the Treaties is that, as well as failing to generate consensus, it was roundly rejected by the peoples of the Member States, uander th~~e conditions laid down by the said case-law~~is situation cannot be changed or undermined by Declaration No 17 concerning primacy, annexed to the Treaty of Lisbon;

Amendment 49 #

Motion for a resolution
Recital D

D. whereas~~, in Declaration No 17 concerning primacy, annexed to the Treaty of Lisbon, the Conference recalls that, in accordance with the well-settled case-law of the CJEU, the Treaties~~ the Member States have refused to accept the inclusion of this principle of primacy of EU law both in the draft European Constitution and in the ~~law adopted by the Union on the basis of the Treaties have primacy over the law of the Member States, under the conditions laid down by the said case-law~~Treaty of Lisbon, and whereas, instead, only Declaration No 17 concerning primacy, annexed to the Treaty of Lisbon, makes reference to it;

Amendment 5 #

Motion for a resolution
Citation 2 a (new)

— having regard to the fact that the principle of primacy of EU law is not regulated in the Treaties of the Union,

Amendment 50 #

Motion for a resolution
Recital D a (new)

Da. whereas the continuous dialogue between the Court of Justice of the European Union and national supreme and constitutional courts regarding the interpretation of this principle results from tensions between the EU and national legal orders, namely regarding the division of competences between the two constitutional spheres and who has the ultimate authority to define whether something falls under the scope of powers conferred by the Member States to the EU;

Amendment 51 #

Motion for a resolution
Recital E

E. whereas the case-law establishing the principle of primacy has not been ~~implicitly~~ accepted by all of the Member States, ~~which have never used a Treaty revision to lay down exceptions to the precedence of EU law~~and whereas the constitutional courts of several Member States have rejected the principle of primacy over national constitutions to respect their national identity and because they have not ceded their sovereign powers in this area;

Amendment 52 #

Motion for a resolution
Recital E

E. whereas the case-law establishing the principle of primacy has ~~been implicitly~~never been transposed into the Treaties and therefore cannot be deemed to have been accepted by the Member States, which have never used a Treaty revision to lay down ~~exceptions to the precedence of EU law~~the principle of primacy of EU law, which was roundly rejected by the peoples at the time of the so-called Constitution for Europe;

Amendment 53 #

Motion for a resolution
Recital E

E. whereas the case-law of the Court of Justice of the European Union establishing the principle of primacy has never been imexplicitly accepted by the Member States~~, which have never used a Treaty revision to lay down exceptions to the precedence of EU law~~;

Amendment 54 #

Motion for a resolution
Recital E

E. whereas the case-law establishing the principle of primacy has been ~~implicitly~~ accepted by the Member States~~, which have never used a Treaty revision to lay down exceptions to the precedence of EU law~~;

Amendment 55 #

Motion for a resolution
Recital E

E. whereas the case-law establishing the principle of primacy has never been imexplicitly ~~accept~~enshrined by the Member States~~, which have never used a Treaty revision to lay down exceptions to~~ in primary law in a revision of the pTre~~cedence of EU law~~aties;

Amendment 56 #

Sophia IN 'T VELD, Alin MITUȚA, Charles GOERENS, Max ORVILLE, Sandro GOZI

Motion for a resolution
Recital E

E. whereas the case-law establishing the principle of primacy ~~has been implicit~~is widely accepted by the Member States, which have never ~~used a Treaty revision to lay down~~amended the Treaties to introduce exceptions to the pr~~ecedence~~imacy of EU law;

Amendment 57 #

Motion for a resolution
Recital E

E. whereas the case-law establishing the principle of primacy has been implicitly accepted by the Member States, w~~hich~~ith the ratification of the Lisbon Treaty and Declaration No 17 annexed thereto; whereas Member States have never used a Treaty revision to lay down exceptions to the precedence of EU law or limitations on the applicability of that principle;

Amendment 58 #

Motion for a resolution
Recital E a (new)

Ea. whereas there are Member States, such as Spain, where, since time immemorial, case-law does not constitute a source of law (Article 1.6 Civil Code), meaning that is not easily sustainable that the doctrine emanating from a Court of Justice whose origin lies in a Treaty can modify laws adopted by a national parliament or even the Constitution;

Amendment 59 #

Motion for a resolution
Recital E a (new)

Ea. whereas, in accordance with Article 4(2) TEU, the EU must respect the national identities of Member States, inherent in their fundamental structures, political and constitutional, inclusive of regional and local self-government;

Amendment 6 #

Motion for a resolution
Citation 2 b (new)

— having regard to the judgment of the Court of Justice of the European Communities in the Costa v E.N.E.L. case of 15 July 1964,

Amendment 60 #

Motion for a resolution
Recital E a (new)

Ea. whereas the principle of primacy only applies within the scope of EU law; whereas the Court of Justice of the European Union has the exclusive competence to determine the scope of EU law under Article 344 TFEU;

Amendment 61 #

Motion for a resolution
Recital E b (new)

Eb. whereas the EU legal order is rooted in public international law Treaties, the existence of which depends on national acts of ratification; whereas the relationship between the EU legal order and national legal orders is based on the principle of conferral as enshrined in Article 4(1) TEU; whereas national courts have the exclusive competence to determine the scope of national law including ratification acts;

Amendment 62 #

Motion for a resolution
Recital E c (new)

Ec. whereas the claim of the Court of Justice of the European Union to exclusively determine the scope of EU law and the claims of national constitutional courts to exclusively determine the scope of national law are both legitimate;

Amendment 63 #

Motion for a resolution
Recital F

F. whereas several national constitutional courts have nevertheless defended the existence of certain limits to the principle of primacy; whereas these reservations mostly concern respect for EU competences and the national constitutional identity;deleted

Amendment 64 #

Motion for a resolution
Recital F

F. whereas several national constitutional courts ~~have nevertheless defended the existence of certain limits to the principle of primacy; whereas these reservations mostly concern respect for EU competences and the national constitutional identity~~, including the French Constitutional Council in a decision of 15 October 2021, have recalled that Union law is applied by their state with due respect for EU competences and the national constitutional identity; whereas that decision was not the subject of an infringement procedure by the European Commission, which, by its failure to act has approved these principles de facto and de jure;

Amendment 65 #

Motion for a resolution
Recital F

F. whereas several national constitutional courts have nevertheless defended the existence of certain limits to the principle of primacy; whereas these reservations mostly concern respect for EU competences and the national constitutional identitya directive may not be transposed or domestic law may not be adapted to a regulation on a manner contrary to a rule or principle inherent to the constitutional identity of a Member State, unless the national constituent assembly has expressly consented thereto;

Amendment 66 #

Motion for a resolution
Recital F

F. whereas several national constitutional courts have ~~nevertheless defended the existence of certain limi~~concluded that the scope of the national acts ratifying the EU Treaties does not cover unjustified violations of human rights, tohe weakening of the principle of ~~prim~~democracy;, wh~~ereas these reservations mostly concern respect for EU competences and~~ich includes the adoption of legally binding provisions by the EU outside of the scope of competences conferred upon the EU, and the conferral of core provisions of the national constitution (‘constitutional identity’);

Amendment 67 #

Motion for a resolution
Recital F

F. whereas several national constitutional courts have nevertheless defended the existence of certain limits to the principle of primacy; whereas these reservations mostly concern respect for EU competences ~~and~~, the national constitutional identity and protection of fundamental rights;

Amendment 68 #

Sophia IN 'T VELD, Alin MITUȚA, Charles GOERENS, Max ORVILLE, Sandro GOZI

Motion for a resolution
Recital F

F. whereas ~~several~~certain national constitutional courts have nevertheless ~~defend~~argued the existence of certain limits to the principle of primacy; whereas these reservations mostly concern respect for EU competences and the national constitutional identity;

Amendment 69 #

Motion for a resolution
Recital F

F. whereas several national constitutional courts have ~~nevertheless~~ defended the existence of certain limits to the so-called principle of primacy; whereas these reservations mostly concern respect for EU competences and the national constitutional identity;

Amendment 7 #

Motion for a resolution
Citation 2 c (new)

— having regard to the judgments of the constitutional courts of a number of Member States questioning the application of this principle over national constitutions,

Amendment 70 #

Motion for a resolution
Recital F

F. whereas, according to the European Commission’s 2022 Rule of Law Report, several national constitutional courts have nevertheless defended the existence of certain limits to the principle of primacy; whereas these reservations mostly concern respect for EU competences and the national constitutional identity;

Amendment 71 #

Motion for a resolution
Recital F

F. whereas several national constitutional courts have nevertheless defended the existence of certain limits to the principle of primacy related to Articles 4(2) and 5 TEU; whereas these reservations mostly concern respect for EU competences and the national constitutional identity;

Amendment 72 #

Motion for a resolution
Recital F

F. whereas several national constitutional and supreme courts have nevertheless defended the existence of certain limits to the principle of primacy; whereas these reservations mostly concern respect for EU competences and the national constitutional identity;

Amendment 73 #

Motion for a resolution
Recital F

F. whereas several national constitutional courts have nevertheless rightly defended the existence of certain limits to the principle of primacy; whereas these reservations mostly concern respect for EU competences and the national constitutional identity;

Amendment 74 #

Motion for a resolution
Recital F a (new)

Fa. whereas such interpretations of the scope of national law by national constitutional courts can be perceived at the level of EU law as reservations of the principle of primacy;

Amendment 75 #

Motion for a resolution
Recital F b (new)

Fb. whereas only the Polish constitutional court has considered that EU primary law is inferior to national constitutional law and is therefore the only national constitutional court that has explicitly limited the scope and the effect of the principle of primacy;

Amendment 76 #

Motion for a resolution
Recital F c (new)

Fc. whereas the EU legal order and a Member State’s national order are distinct and autonomous legal orders that co-exist next to each other at equal footing and that can both legitimately claim to be applicable within the territory of a Member State; whereas a conflict rule is needed once the scope of provisions of the EU legal order and of the national legal order overlap but lead to diverging legal consequences; whereas the principle of primacy is such a conflict rule;

Amendment 77 #

Motion for a resolution
Recital G

G. whereas the principle of primacy does not imply a hierarchy between the legal orders of the EU and the Member States, but rather requires that, in the event of conflicting provisions of EU and national law, national courts must disapply those national provisions, andforms part of a hierarchy of rules under which EU law may not encroach upon or disregard the constitutional order of the Member States, and whereas in this context thate national courts interpret their national law in conformity with EU law;

Amendment 78 #

Sophia IN 'T VELD, Alin MITUȚA, Charles GOERENS, Max ORVILLE, Sandro GOZI

Motion for a resolution
Recital G

G. whereas the principle of primacy ~~does not imply a hierarchy between the legal orders of the EU and the Member States, but rather~~ requires that, in the event of conflicting provisions of EU and national law, national ~~courts must disapply~~authorities and courts cannot apply or enforce those national provisions, and that national authorities and courts interpret their national law in conformity with EU law; whereas the principle furthermore requires that conflicting national provisions must be repealed or amended to comply with EU law;

Amendment 79 #

Motion for a resolution
Recital G

G. whereas the principle of primacy does not imply a hierarchy between the legal orders of the EU and the Member States, but rather requires that, in the event of conflicting provisions of EU and national law~~, national courts must disapply those national provisions,~~ EU law prevails and that national courts must interpret their national law in conformity with EU law; whereas a conflict between domestic law and EU legislation can finally be solved either by amending the domestic law or the respective EU law;

Amendment 8 #

Motion for a resolution
Citation 3

— having regard to Declaration No 17 concerning primacy, annexed to the Final Act of the Intergovernmental Conference which adopted the Treaty of Lisbon, signed on 13 December 20071, _________________ 1 OJ C 202, 7.6.2016, p. 344.deleted

Amendment 80 #

Motion for a resolution
Recital G

G. whereas the principle of primacy does not imply a hierarchy between the legal orders of the EU and the Member States nor entail the annulment or automatic invalidation of national provisions, but rather requires that, in the event of conflicting provisions of EU and national law, national courts must disapply those national provisions~~, and that national courts~~ for as long as the EU provisions which take precedence over them remain in force, and interpret their national law in conformity with EU law;

Amendment 81 #

Motion for a resolution
Recital G

G. whereas the principle of primacy ~~does not~~inevitably implyies a hierarchy between the legal orders of the EU and the Member States~~, but rather~~ since it requires that, in the event of conflicting provisions of EU and national law, national courts must disapply those national provisions, and that national courts interpret their national law in conformity with EU law;

Amendment 82 #

Motion for a resolution
Recital G

G. whereas it is stated that the principle of primacy does not imply a hierarchy between the legal orders of the EU and the Member States, but rather requires that, in the event of conflicting provisions of EU and national law, national courts must disapply those national provisions, and that national courts interpret their national law in conformity with EU law, which is a contradiction in itself;

Amendment 83 #

Motion for a resolution
Recital G

G. whereas the principle of primacy does not imply a hierarchy between the legal orders of the EU and the Member States, but rather requires that, in the event of conflicting provisions of EU and national law ranking beneath the Constitution, national courts must disapply those national provisions, and that national courts interpret their national law in conformity with EU law;

Amendment 84 #

Ga. It is clear that 'not apply' means modify, repeal or render inapplicable in a given case, so to claim that there is no hierarchy but that there is primacy amounts to nothing more than unacceptable sophistry, at odds with the most basic principles of logic;

Amendment 85 #

Motion for a resolution
Recital G a (new)

Ga. whereas there is still no commonly accepted view that the principle of primacy of EU law should be codified, and doubts have been raised as to the effectiveness of such codification;

Amendment 86 #

Motion for a resolution
Recital H

H. whereas, pursuant to the first paragraph of Article 267 TFEU, the CJEU has jurisdiction to give rulings on all questions concerning the interpretation of the Treaties and the validity and interpretation of EU secondary law in the context of the preliminary reference procedure; ~~whereas the CJEU therefore has exclusive competence to provide the definitive interpretation of EU law;~~

Amendment 87 #

Motion for a resolution
Recital H

H. whereas, pursuant to the first paragraph of Article 267 TFEU, the CJEU has jurisdiction to give rulings on all questions concerning the interpretation of the Treaties and the validity and interpretation of acts of EU institutions, bodies, offices or agencies such as EU secondary law in the context of the preliminary reference procedure; whereas the CJEU therefore has exclusive competence to provide the definitive interpretation of EU law;

Amendment 88 #

Motion for a resolution
Recital H

H. whereas, pursuant to the first paragraph of Article 267 TFEU, the CJEU has jurisdiction to give rulings on ~~all~~ questions concerning the interpretation of the Treaties and the validity and interpretation of EU secondary law in the context of the preliminary reference procedure; whereas the CJEU therefore has exclusive competence to provide the definitive interpretation of EU law;

Amendment 89 #

Motion for a resolution
Recital H

H. whereas, pursuant to the first paragraph of Article 267 TFEU, the CJEU has jurisdiction to give rulings on all questions concerning the interpretation of the Treaties and the validity and interpretation of EU secondary law in the context of the preliminary reference procedure; whereas the CJEU therefore has exclusive competence to provide the definitive interpretation of EU law; whereas such interpretation should not lead to introducing a de facto amendment to the Treaty by changing the meaning of a provision without formally changing its content (judicial activism);

Amendment 9 #

Motion for a resolution
Citation 3 a (new)

– having regard to the case-law of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU),

Amendment 90 #

Motion for a resolution
Recital H

H. whereas, pursuant to the first paragraph of Article 267 TFEU, the CJEU has jurisdiction to give rulings on all questions concerning the interpretation of the Treaties and the validity and interpretation of EU secondary law in the context of the preliminary reference procedure; whereas the CJEU therefore has exclusive competence to provide the definitive interpretation of EU law; , but only in the areas of competence conferred on the Union by the Treaties;

Amendment 91 #

Motion for a resolution
Recital H a (new)

Ha. whereas national courts of last instance have jurisdiction to give final rulings on the interpretation of national law that does not imply questions concerning the interpretation of the Treaties and the validity and interpretation of acts of EU institutions, bodies, offices or agencies such as EU secondary law; whereas in rare cases a diverging interpretation of EU law has led to conflicts of competence between national courts of last instance and the CJEU;

Amendment 92 #

Motion for a resolution
Recital I

I. whereas ~~the third paragraph of Article 267 TFEU obliges national c~~Article 267(3) of the TFEU provides that the Courts of ~~last instance to initiate a preliminary reference procedure if such a question is raised~~Justice of the European Union shall have jurisdiction to hand down preliminary rulings on the interpretation of EU law and on the validity of acts of the institutions and other bodies of the Union; whereas, pursuant to Article 344 TFEU, the Member States undertake not to submit a dispute concerning the interpretation or application of the Treaties to any method of settlement other than those provided for therein;

Amendment 93 #

Motion for a resolution
Recital I

I. whereas the third paragraph of Article 267 TFEU obliges national courts of last instance to initiate a preliminary reference procedure if such a question is raised; whereas national courts of last instance remain obliged to refer additional preliminary questions to the Court of Justice of the European Union in case they disagree with answers previously given by the Court in the same procedure; whereas, pursuant to Article 344 TFEU, the Member States undertake not to submit a dispute concerning the interpretation or application of the Treaties to any method of settlement other than those provided for therein;

Amendment 94 #

Motion for a resolution
Recital I a (new)

Ia. whereas national courts and the Court of Justice of the European Union can, under the preliminary reference procedure, enter into a constructive dialogue on conflicts between the national legal order and the EU legal order;

Amendment 95 #

Motion for a resolution
Recital J

J. whereas, in accordance with Article 258 TFEU, the Commission has the possibility of opening an infringement procedure before the CJEU against a Member State that has failed to fulfil the obligations resulting from the principle of primacy;deleted

Amendment 96 #

Motion for a resolution
Recital J

J. whereas, in accordance with Article 258 TFEU, the Commission has the possibility of opening an infringement procedure before the CJEU against a Member State that has failed to fulfil the obligations resulting from the principle of primacy;deleted

Amendment 97 #

Motion for a resolution
Recital J

J. whereas, in accordance with Article 258 TFEU, the Commission has the possibility of opening an infringement procedure before the CJEU against a Member State that has failed to fulfil the obligations ~~resulting from the principle of primacy~~binding upon it under the Treaties, but primacy does not constitute such an obligation since it is not enshrined in primary law;

Amendment 98 #