BETA


2023/0115(COD) Deposit protection, use of deposit guarantee schemes funds, cross-border cooperation, and transparency

Progress: Awaiting Council's 1st reading position

RoleCommitteeRapporteurShadows
Lead ECON PETER-HANSEN Kira Marie (icon: Verts/ALE Verts/ALE) NIEDERMAYER Luděk (icon: PPE PPE), TINAGLI Irene (icon: S&D S&D), MARTÍN FRÍAS Jorge (icon: PfE PfE), ZĪLE Roberts (icon: ECR ECR), BOYER Gilles (icon: RE RE), SCHIRDEWAN Martin (icon: GUE/NGL GUE/NGL)
Former Responsible Committee ECON PETER-HANSEN Kira Marie (icon: Verts/ALE Verts/ALE)
Former Committee Opinion IMCO
Former Committee Opinion JURI
Lead committee dossier:
Legal Basis:
TFEU 053-p1

Events

2024/10/21
   EP - Committee decision to open interinstitutional negotiations after 1st reading in Parliament
2024/09/12
   EP - PETER-HANSEN Kira Marie (Verts/ALE) appointed as rapporteur in ECON
2024/08/08
   EC - Commission response to text adopted in plenary
Documents
2024/04/24
   EP - Results of vote in Parliament
2024/04/24
   EP - Decision by Parliament, 1st reading
Details

The European Parliament adopted by 385 votes to 180, with 156 abstentions, a legislative resolution on the proposal for a directive of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Directive 2014/49/EU as regards the scope of deposit protection, use of deposit guarantee schemes funds, cross-border cooperation, and transparency.

The proposed Directive aims to ensure uniform protection of depositors in the Union.

The European Parliament’s position adopted at first reading under the ordinary legislative procedure amends the proposal as follows:

Official recognition, participation and supervision

Member States should ensure that the competent authority, in cooperation with the designated authority, promptly takes all appropriate measures, including, if necessary, the imposition of penalties, to ensure that the credit institution concerned complies with its obligations as a member of a DGS. They should determine the system of penalties applicable in the event of failure by credit institutions to comply with their obligations as members of a DGS. Sanctions must be effective, proportionate and dissuasive.

The designated authorities should have the necessary enforcement powers, including powers to impose penalties or other administrative measures, to remedy infringements of this Directive by a DGS.

Eligibility of deposits

The following should be excluded from any reimbursement by DGSs: (i) deposits arising from transactions for which a criminal conviction has been handed down for a money laundering or terrorist financing offence; (ii) deposits made by natural or legal persons subject to targeted financial sanctions adopted by the Union.

Level of cover

To harmonise depositor protection in the Union and to reduce the administrative complexity and legal uncertainty related to the scope of protection of such deposits, it is necessary to align their protection to a minimum amount of at least EUR 500 000 and a maximum of EUR 2 500 000 for a harmonised duration of 6 months, in addition to the coverage level of EUR 100 000. After their transposition by Member States, the Commission should carry out a review of the amounts which are protected, with a view to determining whether the maximum amount should be reduced, taking into account whether the amounts which are protected are proportionate and ensure a level playing field across the Union.

Determining refundable amount

Member States should ensure that credit institutions report to their DGSs, at least annually, the aggregated amount of eligible deposits and ensure that DGSs may at any time request credit institutions to inform them about the aggregated amount of eligible deposits of every depositor.

Where interest rates on certain deposits significantly exceed the prevailing market interest rate, as determined and based on transparent and publicly available data, the DGS should have the power to adjust the reimbursed interest to reflect the prevailing market interest rate at the time of the determination made by the relevant administrative authority or of the ruling made by the judicial authority. That adjustment should be made to prevent moral hazard.

Repayments

DGSs should ensure that the repayable amount is available as soon as possible and in any event within seven working days . Where DGSs are not able to make the repayable amount available in less than seven working days, they should ensure that depositors have access to an appropriate amount of their covered deposits to cover the cost of living within five working days of making a request for that amount.

DGS funding

Member States should ensure that DGSs have in place adequate alternative funding arrangements to enable them to obtain short-term funding to meet claims against those DGSs. Member States should ensure that the alternative funding arrangements of DGSs are not financed through public funds. They should ensure that DGSs use the financial resources available primarily to guarantee repayments to depositors.

Target level

Member States are to ensure that by 3 July 2024, the available financial means of a DGS reach a target level of 0.8 % of the amount of the covered deposits of its members. In consideration of the expansion of scope for DGS use, the adequacy of the 0.8 % target level should be subject to close monitoring and assessment.

Transparency

It is essential that any involvement of the DGS in any scenario be conducted with a focus on cost effectiveness and transparency. That approach is essential to avoid distorting the level playing field and to ensure that no unfair advantages are conferred on specific market participants.

Preventative measures

To ensure that preventive measures achieve their objective, credit institutions should be required to present to the competent authority a note outlining the measures that they commit to undertake. The note should detail the credit institution’s initial capital shortfall, the capital-raising measures implemented and the safeguards put in place to prevent the outflow of funds. For the same reason, during the implementation of the measures envisaged in the note, credit institutions should also strengthen their liquidity positions and refrain from aggressive commercial practices, and from the distribution of dividends or variable remuneration or repurchasing of own shares or call hybrid capital instruments.

Within a reasonable timeframe, the credit institution should provide the competent authority with a business reorganisation plan to secure long-term viability. Preventive measures granted to a credit institution should be suspended where the competent authority is not satisfied that the business reorganisation plan is credible and feasible to secure long-term viability.

To mitigate moral hazard, where appropriate, the credit institution receiving support from DGSs in the form of preventive measures, its shareholders, its creditors or the business group to which it belongs should contribute to the restructuring from their own resources and provide adequate remuneration for the preventive measure granted by the DGS.

To give them sufficient time to adapt to the new provisions, in particular the safeguards for the application of preventive measures, a three-year transitional period should be granted to institutional protection systems.

Documents
2024/03/25
   EP - Committee report tabled for plenary, 1st reading/single reading
Documents
2024/03/25
   EP - Committee report tabled for plenary, 1st reading
Documents
2024/03/20
   EP - Vote in committee, 1st reading
2023/11/27
   EP - PETER-HANSEN Kira Marie (Verts/ALE) appointed as rapporteur in ECON
2023/11/06
   EP - Amendments tabled in committee
Documents
2023/10/03
   EP - Committee draft report
Documents
2023/10/02
   PT_PARLIAMENT - Contribution
Documents
2023/07/10
   EP - Committee referral announced in Parliament, 1st reading
2023/07/05
   ECB - European Central Bank: opinion, guideline, report
2023/06/12
   EDPS - Document attached to the procedure
2023/04/19
   EC - Document attached to the procedure
2023/04/19
   EC - Document attached to the procedure
2023/04/18
   EC - Legislative proposal published
Details

PURPOSE: to ensure uniform protection of depositors in the Union.

PROPOSED ACT: Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council.

ROLE OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT: the European Parliament decides in accordance with the ordinary legislative procedure and on an equal footing with the Council.

BACKGROUND: deposit guarantee schemes (DGS) reimburse a limited amount to compensate depositors whose bank has failed. A fundamental principle underlying DGS is that they are funded entirely by banks, and that no taxpayer funds are used.

Under existing EU rules, deposit guarantee schemes protect depositors' savings by guaranteeing deposits of up to EUR 100 000 and help prevent the mass withdrawal of deposits in the case of bank failure, which can create financial instability.

In accordance with Directive 2014/49/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council on deposit guarantee schemes, the Commission has reviewed the application and the scope of that Directive and concluded that the objective of protection of depositors in the Union through the establishment of deposit guarantee schemes has mostly been met. However, the Commission also concluded that there is a need to address the remaining gaps in depositor protection and to enhance the functioning of DGSs, while harmonising rules for DGSs interventions other than payout proceedings.

The proposed amendments to Directive 2014/49/EU (the Deposit Guarantee Schemes Directive or DGSD) are part of the crisis management and deposit insurance (CMDI) legislative package that includes also amendments to Directive 2014/59/EU (the Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive or BRRD) and Regulation (EU) No 806/2014 (the Single Resolution Mechanism Regulation or SRMR).

CONTENT: the aim of the proposed amendments is to build on and clarify the mandate of DGSs to better protect deposits in the context of the reimbursement of depositors.

More specifically, the proposal:

- clarifies the scope so that along with the establishment and functioning of the DGS, the coverage and repayment of deposits, and the use of DGS funds for measures to maintain the access of depositors to their deposits also fall within the scope of this Directive;

- harmonises the level of coverage of EUR 100 000 per depositor and bank, as set out in the Deposit Guarantee Scheme Directive and extends depositor protection to public entities (i.e. hospitals, schools, municipalities), as well as client money deposited in certain types of client funds (i.e. by investment companies, payment institutions, e-money institutions);

- includes measures to harmonise the protection of temporary high balances on bank accounts in excess of EUR 100 000 linked to specific life events (such as inheritance or insurance indemnities);

- consolidates the provisions on the exchange of information between credit institutions and DGS and reporting by authorities;

- harmonises the rules for the calculation of the repayable amount;

- allows the DGS to apply a longer period of up to 20 working days in the case of repayment of beneficiary accounts, client funds, and temporary high balances;

- aims to ensure that depositors, above a threshold of EUR 10 000 , are reimbursed via credit transfers in line with the AML/CFT objectives;

- seeks to harmonise to five years the period during which depositors can make a claim against the DGS;

- establishes a set of safeguards for preventive measures and allocate the responsibilities among authorities for assessing how preventive measures are applied. This aims at ensuring that the use of these measures is timely, cost-effective and applied consistently across Member States, as improvements to the current situation;

- establishes requirements for the credit institutions which did not comply with their commitments or fail to repay financial support granted with preventive measures. The EBA is mandated to develop guidelines on the content of the note with measures needed for the efficient implementation of a preventive measure and of the remediation plan;

- clarifies that the protection by DGSs also covers depositors located in Member States where their member credit institutions exercise the freedom to provide services;

- requires that branches of credit institutions established in third countries join a DGS in a Member State if they want to provide banking services and take eligible deposits in the EU. This enhances the protection of depositors as it eliminates the risk of having deposits in the EU whose protection by a non-EU DGS would not be up to the EU standards;

- seeks to harmonise information which banks have to provide to their clients annually on the protection of their deposits. It also enhances the information requirements for depositors in case of mergers or other major reorganisations of credit institutions, changes of DGS affiliation and unavailability of deposits due to the critical financial situation of banks;

- clarifies rules on reporting and improving the exchange of information from the credit institution to the DGSs and from the DGSs and the designated authorities to the EBA. It is also important that the EBA is appropriately informed of situations that occur and for which the DGS may intervene, to support the EBA in its tasks of overseeing the financial integrity, stability, and security of the European banking system.

Documents

Votes

A9-0154/2024 – Kira Marie Peter-Hansen – Commission proposal #

2024/04/24 Outcome: +: 385, -: 180, 0: 56
ES RO PL HU NL PT FR BG SE DK SI HR LT FI EL BE AT CZ SK EE MT IE LV LU IT DE
Total
58
28
43
16
28
20
70
16
21
14
8
12
10
13
14
21
17
21
13
7
4
12
7
6
57
85
icon: S&D S&D
126

Romania S&D

Abstain (1)

5

Slovenia S&D

2

Lithuania S&D

2

Greece S&D

1

Belgium S&D

2

Czechia S&D

For (1)

1

Slovakia S&D

For (1)

1

Estonia S&D

2

Latvia S&D

2

Luxembourg S&D

For (1)

1
icon: PPE PPE
158

Hungary PPE

1

Denmark PPE

For (1)

1

Estonia PPE

For (1)

1

Malta PPE

For (1)

1

Latvia PPE

2

Luxembourg PPE

2
icon: Renew Renew
96

Poland Renew

1

Hungary Renew

For (1)

1

Bulgaria Renew

2
3

Slovenia Renew

2

Croatia Renew

For (1)

1

Lithuania Renew

1

Finland Renew

2

Greece Renew

1

Austria Renew

For (1)

1

Estonia Renew

3

Ireland Renew

2

Latvia Renew

For (1)

1

Luxembourg Renew

2
icon: Verts/ALE Verts/ALE
68

Spain Verts/ALE

3

Romania Verts/ALE

1

Poland Verts/ALE

For (1)

1

Netherlands Verts/ALE

3

Portugal Verts/ALE

1

Sweden Verts/ALE

3

Denmark Verts/ALE

2

Lithuania Verts/ALE

For (1)

Abstain (1)

2

Finland Verts/ALE

3

Greece Verts/ALE

For (1)

1

Belgium Verts/ALE

3

Austria Verts/ALE

For (1)

Against (2)

3

Czechia Verts/ALE

3

Ireland Verts/ALE

2

Luxembourg Verts/ALE

For (1)

1

Italy Verts/ALE

For (1)

1
icon: NI NI
37

Romania NI

Abstain (1)

1

Netherlands NI

Against (1)

1

France NI

2

Croatia NI

Against (1)

Abstain (1)

2

Greece NI

For (1)

3

Belgium NI

For (1)

1

Czechia NI

Against (1)

1

Latvia NI

Against (1)

1

Germany NI

Abstain (1)

3
icon: The Left The Left
30

Portugal The Left

4

Sweden The Left

Against (1)

1

Denmark The Left

1

Finland The Left

Abstain (1)

1

Greece The Left

For (1)

2

Belgium The Left

Against (1)

1

Czechia The Left

Abstain (1)

1

Ireland The Left

4

Germany The Left

For (1)

3
icon: ECR ECR
61

Romania ECR

Abstain (1)

1

France ECR

Against (1)

1

Bulgaria ECR

2

Sweden ECR

3

Croatia ECR

Abstain (1)

1

Lithuania ECR

Abstain (1)

1

Finland ECR

2

Greece ECR

Against (1)

1

Slovakia ECR

Against (1)

1

Latvia ECR

Abstain (1)

1

Germany ECR

Abstain (1)

1
icon: ID ID
45

Denmark ID

Against (1)

1

Austria ID

3

Czechia ID

Against (1)

1

Estonia ID

Against (1)

1
AmendmentsDossier
250 2023/0115(COD)
2023/11/06 ECON 250 amendments...
source: 754.693

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  • The European Parliament adopted by 385 votes to 180, with 156 abstentions, a legislative resolution on the proposal for a directive of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Directive 2014/49/EU as regards the scope of deposit protection, use of deposit guarantee schemes funds, cross-border cooperation, and transparency.
  • The proposed Directive aims to ensure uniform protection of depositors in the Union.
  • The European Parliament’s position adopted at first reading under the ordinary legislative procedure amends the proposal as follows:
  • Official recognition, participation and supervision
  • Member States should ensure that the competent authority, in cooperation with the designated authority, promptly takes all appropriate measures, including, if necessary, the imposition of penalties, to ensure that the credit institution concerned complies with its obligations as a member of a DGS. They should determine the system of penalties applicable in the event of failure by credit institutions to comply with their obligations as members of a DGS. Sanctions must be effective, proportionate and dissuasive.
  • The designated authorities should have the necessary enforcement powers, including powers to impose penalties or other administrative measures, to remedy infringements of this Directive by a DGS.
  • Eligibility of deposits
  • The following should be excluded from any reimbursement by DGSs: (i) deposits arising from transactions for which a criminal conviction has been handed down for a money laundering or terrorist financing offence; (ii) deposits made by natural or legal persons subject to targeted financial sanctions adopted by the Union.
  • Level of cover
  • To harmonise depositor protection in the Union and to reduce the administrative complexity and legal uncertainty related to the scope of protection of such deposits, it is necessary to align their protection to a minimum amount of at least EUR 500 000 and a maximum of EUR 2 500 000 for a harmonised duration of 6 months, in addition to the coverage level of EUR 100 000. After their transposition by Member States, the Commission should carry out a review of the amounts which are protected, with a view to determining whether the maximum amount should be reduced, taking into account whether the amounts which are protected are proportionate and ensure a level playing field across the Union.
  • Determining refundable amount
  • Member States should ensure that credit institutions report to their DGSs, at least annually, the aggregated amount of eligible deposits and ensure that DGSs may at any time request credit institutions to inform them about the aggregated amount of eligible deposits of every depositor.
  • Where interest rates on certain deposits significantly exceed the prevailing market interest rate, as determined and based on transparent and publicly available data, the DGS should have the power to adjust the reimbursed interest to reflect the prevailing market interest rate at the time of the determination made by the relevant administrative authority or of the ruling made by the judicial authority. That adjustment should be made to prevent moral hazard.
  • Repayments
  • DGSs should ensure that the repayable amount is available as soon as possible and in any event within seven working days . Where DGSs are not able to make the repayable amount available in less than seven working days, they should ensure that depositors have access to an appropriate amount of their covered deposits to cover the cost of living within five working days of making a request for that amount.
  • DGS funding
  • Member States should ensure that DGSs have in place adequate alternative funding arrangements to enable them to obtain short-term funding to meet claims against those DGSs. Member States should ensure that the alternative funding arrangements of DGSs are not financed through public funds. They should ensure that DGSs use the financial resources available primarily to guarantee repayments to depositors.
  • Target level
  • Member States are to ensure that by 3 July 2024, the available financial means of a DGS reach a target level of 0.8 % of the amount of the covered deposits of its members. In consideration of the expansion of scope for DGS use, the adequacy of the 0.8 % target level should be subject to close monitoring and assessment.
  • Transparency
  • It is essential that any involvement of the DGS in any scenario be conducted with a focus on cost effectiveness and transparency. That approach is essential to avoid distorting the level playing field and to ensure that no unfair advantages are conferred on specific market participants.
  • Preventative measures
  • To ensure that preventive measures achieve their objective, credit institutions should be required to present to the competent authority a note outlining the measures that they commit to undertake. The note should detail the credit institution’s initial capital shortfall, the capital-raising measures implemented and the safeguards put in place to prevent the outflow of funds. For the same reason, during the implementation of the measures envisaged in the note, credit institutions should also strengthen their liquidity positions and refrain from aggressive commercial practices, and from the distribution of dividends or variable remuneration or repurchasing of own shares or call hybrid capital instruments.
  • Within a reasonable timeframe, the credit institution should provide the competent authority with a business reorganisation plan to secure long-term viability. Preventive measures granted to a credit institution should be suspended where the competent authority is not satisfied that the business reorganisation plan is credible and feasible to secure long-term viability.
  • To mitigate moral hazard, where appropriate, the credit institution receiving support from DGSs in the form of preventive measures, its shareholders, its creditors or the business group to which it belongs should contribute to the restructuring from their own resources and provide adequate remuneration for the preventive measure granted by the DGS.
  • To give them sufficient time to adapt to the new provisions, in particular the safeguards for the application of preventive measures, a three-year transitional period should be granted to institutional protection systems.
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  • The European Parliament adopted by 385 votes to 180, with 156 abstentions, a legislative resolution on the proposal for a directive of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Directive 2014/49/EU as regards the scope of deposit protection, use of deposit guarantee schemes funds, cross-border cooperation, and transparency.
  • The proposed Directive aims to ensure uniform protection of depositors in the Union.
  • The European Parliament’s position adopted at first reading under the ordinary legislative procedure amends the proposal as follows:
  • Official recognition, participation and supervision
  • Member States should ensure that the competent authority, in cooperation with the designated authority, promptly takes all appropriate measures, including, if necessary, the imposition of penalties, to ensure that the credit institution concerned complies with its obligations as a member of a DGS. They should determine the system of penalties applicable in the event of failure by credit institutions to comply with their obligations as members of a DGS. Sanctions must be effective, proportionate and dissuasive.
  • The designated authorities should have the necessary enforcement powers, including powers to impose penalties or other administrative measures, to remedy infringements of this Directive by a DGS.
  • Eligibility of deposits
  • The following should be excluded from any reimbursement by DGSs: (i) deposits arising from transactions for which a criminal conviction has been handed down for a money laundering or terrorist financing offence; (ii) deposits made by natural or legal persons subject to targeted financial sanctions adopted by the Union.
  • Level of cover
  • To harmonise depositor protection in the Union and to reduce the administrative complexity and legal uncertainty related to the scope of protection of such deposits, it is necessary to align their protection to a minimum amount of at least EUR 500 000 and a maximum of EUR 2 500 000 for a harmonised duration of 6 months, in addition to the coverage level of EUR 100 000. After their transposition by Member States, the Commission should carry out a review of the amounts which are protected, with a view to determining whether the maximum amount should be reduced, taking into account whether the amounts which are protected are proportionate and ensure a level playing field across the Union.
  • Determining refundable amount
  • Member States should ensure that credit institutions report to their DGSs, at least annually, the aggregated amount of eligible deposits and ensure that DGSs may at any time request credit institutions to inform them about the aggregated amount of eligible deposits of every depositor.
  • Where interest rates on certain deposits significantly exceed the prevailing market interest rate, as determined and based on transparent and publicly available data, the DGS should have the power to adjust the reimbursed interest to reflect the prevailing market interest rate at the time of the determination made by the relevant administrative authority or of the ruling made by the judicial authority. That adjustment should be made to prevent moral hazard.
  • Repayments
  • DGSs should ensure that the repayable amount is available as soon as possible and in any event within seven working days . Where DGSs are not able to make the repayable amount available in less than seven working days, they should ensure that depositors have access to an appropriate amount of their covered deposits to cover the cost of living within five working days of making a request for that amount.
  • DGS funding
  • Member States should ensure that DGSs have in place adequate alternative funding arrangements to enable them to obtain short-term funding to meet claims against those DGSs. Member States should ensure that the alternative funding arrangements of DGSs are not financed through public funds. They should ensure that DGSs use the financial resources available primarily to guarantee repayments to depositors.
  • Target level
  • Member States are to ensure that by 3 July 2024, the available financial means of a DGS reach a target level of 0.8 % of the amount of the covered deposits of its members. In consideration of the expansion of scope for DGS use, the adequacy of the 0.8 % target level should be subject to close monitoring and assessment.
  • Transparency
  • It is essential that any involvement of the DGS in any scenario be conducted with a focus on cost effectiveness and transparency. That approach is essential to avoid distorting the level playing field and to ensure that no unfair advantages are conferred on specific market participants.
  • Preventative measures
  • To ensure that preventive measures achieve their objective, credit institutions should be required to present to the competent authority a note outlining the measures that they commit to undertake. The note should detail the credit institution’s initial capital shortfall, the capital-raising measures implemented and the safeguards put in place to prevent the outflow of funds. For the same reason, during the implementation of the measures envisaged in the note, credit institutions should also strengthen their liquidity positions and refrain from aggressive commercial practices, and from the distribution of dividends or variable remuneration or repurchasing of own shares or call hybrid capital instruments.
  • Within a reasonable timeframe, the credit institution should provide the competent authority with a business reorganisation plan to secure long-term viability. Preventive measures granted to a credit institution should be suspended where the competent authority is not satisfied that the business reorganisation plan is credible and feasible to secure long-term viability.
  • To mitigate moral hazard, where appropriate, the credit institution receiving support from DGSs in the form of preventive measures, its shareholders, its creditors or the business group to which it belongs should contribute to the restructuring from their own resources and provide adequate remuneration for the preventive measure granted by the DGS.
  • To give them sufficient time to adapt to the new provisions, in particular the safeguards for the application of preventive measures, a three-year transitional period should be granted to institutional protection systems.
links
Research document
docs/7
date
2024-04-24T00:00:00
docs
url: https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/TA-9-2024-0328_EN.html title: T9-0328/2024
type
Text adopted by Parliament, 1st reading/single reading
body
EP
events/4/summary
  • The European Parliament adopted by 385 votes to 180, with 156 abstentions, a legislative resolution on the proposal for a directive of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Directive 2014/49/EU as regards the scope of deposit protection, use of deposit guarantee schemes funds, cross-border cooperation, and transparency.
  • The proposed Directive aims to ensure uniform protection of depositors in the Union.
  • The European Parliament’s position adopted at first reading under the ordinary legislative procedure amends the proposal as follows:
  • Official recognition, participation and supervision
  • Member States should ensure that the competent authority, in cooperation with the designated authority, promptly takes all appropriate measures, including, if necessary, the imposition of penalties, to ensure that the credit institution concerned complies with its obligations as a member of a DGS. They should determine the system of penalties applicable in the event of failure by credit institutions to comply with their obligations as members of a DGS. Sanctions must be effective, proportionate and dissuasive.
  • The designated authorities should have the necessary enforcement powers, including powers to impose penalties or other administrative measures, to remedy infringements of this Directive by a DGS.
  • Eligibility of deposits
  • The following should be excluded from any reimbursement by DGSs: (i) deposits arising from transactions for which a criminal conviction has been handed down for a money laundering or terrorist financing offence; (ii) deposits made by natural or legal persons subject to targeted financial sanctions adopted by the Union.
  • Level of cover
  • To harmonise depositor protection in the Union and to reduce the administrative complexity and legal uncertainty related to the scope of protection of such deposits, it is necessary to align their protection to a minimum amount of at least EUR 500 000 and a maximum of EUR 2 500 000 for a harmonised duration of 6 months, in addition to the coverage level of EUR 100 000. After their transposition by Member States, the Commission should carry out a review of the amounts which are protected, with a view to determining whether the maximum amount should be reduced, taking into account whether the amounts which are protected are proportionate and ensure a level playing field across the Union.
  • Determining refundable amount
  • Member States should ensure that credit institutions report to their DGSs, at least annually, the aggregated amount of eligible deposits and ensure that DGSs may at any time request credit institutions to inform them about the aggregated amount of eligible deposits of every depositor.
  • Where interest rates on certain deposits significantly exceed the prevailing market interest rate, as determined and based on transparent and publicly available data, the DGS should have the power to adjust the reimbursed interest to reflect the prevailing market interest rate at the time of the determination made by the relevant administrative authority or of the ruling made by the judicial authority. That adjustment should be made to prevent moral hazard.
  • Repayments
  • DGSs should ensure that the repayable amount is available as soon as possible and in any event within seven working days . Where DGSs are not able to make the repayable amount available in less than seven working days, they should ensure that depositors have access to an appropriate amount of their covered deposits to cover the cost of living within five working days of making a request for that amount.
  • DGS funding
  • Member States should ensure that DGSs have in place adequate alternative funding arrangements to enable them to obtain short-term funding to meet claims against those DGSs. Member States should ensure that the alternative funding arrangements of DGSs are not financed through public funds. They should ensure that DGSs use the financial resources available primarily to guarantee repayments to depositors.
  • Target level
  • Member States are to ensure that by 3 July 2024, the available financial means of a DGS reach a target level of 0.8 % of the amount of the covered deposits of its members. In consideration of the expansion of scope for DGS use, the adequacy of the 0.8 % target level should be subject to close monitoring and assessment.
  • Transparency
  • It is essential that any involvement of the DGS in any scenario be conducted with a focus on cost effectiveness and transparency. That approach is essential to avoid distorting the level playing field and to ensure that no unfair advantages are conferred on specific market participants.
  • Preventative measures
  • To ensure that preventive measures achieve their objective, credit institutions should be required to present to the competent authority a note outlining the measures that they commit to undertake. The note should detail the credit institution’s initial capital shortfall, the capital-raising measures implemented and the safeguards put in place to prevent the outflow of funds. For the same reason, during the implementation of the measures envisaged in the note, credit institutions should also strengthen their liquidity positions and refrain from aggressive commercial practices, and from the distribution of dividends or variable remuneration or repurchasing of own shares or call hybrid capital instruments.
  • Within a reasonable timeframe, the credit institution should provide the competent authority with a business reorganisation plan to secure long-term viability. Preventive measures granted to a credit institution should be suspended where the competent authority is not satisfied that the business reorganisation plan is credible and feasible to secure long-term viability.
  • To mitigate moral hazard, where appropriate, the credit institution receiving support from DGSs in the form of preventive measures, its shareholders, its creditors or the business group to which it belongs should contribute to the restructuring from their own resources and provide adequate remuneration for the preventive measure granted by the DGS.
  • To give them sufficient time to adapt to the new provisions, in particular the safeguards for the application of preventive measures, a three-year transitional period should be granted to institutional protection systems.
links
Research document
docs/7
date
2024-04-24T00:00:00
docs
url: https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/TA-9-2024-0328_EN.html title: T9-0328/2024
type
Text adopted by Parliament, 1st reading/single reading
body
EP
events/4/summary
  • The European Parliament adopted by 385 votes to 180, with 156 abstentions, a legislative resolution on the proposal for a directive of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Directive 2014/49/EU as regards the scope of deposit protection, use of deposit guarantee schemes funds, cross-border cooperation, and transparency.
  • The proposed Directive aims to ensure uniform protection of depositors in the Union.
  • The European Parliament’s position adopted at first reading under the ordinary legislative procedure amends the proposal as follows:
  • Official recognition, participation and supervision
  • Member States should ensure that the competent authority, in cooperation with the designated authority, promptly takes all appropriate measures, including, if necessary, the imposition of penalties, to ensure that the credit institution concerned complies with its obligations as a member of a DGS. They should determine the system of penalties applicable in the event of failure by credit institutions to comply with their obligations as members of a DGS. Sanctions must be effective, proportionate and dissuasive.
  • The designated authorities should have the necessary enforcement powers, including powers to impose penalties or other administrative measures, to remedy infringements of this Directive by a DGS.
  • Eligibility of deposits
  • The following should be excluded from any reimbursement by DGSs: (i) deposits arising from transactions for which a criminal conviction has been handed down for a money laundering or terrorist financing offence; (ii) deposits made by natural or legal persons subject to targeted financial sanctions adopted by the Union.
  • Level of cover
  • To harmonise depositor protection in the Union and to reduce the administrative complexity and legal uncertainty related to the scope of protection of such deposits, it is necessary to align their protection to a minimum amount of at least EUR 500 000 and a maximum of EUR 2 500 000 for a harmonised duration of 6 months, in addition to the coverage level of EUR 100 000. After their transposition by Member States, the Commission should carry out a review of the amounts which are protected, with a view to determining whether the maximum amount should be reduced, taking into account whether the amounts which are protected are proportionate and ensure a level playing field across the Union.
  • Determining refundable amount
  • Member States should ensure that credit institutions report to their DGSs, at least annually, the aggregated amount of eligible deposits and ensure that DGSs may at any time request credit institutions to inform them about the aggregated amount of eligible deposits of every depositor.
  • Where interest rates on certain deposits significantly exceed the prevailing market interest rate, as determined and based on transparent and publicly available data, the DGS should have the power to adjust the reimbursed interest to reflect the prevailing market interest rate at the time of the determination made by the relevant administrative authority or of the ruling made by the judicial authority. That adjustment should be made to prevent moral hazard.
  • Repayments
  • DGSs should ensure that the repayable amount is available as soon as possible and in any event within seven working days . Where DGSs are not able to make the repayable amount available in less than seven working days, they should ensure that depositors have access to an appropriate amount of their covered deposits to cover the cost of living within five working days of making a request for that amount.
  • DGS funding
  • Member States should ensure that DGSs have in place adequate alternative funding arrangements to enable them to obtain short-term funding to meet claims against those DGSs. Member States should ensure that the alternative funding arrangements of DGSs are not financed through public funds. They should ensure that DGSs use the financial resources available primarily to guarantee repayments to depositors.
  • Target level
  • Member States are to ensure that by 3 July 2024, the available financial means of a DGS reach a target level of 0.8 % of the amount of the covered deposits of its members. In consideration of the expansion of scope for DGS use, the adequacy of the 0.8 % target level should be subject to close monitoring and assessment.
  • Transparency
  • It is essential that any involvement of the DGS in any scenario be conducted with a focus on cost effectiveness and transparency. That approach is essential to avoid distorting the level playing field and to ensure that no unfair advantages are conferred on specific market participants.
  • Preventative measures
  • To ensure that preventive measures achieve their objective, credit institutions should be required to present to the competent authority a note outlining the measures that they commit to undertake. The note should detail the credit institution’s initial capital shortfall, the capital-raising measures implemented and the safeguards put in place to prevent the outflow of funds. For the same reason, during the implementation of the measures envisaged in the note, credit institutions should also strengthen their liquidity positions and refrain from aggressive commercial practices, and from the distribution of dividends or variable remuneration or repurchasing of own shares or call hybrid capital instruments.
  • Within a reasonable timeframe, the credit institution should provide the competent authority with a business reorganisation plan to secure long-term viability. Preventive measures granted to a credit institution should be suspended where the competent authority is not satisfied that the business reorganisation plan is credible and feasible to secure long-term viability.
  • To mitigate moral hazard, where appropriate, the credit institution receiving support from DGSs in the form of preventive measures, its shareholders, its creditors or the business group to which it belongs should contribute to the restructuring from their own resources and provide adequate remuneration for the preventive measure granted by the DGS.
  • To give them sufficient time to adapt to the new provisions, in particular the safeguards for the application of preventive measures, a three-year transitional period should be granted to institutional protection systems.
links
Research document
docs/7
date
2024-04-24T00:00:00
docs
url: https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/TA-9-2024-0328_EN.html title: T9-0328/2024
type
Text adopted by Parliament, 1st reading/single reading
body
EP
events/4/summary
  • The European Parliament adopted by 385 votes to 180, with 156 abstentions, a legislative resolution on the proposal for a directive of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Directive 2014/49/EU as regards the scope of deposit protection, use of deposit guarantee schemes funds, cross-border cooperation, and transparency.
  • The proposed Directive aims to ensure uniform protection of depositors in the Union.
  • The European Parliament’s position adopted at first reading under the ordinary legislative procedure amends the proposal as follows:
  • Official recognition, participation and supervision
  • Member States should ensure that the competent authority, in cooperation with the designated authority, promptly takes all appropriate measures, including, if necessary, the imposition of penalties, to ensure that the credit institution concerned complies with its obligations as a member of a DGS. They should determine the system of penalties applicable in the event of failure by credit institutions to comply with their obligations as members of a DGS. Sanctions must be effective, proportionate and dissuasive.
  • The designated authorities should have the necessary enforcement powers, including powers to impose penalties or other administrative measures, to remedy infringements of this Directive by a DGS.
  • Eligibility of deposits
  • The following should be excluded from any reimbursement by DGSs: (i) deposits arising from transactions for which a criminal conviction has been handed down for a money laundering or terrorist financing offence; (ii) deposits made by natural or legal persons subject to targeted financial sanctions adopted by the Union.
  • Level of cover
  • To harmonise depositor protection in the Union and to reduce the administrative complexity and legal uncertainty related to the scope of protection of such deposits, it is necessary to align their protection to a minimum amount of at least EUR 500 000 and a maximum of EUR 2 500 000 for a harmonised duration of 6 months, in addition to the coverage level of EUR 100 000. After their transposition by Member States, the Commission should carry out a review of the amounts which are protected, with a view to determining whether the maximum amount should be reduced, taking into account whether the amounts which are protected are proportionate and ensure a level playing field across the Union.
  • Determining refundable amount
  • Member States should ensure that credit institutions report to their DGSs, at least annually, the aggregated amount of eligible deposits and ensure that DGSs may at any time request credit institutions to inform them about the aggregated amount of eligible deposits of every depositor.
  • Where interest rates on certain deposits significantly exceed the prevailing market interest rate, as determined and based on transparent and publicly available data, the DGS should have the power to adjust the reimbursed interest to reflect the prevailing market interest rate at the time of the determination made by the relevant administrative authority or of the ruling made by the judicial authority. That adjustment should be made to prevent moral hazard.
  • Repayments
  • DGSs should ensure that the repayable amount is available as soon as possible and in any event within seven working days . Where DGSs are not able to make the repayable amount available in less than seven working days, they should ensure that depositors have access to an appropriate amount of their covered deposits to cover the cost of living within five working days of making a request for that amount.
  • DGS funding
  • Member States should ensure that DGSs have in place adequate alternative funding arrangements to enable them to obtain short-term funding to meet claims against those DGSs. Member States should ensure that the alternative funding arrangements of DGSs are not financed through public funds. They should ensure that DGSs use the financial resources available primarily to guarantee repayments to depositors.
  • Target level
  • Member States are to ensure that by 3 July 2024, the available financial means of a DGS reach a target level of 0.8 % of the amount of the covered deposits of its members. In consideration of the expansion of scope for DGS use, the adequacy of the 0.8 % target level should be subject to close monitoring and assessment.
  • Transparency
  • It is essential that any involvement of the DGS in any scenario be conducted with a focus on cost effectiveness and transparency. That approach is essential to avoid distorting the level playing field and to ensure that no unfair advantages are conferred on specific market participants.
  • Preventative measures
  • To ensure that preventive measures achieve their objective, credit institutions should be required to present to the competent authority a note outlining the measures that they commit to undertake. The note should detail the credit institution’s initial capital shortfall, the capital-raising measures implemented and the safeguards put in place to prevent the outflow of funds. For the same reason, during the implementation of the measures envisaged in the note, credit institutions should also strengthen their liquidity positions and refrain from aggressive commercial practices, and from the distribution of dividends or variable remuneration or repurchasing of own shares or call hybrid capital instruments.
  • Within a reasonable timeframe, the credit institution should provide the competent authority with a business reorganisation plan to secure long-term viability. Preventive measures granted to a credit institution should be suspended where the competent authority is not satisfied that the business reorganisation plan is credible and feasible to secure long-term viability.
  • To mitigate moral hazard, where appropriate, the credit institution receiving support from DGSs in the form of preventive measures, its shareholders, its creditors or the business group to which it belongs should contribute to the restructuring from their own resources and provide adequate remuneration for the preventive measure granted by the DGS.
  • To give them sufficient time to adapt to the new provisions, in particular the safeguards for the application of preventive measures, a three-year transitional period should be granted to institutional protection systems.
links
Research document
docs/7
date
2024-04-24T00:00:00
docs
url: https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/TA-9-2024-0328_EN.html title: T9-0328/2024
type
Text adopted by Parliament, 1st reading/single reading
body
EP
events/4/summary
  • The European Parliament adopted by 385 votes to 180, with 156 abstentions, a legislative resolution on the proposal for a directive of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Directive 2014/49/EU as regards the scope of deposit protection, use of deposit guarantee schemes funds, cross-border cooperation, and transparency.
  • The proposed Directive aims to ensure uniform protection of depositors in the Union.
  • The European Parliament’s position adopted at first reading under the ordinary legislative procedure amends the proposal as follows:
  • Official recognition, participation and supervision
  • Member States should ensure that the competent authority, in cooperation with the designated authority, promptly takes all appropriate measures, including, if necessary, the imposition of penalties, to ensure that the credit institution concerned complies with its obligations as a member of a DGS. They should determine the system of penalties applicable in the event of failure by credit institutions to comply with their obligations as members of a DGS. Sanctions must be effective, proportionate and dissuasive.
  • The designated authorities should have the necessary enforcement powers, including powers to impose penalties or other administrative measures, to remedy infringements of this Directive by a DGS.
  • Eligibility of deposits
  • The following should be excluded from any reimbursement by DGSs: (i) deposits arising from transactions for which a criminal conviction has been handed down for a money laundering or terrorist financing offence; (ii) deposits made by natural or legal persons subject to targeted financial sanctions adopted by the Union.
  • Level of cover
  • To harmonise depositor protection in the Union and to reduce the administrative complexity and legal uncertainty related to the scope of protection of such deposits, it is necessary to align their protection to a minimum amount of at least EUR 500 000 and a maximum of EUR 2 500 000 for a harmonised duration of 6 months, in addition to the coverage level of EUR 100 000. After their transposition by Member States, the Commission should carry out a review of the amounts which are protected, with a view to determining whether the maximum amount should be reduced, taking into account whether the amounts which are protected are proportionate and ensure a level playing field across the Union.
  • Determining refundable amount
  • Member States should ensure that credit institutions report to their DGSs, at least annually, the aggregated amount of eligible deposits and ensure that DGSs may at any time request credit institutions to inform them about the aggregated amount of eligible deposits of every depositor.
  • Where interest rates on certain deposits significantly exceed the prevailing market interest rate, as determined and based on transparent and publicly available data, the DGS should have the power to adjust the reimbursed interest to reflect the prevailing market interest rate at the time of the determination made by the relevant administrative authority or of the ruling made by the judicial authority. That adjustment should be made to prevent moral hazard.
  • Repayments
  • DGSs should ensure that the repayable amount is available as soon as possible and in any event within seven working days . Where DGSs are not able to make the repayable amount available in less than seven working days, they should ensure that depositors have access to an appropriate amount of their covered deposits to cover the cost of living within five working days of making a request for that amount.
  • DGS funding
  • Member States should ensure that DGSs have in place adequate alternative funding arrangements to enable them to obtain short-term funding to meet claims against those DGSs. Member States should ensure that the alternative funding arrangements of DGSs are not financed through public funds. They should ensure that DGSs use the financial resources available primarily to guarantee repayments to depositors.
  • Target level
  • Member States are to ensure that by 3 July 2024, the available financial means of a DGS reach a target level of 0.8 % of the amount of the covered deposits of its members. In consideration of the expansion of scope for DGS use, the adequacy of the 0.8 % target level should be subject to close monitoring and assessment.
  • Transparency
  • It is essential that any involvement of the DGS in any scenario be conducted with a focus on cost effectiveness and transparency. That approach is essential to avoid distorting the level playing field and to ensure that no unfair advantages are conferred on specific market participants.
  • Preventative measures
  • To ensure that preventive measures achieve their objective, credit institutions should be required to present to the competent authority a note outlining the measures that they commit to undertake. The note should detail the credit institution’s initial capital shortfall, the capital-raising measures implemented and the safeguards put in place to prevent the outflow of funds. For the same reason, during the implementation of the measures envisaged in the note, credit institutions should also strengthen their liquidity positions and refrain from aggressive commercial practices, and from the distribution of dividends or variable remuneration or repurchasing of own shares or call hybrid capital instruments.
  • Within a reasonable timeframe, the credit institution should provide the competent authority with a business reorganisation plan to secure long-term viability. Preventive measures granted to a credit institution should be suspended where the competent authority is not satisfied that the business reorganisation plan is credible and feasible to secure long-term viability.
  • To mitigate moral hazard, where appropriate, the credit institution receiving support from DGSs in the form of preventive measures, its shareholders, its creditors or the business group to which it belongs should contribute to the restructuring from their own resources and provide adequate remuneration for the preventive measure granted by the DGS.
  • To give them sufficient time to adapt to the new provisions, in particular the safeguards for the application of preventive measures, a three-year transitional period should be granted to institutional protection systems.
links
Research document
docs/7
date
2024-04-24T00:00:00
docs
url: https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/TA-9-2024-0328_EN.html title: T9-0328/2024
type
Text adopted by Parliament, 1st reading/single reading
body
EP
events/4/summary
  • The European Parliament adopted by 385 votes to 180, with 156 abstentions, a legislative resolution on the proposal for a directive of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Directive 2014/49/EU as regards the scope of deposit protection, use of deposit guarantee schemes funds, cross-border cooperation, and transparency.
  • The proposed Directive aims to ensure uniform protection of depositors in the Union.
  • The European Parliament’s position adopted at first reading under the ordinary legislative procedure amends the proposal as follows:
  • Official recognition, participation and supervision
  • Member States should ensure that the competent authority, in cooperation with the designated authority, promptly takes all appropriate measures, including, if necessary, the imposition of penalties, to ensure that the credit institution concerned complies with its obligations as a member of a DGS. They should determine the system of penalties applicable in the event of failure by credit institutions to comply with their obligations as members of a DGS. Sanctions must be effective, proportionate and dissuasive.
  • The designated authorities should have the necessary enforcement powers, including powers to impose penalties or other administrative measures, to remedy infringements of this Directive by a DGS.
  • Eligibility of deposits
  • The following should be excluded from any reimbursement by DGSs: (i) deposits arising from transactions for which a criminal conviction has been handed down for a money laundering or terrorist financing offence; (ii) deposits made by natural or legal persons subject to targeted financial sanctions adopted by the Union.
  • Level of cover
  • To harmonise depositor protection in the Union and to reduce the administrative complexity and legal uncertainty related to the scope of protection of such deposits, it is necessary to align their protection to a minimum amount of at least EUR 500 000 and a maximum of EUR 2 500 000 for a harmonised duration of 6 months, in addition to the coverage level of EUR 100 000. After their transposition by Member States, the Commission should carry out a review of the amounts which are protected, with a view to determining whether the maximum amount should be reduced, taking into account whether the amounts which are protected are proportionate and ensure a level playing field across the Union.
  • Determining refundable amount
  • Member States should ensure that credit institutions report to their DGSs, at least annually, the aggregated amount of eligible deposits and ensure that DGSs may at any time request credit institutions to inform them about the aggregated amount of eligible deposits of every depositor.
  • Where interest rates on certain deposits significantly exceed the prevailing market interest rate, as determined and based on transparent and publicly available data, the DGS should have the power to adjust the reimbursed interest to reflect the prevailing market interest rate at the time of the determination made by the relevant administrative authority or of the ruling made by the judicial authority. That adjustment should be made to prevent moral hazard.
  • Repayments
  • DGSs should ensure that the repayable amount is available as soon as possible and in any event within seven working days . Where DGSs are not able to make the repayable amount available in less than seven working days, they should ensure that depositors have access to an appropriate amount of their covered deposits to cover the cost of living within five working days of making a request for that amount.
  • DGS funding
  • Member States should ensure that DGSs have in place adequate alternative funding arrangements to enable them to obtain short-term funding to meet claims against those DGSs. Member States should ensure that the alternative funding arrangements of DGSs are not financed through public funds. They should ensure that DGSs use the financial resources available primarily to guarantee repayments to depositors.
  • Target level
  • Member States are to ensure that by 3 July 2024, the available financial means of a DGS reach a target level of 0.8 % of the amount of the covered deposits of its members. In consideration of the expansion of scope for DGS use, the adequacy of the 0.8 % target level should be subject to close monitoring and assessment.
  • Transparency
  • It is essential that any involvement of the DGS in any scenario be conducted with a focus on cost effectiveness and transparency. That approach is essential to avoid distorting the level playing field and to ensure that no unfair advantages are conferred on specific market participants.
  • Preventative measures
  • To ensure that preventive measures achieve their objective, credit institutions should be required to present to the competent authority a note outlining the measures that they commit to undertake. The note should detail the credit institution’s initial capital shortfall, the capital-raising measures implemented and the safeguards put in place to prevent the outflow of funds. For the same reason, during the implementation of the measures envisaged in the note, credit institutions should also strengthen their liquidity positions and refrain from aggressive commercial practices, and from the distribution of dividends or variable remuneration or repurchasing of own shares or call hybrid capital instruments.
  • Within a reasonable timeframe, the credit institution should provide the competent authority with a business reorganisation plan to secure long-term viability. Preventive measures granted to a credit institution should be suspended where the competent authority is not satisfied that the business reorganisation plan is credible and feasible to secure long-term viability.
  • To mitigate moral hazard, where appropriate, the credit institution receiving support from DGSs in the form of preventive measures, its shareholders, its creditors or the business group to which it belongs should contribute to the restructuring from their own resources and provide adequate remuneration for the preventive measure granted by the DGS.
  • To give them sufficient time to adapt to the new provisions, in particular the safeguards for the application of preventive measures, a three-year transitional period should be granted to institutional protection systems.
links
Research document
docs/7
date
2024-04-24T00:00:00
docs
url: https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/TA-9-2024-0328_EN.html title: T9-0328/2024
type
Text adopted by Parliament, 1st reading/single reading
body
EP
events/4/summary
  • The European Parliament adopted by 385 votes to 180, with 156 abstentions, a legislative resolution on the proposal for a directive of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Directive 2014/49/EU as regards the scope of deposit protection, use of deposit guarantee schemes funds, cross-border cooperation, and transparency.
  • The proposed Directive aims to ensure uniform protection of depositors in the Union.
  • The European Parliament’s position adopted at first reading under the ordinary legislative procedure amends the proposal as follows:
  • Official recognition, participation and supervision
  • Member States should ensure that the competent authority, in cooperation with the designated authority, promptly takes all appropriate measures, including, if necessary, the imposition of penalties, to ensure that the credit institution concerned complies with its obligations as a member of a DGS. They should determine the system of penalties applicable in the event of failure by credit institutions to comply with their obligations as members of a DGS. Sanctions must be effective, proportionate and dissuasive.
  • The designated authorities should have the necessary enforcement powers, including powers to impose penalties or other administrative measures, to remedy infringements of this Directive by a DGS.
  • Eligibility of deposits
  • The following should be excluded from any reimbursement by DGSs: (i) deposits arising from transactions for which a criminal conviction has been handed down for a money laundering or terrorist financing offence; (ii) deposits made by natural or legal persons subject to targeted financial sanctions adopted by the Union.
  • Level of cover
  • To harmonise depositor protection in the Union and to reduce the administrative complexity and legal uncertainty related to the scope of protection of such deposits, it is necessary to align their protection to a minimum amount of at least EUR 500 000 and a maximum of EUR 2 500 000 for a harmonised duration of 6 months, in addition to the coverage level of EUR 100 000. After their transposition by Member States, the Commission should carry out a review of the amounts which are protected, with a view to determining whether the maximum amount should be reduced, taking into account whether the amounts which are protected are proportionate and ensure a level playing field across the Union.
  • Determining refundable amount
  • Member States should ensure that credit institutions report to their DGSs, at least annually, the aggregated amount of eligible deposits and ensure that DGSs may at any time request credit institutions to inform them about the aggregated amount of eligible deposits of every depositor.
  • Where interest rates on certain deposits significantly exceed the prevailing market interest rate, as determined and based on transparent and publicly available data, the DGS should have the power to adjust the reimbursed interest to reflect the prevailing market interest rate at the time of the determination made by the relevant administrative authority or of the ruling made by the judicial authority. That adjustment should be made to prevent moral hazard.
  • Repayments
  • DGSs should ensure that the repayable amount is available as soon as possible and in any event within seven working days . Where DGSs are not able to make the repayable amount available in less than seven working days, they should ensure that depositors have access to an appropriate amount of their covered deposits to cover the cost of living within five working days of making a request for that amount.
  • DGS funding
  • Member States should ensure that DGSs have in place adequate alternative funding arrangements to enable them to obtain short-term funding to meet claims against those DGSs. Member States should ensure that the alternative funding arrangements of DGSs are not financed through public funds. They should ensure that DGSs use the financial resources available primarily to guarantee repayments to depositors.
  • Target level
  • Member States are to ensure that by 3 July 2024, the available financial means of a DGS reach a target level of 0.8 % of the amount of the covered deposits of its members. In consideration of the expansion of scope for DGS use, the adequacy of the 0.8 % target level should be subject to close monitoring and assessment.
  • Transparency
  • It is essential that any involvement of the DGS in any scenario be conducted with a focus on cost effectiveness and transparency. That approach is essential to avoid distorting the level playing field and to ensure that no unfair advantages are conferred on specific market participants.
  • Preventative measures
  • To ensure that preventive measures achieve their objective, credit institutions should be required to present to the competent authority a note outlining the measures that they commit to undertake. The note should detail the credit institution’s initial capital shortfall, the capital-raising measures implemented and the safeguards put in place to prevent the outflow of funds. For the same reason, during the implementation of the measures envisaged in the note, credit institutions should also strengthen their liquidity positions and refrain from aggressive commercial practices, and from the distribution of dividends or variable remuneration or repurchasing of own shares or call hybrid capital instruments.
  • Within a reasonable timeframe, the credit institution should provide the competent authority with a business reorganisation plan to secure long-term viability. Preventive measures granted to a credit institution should be suspended where the competent authority is not satisfied that the business reorganisation plan is credible and feasible to secure long-term viability.
  • To mitigate moral hazard, where appropriate, the credit institution receiving support from DGSs in the form of preventive measures, its shareholders, its creditors or the business group to which it belongs should contribute to the restructuring from their own resources and provide adequate remuneration for the preventive measure granted by the DGS.
  • To give them sufficient time to adapt to the new provisions, in particular the safeguards for the application of preventive measures, a three-year transitional period should be granted to institutional protection systems.
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  • The European Parliament adopted by 385 votes to 180, with 156 abstentions, a legislative resolution on the proposal for a directive of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Directive 2014/49/EU as regards the scope of deposit protection, use of deposit guarantee schemes funds, cross-border cooperation, and transparency.
  • The proposed Directive aims to ensure uniform protection of depositors in the Union.
  • The European Parliament’s position adopted at first reading under the ordinary legislative procedure amends the proposal as follows:
  • Official recognition, participation and supervision
  • Member States should ensure that the competent authority, in cooperation with the designated authority, promptly takes all appropriate measures, including, if necessary, the imposition of penalties, to ensure that the credit institution concerned complies with its obligations as a member of a DGS. They should determine the system of penalties applicable in the event of failure by credit institutions to comply with their obligations as members of a DGS. Sanctions must be effective, proportionate and dissuasive.
  • The designated authorities should have the necessary enforcement powers, including powers to impose penalties or other administrative measures, to remedy infringements of this Directive by a DGS.
  • Eligibility of deposits
  • The following should be excluded from any reimbursement by DGSs: (i) deposits arising from transactions for which a criminal conviction has been handed down for a money laundering or terrorist financing offence; (ii) deposits made by natural or legal persons subject to targeted financial sanctions adopted by the Union.
  • Level of cover
  • To harmonise depositor protection in the Union and to reduce the administrative complexity and legal uncertainty related to the scope of protection of such deposits, it is necessary to align their protection to a minimum amount of at least EUR 500 000 and a maximum of EUR 2 500 000 for a harmonised duration of 6 months, in addition to the coverage level of EUR 100 000. After their transposition by Member States, the Commission should carry out a review of the amounts which are protected, with a view to determining whether the maximum amount should be reduced, taking into account whether the amounts which are protected are proportionate and ensure a level playing field across the Union.
  • Determining refundable amount
  • Member States should ensure that credit institutions report to their DGSs, at least annually, the aggregated amount of eligible deposits and ensure that DGSs may at any time request credit institutions to inform them about the aggregated amount of eligible deposits of every depositor.
  • Where interest rates on certain deposits significantly exceed the prevailing market interest rate, as determined and based on transparent and publicly available data, the DGS should have the power to adjust the reimbursed interest to reflect the prevailing market interest rate at the time of the determination made by the relevant administrative authority or of the ruling made by the judicial authority. That adjustment should be made to prevent moral hazard.
  • Repayments
  • DGSs should ensure that the repayable amount is available as soon as possible and in any event within seven working days . Where DGSs are not able to make the repayable amount available in less than seven working days, they should ensure that depositors have access to an appropriate amount of their covered deposits to cover the cost of living within five working days of making a request for that amount.
  • DGS funding
  • Member States should ensure that DGSs have in place adequate alternative funding arrangements to enable them to obtain short-term funding to meet claims against those DGSs. Member States should ensure that the alternative funding arrangements of DGSs are not financed through public funds. They should ensure that DGSs use the financial resources available primarily to guarantee repayments to depositors.
  • Target level
  • Member States are to ensure that by 3 July 2024, the available financial means of a DGS reach a target level of 0.8 % of the amount of the covered deposits of its members. In consideration of the expansion of scope for DGS use, the adequacy of the 0.8 % target level should be subject to close monitoring and assessment.
  • Transparency
  • It is essential that any involvement of the DGS in any scenario be conducted with a focus on cost effectiveness and transparency. That approach is essential to avoid distorting the level playing field and to ensure that no unfair advantages are conferred on specific market participants.
  • Preventative measures
  • To ensure that preventive measures achieve their objective, credit institutions should be required to present to the competent authority a note outlining the measures that they commit to undertake. The note should detail the credit institution’s initial capital shortfall, the capital-raising measures implemented and the safeguards put in place to prevent the outflow of funds. For the same reason, during the implementation of the measures envisaged in the note, credit institutions should also strengthen their liquidity positions and refrain from aggressive commercial practices, and from the distribution of dividends or variable remuneration or repurchasing of own shares or call hybrid capital instruments.
  • Within a reasonable timeframe, the credit institution should provide the competent authority with a business reorganisation plan to secure long-term viability. Preventive measures granted to a credit institution should be suspended where the competent authority is not satisfied that the business reorganisation plan is credible and feasible to secure long-term viability.
  • To mitigate moral hazard, where appropriate, the credit institution receiving support from DGSs in the form of preventive measures, its shareholders, its creditors or the business group to which it belongs should contribute to the restructuring from their own resources and provide adequate remuneration for the preventive measure granted by the DGS.
  • To give them sufficient time to adapt to the new provisions, in particular the safeguards for the application of preventive measures, a three-year transitional period should be granted to institutional protection systems.
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  • PURPOSE: to ensure uniform protection of depositors in the Union.
  • PROPOSED ACT: Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council.
  • ROLE OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT: the European Parliament decides in accordance with the ordinary legislative procedure and on an equal footing with the Council.
  • BACKGROUND: deposit guarantee schemes (DGS) reimburse a limited amount to compensate depositors whose bank has failed. A fundamental principle underlying DGS is that they are funded entirely by banks, and that no taxpayer funds are used.
  • Under existing EU rules, deposit guarantee schemes protect depositors' savings by guaranteeing deposits of up to EUR 100 000 and help prevent the mass withdrawal of deposits in the case of bank failure, which can create financial instability.
  • In accordance with Directive 2014/49/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council on deposit guarantee schemes, the Commission has reviewed the application and the scope of that Directive and concluded that the objective of protection of depositors in the Union through the establishment of deposit guarantee schemes has mostly been met. However, the Commission also concluded that there is a need to address the remaining gaps in depositor protection and to enhance the functioning of DGSs, while harmonising rules for DGSs interventions other than payout proceedings.
  • The proposed amendments to Directive 2014/49/EU (the Deposit Guarantee Schemes Directive or DGSD) are part of the crisis management and deposit insurance (CMDI) legislative package that includes also amendments to Directive 2014/59/EU (the Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive or BRRD) and Regulation (EU) No 806/2014 (the Single Resolution Mechanism Regulation or SRMR).
  • CONTENT: the aim of the proposed amendments is to build on and clarify the mandate of DGSs to better protect deposits in the context of the reimbursement of depositors.
  • More specifically, the proposal:
  • - clarifies the scope so that along with the establishment and functioning of the DGS, the coverage and repayment of deposits, and the use of DGS funds for measures to maintain the access of depositors to their deposits also fall within the scope of this Directive;
  • - harmonises the level of coverage of EUR 100 000 per depositor and bank, as set out in the Deposit Guarantee Scheme Directive and extends depositor protection to public entities (i.e. hospitals, schools, municipalities), as well as client money deposited in certain types of client funds (i.e. by investment companies, payment institutions, e-money institutions);
  • - includes measures to harmonise the protection of temporary high balances on bank accounts in excess of EUR 100 000 linked to specific life events (such as inheritance or insurance indemnities);
  • - consolidates the provisions on the exchange of information between credit institutions and DGS and reporting by authorities;
  • - harmonises the rules for the calculation of the repayable amount;
  • - allows the DGS to apply a longer period of up to 20 working days in the case of repayment of beneficiary accounts, client funds, and temporary high balances;
  • - aims to ensure that depositors, above a threshold of EUR 10 000 , are reimbursed via credit transfers in line with the AML/CFT objectives;
  • - seeks to harmonise to five years the period during which depositors can make a claim against the DGS;
  • - establishes a set of safeguards for preventive measures and allocate the responsibilities among authorities for assessing how preventive measures are applied. This aims at ensuring that the use of these measures is timely, cost-effective and applied consistently across Member States, as improvements to the current situation;
  • - establishes requirements for the credit institutions which did not comply with their commitments or fail to repay financial support granted with preventive measures. The EBA is mandated to develop guidelines on the content of the note with measures needed for the efficient implementation of a preventive measure and of the remediation plan;
  • - clarifies that the protection by DGSs also covers depositors located in Member States where their member credit institutions exercise the freedom to provide services;
  • - requires that branches of credit institutions established in third countries join a DGS in a Member State if they want to provide banking services and take eligible deposits in the EU. This enhances the protection of depositors as it eliminates the risk of having deposits in the EU whose protection by a non-EU DGS would not be up to the EU standards;
  • - seeks to harmonise information which banks have to provide to their clients annually on the protection of their deposits. It also enhances the information requirements for depositors in case of mergers or other major reorganisations of credit institutions, changes of DGS affiliation and unavailability of deposits due to the critical financial situation of banks;
  • - clarifies rules on reporting and improving the exchange of information from the credit institution to the DGSs and from the DGSs and the designated authorities to the EBA. It is also important that the EBA is appropriately informed of situations that occur and for which the DGS may intervene, to support the EBA in its tasks of overseeing the financial integrity, stability, and security of the European banking system.
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